PUNSALAN, JR. V. VDA. DE LACSAMANA G.R. No. L-55729 March 28, 1983FACTS:Punsalan was the owner of a piece of land, which he mortgaged in favor of PNB. Due to his failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed and the land was sold in a public auction to which PNB was the highest bidder.On a relevant date, while Punsalan was still the possessor of the land, it secured a permit for the construction of a warehouse.A deed of sale was executed between PNB and Punsalan. This contract was amended to include the warehouse and the improvement thereon. By virtue of these instruments, respondent Lacsamana secured title over the property in her name.Petitioner then sought for the annulment of the deed of sale. Among his allegations was that the bank did not own the building and thus, it should not be included in the said deed.Petitioner’s complaint was dismissed for improper venue. The trial court held that the action being filed in actuality by petitioner is a real action involving his right over a real property. ISSUE:W/N the trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue.W/N the warehouse is an immovable and must be tried in the province where the property lies.HELD: Warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real property. Buildings are always immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which it is stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as immovable property.

PRUDENTIAL BANK V. PANIS 153 SCRA 390FACTS:Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs Tumalad over their house, which was being rented by Madrigal and company. This was executed to guarantee a loan, payable in one year with a 12% per annum interest. The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure to pay the loan. The house was sold at a public auction and the plaintiffs were the highest bidder. A corresponding certificate of sale was issued. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an action for ejectment against the defendants, praying that the latter vacate the house as they were the proper owners.ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE MORTGAGE, AHOUSE OF STRONG MATERIALS, BE THE OBKECT OF A CHATTELMORTGAGE?HELD: Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are immovable property such as when through stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal property those by their nature would be real property. This is partly based on the principle of estoppel wherein the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house as chattel, a conduct that may conceivably stop him from subsequently claiming otherwise. In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property through chattel mortgage could only have meant that defendant conveys the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.

Leung Yee v Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil 644FACTS: The "Compania Agricola Filipina" purchased from "Strong Machinery Co." rice-cleaning machines which the former installed in one of its buildings. As security for the purchase price, the buyer executed a CHATTEL MORTGAGE on the

machines and the building on which they had been installed. Upon buyer's failure to pay, the registered mortgage was foreclosed, and the building was purchased by the seller, the "Strong Machinery Co." This sale was annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. Later, the "Agricola" also sold to "Strong Machinery" the lot on which the building had been constructed. This sale was not registered in the Registry of Property but the Machinery Co. took possession of the building and the lot.Previously however, the same building has been purchases at a sheriff's sale by Leung Yee, a creditor of Agricola, although Leung Yee knew all the time of the prior sale in favor of "Strong Machinery." The sale in favor of Leung Yee was recorded in the Registry. Leung Yee now sues to recover the property from "Strong Machinery."ISSUE: Who has a better right to the property?HELD:The building is real property, therefore, its sale as annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry cannot be given the legal effect of registration in the Registry of Real Property. The mere fact that the parties decided to deal with the building as personal property does not change its character as real property. Thus, neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry, nor the annotation in said registry of the sale of the mortgaged property had any effect on the building. However, since the land and the building had first been purchased by "Strong Machinery" (ahead of Leung Yee), and this fact was known to Leung Yee, it follows that Leung Yee was not a purchaser in good faith, and should therefore not be entitled to the property. "Strong Machinery" thus has a better right to the property.

Standard Oil Co. v. Jaranillo 44 Phil. 631

FACTS: De la Rosa, who was renting a parcel of land in Manila, constructed a building of strong materials thereon, which she conveyed to plaintiff Standard Oil Co. by way of chattel mortgage. When the mortgagee was presenting the deed to the Register of Deeds of Manila for registration in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, the Registrar refused to allow the registration on the ground that the building was a real property, not personal property, and therefore could not be the subject of a valid chattel mortgage.ISSUE: May the deed be registered in the chattel mortgage registry?HELD: Yes, because the Registrar's duty is MINISTERIAL in character. There is no legal provision conferring upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of the document presented before him. He should therefore accept the legal fees being tendered, and place the document on record.

Navarro vs PinedaFacts: Defendant-appellants, Rufino Penida and his mother Juana Gonzales, borrowed a sum of money payable on or before June 14, 1960 to the plaintiff Conrado Navarro. As a security, Rufino executed a “Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage”. In the said mortgage his mother, by way of Real Estate Mortgage pledge a parcel of land belonging to her. Rufino, on the other hand, executed a Chattel mortgage of his two storey residential house made of G.I. sheet roofing, “sawali’ walls and wooden posts, and a truck. The said mortgages are contained in one document, and were duly registered. However, the house was erected on the land of Attorney Vicente Castro. After two extensions they failed to pay their obligation.

Issue: Whether or Not, a house erected on a land that belongs to a third person may be the subject of a chattel mortgage.Ruling: That the property subject of the controversy is a chattel since it was built on a rented land that belongs to another. As such, it does not become immobilized by attachment, so as to make it a real property. Moreover, the stipulation of the parties expressly states in the document that it is a chattel. By express declaration of the parties in the contract, appellants are estopped from claiming otherwise. However, this is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. With respect to third persons who are not parties to the contract, the house is considered as immovable property.

LOPEZ v OROSA, JR., PLAZA THEATRE, INC.The Building is an immovable by itself, separate and distinct from the land from which it is attached.FACTS:Orosa invited Lopez to invest with him in building a theatre. Lopez supplied wood for the construction of the said theatre. The materials totaled 62k but Orosa was only able to pay 20k thus leaving a balance of almost 42k. Later on respondents acquired a bank loan of 30k, wherein Luzon Surety Company as their surety and the land and buildings as mortgages. Petitioner sued to collect the unpaid materials and was able to get a judgment against the respondents making them jointly liable to pay the remaining amount. Also, he was able to obtain a material man’s lien on the building of the theatre. The stocks amounting to 42k shall be sold in public auction in case the respondents default. Petitioner wasn’t happy because he also wanted a lien on the land, urging that the judgment lien should include it since the building and the land are inseparable.ISSUE:Whether or not the building and the land are inseparable and W/N petitioner can obtain a lien on the land as well?RULING:NO to both! The contention that the lien executed in favor of the furnisher of the materials used for the construction, repair or refection of a building is also extended to land on which the construction was made is without merit, because while it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land in the enumeration (in the CC) of what may constitute real properties could mean only one thing- that a building is by itself an immovable property.The preference to unregistered lien is only with respect to the real estate upon which the refection or work was made. The material man’s lien could be charged only to the building for which the credit was made or which received the benefit of refection.

SIBAL v. VALDEZFACTS: The deputy sheriff of Tarlac attached and sold to Valdez the sugarcane planted by the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked for the redemption of the sugarcane. Valdez said that it cannot be subject to redemption because it is a personal property.ISSUE: WON the sugarcane in question is a personal or real property.HELD:Sugarcane is under real property as ungathered products. The Supreme Court of Louisiana provided that standing crops are considered as part of the land to which they are attached but the immovability provided for is only one in abstract. The existence of a right on the growing crop is mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop movable quoad the right acquired therein.-A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the immovable. It belongs to the lessee and may be sold by him.-Act 1508 (Chattel Mortgage Law) recognize growing crops as personal property.

– Crops whether growing or ready to be harvested, when produced by annual cultivation, is not part of realty.– Paragraph 2 of Art. 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by Sec. 450 of Code of Civil Procedure and Act no. 1508 in the sense that for purposes of attachment and execution and Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered products have the nature of personal property.

Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, 61 Phil. 709Facts:Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., a holder of a lumber concession, has operated sawmill in a land which it does not own. The company erected a building therein which housed the machinery used by it. In the lease contract between the sawmill company and the owner of the land, it has been agreed that after the lease period or in case the company should leave or abandon the land leased before the said period, ownership of all the improvements and buildings except machineries and accessories, made by the company shall pass to the owner of the land without any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said improvements and buildings. In another action, A writ of execution was issued against the company and the properties in question were levied upon. The company assailed the said writ contending that the machineries and accessories were personal in nature, hence, not subject to writ of execution. The trial judge ruled in favour of the company.Issue:Whether or not the subject properties are personal in nature.Held: The subject properties are personal in nature. Article 334, paragraph 5, of the [Old] Civil Code provides that real property consists of (5) Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade of industry. Machinery which is movable in nature only becomes immovable when placed in a land by the owner of the property or land but not when so placed by a tenant or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, the machinery is intended not by the owner of the land but by the saw mill company for use in connection with its trade. In this sense, the machinery is not a real property.

Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor DigestFacts: Petitioner is a public utility company engaged in the transport of passengers and cargo by motor vehicles in Mindanao with main offices in Cagayan de Oro (CDO). Petitioner likewise owned a land where it maintains a garage, a repair shop and blacksmith or carpentry shops. The machineries are placed thereon in wooden and cement platforms. The City Assessor of CDO then assessed a P4,400 realty tax on said machineries and repair equipment. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals but it sustained the City Assessor's decision, while the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) sustained the same.Note: This is merely a case digest to aid in remembering the important points of a case. It is still advisable for any student of law to read the full text of assigned cases.Issue: Whether or not the machineries and equipments are considered immobilized and thus subject to a realty taxHeld: The Supreme Court decided otherwise and held that said machineries and equipments are not subject to the assessment of real estate tax.Said equipments are not considered immobilized as they are merely incidental, not essential and principal to the business of the petitioner. The transportation business could be carried on without repair or service shops of its rolling equipment as they can be repaired or services in another shop belonging to another.

US V. CARLOSFACTS:Mr. Carlos stole about 2273 kilowatts of electricity worth 909 pesos from Meralco. The court issued warrant for arrest. Mr. Carlos demurred and refused to enter a plea. He claimed that what he did failed to constitute an offense. His counsel further asserted that the crime of larceny applied only to tangibles, chattels and objects that can be taken into possession and spirited away.Deliberation quickly followed at the court which subsequently sentenced him to over a year in jail. Mr. Carlos contested saying that electrical energy can’t be stolen (how can one steal an incorporeal thing?). He filed an appeal on such grounds and the court of first instance affirmed the decision. The case reached the Supreme Court.ISSUE:Whether or not larceny can be committed against an intangible such as electricity.HELD:Yes, larceny of incorporeal objects is possible. The right of ownership of electrical current was secured byArt 517 and 518 of the Penal Code which applies to gas.Analogically, electricity can be considered as ‘gas’ which can be stolen. However, the true test of what constitutes the proper subject of larceny is not whether the subject is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by another other than the owner. It is a valuable article of merchandise, a force of nature brought under the control of science. Mr. Carlos secretly and with intent to deprive the company of its rightful property, used jumper cables to appropriate the same for his own use. This constitutes larceny.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 179987 April 29, 2009FACTS:On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, includingLot9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.ISSUES:1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing

of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?HELD:The Petition is denied.(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the

subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.