Judith Rossebø, Principal Scientist, ABB Corporate ... · Industrial Automation and Control...

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Cyber Security in Industrial Sensor and Mobile Systems Judith Rossebø, Principal Scientist, ABB Corporate Research, 6.09.2013 © ABB Group, Judith Rossebø/Corporate Research September 20, 2013 | Slide 1

Transcript of Judith Rossebø, Principal Scientist, ABB Corporate ... · Industrial Automation and Control...

Page 1: Judith Rossebø, Principal Scientist, ABB Corporate ... · Industrial Automation and Control Systems Cyber Security – Incidents § In 2001, a former employee repeatedly hacked into

Cyber Security in Industrial Sensorand Mobile Systems

Judith Rossebø, Principal Scientist, ABB Corporate Research, 6.09.2013

© ABB Group, Judith Rossebø/Corporate ResearchSeptember 20, 2013 | Slide 1

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Wireless in Industrial Automation

© ABB Group, Judith Rossebø/Corporate ResearchSeptember 20, 2013 | Slide 2

§Oil & Gas

§Smart Cities §Ports

§Utilities/Smart Grid §Mining

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Wireless Sensor Networks for Industrial Automationand Control Systems

§ Process Monitoring

§ Condition Monitoring

§ Asset Management

© ABB Group, Judith Rossebø/Corporate ResearchSeptember 20, 2013 | Slide 3

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Wireless in Industrial Automation

© ABB Group, Judith Rossebø/Corporate ResearchSeptember 20, 2013 | Slide 4

Wireless Stds in use: IEC 62591, IEC 62601, IEC/PAS 62734, IEC 61784-1,IEEE 802.1, IEEE 802.3, IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15.1, IEEE 802.15.4, etc.

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Industrial Automation SystemsRequirements on wireless and mobile systems

§ For the sensor and actuator type of applications in industrialautomation, the main requirement is the real time behaviour:

§ Determinism for process industry.

§ Low latency and determinism for factory automation.

© ABB Group, Judith Rossebø/Corporate ResearchSeptember 20, 2013 | Slide 5

Needs for Factory and Process AutomationDeterminism Temporal certaintyShort Latency Fast responseCoexistence Management of CoexistenceRobustness Availability of transmission linkRange Extensive plants and NLOS (no line of sight)Frequ. Band 1,5 GHz … 6 GHz

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Industrial Automation and Control SystemsCyber Security – Incidents

§ In 2001, a former employee repeatedly hacked into the SCADA system that controlled aQueensland, Australia sewage treatment plant, releasing about 264,000 gallons of raw sewage intonearby rivers and parks.

§ In 2006, a foreign hacker penetrated security of a water filtering plant in Harrisburg, PA through theInternet and planted malicious software capable of affecting the plant’s water treatment operations.

§ In 2008, a teenage boy hacked into the track control system of the Lodz, Poland city tram system,derailing four vehicles, after adapting a television remote control so it could change track switches

§ In 2010 Stuxnet is reckoned to have infected Iranian computers after being copied onto USB sticksleft in locations known to be used by Iranian nuclear scientists and their contacts. It then spread intocomputer systems and took over the connected control systems, spinning centrifuges to dangerousspeeds in order to damage the systems.

© ABB Group, Judith Rossebø/Corporate ResearchSeptember 20, 2013 | Slide 6

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Electricity Grid and Smart MeteringCyber Security – Incidents

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Industrial Automation vs Enterprise ITA different set of challenges

© ABB Group, Judith Rossebø/Corporate ResearchSeptember 20, 2013 | Slide 8

Enterprise IT IndustrialAutomation

Object underprotection Information Physical process

Risk impact Information disclosure,financial loss

Safety, health,environment, financial

Main securityobjective Confidentiality, Privacy Availability, Privacy

Security focus Central Servers(fast CPU, lots of memory, …)

Distributed System(possibly limited resources)

Availabilityrequirements

95 – 99%(accept. downtime/year: 18.25 days -3.65 days)

99.9 – 99.999%(accept. downtime/year: 8.76 hrs –5.25 minutes)

Problemresponse

Reboot, patching/upgrade,isolation

Fault tolerance, onlinerepair

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Cyber Security Goals

The goals of Cyber Security are

§ Availability–avoid denial of service

§ Integrity–avoid unauthorized modification

§ Confidentiality–avoid disclosure

§ Authentication–avoid spoofing / forgery

§ Authorization–avoid unauthorized usage

§ Auditability–avoid hiding of attacks

§ Non-repudiation–avoid denial of responsibility

Cyber security has

§ Functional aspects (e.g., user authentication, firewall)

§ Quality aspects (e.g., testing, policy, defense in depth)

© ABB Group, Judith Rossebø/Corporate ResearchSeptember 20, 2013 | Slide 9

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Wireless Sensor NetworkWhat are the threats?

© ABB Group, Judith Rossebø/Corporate ResearchSeptember 20, 2013 | Slide 10

Wireless FieldDevices

Fake devicejoins thenetwork

Jamming ofthe wireless

sensor network

Manipulation ofsettings,

corruption ofapplication,corruption of

data etc.

Manipulation inGW of settingsin the wirelesssensor network

Manipulation ofdata information

(spoof, alter,replay)

Eavesdroppingon the wirelesssensor network

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Protection of Wireless Sensor NetworksThreat analysis

§ Authenticity of Communication Peers – to prevent threat of packetmanipulation, prevent malicious nodes from accessing the network

§ Confidentiality of information – to prevent an attacker from eavesdroppingon the network, monitoring the network for traffic analysis

§ Integrity of information – to prevent attackers from manipulating theinformation exchanged

§ Availability of Information – to prevent attackers from working at differentlayers to disrupt the availability of information (jamming at the physicallayer, flooding at the transport layer etc.)

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Wireless HART for Process Measurement and Control

§ Data Protection

§ Confidentiality

§ Integrity

§ Network Protection

§ Availability

§ Prevent eavesdropping

§ Secure join procedure

§ Authenticate devices

§ Encrypt messages

§ Ensure message integrity

§ Ecrypt messages

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Understanding WirelessHART Security

§ Data is valuable

§ Ensure it is not altered orread

§ Multilayer security

§ Data encryption

§ Data authentication

§ Device authentication

§ Network monitoring

© ABB Group, Judith Rossebø/Corporate ResearchSeptember 20, 2013 | Slide 13

Encryption

Data Privacy

Time Division

Replay Attack

Join Key &Encryption

Rogue Devices

Keyrotation

Message IntegrityChecking

Spoofing

Whitelisting

Spoofing

Channel Hop

Denial of Service

HealthReports

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Reliable Wireless IP networkABB Tropos Distribution Area Network

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functional requirements for security of the wirelessdistribution network

§ Availability and performance - system integrity and availability are maintainedeven under adverse conditions such as external attacks or peak loads

§ Network Access Control - strong authentication and authorizationrequirements on devices and users

§ Network resource and end-point protection - The distribution area networkneeds to be capable of protecting itself from attacks and unauthorized access

§ Secure end-to-end data transmission - must support in addition to ensuringthat there are no violations of confidentiality, privacy and data integrity

§ Traffic segmentation across application boundaries – mechanisms toeffectively segregate different classes of traffic to maintain inter-subsystemsecurity and privacy

§ Secure network configuration, operation and management - Only authorizednetwork operators must be able to alter the operation of the network elements

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ABB Tropos multi-layer security

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Conclusions

§ Wireless systems are being used more and more in industrial automation andcontrol systems. The future trend is to connect more than instruments; provide awireless backbone for everything in the plant, localization capabilities areincreasing in importance

§ Spectrum is a limited resource; the 2,4 GHz spectrum is highly suited forindustrial wireless and there different, standard-based wireless are used andcoexist in the 2,4-GHz-band for Industrial Automation

§ Security in industrial wireless systems must be addressed at different layers andrequires both protection and detection mechanisms

§ Security is not just a matter of technology, it is primarily about people,relationships, organizations and processes working in tandem to prevent anattack

§ Privacy and security concerns should not be understimated

§ Systems need to be established with security embedded across systems andwith quick and decisive responses to suspected breaches or problems

© ABB Group, Judith Rossebø/Corporate ResearchSeptember 20, 2013 | Slide 17

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