Judicial Reform in Mexico Toward a New Criminal Justice System

Trans-Border InstituteJoan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies

University of San DiegoMay 2010

Copyright: Justice in Mexico Project, 2010.

Cover art derived from Wikicommons.

Trans-Border Institute (TBI)University of San Diego5998 Alcalá Park, San Diego, CA 92103www.sandiego.edu/tbi

About the Report:

This report was prepared for the Justice in Mexico Project (www.justiceinmexico.org) coordinated by the Trans-Border Institute (TBI) at the University of San Diego. Since 2002, this project has been a focal point for research, scholarly interchange, and policy forums to examine the challenges and prospects for the rule of law in Mexico. This project is made possible by the very generous support of The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and The Tinker Foundation. This report also benefited from the support of the Smith-Richardson Foundation in a grant to TBI and Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and from the TIES Program from Higher Education for Development sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development through a grant to the University of San Diego and the Universidad Autónoma de Baja California.

Judicial Reform in MexicoToward a New Criminal Justice System

Trans-Border InstituteJoan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies

University of San Diego

May 2010

SPECIAL REPORT

By Matt Ingram and David A. Shirk

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ..................................................................................................... 1

Overview: Judicial Reform in Mexico ......................................................................... 3

Mexico’s Criminal Justice Sector Challenges ............................................................... 3

What Kind of Reform? Oral Trials, Due Process, and More ..................................... 6

1) “Oral Trials”: Changes in Mexican Criminal Procedure ...................................... 9

2) The Rights of the Accused: Guarantees for the Presumption of Innocence, Due Process,

and an Adequate Legal Defense ..................................................................................... 11

3) Police Reform: Merging Preventive and Investigative Capacity ................................... 13

4) Organized Crime: Providing New Tools to Combat Crime Syndicates .............................. 15

Implementing Judicial Reform at the Federal and State Level .............................. 16

Prospects for the New Criminal Justice System ...................................................... 19

Concluding Observations ............................................................................................. 22

Appendix: Index of State Reform Initiatives ................................................... 24

Endnotes ....................................................................................................................... 29

Works Cited ................................................................................................................... 37

Author Biographies and Acknowledgements................................................................ 42

Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Lifecycle of a Crime in Mexico .......................................................................... 4

Table 1: Legal Foundations of the Mexican Criminal Justice System .............................. 7

Figure 2: Key Steps in Mexico’s New Adversarial Criminal Procedures ........................ 10

Figure 3: State Level Implementation of Judicial Reform .......................................... 17

Executive Summary

• Mexico’s public security challenges have prompted substantial public attention to the need to reform the judicial sector: Elevatedlevelsof “common”crimeandhighprofileviolencefromorganizedcrimehavecontributedtopublicfrustrationandcallsforgreatersecurity.Duetothelackof transparencyandefficiencyinthecriminaljusticesystem,fewerthan25percentof crimesarereportedandjust1or2percentof crimesresultinasentence.

• In 2008, Mexico introduced a series of constitutional and legislative changes that will bring major changes to its criminal justice system: Mexico’s2008judicialsectorreformscomprisefourmainelements:1)changestocriminalprocedurethroughtheintroductionof neworal,adversarialprocedures,aswellasalternativesentencinganddisputeresolution;2)agreateremphasisonthedueprocessrightsof theaccused(i.e.,thepresumptionof innocenceandanadequatelegaldefense);3)modificationstopoliceagenciesandtheirroleincriminalinvestigations;and4)toughermeasuresforcombatingorganizedcrime.

• Implementing the 2008 reforms involves an array of challenges, and will require substantial resources and effort over a long period of time:Reformshavebeenimplementedinonly13of Mexico’s32states,andtherearenumeroussupplemen-tarymeasuresneededtoenhancejudicialsectorfunctioning.Somecriticstendtofearthatreformeffortsmaybetryingtodotoomuch,toofast,withtoofewresources,andwithtoolittlepreparation.Otherssaytheydon’tdoenough.

• For the reform effort to succeed, policy makers will need to develop realistic estimates of the resources needed:Currently,thereisnoestimateof thereforms’an-ticipatedfinancialcostsonwhichtobasebudgetaryallocations,butthereiswidespreadagreementthattheeffortwillrequiremassiveinvestments—ineducation,training,andsupportinginfrastructure—thathaveyettomaterialize.Policymakersmustbegintoproperlyestimateandallocateadequateresourcestoensurethesuccessof thereforms.

• To monitor progress, administrators will need to develop indicators to measure successful implementation and performance:Policymakersandcivicorganizationsworkingtoimplementthereformsmustdevelopbaselineandperformancemeasurestoproperlyevaluatetheprogress,accomplishments,andinadequaciesof reformefforts.Greatertransparencyandaccesstoinformationwillberequired,aswellasresourcesdedicatedtodatagathering,analysis,anddissemination.

• Above and beyond the recent reforms, there is a need to promote greater professionalism and accountability in the judicial sector:“Oraltrials”arenomagicbulletforMexico’sailingjudicialsystem.Thecoreproblemsof theMexicanjusticesec-torstemfromthecorruptionandweaknessof judicialinstitutions.Proceduralreformscannotbesuccessfulwithoutfurthereffortstopromotegreaterprofessionalism,trans-parency,andaccountabilityamongpolice,prosecutors,publicdefendersandjudges(e.g.,moretraining,bettervetting,moreeffectiveoversight,improvedpublicaccesstoinfor-mation,andstrongerprofessionalassociations).

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Overview: Judicial Reform in Mexico

Asstoriesof crimeandviolenceplayoutintheheadlines,Mexicoisinthemidstof amajortransformationof itsjudicialsector.Inrecentyears,Mexicohasbeengraduallyimplementingaseriesof reformsthatadvocateshopewilldramaticallyimprovepublicsecurityandtheadministrationof justiceoverthenextdecade.Centraltotheprocessof judicialreforminMexicoisapackageof ambitiousconstitutionalandstatutorychangesapprovedbytheMexicanCongressin2008,andtobeimplementedthroughoutthecountryby2016.Together,thesereformstouchvirtuallyallaspectsof thejudicialsector,includingpolice,prosecutors,publicdefenders,thecourts,andthepenitentiarysystem.ThereformsincludesignificantchangesinMexicancriminalprocedure,newmeasurestopromotegreateraccesstojustice(forbothcriminaldefendantsandcrimevictims),newfunctionsforlawenforcementandpublicsecurityagenciesintheadministrationof justice,andtoughermeasuresforcombatingorganizedcrime.

Advocatesof thereformshopethattheywillhelpMexicotoachieveamoredemocraticruleof lawbyintroducinggreatertransparency,accountability,anddueprocesstoMex-ico’sjudicialsector.However,criticsnotethatthereformsattempttoachievetoomuchintoolittletime,containblatantlycontradictoryfeatures,andfailtoaddresspersistentproblemsof institutionalizedcorruption.Meanwhile,althoughtherehasbeensubstantialattentiontoMexico’sjudicialsectorreformsamongMexicanscholarsandlegalexperts,therehasbeenremarkablylittleefforttooutlinetheseinitiativesforaU.S.audience.AsU.S.policymakersandexpertscontemplaterenewedeffortstostrengthenMexicanjudi-cialsectorinstitutions,thereisgreaturgencytounderstandwhatprogresshasbeenmadesofarinMexicanjudicialsectorreformandwhatissuesremain.Thisreporthelpstofillthegapinourcurrentunderstandingof theseproblemsbyexplainingMexico’sjusticesectorchallenges,thespecificchangesproposedunderthe2008reformpackage,andthechallengesthatlieinstoreforMexicoasitimplementsjudicialsectorreformsoverthenextdecade.

Mexico’s Criminal Justice Sector Challenges

Theweaknessesof Mexico’scriminaljusticesystemcontributetohighlevelsof criminalimpunity,poorprotectionsforindividualsaccusedof acrime,andlowpublicconfidenceinthejudicialsector.Indeed,ina2007Galluppoll,only37%of Mexicansrespondedpositivelytothequestion,“doyouhaveconfidenceinMexico’sjudicialsystem?,”while58%said“no”and4%“don’tknow.”1AccordingtoMitofsky,apollingfirm,policearerankedamongtheleastrespectedMexicaninstitutions;justoneintenMexicanshassomeormuchconfidenceinpoliceagencies.2Mexicancitizensdistrustlawenforce-mentofficialsnotonlybecauseof theperceptionthatauthoritiesareunabletosolvecrimes,butbecauseof theperception(andreality)thatthereiswidespreadcorruptionandcriminalactivityonthepartof justicesystemoperatives,mostnotablypolice.3Asaresult,victimizationsurveyssuggest,25%orfewercrimesareevenreported,makingthetrueincidenceof crimea“blackstatistic”(cifranegra).4

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Muchof theproblemhastodowiththefactthatMexico’snewdemocracyisstillintheprocessof developinga“democratic”policeforceandaprofessional,independentjudiciary.Historically,Mexicanlawenforcementagencieswereanextensionof autocraticorsemi-authoritariansystemsof control,andhavelongexhibitedsignificantproblemsof institutionalcorruption.Policeorganizationsweregenerallyabletoimposeorder,butwerealsousedasinstrumentsof patronageandpoliticalcoercion.5Mexico’stransfor-mationfromavirtualone-partystateintoamulti-partydemocracyhasbroughtsignifi-cantchangeswithregardtotheexpectationsforthenation’spublicsecurityapparatus,makingtheuseof traditionalcoercivetacticsandaccommodationof organizedcrimeunacceptable.Partlyasaresultof theirevolvingrole,policeorganizationsnotonlylackthecapacitytoadequatelyenforcethelaw,butthedegreeof accountabilitythatpro-motesgreatereffectiveness,professionalism,integrity,andadherencetodueprocess.6Inotherwords,policereformhasnotkeptpacewithMexico’sdemocraticregimechange.

Meanwhile,bymanyaccounts,theadministrationof justicethroughMexico’scourtsystemhasalsoprovedwoefullyinadequate.Asiscommontootherpartsof LatinAmerica,theproblemsfacedbyMexicanjudiciaryarelargelyattributabletothehistori-calneglect—if notoutrightsubversion—of theinstitutioninthepoliticalsystem.Duetoseveralfactorsthathindereddemocraticdevelopmentinthe19thand20thcenturies,Mexico’sjudiciaryhasbeenfarweakerthanthelegislatureand(especially)theexecutivebranch.7InMexicoandmostLatinAmericancountries,largemajoritiesexpressalackof confidenceinjudicialsectorinstitutions.8InMexico,theseconcernsowepartlytopersistentanddeeplyengrainedproblemsinthefunctioningof courtsandpenalinstitu-tions,whichsufferfromsignificantresourcelimitationsandcasebacklogs.Asaresult,onlyaboutoneinfivereportedcrimesarefullyinvestigated,andanevensmallerfractionof theseresultintrialandsentencing.Thenetresultiswidespreadcriminalimpunity,withperhapsoneortwooutof every100crimesresultinginasentence(SeeFigure1).9Forthevictimsof crimesinMexico,thereisrarelyanyjustice.

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Figure 1: Life Cycle of a Crime in Mexico

Source:GuillermoZepedaLecuona,“CriminalInvestigationandSubversionof JusticeSystemPrinciples,”inReformingtheAdministrationof JusticeinMexico,2007.Numbersroundedtonearesttenth.

Yet,therearealsoproblemsof accesstojusticeforthoseaccusedof acrime.Thosefewcasesinwhichasuspectisdetainedandbroughttotrialarehamperedbylengthy,inef-ficientcriminalproceedingsthatoftenlackanadherencetodueprocess.10Policeinves-tigatorsareoftenpoorlytrainedandinadequatelyequippedtoemploymodernforensicandinvestigativetechniquesinthecourseof acriminalproceeding.Stateandfederalinvestigativepoliceagenciesexhibitdisturbingpatternsof corruptionandabuse,includ-ingtheuseof briberyandtorture,accordingtosurveysof prisoninmates.11Meanwhile,duringthecourseof criminalproceedings,defendantsarefrequentlyheldin“pre-trialdetention,”withverylimitedaccesstobailevenwhentheoffenseisrelativelyminor.12Duringpre-trialdetentionanddespitethe“presumptionof innocence,”theaccusedarefrequentlymixedwiththegeneralprisonpopulationwhiletheyawaittrialandsentenc-ing.Becauseof lengthydelaysincriminalproceedings,manydefendantslanguishinjailformonthsoryearswithoutasentence.13

Onceasuspecthasbeenidentified,however,aguiltyverdictishighlylikely,particularlywhenasuspectispoorandthecrimeispetty.Indeed,althoughtheprobabilityof be-ingarrested,investigated,andprosecutedforacrimeisextremelylow,asmanyas85%of crimesuspectsarrestedarefoundguilty.14Recentstudiessuggestthatnearlyhalf of allprisonersinMexicoCitywereconvictedforpropertycrimesvaluedatlessthan20dollars.15Accordingtocriticsof Mexico’scriminaljusticesystem,thesepatternsareattributabletothelackof anadequatelegaldefense,andthefactthatthereisreadyacceptanceof theprosecutor’spre-trialinvestigationsasevidenceattrial.Also,inthiscontext,asuspect’sguiltypleaisoftenthesolecauseforindictmentandconviction,andadisturbinglyhighproportionof torturecasesinMexicoinvolvesforcedconfessions.16Meanwhile,armedwithsuperiorresources,accesstoevidence,andproceduraladvan-tages,publicprosecutorsareoftenabletoeasilyoverpowerthemeagerlegaldefenseavailabletomostaccusedcriminals.Additionally,facedwithoverwhelmingcaseloads,thejudgethatrulesonpreliminaryhearingsisthesamejudgeattrialandsentencing,andfrequentlydelegatesmatters—includingcourtappearances—tocourtroomclerks.Asaresult,manyinmatesreportthattheyneverevenhadachancetoappearbeforethejudgewhosentencedthem.

Onceinprison—whetherforpre-trialdetentionorfinalsentencing—inmatestypicallyencounterseverelyovercrowdedfacilities,inadequateaccesstobasicamenities,corruptandabusiveprisonguards,violenceandintimidationfromotherinmates,andongoingcriminalbehavior(includingrampantdruguse).17Accordingtoofficialstatistics,onaverageMexicanprisonsareovercrowdedbymorethan30%abovecapacityin2009,andwithcontinuouslygrowingpopulations.18Inrecentyears,theseconditionsfoundinMexicanprisonshavecontributedtoseriousproblemswithriotingandescapes.19Suchconditionsillustratetheinadequacyof Mexico’scurrentpenalsystem—andperhapstheuseof incarcerationingeneral—asameansof promotingtherehabilitationof convict-edcriminals,thevastmajorityof whomwilleventuallybereleasedbackintosociety.20

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Inshort,theoverallpictureisonewherethe“un-ruleof law”prevailsandthereisaseverelackof accesstojustice,particularlyfortheindigent.21ForMexicoandotherLatinAmericancountriesthathaveundergonedemocratictransitionsinrecentdecades,achievingtheruleof lawpresentsamajortestof regimeperformance,sinceperceptionsof thejudicialsystemappeartobepositivelycorrelatedwithsupportfordemocraticgovernance.22InMexico,concernsaboutthecountry’son-goingpublicsecuritycrisishaveledauthoritiestointroducemajorchangeswiththegoalof modernizingthena-tion’slawenforcementagenciesandempoweringthejudiciary.Whethertheyaresuccess-fulmayhaveimportantimplicationsforoverallsupportfordemocraticgovernance,andsignificantlyshapethedecisionsof theMexicanelectorateinthecomingyears.Tobetterevaluatethechallengesthatreformersface,thecontoursof thecountry’scriminaljusticesystemandthenatureof recentreforminitiativesareconsideredinmoredetailbelow.

What Kind of Reform? Oral Trials, Due Process, and More

Thelegalfoundationsof theMexicancriminaljusticesystemarefoundinthecountry’spost-independenceconstitutions,aswellasbothfederalandstateadministrativelaws,criminalcodes,andcriminalprocedurelaws(SeeTable1).Generallyspeaking,thesefoundationsplacedMexicowithinthecivillawtradition,whichtypicallyreliesonaninquisitorialmodelof criminalprocedurewhereaninstructionaljudgeactivelyleadstheinvestigationandprocessof determiningasuspect’sguiltorinnocence.Thatsaid,itisimportanttorecognizethatthereisenormousvariationintheapplicationof inquisito-rialcriminalproceduresaroundtheworld.Indeed,Mexicohasdevelopedahighlyuniquelegaltraditionthatmixeselementsof differentsystemsandincludesseveraluniquefeatures,suchastheamparo,aspecialinjunctionor“writof protection”introducedinthe19thCentury.23

Theadventof anewrevolutionaryconstitutionin1917broughtsignificantmodifica-tionstoMexico’scriminaljusticesystem,andneweffortstoreformthecountry’scrimi-nalcodesoverthenextdecadeandahalf.24First,thenewconstitutioneliminatedtheMinistryof Justiceand,importantly,thefigureof theinstructionaljudge;asdiscussedbelowinmoredetail,thisplacedprosecutorsinamorecentralroleintheinvestigationandprosecutionof crimes,amovethatsetMexicosignificantlyapartfromotherin-quisitorialsystems.Second,anewfederalcriminal(orpenal)code—outliningboththeprinciplesof Mexicancriminallaw,andspecificcrimesandpunishments—wasenactedin1931,andhasremainedtheprimarybasisof Mexicancriminallawthroughoutmostof thepost-revolutionaryperiod.ThisFederalCriminalCode(CódigoFederalPenal,CFP)establishesthebasisof criminallaw,whiletherulesforcriminalproceedingsarecontainedintheFederalCodeof CriminalProcedure(CódigoFederaldeProcedimien-tosPenales,CFPP)originatingin1934.TheCFPandCFPPgenerallysettheexampleforstate-levelcriminalcodesandprocedures,thoughthereissignificantvariationacrossdifferentstates(particularlywithregardtocriminalcodes).

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Source Origins and Evolution Key Provisions

Mexican Constitution (Constitution de la República Mexicana)

•1917:reformulationof theLib-eral,rights-based1857Constitu-tion,withtheincorporationof keyMexicanrevolutionaryprinciplespromotingsocialjustice,municipalautonomy,andprohibitionsonre-election

•Articles14,16,and18-23:individualguarantees•Articles94-107:roleandfunctionof thefederaljudiciary•Article102:roleof thefederalattorneygeneral,orMinisterioPúblicoFederal)•Article122:theroleof thepublicprosecutorintheFederalDistrict.•Article103,107:therighttoalegalinjunction(amparo)

Organic Law of the Federal Judicial Power (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial de la Federación, LOPJF)

•1908,1917,1928,1934,1935:LOPJFcontainedmodificationstoroleof publicprosecutor.•1995:newLOPJFwithprovi-sionsforjudicialreviewandvettingof judiciary,andlastmodifiedinJanuary2009

•Elevenseparatetitlesand251articlesestablishthegeneralregulationsforfederalcourtsystemincludingtheSupremeCourt,FederalJuridicalCounsel,CircuitCourts,DistrictCourts,andFed-eralElectoralTribunal•Rulesonjurisdictionandtransfercasesfromlowercourts(attracción),professionaladvance-ment,anduseof juries.

Organic Law of the Fed-eral Attorney General (Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, LOPGR)

•1908and1919:Organiclawses-tablishedtoregulateFederalPublicProsecutor•1917:Article21of Constitu-tionoutlinesfunctionsof publicprosecutors•1983:LOPGRestablishesFed-eralAttorneyGeneral’soffice

•Seriesof regulatorylawsandmodificationstotheLOMPFin1941and1955andtheLOPGRin1984,1985,1987,1988,1993,and1996progres-sivelystrengthenedprosecutorialautonomyandrestructuredfederallawenforcementagenciesinMexico.

Federal Criminal Code (Có-digo Penal Federal, CPF)

•1835:firstMexicancriminalcodeadoptedinVeracruz;•1860s:EmperorMaximilianadoptsFrenchcriminalcode;1871:JuárezadoptsCPF(followingSpanishmodel)•1931:Post-revolutionarygovern-mentadoptsnewCPF•2008:Judicialreformsignificant-lymodifiesCPF

•VolumeIof theCPFoutlinesgeneralprinciplesof criminallaw(whatconstitutesacrime,typesof criminaloffenders,andprinciplesof punishment).•VolumeIIof theCPFdealswithspecificcrimesandtheirpunishments.

Federal Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Federal de Procedimientos Penales, CFPP)

•1934:post-revolutionarygovern-mentenactsnewCFPP•2009:MostrecentmodificationtoCFPP•Furthermodificationsarepend-ingreviewbytheMexicanSupremeCourttoadaptfederalcriminalproceduretothe2008judicialreforms.

•Thirteentitlesand576articlesregardingjuris-diction;searchandseizure;courtappearances;pre-trialproceedings;criminalactions;probableresponsibility;presentationof evidence;conclud-ingarguments;acquittalsandjudgments;post-trialphase;rehabilitation;specialcases(mentalillness,juvenileoffenders,drugaddiction).

State Organic Laws, Crimi-nal Codes, and Criminal Procedural Codes

•31statecodes•FederalDistrictcodes

•Whilethereisconsiderablevariation,statelawsandcodesgenerallyadheretostandardsestablishedatthefederallevel.

Table 1: Legal Foundations of the Mexican Criminal Justice System

Overthelasttwodecades,aseriesof reformstotheabovestructureshavebeenimple-mentedinMexico,withsubstantialimplicationsforthecriminaljusticesystemanddemocraticgovernanceoverall.The1980sbroughtthedismantlingof thenation’sfederalpoliceagency,aswellasnewstructuresforcoordinatingnationalsecuritypolicy,underPresidentMigueldelaMadrid(1982-88).25InDecember1994,underPresidentErnestoZedillo(1994-2000),thefederalgovernmentrestructuredthenationalpublicsecuritysystemandreformedthejudiciarytopromotehigherprofessionalstandards,26strongerpowersof judicialreview,27newstandardsforjudicialprecedent,28andgreaterjudicialindependence.29InNovember1996,theZedilloadministrationalsointroducedtheFederalOrganizedCrimeLaw(LeyFederaldeDelincuenciaOrganizada,LFDO)toaddresstheproliferationof organizedcrimesyndicatesinrecentdecades.

Arguably,themostsubstantialeffortstopromotejudicialsectorreforminrecentde-cadesbeganduringtheadministrationof VicenteFox(2000-2006),thefirstpresidentoriginatingfromtheNationalActionParty(PartidoAcciónNacional,PAN),asociallyconservative,pro-businesspartyfoundedin1939.InApril2004,theFoxadministrationproposedaseriesof constitutionalandlegislativechangestomodernizeMexico’scrimi-naljusticesystem.30The2004proposalpressedforacomprehensivereformof includ-ing,amongothermajorchanges,ashifttomodifyMexico’suniquevariationof thein-quisitorialsystembyfurtherincorporatingelementsof theadversarialmodel.AlthoughtheFoxadministrationwasabletopasssignificantreformstothejuvenilejusticesystemin2003,the2004justicereformpackagemetsignificantresistanceandultimatelystalledinthelegislature.31Despitefailingtowincongressionalapproval,theFoxadministra-tion’sproposaltriggeredanationaldebateonthemeritsof amajorjudicialreform,andalsosignaledfederalapprovaltoMexicanstatesworkingtoimplementsimilarreformsatthesub-nationallevel.32Thestatesof NuevoLeón,Chihuahua,andOaxacawereamongtheearliestadoptersof newadversarialproceduresandotherinnovations.33

Theperceptionthatthesestate-levelreformscontributedtogreaterjudicialefficiencyandtransparencyhelpedbuildsupportfortheadoptionof federalleveljudicialreformsbytheMexicanCongressin2008,duringtheadministrationof PANPresidentFelipeCalderón(2006-2012).ThereformpackagewasbasedprimarilyonabillpassedintheChamberof Deputies,withsomesignificantmodificationsintroducedintheSenateinDecember2007.34ThereformsweredebatedinCongressforoverayear.Theybenefitedfromwidespreadsupportamongjurists,academics,andhumanrightsadvocatesfavor-ingagreateremphasisondueprocessprotections.35Levelsof violencefromorganizedcrime,whichtooksharpupswingsin2007andespeciallyearly2008,alsolentasenseof urgencytoimprovethejusticesector.Inthiscontext,thepackagewasfinallyapprovedonMarch6,2008withbroad,multi-partysupport.Itpassedwith462votesoutof 468federaldeputiesinthe500-memberChamberof Deputies,andwitha71-25voteinthe128-memberSenate.34Becausethereformpackageincludedconstitutionalamend-ments—includingrevisionstotenarticles(16-22,73,115,and123)—theapprovalof amajorityof Mexico’s32statelegislatureswasrequired.Afterjustthreemonths,thereformswereapprovedatthestatelevelandbroughtintoeffectwiththepublicationof

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thefederalgovernment’sofficialbulletin,theDiarioOficial,onJune18,2008.

The2008reformpackagecomprisedfourmainelements:1)changestocriminalproce-durethroughtheintroductionof neworal,adversarialprocedures,alternativesentenc-ing,andalternativedisputeresolution(ADR)mechanisms;2)agreateremphasisontherightsof theaccused(i.e.,thepresumptionof innocence,dueprocess,andanadequatelegaldefense);3)modificationstopoliceagenciesandtheirroleincriminalinvestiga-tions;and4)toughermeasuresforcombatingorganizedcrime.Eachof theseelementsisexploredinmoredetailbelow.

1) “Oral Trials”: Changes in Mexican Criminal Procedure

Arguably,themostheraldedaspectof the2008reformsistheintroductionof “oraltrials,”withlivepublicproceedingstobeheldinopencourt.However,popularempha-sisonthenoveltyof “oral”trialproceduresissomewhatmisleadingfortworeasons.37First,Mexicancriminalcourtshavetraditionallyreliedontheuseof oraltestimony,presentationof evidence,andargumentation,inatleastsomefashion.38Therefore,amoreappropriateaspectof thereformtoemphasizeisthelargertransitionfromMexico’suniqueinquisitorialmodelof criminalproceduretoanadversarialmodelthatdrawselementsfromtheUnitedStates,Germany,Chile,andothercountries.Asecondreasonthattheemphasison“orality”issomewhatover-playedisthat,withthetransitiontoadversarialtrialproceedings,liveoraltrialswillbeusedinonlyasmallfractionof thecriminalcasesmanagedbyMexicancourts.Thisisbecausethereforminvolvesotherchanges,notablytheexpandeduseof ADRsandalternativesentencing(suchas“plea-bargaining,”orjuicioabreviado).Theseproceduraloptionsareintendedtohelpreducetheoverallnumberof caseshandledincourt.Bypromotingvariousalternativestopris-on(suchasmediation,communityservice,reparationstovictims,etc.),thereformsareintendedtoachievegreaterefficiencyandrestorativejustice(justiciarestaurativa).Sinceamajorityof criminalcaseswillberesolvedwithoutevergettingtotrial,thiswillpresum-ablyrelieveconjestioninthecourtsandcontributetoamoreefficientjudicialprocess.

Itshouldbepointedoutthat,contrarytoconventionalwisdom,Mexicodoesnothaveatrueinquisitorialsystem,inwhichthejudgeplaysaleadingroleasthe“inquisitor”overseeingtheinvestigationandprosecutionof acriminalcase.Insteadof aninstruc-tionaljudge(juezdeinstrucción),whowoulddirectlyleadtheinvestigationina“typical”inquisitorialsystem,thepublicprosecutor(ministeriopúblico)playsacentralroleandhasarelativelyhighdegreeof autonomyinMexico’scriminalproceedings.Thissignifi-cantdeparturefromtypicalinquisitorialsystemsdatesbacktotheearly20thcentury,andmakesMexico’ssystemsomewhatmoresimilartotheU.S.systemthanmanymayrealize.39Prosecutorialindependenceisespeciallynotableduringthepreliminaryinquiry(averiguaciónprevia),inwhichasuspectisinvestigatedandformallyindictedforacrime.Thishybridor“mixed”modelhassomeimportantliabilities.Indeed,criticschargethatthepowerandautonomyof thepublicprosecutorduringthepreliminaryinquirycon-tributestoabusessuchasforcedconfessionsandmishandlingof evidence.40

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Underthe2008reforms,Mexicowillfurthermodifyitssystembyadoptingelementsof theadversarialmodel,whichistypicallyassociatedwithcommonlawsystemsliketheUnitedStatesortheUnitedKingdom.Oneof theprimarycharacteristicsof adver-sarialsystemsisthatthejudgefunctionsasanimpartialmediatorbetweentwoopposing“adversaries”—theprosecutionandthedefense—astheypresentcompetingevidenceandargumentsinopencourt.Indeed,thedefensecounselgenerallyhasamoreactiveroleinrepresentingthedefendantthroughoutthecriminalproceedings,andinpresent-ingevidenceandargumentsincourt.41Thislendstocertainperceivedadvantagesanddisadvantagesof adversarialsystems.Amongtheadvantagesarethechecksandbalancesbuiltintothecriminalproceeding,aswellasbothefficiencyandtransparencyinthepresentationof evidenceincourt.However,adversarialsystemsalsoplaceatleastoneof theadversariesintheuncomfortablepositionof activelyadvocatingforthe“wrong”side,andsometimeswinning.42

Underthereformsapprovedin2008,theMexicanfederalgovernment,andeventuallyallstategovernments,willadoptmanyaspectsof theadversarialmodeloverthecom-ingyears.Thisshiftimpliesmanysignificantchangestotherolesof keyplayersandthelegalstructuresthatregulatethecriminaljusticesystem(SeeFigure2).Theimplicationsforcriminallegalprocedureincludeamoreabbreviatedandlessformalizedpreliminaryinvestigativephase,andagreaterrelianceonpresentationof testimonyandevidenceduringlive,publictrialsthatarerecordedforsubsequentrevieworappeal.43There-formsalsoincludeseveraladditionalinnovations.Someof these,suchasthearraigo,arediscussedbelow.Othersareintendedtopromoteamoreefficientdivisionof labor,re-lievecongestionandcasebacklogs,andprovidegreaterchecksandbalancesthroughouttheprocess.Allof thesechangeswillhavesignificantimplicationsforeachof themajor

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Figure 2: Key Steps in Mexico’s New Adversarial Criminal Procedures

FigurepreparedwithassistancefromNicoleRamos.

playersinMexicanlawenforcementandadministrationof justice:thedefendant,police,judges,prosecutors,defenseattorneys,andthevictim.

First,inkeepingwiththedesignof theadversarialmodel,Mexicanjudgeswillnowplaymoreof amoderatingroleduringthetrialphase,whileprosecutorsanddefensecounsel-orspresentargumentsandevidenceinlive,recorded,oralhearings.Anequallyimportantinnovationisthatthereformsalsocreatespecialjudgeshipsfordifferentphasesof thecriminalproceedings,ostensiblypromotinganefficientdivisionof laborandfewercon-flictsof interest.Adueprocessjudge,orjuezdegarantía,willpresideoverthepre-trialphase(investigation,preliminaryhearing,indictment,andplea-bargaining).Asentenc-ingjudge,orjuezdesentencia(alsocalledtheoraltrialjudge,or“juezdejuciooral”)willpresideoverthetrialphase,aswellasthepresentationof oralargumentsandthefinalverdict.Asentenceimplementationjudge(juezdeejecucióndesentencia)willbechargedwithensuringthatsentencesareproperlyappliedandthetermsof agreementforrestorativejustice(e.g.,repaymentof damages)arefulfilled.44Asdiscussedingreaterdetailbelow,thecreationof thenewdueprocessjudgeisprimarilyintendedtoensuredueprocesspriortothetrialphase.

Meanwhile,thepublicprosecutor(ministeriopúblico)willlosesomeof thetraditionalpowervestedinthatoffice.Withtheintroductionof “probablecause”asabasisforcriminalindictment,thepreliminaryinvestigation(averiguaciónprevia)isnolongerascentraltotheprocess.Thismeansthattheroleof thepublicprosecutorislessdecisiveindeterminingtheprobableguiltof theaccused(probableresponsible),butalsothatthepublicprosecutorhasalowerthresholdtoinitiateachargeorarrest(Article19,Paragraph1).Thepublicprosecutorwillstillhavesubstantialdiscretionaboutwhetherornottoseekprosecution,underaprovisionknownas“theprincipleof opportunity”(principiodeoportunidad)whichallowstheprosecutortostrategicallyweighhisorherdecisionagainsttheresourcelimitationsandprioritiesof lawenforcement.

Onepossibleconcern,however,isthatprosecutorswillneglecttotakeacaseforpoliti-cal,personal,orotherreasons.HenceunderArticle20,SectionCof theMexicanCon-stitution,thereformsalsoallowcrimevictimstofileacriminalmotionbeforeajudgeincertaincases,withthegoalof creatingpressureonpublicprosecutorstoinvestigateimportantcases.Thereformsalsoincludeprivacyprotectionstoconcealtheidentityof thevictim,plaintiff,andwitnesses.Inaddition,thereformsmandateasystemof repa-rationsforharmsresultingfromthecrime,includinganemphasisontherestitutionorrestorationof damages(reparacióndedaño),thetermsof whichcanbedeterminedbythedueprocessjudgethroughmediationorothersolutions.

2) The Rights of the Accused: Guarantees for the Presumption of Innocence, Due Process, and an Adequate Legal Defense

Alsoincludedinthe2008reformsarestrongerconstitutionalprotectionsforthepre-sumptionof innocence,amoresubstantialroleforjudgesindistinctphasesof thecriminalproceeding(includingarequirementthatthejudgemustbephysicallypresent

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duringallhearingsinvolvingthedefendant),specificprovisionsbanningtheuseof torture,newmeasurestoprovideaqualitylegaldefensefortheaccused,andotherproceduralsafe-guardsintendedtobolsterdueprocess.Thisnewemphasisontheprotectionsfortherightsof theaccusedisfrequentlydescribed—bothbyproponentsandcritics—asa“systemof guarantees”orasistemagarantista.45

First,aspartof thepresumptionof innocence,the2008reformsseektolimittheuseof preventativedetention,or“pre-trial”detention.Inrecentyears,becauseof casebacklogsandinefficiencies,morethan40%of Mexico’sprisonpopulation(some90,000prisoners)hasconsistedof prisonerswaitinginjailforafinalverdict.46Manysuspectsaredetainedevenwhenchargedwithrelativelyminoroffenses,suchasshopliftingoranautomobileac-cident.47Moreover,pre-trialdetaineesarefrequentlymixedwiththegeneralprisonpopu-lation,andinmanyinstancestheircasesarenotadjudicatedforexceedinglylongperiodsof time.Underthenewreforms,pre-trialdetentionareintendedtoapplyonlyincasesof violentorseriouscrimes,andforsuspectswhoareconsideredaflightriskoradangertosociety.Also,thenewreformsrequirethoseheldinpre-trialdetentiontobehousedinsepa-rateprisonfacilities(awayfromconvictedcriminals),andtobeheldonlyforamaximumof twoyearswithoutasentence.

Second,asnotedearlier,the2008reformscreatedanewdueprocessjudge(thejuezdegarantíaorjuezdecontrol),whoseroleistoensurethatacriminalcasemovesforwardproperlyduringitsinvestigation,preliminaryhearing,andindictment.Thedueprocessjudgeisresponsiblefordeterminingwhetherasuspect’srightsshouldbelimitedduringthetrialphase(e.g.,pre-trialdetention,housearrest,restrainingorder)orwhethertheyshouldbereleasedonbailorontheirownrecognizanceuntilaguiltyverdicthasbeendelivered.Thedueprocessjudgewillalsoissuethefinalsentenceincaseswherethedefendantacceptsapleabargain(juicioabreviado),inwhichallpartiesacceptthattheaccusedwillreceivealessersentenceinexchangeforaguiltyplea.Thedueprocessjudgewillalsooverseeotheralternativedisputeresolutionprocesses,suchastheuseof mediation.

Anotherimportantchangeincludedinthenewreformsistheemphasisonthephysicalpresenceof thejudgeduringallhearingsinvolvingthedefendant.UnderMexico’stradi-tionalsystem,criminalproceedingsdonottakeplaceprimarilyduringliveaudiencesinacondensedtimeframe,andhearingsaresometimesconductedbycourtclerkswithoutthepresenceof theactualjudge.Theresultisthatmanycriminaldefendantsattestthattheyneverhaddirectinteractionwiththejudgewhohandledtheircase.Indeed,insurveyswithMexicaninmates,AzaolaandBergman(2009)reportthat80%of inmatesinterviewedintheFederalDistrictandtheStateof Mexicowerenotabletospeaktothejudgewhotriedtheircase.48Withtheshifttoanemphasisonthephysicalpresenceof thejudgethroughoutthecriminalproceeding,crimesuspectsandtheirlegaldefensecounselwillpresumablyhaveagreaterabilitytomakedirectappealstotheindividualwhowilldecidetheircase.

Third,thereformsalsoincludespecificprovisions,underArticle20of theMexicanConsti-tution,admonishingagainsttheuseof torture.Inresponsetotheaforementionedproblems

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of torture-basedconfessionsintheMexicancriminaljusticesystem,thereformsmakeitunlawfultopresentasuspect’sconfessionasevidenceincourt(unlessobtainedinthepresenceof thesuspect’sdefenseattorney).Intheory,thismeansthattheprosecutorwillhavetorelyonotherevidencetoobtainaconviction,andtherebyconductmorethor-oughinvestigations.Thisalsomeansthattheaccusedwilltheoreticallyhavethebenefitof goodlegalcounselandamoreinformedunderstandingof theconsequencespriortoimplicatingthemselvesinacrime.

Finally,withregardtotherightsof theaccused,thereformsaimtostrengthenandraisethebarforasuspect’sdefensecounsel.Allcriminaldefendantswillberequiredtohaveprofessionallegalrepresentation.Underthereforms,anythirdpartyservingasthedefensecounselfortheaccusedmustbealawyer,achangefromthepriorsystem,whichallowedanytrustedperson(personadeconfianza)torepresenttheaccused.Also,underconstitutionalamendmentstoArticle17,thereformrequiresthattherebeastrongsys-temof publicdefenderstoprotecttherightsof thepoorandindigent.Thisprovisionisextremelyimportant,giventhatthevastmajorityof defendantsrelyonapublicdefender(defensordeoficio).Indeed,thesameprisonersurveynotedabovefoundthat75%of inmateswererepresentedbyapublicdefender,and60%of theseswitchedfromtheirfirstpublicdefenderbecauseof theattorney’sperceivedindifference.49

3) Police Reform: Merging Preventive and Investigative Capacity

Themaincriticismsof theMexicancriminaljusticesystemresidelesswithjudgesandcourtroomprocedurethanwithlawenforcement,particularlyprosecutors(ministeriospúblicos)andpoliceofficers.50Whilemostattentiontothe2008judicialreformshasfocusedontheshiftincourtroomprocedures,equallyimportantchangesareinstoreforpoliceinvestigationsandlawenforcementagencies.Specifically,thereformsaimtowardagreaterintegrationof policeintotheadministrationof justice.UnderMexico’stradi-tionalsystem,mostpolicewereostensiblydedicatedtopreventivefunctions,and—asidefromdetainingindividualsinflagrantedelicto—notconsideredcentraltotheworkof prosecutorsandjudges.Underthenewsystem,policewillneedtodevelopthecapacityandskillstoprotectandgatherevidencetohelpprosecutors,judges,andevendefenseattorneysdeterminethefactsof acaseandensurethatjusticeisdone.Aspolicebecomemoreinvolvedincriminalinvestigationsandlegalproceedings,itisessentialandurgentthattheybeadequatelypreparedtocarryouttheseresponsibilitiesproperly.UnderMex-ico’s2008reforms,theConstitution(Article21,Paragraphs1-10)underscorestheneedtomodernizeMexicanpoliceforces,whicharenowexpectedtodemonstrategreaterprofessionalism,objectivity,andrespectforhumanrights.Whilethereformsprovideaneight-yearperiodforthetransitiontothenewadversarialsystem,manyof thereformsaffectingpolicehavealreadyenteredintoeffect.

Themostsignificantchangeisthatthereformsstrengthentheformalinvestigativecapacityof policetogatherevidenceandinvestigatecriminalactivity,incollaboration

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withthepublicprosecutor,orministeriopúblico.Forexample,underreformstoArticle21,Paragraph1of theMexicanConstitution,alongwithpublicprosecutorsandinves-tigators,policewillnowshareresponsibilityfortheprotectionof thecrimesceneandthegatheringof evidence.Thisissignificantbecause,untilrecently,asmanyas75%of Mexico’smorethan400,000policelackedinvestigativecapacity,weredeployedprimarilyforpatrolandcrimeprevention,andwerelargelyabsolvedof responsibilitiestopro-tectorgatherevidence.Giventhatevidencecollectedbythereportingofficerisoftenaprimarytoolfortheprosecutioninothercriminaljusticesystems,thelimitedcapacityof Mexicanpoliceinthisregardseriouslylimitsandsometimeseveninterfereswiththesuccessfulresolutionof criminalcases.

The2008reformsnowopenthedoortogreaterpoliceparticipationincriminalinves-tigations,andeventhereorganizationof policeagenciestofacilitatemoreeffectivepoliceinvestigations.51Atthefederallevel,thankstosupportinglegislationpassedinMay2009,theAttorneyGeneral’sOffice(ProcuraduríaGeneraldelaRepública,PGR)andtheSecretaryof PublicSecurity(SecretaríadeSeguridadPública,SSP)reorganizedtheirrespectivepoliceagencies.UndertheFederalAttorneyGeneralLaw(LeyOrgánicadelaProcuradoraGeneraldelaRepública),thePGReffectivelydissolvedtheFederalAgencyof Investigations(AgenciaFederaldeInvestigaciones,AFI)andcreatedthenewFederalMinisterialPolice(PolicíaFederalMinisterial,PFM).52Agentsof theAttorneyGeneral’spoliceforceswillnowhavegreaterpowerstoinvestigatecrimes.Forexample,thereformsexpandtheabilityof theAssistantAttorneyGeneralforSpecialInvestiga-tionof OrganizedCrime(SubprocuradordeInvestigaciónEspecializadadeDelincuen-ciaOrganizada,SIEDO)toassumeresponsibilityforcrimesthatarenormallyreservedforlocaljurisdiction(fuerocomun).Thisprocedure,knownas“attraction”(atracción),willostensiblyenable—andpresumablycompel—thefederalgovernmenttotakeonagreaterroleintheinvestigationof severecrimesthatarebeyondthecapacityof stateandlocallawenforcement.

Evenmoresignificant,the2008reformsallowforablendingof crimepreventionandinvestigativefunctionsthatwereformerlyperformedbyseparatelawenforcementagencies:thepreventivepoliceandtheinvestigativepolice.Undersupportinglegisla-tionforthesereforms,namelythe2009FederalPoliceLaw(LeydelaPolicíaFederal),theSSPreplaceditsFederalPreventivePolice(PolicíaFederalPreventiva,PFP),creatingthenewFederalPolice(PolicíaFederal).ThenewlaweffectivelybestowsinvestigativepowersuponwhatwaspreviouslytheFederalPreventivePolice(PFP),whichformerlycarriedoutastrictlypreventivefunction.Underthenewlaw,FederalPoliceofficerswillbeabletocollaboratewiththePGRonitsinvestigations,thoughitisnotyetclearwhatprotocolswillbeultimatelydevelopedtomanagethiscoordination.Othernewfunc-tionsincludesecuringcrimescenes,executingarrestorders,andprocessingevidence,allformerlyfunctionsof theAFI.FederalPoliceagentsalsonowhaveauthorizationtooperateundercovertoinfiltratecriminalorganizations.

Aseparateaspectof the2008reformsthatisintendedtopromotepoliceprofessional-ismhasmixedimplications.Underthereforms,policearenowsubjecttospeciallabor

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provisionsthatgiveadministratorsgreaterdiscretiontodismisslawenforcementpersonnel.Spe-cifically,Article123allowsauthoritiestodismisspolicemoreeasily,weakeningtheirlaborrightsprotections.Whilethisamendmentisintendedtoensurethatadministratorscanexpeditiouslyremoveineffectiveorcorruptofficers,Zepeda(2008)notesthatitcouldhavetheunintendedeffectof furtherunderminingcivilserviceprotectionsthathelptoensureanofficer’sprofes-sionaldevelopmentandprotecthimfromunduepressureorpersecution.53Policealreadyfaceunpredictablecareeradvancementanddeplorableworkingconditions,accordingtotheJusticeinMexicoProject’s2009Justiciabarómetrosurveyof morethan5,400municipalpoliceinthemetro-areaof Guadalajara,Mexico’ssecondlargestcity.54Thatsurveyfoundthatnearly70%of officersfeelthatpromotionsarenotbasedonmerit,andmost(60%)thinkthatpersonalcon-nectionsdriveone’scareeradvancementontheforce.If thatisindeedthecase,thenewreformswilllikelymakepoliceofficersevenmoredependentonthewhimsof theirsuperiors.

Intheend,themostimportantimpactof the2008reformsonlawenforcementmaybethechecksandbalancesthatwillresultfromstrongerdueprocessprotectionsfortheaccused.If reformadvocates’predictionsholdtrue,theshifttoadversarialprocedureswillraisethestan-dardsforinvestigationandprosecution,asastrongerlegaldefensecreatesgreaterpressureonpoliceandprosecutorstofollowproperprocedureandbuildthestrongestpossiblecaseagainstaparticularcrimesuspect.

4)OrganizedCrime:ProvidingNewToolstoCombatCrimeSyndicates

Finally,the2008reformsalsosignificantlytargetorganizedcrime,definedinaccordancewiththeUnitedNationsConventionAgainstOrganizedCrime,signedinPalermo,Italyin2000.Thatconventionbroadlydefinesanorganizedcrimesyndicateas“astructuredgroupof threeormorepersons,existingforaperiodof timeandactinginconcertwiththeaimof commit-tingoneormoreseriouscrimesoroffences[withamaximumsentenceof fourormoreyearsinprison]…inordertoobtain,directlyorindirectly,afinancialorothermaterialbenefit.”

Incasesinvolvingorganizedcrime,theMexicanconstitutionhasnowbeenamendedtoallowforthesequesteringof suspectsunder“arraigo”(literally,to“root”someone,i.e.,toholdfirmly)forupto40dayswithoutcriminalcharges(withpossibleextensionof anadditional40days,uptoatotalof 80days).55Underarraigo,prisonersmaybeheldinsolitaryconfinementandplacedunderarrestinspecialdetentioncenterscreatedexplicitlyforthispurpose.Furthermore,inordertofacilitateextradition,thereformsalsoallowforthesuspensionof judicialproceed-ingsincriminalcases.Prosecutorsmayusethe40dayperiodtoquestionthesuspectandobtainevidencetobuildacaseforprosecution.Becauseformalchargeshavenotbeenlevied,theyarenotentitledtolegalrepresentationandtheyarenoteligibletoreceivecreditfortimeservedif convicted.56

Inadditiontospecialmechanismsforthedetentionof organizedcrimesuspects,the2008reformsalsopavedthewayfornewusesof wiretappingandothertoolsforfightingorganizedcrime.Also,followingfromthe2008reforms,newsupportinglegislationonassetforfeiture(ex-tincióndedominio)waspassedin2009todefinethetermsforseizingpropertyincasesrelated

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todrugtrafficking,humantrafficking,andautotheft.57Underthenewlaw,theFederalAttorneyGeneral’sofficehasdiscretiontodeterminewhenaparticularsuspectisinvolvedinorganizedcrime,andwhetherornotassetsrelatedtothosecrimesareeligibleforforfeiture.58

Implementing Judicial Reform at the Federal and State Level

Thescopeandscaleof changecontemplatedunderthe2008judicialreformsisenormous.Ex-istinglegalcodesandproceduresneedtobesignificantlyrevisedatthefederalandstatelevel;traditionalcourtfacilitiesneedtoberemodeledandoutfittedwithvideo-recordingequipment;judges,courtpersonnel,andlawyersneedtoberetrained;policeneedtobeprofessionalizedandpreparedtoassistwithcriminalinvestigations;victimandwitnessassistanceprogramsneedtobedeveloped;newbureaucraciesneedtobeexpandedtosupervicenon-custodydefendants(e.g.,individualsonbail,probation,orparole);andcitizensneedtobepreparedtounderstandthepurposeandimplicationsof thenewprocedures.Afterthereformspassedin2008,thefederalandstategovernmentsweregivenuntil2016—aperiodof uptoeightyears—toadoptthereforms.

TheSecretaryof theInterior(SecretaríadeGobernación,SEGOB)chairsthe11-memberCoordinatingCouncilfortheImplementationof theCriminalJusticeSystem(ConsejodeCoordinaciónparalaImplementacióndelSistemadeJusticiaPenal,CCISJP),whichisaidedbyatechnicalsecretarywhooverseesthereformprocesswithinSEGOB.59Thecouncilalsohasnominalrepresentationfromacademiaandcivilsociety.60Althoughthereformswerepassedinmid-2008,theCCISJPwasnotformallyinaugurateduntilitsfirstconvocationinJune2009,whichwasfollowedbyadditionalmeetingsinAugust2009andJanuary2010.61Thisinitialdelaywaspartlyattributabletothedeathof theformertechnicalcoordinatorof thecounsel,Assis-tantSecretaryof theInteriorJoséLuisSantiagoVasconcelos,inaplanecrashinMexicoCityinApril2008,alongsidethen-Secretaryof theInteriorJuanCamiloMouriño.Thenewtechnicalcoordinatorforthecounsel,Assistant-Secretaryof theInteriorFelipeBorregoEstrada,wasap-pointedinDecember2008.62

Theroleof theCCISJPisto:1)serveastheliaisonbetweenthevariousmembersof thecoun-cilandotherentitiesworkingtopromotejudicialreform,2)monitoradvancesintheimplemen-tationof federalreformsatthestatelevel,3)providetechnicalassistancetostatesworkingtoimplementthereforms(e.g.,courtroomdesign,software,etc.),4)providetrainingforjudicialsystemoperatives(e.g.,judges,lawyers,legalexperts),and5)manageadministrativeandfinan-cialaspectsof thereform(e.g.,guidinglegislativebudgetrequests).Thegoalof theCCISJPistohavereformsapprovedinallMexicanstatesandimplementedin19of 32federalentities(31statesandtheFederalDistrict)by2012,whenthecurrentadministrationleavesoffice.63

Effortstoimplementthesereformswillrequireresources,time,andsomecoaxingatboththefederalandstatelevel.Foremostistheproblemof funds.Whilethereiswidespreadrecognitionof theneedforamassiveinvestmentof fundstothejudicialsector,thereisnoestimateforthetotalcostof implementingthereforms.However,thecommitmentof governmentalresourcesatthefederalandstatelevelwilllikelyneedtobegreatlyincreasedfromtheirpresentlevels.64

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Asecondchallengeistheefforttogeneratemomentumandpoliticalwillatboththefederalandstatelevel.Atthefederallevel,theSupremeCourthasmadelittleprogressindevelopinganewFederalCodeof CriminalProcedure(CódigoFed-eraldeProcedimientosPenales,CFPP).Thishasleftstateswithlittleguidanceonthefederalproceduresthatwillultimatelyhaveimportantbearingontheirowncriminalcodes.WhiletherearesomenotableadvocatesforthereformontheSupremeCourt,itisnotclearhoworwhenitwillbegintodemonstrateleader-shiponthegenerationof thenewcodeof criminalprocedure.

Meanwhile,atthestatelevel,therehasbeensomesignificantprogress.Indeed,sixstates—Chihuahua,MexicoState,Morelos,Oaxaca,NuevoLeón,andZa-catecas—hadalreadyadoptedandimplementedsimilarreformspriorto2008,providingimportantprecedentsthatinformedthefederalinitiative.Indeed,inJune2007,thestateof Chihuahuahadalreadyhelditsfirstoraltrial.65Mean-while,severalotherstates—BajaCalifornia,Durango,andHidalgo—hadap-provedbutnotyetimplementedstate-levelinitiativepriortothefederalreforms.AccordingtoaJanuary2010reportfromtheCCISJP,severalotherstatesarecur-rentlyworkingtorevisetheirconstitutionsandcriminalcodestoachievecompli-ancewiththe2008reform.66Still,somestateslagsignificantlybehind,withnosignificantsignsof activitytowardadoptingthereformsmorethantwoyearsafterthefederalreform.67Tobesure,withatotalof 18state-levelelectionsin2009and2010,therehavebeensignificantpoliticaldistractionsthatmakeitdif-ficulttomobilizereforminitiatives.However,somestateswillneedtoeitherpickupthepaceoreventuallylobbyforanextensionof thecurrent2016deadlineforpassageof thereforms.

Amongstatesthathaveeitherapprovedorimplementedstate-levelreforms,therearesomesignificantdifferencesinsubstanceandstrategy.Somestateshaveappliedsomeof thereformstoalltypesof criminalcases,butstartedwithalim-itedsetof judicialdistrictsandonlylaterexpandedtootherplaces,anapproachthatcouldbecalled“geographicgradualism.”Otherstatesinvertedthisstrategy,applyingthereformstoalljudicialdistrictsinthestate,butstartingwithcertaintypesof criminalcases(implementaciónpordelito)andonlylaterexpandingtoallcriminalcases,withsomestatesevenexpandingtomattersof civilandfamilylaw.Thismightbereferredtoasacategoricalapproach,or“substantivegradual-ism.”

Forthepurposesof gaugingtheprogressthatdifferentstateshavemadeinimplementingthereformsasof December2009,wedrawonIngram’sin-depthresearchandfieldinterviewstoidentifyfourcategoriesillustratedinFigure3(nextpage):68

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Category 1 comprisesthosestatesthathaveadvancedfurthesttowardsachievingthegoalsof thefederalreform,includingstatesthatmadeearlyeffortstoreformthecrimi-naljusticesector(somedoingsoseveralyearsago,pre-datingthefederalreformof 2008),andotherrelativelate-comersthathavenonethelessmovedquicklytopassneces-saryreformsandareinthemidstof orveryclosetotheprocessof implementation.Thisgroupconsistsof eightstates(inalphabeticalorder):BajaCalifornia,Chihuahua,Durango,Morelos,NuevoLeón,Oaxaca,Stateof Mexico,70andZacatecas.71

Category 2 capturesthosestatesthathavereforminitiativesunderwaybutthathadnotyetbeenapprovedasof December2009,i.e.,statesthathaveareforminitiativepend-inginthelocallegislature,orhavebeendebatingdifferentreforminitiatives.ThisgroupincludesHidalgo,Yucatán,andCampeche.Despitenothavingapprovedthereforms,thesestatesarefurtheralongthantheremainingstatesinthatthereisatleastaformalproposalforreformalreadyunderdebateandreceivingpubliccomment.

Category 3 capturesthosestatesthathavenotapprovedareformanddonothaveareformpackageunderconsideration,buthavenonethelesspassedorhaveexistingADRlawsthatcomplementthegoalsof thefederalreform.Insomestatesinthisgroup,therewerereforminitiativesbutthesehavestalledorappearinactive.Thiscategoryalsoincludesthestateof Veracruz,whichhasformalreformsthatcreatedanadversarialpro-ceedingbutthisreformisregardedbyobserversaspartial,cosmetic,orinsufficient.

Category 4consistsof twotypesof states:a)thosethatpracticeADR(usuallyinthe

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Figure 3: State-Level Implementation of Judicial Reform Initiatives69

formof offeringamediationcenter)withoutlawsthatformallyexpandorregulateADR,andb)thoseforwhichthereisnoreadyevidenceof billsorotherreformprojectsinthepipeline.Thiscategoryincludestheremainingstates:BajaCaliforniaSur,Coahuila,Guerrero,Nayarit,Querétaro,Puebla,Sinaloa,SanLuisPotosí,andTabasco.

Inshort,Category1capturesstatesthatmightbecalled“strongreformers”,Category2capturesstatesthatmightbecalled“moderatereformers”,Category3includesthosethatmightbecalled“pendingreformers”,andCategory4coversstatesthatmightbelabeled“non-reformers.”72Thesecategoriesareonlymeanttodistinguishbroadclassesof states.73Naturally,thereformprocessisinfluxandmanystatesmayproposeareformormakeanadvancethatisnotincludedhere.Similarly,statesmayappeartomoveforwardtowardsreform,andthentheprocessmaystall(e.g.,Coahuila).Thus,thelandscapeof reformisirregularinwaysthatmakeitdifficulttogetaclearpictureor“snapshot”of thestateof reformacrossallstates.Moreimportantly,ourdiscussionhereisnotintendedasaprecisemetricof reformlevelsacrosstheMexicanstates,butasageneraloverviewof thereformprocess.Thatis,ourcategorizationisnotmeanttobecomprehensiveorexhaustiveof alllegalchangesacrossthestates.Rather,itprovidesaquickviewof clearandmeaningfuldifferencesamongthestates.Theappendixof thisreportprovidesfurtherdetailsontheadvancesmadeinkeystates.

Prospects for the New Criminal Justice System

TherearecertainlyrealprospectsforMexico’s2008judicialsectorreformstobesuc-cessful.Proponentsof Mexico’sjudicialsectorreformspointtoseeminglysuccessfultransitionsfrominquisitorialtoaccusatorysystemselsewhereinLatinAmerica,mostnotablyChile.74Indeed,theMexicangovernmenthasestablishedaninternationalagree-mentwiththegovernmentof Chiletoshareexperiencesandtraininginordertofacili-tateMexico’stransitiontotheadversarialmodelof criminalprocedure.Theexperienceof Chileappearstosuggestthattheuseof adversarialtrialproceedingsandalternativesentencingmeasuresreducespaperwork,increasesefficiency,andhelpstoeliminatecasebacklogsbyconcentratingproceduresinawaythatfacilitatesjudicialdecisions.Mean-while,althoughtheidealsof securityandlibertyareoftenperceivedtobeintensionwithoneanother,anemphasisonguaranteeingtherightsof bothcrimevictimsandsuspectsultimatelystrengthenstheruleof law.Thatis,arights-basedapproachcompelsthestatenotonlytodefendthesecurityof thepublic,butalsocompelsstateactorsthemeselvestorespectthelawintheirtreatmentof individuals.

Still,despitethesemuch-toutedbenefits,Mexico’sjudicialreformshavefacedseriousandmeritedcriticism,bothfromtraditionalistsandfromadvocatesof moresubstantialreform.Someinitiallybristledattheperceptionthatthereformswerebeingactivelypromotedbyoutsideforces,particularlyfromtheUnitedStates.75Onarelatednote,giventroublinggapsandinconsistenciesriddledinthereformsthemselves,somecritics

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expressedconcernsthatthereformconstitutedanill-conceived,costly,andpotentiallydangerousattempttoimposeanewmodelwithoutconsiderationof theintricacies,nu-ances,andbenefitsof Mexico’sexistingsystem.Indeed,evennow,despitewidespreadagreementthatmassiveinvestmentsinthejudicialsectorwillbeneeded,thereisnoconcreteestimateof thereforms’anticipatedfinancialcostsonwhichtobasebudgetaryallocations.Inshort,criticstendtofearthatMexico’ssweepingjudicialreformsmaybetryingtodotoomuch,toofast,withtoofewresources,withtoolittlepreparation,andwithlittlepromiseof success.76

Meanwhile,othersworrythatthereformshavenotgonefarenough.Intheeyesof somecritics,thereformsultimatelyfailtoaddressthemajorinstitutionalweaknessesof thejudicialsector.77Indeed,inothercountrieswheresimilarreformshavebeenimple-mented,suchasHonduras,problemsof corruptionandinadequateprofessionalcapacityhavecontinuedtounderminetheeffectiveadministrationof justice.Atthesametime,asnotedabove,the2008reformsintroducednewmeasuresthatmayactuallyunder-minefundamentalrightsanddueprocessof law.Theuseof arraigo—sequesteringof suspectswithoutcharge—iswidelycriticizedforundermininghabeascorpusrightsandcreatingan“exceptionallegalregime”forindividualsaccusedof organizedcrime.78Althoughnotusableasevidenceintrial,confessionsextracted(withoutlegalrepresenta-tion)underarraigocanstillbesubmittedassupportingevidenceforanindictment.Alsoof concerntodueprocessadvocatesistheintroductionof theuseof thepleabargain(juicioabreviado),sinceunscrupulousprosecutorscouldtrytousepleaagreementsasameanstopressureinnocentpersonsintoincriminatingthemselves.

Tobesure,protectingthelegalrightsof crimesuspectsisoftenunsavorytothepublic.”However,havingstrongrightsfortheaccusedhelpstoensurethatthegovernmentisitself boundbythelaw,andthatallcitizenshaveaccesstojustice.Respectingthepre-sumptionof innocenceandthedueprocessof lawultimatelyimposestheburdenof proof onpoliceandprosecutors,whomustdemonstratethecredibilityof theirchargesagainstasuspect.However,inChileandelsewhere,concernsaboutpretrialreleaseandtheriskof flightbytheaccused,hasledtobackslidingonreformsthatprovidedimpor-tantprotectionsforthepresumptionof innocence.Giventheproliferationof violentcrime,manyMexicansareunderstandablyreluctanttoplacegreateremphasisonthepresumptionof innocenceandpre-trialrelease,asthisrights-basedapproachmayexces-sivelyfavorcriminalstothedetrimentof therestof society.Asaresult,thereissomeconcernamongreformadvocatesthatMexicanauthoritiesmaygiveintopracticalandpublicpressuresthatwillunderminetherights-basedaspectsof thereforms.

Inshort,theroadaheadforMexico’s2008judicialreformswilllikelybelong,difficult,andof uncertaindestination.Asshownbythediscussionabove,thereformprocessatthesub-nationallevelisevolvinginahighlyunevenmanneracrossMexico’s32states.Thisunevennesshaspositiveandnegativeimplications.Regardingtheformer,thevaria-tionintimingandcontentof reformsacrosstheMexicanstatesoffersarichvarietyof experiencesfromwhichobserversandpolicymakerscanlearnaboutbestpracticesand

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policyimplementation.Bothbeforeandafterimplementingreforms,statescanlooktotheirneighborsanddrawpracticallessonsfromtheirvaryingexperiences,asisoftenthecaseinfederalsystemsof government.Atthesametime,forpractitionersandexperts,Mexico’songoingexperiencewithcriminaljusticereformoffersalivinglaboratorytostudyprocessesof reformandinstitutionalchangethatareacorepartof democracy.

Onthenegativeside,however,theunevennessof criminalprocedureacrosstheMexi-canstatesgeneratesdifferentrealitiesinthedailypracticeof justiceinstitutionsineachstate.Forcitizens,thesedifferencescanmeanaverydifferentexperienceof thejudicialprocessandverydifferentqualityof legaloutcomesinonestateversusanother.Inotherwords,citizenswithinasinglecountryreceiveadifferenttreatmentbythecourtsandmayexperiencejusticeinstarklydifferenttermsdependingonlyonwhichstatetheycallhome.Forlegalpractitioners,includingattorneysandjudges,thesedifferencesinlegalstandardsandprofessionalexpectationscanchallengereceivedtraining,createunusualethicaldilemmas,andnarrowemploymentopportunities.

Inshort,criminalprocedurereformanditsmultiformcharacterposechallengingten-sionsandpuzzlesforscholars,practitioners,andpolicymakers.Apromisingresolutionistoacknowledgetheinstitutionalunevennessinthejusticesectorandseektobetterun-derstandthesourcesof thisunevenness,thatis,theprocessof institutionalchangeandpolicyimplementation,leveragingtheselessonstoadvancethereformprocessinMexicoandachieveamoreuniforminstitutionallandscape.

Atboththefederalandstatelevel,theultimatelegacyof thesereformswilldependlargelyonhowtheyareimplemented,andbywhom.Therewillneedtobeenormousinvestmentsinthetrainingandprofessionaloversightof theestimated40,000practicinglawyersinMexico,manyof whomwilloperatewithinthecriminaljusticesystem’snewlegalframework.82EnablingMexico’slegalprofessiontomeetthesehigherstandardswillrequireasignificantrevisionof educationalrequirements,greateremphasisonvettingandcontinuingeducationtopracticelaw,bettermechanismstosanctiondishonestandunscrupulouslawyers,andmuchstrongerandmoreactiveprofessionalbarassocia-tions.83Atthesametime,morethan400,000federal,state,andlocallawenforcementofficershavebeengivenamuchlargerroleinpromotingtheadministrationof justice.If theyaretodevelopintoaprofessional,democratic,andcommunity-orientedpoliceforce,theywillneedtobeproperlyvetted,heldtohigherstandardsof accountability,giventhetrainingandequipmenttheyneedtodotheirjobs,andtreatedliketheprofes-sionalstheyareexpectedtobe.

Forcomparativeperspective,itisworthnotingthatintheUnitedStatesseveralkeyreformstoprofessionalizetheadministrationof justiceandpromotearights-basedcriminaljusticesystemonlytookeffectinthepost-warera.Alsoaroundthesametimeperiod,thedevelopmentof professionalstandardsandoversightmechanismsforactorsintheU.S.judicialsystemtookplacesporadicallyandoverthecourseof severaldecades.Inthe1960sand1970s,theUnitedStatesestablishedkeyprovisionstoensureaccessto

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apubliclyfundedlegaldefense(1963Gideonv.Wainwright),dueprocessforcriminaldefendants(1967Mirandav.Arizona),andotherstandardsandpracticestopromote“professional”policing.Ineffect,thisdueprocessrevolution—aswellasotherchangesintheprofession—helpedraisethebarforpolice,prosecutors,andpublicdefenders,andtherebypromotedtheoverallimprovementof theU.S.criminaljusticesystem.

Moreover,ittookatleastagenerationandmajor,targetedinvestmentstotrulyprofes-sionalizetheU.S.lawenforcementandjudicialsectors.TheSafeStreetsActof 1968mandatedthecreationof theLawEnforcementAssistanceAdministration(LEAA),whichhelpedfundcriminaljusticeeducationprograms.LEAAalsosupportedjudicialsectorresearchthroughtheNationalInstituteof LawEnforcementandCriminalJustice,theprecursortotheNationalInstituteof Justice.Mexicowilllikelyneedtomakesimi-larlylargeinvestmentsinthejudicialsector,andwillrequireasimilarlylong-termtimehorizonasitventuresforward.

OnepossibleacceleratorforMexicoisthatmanydomesticandinternationalorganiza-tionshavebeenworkingactivelytoassistwiththetransformation.TheNationalFundfortheStrengtheningandModernizationof JusticePromotion(FondoNacionalparaelFortalecimientoyModernizacióndelaImparticióndelaJusticia,FondoJurica)hassponsoredthedevelopmentof amodelproceduralcodeandnewtrainingprograms.Meanwhile,U.S.governmentagenciesandnon-governmentalprofessionalassociationshaveofferedvariousformsof assistance,includingfinancialassistanceandlegaltrain-ing.Notably,theRuleof LawInitiativeof theAmericanBarAssociation(ABA),theNationalCenterforStateCourts,andU.S.government-fundedconsultingagencies,likeManagementSystemsInternational,havealsoworkedtopromotereformandprovidetrainingandassistance.Also,from2007-2008,theJusticeinMexicoProjectorganizedanine-partseriesof forumshostedinMexicoandtheUnitedStatesincollaborationwiththeCenterforDevelopmentResearch(CentrodeInvestigaciónparaelDesarrollo,A.C.,CIDAC)topromoteanalysisandpublicdialogueaboutjudicialreform.85

Of criticalimportanceforallof theseeffortswillbethedevelopmentof quantitativeandqualitativemetricstoevaluatetheactualperformanceof thenewsystem.Arecaseshandledmoreefficientlybythecriminaljusticesystemthaninthepast?Areallpartiessatisfiedwhentheircasesarehandledthroughmediation?Havepolice,prosecutors,pub-licdefenders,andjudgesdemonstratedsignificantimprovementsincapacityandservicedelivery?Doesthenewcriminaljusticesystemadequatelyprepareconvicts(andcommu-nities)fortheirultimatere-entrytosociety?Unfortunately,onmanyof thesequestions,therearefewadequatebaselineorperformanceindicatorsavailable.85

Concluding Observations

Despiteconventionalcharacterizations,Mexico’srecentjusticesectorreformsaremuchmoreinvolvedthanthemereintroductionof “oraltrials.”Theyinvolvesweepingchang-

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estoMexicancriminalprocedure,greaterdueprocessprotections,newrolesforjudicialsystemoperators,andtoughermeasuresagainstorganizedcrime.Advocateshopethatthereformswillbringgreatertransparency,accountability,andefficiencytoMexico’sail-ingjusticesystem.However,bynomeansdorecentreformsguaranteethatMexicowillovercomeitscurrentchallengesanddevelopabettercriminaljusticesystem.Whetherthisefforttoreformthecriminaljusticesystemwillsucceedmaydependlessontheseproceduralchangesthanoneffortstoaddressotherlong-standingproblemsbyshoringuptraditionallyweakandcorruptinstitutions.84

Theenormityof thechallengesconfrontedbyMexico’sjudicialsectorisnottobeunder-estimated.Mexicoisworkingtomakemajorprogressinarelativelyshortperiod,attemptingtoradicallyalterhundredsof yearsof unique,independentlegaltraditioninlessthanadecade.Therealityisthatthereformeffortwilltakedecades,willrequiremassiveresourcesandeffort,andwillinvolveagreatdealof trialanderror.Also,giventhedramaticchangesproposed,theremaybesignificantandlegitimateresistancetosomeaspectsof thereforms.Inworkingthroughtheseissues,Mexicocancertainlylooktoandlearnfromboththepositiveandnegativeexperiencesof otherLatinAmericancountriesthathaveadoptedlegalreformsinrecentyears(e.g.,Chile,Colombia,CostaRica,ElSalvador,Honduras,andVenezuela).However,likeMexicoitself,theMexicanmodelof criminaljusticeisquiteunique.AnyefforttochangetheMexicansystemwillundoubtedlydevelopalongitsowncourse,atitsownpace,andwithsometimesunex-pectedresults.Intheend,thesuccessof theseeffortswillrestontheshouldersanewgenerationof citizensandprofessionalswithinthecriminaljusticesystem,whowillbeboththestewardsandbeneficiariesof Mexico’son-goingjudicialsectorreforms.

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No. State I II III IV Category1 Aguascalientes 0 0 1 0 32 BajaCalifornia 1 0 0 0 13 BajaCaliforniaSur 0 0 0 1 44 Campeche 0 1 0 0 25 Chiapas 0 0 1 0 36 Chihuahua 1 0 0 0 1

7 Coahuila 0 0 1 0 38 Colima 0 0 1 0 39 DistritoFederal 0 0 1 0 310 Durango 1 0 0 0 111 Stateof Mexico 1 0 0 0 112 Guanajuato 0 0 1 0 313 Guerrero 0 0 0 1 414 Hidalgo 0 1 0 0 215 Jalisco 0 0 1 0 316 Michoacán 0 0 0 1 417 Morelos 1 0 0 0 118 Nayarit 0 0 0 1 419 NuevoLeón 1 0 0 0 120 Oaxaca 1 0 0 0 121 Puebla 0 0 0 1 422 Querétaro 0 0 0 1 423 QuintanaRoo 0 0 0 1 424 SanLuisPotosí 0 0 0 1 425 Sinaloa 0 0 0 1 426 Sonora 0 0 1 0 327 Tabasco 0 0 0 1 428 Tamaulipas 0 0 1 0 329 Tlaxcala 0 0 1 0 330 Veracruz 0 0 1 0 331 Yucatán 0 1 0 0 232 Zacatecas 1 0 0 0 1

Totals: 8 3 11 10

Appendix: Categorical Index of State Level Reform Initiatives

(asof December2009)

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Description of State-Level Reform Index

Category 1 consists of (in alphabetical order) Baja California, Chihuahua, Durango, Morelos, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, State of Mexico, and Zacatecas.

InBaja California,thetransitiontotheadversarialsystemhasproceededquicklywithapackageof reformsapprovedinitiallyonOctober19,2007butthatfailedtogointoeffectin2009asplanned.Afterseveralpriordelays,thereformwasscheduledtotakeeffectMay3,2010,butintheweeksbeforethatdatethetransitionwaspostponedagain;itisnowanticipatedtotakeeffectinAugust2010.Thenewtimetableestablishesthatthereformwillbegeographi-callygradual,takingplacefirstinthedistrictof Mexicali.In2012,itwillbeimplementedinthedistrictof Ensenada,andfinallyinthedistrictsof Tijuana,Tecate,andPlayasdeRosaritoin2013.

Chihuahua,alongwithNuevoLeónandOaxaca,isoneof thereformpioneers.OnJanuary18,2006,alegislativeinitiativeproposedreformingcriminalproce-duresinthestate.Theconstitutionalportionof thereformwasapprovedonMay11,2006(CHI-Decreto595/06,5),whichenteredintoeffectonJune11,2006(CHI-Dec.603/06II;PeriódicoOficialNo.46,pag.4775-4778).Regardingthetransitiontotheadversarialsystem,theCodeof CriminalProcedure(CódigodeProcedimientosPenales,orCPP)wasapprovedonJune15,2006,andwasimplementedgraduallythroughoutthestate.UnlikeNuevoLeón’simplemen-tationbysubjectmatterjurisdiction(i.e.,bytypeof crime),Chihuahuaimple-mentedthereformatfirstonlyinonejudicialdistrict,butappliedthereformtoallcrimes.ThisprocessbeganintheJudicialDistrictof Morelosinthecityof Chihuahua,onJanuary1,2007(CHIH-CPP,Transitorios,Art.Segundo;PJ-CHIHInforme2007,20),andthestate’sremaining12judicialdistrictsadoptedthereformbyJuly1,2008(Informe2007,20;Acuerdo2009).

Likeotherstatesafterit,ChihuahuahasdevelopednotonlyADRmechanisms(e.g.,mediationandconciliation),butalsoalternativewaystoexittheprevi-ouslyrigidandinflexiblecriminalprocess.Forinstance,theCodeof CriminalProcedureallowsfora“reparativeagreement”(acuerdoreparatorio),inwhichthedefendantagreestomakereparationstothevictim(arts.196etseq).Also,criminalproceedingscanbeinterruptedorsuspended(suspensióndelprocesoaprueba)if thedefendantmeetscertaineligibilityandsuitabilitycriteria,aprocesssimilartodiversionorprobationinsomeU.S.courts,(CHIH-CPC,arts.201etseq.).Further,thereisthepossibilityof an“abbreviatedprocess”(procedimien-toabreviado)inwhichtheproceedingsbeforethecourtcanbeshortenedif thedefendantadmitstothechargeandwaivestrial(CHI-CPC,arts.387etseq).

Durango reportsfirstpushingforreformin2007(Gaucín2009),butthenewPenalCode(CódigoPenal)wasnotapproveduntilJune11,2009.Similarly,thenewCodeof CriminalProcedure(CódigoProcesalPenal,orCPP)wasnotapproveduntilJune21,2009.ThesereformswereoriginallyscheduledtoenterintoeffectnolaterthanDec.31,2009(DUR-CPC,Art.TransitorioPrimero,sec.

I),andthecourt’swebsitereportedtheinaugurationof thenewinstallationsforadver-sarialproceedingsonDecember14,2009(DUR-PJ2009).Asinotherstatesthathaveoptedforageographicallygradualprocessof implementation,Durango’sreformwillfirsttakeeffectinthestate’scapitalcity,Durango.Thereformwillthenexpandtootherdistricts.

Morelosisanotherstatethatbeganasubstantialreformprocessbeforethe2008federalreform.Followingconsultationswithacademicsandopportunitiesforpubliccomment,debatebeganinthelegislatureonJuly12,2007.ThereformtotheCodeof CriminalProcedurewasapprovedfourmonthslater,onNovember19,2007,layingthefoun-dationfortheadversarialprocessinthestate.Itwasimplementedinageographicallygradualmannerthroughoutthestate,followingtheexampleof Chihuahua.TheFirstJudicialDistrictsawimplementationbeginningonOctober30,2008.LikeChihuahuaandotherstates,theCodeof CriminalProcedureinMorelosincludestheopportunityforearlyoralternativeexitsfromthecriminalprocess.88

Nuevo León wasthepioneerof currenttrendsincriminalproceduralreforminMex-ico.ThefirstadversarialtrialinMexicotookplaceinthisstateonFebruary23,2005(Carrizales2005).Indeed,thereformprocessmayhavebegunhereasearlyasOctober2003.A2004reformtotheCodeof CriminalProcedure(CPP)initiatedtheprocessof legalchangeinthestate.TheCPPidentifieswhichtypesof casesareeligiblefortheadversarialmodel,definingaprocessof substantivegradualism,whichisunlikemostotherstatesinCategory1.Earlyinthepost-reformera–fromJuly2004toDecember2005–thekindsof casesweremorelimited.However,onDecember7,2005,Decree279/05broadenedthisrestriction.89Intheareaof criminaloffenses,onelastreformwasapprovedonFebruary20,2009,andtookeffectJuly1,2009,expandingthetypesof eligiblecasesevenfurther.NuevoLeónisalsoamongthefirststatestoexpandtheadversarialprocessbeyondcriminalcasestoincludecivilandfamilymatters.Decree360/06,approvedonAugust11,2006,establishedthatrentaldisputes,childcustody,anddivorcesthatwereinitiatedbymutualconsentwouldbethejurisdictionof theadversari-alprocess(NLN-CivilCode,art.989).By2007,theadversarialsystemwasfunctioninginthesecivilmatters(PJ-NLN2008,20-21).90

OaxacaapprovedanewCodeof CriminalProceduresonSeptember6,2006thatenactedthetransitiontoadversarialproceedings(OAX-CPC,TransitorioSegundo).Thenewprocesswasscheduledtogointoeffectoneyearlater,inSeptember2007,andtheadversarialmodelwasfirstimplementedonSeptember9,2007,inthejudicialdistrictsof theeasternregionof theIsthmusof Tehuantepec(Informe2007,14).Oneyearafterthat,onSeptember9,2008,themodelwasexpandedtothedistrictsinthewesternMix-tecaregion(PJ-OAX2008a,15;PJ-OAX2008b).Theprocessof expansionissupposedtocontinuegraduallyacrossthestate,oneregionperyear,untilthereformreachesallsevenregionsof thestatebySeptember2012.Whilethejudicialleadershiphasextolledthesystem,atleastsomeprivateattorneysareskeptical,notingalackof trainingandalackof sensitivitytoindigeneouscustom.91

IntheState of Mexico,aninitialreforminJanuary2006wasverysuperficial,essentiallyaddingaseriesof articlestotheexistingCodeof CriminalProcedures(articles275-A

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through275-R).Thislayeringof severalarticlesontotheexistingcodeseemedacosmet-icefforttocreateanadversarialprocess.Indeed,thelawreferredtothenewprocessastrialsthatwerenotoralbut“predominantlyoral”(“JuicioPredominantementeOral”;seePJ-MEX2008).Symptomatically,theannual“stateof thecourts”report(InformeAnual2006)didnothaveaseparatesectiononthecreationof adversarialproceedings,whichshouldhavebeenrevolutionary(Langer2007)andparticularlynotablewithinMexico.Accentuatingthesuperficialcharacterof themodificationsin2006,areforminFebruaryof 2009implicitlyacknowledgedaneedfordeeperchangesbyseekingafullertransfor-mationtotakeeffectbyAugust1,2009.However,thereformcalendarwasrestructuredfourmonthslater,onJune30,2009,callingfortheestablishmentof adversarialproceed-ingsbyOctober1,2009,infourjudicialdistricts,includingthestatecapitalof Toluca(Decreto289/09,2).Thereformwillnowbeexpandedprogressivelythroughoutthere-mainingdistrictsinthestatewithafinaltargetdateforcompletionof October1,2011.

InZacatecas,areforminitiativewasfirstformallyproposedonMarch28,2007(De-creto511/07),thoughtheopeningof decreenotesthatthiskindof reformwasbe-ingcontemplatedinthestateasearlyas2005.Theapprovedreformwaspublishedsixmonthslater,onSeptember15,2007,andenteredintoeffectalmostayear-and-a-half afterthat,onJanuary5,2009(CódigoProcesalPenal,TransitorioPrimero).Thefirstadversarialcaseenteredthenewsystemfourdayslater,onJanuary9,2009.Asof De-cember29,2009,inthefirstfullyearof operation,thejudiciaryhadprocessed205oraltrials(PJ-ZACInformedeAudiencias;PJ-ZACConsultas).ThisisaremarkablenumberconsideringthatChihuahua,initsthirdyearwiththenewsystem,processedonly59oraltrials(seeabove).

Category 2 consists of Campeche, Hidalgo, and Yucatán.

InCampeche,therearenotrialsintheadversarialmodel,accordingtotheRegulatoryCodeof theJudiciary(LOPJ,lastreformedDec.18,2007).However,areforminitia-tiveiscirculatingasof September8,2009.Indeed,thisisthefifthversionof suchaninitiative,andappearstobefollowingthemodelcodeof criminalprocedurefromtheNationalCouncilof StateCourts(ConsejoNacionaldeTribunalesdeJusticia,orCO-NATRIB).

Hidalgo,likeCampeche,doesnothaveanapprovedreform.However,thestateformedanimplementingcommissioncalledthe“InterinstitutionalReformCommission”(ComisiónInterinstitucionalparalaReformaIntegraldelSistemadeJusticiaPenal,orCII).Asof October5,2009,thiscommissiondeliveredasetof legislativeinitiativestothestatelegislature.Theproposedplanistoimplementthereformgraduallyacrossdistricts(geographicgradualism),followingthemodelof Chihuahua,Oaxaca,Morelos,and,later,DurangoandBajaCalifornia(HID-CIIInforme,2-5).

Yucatán alsodoesnothaveanapprovedreform(seeLOPJ;lastreformdatedDecem-ber15,2007).However,thejudiciaryhasinitiatedareformproject(anteproyectodereforma).Thefirstversionof thisinitiativecirculatedin2009,andasecondversionwascirculatedrecentlyonJanuary4,2010,requestinganewroundof commentsandfeed-back.AswasthecaseinCampeche,thiscodeisbasedoff themodelcodeof criminal

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proceduregeneratedbytheCONATRIB(PJ-YUC2010).Thecourtanticipatesthelawgoingintoeffectin2011(PJ-YUC2009).

Category 3: The various states that comprise this category share the fact that they practice ADR and have passed formal laws regulating ADR.

AguascalienteshashadaCenterforParticipatoryJustice(CentrodeJusticiaParticipa-tiva)inoperationsinceOctober2001(PJ-AGS).In2008,thestatepassedalawgovern-ingADR(LeydeJusticiaAlternativa),systematizingmediationandconciliation.OtherstatesinthisgrouphavesimilarexperiencespassingADRlaws,buttheyhavealsoshownatleastsomeefforttowardspromotingthecriminalprocedurereform.

InCoahuila,apublicunveilingof plansforreforminthefirstweekof JuneledsomeobserverstooptimisticallyreportthatoraltrialswouldbeimplementedinCoahuilapriortothefederalproceduralreform.However,thecourt’smostrecentannualreportstatesthereformisstillaworkinprogress,andthatanewjudicialcenterisbeingbuilt,peoplearebeinghired,andmoretrainingsarescheduledfor2010(PJ-COA2009).Thus,despitehavinganADRlaw,thebroaderreforminCoahuilaappearstohavestalled.

Sonorahadasimilarreforminitiative(anteproyecto)putforwardonNovember28,2008.However,giventheabsenceof anyevidenceof reformsincethen,theprojectdoesnotseemtohaveadvancedanywhere(theLOPJshowsnoreformsafterSep7,2007,andtheCPPshowsnoreformssinceJuly12,2007).

InGuanajuatoin2008,thegovernorpubliclystatedhewantedtheadversarialprocessinthestate(Gob-GUANoticias2008),andonAugust27,2009,thelocallegislatureapprovedaninitiativetoreformportionsof theconstitutioninawaythatwouldsetthestageforabroaderreform(Dictamen901;Boletín252/09).However,thiswasonlyafirststep.Asof November11,2009,theconstitutionalchangeshadstillnotbeenap-provedbyhalf themunicipalitiesasrequired(Miranda2009),andtherewerenoformalinitiativesyetbeingdebatedforbroaderreformstotheCodeof CriminalProceduresorotherlegislation.Withouttheseactions,2009closedwithGuanajuatolookingmuchlikeCoahuilaorSonora.

Category 4: The remaining states do not appear to have any bills or initiatives for transitioning to the adversarial process, and also do not have a formalized system of alternative dispute resolution.

Thereformprocessmaybeunderway,buttherewasnoreadyevidencefromgovern-mentandcourtwebsites,annualcourtreports,orlocallegislationtogaugewherethestatemightbelocatedinthereformprocess.InTabascotherearetrainingsunderway,butthereformisunlikelybefore2011.InaninterviewonJanuary19,2010,thepresi-dentof CONATRIB,RodolfoCamposMontejo,notedthatitmayalmostbetoolateforTabasco(“selesvaeltren”,or“thetrainisleavingthembehind”),highlightingthatstateslikeNuevoLeónandMexicoarealreadyapplyingtheadversarialprocessincivilmatterslikefamilylawandrentaldisputes,andthatstateslikeTabasco(andtherestof Category4)are“missingtheboat”(TAB-PJ2010).

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Endnotes:1Ray(2008).

2Tobesure,theonlyinstitutionalactorsinMexicolesswellrespectedthanpoliceareunions,legislators,andpoliticalparties.ConsultaMitofsky(2010).

3Indeed,accordingtoarecentsurveyconductedbytheJusticeinMexicoProject,policethemselvesperceiveahighdegreeof corruptionontheforce.Outof morethan5,400municipalpoliceofficerssurveyed,roughlyathirddescribedsevereproblemsof corruption;40%showedlittletrustintheirsuperiors;and68%saidthatcorruptionisconcentratedathighlevelswithintheirdepartment.Onlyabouthalf (52%)feltthatthereareadequatemechanismsforinvestigatingcorruption.32%indicatedthattheproblemmostconcerningtocitizensisdrugtrafficking;29%indicatedthattheproblemmostdifficultforlocalpolicetosolveisdrugtrafficking;and45%saidthattheillicitcriminalactivityinwhichlocalpolicearemostlikelytobeinvolvedisdrugtrafficking.Moloeznik,etal.(2009).

4ICESIvictimizationsurveyssuggestthatnomorethanaquarterof allcrimes(roughly22%in2008)areactuallyreported.39%of thosewhodon’treportcrimesindicatethatitisawasteof time;thenextlargestproportion(16%)indicatethattheydonottrusttheauthorities,and10%saythattheprocessof reportingacrimeistoocumbersome.Athird(33%)of thosewhoreportedacrimesaidthattherewasnoresultfromreportingthecrime.Seewww.icesi.com.mx

5Vanderwood(1970),Vanderwood(1992),ArteagaBotelloandLópezRivera(1998),YáñezR(1999),Davis(2006),Davis(2008),Uildriks(2009).

6Varenik(2003).

7Post-independencepoliticalinstabilityinthe19thcentury,the34-yeardictatorshipof GeneralPorfirioDíaz(1876-1910),andseverelyrestrictedtermsof democraticcompetitionduring71yearsof uninterruptedrulebytheInstitutionalRevolutionaryParty(PRI)significantlyimpededthedevelopmentof judicialindepen-denceinMexico.UnderthePRI,forexample,judicialappointmentsdependedheavilyonloyaltytotherulingpartyandjudicialdecisionsonlyrarelycontradictedtheelectedbranchesof governmentcontrolledbytheparty.Zamora,etal.(2005),Schatz,etal.(2007).

8Afterdecadesof irrelevanceinLatinAmerica,courtshaveplayedanincreasinglyimportantroleinaddressingissuesof transitionaljustice,inconstitutionaldeliberations,andinreformstotheadministrationof justicethroughouttheregion.Acentralthemethroughoutmuchof thenewliteratureonthejudiciaryinLatinAmericaisthelinkbetweendemocracyandtheruleof law,particularlytheroleof thecourtsinprotectingademocraticsocietyagainstabusesof authorityinacontextof politicaluncertainty.Fix-Zamudio(1986),MelgarAdalid(1995),Domingo(1996),Fix-ZamudioandCossíoDíaz(1996),JarquínandCarilloFlorez(1998),Prillaman(2000),DomingoandSieder(2001),Ungar(2001),Biggar(2003),Magaloni(2003),Do-mingo(2004),Hilbink(2007).

9ZepedaLecuona(2004).

10HumanRightsFirst(2001).

11Asdiscussedbelow,municipalpolicedonotconductinvestigations.However,patternsof corruptionandabuseassociatedwithpoliceinvestigationscollectedatthefederalandstatelevelareindicatedbyprisonerre-sponsestosurveyquestionsregardingtheuseof briberyandphysicalcoercioninthecriminaljusticesystem.AzaolaandBergman(2007).

12InternationalRehabilitationCouncilforTortureVictims(IRCT)(2006),LaraKlahr(2008),HumanRightsWatch(2009),Luhnow(2009).

13Luhnow(2009).

14Thefactthatapreponderanceof thosefoundguiltyarepoorpeoplechargedwithpettyoffensessuggeststhatsomewhocanaffordtodosomay“buy”theirwayoutof criminalcharges.Ibid.

15Tobar(2008).

16AccordingtotheInternationalRehabilitationCouncilforTortureVictims(IRCT),a“majorityof torturereportsandotherhumanrightsviolationscontinuetooccurinthecontextof theadministrationof justice,particularlyduringtheinvestigativeandprosecutorialphasesof criminalproceedings.Furthermore,thereisagrowingnumberof torturecomplaintsof politicaldetaineesagainstthesecurityforces.”Indeed,accord-ingtoMexico’shumanrightsombudsman,asmanyas90%of reportedtorturecasesaretheresultof theforcedconfessionsof prisoners.HernándezForcadaandLugoGarfias(2004),p.139;InternationalRehabili-tationCouncilforTortureVictims(IRCT)(2006),p.8.

17Regardingdruguse,AzaolaandBergman(2009)citeevidencethatmanyinmatesenteredprisonwithoutpriordruguse,butdevelopedanaddictiononceinprison.Thisimpliesaddedsocialcosts,AzaolaandBergman

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argue,sinceaddictedprisonersaremorelikelytobecomeconnectedtootherdelinquentsanddevelopfull-fledgedcriminalcareers.AzaolaGarrido(1990),H.BringasandRoldánQuiñones(1998).

18In2009,prisonsintheFederalDistrictandMexicoStateaccountforacombinedtotalof about28%of Mexico’sentireprisonpopulation,andoperatedat212%and183%capacity,respectively.AccordingtoasurveyconductedinthosesamestatesbyBergmanandAzaola(2009),conditionsinsideprisonsareverybadandgettingworse;in2009,over70%of inmatesreportedthattheydidnothaveenoughfood,adramaticincreasefrompreviousyears.AzaolaandBergman(2009).

19TwentydiedanddozenswerewoundedinanAugust2009prisonriotinwhichpolicelaterconfiscatednumerousmakeshiftweapons,guns,andafragmentationgrenade.JusticeinMexicoProject(2009).http://www.justiceinmexico.org/news/pdf/justiceinmexico-august2009news-report082109.pdf.(Ac-cessedMarch1,2010).

20Mexicoisnotaloneinthisregard.Averitable“boom”inincarcerationsintheUnitedStateshasincreas-inglyraisedseriousquestionsabouttheeffectivenessof supposedly“modern”prisonfacilitieswithregardtoeitherthepreventionof crimesortherehabilitationof thosewhocommitthem.Evenworse,prisonsappeartoperpetuateandintensifysocialinequalities.Writingin2009,RaphaelandStollpointoutthat,intheUnitedStates,“less-educatedminoritymenareconsiderablymorelikelytobeincarceratedcurrentlythanatanytimeinthepast.”RaphaelandStoll(2009).

21Méndez,etal.(1999)BaileyandGodson(2000),BaileyandChabat(2001),Cumaraswamy(2002),ZepedaLecuona(2004),Davis(2006),CorneliusandShirk(2007),DonnellyandShirk(2009).

22Thereisacorrelationcoefficientof .5026betweencountryevaluationsof democraticgovernancereportedinthe2008Latinobarómetroandperceptionsof judicialsystemperformancereportedinthe2007Galluppoll.Thisissuggestiveof arelationshipbetweencitizenperceptionsof democracyandtheeffectivenessof judicialinstitutions.

23Ajuciodeamparo,alsosimplyreferredtoasanamparo,isliterallyalegal“writof protection”thatpro-videsaninjunctionblockinggovernmentactionsthatwouldencroachonanindividual’sconstitutionalrights.Anamparograntsindividualscertainrights,including:(1)defendingliberty,lifeandpersonaldignity;(2)defendingindividualrightsagainstunconstitutionallaws;(3)examiningthelegalityof judi-cialdecisions;(4)protectingagainstgovernmentalactions;and(5)protectingagainstactionsbyejidos(communalfarms).Acourt’sdecisiontograntanamparoeffectivelyplacesaninjunctionforagivenpartytoceaseanddesistanoffendingaction.Thisinjunctionisonlybindingforthepartiesinvolvedinthatparticularcasecase(i.e.,interparteseffects).

24SpeckmanGuerra(2007).

25TheFederalSecurityDirectorate(DirecciónFederaldeSeguridad,DFS)oversawdomesticsecuritymat-tersfrom1947to1985,andservedasaprimaryinstrumentof socialandpoliticalcontrolforthefed-eralgovernment.Thedissolutionof theDFS,duetoproblemsof rampantcorruption,ledtothecre-ationanddestructionof aseriesof newfederallawenforcementagenciesoverthenexttwodecades.TheDFSwaseventuallyreplacedbytheCISEN.Anotheragency,theFederalJudicialPolice(PolicíaFederalJudicial,PFJ),waswidelyperceivedtobethenewlocusof corruption.ThePFJwasreplacedbytheFederalInvestigativeAgency(AgenciaFederaldeInvestigación,AFI)bypresidentialdecreein2001,ostensiblytodevelopcapabilitiessimilartotheU.S.FederalBureauof Investigation.However,inDecember2005,thePGRannouncedthatnearlyone-fifthof AFIofficerswereunderinvestigationforsuspectedinvolvementinorganizedcrime;asdiscussedbelow,theagencywasdissolvedin2009.JusticeinMexicoProject,JusticeinMexicoNewsReport,June2009.http://www.justiceinmexico.org/news/pdf/justiceinmexico-june2009news-report062309.pdf (AccessedFebruary22,2010).

26ThereformsintroducedinDecember1994createdanewoversightmechanism,knownastheFederalJudicialCouncil(ConsejodelaJudicaturaFederal,CJF),forvettingorevaluatingtheprofessionalqualificationsof judgespriortoappointment.TheCJFisamixedbodycomprisingsevenindividuals,includingtheChief Justiceof theSupremeCourt,oneotherappointedjudge,twodistrictmagistrates,twomemberschosenbytheSenate,andonememberappointedbytheMexicanpresident.Thesemembersservefour-year,non-renewableterms.Thecreationof suchcouncilsisaregionalphenom-enondevelopedinLatinAmericaduringthe1990s.Ungar(2001).

27ThereformsalsoexpandedtheSupremeCourt’spowersof judicialreviewbyintroducing“motionsof unconstitutionality”(accionesdeinconstitucionalidad).Thisinnovationallowedkeyinstitutionalac-tors—theexecutivebranch,politicalparties,andadesignatedproportionof representativesfromtheSenate,theChamberof Deputies,andtheMexicoCitylegislature—tochallengetheconstitutionalityof legislationorothergovernmentactions.

28Whileamparodecisionshaveinterparteseffects,universallybindingprecedents(ergaomneseffects)canonlybeestablishedaftertheSupremeCourtorcollegiatecircuitcourtsmakefiveconsecutiveandidenticalmajorityrulingsonthesametopicinamparocases,providedthatthecollegiatecourtdecisionsarenotcontradictedbytheSupremeCourt.Insuchcases,thisestablishesalegalprecedent

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knownasajurisprudencia,inreferencetothepublishedsummariesthatcompileanddocumentmodifica-tionsinMexicanlaw.Ineffect,precedentsthroughjurisprudenciaestablishaverylimitedformof staredeci-sisintheMexicanlegalsystem.Still,generallyspeaking,whiledecisionsmadebyjudgesinothercasescanbe(andoftenare)informallyconsultedandfoundtobepersuasiveindeterminingtheoutcomeinacase,theydonotsetbindingprecedents.

29Recentdecisions(suchasthecourt’sJune2007verdictontheTelevisaLaw)signalagrowingsenseof au-tonomyonthepartof theMexicanSupremeCourt,whichmayconstitutethebeginningof aneweraof ju-dicialindependenceandactivisminMexico.Ultimately,though,thepoliticalfactorsthatmotivatedthe1994reformarethesubjectof somescholarlydebate,withsomescholarsdescribingthereformsasan“insurancepolicy”forthePRIinanticipationof itselectoraldecline.See:Beer(2006),BegnéGuerra(1995),Domingo(2000),InclánOseguera(2004),Finkel(2008),InclánOseguera(2009).

30Foramorecompletediscussionof the2004judicialreformpackageproposedbytheFoxadministration,seeShirkandRíosCázares(2007).

31In2003,therewereseveralsignificantmodificationstotheFederalJuvenileDelinquencyLaw(LeyparaelTratamientodeMenoresInfractores,LTMI).

32In2005,theJusticeinMexicoProjectsponsoredabriefingof theMexicanSenatetooutlinetheargumentsforandagainsttheFoxreforms.Thetechnicalanalysisgeneratedbytheprojectwasthendisseminatedtoinformdebatesoccurringatthestateandlocallevel.GonzalezPlacencia,etal.(2005).

33MangisandSzmania(2008),Márquez-CarrasquilloandShirk(2008).

34Oneof theearliestCalderón-eralegislativeproposalstomodifythejudicialsystemcamefromFederalDeputyJesúsdeLeónTello,fromtheNationalActionParty(PAN).However,thebillthatbecamethebasisforthe2008reformswaschampionedbytheheadof theJudicialCommitteeintheChamberof Deputies,former-Mexicogovernorandthen-FederalDeputyCésarCamachoQuiroz,fromthePRI.AfterthebillpassedintheChamberof Deputieskeyprovisions(havingtodowiththeuseof searchandseizurewithoutawarrant)wereremovedbytheSenateinDecember2007.

35Soonafterthereformswerepassed,Mexico’sNationalHumanRightsCommissionindicatedthereformswereintendedto“adjustthesystemtotheprinciplesof ademocraticruleof law,suchasguaranteeingtherightsof victimsandtheaccusedandtheimpartialityof trials,todevelopmoreeffectivepracticesagainstorganizedcrimeandinthefunctioningof prisons,aswellaslinkingtheNationalPublicSecuritySystemtotheprotectionof humanrights,andobligingauthoritiesatallthreelevelsof governmenttocoordinatebroadlyandtrulyshareinformationoncriminalityandpolicepersonnel;toregulatethevetting,trainingandtenureof personnel,tocertifycompetency,andopenspacesforsocialparticipationinevaluation[of thesystem].”ComisiónNacionaldeDerechosHumanos(2008).Author’stranslation.

36Membersof thePRDsupportedthereforms,thoughthePRDwasthepartymostdividedonthevote.Tobar(2008).

37Advocatesof judicialreformbegantoutilizethereferenceto“oraltrials”inadeliberatemanner,becausetheconceptprovidedasimplevisualforencapsulatingthemanychangesentailedinthereform.

38Contrarytopopularopinion,notallaspectsof traditionalMexicancriminallawarebasedonwrittenaffida-vits(expedientes).Intheevidentiaryphase(instrucción)withinthelargerprocessof acriminaltrial(procesopenal),judgesfrequentlyinterviewvictims,suspects,witnesses,prosecutors,anddefenseattorneys“orally.”Certainportionsof criminalproceedings,particularlyatthepre-trialevidentiary(pre-instrucción)hearing,occurinlivecourtsessions.

39Thissignificantdeparturefromtraditionalinquisitorialsystemsdatesbacktoreformsinitiallyproposedintheearly20thcentury,underthe1908OrganicLawof theFederalPublicProsecutor(LeyOrganicadelMinisterioPúblicoFederalyReglamentacióndeSusFunciones),the1908and1917OrganicLawof theFederalJudicialPower(LeyOrgánicadelPoderJudicialFederal),Article21of the1917Constitution,the1919Lawof Organizationof theFederalPublicProsecutor(LeydeOrganizacióndelMinisterioPúblicoFederal,LOMPF),andthe1934ReglamentaryLawforArticle102of theMexicanConstitution(LeyRegla-mentariadelArtículo102delaConstitucióndelaRepública),andthe1983OrganicLawof theFederalAttorneyGeneral(LeyOrgánicadelaProcuraduríaGeneraldelaRepública).SubsequentmodificationstotheLOMPFin1941and1955andtheLOPGRin1984,1985,1987,1988,1993,and1996progressivelystrengthenedprosecutorialautonomyandrestructuredfederallawenforcementagenciesinMexico.

40ZepedaLecuona(2004),Zamora,etal.(2005),Naval(2006).

41Whileinquisitorialsystemsalsohavedefensecounselfortheaccused,theirinteractionwithjudgesandpros-ecutorstendstofocusprimarilyonassuringadherencetopropercriminalprocedure.

42Accordingtoonerecentcritiqueof theuseof theadversarialsystemintheUnitedStates,“Meanttofacilitatethesearchfortruth,ouradversarialjusticesystemoftendegeneratesintoabattlefieldwherewinning,ratherthandoingtherightthing,becomesthegoal.Mistrustonbothsides,egosandpersonalandagencyagendascangetinthewayof justice.”Trainum(2010).

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43Thismovesawayfromtheprimarilywrittenpresentationof affidavitsthataretranscribedbythepublicpros-ecutor,whichareknownasexpedientesoractuaciones.

44Theoraltrialjudge(juezdetribunaloral)willpresideoverthetrialphaseof acriminalproceeding,workinginanopencourtroom,consideringevidencepresentedbytheprosecutionandthedefense,andultimatelymak-ingadeterminationregardingtheguiltorinnocenceof thesuspect.

45“Garantismo”isaloadedterminMexico.Onetheonehand,itisusedinapositivesensebyprogressivejuristsconcernedabouttherealeffectof civilrights.Ontheotherhand,itisuseddisparaginglybymoreconservativejuristswhothinkjudgesandthestateshouldbemoreconcernedabouttheformandproce-duresof thelawthanwithprotectingparticularinterests.Thistensionresonateswithdiscussionsaboutlegalorjudicial“activism”intheUnitedStates.

46Ciudadano(2006),ElPorvenir(2006),Reforma(2006),Salazar(2006).

47Theconsequencesof mixingpre-trialandconvictedprisonerscanbedangerous.InSeptember2008,twoprisonriotsbrokeoutintheLaMesaprisonfacilityknownas“LaPeni,”killingnearlytwodozenpeople.TheLaMesaprisonisintendedtohouseaccusedcriminalswhoareineligibleforreleasebeforetrialandsentencing,butalsocontainedconvictedcriminals.JusticeinMexicoProject(2008).

48AzaolaandBergman(2009).

49Ibid.

50AsZamora,et.al.note,“Mexicancriminalpenaltiesareharsh,butthecombinationof harshpenaltiesand‘flexible’enforcementgivesagreatdealof powertopoliceofficerstoexactbribesinexchangeforoverlook-inganinfraction,largeorsmall.”Zamora,etal.(2005),p.359.

51TheAFIwascreatedbypresidentialdecreein2001tobolstertheinvestigativecapacityof theFederalAt-torneyGeneral’sOffice(PGR).Atthattime,theAFIreplacedthecorruption-plaguedFederalJudicialPoliceinordertobringaboutamoreprofessional,scientific,andcomprehensiveinvestigativeprocessthatwouldtakeaimattheoperationalfoundationsof organizedcrime–similartothestatedgoalsof thenewFederalMinisterialPolice.Theagencycameunderfirein2005underwidespreadallegationsof corruption,andinDecemberof thatyearthePGRannouncedthatnearlyone-fifthof itsofficerswereunderinvestigationforsuspectedinvolvementinorganizedcrime.Agentsof theAFItooktothestreetsinApril2009todemandthatthePGRandCongressnotallowtheagencytodisappear.Nonetheless,themeasurewasapprovedbycongress,andPres.CalderónsigneditintolawonMay29,2009.Fromthedatethenewlawwentintoeffect,thePGRhadthirtydaystopurgeitsrostersof undesirablepersonnel.FormerAFIagentsabletopasstoxi-cology,medical,psychological,andbackgroundchecksweregivenpriorityinthenewagency.Economista(2005),CastilloandMendez(2006),ElFinanciero(2009).

52Asdiscussedbelow,thereformsalsograntexpandedpermissionforauthoritiestomonitortelephone,satel-lite,andinternetcommunicationsintheinvestigationsof organizedcrimeactivity,providedpermissionisgrantedthroughajudicialorder.

53ZepedaLecuona(2008).

54Morethan80%of themorethan5,400participantsinthestudyreportedearninglessthan$800USDpermonth,relativelylowcomparedtootherpublicsectoremployment.Moreover,despitecivilserviceprotec-tionsinthelaw,overtwothirdsfeltthattheproceduresusedbypolicedepartmentsforraisesandpromo-tionsareunfairandnotbasedonmerit.Manyofficersreportedexcessivelylongworkinghours(70%workmorethan50hoursaweekwithnoovertimepay);afifthof theforcereportedextremelyextendedshifts(a24-hourshiftforeverytwodaysoff);and68%reported30minutesorlessformealsandbreaks.Moloeznik,etal.(2009).

55Currently,theFederalCodeof CriminalProceduredoesnothaveclearcriteriaforhowajudgeshouldmakeadeterminationregardingtheapplicationof arraigo,orwhatisthenecessaryburdenof proof thatprosecu-torsmustmet(e.g.,probablecause).AsstatedunderArticle133of theCFPP,“Thejudicialauthoritymay,attherequestof thepublicprosecutor,imposepreventivemeasuresonthepersonagainstwhomacriminalactionisbeingintroduced,insofarasthesemeasuresarenecessarytopreventflightfromjudicialaction;thedestruction,alteration,orhidingof evidence;intimidation,threats,orimproperinfluenceoverwitnessestothecrime.”Deaton(2010),p.17.

56ThearraigoprocedurewasfirstintroducedinMexicoin1983,asameasuretocombatorganizedcrime.However,in2006,theSupremeCourtruledthattheprocedurewasunconstitutional,citingviolationsof thehabeascorpusrightsof individualsheldwithoutcharge.The2008reformsraisedthearraigoproceduretothelevelof aconstitutionalprovision,therebyeliminatingchargesof unconstitutionality.Howbroadly,frequently,andeffectivelytheprocedurehasbeenutilizedsince2008isnotclear,inlargepartbecauseaccesstoinformationaboutarraigocasesisdifficulttoobtain.

57BecerrilandBallinas(2009),Villamil(2009).

58“Assetsfallingsubjecttothelawaredefinedas:instruments,objects,orproductsof crimes;thoseusedtohide,disguise,ortransformcriminalproceeds;propertiesof thirdpartiesusedtoaidinthecommissionof

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crimes;andgoodsbelongingtothirdpartiesdeemedbythePGRtobetheproductof criminalactivity…Underthelaw,thePGRmustsubmitanannualreporttoCongressof assetseizures.Moreover,if ajudgedeemsthataseizurewasperformedunjustlytheassetsmustbereturnedwithinterestwithinsixmonths.”JusticeinMexicoProject(2009).

59InadditiontotheSecretaryof theInterior,thiscouncilincludesrepresentativesfromtheChamberof Depu-ties,theSenate,theSupremeCourt,theFederalAttorneyGeneral(ProcuraduríaFederaldelaRepública,PGR),thePublicSecuritySecretary(SecretaríadeSeguridadPública),theFederalJudicialCouncil(ConsejodelaJudicaturaFederal),theNationalPublicSecurityConference(ConferenciaNacionaldeSecretariosdeSeguridadPública),theLegalCounselof theFederalExecutiveBranch(ConsejeríaJurídicadelEjecutivoFederal),theNationalCommissionof StateSupremeCourts(ComisiónNacionaldeTribunalesSuperioresdeJusticia,CONATRIB),andtheNationalConferenceof AttorneysGeneral(ConferenciaNacionaldeProcuracióndeJusticia).

60ProfessorMiguelSarreIguíniz,of theTechnicalAutonomousInstituteof Mexico(InstitutoTecnológicoAutónomodeMéxico,ITAM)wasapprovedastheacademicrepresentativeinJanuary2010.BusinessmanandNGOactivistAlejandroMartíGarcía,whosesonwaskidnappedandkilled,wasappointedastherepre-sentativeforcivicorganizationsonthecounsel.SecretaríadeGobernación(2010).

61Theinauguralmeetingof thecounciltookplaceonJune18,2009,oneyearafterthereformswerefirstap-proved.DeputyCarlosNavarroSugichrepresentedtheChamberof Deputies,SenatorMarioLópezValdezrepresentedtheSenate,CounselorOscarVázquezMarínrepresentedtheConsejodelaJudicaturaFederal,MinisterJosédeJesúsGudiñoPelayorepresentedtheSupremeCourt.ThesecondandthirdmeetingstookplaceonAugust13,2009andJanuary8,2010,respectively.SecretaríadeGobernación(2009).

62Atthetimeof thecrash,SantiagoVasconcelos,51,wasalongtimefederalprosecutorwhohadrecentlyjoinedPres.Calderón’sstaff asatoplegaladvisor.Asaformerdrugprosecutor,SantiagoVasconcelosprevi-ouslyheadedtheSpecialOfficefortheInvestigationof OrganizedCrime(SubprocuradordeInvestigaciónEspecializadadeDelincuenciaOrganizada,SIEDO),wassubjecttofrequentthreatsonhislife.BeginninghisservicewiththeAttorneyGeneral’sofficein1993,SantiagoVasconceloswasappointedassistantattorneygeneralforJudicialandInternationalAffairsin2007.SantiagoVasconceloshadhelpedoverseeadramaticincreaseincross-borderextraditions,includingthatof Gulf cartelleaderOsielCardenas.Hisreplacement,BorregoEstrada,waspreviouslyamemberof theNationalActionParty(PAN),servedaspresidentof theSupremeCourtof Zacatecasfrom1998to2004,andatthetimeof hisappointmentwassecretaryof theJusticeCommitteeintheChamberof DeputiesandPANrepresentativefortheCommitteefortheReformof theState.ElUniversal(2008),Milenio(2008).

63InterviewwithFelipeBorregoEstradainMexicoCityonMarch17,2010.

64Oneindicatorof thelowprioritizationof resourcesforjusticereformimplementationisthatthe2009federalbudgetfailedtoincludeanyfundingfortheCCISJPitself,whichthenrequiredaspecialallocationtocovertheactivitiesof thetechnicalsecretary’soffice.

65AnselmoChávezRivero,anindigenousmanof Tarahumaradescent,waschargedwiththerapeof twomi-nors;heandotherwitnessestestifiedintheirnativelanguagebeforeJudgeFranciscoManuelSáenzMoreno,whofoundthedefendantguilty.Fierro(2007).

66AccordingtoCCISJP,inseveralstates,oneormorebranchesof governmenthavedemonstratedsignificantactivityorpoliticalwilltoadvancethereforms.TheseincludeGuanajuato,Tabasco,Tlaxcala,andYucatán.SecretaríadeGobernación(2010).

67AccordingtoCCISJP,thesestatesincludeAguascalientes,BajaCaliforniaSur,Campeche,Chiapas,Coahuila,Colima,theFederalDistrict,Guerrero,Jalisco,Michoacán,Nayarit,Puebla,Querétaro,SanLuisPotosí,Sinaloa,Sonora,Tamaulipas,andVeracruz.Ibid.

68Themaindataforthisassessmentcomesfromareviewof documentscollectedfromindividualcourtandgovernmentwebsites,includingtheannual“Stateof theCourts”reports(InformesAnuales),localcon-stitutions,internalregulatorydocumentsof thecourt(e.g.,LeyOrgánicadelPoderJudicial,orLOPJ;alsoReglamentos),andlocalpenalcodes(CódigoPenal)andcodesof criminalprocedure(CódigodeProced-imientosPenales,orCPP;thisissometimesreferredtoalsoasCódigoProcesalPenal).Journalistaccounts,academiccommentary,andothersecondarysourcescomplementtheseofficialrecords.Thegroupingisalsosupportedbyinformationavailableatotherorganizationsthattrackthecriminaljusticereform.Forinstance,theNationalInstituteof PenalSciences(InstitutoNacionaldeCienciasPenales,orINACIPE)maintainsawebsitethatlistsstatesthathaveproducedreformstotheircriminalcodesorcodesof criminalprocedure,aswellasreformsrelatedtoalternativedisputeresolution.TheProgramtoSupporttheRuleof Law(ProgramadeApoyoalEstadodeDerecho,orPRODERECHO),anorganizationaffiliatedwiththeUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)(PJ-MOR2009),hasawebsitethatprovidesinformationrelatedtothestatusof reformeffortsineachstate.Seehttp://www.inacipe.gob.mx(lastvisitedFeb.15,2010)andhttp://www.proderecho.com(lastvisitedFeb.10,2010).

69MapgeneratedbyIngramwithArcMap9.3.

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70ForreadersunfamiliarwithMexico,thecountry,astate,andthenation’scapitalsharethesamename.Further,thestatewrapsaroundalargeportionof thecapitalcity.Thephrasing“Stateof Mexico”isusedtodistin-guishthestatefromthecityforthesakeof clarity.InSpanish,thestate’sfullnameis“EstadodeMéxico,”frequentlyshorthandedas“Edomex”.

71AllthestatesinthefirstgrouparerecognizedbyPRODERECHOasadvancedreformersintheimplementa-tionstage,exceptforBajaCaliforniaandDurango,whichweincludebutPRODERECHOdoesnot.Thesetwostateshavemorerecentreforms,soitisnotsurprisingthatPRODERECHO’swebsitemightnothavebeenupdatedtoincludethem.Durango’sreformwasapprovedinmid-2009andenteredintoeffectbytheendof 2009.Similarly,BajaCalifornia’sreformisrecentandwasnotscheduledtogointoeffectuntilFebru-ary2010(nowMay2010).

72Formostof thestatesinCategory2,3,or4,PRODERECHOreportseither(a)thatthestatehasexpressedsomeinterestinpursuingreform,whichthefederalreformrequiresanyway(BajaCaliforniaSur,Coahuila,Guerrero,Nayarit,Querétaro,SanLuisPotosí,Tabasco),or(b)noinformationatall(Campeche,Micho-acán,Sinaloa,Yucatán),reflectingtheabsenceof informationregardingprojectsof reform.WecategorizeCampecheandYucatánasCategory2becauseIngramfoundindependentevidenceof activereforminitia-tivesunderconsideration.

73Forinstance,theStateof MexicodoesnothaveaformallawgoverningADRbuthasbeentransitioningincrementallytowardstheadversarialprocesssince2005andpassedamorecomprehensivereformin2009.Thisstateshouldbedistinguishedfromotherstates,eventhosethathaveADR,ADRlaws,andafullerreformpackageunderconsideration.

74Chile,of course,hashadtheadvantageof ahistoricallystrongjudiciary,lowlevelsof institutionalcorruptioninthejudicialsector(includingitsnationalpoliceforce),andarelativelystrongeconomy.Evenso,ontheaforementioned2007Galluppoll,Chileansratedtheperformanceof theirjudicialsystemfarmorecriticallythanMexicans.

75Proceso(2008).

76PelayoandSolorio(2010).

77Corcoran(2008).

78AsZepeda(2008)argues,theworstmiscarriageof justiceiswhenthecoerciveapparatusof ademocraticstatedeprivesaninnocentpersonof theirliberty;withoutaformalchargeagainstanindividual,thepresumptionof innocenceshouldprevail.ZepedaLecuona(2008).

79Oneconcernaboutthearraigoisthatitunderminesthereforms’tortureprohibitions.AccordingtoDeaton(2010),“Thedetainingauthoritieshaveapowerfulincentivetotortureadetaineeinordertogetthemtomakefalseconfessionssothattheymaythenhavethe“evidence”tofilechargesagainstthem.Notonlydotheyhavetheincentive,butgiventhesecretnatureof arraigoanditsplacementof detaineesincommuni-cado,withoutadequateaccesstotheirattorney,arraigoisaninvitationtotorture.Thatis,itisaninvitationtocommittheveryabusethattheconstitutionalprohibitionagainsttortureisdesignedtoprevent.”Alcántara(2006),Deaton(2010),p.16.

80BlakeandBlakeBohne(2009).

81Indeed,therearesomeconcernsthatreformeffortsinChilehavenotshownasmuchprogressasadvocateswouldlike,andhasevenexperiencedasignificantcounter-reformmovementthathasreversedsomekeyaspectsof theirreforms.VenegasandVial(2008).

82Sincetherearenorequirementsthatlawyersmaintainactivebarmembershiporregistrationtopracticelaw,thetotalnumberof practicinglawyersisunknown.FixFierro(2007)estimatesthisnumbertobearound40,000.Thereisnoclearindicationexactlyhowmanyof thesepracticecriminallaw.FixFierrosuggeststhat,giventheproliferationof Mexicanlawschoolsinrecentyears,Mexico’slegalprofessionsuffersfromaproblemof quantity-over-quality.FixFierroandJiménezGómez(1997).

83Effortstopromoteprofessionalismamonglawyersareneeded,astheywillbeprimarilyresponsiblefor“qual-itycontrol”intheMexicancriminaljusticesystem.AlthoughMexicohasrecentlyadoptedanewcodeof ethics,Mexicanlawyersarenotpresentlyrequiredtoreceivepost-graduatestudies,takeabarexam,maintaingoodstandinginaprofessionalbarassociation,orseekcontinuingeducationinordertopracticelaw.Allof theseareelementsof legalprofessionalismthatdevelopedgraduallyandinasomewhatadhocmannerintheUnitedStates,andmostlyinthepost-warera.

84Atthesametime,lawyerswerebuildingnewstandardsforprofessionalconduct,includingitsModelCodeof EthicsfirstdevelopedbytheAmericanBarAssociation(ABA)in1969andusedinmoststates.Thiscodewasprecededin1908bytheCanonsof ProfessionalEthics.AnABACommissiononEvaluationof ProfessionalStandardswasfirstappointedin1977,andtheABAdevelopeditsModelRulesof ProfessionalConductin1983.Onlyonestate,California,doesnotformallyadheretothemodelrules,thoughitdoeshaveitsownrulesof professionalconduct.See:www.aba.org.

85Thisseriesof forums,knownasthe“JusticeNetwork/ReddeJusticia,”broughttogetherhundredsof U.S.

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andMexicanlawstudents,legalpractitioners,businesspeople,academics,journalists,andNGOrepresenta-tivesinAguascalientes(September2007),BajaCalifornia(May2007),Chihuahua(March2008),Coahuila(March2007),Jalisco(July2007),NuevoLeón(January2008),Oaxaca(November2007),andZacatecas(September2007).In2009,theprojectalsoworkedtoestablishabi-nationallegaleducationprogrambetweentheUniversityof SanDiegoandtheUniversidadAutónomadeBajaCalifornia(UABC)withas-sistancefromHigherEducationforDevelopment(HED).

86RecenteffortsbytheJusticeinMexicoProjecttointerviewlawyersandpolicethroughaninstrumentknownasthe“Justiciabarómetro,”constitutesomeof thefirstindependentsurveysontheprofile,operationalcapacity,andprofessionalopinionsof judicialsystemoperators.However,otherprocessindicatorsaresorelyneededtomeasuretherealimplicationsof thereforms.

87Seehttp://www.chihuahua.gob.mx/justiciapenal(lastvisitedFeb,14,2010).

88Atthesecondoraltrial,therewerecomplaintsthatitwasaclosedproceeding(doorswereclosedtopreventovercrowdingafteralargenumberof peoplecametowatch),andthateightof thetenotheroraltrialjudgeswerealsointheaudience,creatingthepotentialforfuturebiasortheappearanceof partialityif thecaseneededtoberetried(TBI2008e,15).

89ThePenalCodeof NuevoLeónidentifiesthreedegreesof culpability:(1)dolo,(2)culpa,and(3)preterin-tentionality.Culpamostcloselyresemblesnegligenceoranactof omissionintheU.S.languageof mensrea.Article28of theCodereadsasfollows:“Obraconculpaquienrealizaelhecholegalmentedescrito,porinobservanciadeldeberdecuidadoqueleincumbedeacuerdoconlasleyesoreglamentos,lascircunstanciasysuscondicionespersonales,olasnormasdelaprofesiónoactividadquedesempeña.Asímismoenelcasoderepresentarseelhechocomoposibleyseconduceenlaconfianzadepoderevitarlo.”

90Oralproceedingsmayhavealreadybeentakingplaceasearlyaslate2006,butthecourt’sreportfor2006-2007coversthetimeperiodfromAugust2006toJuly2007,anditisnotclearinwhichyearthereportedcasestookplace(PJ-NLN2007,20).

91TheseareBajaCaliforniaSur(TBI2008c,11-12)andTlaxcala(TBI2009a,17).Inthelatter,thepresidentof thestatesupremecourtrepeatedlyfaultedthelocallegislaturefornotprioritizingjustice(TBI2009a,17;2009c,17).

92Privateattorneyswhopracticecriminallawremainskepticalinotherpartsof Mexico,aswell.However,thereisatleastsomeevidencethattheseattorneysmaybemotivatedbythefactthenewsystemwillresultinlowerearningsforthem,inpartbecausetheywillhavetoeitheracquirenewtrainingorfindadifferentlineof work,andinpartbecausethenewprocessmakeslitigationperiodsshorter,generatingefficiencybutalsoreducingthefeesattorneyscancharge(see,e.g.,PelayoandSolorio2010,356).Similarly,judgesandotherolderormid-careerlegalprofessionalsmayopposethereformbecausetheydonotwanttohavetolearnanewwayof doingthejobtheyhavebeendoingfor10,20,or30years.

93“Elsistemapenalacusatorio,adversarial,yoral…hasidoincorporado[enlaConstitucióndelEstado,elCódigodeProcedimientosPenales,ylaLeyOrgánicadelPoderJudicial].”

94Openingof decreenotesthatthiskindof reformwascontemplatedinthestateasearlyas2005.

95JudgeJavierPinedaSordawasalsoaffiliatedwithPRODERECHO,anon-profitorganizationpromotingjudicialreforminMexico(ActualidadJudicial,62).DuetosometiesbetweenUSAIDandPRODERECHO,observersmightquestiontowhatextentPinedaSordaisidentifiedasadomesticorforeignbrokerof exper-tise.DespitehistiestoPRODERECHO,however,heisapublicservantinChihuahua,whichwouldweighheavilyinfavorof classifyinghimasadomesticinfluence.Zacatecashasreliedonforeignexpertiseinthepast,includingtrainersfromCostaRica,Chile,Spain,andEngland(ActualidadJudicial2007,63-66).

97Seehttp://www.portal.camp.gob.mx/C3/C6/justiciapenal;alsohttp://www.tribunalcampeche.gob.mx/cisj-upe.

98Seehttp://www.nuevosistemadejusticiapenalhgo.gob.mx

99InChiapas,theLeydeJusticiaAlternativapassedonMarch18,2009.NoreformisapparentintheexistingCodeof Criminalprocedure,whichnotesthelastreformwasonOctober21,2009.InMexicoCity,anAlter-nativeJusticeCenter(CentrodeJusticiaAlternativa)hasbeenoperatingsinceSeptember1,2003(Informe2008,53),andtheLeydeJusticiaAlternativapassedonJanuary8,2008.Inthenorthernstateof Tamaulipas,theLeyOrgánicadelPoderJudicial(lastreformdatedSeptember3,2009)saysnothingaboutanychangesincriminalprocedure,butaMediationLaw(LeydeMediacion)isinexistencesince2007.InTlaxcala,the2009Stateof theCourtsreport(Informe2009)saysnothingaboutchangesincriminalprocedure,andtheLOPJissimilarlysilent(lastreformdatedJanuary12,2007).However,theLeydeJusticiaAlternativadatesbackto2007.JaliscopasseditsLJAin2006(effectiveJan.1,2008),GuanajuatoonMay27,2003(lastreformedonAugust1,2006),Colimain2003,andSonoraonApril7,2008.

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About the Authors:

Matthew Ingram, Ph.D.,isafellowattheCenterforU.S.-MexicanStudies.Dr.IngramearnedhisB.A.fromPomonaCollege,andobtainedhisdoctoraldegreeinPoliticalSci-enceandalawdegreefromtheUniversityof NewMexico.Hiscomparativeandinter-disciplinaryresearchinpoliticsandlawseeksabetterunderstandingof thesourcesof stronginstitutions,statebuilding,anddemocracy.Dr.Ingramhaswrittenseveralpapers,including“PeacebyDesign:InstitutionalChoicesandtheRiskof ArmedConflictinDemocracies,”and“Ruleof LawandDemocracy:ConceptualandCausalIssuesfromaComparativePerspective.”Hiscurrentresearchproject,“CraftingCourtsinNewDe-mocracies:ThePoliticsof Sub-nationalJudicialReforminMexicoandBrazil,”looksattheprocessof judicialreforminLatinAmerica’stwolargestdemocracies.

David A. Shirk, Ph.D., isDirectorof theTrans-BorderInstituteandAssociateProfes-sorof PoliticalScienceattheUniversityof SanDiego.Dr.ShirkreceivedhisB.A.fromLockHavenUniversityandhisdoctorateattheUniversityof California-SanDiego.HespecializesinMexicanpolitics,U.S.-Mexicanrelations,andtheU.S.-Mexicanborder.Dr.ShirkisprincipalinvestigatorfortheJusticeinMexicoproject(www.justiceinmexico.org),aresearchinitiativeonpublicsecurityandruleof lawissuesinMexico.In2009,hetestifiedbeforetheU.S.Congressontheissueof Mexicandrugtraffickingandviolence.Dr.Shirk’srecentpublicationsinclude:“DrugViolenceinMexico”(2010),PoliceandPublicSecurityinMexico(2009),ContemporaryMexicanPolitics(2008);ReformingtheAdministrationof JusticeinMexico(2007);EvaluatingAccountabilityandTransparencyinMexico(2007);andMexico’sNewPolitics:ThePANandDemocraticChange(2005).In2009-10,Dr.ShirkisinresidenceasafellowattheWoodrowWilsonCenterforIn-ternationalScholarsinWashington,D.C.

Acknowledgements:

RobertDonnelly,CoryMolzahn,andOctavioRodriguezmademajorcontributionstothecontentandeditingof thisreport.Thereportalsoreflectsthecontributionsandcollaborationof CarlosCastañeda,AnnaCearley,JudithDavila,JaniceDeaton,TheresaFirestine,ElisseLarouche,CharlesPope,andNicoleRamos.MarceloBergman,Fran-ciscoGorjon,GustavoGuerra,LinnHammergren,MattIngram,EricOlson,MaríaCandelaríaPelayoTorres,MiguelSarre,AllenSnyder,DanielSolorio,andAndrewSeleealsoprovidedvaluablecommentsandcritiques.Thisresearchbenefitedfromthegener-ousfinancialandinstitutionalsupportof TheWilliamandFloraHewlettFoundation,TheTinkerFoundation,TheSmith-RichardsonFoundation,andtheWoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars.Theanalysisandconclusionsof theauthordonotreflecttheviewsof theTrans-BorderInstituteoritssponsoringorganizations.

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