JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment - la Repubblica

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO

U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20330910

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JTF-GTMO-CDR 10 September 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172 SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9LY-010017DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment 1. (S) Personal Information:

○ JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abu al-Libi ○ Current/True Name and Aliases: Mustafa Faraj Muhammad

Muhammad Masud al-Jadid al-Uzaybi, Abd al-Wakil, Abu Jayhoun, Abu al-Faraj, Abu Faraj al-Libi, Doctor, Irjaz, Mahfoz, Mansur Ahmad, Abdul al-Raqman Mohajer, Mhafiz, Tawfiq, Uthman, Wakil Khan

○ Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya (LY) ○ Date of Birth: 1970 ○ Citizenship: Libya ○ Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9LY-010017DP

2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as CD on 8 December 2006. b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee was the operational chief of al-Qaida and had long-term associations with Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Detainee managed al-Qaida operations, including al-Qaida operations in Iraq, after Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s, aka (KSM), aka (Mukhtar), US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024) capture.

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9LY-010017DP (S)

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Detainee also directed al-Qaida operations against US and Coalition forces within Afghanistan (AF). Detainee planned and executed operations against the US and other nations, including an alleged 2003 assassination attempt against President Musharraf of Pakistan. Detainee provided safe havens for UBL and senior al-Qaida leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2001 and 2003. Detainee was an instructor and administrator at two al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan. Detainee managed two al-Qaida guesthouses in Kabul, AF and participated in armed hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is knowledgeable of al-Qaida's strategies and was identified as helping to publish a magazine supporting Islamic extremism and jihad. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

• A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies • A HIGH threat from a detention perspective • Of HIGH intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO assessment. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.)

• Revised detainee’s account of events • Incorporated reporting of detainee’s activities

4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee graduated in 1989 from Shuhada al-Wajib High School in Libya. The first time detainee left Libya was for travel to Tunis, Tunisia (TS) in late 1988 or early 1989 with his father, who wished to exchange Libyan currency for Tunisian currency.1

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In 1989, detainee learned about extremism through the media and cassette tapes that solicited volunteers to travel to Afghanistan.2 An individual

1 TD-314/12435-06, TD-314/46042-05 2 Analyst Note: In IIR 6 034 0164 05, Awad Khalifa Muhammad Abu Bakr Abu Uwayshah, ISN US9LY-000695DP (LY-695), contradicted detainee, stating detainee participated in the Afghan-Soviet Jihad, which took place between 1979 and 1989. LY-695 added detainee came to Afghanistan in the late 1980's. LY-695 claimed detainee originally trained in Tajikistan, further contradicting detainee's reporting. In TD-314/21038-03, Ali

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named Jafar, who lived in detainee's neighborhood and returned from participating in extremist activities in Afghanistan, was recruiting volunteers to go to Afghanistan. Detainee, along with Jafar and three others, departed Libya in 1989 and traveled to Cairo, Egypt (EG) to obtain visas for Pakistan (PK). Libya was not issuing Pakistani visas at the time for fear that people would travel to Afghanistan for extremist activities. After multiple failures for obtaining Pakistani visas in Egypt, Jafar attempted to take all the passports to Saudi Arabia (SA) to obtain visas. However, he was arrested upon arrival and sent back to Cairo with the passports. Jafar led the authorities to the house in Cairo where detainee and the others were staying, resulting in the collective arrest of everyone present at that location. The group was deported to Tunisia, where detainee and the others again tried to acquire Pakistani visas. They were subsequently arrested by Tunisian authorities. When the group was released in the end of 1989 or around the beginning of 1990, Jafar organized a flight to Algeria (AG) for detainee and his Libyan companions, and finally acquired Pakistani visas. Detainee and several others traveled to Islamabad, PK in early 1990 and upon arrival spoke with one of Jafar's contacts on the phone. This contact provided directions to the al-Ansar Guesthouse in Peshawar, PK which housed mainly new Arab recruits and injured fighters returning from the front lines.3

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Approximately two days later, detainee and some Libyan recruits traveled to a Miram Shah, PK guesthouse before continuing to al-Qaida's Jawar Camp in Khowst, AF for basic military training.4 Detainee was taught basic weapons handling, physical fitness, and Islamic law over a period of two months. Upon completion of the course, the emir of the camp took detainee and some other recruits who were considered dedicated and trustworthy to a meeting. The emir offered those present at the meeting the opportunity to become members of al-Qaida. Detainee was presented a paper contract that outlined the details of becoming a member of al-Qaida and a commitment to spend a number of months fighting on the front lines of Afghanistan to prove his dedication. At that time, al-Qaida had only existed for about three years. Detainee could not give bayat (oath of allegiance) at the time to UBL because UBL was in Saudi Arabia.5 (S//NF) From 1990 through the middle of 1992, detainee split his time between fighting on the front lines in Afghanistan and working at the Khallad and Jihad Wahl Training Camps in

Muhammad Abd al-Aziz al-Fakhri, aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212) also stated detainee participated in the Afghan-Russian Jihad. 3 TD-314/12435-06, TD-314/46042-05 4 Analyst Note: In TD-314/57072-04, Sharif al-Masri (detained in 2004) claimed detainee told him detainee traveled to Afghanistan when he was very young and was with al-Qaida since his early days in Afghanistan. In TD-314/75453-05, detainee reported al-Faruq Training Camp used to be called Jawar Training Camp. Variants for Jihad Wahl include Jihad Wael and Jihad One. A variant of Jawar is Zhawar. The Zhawar Killi Camp complex consisted of several training camps, including Jihad Wahl and Khalid Ibn al-Walid, aka (Khallad) Training Camps. 5 TD-314/12435-06, TD-314/46042-05

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Pakistan. In 1991, detainee saw UBL for the first time when UBL came to the Jihad Wahl Camp and gave a speech, in which detainee heard UBL hint at large attacks against the US in the future. In mid-1992 to 1993, al-Qaida sent detainee and approximately 25 to 30 others to study Islamic Law at a University in Peshawar. After approximately three months of study in Pakistan, all 25 to 30 fled because the situation in Pakistan changed.6 Detainee returned to the Jihad Wahl Camp to train new recruits arriving from Tajikistan.7 Detainee next worked at the al-Faruq Training Camp from 1993 until 1998 as both an administrator and as an instructor.8 As an administrator, detainee was responsible for overseeing the finances, logistics, library, and basic storage needs at the camp. As an instructor, the detainee taught classes in topography, basic enemy targeting, and entry-level weapons courses. Sometime between 1995 and 1996, detainee had problems with his eyesight and skin that precluded him from teaching the advanced weapons course so he became an administrator at the camp.9

(S//NF) In 1997, when UBL arrived from Sudan (SU), detainee met him face-to-face for the first time in Jalalabad, AF. UBL called a meeting of senior al-Qaida members and detainee traveled to the meeting from Khowst. During the meeting, UBL gave a speech on fighting Americans and freeing the holy sites.10 (S//NF) Approximately a month after the 1998 al-Qaida attacks on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, US forces attacked numerous al-Qaida camps including Jihad Wahl, al-Faruq, Sadiq, and some Pakistani camps. Detainee visited Jihad Wahl a few days after the attack and decided to close it. Approximately three weeks later, he received a letter from Abu Hafs, aka (Muhammad Atif), aka (Abu Hafs al-Masri) with an order from al-Qaida senior leaders to move the Jihad Wahl and al-Faruq Camps to Kabul. The camps were combined into a single camp called al-Faruq that remained in Kabul for only two months. UBL ordered the al-Faruq Training Camp to be moved from Kabul to Kandahar, AF around the end of 1999. Abu Muhammad al-Masri was then put in charge of the camp due to detainee's preparations for his own wedding. In early 2000, detainee was appointed and operated the two guesthouses in Kabul, until the fall of Kabul in late 2001. On 11 September 2001, Abu Hafs called and told detainee to come to his house. While at Abu Hafs’ house, detainee saw the World Trade Center burning. Abu Hafs told detainee that there would probably be a strong reaction from the US and they needed to make preparations to leave Kabul to find safe haven. Detainee stayed in Kabul until the city fell to US and Coalition

6 TD-314/12435-06, TD-314/46042-05, TD-314/46021-05 7 TD-314/46021-05 8 Analyst Note: In TD-314/46021-05, detainee reported he was an instructor at Jihad Wahl from 1994 to 1996. 9 TD-314/12435-06, TD-314/46042-05, TD-314/46021-05, Analyst Note: Senior al-Qaida members talk about detainee's skin condition: see TD-314/20785-04 and IIR 6 034 1524 03. It is reported in IIR 6 034 0164 05 detainee appears to have Vitiligo, also called White Spot Disease or Lukoderma, a disease in which patches of skin become discolored from loss of pigmentation. 10 TD-314/12435-06, TD-314/46042-05

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forces on 13 November 2001. This was detainee’s last face to face meeting with UBL where UBL discussed the logistical details of moving fighters out of Kabul to a safe haven. Detainee fled to Kandahar in late December 2001 and met his wife who was residing there. Detainee traveled to Gardez, AF to assist between 100 and 200 fighters move from Gardez to Kandahar. He spent the next nine to ten months in hiding with his family in Pakistan.11

(S//NF) In October 2002, Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), contacted and asked detainee to work with him in Peshawar. Detainee accepted the offer and spent the next five to six months working under IZ-10026 organizing the purchase of supplies for fighters including medicine, lights, batteries, food, and clothing. In July 2003, detainee received a letter from UBL’s designated courier, Maulawi Abd al-Khaliq Jan, requesting detainee take on the responsibility of collecting donations, organizing travel, and distributing funds to families in Pakistan. UBL stated detainee would be the official messenger between UBL and others in Pakistan.12 In mid-2003, detainee moved his family to Abbottabad, PK and worked between Abbottabad and Peshawar.13

(S//NF) Between August 2003 and February 2004, detainee traveled to Shkai, PK on three occasions. While at Shkai, detainee met with al-Qaida’s Shari’a Council, delivered funds to fighters, met with Hamza Rabia, and visited IZ-10026. In mid 2004, detainee moved his family from Abbottabad to Bajaur, PK. During October 2004, detainee received a letter from UBL asking about the [financial] situations in Pakistan and Waziristan. In addition to the letter, there was a video tape of UBL speeches. In December 2004, detainee met with Shawqi Marzuq Abd al-Alam Dabbas, aka (Khalid Habib), in Bajaur. They discussed possible future operations against US interests in Poland.14 In mid-March 2005, Abu Ubaydah al-Masri15 instructed detainee to meet with Abd al-Khaliq Jan in Mardan, PK. The meeting did not take place.16

5. (U) Capture Information:

11 TD-314/12435-06, TD-314/46042-05 12 TD-314/12435-06, TD-314/46042-05, TD-314/40102-05, Analyst Note: In TD-314/37025-05, detainee stated of early May 2005, he was responsible for facilitation within the settled areas of Pakistan, communication with UBL and external links. He was responsible for communicating with al-Qaida members abroad and obtaining funds and personnel from those al-Qaida members. In TD-314/54704-04, TD-314/54644-04, detainee met with Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Obaidallah to establish a formal chain for passing financial support to the Taliban. 13 TD-314/12435-06, TD-314/46042-05 14 TD-314/12435-06, TD-314/46042-05, Analyst Note: In TD-314/42659-05, detainee provides information on the Shura Council. 15 Analyst Note: In TD-314/76046-06, Abu Ubaydah al-Masri is reported as the former al-Qaida emir of Konar Province who now appears to have greater responsibility for operational planning abroad. 16 TD-314/44727-05

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a. (S//NF) Detainee tried to meet with Abd al-Khaliq again in mid-April and again in early May. In mid-April 2005, detainee began arranging for a store front to be used as a meeting place and drop point for messages he wanted to exchange with Abd al-Khaliq. On 2 May 2005, while he was waiting to meet with Abd al-Khaliq in Mardan, Pakistani Special Forces arrested detainee.17 Reporting identified detainee as an al-Qaida senior commander of operations in Pakistan who maintained communication with senior al-Qaida leadership including UBL and who is most closely associated with significant network operatives IZ-10026 and now-deceased Ali Ammar Ashur al-Raqiai, aka (Abu Layth al-Libi).18 Pakistan's foreign office confirmed that the detainee was transferred to US custody on 6 June 2005.19

b. (S) Property Held:

• Computer and computer media20 (Not held by JTF-GTMO)

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 4 September 2006

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

• Detainee is designated as a HIGH VALUE DETAINEE (HVD) and was specifically transferred to JTF-GTMO to face prosecution for terrorist activities against the US

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Detainee has provided a detailed account of his activities and associations, and admitted acting in a position of authority and responsibility for UBL and al-Qaida. However, certain details are possibly omissions of the entire story, such as operational knowledge of al-Qaida plans leading to the US Embassy bombings in Africa and 11 September 2001 attacks. Details of detainee’s account are corroborated by other JTF-GTMO detainees who would have similar placement and access. 7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

17 TD-314/44727-05, TD-314/46810-05, IIR 2 243 0010 06, Analyst Note: There are 119 pages of scanned information recovered from the detainee's computer pertaining to circuitry. 18 IIR 2 243 0010 06, Analyst Note: Abu Layth al-Libi was killed on 29 January 2008 at his house in Pakistan. 19 010017 Abu Faraj al-Libi 01-DEC-2005, 010017 Captured al-Qaeda Kingpin is case of Mistaken Identity 08-May-2005 20 TD-314/47553-05

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b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a senior al-Qaida member who managed al-Qaida operations, to include al-Qaida operations in Iraq, once KU-10024 was captured, and had control over al-Qaida operations against US and Coalition forces within Afghanistan. Detainee planned and executed operations against the US and other nations, including an alleged 2003 assassination attempt against President Musharraf of Pakistan.21 Detainee also provided safe havens for UBL and senior al-Qaida leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2001 and 2003. Detainee served as an instructor and administrator at two al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan where he also received formal militant training. Detainee further managed two al-Qaida guesthouses and fought on the Afghan front lines in support of the Taliban. Detainee is knowledgeable of al-Qaida's strategic doctrine and was identified as having helped publish a jihadist magazine.

• (S//NF) Detainee is a senior al-Qaida member who managed al-Qaida external operations, to include al-Qaida operations in Iraq, once KU-10024 was captured, and had control over al-Qaida operations within Afghanistan against US and Coalition forces.

○ (S//NF) Detainee admitted joining al-Qaida in the early 1990’s and was reported among UBL’s cadre.22 Detainee’s name appears on a list of 22 al-Qaida members recovered by US and Coalition forces from the residence of Abu Hafs in Kandahar on or about 11 December 2001.23 ○ (S//NF) IZ-10026 said he believed detainee to be a suitable choice to replace KU-10024 after KU-10024’s capture. IZ-10026 reported that in 2003, Hamza Rabia moved in the role as a key al-Qaida external operations planner under detainee’s overall management. Al-Qaida members discussed the fact that a big attack had not occurred since KU-10024’s capture. IZ-10026 reported detainee stated an operation should happen soon.24 ○ (S//NF) According to IZ-10026, detainee managed al-Qaida’s "Iraq File," making him responsible to senior al-Qaida leaders for Iraq.25 ○ (S//NF) Ahmad Khaflan Ghailani, ISN US9TZ-010012DP (TZ-10012), reported detainee was his emir (leader) while in Mir Ali, PK.26 TZ-10012 stated UBL would be notified of any planned attack and if UBL deemed an attack was too small or unfeasible, UBL would cancel it. TZ-10012 stated Muhammad Atif would also be notified, but since Atif’s death in 2004, detainee would possibly be notified, but not any other persons.27

21 TD-314/12435-06, TD-314/51970-02, TD-314/49699-04, TD-314/30445-05 22 TD-314/46042-05,TD-314/49699-04 23 IIR 7 739 3031 03 24 TD-314/82496-06 25 Antiterroism Force Protection Iinformation Roundup-Serial 2048 26 IIR 4 201 1693 08 27 TD-314/10556-05

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○ (S//NF) KU-10024 stated detainee and IZ-10026, who were the emirs of al-Qaida operations inside Afghanistan, planned to use suicide operatives and car bombs to attack US and Afghan military convoys in Afghanistan.28 ○ (S//NF) Detained al-Qaida in Iraq senior facilitator, Layth Ibrahim Abd al-Fatah al-Farha, aka (Abu Jafar al-Iraqi), stated during a mid-2004 meeting, detainee requested al-Zarqawi provide Chinese anti-aircraft missiles for al-Qaida's use against helicopters and other military aircraft in Afghanistan.29 ○ (S//NF) Al-Qaida facilitator Faysalallah Baluch Abbas Baluchistan, aka (Yaqub), identified detainee as the head of the “Egyptian Group." Yaqub reported the group consisted of detainee; Muhammad Umar Abd al-Rahman, aka (Assadallah); Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, aka (Shaykh Said al-Masri); Muhammad Shawqi al-Islambuli, aka (Khalid al-Masri); Hamza Rabia; and Saadi al-Masri.30 ○ (S//NF) Detainee is married to one of Abadallah Abd al-Qadir Tabarak’s, ISN US9MO-000056DP (MO-056, transferred) daughters. MO-056 was reportedly head of UBL’s bodyguards while in Kandahar in 2001.31 ○ (C//REL US, GCTF) Abd al-Razzaq Abdallah Ibrahim al-Sharikh, ISN US9SA-000067DP (SA-067, transferred) stated detainee was a leader of his own group and a member of al-Qaida. Detainee was famous because he appeared on al-Jazeera mentioning operations and bragged he killed approximately 100 Americans in Afghanistan in 2003.32

• (S//NF) Detainee planned and executed operations directed against the US and other nations, including a 2003 assassination attempt against President Musharraf of Pakistan.33 Detainee also provided safe havens for UBL and senior al-Qaida leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2001 and 2003.

○ (S//NF) Detainee headed an operation to build remote detonators and conceal them in children's video game cartridges.34

(S//NF) During raids conducted between 9 and 11 September 2002 in Karachi, PK, over 20 radio-type detonating devices were discovered in the Tariq Road Safe House, which was one of the other residences raided the same day.

28 TD-314/13719-03 29 TD-314/78147-05 30 TD-314/44865-02, Analyst Note: IZ-10026 reported Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid took over detainee’s responsibilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan after detainee’s capture. Shaykh al-Yazid was killed on 8 August 2008 in Afghanistan. 31 TD-314/37810-03, TD-314/54050-04, TD-314/58576-04 32 IIR 6 034 0085 07 33 TD-314/12435-06, TD-314/51970-02, TD-314/49699-04, TD-314/30445-05 34 TD-314/19805-03

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The devices were built inside of black “Sega” videogame cartridges and were designed for remote activation through use of a cell phone.35 (S//NF) TZ-10012 reported seeing detainee in a safe house in Karachi in early

2002.36 ○ (S//NF) Detainee organized a network of suicide bombers and facilitators allegedly behind the December 2003 assassination attempt on Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and the July 2004 attempt on Prime Minister Designate Shuakat Aziz.37

(S//NF) IZ-10026 reported detainee, in 2004, wanted to organize a group to carry out operations in Pakistan, specifically against President Musharraf. Detainee considered killing President Musharraf as al-Qaida’s main focus in Pakistan.38

○ (S//NF) Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash, aka (Khallad), ISN US9YM-010014DP (YM-10014) stated he asked detainee for suicide operatives for operations in Karachi, planned by himself and Ammar al-Baluchi, ISN US9PK-010018DP (PK-10018). YM-10014 stated detainee informed him that he had about 50 operatives that would be willing to carry out operations. YM-10014 did not tell detainee the nature of the operations, but only to have the operatives ready when either he or PK-10018 asked for them.39 ○ (S//NF) Detainee has knowledge of al-Qaida possibly possessing a nuclear bomb. Al-Qaida associate Sharif al-Masri stated in June or July 2004, upon encountering difficulties in moving the nuclear bomb, detainee commented if al-Qaida was able to move the bomb, al-Qaida would find operatives to use it. However, detainee told Sharif al-Masri that al-Qaida currently had no operatives in the US. The operatives would be Europeans of Arab or Asian descent. The device was reportedly located in Europe.40 Sharif al-Masri reported detainee would know about the bomb and its exact location.41 Sharif al-Masri believes if UBL were to be captured or killed, the bomb would be detonated in the US, detainee would be one of those able to give the order.42

35 TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/40307-02, Analyst Note: Involved in the remote detonators plot, in IIR 6 034 0310 03, Musab Omar Ali al-Mudwani, ISN US9YM-000839DP (YM-839), reported he received his passport from Abu al-Faraj, who was possibly from Morocco or Libya, possibly is detainee. In IIR 4 201 0145 08, GZ-10016 reported detainee in Birmal, AF along with KU-10024 who was smuggling out his own group of fighters. 36 TD-314/17080-05 37 IIR 6 873 0010 06, para number 5A4, TD-314/02429-05, IIR 7 102 0423 05, 010017 Abu Faraj al-Libbi 27-Oct-2006, 010017 Abu Faraj al-Libbi 01-Dec-2005, TD-314/49706-05 38 TD-314/82222-06 39 TD-314/31935-03 40 TD-314/09972-05, TD-314/51288-04 41 TD-314/11016-05 42 TD-314/69521-04

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(S//NF) Detainee also met with Hamza Rabia in Shkai circa November 2003 and discussed the issue of buried uranium in Kandahar.43 IZ-10026 claimed that Hamza Rabia along with two other al-Qaida operatives, were killed in an attack in December 2005.44

○ (S//NF) Detainee met with senior al-Qaida external operations chief Hamza Rabia in Shkai in September 2003 to pass a verbal message from al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri concerning al-Zawahiri's request that Hamza Rabia conduct attacks in India, Israel, and Egypt. Detainee agreed to help Hamza Rabia re-constitute the external operations program of al-Qaida. In support of this, detainee admitted recruiting terrorist operatives who could travel to the US or Europe.45 ○ (S//NF) IZ-10026 stated that after the capture of KU-10024 in March 2003, Ayman al-Zawahiri fled the house in which he was located and moved to Shkai, South Waziristan, PK, with the assistance of detainee. 46

(S//NF) IZ-10026 said Zawahiri fled the house in which he was located in late February 2003, after KU-10024’s, arrest in March 2003. Zawahiri left alone and sought out an Afghan named Farid al-Afghani. Farid delivered Zawahiri to detainee, who then coordinated Zawahiri's relocation to Shkai within a few weeks of KU-10024’s arrest. After the capture of detainee in May 2005, Zawahiri’s residence was changed to a good place owned by a simple, old man. 47

○ (S//NF) Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016) recalled that detainee was in charge of a secret guesthouse in Kabul at which UBL and Zawahiri stayed in October 2001.48

(S//NF) Detainee admitted he had considered using India as a platform to send operatives to the US or UK because of the large Muslim population there and the low level of scrutiny given to travelers of Indian nationality.49 (S//NF) IZ-10026 reported requesting detainee to acquire altimeter watches.

IZ-10026 considered using the altimeter watches to operate as a trigger for an explosive to possibly be used against an Indian airliner. Detainee did not find the watches.50 (S//NF) Detainee stated he visited Hamza Rabia at his newly procured

training site or safe house in Shkai circa November 2003. Detainee was aware Hamza Rabia and his assistant, Abu Bakr al-Suri, planned to use the house as a staging point for external operations and that Rabia needed a facility for research

43 TD-314/42005-05 44 TD-314/85366-06 45 TD-314/42005-05, TD-314/40277-05 46 TD-314/21484-07 47 TD-314/21484-07 48 TD-314/24083-04 49 TD-314/57269-05 50 TD-314/01018-07

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and training. Detainee speculated that explosives training with gasoline bombs, remote detonation devices, and security training would take place at the house.51 Hamza Rabia wanted strongly to attack passenger trains in the US or UK following the March 2004 bombing of commuter trains in Madrid, Spain.52 (S//NF) TZ-10012, while in Shkai mid 2003, heard reporting of detainee

communicating with operatives in the UK.53 ○ (S//NF) GZ-10016 reported detainee, as of March 2002, was in hiding with IZ-10026 and other senior al-Qaida officials in the Shawal area of Birmal, AF near Waziristan, PK.54 GZ-10016 stated in a separate debriefing that a Jamaican who was previously located with the detainee and IZ-10026 wanted his help in facilitating travel to the US, UK, or Morocco in order to conduct terrorist attacks.55 ○ (U) Open source reporting identified detainee as the main contact between UBL and Islamic extremist operating inside Pakistan. Detainee communicated with al-Qaida operatives outside Pakistan, particularly in the UK.56 ○ (S//NF) Detainee provided funding and direction for a disruption campaign headed by Sharif al-Masri to expel the US and its allies from Afghanistan.57 ○ (S//NF) IZ-10026 reported after the Madrid, Spain train bombing in March 2004, IZ-10026 and other al-Qaida members agreed they needed an operation against US interests in Italy. IZ-10026 had not made specific plans for the operation, but had passed on his ideas to detainee.58 ○ (S//NF) Between late 2002 and early 2003, IZ-10026 sent detainee a letter detailing an idea to attack oil tankers as they passed through the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf.59 ○ (S//NF) In March 2005, detainee was in communication with the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi regarding moving an al-Qaida operative to Iraq.60 ○ (S//NF) Detainee admittedly attempted to bring a group of Somalis led by Salah al-Din under al-Qaida to support an attack against the US.61 Detainee met al-Qaida courier Abdirashid Aidid Samatar in Islamabad, PK at Abdallahi Sudi Arale’s, ISN DJ9SO-010027DP (SO-10027), house in May 2004.62 Samatar received detainee’s

51 TD-314/47291-05 52 TD-314/37967-05 53 TD-314/48232-06 54 TD-314/03233-03, Analyst Note: See also TD-314/24083-04 for GZ-10016 comments about detainee. 55 TD-314/03484-03 56 010017 Pakistan and the al-Qaida Man 04-May-2005 57 TD-314/10807-03, Analyst Note: Detained al-Qaida associate Sharif al-Masri is an Egyptian extremist and al-Qaida operative Muhammad Salah al-Din Abd al-Halim Zaydan’s, aka (Sayf al-Adl), brother-in-law. 58 TD-314/79233-06 59 TD-314/79427-06 60 TD-314/42005-05 61 TD-314/36650-05, TD-314/26731-05 62 TD-314/52551-06, TD-314/56522-06

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permission to travel to Pakistan to meet with al-Qaida members to discuss cooperation.63

• (S//NF) Detainee received militant training, fought on the front lines of Afghanistan, and later became an instructor and administrator for two different al-Qaida training camps. (Analyst Note: Detainee's admission of administering al-Qaida militant training camps corroborates reporting from others detained at JTF-GTMO.64)

○ (S//NF) Detainee was a trainer at Jihad Wahl, and later became a trainer and administrator at the al-Faruq Training Camp in Khowst from 1993 to 1998.65 ○ (S//NF) Detainee stated while administering al-Qaida training camps and combat units in Afghanistan during the 1990's, his contacts were mostly members of Pakistani militant groups including Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA),66 Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Harakat ul-Jihad ul-Islami (HUJI), and Jaysh-e-Muhammad (JEM).67 ○ (S//NF) Detainee managed two al-Qaida affiliated guesthouses in Kabul. Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-Hajj aka (Riyadh the Facilitator), ISN PK9YM-001457DP (YM-1457), photo-identified detainee as Abu Faraj al-Libi. YM-1457 said detainee managed two guesthouses in Kabul. One was the Ghulan Faheem, aka (Khat), aka (Number Nine), Guesthouse in the Karti Barwan District and the other was the former Saudi Arabian Ambassador's residence, aka (Azzam Guesthouse).68 ○ (S//NF) GZ-10016 commented detainee was the radio communicator for Kabul. Detainee worked out of Madafa Sita (six) or Tesa (nine) and communicated mostly with Northern Afghanistan and Kandahar.69 IZ-10026 referred to detainee’s position as the “communications gatekeeper for UBL and al-Zawahiri.”70 (Analyst Note: Tesa is assessed to be one of al-Qaida guesthouses detainee operated.)

63 TD-314/37096-06, Analyst Note: In TD-314/63664-04, Abdirashid Aidid Samatar, aka (Abdirashid Aidid Ahmad), stated Somalis living in the US were attractive to al-Qaida because they could easily travel to Pakistan to meet with al-Qaida members and easily carry messages to al-Qaida members worldwide given their US travel documents. 64 IIR 6 034 0745 03, TD-314/36891-03 65 TD-314/12435-06, TD-314/46021-05, TD-314/57072-04, IIR 6 034 0088 05, IIR 6 034 0745 03, 000695 SIR 10-DEC-2004 66 TD-314/38500-05, Analyst Note: According to the report titled “Islamic Militant Groups – Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM),” HUA was declared a foreign terrorist organization in 1997, and in an attempt to circumvent the declaration was renamed Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) in 1998. 67 TD-314/38500-05, Analyst Note: HUM, HUJI, and JEM are NIPF Priority 2 CT targets. Priority 2 targets are issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests. 68 IIR 6 034 0088 05, Analyste Note: In IIR 6 034 0324 03, Abd al-Zahir, ISN US9AF-000753DP (AF-753), reported detainee operated the Ashawara Guesthouse in Kabul. 69 TD-314/17671-03 70 TD-314/86763-06

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(C//REL US, GCTF) Tariq Mahmud Ahmad al-Sawah, ISN US9EG-000535DP (EG-535), met detainee once in the August 2001 at detainee’s guesthouse in Kabul. Detainee maintained communications equipment that kept in contact with the commander of the fighters at Tora Bora, Ali Muhammad Abd al-Aziz al-Fakhri, ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212).71

○ (S//NF) Detainee participated in armed hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee fought along with other al-Qaida operatives under the command of IZ-10026 in the mountainous area of Afghanistan between Kabul and Khowst following the initiation of the US bombing campaign on 17 October 2001.72

• (S//NF) Detainee’s long term association with al-Qaida provided him an understanding of al-Qaida strategy and doctrine.

○ (S//NF) Detainee stated al-Qaida's strategy was to first strike deep inside the US, then hit US interests in peripheral countries worldwide, followed by attacks against Coalition partners. Detainee added the Iraqi battlefield was even more important and effective for al-Qaida than Pakistan because with Iraq as an operating environment, al-Qaida's chances of executing a successful attack against the US were 80-90 percent, whereas in Pakistan al-Qaida only had a 10 percent chance of success.73 ○ (S//NF) SA-067 reported detainee along with UBL, Ayman al-Zawahiri, IZ-10026, Mullah Muhammad Omar, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Abu Layth al-Libi, and Muhammad Rahim published a magazine in the Peshawar and Islamabad areas of Pakistan, which covered all the killings of Americans, the extremist fighters’ work against the Northern Alliance, the weapons used by the fighters, how they fed the poor, the number of fighters who died, and the faces of the real leaders.74 ○ (S//NF) Detainee said prior to 11 September 2001, al-Qaida gained its knowledge of guerrilla warfare tactics from reading translated US military manuals stored in what he described as the group's vast Afghanistan-based library.75 ○ (S//NF) Al-Qaida members read translations of Mao Zedong’s works on guerrilla warfare and Mao's works were used extensively in al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan during the 1990’s. Detainee said that some al-Qaida members even took excerpts from these works and widely distributed them as small pamphlets titled, "The War of the Weak."76

71 IIR 6 034 0195 07 72 TD-314/03141-03 73 TD-314/36650-05, Analyst Note: See TD-314/55608-06, for more information on detainee's feelings Iraq was the best battlefield against the US. 74 000067 SIR 02-SEP-2006 75 TD-314/47412-05 76 TD-314/47412-05

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○ (S//NF) Detainee reported on al-Qaida’s methods for choosing and employing couriers, as well preferred communication means.77 ○ (C//REL GCTF) Detainee appeared in a video of a speech given by UBL at the Tarnak Farm Training Camp, believed to have occurred on 8 January 2000.78

c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been moderately compliant. He currently has 15 reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 15 June 2008 when he damaged government property by writing on the wall. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include occasionally becoming physically combative (i.e. spitting) on the guard force and staff. Detainee was also found to be in possession of dangerous contraband (plastic shank).

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainee has not been interrogated by the JTF-GTMO Interrogation Control Element.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee has served as a senior al-Qaida leader, replacing KU-10024 upon his capture. Detainee’s position as the “communications gateway” to UBL provided him with knowledge of operations and associations not normally within detainee’s area of operations. Detainee has traveled with and facilitated other senior al-Qaida members’ travel. Detainee further planned and participated in several terrorist operations. Detainee was a trainer at al-Qaida’s al-Faruq Militant Training Camp and operated two al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee reportedly has knowledge of an al-Qaida nuclear device, which detainee currently has neither confirmed nor denied.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee’s long term associations with al-Qaida and other extremist groups, as well as extensive connections during his work as a facilitator of personnel and financing, has provided detainee with extensive knowledge of the operations and key figures of al-Qaida’s terrorist network.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

• Al-Qaida leadership, facilitators, and operatives to include: UBL, Zawahiri, Sayf al-Adl, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, SO-10027, IZ-10026, KU-10024, PK-10018, GZ-10016, YM-10014, TZ-10012, YM-1457, LY-212, Sharif al-Masri, Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Shaykh Marzuq Abd al-Salam Dabbas, aka (Khalid Habib), Abu Layth al-Libi,

77 TD-314/41075-05, TD-314/ 42370-05 78 IIR 6 034 1160 04

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JTF-GTMO-CDRSUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) forGuantanamo Detainee. ISN US9LY-010017DP (S)

Lalth Ibrahim Abd al-Fatah al-Farha, aka (Abu Jafar al-lraqi), Abdirashid Aidid Samatar,Muhammad Umar Abd al-Rahman, aka (Assadallah), Muhammad Shawqi al-Islambuli,aka (Khalid al-Masri), Hamza Rabia, Saadi al-Masri, and UBL's bodyguards and securitydetail. Al-Qaida plots: Plots directed by KU-l0024 inside the US, attacks on US andCoalition forces in Afghanistan and using suicide bombers in Pakistan, 1998 EmbassyBombings in Africa, 1l September 2001 attacks, plots against US interests in the UK,Iraq, India, Morocco, maritime plots, and a possible nuclear weapon attack. Al-Qaidacommunications. Al-Qaida Media Center and propaganda campaigno A1-Qaida recruiting techniques. Al-Qaida training campso Al-Qaida guesthouses and safe houseso Other extremist persons to include: Mullah Muhammad Omar, GulbuddinHekmatyar, Jalaluddin Haqqanio Other extremist groups to include: Taliban, HUA, HUM, HUJI, JEM and detainee's"Egyptian Group"

JRNavy

- Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College

October 2001 guide Intelligence l4/arning Terminologt.

1 5

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D. M. THOMAS,Rear Admiral, USCommanding

S E C RE T // NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSEHEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO

U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBAAPO AE 09360

JTF-GTMO-CDR 8 December 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW glst Avenue.Miami , FL33172

SUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9KU-010024DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S/NF) Personal Information:

o JDIMSA{DRC Reference Name: Khalid Shaykh Muhammado Aliases and Current/True Name: Mukhtar al-Baluchi" The

Brain. Ashraf Refaat Nabith Hen. Khalid Abdul Wadud.Salim Ali. Fahd Bin Abdallah Bin Khalid. Abdul RahmanAbdullah Faqasi al-Ghamdi

o Place of Birth: Baluchistan" Pakistan (PK)o Date of Birth: 14 April 1965. Citizenship: Pakistano Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9KU-010024DP

2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (S/NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD).

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a senior al-Qaida recruiter,financier, and operational planner for al-Qaida's global terrorist network. Detainee was themastermind of the 11 September 200I terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, thePentagon, and the hijacking of United Airlines flight 93 that crashed in Pennsylvania.

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCESREASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)DECLASSIFY ON: 20311208


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JTF-GTMO-CDRSUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9KU-010024DP (S)

Detainee described himself as the head of al-Qaida's military committee.' Jtp-GtVtO hasdetermined this detainee to be:

o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.o A MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective.o Of HIGH intelligence value.

4. (S//NF) Account ofDetainee's Timeline:

The following section is based on a consolidation of several accounts from varioussignificant individuals in order to assemble a feasible timeline.

^. (S//NF) Prior Yistory: Detainee is a Pakistani who was raised in Kuwait (KU) duringhis formative years.' Detainee attended an unidentified high school operated by the Kuwaitigovernment.' Detainee wanted to be involved in jihad since the age of II or I2.o News fromlocal Kuwaiti television channels, local newspapers and magazines distributed by the MuslimBrotherhood in Kuwait influenced detainee to join jihad. In 1982, detainee heard a speechfrom Abdul Rasool Sayyaf,5 the leader of the mujahideen in Afghanistan (AF), who preachedjihad as a religious war between Muslims and non-Muslims. Shortly thereafter, at the age of16, detainee joined the Muslim Brotherhood. Afterjoining the Muslim Brotherhood,detainee became more dedicated, read more about religion and taught others about Islam inorder to recruit them into the Muslim Brotherhood. After graduation from high school in1983 and upon the suggestion of his brother Zahid, detainee attended college in the US atChowan College in Murfreesboro, North Carolina (NC)." Detainee would later transfer toNorth Carolina Agriculture and Technical State University in Greensboro, NC, and receivedhis Bachelor of Science (BS) degree in Mechanical Engineering in 1986.' After graduatingin 1986, detainee traveled to Peshawar, PK, due to the expiration of detainee's visa.

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee subsequently quit his membership in theMuslim Brotherhood because they did not support violent jihad. Detainee traveled toAfghanistan to join the Soviet jihadu like his brothers Zahid and Abid.e

' 010024 Profile al-Qaida Kingpin 28-Sep-2006' to-ltqrasqgs-oa' tn-: t+iogogs-oeo to-ltqtes+gs-oe5 Analyst Note: Abdul Rasool Sayyaf is the leader of the Afghan Ittihad-I-Islami.' TD-314/68635-06'to-zutegax-oat to-:t+/oao:s-oo

2


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JTF-GTMO-CDRSUBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal lnput and Recommendation for ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9KU-010024DP (S)

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee attended the Sada training campto run byShaykh Abdallah Azzam.t I At the conclusion of his training in 1987, detainee worked forthemagazine "al-Bunyan al-Marsous," produced by Sayyaf s grorrp.t' In following years,while fighting on the front lines, detainee worked for al-Bunyan as time permitted.'' [n late1987 through 1988, detainee worked as a hydraulic engineer for a Japanese company namedMaruzen, which sent him to Japan to learn company management. A month later, detaineereturned to the mountains of Afghanistan where he dug caves and trenches.to Detainee alsorepaired broken hydraulic drills on the front lines of Afghanistan. Four months later,detainee traveled to Pakistan with his brother Abid to teach school.l5 After Abid's death,detainee took over Abid's work at the Peshawar school. To solicit support for the school, in1991 detainee and his brother-in-law, Abd al-Samad Din Muhammad, visited Sayyaf inAfghanistan. Sayyaf agreed to pledge money, support, and land in support of the school.16ln 1992, detainee received a Masters degree in Islamic Culture and History throughcorrespondence classes from Punjab University in Pakistan." ln 1993, detainee moved hisfamily to Qatar at the suggestion of the former minister of Islamic affairs of Qatar, ShaykhAbdallah Bin Khalid Bin Hamad al-Thani, where he took a position as project engineer withthe Qatari Ministry of Electricity and Water. Detainee engaged in extensive internationaltravel during his tenure at the Qatari ministry until early 1996.

d. (S/A{F) In early 1996, detainee fled to Pakistan to avoid capture by US authorities for hispart in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, for which he has been indicted.'n

n to-:t+/os+gs-oor0 Analyst Note: The Sada training camp was identified in the founding minutes of al-Qaida as an open camp from

which the best would be selected to join al-Qaida.rr Analyst Note: Deceased Shaykh Abdallah Azzamwas Usama Bin Laden's spiritual mentor.'' TD-314168635-06, Analyst Note: Fethi Boucetta, ISN US9AG-000718DP (AG-718) remarked that "al-Bunyan

al-Marsous" means "firm structure," and is anti-US and anti-Western; it was also one of the magazines thatmotivated Algerian medical students to go to jihad. This magazine concentrated its effort on showing graphicpictures of Muslims being oppressed and massacred in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Republic of Chechnya,and Kashmir. The magazine listed addresses and points of contacts of non-governmental organizations servicing

_- Afghanistan and Pakistan areas. For further information see IIR 6 034 ll82 03.' ' TD-314t69710-06to TD-314169710-06, Analyst Note: It is likely these caves and trenches were military preparations to support the

mujahideen.tt TD-3 | 4 r 697 10-06, TD-3 r4l53936-06tu TD-314169710-06, Analyst Note: Abd al-Samad Din Muhammad is detainee's cousin and brother-in-law and is

detained in Pakistan for his iihadist activities.'t TD-3 r 4/70058-06, TD-314i65485-06tt The 9-1 I Commission Report 24-Jul-2003, p. 147;TD-314169710-06; TD-314 130259-02,

3

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S E C R E T / / NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8

JTF-GTMO-CDRSI-IBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9KU-010024DP (S)

Detainee attempted to travel to Chechnya to join the mujahideen leader Ibn al-Khattable butwas unsuccessful. Detainee retumed to Karachi, PK, and then to Afghanistan where heformed a working relationship with Usama Bin Laden (UBL)20 and actively joined the jihadagainst the United States.2l It was during this time that detainee presented his idea to UBLfor what became the 11 September 2001 attacks." In 1999, detainee moved to Kandahar,AF," and provided media facilitation and technical assistance to al-Qaida. In late 2000,detainee became head of the al-Qaida Media Committee in Kandahar.'o Onthe morning ofthe 11 September 2001 attacks, detainee escorted Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, ISN US9YM-010013DP (YM-10013), to a home in Karachi, where they were informed that the attackswere on television. With this news they celebrated the success of the mission.25 From thatmoment forward, detainee was attempting to evaded capture. He met again with tlBL tobrace for an anticipated counterattack, and soon began to conceive a plot for an attack againstthe Heathrow Airport in London, United Kingdom (UK).tu [n December 2001 detainee leftAfghanistan, and arranged safe exit from the battlefield for al-Qaida operatives withpotential.'' In December 2002, detainee stated that UBL made a written decree declaringdetainee as the al-Qaida Chief of External Operations.28

5. (S//NF) Capture Information:

Analyst Note: Detainee cornmented that his position allowed him to gain managerial and organizationalexperience which later facilitated his success in planning the 9lll attacks.

re Analyst Note: Ibn Khattab, born in 1970, was a seasoned commander and experienced tactician in bomb makingand rough terrain combat who believed that the Russian states of Dagestan and Chechnya should be united as onenation. He was reportedly aligned with Usama Bin Laden, Chechen Hamil Basayev, and several militantorganizations. Press reporting indicated that he was killed by poison on 25 April 2002. For further informationsee http://www.66mi.arm)'.smil.mil/acelallsorc/trans/russ-chech/img35.html

'o The 9-11 Commission Report 24-Jul-2003,p. 149, Analyst Note: Detainee says he met UBL for the first time

^, when the Sayyaf group and UBL's Arab mujahideen group were next to each other along the front line." TD-314169710-06" TD-314r36069-0323 to-3t4130259-o2,TD-314125433-O2,TD-314169710-O6,Analyst Note: From 1996 to 2003, detainee'�s older

brother Zahid supported him. He also received support from "personal" donations from friendly mujahideen whowould provide him money. Reporting on the locAtions where KU-10024 and his family lived has conflictingtimelines. Detainee moved around from location to location quite frequently, both with and without his family.

to TD-3r4r69710-06" tD-314138366-02, Analyst Note; Ramzi Bin al-Shibh is an al-Qaida operative who was originally destined for

the 9ll1 mission, but because he could not obtain a US visa, became a planner for the operation instead.26 to3vr36o69-03" to-3t4r36069-03tt OLOO24 Moussaoui Testimony, p.2,para. 1, http://www.rcfp.org/moussaoui/pdf/DX-094l.pdf

4




^. (S/A{F) Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) captured detainee;Pakistani fundamentalist, Ahmed Abdul Qadoos; al-Qaida's financial manager Mustafa al-Hawsawi;2e and an unidentified Saudi on 1 March 2003. Detainee was immediately turnedover to US custody.3o

b. (S) Property Held: The following items are not held by JTF-GTMO but were reportedas pocket litter belonging to detainee:

o Casio wrist watch. Model F-91W31. Ring32

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 4 September 2006

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: Detainee was transferred to JTF-GTMO to face prosecution for terrorist activities against the United States.

6. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threatto the US. its interests and allies.

b. (S/NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a senior operational planner,recruiter and financier for al-Qaida's global terrorist network. Detainee was the mastermindof the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.Detainee described himself as the head of al-Qaida's military committee. Detainee hasspecifically stated he is the enemy of the United States.

o (S/A{F) Al-Qaida operations and plans: Detainee is one of al-Qaida's keyoperational planners linked to a majority of al-Qaida's major international operations.

o (U) 1 I September 2001hijackings: 2,973 killed, 24 missing and presumed dead.' (U) At a meeting in Tora Bora, arranged by deceased al-Qaida militarycommander Mohammed Atef aka (Abu Hafs al-Masri), detainee presented UBL

2n 010016 Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Request for Response #41'o IIR 2 227 0286 03" PAKT-2003-900193.pdf, Analyst Note: The Casio model F-9lW watch is linked to al-Qaida and radical Islamic

terrorist improvised explosive devices. For further information refer to 000002 MFR 24-APR-2002, Casio Watch

^^ Electronic Analysis Report 19-Aug-2004, Casio Watches and Relationship to Detainees 20-Apr-2006." PAKT-2003-900 I 9 1.pdf

5




with his ideas for various terrorist operations, including his rendition of whatbecame the 11 September 2001 hijacker plot. UBI requested detainee to formallyjoin al-Qaida, which detainee stated he declined." In late 1998 or early 1999,IIBL gave permission for detainee to proceed with the 11 September 2001operation.3a At that time detainee accepted UBL's standing invitation to workdirectly with al-Qaida.35. (S/AIF) Sayf al-Adl remarked that Muhammad Atef arranged four cells totransfer and exchange communication between the leader (Muhammad Atta) ofthe hijackers and the base command. Detainee was in charge of the second cell inPakistan.'o

o (S/AIF) 1993 World Trade Center bombing: 6 killed, 1,042 injured. In 1991 or1992, detainee assisted his nephew Ramzi Yousef with planning an attack in the USon the World Trade Center. In the fall of 1992, detainee and Yousef had numeroustelephone conversations discussing the progress of the operation, and for whichYousef sought additional funding. In 3 November 1992, detainee wired $660 USDfrom Qatar to the bank of Yousef s co-conspirator, Mohammed Salameh.3T Detaineewas indicted for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing in January 1996.38o (U) 1998 East Africa bombings: 257 kllled,4,085 injured. In late August 1998,a foreign govemment sent a list of names of individuals who flew into Nairobi beforethe al-Qaida attack on the US embassy in Nairobi. The CIA reportedly recognizedone of the passenger's names as an alias for detainee.3eo (S/A{F) Detainee's involvement in al-Qaida's chemical and biologicaldevelopment:

' (S/A{F) In August 2001, detainee had conversations with Muhammad Atef,and learned that al-Qaida was pursuing the development of anthrax relatedtechnologies to use in operations. Abu Harith al-Malaysi aka (Abu Haris) askeddetainee in the summer of 2001 to move crates containing biological laboratoryequipment from Karachi to Kandahar. This further convinced detainee of an al-

" The 9-1'o The 9-1" The 9-l

Commission Report 24-Ju1-2003, p. 149Commission Report 24-Jul-2003, p. 149Commission Report 24-Jul-2003, p. 150, 154.

" SA-RIY-040721-90007-61707, Analyst Note: This is a reference to communication nodes set in place to relaymessages between al-Qaida headquarters and the 9/l I cell members; one in Afghanistan: one in Pakistan, one in

_ Europe and one in the US." The 9-11 Commission Report 24-Jil-2003, p. 73 and p. 147; Analyst Note: There is no further information on

Mohammed Salameh." The 9-11 Commission Report 24-Ju1-2003,p.73'n The 9-11 Commission Report 24-Jul-2003

b




Qaida effort to produce anthrax.a0 After his discussions with Muhammad Atef,detainee said he assumed the special laboratory near Tamak Farm was related toanthrax development efforts and the equipment he was asked to transfer fromKarachi to Kandahar, circaMay 2001, was for that laboratory.4l. (S//I{F) Detainee was present in CNN videotapes showing al-Qaida'schemical testing on dogs and was reportedly in regular consultations with notedpoison and explosives expert Abu Khabab al-Masri.a2. (S/AIF) Immediately prior to the fall of Kandahar in late 2001, JI memberYazid Sufaat stayed at detainee's home for six days. Yazid told detainee he wasdeveloping anthrax for al-Qaida, and was happy in his work. Yazid was givingbiology lessons to two al-Qaida operatives, detained Abu Bakr al-Filistini aka(Samir Hilmi al-Barq) and al-Hud al-Sudani.a3 When detainee queried Yazidabout the danger of his researcho Yazid indicated there was little to worry aboutsince he (Yazid), Bakr, and al-Hud all had anthrax vaccines. As al-Qaida wasleaving Afghanistan,Yazidplanned to reinstitute the anthrax program inPakistan.aa

o (S/AfF) Djerba Synagogue bombing in Tunisia: 19 killed, 15 injured. It isassessed that detainee contributed to the 1l April 2002 attack on the DjerbaSynagogue in Tunisia. Investigators examining the perpetrator's (Nizar Nawar) cellphone found that Nizar had called a number in Pakistan assigned to detainee just threehours before the attack.aso (S/n{F) In early September 2002, an undated letter was recovered as a result of araid in Karachi. Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani, ISN US9PK-001460DP (PK-1460),an al-Qaida facilitator with close ties to detainee, provided an assessment of themeaning of the letter written by detainee to Hamza al-Zubair (NFI); the letter

oo To-3t4160789-04, TD-314/19304-03, Analyst Note: Abu Hafs al-Masri aka (Muhammad Atef) was killed incoalition air strikes in Afghanistan in November 2001 . Abu Harith is an al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiya facilitator.He is the son of JI religious emir Abu Bakir Bashir. For further information on Abu Harith please refer to DA-DPM report dated 0519232D8C 05. Detainee assigned both PK-1460 and PK-1461 to move the crates.

ot TD-3r4r60789-04ot OlO024 Arrested in Pakistana3 Analyst Note: Detainee's nephew, Ammar al-Baluchi stated that Abu Bakr was working on an anthrax project

with detainee. Before his work with detainee, Abu Bakr worked as a medic for the mujahideen brothers inKarachi and added that Abu Bakr knew several al-Qaida members because of the nature of his work. Ammarnoted that Abu Bakr was well cormected in Karachi and, although this was not his primary role, could be calledupon if a brother needed housing assistance. For further information on Abu Bakr al-Filistini please refer to TD-314/43889-05 and TD-314/24678-04. There is no further information on al-Hud al-Sudani.

oo TD-3t41t9304-03ot TD-314n3122-03

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appeared to use code words for a possible poison attack. PK-1460 said detaineespoke often of trying to acquire or make poisons and to use them in attacks.a6o (S/A{F) Daniel Pearl murder: In early 2002, Wall Street Journal reporter DanielPearl was abducted and murdered. Interviews with al-Qaida operative Sharif al-Masrideclared that Sayf al-Adl, a former al-Qaida military commander, said that Pearl wastransferred to detainee's custody; detainee was in charge of all al-Qaida activities inKarachi at this time. Al-Adl counseled detainee, stating that it would not be wise tomurder Pearl. Al-Adl recommended that Pearl be returned back to one of theprevious groups who held him, or freed. Al-Adl indicated to Sharif al-Masri that bothdetainee and al-Qaida chief financial officer, Shaykh Said al-Masri, disagreed with al-Adl on this point. Pearl was then taken to the house of al-Qaida's finance chief inPakistan, Saud Memon, and murdered.aTo (S/A{F) Richard Reid's failed shoe bomb plotof 22 December 2001: Detainee'snephew and fellow al-Qaida facilitator Ali Abd al-Aziz aka (Ammar al-Baluchi), ISNUS9PK-010018DP (PK-10018), stated that the shoe bomber, Richard Reid, wasoffered to detainee as an operative who was already prepared with the proper traveldocuments.a8 Detainee stated that he had instructed Reid to shave his beard prior toboarding the airplane and to detonate the bomb inside the airplane bathroom.Detainee added that Reid did not do this because he was irresponsible.ae

o (S/A{F) Detainee had numerous plots and plans for operations targeting the US, itsallies, and its interests world-wide.

o (S/AID The Bojinka plot: Bojinka called for the simultaneous downing of 12American airliners over the Pacific Ocean. Ramzi Yousef enlisted several co-conspirators from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing to help with this plot. Theplot was funded by Abdullah Azzam and UBL's Afghan jihad services directorate inPakistan.soo (U) Detainee planned three other plots in 1994, alongwith Ramzi Yousef.Detainee planned two separate assassination plots, one against Pope John Paul II andthe other against President Clinton, during their respective trips to the Philippines andbombings of US-bound cargo carriers.''

ou TD-314t39649-02ai fO3tql5?,636-04, Analyst Note: British national Omar Sheikh is on death row for the kidnapping and killing of

American.iournalist Daniel Pearl in 2001.ot to-gt+l to89l-06on To3tqr632rr-04s0 tO3rul6Zg28-03, The 9-l I Commission Report 24-Jul-2003,p. 73, DIA Special Analysis Evolution of the

Transnational Terrorist Threat 19 Nov 2004tt DIA Special Analysis Evolution of the Transnational Terrorist Threat 19 Nov 2004

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o (U) During the summer of 2001, detainee approached UBL with proposS]s forother attacks on targets in Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and the Maldives.'"o (S/AfF) Panama Canal: Detainee claimed he tasked US citizen and al-Qaidaoperative Jafar al-Tayar aka (Adnan el Shukrijumah) to conduct surveillance on thePanama Canal as part of an ev_e^ntual plan to detonate one or two explosive-ladenships transiting the waterway." Detainee said Jafar al-Tayar was given a moregeneral tasking in 2001 of spotting and conducting surveillance of potential targetsacross the US.5ao (S) Remote-controlled firing devices disguised in Sega game cartridges:Detainee discussed remote-controlled firing devices (RCFDS) which were foundduring raids on Karachi in September 2002. These RCFDS were built inside blackSega video.g*. cassette cartridges to protect the RCFDS and to make them appearrnnocuous.--o (S/AfD Heathrow Airport, London: Detainee provided information on theoperatives he chose to participate in the attack on Heathrow Airport in London.There were two primary cells for the attack: the United Kingdom based cell, tasked toobtain pilot training from a commercial flight school in Kenya; and a Saudi Arabia-based cell, tasked to identify martyr candidates to assist in the aviation attack.56

o (S/A{F) Detainee was a key constituent in the joining of al-Qaida and JI through JIleader, Riduan Bin Isomuddin aka (Hambali), ISN US9ID-010019 (ID-l0019), whichcontributed to the facilitation of planning of al-Qaida operations in Southeast Asia:

o (S/AID In 1996, detainee invited Hambali to Afghanistan to meet with LIBL.Hambali spent three or four days with UBL and, at the conclusion of their meetings,UBL indicated that al-Qaida and Hambali's organization, JI, unofficially agreed towork together on targets of mutual interest.)'o (U) In 1998, JI spiritual leader, Abu Bakr Bashir, formally accepted UBL's offerto ally JI with al-Qaida. Hambali met with detainee in Karachi to arrange for JImembers to train at al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan.s8

t'The 9-11 Commission Report 24-Jul-2003, p. 150 (Ch. 5, Footnote l8)t'DIA JITF-CT Analytical Product, 06 June 2003to ro34144238-04tt TD-314152106-04, Analyst Note: This information has been confrrmed by PK-001460.tu tl-3 t 4/t 8750-03, TD-3 14 135496-03t ' to4urt7276-03tt The 9-11 Commission Report 24-Jul-2003,p. 151. Ch. 5, Footnote 22, Analyst Note: At this time, al-Qaida

started to fund Jemaah Islamiya; Jemaah Islamiya would perform casing activities and locate bomb-makingmaterials while al-Qaida would underwrite operations, provide bomb-making expertise, and deliver suicideoperatives.

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o (S/A{F) In 1999, detainee provided money and instructions to Hambali to look atoptions for attacking the US Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia (ID).tno (S/A{F) In January or February 2002, detainee said he aided Hambali's exit fromAfghanistan by acquiring a legitimate Indonesian passport in which Hambali's photowas substituted.60o (C) Detainee arranged for a courier to deliver funds from al-Qaida to JI leaders inIndonesia to conduct three terrorist bomb attacks: the 2002 Bali bombings; the 2003Marriott hotel bombing in Jakarta; and, the 2004 attack on the Australian Embassy inJakarta.6l

. (S/A{F) In February 2002, JI leaders met in Bangkok, Thailand (TH), toorganize attacks against American interests in the region. The attacks were to beconducted using approximately $86,000 USD given to JI from al-Qaida for itsoperations, including the 2002 Bali bombing, and the 5 August 2003 J.W.Marriott hotel bombing in Jakarta.62' (S/A{F) Before May 2003, detainee gave Hambali approximately $130,000USD to deliver to JI; $100,000 USD was given as a sign of congratulations for thesuccess of the Bali bombings, and the additional $30,000 USD was provided tofund future operations.

o (U) Manila portion of 1 1 September 2001: Detainee split the 1 1 September 2001operation into two parts to have a greater effect. The second operation involved asmaller version of the Bojinka plot: including hijacking US-flagged commercialairlines flyrtrg Pacific routes and exploding the aircraft in mid-air rather than flyingthe aircraft into targets. In spring 2000, UBL cancelled the East Asia portion of theoperation.63

. (S/AIF) Detainee instructed 11 September 2001hijacker Nawaf al-Hazmi andoperatives Walid Bin Attash andZohair Mohammed Said aka (Abu Bara al-Taizi),ISN US9YM-000569DP (YM-569), on Western culture and travel inpreparation for operations. 6a

. (S/A{F) Approximately two months prior to 11 September 2001, detaineetook several UBL bodyguards including YM-569; Abd al-Rahman Shalbi IsaUwaydha, ISN US9SA-000042DP (SA-0a2); Abd al-Malik Abd al-Wahab, ISNUS9YM-000037DP (YM-037); and volunteers Abu Hafs al-Kuwaiti and Abu

tn TD-314r39810-03uo To-314/3s 496-03u ' I IR2 227 026r 06u'rrr2 248 oorg 04ut O1OO24 Moussaoui Testimony, page 5, paragraph 7, http://www.rcfo.org/moussaoui/pdf/DX-094l.pdfuo The 9-l l Commission Report 24-Jul-2003,p. 157

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Musab al-Hashidi, to Karaclri to teach them English and American culture inpreparation for the attacks.o)

o (S/A{F) US and Israeli embassies in Manila: In August 2001, detainee gaveoperative Mohammad Mansour Jabarah $10,000 USD and sent him to Manila,Philippines (RP), to bomb US and Israeli embassies. Jabarah embarked on hismission one day before the 11 September 2001 attacks. It was to be a joint operation,with al-Qaida supplying the suicide bombers and the funding, and JI purchasing theexplosives and making the plans.66

. (U) Plots in the US:o (S/A{F) Detainee stated that as an enemy of the US, he thought about the USpolicies with which he disagreed and how he could change them. Detainee's planwas to make US citizens suffer, especially economically, which would put pressureon the US govemment to change its policies. Targeting priorities were determined byinitially assessing those that would have the greatest economic impact, and secondlywhich would awaken people politically.6To (S/AIF) Detainee discussed his involvement in the 11 September 2001 attackswith Abu Zubaydah,IsN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016). When Abu Zubaydahasked whether detainee had any other operations ready, detainee replied that the 11September 2001 attacks had been his dream and life's work. Detainee noted thatbecause he did not hit the White House during the 11 September 2001 attacks, asintended, that he would somehow try to attack the White House again one day, due toits sprbolic value to America.6so (U) Detainee told his interrogators that al-Qaida had planned to create a "nuclear

hell storm" in America.6eo (S/A{F) Jewish targets in New York: In early 2001, at UBL's direction, detaineesent al-Qaida operative Issa al-Britani to surveil potential economic and o'Jewish"

targets in New York City.Too (S/A{F) Tallest building in California: In late 200I, detainee directed a plan for acommercial airplane to be hijacked and flown into the "tallest building in California,"using at least two separate shoe bombs to gain access to the cockpit. "

o' TD-314123432-04,TD-314123505-04, Analyst Note: This was training for the SE Asia portion of the planes plot.ou FBIS EUP20030 I 2 4000492 23 -Jan-2003u' TD-314136069-03u* rD3r4r28434-02un Al-qaida warning - WorldnetDaily.com l7-Sep-06, Al-Qaida warns Muslims: Time to get out of U.S. Afghan

terror commander hints at big attack on N.Y. and l(ashington.'_o.TD-314144238-04, Analyst Note: This was possibly part of the 9/l I operation." http://www.in.hanscom.af.smil.miVdintpro/AugusL02/DlSUM-26Aug02.htrnl (ESC-IN DISUM 26-Aug-2002),

TD-314/36069-03

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o (U) CIA and FBI headquarters and nuclear power plants: Other potential targetsdetainee considered were CIA and FBI headquarters, nuclear power plants in the US,and the tallest buildings in the state of Washington.''o (S/AfF) Hacking into bank computers in US: Detainee deployed Ali SalehMohamed Kahlah al-Mari, ISN US9QA-010010DP (QA-10010), to travel to the USas an al-Qaida sleeper agent with the mission to explore possibilities for hacking intomain frame computers of US banks."o (U) Follow-on attacks in the US: Detainee intended for al-Qaida operativeZacanas Moussaoui (in US custody) to participate in a follow-on attack in the US,unrelated to the 11 September 2001 attacks.Tao (S) Cargo airplane hijackings: In April 2002, detainee tasked al-Qaida operativeIyman Faris aka (Faris Iyam) aka (Lyman Faris), to provide a complete study on theprocedure for entering cargo areas of airports. Detainee planned to hijack cargoplanes and simultaneously fly those planes into several airport terminals across theUS., 'o (S/AIF) Brooklyn Bridge: Detainee also tasked Faris to destroy the BrooklynBridge by cutting the suspension cables,76o (S/A{F) Natural gas explosion in Chicago: In early 2002, Abu Zubaydah sentBinyam Ahmed Mohammed, ISN US9ET-001458DP (ET-1458), and operative JosePadilla (in US custody) to detainee to discuss future operations in the US." Detaineedirected Padilla to travel to Chicago, Illinois, rent an apartment, and initiate a naturalgas explosion to cause the building to collapse. Detainee told ET-1458 to join Padillain Chicago on this mission.Ts Detainee also directed Padilla to study the feasibility ofan op..uiion to set fire to a hotel or gas station in the US.7e

' (S/A{F) Ammar al-Baluchi reported that ET-1458 and Padilla stayed in theKarachi guesthouse for approximately one week, during which time Ammar sawET1458 and Padilla conversins with detainee. Ammar claimed that even after

'' The 9-l I Commission Report 24-Jul-2003,p. 154" TO-3t41t6750-03, Analyst Note: Ali Saleh al-Mari was taken into custody on l8 December 2001 and is being

held as an enemy combatant in Charleston, South Carolina.'o 010024 Moussaoui Testimony, pages 1 and2, paragraphs 1 and 4 http://www.rcfu.org/moussaoui/pdf/DX-

__ 094l .pdf" TRRS-04-12-05 18, Analyst Note: Faris was an Ohio-based HAZMAT truck driver who had previously worked

_- with airplane cargo a few years prior.'' http://acic.north-inscom.armv.smil.mil/Products/ATS/ats_05031 1a.asp" TD-3r415r751-0278 tO-3t+/38760-02,Analyst Note: Padilla was arrested by US authorities as he anived in Chicago on 8 May 2002.tn DIA JITF-CT Analytical Product: US debriefing of senior al-Qaida operative describes planning against bridges

and gas stations in the US.

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Padilla's arrest and association with a "dirty bomb" plot in the media, he did notdiscuss the matter with detainee.sO

o (S/A{F) Detainee was designated by UBL as the al-Qaida Chief of Extemal MilitaryOperations. Detainee was also in charge of propaganda and facilitation for the al-Qaidanetwork.

o (S/AfD Senior al-Qaida operative Abu Zubair al-Haili stated that detainee was incharge of operational planning and execution for operations external to Afghanistan.8lUBL placed detainee in charge of the al-Qaida Media Committee, as of October2000.0'

. (U) In 1997 and the first half of 1998, detainee admits to traveling frequentlybetween Pakistan and Afghanistan, visiting UBL, and cultivating friendships withhis lieutenants, Mohammed Atef and Sayf al-Adl, assisting them with computerand media projects.83. (S/A{F) Ramzi Bin al-Shibh stated that during his second trip to Afghanistanin February 200I, he learned that detainee was responsible for exporting al-Qaidarelated media from Afghanistan, as part of the al-Qaida media committee.Detainee further told al-Shibh that after al-Qaida left Afghanistan in December2001, al-Qaida used a new approach and started distributing its messages on al-Jazeeta.sa

o (S/A{F) When Afghanistan fell to coalition forces in December 2001, detaineestated he was put in charge of evacuating the families during the coalitionbombardment of Afghanistan.8s According to Sayf al-Adl, Abu Mohammedrequested a meeting. The meeting was held on the Saturday after Muhammad Atef sdeath, probably 17 November 200I, to select a new Amir, and to make decisions onthe evacuation the families. Shaykh Said al-Masri and detainee supported the effortto evacuate the women outside of Afghanistan and took the necessary steps to achievethe objective.s6

to TD-3 14 r 12265 -04, TD-3 l41059 l 5-03tt TD-3r413gl3o-02tt 010024 Moussaoui Testimony, pages I and 2, paragraphs I and 4, http://www.rcfp.org/moussaoui/odf,{DX-

0941.pdft' The 9-1 1 Commission Report 24-Jul-2003, p. 149to TD-3r4r39i77-0285 to-3t+/35339-03tu

6ISe; FBI FISA DTG 11-SEP-06, SA-RIY-040721-90007-61707, Analyst Note: Sheikh Sa'id al-Masri is al-Qaida's chief financial officer. According to FBI FISA reporting, al-Masri, who has been located in Pakistansince at least2002, has taken on some additional responsibilities to his role within in al-Qaida. In addition to hisposition as the senior financial officer for al-Qaeda, Sheikh Sa'id is acting as the communications conduit to al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and possibly UBL as well. Sheikh Sa'id has also assumed some

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o (S/A{F) In early 2002, detainee gave Sayfullah Paracha, ISN US9PK-001094DP(PK-1094), between $500,000 and $600,000 USD for "safekeeping." Detainee statedsix months earlier he had asked PK-1094 to research offshore companies to hold al-Qaida's funds.87

o (S/A{F) Detainee comes from a long line of Islamic extremists.o (S/AfF) Detainee's three brothers: Zahid Shaykh Muhammad aka (Abu Hafs), thedirector of the Kuwaiti Lajnat ul-Dawa88 organization in Quetta, PK; Abid ShaykhMuhammad; and Aaref Shaykh Muhammad.8e His older brother Abid supported theanti-Soviet jihad by fighting in Afghanistan, where he was killed. This significantlyaffected and influenced detainee to support jihad. His other older brother, Zahid, wasan active supporter of various humanitarian assistance programs in Afghanistan, andhelped establish the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait.e0o (S/A{F) Detainee's six cousins: Detained Ramzi Yousef, captured for his role inthe 1993 World Trade Center bombing; detained Abd al-Samad; Abd al-Karim aka(Abu Musab al-Baluchi); Abd al-Mun'im aka (Abu Khalid al-Baluchi); Hashim Abdal-Aziz aka (Shabir); and detained Ammar al-Baluchi. Abu Musab and Abu Khalidrespectively, handle some of the most sensitive logistic and administrative matters foral-Qaida operatives based in or transiting to Pakistan. Ammar al-Baluchi played akey role as financial facilitator for detainee's operations.er

facilitation duties, previously carried out by other now-detained or deceased senior al-Qaeda leaders, and providesmanagerial duties for the senior leadership.

t' TD-3r4r4r195-0488 Analyst Note: Lajnat ul-Dawa is a Tier 3 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). A Tier 3 TSE has available resources

and is in a position to provide frnancial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests,or provide witting operational support to Tier 3 terrorist groups. Lajnat ul-Dawa al-Islamiya, or IslamicMissionary Commission, is the largest non-govemment organization (NGO) network for Afghan refugees and runby rich Kuwaitis. Otherwise known as the Islamic Call Committee, LDI was a subsidiary of the Kuwait-basedNGO, Social Reform Society. The LDI has been involved in Afghanistan since the early 1980s, and hadsupported the training camps and extremists there for rnany years. For further information see TD-314125433-02.

tn TD-3r4r4s3ri-02to TD-3r4r70274-06tt USAREUR Current Threat Report 5-Feb-2003

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JTF-GTMO-CDRSIIBJECT: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9KU-010024DP (S)

c. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee detention threat level is assessed asMEDII-IM based on a DoD initial 90-dav observation.

Commandins

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