j q q q - to2

Report on the Committee on

Carbon Dioxide

Gregory G. W'dks, Chair Nuclear Electric Insurance Ltd, DE [I]

James M. Racci, Secretary Harrington Group, Inc., GA [SE]

Robert IC Andrews, J3cH Marsh & McLennan, MI [I] Kerry M. Bell, Under~ i t e r s Laboratories lnc_, IL [RT] Richard Bisterfeldt, Wausau HPR Engr, IL [I]

Rep. The Alliance of American Insurers Salvatore A. Chines, HSB Industrial Risk Insurers, CT [I] Ray Downey, Chemetron Fire Systems/Williams Holdings,

OH [M] Dale IL Edlbeck, Ans'al Inc./Tyco, WI [M] Charles B. Ford, Queenstown, MD [U]

Rep. U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary William Matt Hogan, Duke Power Co., SC [U]

Rep. Edison Electric Inst. Robert C. Merritt, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA [I] Timothy E. Meyer, Kemper, NY [I] Earl B. Neargarth, bike Protection Systems, MO [M] Paul Rockwell, Fox Valley Fire & Safety Co., IL [IM]

Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Assn. S. Douglas Ross, Aut3mated Fire Suppression, NC [IM]

Rep. Nat'l Assn. of Fire Equipment Distributors Inc. Klaus Wahle, U.S. Coast Guard, DC [E] Thomas J. Wysocki, Gtutrdian Services, Inc., IL [SE]

Alternates

Ronald C. Adcock, J&H Marsh & McLennan, IL [I] (Alt. to R. K. Andrews)

William M. Carey, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., IL [RT] (Alt. to IL M. Bell)

Randall S. Chaney, Wansan HPR Engr, CA [I] (Alt. to IL Bisterfeldt)

David M. Gough, HSB Industrial Risk Insurers, CT [I] (Alt. to S. A. Chines)

Donald W. Hering, Ansul Preferred CO~ Systems/Tyco, OH [M] (Alt. to D. R. Edlbeck)

Robert Kaslskl, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA [I] (Alt. to R. C. Merritt)

James L. Kidd, Hille~ New England Fire Protection, Inc., MA [IM] (Alt. to P. Rockwell)

Norbert W. Makowka, Nat'l Assn. of Fire Equipment Distributors (NAFED), IL [IM] (Alt. to S. D. Ross)

Bernard R. Planer, Ftke Protection Systems, MO [M] (Alt. to E. D. Nearg~rth)

Bruce G. Scheiman, Chemetron Fire Systems/Williams Holdings, IL [M] (Alt. to IL Downey)

Edward D. Leedy, NzLperville, IL [SE] (Member Emeritus)

Staff Liaison: Mark T. Conroy

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on the installation, maintenance and use of carbon dioxide systems for fire protection.

This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition~ Since that tira6 changes in the membership may have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the front of this book.

The Report of the Technical Committee on Carbon Dioxide is presented for adoption.

This Report was prepared by the Technical Committee on Carbon Dioxide, and proposes for adoption amendments to NFPA 12-1998, Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems. NFPA 12-1998 is published in Volume 1 of the 1998 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

This Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Carbon Dioxide, which consists of 17 voting members and is reporting in 3 Segments.

Segment No. 1 consists of Proposals 12-1 through 12-17 (excluding 12-8a) and 12-19 through 12-40.

On Segment No. 1, 15 voted alfirmatively, 1 negatively after circulation of negative ballots (Mr. Edlbeck), and 1 ballot was not returned (Mr. Neargarth).

Mr Edlbeck voted negatively on Proposal 12-12 (Log #CP1) stating:

"Elimination of the word "Automatic" would require all carbon dioxide systems to be supervised. It would be impractical to provide supervision of manual systems such as cable pull, or pneumatically actuated systems. These systems have many applications, which do not require an electronic control panel, such as remote locations without electricity, industrial systems in dirty environments, and a significant number of marine systems. Requirement for supervision of these systems would require an electronic control panel if NFPA 72 were to be complied with."

Mr. Edlbeck also voted negatively Proposal 12-20 (Log #CP2) stating:

"This change would require recalculation of many older systems for which the drawings and calculations have been lost or are otherwise unavailable. In some cases calculation software may no longer be available, which would require that the systems be manually calculated (if possible) at great expense to the owner. Specific information such as equivalent lengths for valves and fittings may not be available if the manufacturer of such a system is out of business. These systems may be perfectly fine systems, which would have to be replaced only because drawings and calculations are not available."

Segment No. 2 consists of Proposal 12-18 (Log #12).

On Segment No. 2, 9 voted altirmatively, 6 negatively after circulation of negative ballots (Messrs. Chines, Downey, Makowka, Wahle, WilLs, and Wysocki), 1 abstained (Mr. Meyer), and 1 ballot was not returned (Mr. Neargarth).

Please note that this segment did not achieve the required two- thirds Technical Committee approval.

Mr. Downey voted negatively stating: "More discussion is required on this topic due to the use of 3AA

2150 cylinders now in use for H.P. CO~ and 1-9.2.2 current requirement for pressure relief defies.

Mr. Chines voted negatively stating: "Further investigation is needed before I can be completely sold

on this change. The changes referred to as "established" in NFPA 2001 are still pending."

Mr. Makowka voted negatively stating: "According to Section 1-9.2.2 of NFPA 12, a relief valve is

required on all sections of closed piping. "The pressure relief device shall operate at between 2400 psi and $000 psi on systems supplied with high-pressure storage and at 450 psi on systems supplied by Io~pressure storage°" The submitter 's proposal uuhzes pressures lower than these (1800 psi for high-pressure and 360 psi for low-pressure systems) for the internal pipe pressure when calculating pipe strength requirements."

Mr. Wahle voted negatively stating: "In view of the negative ballots received on Proposal 12-18, I 'm

changing my vote from "Abstain" to "Negative". Reason: As the negative ballots show, it is clear that the

committee has not discussed this proposal adequately, particularly with respect to pressure relief device settings."

Mr. WilLS voted negatively stating: "I am changing my vote from Abstain to Negative. The reason for

this change is my agreement with the comments supporting the other negative votes, and my opinion that this proposal has not been considered in sufficient detail by the Committee."

Mr. Wysocki voted negatively stating: "Proposal does not address the effects of shock, low temperature

on pipe. 1-9.2.2 requires safety device on closed sections of pipe to operate between 2400 and 3000 psi. Proposal does not address relation with 1-9.2.2."

Mr. Meyer abstained stating: "I agree with the consensus of Messrs. Downey, Makowka,

Wysocki, WilLS, Chines, and Wahle that this section needs

47

N F P A 12 - - F 9 9 R O P

additional review and study before proposing it for adoption, so I am notifying you that my vote on this proposal should be changed to ABSTAIN."

Segment No. 3 consists of Proposal 12-8a (Log #CPI0).

On Segment No. 3, all 17 voted affirmatively.

Mr. 'Rockwell voted affirmative with file following comment: "I thought we were going to give some direction on what qualifies

as a lock-out."

(Log #CP5) 12- 1 - (1-3.1 Hand Hose Line System): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Carbon Dioxide RECOMMENDATION: Delete the existing definition and revise with the preferred as follows:

Hand Hose Line System. A hose and nozzle assembly connected by fixed piping or connected directly to a supply of extinguishing agenL SUBSTANTIATION: This is the Preferred definition as it stands in the Glossa~ of Terms for NFPA 122 and NFPA 123. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept,

(Log #CP7) 12- 2 - (1-3.1 Inspection): Accept SUBMITTER= Technical Committee on Carbon Dioxide RECOMMENDATION: Delete the existing definition and revise with the preferred as follows:

Inspection. A visual examination of a system or portion thereof to verify that it appears to be in operating condition and is free of physical damage. SUBSTANTIATION: This is the Preferred definition as it stands in the Glossary of Terms for NFPA 820° COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP6) 12- 3 - (1-3.1 Local Application System): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Carbon Dioxide RECOMMENDATION: Revise the existing definition to read as follows:

Local Application System. A system consisting of a supply of extinguishing agent arranged to discharge directly on the burning material. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CP3) 12- 4 - (1-3.1 Lock-Out (New)): Accept SUBMITrER: Technical Committee on Carbon Dioxide RECOMMENDATION: Add a new definition to read:

Lock-Out. A valve in the discharge pipe between the nozzles and the supply which can be locked in the closed position to prevent flow o f carbon dioxide to the protected area. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMrrTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #22) 12- 5 - (1-4.2.1(d)): Reject SUBMITTER: David H. Kay, US Navy RECOMMENDATION: Delete entire Paragraph 1-4.2.1 (d) "Ordinary combustibles such as paper, wood, and textiles." SUBSTANTIATION: CO 2 systems are not acceptable for combating ordinary combustibles fires involving materials in bulk such as paper, wood, and textile products. CO 2 has limited cooling and quenching capabilities and cannot be relied upon for controlling and extinguishin~ deep seated class A fires. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Carbon dioxide is effective on ordinary combustibles (Class A Fires).

12- 6 - (1-5.1): Reject (Log #30) SUBMITrER: David H. Kay, US Navy RECOMMENDATION: Insert the following after the first sentence:

"The primary hazard to personnel is death by asphyxiation. If carbon dioxide is breathed at the concentrations expected in CO 2 protected spaces (over 30 percent), loss of consciousness will occur in less than 16-35 seconds. Cardiac arrest can occur within seconds of loss of consciousness depending on the individual. Serious and permanent injury to the brain can occur within 3-5 minutes after cardiac arrest unless cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is started. Tests indicate that CO 2 concentrations will

48

N F P A 12 - - F9 9 R O P

reach dangerous levels in a space 10 seconds after start of discharge."

Insert the following after the third sentence: "At lower CO 2 concentrations (7-10 percent) such as might

occur in a space with leakage of CO 2 from a CO 2 protected space, an increased rate and depth of breathing will occur almost immediately. At three percent CO 2 concentrations, the breathing volume is approximately doubled, at five percent it is tripled, and at ten percent it is ten times what it is at a resting condition. Even at these low concentrations loss of consciousness can occur. At ten percent CO 2 concentration, headaches and vomiting in addition to severe discomfort from hypervejntilation will occur followed by loss of consciousness in four minutes. Personnel who lose consciousness may be revived without permanent injury if they are immediately removed from the hazardous atmosphere and

~ rovided CPR, if necessary." UBSTANTIATION: Current standard does not provide safety

information with respe=t to exposure effects of CO 2 at design concentrations and at lower CO 2 concentrations where CO 2 can migrate. This proposal makes aware to system owners, designers, installers, and maintenance personnel the dangers and risks associated with CO 2 s)~tems. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The submitter does not provide any reference as to the source: of the information.

(Log #23) 12- 7 - (1-5.1.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER: David H. Kay, US Navy RECOMMENDATION: Delete all references to "Warning" and replace with "Danger."

Insert "inside the protected spaces, outside each access to the protected space and" after the words "shall be affixed."

Delete ", not only in prntected spaces but in adjacent areas where the carbon dioxide could migrate or leak" after words "gas can accumulate" and insert "or mi~ate." SUBSTANTIATION: Danger signs are more appropriate in identifying warning or imminent hazard capable of producing immediate injury or death to personnel. Danger signs shall be posted inside and outside the protected space to alert personnel to vacate the protected space or prevent entry to the protected space when the carbon dioxide alarm sounds. See 29 CFR 1910.145for Danger and Warning definitions. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

1. Appropriate warning signs shall be affixed in a conspicuous location.

2. Revise t-5.1.2(a) lhrough (e) as follows: (a) Typical sign in every protected space

WARNING - - CARBON DIOXIDEGAS - - WHEN ALARM OPERATES VACATE IMMEDIATELY.

(b) Typical sign at every entrance to protected space WARNING - - CARBON DIOXIDE GAS - - WHEN ALARM

OPERATES DO NOT ENTER UNTIL VENTILATED. (c) Typical sign in every nearby space where carbon dioxide can

accumulate to hazardous levels. CAUTION - - CARBON DIOXIDE DISCHARGE INTO A NEARBY SPACE MAY COLLECT HERE. WHEN ALARM

OPERATES VACATE IMMEDIATELY. (d) Typical sign outside each entrance to carbon dioxide storage

rooms. CAUTION - - CARBON DIOXIDE GAS - - VENTILATE THE

AREA BEFORE ENTERING. A HIGH CARBON DIOXIDE GAS CONCENTRATION MAY OCCUR IN THIS AREA AND MAY

CAUSE SUFFOCATION. (e) Appropriate waa~ing signs shall be placed at every location

where manual operation of the system can occur. A typical sign at each manual actuation station.

WARNING - - ACTUATION OF THIS DEVICE WILL CAUSE CARBON DIOXIDE TO DISCHARGE. BEFORE ACTUATING,

BE SURE PERSONNEL ARE CLEAR OF THE ARE~ COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee feels that the word "WARNING" is appropriate to warn individuals of the potential of the hazards.

(Log #24) 12- 8 - (1-5.1.2(a) through (d)): Reject SUBMITTER= David H. Kay, US Navy RECOMMENDATION: Delete the words "Warning" or "Caution" and replace with "Danger." SUBSTANTIATION: Dan~er signs are more appropriate in identifying warning or imminent hazard capable of producing immediate injury or death to personnel. For definition of "Warning" and "Danger" see 29 CFR 1910.145. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE- STATEMENT: The Committee feels that the word "WARNING" is appropriate to warn individuals of the potential of the hazards.

(Log #CP10) 12- 8a - (1-5.1.7, A-1-5.1.7): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Carbon Dioxide RECOMMENDATION: Add after the first sentence of 1-5.1.7:

"A total flood system shall be locked out when personnel are in the protected space in locations where they will be unable to exit within the time delay period provided for the system."

Add to A-1-5.1.7: "Examples of situations which might require lockout of a total

flood system are when persons are present in the spaces on ladders or scaffolds or working so they are physically under or inside equipment. If the location of persons is where they cannot easily exit the protected space within the system's time delay period, the system should be locked out." SUBSTANTIATION: Emphasize additional safety related information for use of system lockouts. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CPg) 12- 9 - (1-7.1.1, 1-9.1, A-I-9.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Carbon Dioxide RECOMMENDATION: Make the following additional changes:

1. Add the following Exception to 1-7.1.1: Exception No. 3: This does not apply to marine systems (see

Chapter 6). 2. Add the following Exception to 1-9.1: Exception: Piping sections not normally opened to atmosphere

need not have corrosion resistant finish on the inside. 3. Move the following from A-l-9.1 to 1-9.1: "A dirt trap consisting of a tee with a capped nipple, at least 2 in.

(51 mm) long, should shall be installed at the e n d o f each pipe run."

4. Add the following to A-l-9.1: "Examples a~e hot dipped galvanized inside and out or stainless

steel." SUBSTANTIATION: In 1993, and accidental discharge of a carbon dioxide system protecting a shipboard engine room resulted in the loss of two lives. A review of the accident by the Coast Guard reveled a number of areas where the current regulations pertaining to shipboard carbon dioxide systems were in need of improvement. In lieu of developing a new federal regulation, the Coast Guard requested the assistance of the NFPA in developing an industry standard on shipboard carbon dioxide installations similar to previous requests to develop standards on shipboard sprinkler systems and water mist systems. This Committee Proposal represents the product of this effort. Additionally, this supports a larger effort by the NFPA to develop a set of comprehensive marine fire protection standards. COMMITfEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #25) 12- 10 - (1-7.3.$): Reject SDBMITrER: David H. Kay, US Navy RECOMMENDATION: Insert the following as a new sentence after the first sentence:

"Cable operated control discharge heads (pilot cylinders) and exposed cable shall be protected by an expanded metal protective cage. The protective cage shall not interfere with the operation and maintenance of the cylinders." SUBSTANTIATION: Current wording does not address protection of cable operated exposed actuation devices that may present a safety hazard to personnel within the protected space or spaces where CO 2 can migrate° The above recommendation

49

N F P A 12 - - F 9 9 R O P

makes clear d~at cable operated actuation devices are to be protected. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Other alternate methods may be acceptable. The current wording is performance based.

user to the applicable section of the 49 CFR for detailed requirements.

Note: Supporting material available for review at NFPA headquarters. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #26) 12- 11 - (1-7.3.5): Reject SUBMITTER: David H. Kay, US Navy RECOMMENDATION: Insert the following after the third sentence:

"A time delay device and a predischarge alarm shall he provided in all total flooding systems except in unusual cases where life safety is not the dominant factor."

Insert the word "not" following the words "control are" in the fourth sentence. SUBSTANTIATION: Current wording is unclear and does not provide recommendations to make a determination if a time delay device is needed.

Examples should be provided in Section A-1-7.3.5 to aid in the determination of time delay installation. U.S. Navy believes all CO 2 systems, except hose lines, shall have a time delay device installed. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The concept behind the emergency manual control is to have the capability to discharge in the event that normal controls fall. The third paragraph requires an evaluation based on the nature of the haza rdand would require the suggested dine delay and predischarge alarm where the evaluation so indicates.

(Log #CP1) 12- 12- (1-7.4): Accept SUBMITrER: Technical Committee on Carbon Dioxide RECOMMENDATION: Delete the word "automatic" in the first sentence. SUBSTANTIATION: Supervision must be provided regardless of system type. The "lock-out" required by Section 1-5.1.7 must be supervised for automatic and manual systems. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #27) 12- 13- (1-7.5): Reject SUBMITTER: David H. Kay, US Navy RECOMMENDATION: Insert the following as the first sentence:

"Alarms and associated components located within a protected space where flammable liquids are present shall be explosion proof type."

Insert the following after words "to warn personnel" in the second sentence: "to exit the protected space and". SUBSTANTIATION: Current wording does not provide for prevention of explosions due to possible ignition of flammable vapors by an electrical spark. Routine maintenance of alarms may generate an explosion due to high concentrations of flammable vapors within a space where flammable liquids are present. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Not within the scope of this standard. (See NFPA 70, National Electrical Code).

(Log #11) 12- 14- (1-8.5.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assoc. RECOMMENDATION: Reword Section 1-8.5.2 to read as follows:

1-8.5.2 Each cylinder shall be provided with a pressure relief device of the rupture disc type. T h e pressure relief device shall be sized and fitted in accordance with the requirements specified in Section 173.34(d) of the Department of Transportation (DOT), 49 CFR, Code of Federal Regulations. SUBSTANTIATION: The wording "safety device" was changed to "pressure relief device" to agree with the terminology currently used within the compressed gas industry and in the DOT regulations. The present wording implies that all pressure relief devices are designed to actuate at pressures that exceed the test pressure of the cylinder. This is not true. CGA pamphlet S-1.1- 1994, Section 4.2.1, generally specifies that the rated burst pressure of the rupture disk shall not exceed the minimum required test pressure of the cylinder. The proposed new wording refers the

(Log #28) 12- 15- (1-8.5.3): Reject SUBMITTER: David H. Kay, US Navy RECOMMENDATION: Insert the following after the first sentence:

"For high pressure cable operated systems, each cylinder shall be suitably mounted with each cylinder having its own set of cylinder straps." SUBSTANTIATION: U.S. Navy experience with cylinders for high pressure pull cable operated total flooding systems have shown that incorrect mounted and supported cylinders have rotated during maintenance and inadvertently activated system. The above recommendation is required in the U.S. Navy and prevents accidental activation of the system due to inadvertent cylinder rotation. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee feels that the listed equipment in conjunction with the manufacturer's maintenance manual should he sufficient to preclude this problem.

(Log #31 ) 12- 16- (1-8.5.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Doug Toupalik, Ansul Inc.

[ RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: [ "Individual cylinders shall be used having a standard weight ] capacity of 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 35, 50, 75, 100, or 120 lb. (2.3, 4.5, 6.8, [ 9.1, 11.4, 15.9, 22.7, 45.4, or 54.4 Kg.) of carbon dioxide contents [ for special temperature charges (see 1-8.5.5)...".

SUBSTANTIATION: High pressure cylinders of 120 lb. capacity are commercially available which can reduce the area footprint and hardware required for a system and reduce installed cost for the user. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.,

(Log #29) 12- 17 - (1-9.1): Reject SUBMITFER: David H. Kay, US Navy RECOMMENDATION: Insert the following after the first sentence:

"Where pneumatically operated time delays and pressure switches are exposed to corrosive atmospheres, installed piping upstream of the time delay shall be non-ferrous. Pneumatically operated pressure switches shall be installed outside and near the access to the protected spaces." SUBSTANTIATION: U.S. Navy experience has shown that pneumatically operated time delays and pressure switches exposed to a corrosive atmosphere will fail due to time delay and pressure switches orifices being clogged from rust particles. Therefore, non-ferrnns piping for these systems are warranted. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject° COMMITTEE STATEMENT: 1. The standard already requires special corrosion resistant materials or coatings in severely corrosive atmospheres and is not specific to non-ferrous. The standard permits equivalent methods for compliance.

2. It may be preferable to locate pneumatically operated pressure switches inside protected spaces where they can be securely mounted.

N O T E : S ince the bal lot on this Proposa l d id not con f i rm the C o m m i t t e e Act ion , the C o m m i t t e e is so l ic i t ing publ ic c o m m e n t for rev iew w h e n the p r o p o s a l is r e c o n s i d e r e d by t he C o m m i t t e e as a Publ ic C o m m e n t .

(Log #12) 12- 18 - (1-9.1.4, 1-9.1.5, A-1-9.1.4 (New) and A-1-9.1.5 (New)): SUBMITTEI~ Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assoc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

Forward: This proposal includes changes to the pipe design pressures specified in Paragraphs 1-9.1.4 and 1-9.1.5, along with new appendix materials that provide guidelines for use of the ANSI B$1.1 Power Piping Code. Because of their inter-relationship, the proposed changes to 1-9.1.4 and 1-9.1.5, along with the new appendix material, are all included in this one proposal.

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N F P A 1 2 m F 9 9 R O P

1. Paragraph 1-9.1.4: Revise thesecond sentence to read as follows:

"The internal pressure for this calculation shall be 1800 t ~ (!2,411 kPa)."

• 2. Paragraph 1-9.i.5: Revise the second sentence to read as follows:

"The internal pressure for this calculation draft be 860 psi (2,482 ~a)."

Appendix Materials: 1. Add new Sections A-I-O.1A and A-1-9.1.5as follows: A-1-9.1.4 (A-1-9.1.5) The following presents guidelines for

calculating the pipe and robing wall thickness for use with carbon dioxide fire extinguishing systems in accordance with this standard. Paragraphs 1-9.1.4 and 1-9.1.5 specify that, when high pressure and low pressure systems use pipe or ~ubing other than that specified in 1-9.1, the thickness of-the pipe or tubing shall be calculated in accordance with the ANSI B81.1, Power Piping Code.

Exempt from these requiremenm are steel pipe and stmnle~ steel pipe specifically called out in 1-9.1, namely:.

H~h Low P r e m m e P r e m u r e s ~

Steel Pipe Seamle~ and Electric Welded X X ASTM A-58, Grade A or B X X ASTM A-106, GradeA, B, or C X X ASTM A-58, Grade F ~ X Sch. 4 0 : k / 4 in. I.P.S. or smaller X X Sch. 8 0 : 1 in. through 4 in. !.P~. X X Sch. 40:. All sizes ~ X

Stalnlem Steel Pipe Seamle~ or Electric Welded X Tsype ~04, ~ 316, $16L X

ch. 4 0 : 8 / 4 in. I.P~. or smaller X Sth. 8~. 1 in. through 4 in. l.P~. X

X X X, X X, Sch. 40: All sizes

i

Not exempt from these requirements are: * Steel and stainless steel tubin~g: All size& type& and grade~ * All non-ferrous tubing and piping (such as copper and copper

alloys). • Steel and stainless steel pipe: In all size& types, and grades n o t

specified in 1~9.1. Minimum Pipe and Tubing Design Requiremenm for Carbon

Dioxide Systems using the ANSI BSI.1 Power Pipin~ Code. (Note: For the purpose of thi" "s section, the term "pipe or ptping," where used, aho means "tube or robing").

1. Limitations on pipin~ used for carbon dioxide s~tems (or any pressurized fluid) are set by:.

(a) Maximum pressure expected within the pipe. (b) Material of comumction of the pipe, tensile strength, yield

strength, and temperature limitations of the material. (c) End connection joining method& e.g., threaded, welded,

grooved, flared, etc. (d) Pipe construction method, e.g., seamless, ERW (electric

resistance welded), furnace welded, etc.; (e) Pipe diameter;, and (f) Wall thickness of the pipe.

2. The basic equation to determine the minimum wail thickness for piping Lmder internal preuure is:

t = (PD/2SE) + A

where. t = required wall thickness (inches) D = outaide pipe diameger (inches) P ,. maximUm allowaHe preuure (l~ig) SE - maximum a l l o ~ e ~ r e m ( i n c ~ u ~ g j o i n t e~dency) (psi).

SE values are found in Appendix A of the Power Piping Code.

A ,, allowance for threading, grooving, etc. (inches) NOTF~ For t h e e calculation~ A - depth of thread for threaded connections A - depth'of groove for cut groove connections A - zero for Welded, brazed, or rolled groove connections A - zero focjoints in tul~ng ruing compresdon, or flare fitfin~ The term SE is defined as I / 4 of the re ,He su'ength of the psping

material or 2/8 of the yield strength (whichever is lower) multiplied by a jo int efftclency factor (E~. jo int eflidency factors are: 1.0 for u~mlem 0.85 for ERW (electric resimance welded) 0.60for furnace butt weld (continuous weld) (Class F) 3. The basic equation can be rewrltte~ to solve for P so as to

determine the maximum allowable preDure for which a pipe having a nominal wall thickness, t, can be use&

P - 2SE ( t- A)/D

4 . The information, table~ and. calculatinm that follow provide guidelines based on the use of stahdess steel tubing.

(a) The calculations cover joims in tubing, using flared or compression type fittings, or ~ or welded connectiom.

(b) Other materials can be used provided that the appropriate SE values, wall thickness, and end connection factors are mtmltuted.

5. Paragraph 102.2.4(B) of the ANSI B$1.1, Power Piping Code, allows the maximum al lov~le ~ m (SE) to be increased by 20

• percent, if the duration of the pressure (or temperature) increme tS limited to less than 1 percent ofany24-hour period. Since-the CO~ piping is normally unpressurized, the system discharge period satisfies this criteria. Therefore, the data shown in this paragraph is b~ed on values of S~ tbtgt have been taken fi'om APl~dix- A-of the ANSI B$1.1, Power Piping Code. The values for maximum allowable ~rem (SE), u ~ l in the following calculaflom, have been increased 20 p e r ~ n t and are shown in bold print in Table A-1- 9.1.4(a).

Caution: The SE values shown in Table A-1-9.1.4(a) are for • stainless steel tubing oMy and ~we not valid for other materials.

Note I: The above SE values (increased by 20 percent) do not apply to extezded ~ times exceeding 14.4 minute~ Note ~: The ab6ve SE values. ( i o c r e a ~ by 20 percent) should

not be used for design ofCO 2 pilot l i n ~ that are under constant prepuce.

Note $: For compression or flare-type tubing fittings, the maximum.allewabfe, working pressm'e specified by the fitting manufacturer should be mp-'d.

Stainless Steel Tubh~ Semale~ 0g = 1.0) TypeS04 Type 316 Type S04L Type $16L

~ W (E = 0 ,85 ) Type S04 Type 816 Type 304L T ~ e $16L

For SI Units: 1 psi = 6.895 kPa

, $ ~ . "

A215 A '~9

• A2I$ A 269

A 249 A 269 A 249 A269

from. Table,A~ i

lSSOo va lssoo psi 157OO t~i 157OO psi

16000 psi 16000 pa

L20~)

18840 i~ 18S40 ~

19~e0p~ 159eo 159soi~

51

N F P A 12 - - F99 R O P

6. Minimum Piping Requirements: Table A-1-9.1.4(b) provides maximum allowable pressure ratings

for various types of stainless steel tubing when using flared or compression type fittings, or brazed or welded end connections (where A = 0). The pressures have been calculated using the formulae, SE values, and end connections shown in A-1-9.1.4.2 and A-I-9.1.4.5.

To use this table, select the desired tube diameter; then choose the proper wall thickness where the pressure rating is equal to or greater than the applicable minimum design pressure value specified in Paragraph 1-9.1.4 or Paragraph 1-9.1.5.

(D) Tubing

Size (in.)

1 / 4 0 D 3/80D 1 / 2 0 D 5 / 8 0 D

3 / 4 0 D

7 / 8 0 D

1 0 D

1 - 1 / 4 0 D

2 0 D

* The piping is not normally pressurized until system actuation. At the time of actuation the pressure in the piping is only sustained for a short time period.

* The minimum design safety factor of the DOT containers used (3A, 3AA) are in the order of 2.5:1 (3AA).

* The Power Piping Code provides for a design safety factor of 4:1 (e.g., ultimate strength vs. max. allowable design stress) for the material being used, and also includes further reductions in pressure rating based on construction efficiency factors (seamless, ERW), and end connection factors (threaded, welded, etc.).

Table A-1-9.1.4(b) Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (psig)

For Type 304, 304L, 316 & 316L Stainless Steel Tubing Using Flared, or Compression Fittings or Welded or Brazed End Connections (A = 0)

(the SE values shown include the 20% added strength factor)

A213/A269

(1') Max. Allowable Workin~ Pressure (psi~)

A249/A269 A213/A269 A249/A269 (0

Wall Thickness

-(in.) .035 .035 .035 .035 .065 .035 .049 .065 .035 .049 .065 .049 .065 .065 .083 .065 .083 .095 .065 .095 .120

ASTM: Type:

Constr: SE:

TP$04 TPBI6

Seamless 22,560 6317 ~11 3158 2528 4692 2106

~ 1 0 1805 2527 3B52 2211 ~ 3 3 2M6 ~ 9 9 19~ 2497 2858 1466 2 1 ~ 2 ~ 7

TP304 TP316 ERW 19,200 5376 3584 2688 2150 3994 1792 25O9 3328 1536 2150 2853 1882 2496 1997 2550 1644 2125 2432 1284 1824 23O4

TPBO4L TP316L

Seamless 18,840 5275 3517 2638 2110 3919 1758 2462 3266 1507 2110 2799 1846 2449 1959 2502 163g 2O85 2386 1225 1799 2261

TP$O4L TP316L

ERW 15,960 4469

22M 17~ 3 3 ~ 1499

2706 1 2 7 17~ ~71 15~ 2O~

2119 1 ~ 1766 2O~ 1 0 ~ 1516 1915

SUBSTANTIATION: Statement of problem: Paragraph 1-9.1.4 of NFPA 12-1998 states: 1-9.1.4 In systems using high-pressure supply with pipe other

than that specified in 1-9.1, the thickness of the pipe shall be calculated m accordance with ANSI B31.1, Power Piping Code. The internal pressure for this calculation shall be 2800 psi (19,306 kPa).

This requirement was reviewed and reevaluated based on comments questioning the justification for requiring the piping to be designed to a higher pressure than that required for the high pressure CO 2 cylinders. For this review, the requirements for DOT cylinders (e.g., DOT SA and SAA types) were used for comparison.

The majority of high pressure CO 2 system cylinders are designed and fabricated in accordance with DOT specifications BA and 3AA. DOT 49 CFR specifies several criteria that must be met to establish the minimum service pressure of the cylinders when used with carbon dioxide, including the maximum permitted fill density.

These criteria are found in 49 CFR 17S.301(e), 175.301(0, and 173.304(a) (2), which state:

173.301(e): The pressure in the container at 70°F must not exceed the marked service pressure of the container.

173.B01(f): The pressure in the container at 1B0°F shall not exceed 5 /4 times the service pressure (e.g., the marked service pressure of the container shall not be less than 4 /5 or 80% of the pressure at 130°F).

173.304(a)(2): For Carbon Dioxide: Maximum permitted fill density. 68%. Minimum Container Service Pressure: DOT-

. ~,A1800; DOT-gAA1800, etc. Comparisons used in this reevaluation include: * The agent containers are continuously under pressure.

* The piping design safety factor is generally equal to or greater than the DOTcylinder design safety factors (e.g., DOT-3AA).

* Paragraph 1-9.2.2 of NFPA 12-1998 requires the use of a pipe header pressure relief device (PRD) in sections of closed piping (e.~., selector valve systems). The operating pressure of the PRD is similar to those used on the DOT-3A1800 and 3AA1800 cylinders. Since the pipe design safety factors, when using the Power Piping Code, are equal to or greater than the DOT cylinder safety factors, there is no reason to consider increasing the design

~ ressure requirement for closed sections of piping protected by eader pressure relief devices. Substantiation for the proposed changes: o There is no justification for requiring the piping design

pressure to be greater than the minimum service pressure of the agent container. The proposed changes, included herein, use the same criteria as that used for the DOT containers and the ASME pressure vessels, in establishing the minimum design pressure for high-pressure CO 2 system piping, namely 1800 psig; and for low pressure CO 2 piping, namely 360 psig.

* Based on use of the Power Piping Code, the proposed changes in pipe design pressure criteria do not compromise safety or performance. The previous edition of NFPA 12-1993, Paragraph 1- 9.1.4, specified a minimum burst pressure of 5000 psi for high pressure system piping. By comparison, applying the B31.1 Power Piping Code to the established DOT cylinder service pressure of 1800 psi, has effectively increased the minimum burst pressure of the piping from 5000 psi to 6000 psi.

* Appendix material has been added to provide the user of this standard with guidelines on the use of the ANSI B31.1 Power Piping Code for design of carbon dioxide system piping. These guidelines follow parameters already established in NFPA 12A and NFPA 2001 for use of the Power Piping Code to determine the

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N F P A 12 - - F 9 9 R O P

maximum allowable working pressure for special hazard systems

TrEE ACTION:: Accept.

(Log #20) 12- 19- (1-I0.3.1): Reje.:t SUBMITTER: David H. Kay, US Navy RECOMMENDATION: Insert the following as the last sentence:

%Vhere carbon dioxide agent is installed within the protected space, all maintenance personnel shall carry an emergency escape breathing device for immediate use." SUBSTANTIATION: U.S. Navy experience has shown that maintenance personnel without proper respiratory protection can be injured or killed by ~.n inadvertent actuation of a CO 2 system. The above recommen&ttion will require all personnel performing maintenance on a CO 2 system to have proper respiratory

rotection. OMMITrEE ACTION: Reject.

COMMITTEE STATEM]g, NT: The Committee feels that this should be evaluated on a case by case basis. 1-5.1.7 covers personnel not familiar with the systems and their operation.

(Log #CP2) 12- 20 - (1-10.$.2): Accept SUBMITI'ER: Technical Committee on Carbon Dioxide

I RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read: "At least annually, using a full set of system drawings and flow

calculations (see 1-fi.2.(i3. all carbon dioxide systems shall be thoroughly checked and tested for proper operation by competent personnel (see 1-10.4)." SUBSTANTIATION: Helps to insure a proper and complete inspection is made. This would also help determine if changes to the hazard or system were made. COMMITTEE ACTIOlq: Accept.

(Log #19) 12- 21 - (Chapter 2): Reject SUBMITTER: Michael D. Hard, Hard Fire Suppression Systems, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add the following text:

"Protection of access floor cavity space shall be accomplished with a 3-dimensional extinguishing agent such as carbon dioxide as applied per this standard, or an agent conforming to NFPA 2001." SUBSTANTIATION: The reader has no guidance for protecting this unique hazard, resulting in the improper use of spnnklers for protection and suppre~,~ion. Lack of clearance and the presence of obstructions make the use of sprinklers a bad fire protection choice. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: This is an occupancy standard type of requirement. NFPA 12 is an installation standard.

(Log #1 ) 12- 22- (Chapter 6): Reject SUBMITTER: Paul Rockwell, Fire Suppression Systems Assoc. RECOMMENDATION: Material should be reviewed, for accuracy, completeness and inconsistencies, with current USCG regulations. References to the applicable sections of the 46 CFR and NVC 6-72 also need to be included in order for this chapter to be properly used to design marine CO 2 systems. SUBSTANTIATION: FSSA agrees that Chapter 6 is important and should be included in this standard. However, we feel that the proposed new Chapter 6 on Marine Systems is incomplete, has inconsistencies, and does not adequately Address personnel safety and precautions that should be taken during service, maintenance, and testing of CO 2 systems aboard ship. We also believe that Proposal 12-27 (Log.#CP4) requires further work and should be sent back to the Comraittee for review.

If the intent of Chap~:er 6 is to include the present US Coast Guard requirements, as well as providing additional guidelines on low pressure systems, testing, etc., then, all of the applicable regulations for CO 2 s~,~tems spedfied in 46 CFR and the USCG Guide to fixed fire fighting equipment aboard merchant vessels,

rifled "Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular NVC 6-72", should be reviewed and included in this chapter. Also, references to 46 CFR Subpart 34.15, 46 CFR Subpart 95.15, NVC 6-72, etc. should be included in this chapter so that the user of this standard is directed to other regulations that apply and can properly design Marine CO 2 Systems.

We also recommend that a draft of Chapter 6 be reviewed and approved by the appropriate US Coast Guard authorities in Washington, DC before it is included as a proposed part of this standard.

Examples of several areas that are in need of review and /o r revisions are highlighted below.

6-2.$.1.1 states: "The leakage during a two minute period shall not exceed a pressure drop of 150 pSL Both 46 CFR 34.15-15(i) (2) and 46 CFR 95.15-15(i)(2) allow a pressure drop of 150 psi minute over the two minute period.

6-2.$.2.1 and 6-2.$.2.2 (Low Pressure Systems). We don' t understand the rational whereby the pipingbetween the tank shut- off valve and the first pilot operated valve shall be tested at $00 psi. Yet, the piping from the tank shut-off valve to the first jo int ahead of the nozzles shall be tested at 700 psi. In our opinion this doesn't make sense and requires further review.

6-2.4.2 and 6-2.4.$: Although not stated as such, these requirements appear to be for High Pressure Systems. What are the specific reqmrements for Low Pressure Systems, or is this intended for both types?

6-2.5.2:49 CFR 147.60 and 49 CFR 147.65 do not exist. This should read 46 CFR 147.60 and 46 CFR 147.65.

NOTE: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.

• 6-2 .7 .1(a) M a c h i n e r y Spaces: Design flooding factors should be as specified in Table 95-I5-5(e)(1) o f 46 CFR, unless the USCG intends to change their requirements. This table is slighdy different than that shown in Table 2-$.$. of NFPA 19.

6-2.7.1(c) Vehicle Spaces: 46 CFRSubpart95.15(f)(1)specifies that the amount of CO 2 required (lbs) is determined by dividing

the gross volume fit 3 ) of the largest space by 22. Depending on the volume of the space the results can be shghtly different than that specified in 6-~.7.1(c).

6-3.1: All Exceptions should be deleted. Personnel evacuation of the spaces being tested should be mandatory in all cases, no matter what type of testing or servicing is being performed on the CO 2 system(s). All personnel not involved in the CO 2 system testing should be evacuated from the hazard area(s) and from the cylinder storage room before any testing is started. It should also be recommended that personnelinvolved in the testing should be equipped with SCBA's and have direct communication between the space being tested and the CO 2 storage room. Personnel safety should be the top priority, and should be the responsibility of the authority having jurisdiction (e.g., person(s) in responsible charge) to assure that all safety precautions have been taken.

O t h e r areas that should be included in Chapter 6: Requirements for USCG approved Design, Installation,

Operation and Maintenance Manuals. Expanded guidelines for inspection, service and maintenance of

the systems. Expanded guidelines forpersonnel safety. Expanded requirements for Low Pressure Systems. Expanded requirements for system testing, including "puff tests". Note: Supporting material is available for review at the NFPA

headquarters. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: No specific recommendation provided.

(Log #CP4) 12- 23 - (Chapter 6): Accept SUBMITTEP¢. Technical Committee on Carbon Dioxide RECOMMENDATION: Add a new Chapter 6 as follows and renumber subsequent chapters.

Chapter 6 Marine Systems 6-1 G e n e r a l . 6-1.1 This chapter outlines the modifications necessary for marine systems. All other requirements of this standard shall apply to marine systems except as modified by this chapter. A-6-l.l I t ls intended that NFPA 12, including this chapter, would be used as a stand alone document for the design, installation and maintenance of marine carbon dioxide systems. Chapter 6 was added in 1999 to address marine installations. It was intended to be used in lieu of other standards such as 46 CFR.

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N F P A 12 - - F 9 9 R O P

6-1.2 Special Definitions. Marine Systems. Systems installed on ships, barges, offshore platforms, motor boats, and pleasure craft. Cargo Space. A space for the carriage or storage of items or

products that are transported by the vessel. Machinery Space. A space that contains mechanical equipment

for handling, pumping, or transferring flammable or combustible liquids as a fuel. A-6-1.2 Machinery Space. Examples include spaces containing engines used for propulsion, engines which drive electrical generators, oil filling stations, cargo pumps, or heating, ventilation and air conditioning machinery. Vehicle Space. A space that is designed for the carriage of

automobiles or other self-propelled vehicles. A-6-1.2 Vehicle Space. Carbon dioxide systems are not recommended for vehicle spaces which are accessible to passengers. Electrical Equipment Space. A space containing electrical

propulsion, power generating or power distribution equipment. 6-2 System Requirements. 6-2.1 System components shall be specifically listed or approved for carbon dioxide system marine applications. 6-2.2 Operating Instructions. 6-2.2.1 Instructions for the operation of the system shall be located in a conspicuous place at or near all manual controls, and in the carbon dioxide storage room. 6-2.2.2 For systems in which the carbon dioxide storage is not within the protected space, the operating instructions shall include a chart indicating the location of the emergency control to be used if the normal controls fail to operate. 6-2.3 System Actuation. 6-2.3.1 Two separate valves shall be provided for releasing carbon dioxide into any protected space. One valve shall control discharge from the carbon dioxide storage. The second valve shall control carbon dioxide discharge into the protected space(s). (See 1-7.3.6) Exception: For systems which contain 300 pounds of carbon dioxide rtora~,e or leas, on~ one valve need be used for the release of the system ~rov,ded that the protected space is normally unoccupied and has torizontal egr~s. 6-2.$.2 A separate manually operated control shall be provided to operate each valve requiredby 6-2.3.1. A set of controls shall be located outside at least one o f the main means of egress from each protected space. A-6-2.3.2 Except for very small protected spaces noted in 6-2.$.1 (exception), it is the intent of this standard to require two separate manual operations to cause discharge of a marine system° Provision of a separate manually activated control for each of the discharge control valves required by 6-2.3.1 accomplishes this intent. This requirement is an exception to the "normal manual operation" as defined in 1-7.1 (b). 6-2.3.3 In addition to the manually operated controls required by 6-2.3.2, each of the valves required by 6-2.3.1 shall be provided with ~ts own emergency manual control. A-6-2.3.3 For a high pressure carbon dioxide system, the emergency manual control for the supply is the manual operator on the pilot cylinder(s). 6-2.3.4 Controls for the valves required by 6-2.3.2 shall be located inside a release box clearly identified for the protected space. If the box containing the controls is to be locked, a key to the box shall be provided in a break-glass type enclosure conspicuously located adjacent to the box. 6-2.3.~ In addidon to the requirements of 1-5.1.5, audible predischarge alarms shall be provided which depend on no source of power other than carbon dioxide pressure. The time delay required by 1-5.1.4 shall be a minimum of 20 seconds and shall depend on no source of power other than carbon dioxide pressure. A-6-2.3.5 Sufficient carbon dioxide should be provided to power the alarms at their rated pressure for the required time. 6-2.4 Carbon Dioxide Storage. 6-2.4.1 Carbon dioxide storage shall be permitted inside normally unoccupied protected spaces for systems which contain not more than 300 pounds of carbon dioxide storage and are equipped for automatic actuation. 6-2.4.2 Low pressure systems shall be provided with dual refrigeration units and shall be constructed in accordance with 46 CFR 58.20. 62.4.3 When the carbon dioxide containers are located outside a protected space, they shall be stored in a room which shall be situated in a safe and readily accessible location, and shall be effectively ventilated so that the agent containers are not exposed to ambient tempuratures outlined in 1-8.5.5. Common bulkheads

and decks located between agent container storage rooms and protected spaces shall be protected with A-60 class structural insulation as defined by 46GFR 72. Doors and other means of closing any opening therein, which form the boundaries between such rooms and adjoining protected spaces, shall be gas tight. Agent container storage rooms must be accessible without having to pass through the space being protected. Access doors shall open outward. 6-2.5 System Piping. 6-2.5.1 Where necessary, drains shall be provided for the removal of accumulated moisture.

A-6-2.5.1 An example of where drains would be necessary would be low points in carbon dioxide piping which is also used by a sampling type smoke detection system. 6-2.5.2 Carbon dioxide piping shall not be fitted with drains or other openings within living quarters.

I 6-2.5.3 Carbon dioxide piping shall be used for no other purpose. l Exception: Carbon Dioxide piping shall be permitted to be used in an air sampling type smoke detection system. 6-2.6 System Design shall comply with Chapter 2, 3, and 4 except as follows:

(a) Machinery Spaces. Machinery spaces shall be designed to a 34 percent concentration based on the gross volume. 85 percent of this concentration shall be achieved within 2 minutes from the start of discharge. Gross volume shall include the casing.

(b) Cargo Spaces. Cargo spaces other than vehicle spaces shall be supplied with carbon dioxide based on one p oundpe r 30 cubic feet based on the gross volume. The initial quantity of carbon dioxide discharged shall be based on the net volume of the space as determined by the amount of cargo in the cargo space. Additional carbon dioxide shall be released as needed to maintain control of the fire. Clear instructions shall be posted within the carbon dioxide storage room detailing the carbon dioxide release

i procedure. i A-6-2.6 (b) Fires in cargo spaces may not be completely extinguished by the carbon dioxide discharge. Whether the fire is completely extinguished or only suppressedwill depend on a number of factors including the type and quantity of burning material. Some leakage of carbon dioxide endched atmosphere from the cargo hold is likely. Therefore, additional carbon dioxide may need to be discharged on an intermittent basis to maintain fire

suppression in the cargo hold until the vessel reaches port. Once a t port, before the cargo hold is opened, properly equipped and trained fire brigade must be standing by to effect complete extinguishment of the burning material.

(c) Vehicle Spaces. Vehicle spaces where the vehicles contain more than 5 gallons of fuel (gasoline or diesel) shall be designed to a 34 percent concentration based on the gross volume. 85 percent of this concentration shall be achieved within 2 minutes from start of discharge

(d) Vehicle Spaces. Vehicle spaces where the vehicles contain 5 gallons or less Of fuel (gasoline or diesel) shall be designed to a 34 percent concentration based on the gross volume. 2/3 of this concentration shall be achieved within 10 minutes from start of discharge. 6-2.6.2 Electrical Equipment Spaces. Electrical Equipment Spaces shall be treated as a dry electrical hazard in accordance with chapter 2. 6-3 Inspection and Maintenance. Inspection and maintenance shall comply with section 1-10.3 and this section. 6-3.1 General. Prior to testing or maintenance of a fixed carbon dioxide system, all personnel shall be evacuated from the protected space (See section 1-5). 6-3.2 Approval of Installations. The following approval tests shall be conducted prior to the tests required by 1-6.5. Pressure tests of the piping shall be performed to meet the requirements of the foUowing paragraphs. The test media shall be a dry, noncorrosive gas such as nitrogen or carbon dioxide. When pressurizing the piping, pressure shall be increased in 50 psi (3.5 bar) increments. Once the pressure in the pipe has reached the required test pressure, the pressure source shall be shut off and disconnected from the pipe. CAUTION: Pneumatic pressure testing creates a potential risk of injury to personnel in the area, as a result of airborne projectiles, if rupture of the piping system occurs. Prior to conducting the pneumatic pressure test, the area in which the pipe is located shall be evacuated and appropriate safeguards shall be provided for test personnel. 6-3.2.1 High Pressure Systems. 6-3.2.1.1 The piping from the carbon dioxide supply to the stop valves in the manifold shall be subjected to a minimum pressure of 1,000 psi. The leakage during a two minute period shall not exceed a pressure drop of 10 percent.

54

N F P A 12 - - F 9 9 R O P

6-3.2.1.2 The distribution piping shall be capped ahead of the first joint ahead (upstream) of the distribution nozzles. The test required by 6-3.2.1.1 shall be performed on the distribution piping; however, the minimum test pressure shall be 600 psi. The leakage during a two minute period shall not exceed a pressure drop of 10 percent. 6-3.2.2 Low Pressure Systems. 6-3.2.2.1 All piping which is normally pressurized shall be subjected to a pressure test of minimum 300 psi. No leakage shall be permitted from the piping during a two minute test. 6-3.2.2.2 The piping from the tank shut off valve to the first joint ahead of the nozzles shall be subjected to a minimum pressure test of 300 psi. The leakage during a two minute period shall not exceed a pressure drop of 10%. . 6-3.3 Predischarge delays and alarms and ventilation shut downs shall be tested by flowing carbon dioxide into the system. Predischarge delays which are not accurate to within +20%/-0% at 70°F of their rating shall be adjusted or replaced, and retested. 6-3.4 Compliance with 6-3.2.3 shall be verified. SUBSTANTIATION: In 1993, and accidental discharge of a carbon dioxide system protecting a shipboard engine room resulted in the loss of two lives. A review of the accident by the Coast Guard reveled a number of areas where the current regulations pertaining to shipboard carbon dioxide systems were in need of improvement, In lieu of developing a new federal regulation, the Coast Guard requested the assistance of the NFPA in developing an industry standard on shipboard carbon dioxide installations similar to previous requests to develop standards on shipboard sprinkler systems and water mist systems. This Committee Prol?osal represents the product of this effort. Additionally, this supports a larger effort by the NFPA to develop a set of comprehensive marine fire protection standards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #13) 12- 24- (6-2.1): Reject SUBMITI'ER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assoc. RECOMMENDATION: Delete second sentence of Paragraph 6-2.1 that reads:

"All other systems shall be of the total flooding type." SUBSTANTIATION: It is recognized that the majority of marine systems are total flooding; however, there may be some marine applications in the future where local application systems may be used (e.g., on off-shore platforms). COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject, COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Material referenced does not exist.

above on systems which contain not more than 300 pounds of carbon dioxide storage provided that the t~rotected soace is normally unoccunied and has horizontal e~ress." SUBSTANTIATION: Pneumatic as well as mechanical actuation is typical in marine applications and should continue to be permitted. Automatic systems should be restricted to those spaces which are normally unoccupied and which have horizontal egress, i.e., it should not be necessary to climb a ladder or stairs to exit such spaces. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMI'Iq'EE STATEMENT: See Section 6-2.3.1 in Committee Proposal 12-23 (Log #CP4).

(Log #4) 12- 28 - (6-2.4.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITEER: John P. Goudreau, Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"A normal manual actuation device shall be provided outside at least one of the main means of egress from the protected space(s)." SUBSTANTIATION: Adds clarity to the requirement, Instead of "device", you may also use "station," a commonly used term in the marine industry to describe such devices. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

See Section 6-2.3.2 in Committee Proposal 12-23 (Log #CP4). COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee provided a requirement in 6-2.3.2 which fulfills the submitter's intent.

(Log #5) 12- 29- (6-2.4.3): Accept SUBMrITER: John P. Goudreau, Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add a new sentence as follows:

"For svstems which contain 300 hounds of carbon dioxide storage or less. only one valve need be used for the release of the swstem nrovided that the nrotected snace is normally unoccunied and has horizontal emress."- SUBSTANTIATION: This added verbage is in accordance with current practice for U.S. flag vessels. It is based on the rationale that two separate valves add considerable expense but adds little to safety cons|derations for such small spaces. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See the Exception to 6-2.3.1 in Committee Proposal 12-23 (Log #CP4).

(Log #2) 12- 25 - (6-2.2): Accept in Principle S U B M I ~ John P Goudreau, Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows:

"System components shall be specifically gv~t,d ggRr_9.y_¢~ for carbon dioxide system marine applications." SUBSTANTIATION: The term "approved" is more applicable and recognizable in the marine industry than the term "listed." COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Pnnciple. COMMIT1"EE STATEMENT: Both terms are appropriate (see definitions). See Committee Proposal 12-23 (Log #CP4).

(Log #14) 12- 26 - (6-2.3.2): Reject SUBMIq['I'EPa Charle:; F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assoco RECOMMENDATION: Delete the word "and" on the second line. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Material does not exist.

(Log #3) 12- 27 - (6-2.4.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITIT, R: John P. Goudrean, Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows:

"Only normal manual actuation which is mechanical or oneumatic in nature and emergency manual actuadon shall be used. Automatic actu~.tion shall be permitted in addition to the

(Log #6) 12- 30 - (6-2.4.5): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: John P. Goudrean, Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Add a new sentence as follows:

"The nredlschar~te alarm shall have a minimum decibel ratin~ of 90 db at 10 ft." SUBSTANTIATION: Some minimum performance recluirement should be specified. This requirement is currently speofied by Underwriters Laboratories and is in accordance with current practice for U.S. flag vessels. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Made reference to 1-7.5 in 6-1.1 of Committee Proposal 12-23 (Log #CP4). COMMITI'EE STATEMENT: Some minimum performance requirement should be specified. This criteria should apply to all systems and was therefore added to 1-7.5.

(Log #15) 12- 31 - (6-2.5.4 (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assoc. RECOMMENDATION: Add new Paragraph 6-2.5.4 to read as follows:

"When the carbon dioxide containers are located outside a protected space, they shall be stored in a room which shall be situated in a safe and readily accessible location, and shall be effectively ventilated so that the agent containers are not exposed to ambient temperatures in excess of 130°F. Common bulkheads and decks Iocatedbetween agent container storage rooms and protected spaces shall be protected with A-60 class structural insulation. Agent container storage rooms must be accessible

55

N F P A 12 - - F 9 9 R O P

without having to pass through the space being protected. Access doors shall open outwards, and bulkheads and decks, including doors and other means of dosing any opening therein, which form the boundaries between such rooms and adjoining spaces, shall be

~ as tight." UBSTANTIATION: Bulkhead insulation, temperature

requirements, and other information, were added to agree with existing requirements found in 46 CFR (95.15-20) and USCG Circular #NVC 6-72 Change I. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6-2.4.3 in Committee Proposal 12-23 (Log #CP4).

(Log #7) 12- 32 - (6-2.7): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: John P. Goudreau, Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Delete:

"~: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v v . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . v . . . . . . . ~.~a ~). Uhe c.zrScn d!c~'de =)~tem "=

~ ' ~ ' ~ i X ~ I O S : This statement is incorrect for machinery and vehicle spaces and is only correct for cargo spaces. It should appear under paragraph 6-2.7.1 (h) which specifically addresses cargo spaces. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6-2.6(b) in Committee Proposal 12-23 (Log #CP4).

(Log #8) 12- 33 - (6-2.7.1(b)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: John P. Goudrean, Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows:

Cargo Spaces. Cargo spaces other than vehicle spaces shall be designed using one pound per 30 cuf t based on the gross volume. ~ Fcrzcnt ~f "..h'z cc.nccn~ra'dcn ~hal! ~c :c:qc;'cd -C~".n I0 m!n'.:=c~ frc.m ~'.z.~ cf ~=:hargc. An initial ¢har~e of carbon dioxide shall be released to bdn~ the fire under control. Additional carbon dioxide shall be released from time to time t9 maintain the concentration. Fire sunDression nrovided by the carbon dioxide system is normally m-a]ntained until the vessel reaches port for final cxtinguishr0ent. SUBST.~ITIATION: This method of controlling fires in cargo holds in standard practice in the marine industry. It is based on the premise that deep seated class A fires cannot be extinguished while at sea without endangering the ship's stability. Carbon dioxide is used to prevent "flash over" until such time as the vessel reaches port and the cargo removed for final extinguishment. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

See A-6-2.6(b) in Committee Proposal 12-23 (Log #CP4). COMMITTEE STATEMENT: This method of controlling fires in

• cargo holds in standard practice in the marine industry. It is based on the premise that deep seated class A fires cannot be extinguished while at sea without endangering the ship's stability. Carbon dioxide is used to prevent "flash over" until such time as the vessel reaches port and the cargo removed for final extinguishment.

(Log #16) 12- 34- (6-2.7.1(c)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assoc. RECOMMENDATION: Paragraph 6-2.7.1 (c), Vehicle S~aces: In the second sentence change "2 minutes" to ~10 minutes.' SUBSTANTIATION: The 10 minute discharge time reflects the requirements of SOLAS. A 2 minute discharge time may not be practical. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See 6-2.6(d) in Committee Proposal 12-23 (Log #CP4).

12- 35- (6-3.1): Reject (Log #17) SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assoc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise Paragraph 6-3.1 to read as follows:

6-3.1 General: Prior to the start of and during testing and maintenance of fixed carbon dioxide systems, all personnel shall be evacuated from the protected space and the cylinder storage room. Only those involved in conducting or wimessing the testing

and /o r maintenance shall be allowed in these spaces during

~ erformance of these functions. UBSTANTIATION: Experience has shown that access to and

egress from marine spaces are unique, and require the imp.lementation of extraordinary safety precautions during test and maintenance of marine CO 2 systems. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Section 6-3.1 of Committee Proposal 12-23 (Log #CP4) is very specific and concise.

(Log #9) 12- 36 - (6-3.1 Exception): Accept in Principle SUBMII"rER: Thomas Wysocki," Guardian Services, Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Delete "Exception" to 6-3.1 as follows:

6-3.1 General. During testing or maintenance of a fixed carbon dioxide s/stem, all personnel shall be evacuated from the protected space.

E::ccUd~n*: Pcr~annc' zh=!! nc.t 5c rcquircd t~ 5c c;ncuatcd

. . . . . . v . . . . . . . . . v . . . . v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S.'~EFf!S X""

SUBSTANTIATION: The "Exception" permits personnel to remain in" the protected space during testing of the C02 system under certain conditions. The conditions proposed attempt to eliminate the possibility of a C02 discharge into the space during maintenance and testing of the C02 system itself.

The removal of a spool piece and proper installation of a blind flange should accomplish this but compromise fire safety and hence life safety. What if a fire should occur while the spool piece is removed? Can the spool piece be reinstalled in time to discharge the system and control the fire? Unlikely.

A double block and bleed arrangement if properly implemented can also accomplish the proposed isolation - gAI~.IlI.II~,IZ~ double block and bleed introduces additional complexity to the normal G0 2 flow through the pipe - it increases chances of a block valve bein~ closed when the system is suonosed to be on line or the "bleed" valve bein~ left onen. The use of this scheme adds an additional element to-system management - upon consideration, it seems to be a questionable system feature.

(Why are persons remaining in the space during testing of the O92? - Possibly they are doing maintenance on equipment in the space - history shows that many fires occur during maintenance procedures.)

We are of the opinion that the proposal recommends a "shortcut to safety" which will likely cause more problems than it solves. Further, there are some system test procedures which by their very nature require CO 2 to be injected into the protected space.

(The 12 Standard already provides for positive system lockouts in 1-5.1.7 (NFPA 12 - 1993 ediUon). We do believe that implementation of these lockouts was not intended to permit personnel not directly involved in implementing the test to remain m the hazard while the CO 2 system was being cycled for test purposes.)

During tests in which some quantity of CO 2 could be injected into the space, persons not directly involved in implementing the test should be evacuated - those who must enter the space to implement the test of the CO 2 system should be provided with appropriate means to effect their safe evacuation in case C0 2 concentrations should rise to a potentially harmful level. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITI'EE STATEMENT: Section 6-3.1 of Committee Proposal 12-28 (Log #CP4).

(Log #10) 12- 37- (6-3.2): Accept SUBMITTER= John P. Goudreau, Ansul Inc. RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"Predischarge delays and alarms and ventilation shut downs shall be tested by flowing carbon dioxide into the system. Predischarge delays which are not accurate to within ; ! 0 % / 9 % +20%/-0% at70 dgg.r_.¢..¢~ of their rating shall be replaced." SUBSTANTIATION: The current requirement is impractical and cannot be achieved under anything other than ideal field conditions. The accuracy of a pneumatic predischarge time delay is impacted by the distance between the predischarge delay device

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N F P A 12 - - F99 R O P

and the CO 2 source as well as by the field temperature at the time the test is conducted. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

See 6-3.3 in Committee. Proposal 12-23 (Log #CP4).

(Log #18) 12- ~8- (6-3.2): Reject SuBMrFI'ER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression S)stems Assoc. RECOMMENDATION: Delete Section 6-3.2in its enurety and replace "with revised Section 6-3.2 to read as follows: 6-3.2 Approval of installations. The following approval tests shall

be conducted prior to the tests required by 1-6.3. .6-3.2.1" Piping pressure test. The #ping shall be pneumatically

tested in a closed circuit for a period of 10 minutes at 40 psig (276 kPa). At the end of 10 minutes the pressure drop shall not exceed 20% of the test pressure.

Exception: The pressure test shall be.permilxed to be omitted if the total piping contains no more'than one change in direction fitting between the storage container and the dischargenozzle, and where all piping is physically checked for tightness.

A-6-3.2.1 The pressure testing of piping systems should only be performed by qualified personnel. All safety precautions should, be followed.

6-3.2.1.1 On sections of low pressure s/stem piping and pilot lines that are normally under continuous pressure, no leakage shall be permitted when subjected to the pressure test in 6-3.2.1.

6-3.2.1.2 The pressure test shall be conducted using a dry, non, corrosive, non-toxic gas such as nitrugen or carbon dioxide vapor. The pressure source shall be shut off during the test.

6-3.2.2* A flow test using carbon dioxide or an -inert gas shall be performed on the piping network to verify that the flow is continuous, and that the piping and nozzles are unobstructed.

A-6-3.2.2 The purpose is to conduct a flow test of shortdurafion (also known as a "puff test") through the piping network to r

determine that (1) the flow is continuous, (2) check valves are properly oriented, and (5) the piping and nozzlesare

• unobstructed. The flow test should be performed using carbon dioxide o r an

inert gas at a pressure not to exceed the normal 0peratlngpressure of the carbojv<lioxide system.

The carbon dioxide or inert gas pressure should be introduced into the piping network at the cylinder connection. The quantity of carbon dioxide or inert gas used for this test should be sufficient to verify that each and every nozzle is unobstructed.

Visual indicators should be used to verify that carbon dioxide or inert gas has discharged out of each and every nozzle in the s3~tem.

6-$.2.$ Predlscharge delays and alarms and ventilation shut downs shall be tested by flowing carbon dioxide into the system. Predischar~e delays which are not accurate to within +20% -0% at 70°F of their rating shall be adjumed or replaced, and retested. •

6-5.2.4 Compliance with 6-2.$ shall be ~ e d , SUBSWANTIKTION: The NTPA 2001 Technical Committee recently approved a pneumatic pressure test o f 40 psi for use on , marine systems piping. This requirement is proposed for incorporation into the NFPA 2001 new Chapter 5 on Marine Systems. Similar pipe tests are also being proposed herewith for use on carbon dioxide marine systems so as to establish standardized requirements for testing all types of gaseous agent ~ t ~ A c T I P ' p m g "

ON: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The suggested testing c~teria is not appropriate for carbon dioxide systems.

(Log #21) 12- 39 - (A-1-5(g)): Reject SUBMITrEI~ David H. Kay, USNavy RECOMMENDATION: DeleteTWarning" and replace with "Danger." SUBSTANTIATION: Danger signs are more appropriate in identifying immediate hazard capable of producing urmaediate injury or death to personnel. Warning and cautions indicate the presence of a lesser hazard. Recommend the above changes to reflect the hazard associated with CO 2 systems. OSHA Peg: 29CFR 1910.145 defines ~Dangef vs. ~ a r n ~ . " COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMrlTEE STATEMF, NT: The Committee feels that the word ~vVARNING ~ is appropriate to warn individuals of the potential of the hazards.

(Log #CP8) 12-40- (A-l-10.1): Accept SUBMITIT~ Technical Committee on Carbon Dioxide

I RECOMMENDATION: Add the following text to the beginning of A-l-10.1 to reack

A "quick check" to give reasonable assurance that the extinguishing system is fully charged and operaHe is done by seeing that the system is in place, that it has not been activated or tempered with, and that there is no obvious ph~fical damage or condition to prm oper~vent ration. SUBSTANTIATION:Provided additionally information regarding inspections. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

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