JP 3-15 Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine ...99).pdf · Joint Doctrine for Barriers,...

24 February 1999

Joint Doctrinefor

Barriers, Obstacles,and Mine Warfare

Joint Pub 3-15

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides barrier, obstacle,and mine warfare guidelines for the planningand execution of theater strategy, campaigns,and joint operations across the range ofmilitary operations. It focuses on nationalpolicy, international law, and operational andlogistic considerations peculiar to thepreparation and conduct of joint militaryoperations involving barriers, obstacles, andmine warfare.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrine forjoint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance.Commanders of forces operating as part ofa multinational (alliance or coalition)military command should followmultinational doctrine and proceduresratified by the United States. For doctrineand procedures not ratified by the UnitedStates, commanders should evaluate andfollow the multinational command’s doctrineand procedures, where applicable.

V. E. CLARKVice Admiral, US NavyDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. v

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

• General..................................................................................................................... I-1• Barrier, Obstacle, and Mine Employment.................................................................. I-1• Threat....................................................................................................................... I-3• International Law and US Policy............................................................................... I-4

CHAPTER IIJOINT COMMAND, CONTROL, AND PLANNING

• General.................................................................................................................... II-1• NCA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guidance........................................ II-1• Joint Force............................................................................................................... II-1• Coordination............................................................................................................ II-1• Planning Considerations........................................................................................... II-2• General Planning Sequence...................................................................................... II-7• Planning Support..................................................................................................... II-9

CHAPTER IIIEMPLOYMENT

• General.................................................................................................................. III-1• Employment Principles.......................................................................................... III-1• Land Operations..................................................................................................... III-3• Air Operations....................................................................................................... III-9• Maritime Operations............................................................................................. III-11

CHAPTER IVCOUNTERING ENEMY EMPLOYMENT

• General.................................................................................................................. IV-1• Land Operations..................................................................................................... IV-1• Maritime Mine Countermeasures........................................................................... IV-8

APPENDIX

A Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle Reports........................................................ A-1B References......................................................................................................... B-1C Administrative Instructions................................................................................ C-1

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GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions.............................................................................. GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Barrier, Obstacle, and Mine Employment....................................................... I-2I-2 The Hague Convention (VIII) Provisions....................................................... I-6II-1 Planning Considerations................................................................................ II-4II-2 Intelligence Support Tasks........................................................................... II-10III-1 Employment Principles for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines.......................... III-2III-2 Land Operations Support Resources............................................................ III-3III-3 Air-Delivered Scatterable Mines................................................................ III-10III-4 Types of Maritime Minefields.................................................................... III-12IV-1 Breaching Fundamentals............................................................................. IV-3IV-2 Breaching Operations.................................................................................. IV-6IV-3 Maritime Mine Countermeasures................................................................ IV-9IV-4 Maritime Mine Countermeasure Mission Objectives................................. IV-13

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Provides Basic Concepts Regarding Barriers, Obstacles, andMines

Covers Joint Command, Control, and Planning

Discusses Friendly Employment of Barriers, Obstacles, andMines

Covers Countering Enemy Employment of Barriers,Obstacles, and Mines

General

Barrier, obstacle, and minefield employment can havesignificant operational impact with minimal risk to friendlyforces. Minefields can attrit enemy forces and destroy orneutralize their equipment. Use of barriers, obstacles, andminefields can also be used as a psychological tool to discernenemy intentions and create uncertainty for the enemycommander. In the defense, barriers, obstacles, and minefieldscan immobilize and canalize enemy forces by taking advantageof terrain by adding strength and depth to the battlefield. Themajor disadvantages of using barriers, obstacles, and minefieldsare the time, personnel, equipment, and materiel required toconstruct and eventually clear them. Additionally, they canbe bypassed or cleared and may cause casualties to friendlyforces and noncombatants, as well as limit friendly mobility.

Strategic employment can enhance deterrence without posingan offensive threat. Operational employment can help protectfriendly ports, lines of communications, and key facilities andfree combat forces for offensive employment. Tacticalemployment is normally done to achieve tactical offensive ordefensive objectives. Barrier, obstacle, and minefieldemployment can be used in land, maritime , and airoperations. The joint force commander (JFC) is responsiblefor ensuring that employment of barriers, obstacles, and minesconforms with international law and US policy. To facilitate

Employment of barriers,obstacles, and minewarfare can enhance acommander’s ability tomass combat power,sustain the force, conductoffensive or defensiveoperations, achievesurprise, and use orrestrict key terrain,airfields, or sea routes.

There are three levels ofemployment of barriers,obstacles and mines:strategic, operational, andtactical.

Levels of Employment

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Joint force commandersare subject to definitive USpolicy and guidancepromulgated by theNational CommandAuthorities and theChairman of the JointChiefs of Staff.

To achieve the maximumeffect from an operationalbarrier, obstacle, orminefield, certain factorsmust be considered.

compliance, rules of engagement (ROE) for employment ofmines are normally included in operation plans and operationorders.

The National Command Authorities (NCA) decision makingprocess evaluates the probable effects of strategic barrier,obstacle, and mine warfare employment across the range ofmilitary operations. The employment of mines in internationalwaters or foreign territories (including territorial seas) isgenerally a hostile act, thus requiring NCA authorization. ROEare directives that authorize and delineate the circumstancesand limitations on the use of force. ROE are generally mission-oriented and action-specific. Coordination must be achievedbetween political goals, multinational forces, and intertheatersupport.

Barriers, obstacles, and minefields that have operationalsignificance are usually formed around an existing terrainfeature (e.g., mountain chain or a strait) or a manmadestructure (e.g., air base, canal, highway, or bridge). Theelement of surprise is very important. In the offense, thepriority of barrier, obstacle, and minefield employment is toenhance and protect the friendly force’s ability tomaneuver. This is achieved by controlling the movement ofenemy ground and naval forces and degrading the operabilityof enemy air bases. In the defense, the priority for barrier,obstacle, and minefield emplacement is directed towarddegrading the enemy’s ability to maneuver, destroying orattriting the enemy force, supporting economy of forcemeasures, and retaining key terrain or areas of significantpolitical, strategic, operational, or tactical value — in otherwords, adding depth and time to the battlespace. Theemployment of air-delivered scatterable mines normallyrequires close coordination between other components duringboth the planning and employment of phases of the operation.Denial operations, deception tactics, and political andpsychological considerations are also a large factor in usingbarriers, obstacles, and minefields.

Command and Control Considerations

Planning Considerations

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Executive Summary

Barrier, obstacle, andminefield planning is atop-down procedure.

Barriers, obstacles, andminefields should beevaluated from both anoffensive and a defensiveposture.

General Planning Sequence

The commander’s intent, intelligence preparation of thebattlespace, concept of operations, and fire support plan ateach level is part of the planning process. Barrier, obstacle,and mine warfare planning requires timely and reliable all-source counterintelligence and intelligence support.Planning for the use of barriers, obstacles, and mines involvesthe acquisition, storage, maintenance, distribution, andsecurity of the material as well as communication supportto facilitate command and control of joint and multinationaloperations.

Barriers, obstacles, and minefields should directly supportthe JFC’s plan. They should be carefully matched to theterrain with a maneuver concept that focuses on enemy forcesas objectives. Coverage by observation and, if necessary,fire is essential in order to restrict enemy breaching efforts,maneuver, and massing of forces and to increase thedestruction of the enemy. Barriers, obstacles, and minefieldsare more effective when employed in depth. The differenttypes of resources range from land mines (conventional orscatterable), sea mines, demolition obstacles (created by thedetonation of explosives), constructed obstacles, or flamefield expedients. Offensive employment focuses on isolatingthe battlefield, facilitating economy of force, enhancing overallforce security, and blocking or delaying an enemy’swithdrawal. Defensive employment focuses on degradingenemy capabilities by disrupting combat formations anddelaying their movement, interfering with command andcontrol, and confusing enemy commanders. Reporting,recording, and marking barriers, obstacles, and minefieldsis imperative to ensure the safety of friendly forces andnoncombatants.

Employment Principles

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In conjunction with othermaritime and air assets,the aim of maritimemining is control of thesea.

The basic types ofminefields arecharacterized as offensive,defensive, or protective.

Successful land operationsdepend on the freedom tomaneuver.

The NCA has tasked the geographic combatantcommanders with the responsibility for the conduct ofmaritime mine warfare within their areas of responsibilityand in support of other combatant commanders’ maritimemine warfare requirements. The geographic combatantcommanders have delegated the responsibility for planningmaritime mine warfare operations to their Navy componentcommanders. Mining can be used at all levels of war andacross the range of military operations to achieve theobjectives of friendly forces. Mining can delay and attritenemy maritime forces and can deny them the unrestricteduse of sea areas of passage. Barriers, obstacles, and minefieldscan also protect friendly harbors, channels, and seaways aswell as shorelines susceptible to enemy amphibious operations.

Offensive minefields (which include strategic fields) are thoseplanted in enemy-controlled waters. Defensive minefieldsare those employed in contested waters to intercept the transitof enemy combatant forces. Protective minefields are thoseemployed in friendly waters to protect friendly ports, harbors,or inshore sea lines of communications. A minelayingoperation consists of planning the minefield, preparing thematerial and personnel to conduct the laying, planning thelaying mission, laying the mines, conducting follow-onsurveillance and, if required, replenishing the minefield.

Terrain conditions, enemy tactics, and integrated fires, barriers,obstacles, and minefields can limit friendly maneuvercapability. Operations to counter the use of natural andmanmade barriers, obstacles, and minefields by enemyforces may involve the employment of conventional,airmobile, airdropped, amphibious, or special operationsforces. These operations are normally supported by combatengineer forces. Intelligence collection plans, an element ofdeception, and logistic support are important factors forplanning and operational support. The following must beconsidered in countering enemy employment of barriers,obstacles, and minefields: preparation; detection of minefields;reconnaissance of enemy barriers, obstacles, and minefields;bypass considerations; and breaching (whether it be in-stridebreaching, deliberate breaching, assault breaching, orclandestine breaching). Recording, reporting, and markingmust be sent immediately through appropriate channels andincorporated in intelligence data.

Maritime Operations

Countering Enemy Employment on Land

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Executive Summary

Mine countermeasures (MCM) reduce the threat andeffects of enemy-laid sea mines on both friendly naval forceand seaborne logistic force access to, and transit of, selectedwaterways. MCM are divided into two broad areas: proactiveMCM destroy enemy mine manufacturing and storagefacilities or mine laying platforms before the mines are laid;enabling MCM are designed to counter mines once they havebeen laid through passive or active MCM. Three primarypassive measures are practiced: localization of the threat,detection and avoidance of the minefield, and risk reduction.Active MCM entail either physical interference with theexplosive functioning of the mine or actually destroying itthrough minehunting or minesweeping. Before maritimeMCM operations, intelligence may indicate the types,quantities, or locations of mine storage sites. A key tocountering any mine is a detailed knowledge of the minesensor and targeting circuitries. The MCM planning processbegins with an estimate of the situation and a missionstatement and results ultimately in production of an MCMtasking order.

This publication provides guidance for the planning andexecution of barriers, obstacles, and mine warfare operationsacross the range of military operations. Barriers, obstacles,and mines can be employed during both offensive anddefensive operations on land and at sea. The emplacementand/or construction of barriers, obstacles, and minefieldsrequires extensive coordination within the joint force.

Countering Enemy Employment at Sea

Maritime minecountermeasures includeall actions undertaken toprevent enemy mines fromaltering friendly forces’maritime plans oroperations.

CONCLUSION

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CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

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1. General

Employment of barriers, obstacles, andmine warfare can, in concert with othercapabilities, enhance a commander’s abilityto mass combat power, sustain the force,conduct offensive or defensive operations,achieve surprise, and use key terrain, airfields,or sea routes. A joint force commander (JFC)must consider both friendly and enemyemployment of these capabilities in preparingplans and conducting operations.

2. Barrier, Obstacle, and MineEmployment

a. Advantages and disadvantages ofbarrier, obstacle, and minefield employmentare listed in Figure I-1.

b. Levels of Employment

• Strategic Employment. Beforehostilities, barriers, obstacles, andminefields can enhance deterrencewithout posing an offensive threat.Defensive employment along a hostileland border can demonstrate friendlyresolve. Maritime defensive andprotective mining can help protectfriendly ports and waters. Pre-hostilityemployment would be as directed by theNational Command Authorities (NCA).NCA determination would be based, inpart, on the political signals sent and onconcurrence by affected friendly nations.Should deterrence fail, offensivemaritime mining of enemy ports andwaters can constrict enemy seaborneeconomic war sustainment efforts and

“Everything that is shot or thrown at you or dropped on you in war is mostunpleasant but of all horrible devices, the most terrifying. . . is the land mine.”

Sir William Slim, Unofficial History, 1959

reduce enemy ability to safely deploymaritime forces. Similarly, offensiveemployment of air-delivered scatterablemines can deny or restrict enemy strategicmobility and sustainability efforts.

• Operational Employment. Defensivebarrier, obstacle, and minefieldemployment can help protect friendlyports, lines of communications(LOCs), and key facilities and freecombat forces for offensiveemployment. Offensive employmentcan protect friendly maneuver whiledisrupting enemy ability to concentrateor maneuver forces. Barriers andobstacles having operationalsignificance usually differ in scale fromthose having tactical significance.However, size alone does not make anobstacle operationally significant. At theoperational level, their primary use is therestriction of enemy maneuver optionsor the creation of friendly maneuveroptions. Major natural terrainfeatures and a focus on the enemyprovide the foundation for thedevelopment of an obstacle or barrierplan. Operational barriers and obstaclesmay be created by the composite effectof many closely coordinated tacticalobstacles or by the reinforcement ofnatural obstacles to form large terrain ormassive obstacles. An example of amassive obstacle is the temporaryflooding caused by the destruction of amajor dam on a river. This, however, isonly temporary in nature. Mines canalso contribute to gaining airsuperiority. Mines can delay efforts to

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repair damage to air bases caused byimmediate effects munitions, thusdegrading or denying the base’scapability to launch or recover aircraft.Mines can also restrict the deploymentof mobile, surface-based air defenses, aswell as surface-to-surface systems,because rapid movement in a mined areaincreases the risk of a mine encounter.Mines can also disrupt logistic

sustainment operations being performedin the enemy’s rear area.

• Tactical Employment. Employment atthe tactical level, such as the creation orcountering of barriers, obstacles, orminefields, is normally done to achievetactical offensive or defensiveobjectives.

Figure I-1. Barrier, Obstacle, and Mine Employment

Provide the capability to inflict significant equipment andpsychological damage and personnel casualties on the enemy

Extend, strengthen, and deepen other defensive and offensivemeasures to support the concept of operations

Immobilize the enemy until barriers, obstacles, or minefields can bebypassed, breached, or cleared

Exploit geographic features

Free forces for other employment

Discern enemy intentions -- commitment of breach assets into aminefield is a detectable indication of intent

Create uncertainty for the enemy commander

BARRIER, OBSTACLE, AND MINE EMPLOYMENT

ADVANTAGES

Creation and removal can consume a significant amount of time,materiel, equipment, and transportation and will be manpower intensiveand hazardous

Can be bypassed, breached, or cleared

Can cause casualties to friendly forces and noncombatants, as well aslimit friendly mobility

Defensive minefields must be rendered safe following their operationalusefulness

DISADVANTAGES

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Introduction

3. Threat

a. Land. US forces may encounterbarriers, obstacles, and minefields acrossthe range of military operations. This isespecially true in areas with highly restrictiveterrain such as mountains or jungles. USforces may be faced with highly mobile enemyforces supported by lethal air and ground fires.Enemy surveillance capabilities maydetermine the effectiveness of employingfriendly barriers, obstacles, and minefields.The timing and methods of emplacement maybe determined by the air situation. Enemyforces may make extensive use of barriers,obstacles, and minefields, including modernas well as technologically obsolete mines andbooby traps, remotely scatterable mines, anda variety of countermeasures to defeat friendlybarriers, obstacles, and minefields. Becauseof the relatively low cost of mines and theirworldwide availability, US forces must beprepared to counter their use throughoutthe range of military operations. Inaddition, enemy use of nuclear munitions andchemical mines must be anticipated. Thethreat of terrorist employment of mines,explosives, and booby traps may necessitatedefensive measures to reduce the vulnerabilityof US personnel, equipment, and facilities.

b. Maritime. Enemy mine layingoperations may be conducted against friendlyports, harbors, and sea lines ofcommunications (SLOCs). Mines may alsobe used in other areas vital to US andmultinational maritime forces such asamphibious objective, fire support, and carrierbattle force operating areas. The relativelylow cost of mines makes them an idealweapon for all nations with access to them.The application of technology by industriallyadvanced countries has produced asophisticated, effective form of maritime minewarfare. Nevertheless, older minetechnologies remain effective. The ease oflaying mines by ship, aircraft, or submarinepresents a valid threat to a commander who

must rely on naval support or on seabornereinforcement and resupply. Maritime powerprojection and resupply forces originate fromfriendly ports. During amphibious operations,assault and assault follow-on shipping musttransit narrows and operate in shallow waters.The enemy can place these forces at risk, withlittle cost to its own forces, by laying only afew mines.

c. Air. Control of airspace is essential toeffective surface operations. Enemy use ofmines could pose a major threat to the abilityto conduct effective air operations. The enemymight employ sea mines in an area whereaircraft carriers would need to operate to bewithin effective range of the enemy. Theenemy might also employ scatterable mines,along with immediate effects munitions, inattacks against friendly air bases ashore.Scatterable mines could seriously disrupt and

US forces must be prepared to encounterminefields throughout the range of militaryoperations.

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THE MINING OF HAIPHONG

In a surprise operation at 0859 on 8 May 1972, Commander Roger Sheets ledthree Marine A-6 intruder and six Navy A-7 Corsair attack planes from CoralSea (CVA 43) over the river approaches to Haiphong through which most ofNorth Vietnam’s imported war material and all of its fuel supply passed. TheAmerican planes took only two minutes to lay their strings of thirty-six 1000-pound, Mark 52 mines before heading back to their waiting carrier. Insucceeding days and months, other carrier aircraft laid thousands of minesand 500-pound, Mark 36 Destructors in the seaways of secondary ports and“reseeded” the Haiphong approaches.

The results were dramatic. For the remainder of 1972, twenty-seven Sino-Soviet bloc merchant ships remained trapped in Haiphong. None of the nationstrading with Hanoi elected to risk steaming their merchant ships through theactivated American minefields. The mining campaign, in conjunction with USair attacks on North Vietnam’s land lines of communication, severely curtailedthe supply of vital munitions to Communist forces mounting the “EasterOffensive” in South Vietnam.

SOURCE: Dr. Edward J. Marolda, “Operation END SWEEP,”Naval Historical Center, 1993

delay air base launch and recovery operations,disrupt logistic sustainment operations to theair base, and thereby limit friendly airoperations.

4. International Law and USPolicy

The JFC is responsible for ensuring thatemployment of barriers, obstacles, andmines conforms with international law andUS policy. To facilitate compliance, rules ofengagement (ROE) for employment of minesare normally included in operation plans(OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs).Enemy or friendly employment of barriers,obstacles, and mines that does not complywith international law should be documentedand reported. The JFC staff judge advocateand political advisor can assist by beingactively involved with the JFC staff duringthe planning and execution of mine warfare.

a. International Law. International lawand practice regulate the use of the seas, eachnation’s rights regarding its national territory

and waters, the initiation and conduct of armedconflict, and limitations regardingemployment and types of weapons.

• The law of armed conflict postulates twocounterbalancing principles: militarynecessity and the avoidance ofunnecessary suffering. The principleof military necessity authorizes the useof force required to accomplish themission. It does not authorize actsotherwise prohibited by the law of war.The principle of avoiding unnecessarysuffering (also referred to as superfluousinjury ) prohibits injury to persons ordamage to objects that may be consideredsuperfluous to achievement of theintended objective. It limits injury tocombatants, collateral injury to civiliansnot taking a direct part in hostilities, andcollateral damage to civilian objects ifwanton or excessive. The law of warprohibition on unnecessary sufferingconstitutes acknowledgment that, in war,there is necessary suffering. A thirdprinciple, proportionality , may be

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Introduction

viewed as a fulcrum for balancingmilitary necessity and unnecessarysuffering. Finally, distinction is thecustomary international law obligation ofparties to a conflict to engage only inmilitary operations in which the effectsdistinguish between the civilianpopulation (or individual civilians nottaking a direct part in hostilities), andcombatant forces, directing theapplication of force solely against thelatter. Each of these principles has beenconsidered in the development of treatiesrelating to the employment of mines andin US doctrine.

• The United Nations (UN) Charteradmonishes member states to refrainfrom the threat or use of force againstthe territorial integrity or politicalindependence of any state, except in twosituations: individual or collective selfdefense, and as authorized by the SecurityCouncil or other competent regionalagency. The employment of mines inthese situations must comply with allrelevant treaties and customary law.

• The Hague Convention (VIII) of 1907,which addresses the use of sea mines, hasachieved almost universal acceptanceby nations. The relevant provisions ofthis convention are summarized in FigureI-2. No belligerent has as yet assertedthat the laying of mines developed since1907 (magnetic, acoustic pressure) is notgoverned by Hague VIII.

• The 1980 United Nations Convention onProhibitions or Restrictions on the Useof Certain Conventional Weapons WhichMay be Deemed to be ExcessivelyInjurious or to Have IndiscriminateEffects, commonly referred to as theConvention on Conventional Weapons(CCW) is a law of war treaty governingthe use of certain conventional weapons

which may be deemed to be excessivelyinjurious or to have indiscriminateeffects. Restrictions include: (1)requirements to record minefieldlocations and disclosure of location atconclusion of hostilities; (2) requirementson use of mines or booby traps in areascontaining concentrations of civilians;and (3) prohibition on types of boobytraps; and (4) requirements to markminefields.

Note: The CCW and its Protocols I andII entered into force for the United Stateson 24 September 1995. On 7 January1997, the President transmitted anamended Protocol II (mines, booby traps,and other devices), as amended on 3 May1996, 35 I.L.M. 1209 (1996), to theSenate for advice and consent toratification. See 33 Weekly Comp. Pres.Doc 14 (Jan. 13, 1997).

• The Convention on the Prohibition of theUse, Stockpiling, Production andTransfer of Anti-personnel Mines and ontheir Destruction, among other things,prohibits the use, stockpiling, and transferof all antipersonnel mines. It alsoprohibits assisting, encouraging, orinducing anyone else to do so. TheUnited States is not party to and has notsigned this treaty. However, many USallies have, and this fact must beconsidered in planning.

• There are two international agreementsthat bear indirectly on maritime minewarfare.

•• The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of1971 prohibits placing any nuclear orother weapons of mass destruction(WMD) on the seabed or subsoil thereofbeyond a 12-mile coastal zone. WMDother than nuclear weapons are not definedin this or any other arms control treaty.

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•• The navigation and overflightprovisions of the 1982 UN Law of theSea Convention reflect customaryinternational law and codify the rightsand duties of nations with respect tovarious uses of the oceans. Mine-layingoperations must consider the applicabilityof this Convention and the rights andfreedoms enjoyed by all nations.

b. US Policy. US policy on barrier,obstacle, and mine employment is addressedin Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10, “Law ofLand Warfare,” Naval Warfare Publication(NWP) 3-15.3, “Mining Operations,” and

Figure I-2. The Hague Convention (VIII) Provisions

THE HAGUE CONVENTION (VIII) PROVISIONS

The provisions of this convention forbid...

the laying of unanchored automatic contact mines thatdo not become harmless within 1 hour after whoever laysthem loses control over them and of anchored automaticcontact mines that do not become harmless immediatelyupon breaking free of their mooring

the mining of enemy waters and ports for the solepurpose of intercepting commercial shipping

Moreover, the convention requires...

belligerents to do their utmost to render anchoredautomatic contact mines harmless within a limited time

when a belligerent can no longer maintain surveillanceover such mines, it must notify other governments andship owners of minefield locations as soon as militaryconditions permit

at the close of war, parties to the Convention must dotheir utmost to remove mines they have laid and reportthe position of anchored automatic contact mines theylaid off the coast of another

NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1, “Commander’sHandbook on the Law of Naval Operations”(section 7.7 and 9.2). US forces do not usenon self-destructing antipersonnel landminesexcept for demining training and countermineoperations in the defense of US and alliedforces in the Republic of Korea. US forcesfully comply with the Protocol on Prohibitionor Restrictions on the Use of Mines, BoobyTraps and Other Devices, as amended on 3May 1996, annexed to the Convention on theProhibition or Restriction on the Use ofCertain Conventional Weapons Which Maybe Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or toHave Indiscriminate Effects.

CHAPTER IIJOINT COMMAND, CONTROL, AND PLANNING

II-1

1. General

There are no special command and control(C2) arrangements for employing orcountering barriers, obstacles, and mines.There are, however, certain factors that shouldbe considered during joint planning.

2. NCA and Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of StaffGuidance

JFCs are subject to definitive US policyand guidance promulgated by the NCAthrough the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff (CJCS). The NCA decision makingprocess evaluates the probable effects ofstrategic barrier, obstacle, and mine warfareemployment across the range of militaryoperations.

3. Joint Force

a. Joint Force Commander. JFCauthority to perform those functions ofcommand that involve organizing, planning,employing, directing, and coordinating arediscussed in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified ActionArmed Forces (UNAAF),” and Joint Pub 3-0,“Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

b. Mine Release Authority. Theemployment of mines in international watersor foreign territories (including territorial seas)is generally a hostile act, thus requiringNCA authorization. The laying of mines inallied territory or waters is permissible duringpeacetime with host nation (HN) permissionand NCA authorization. The JFC will ensurethat employment conforms with both

“The mine issues no official communiqués.”

Admiral William V. Pratt, USN(In Newsweek magazine, 5 Oct 1942)

international law and guidance and policypromulgated by the NCA.

c. Rules of Engagement. ROE aredirectives issued by competent militaryauthority which delineate the circumstanceand limitations under which US forces willinitiate and/or continue combat engagementwith other forces encountered. ROE aregenerally mission-oriented and action-specific. ROE promulgated by thegeographic combatant commander arebased on guidance provided by the NCAthrough CJCS Instruction 3121.01, “StandingRules of Engagement for US Forces.” Thisguidance reflects political, legal, operational,and diplomatic factors that may restrictcombat operations. ROE are requiredthroughout the range of military operationsto ensure compliance with the laws of warand NCA guidance. Combatant commanderpre- and post-hostility ROE and OPLANROE should address authority to emplacebarriers, obstacles, and mines, includingscatterable mines and self destructingantipersonnel mines. Following NCA releaseof these elements for operations, ROE shouldaddress their employment by US forces andthe prevention, denial, or countering of theiremployment by the enemy.

4. Coordination

a. Political. The US Ambassador to aforeign country is responsible, through theDepartment of State, to the President fordirecting and coordinating the activities ofUS Government personnel in that nation.This authority does not apply to personnelunder the command of combatant

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commanders whose responsibility is to theNCA. Nevertheless, the combatant commandsand appropriate ambassadors’ Country Teamsare responsible for maintaining closecoordination throughout the range of militaryoperations. This is particularly true forbarrier, obstacle, and mine warfareemployment before a conflict on thesovereign soil or in national waters of afriendly nation. The US Ambassador’sefforts can be invaluable in gaining acooperative country’s consent to such actions.The combatant commander’s political advisor,who serves as the point of contact with theDepartment of State, may be used as theconduit for these coordination efforts.

b. Multinational Forces. US forces mayconduct operations within the framework ofan alliance, coalition, or other internationalarrangement. The coordination and planningfor joint operations is applicable formultinational operations as well. Planningfor land and maritime barrier, obstacle,and mine warfare should be coordinatedamong multinational forces at all levels.This will preclude limiting friendly operationalmaneuver; conflicting, duplicative, ordivergent operations; and possible fratricideamong multinational forces. Furthermore,information on both friendly and enemybarriers, obstacles, and minefields in the jointoperations area must be exchanged in a timelymanner, consistent with established securityguidelines. Joint force commanders mustconsider limitations that the Convention onthe Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,Production and Transfer of Anti-personnelMines and on Their Destruction may placeon US allies, since many of them may beproscribed from activities associated withmine warfare.

c. Intertheater. Planning will developlocations, communications, and logisticsupport requirements for potential strategicand operational barriers, obstacles, and

minefields. Plans that could impact onother theaters should be coordinated toprevent potential mutual interference. Thisis particularly important for maritime minelaying that could affect strategic movementto or from other theaters. Informationconcerning the locations of enemy-laidmaritime minefields that could affect strategicmovement must also be exchanged amongtheaters.

5. Planning Considerations

a. General. To achieve the maximumeffect from an operational barrier, obstacle,or minefield, certain factors must beconsidered.

• Barriers, obstacles, and minefields areusually formed around an existingterrain feature (e.g., mountain chain ora strait) or a manmade structure (e.g., airbase, canal, highway, or bridge).Although there is little flexibilityin positioning these large-scaleobstructions, flexibility exists in selectingand designating those features that willbe enhanced or reinforced. Operationalbarriers, obstacles, and minefields areplaced to manipulate the enemy in sucha way that supports the commander’sintent and scheme of maneuver andshould be observed and/or covered byfire.

• The effects that these operationalbarriers, obstacles, and minefields willhave on both the friendly and enemyforces’ ability to maneuver on land andsea or to conduct effective air operationsmust be analyzed. Operational barriers,obstacles, and minefields do more thanjust degrade the maneuver of enemyforces. Because of their size and thepattern of placement, they virtuallydictate the maneuver options of bothfriendly and enemy forces.

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Joint Command, Control, and Planning

• The element of surprise is achieved ina different manner through theemployment of operational barriers,obstacles, and minefields. Because oftheir operational significance, bothfriendly and enemy forces usually knowof their existence and location. Surprisecan result when a barrier, obstacle, orminefield perceived by one force assignificant fails to effectively obstructtheir opponent. This implies that theoperational significance of a barrier,obstacle, or minefield depends both onits physical obstruction capability and theway in which the opposing forcesperceive it. Joint forces can attain andenhance surprise through the use ofrapid employment means such as air-or artillery-delivered scatterable minesthat permit rapid mining anywhere in theoperational area. These can confront theattacker with a completely new situationalmost instantly. The use of hard-to-detect employment means such assubmarines is another way to achievesurprise. Surprise can be further gainedthrough the use of lanes and gaps, phonyminefields and obstacles, and self-destructing and/or self-deactivatingmines. Friendly forces should avoidreadily discernible or repetitiveemployment and utilize deceptivemeasures. By varying the type, location,and design, the enemy’s understandingand breaching of friendly barriers,obstacles, and minefields is made moredifficult.

b. Offensive. In the offense, the priorityof barrier, obstacle, and minefieldemployment (to include air-deliveredscatterable mines) is to canalize or delay theenemy’s movements and enhance andprotect the friendly force’s ability tomaneuver. This is achieved by controllingthe movement of enemy ground and navalforces and degrading the operability of enemyair bases. The enemy’s ability to counterattack

or reinforce is restricted and the operationalarea is isolated. Barriers, obstacles, and mineshave five main objectives in offensiveoperations (See Figure II-1).

• Prevent Enemy Reinforcement orCounterattack. To prevent the enemyfrom reinforcing or counterattacking,critical routes are interdicted to hindermovement of reserves and logistics.Speed and depth are vital.

• Facilitate Economy of Force. Barriers,obstacles, and minefields allow fewerforces to defend selected sectors,allowing relieved maneuver units andother combat resources to beconcentrated in other zones for attack.Similarly, they become a combatmultiplier, amplifying the firepowereffectiveness of the friendly forcesdefending them by creating optimumfields of fire. Easily defendedchokepoints can be effectively reinforcedwith obstacles, supported by on-call firesupport, and held by relatively smallforces.

• Provide Security. Barriers, obstacles,and minefields can be used in criticalareas along the flanks of advancing forcesto restrict enemy attacks. At theoperational level, river systems,mountain ranges, deserts, and snow- orice-covered areas are natural barriers andobstacles that can enhance flank security.Shallows, reefs, and other maritimehazards can be used at sea. Existingbarriers and obstacles can bestrengthened with reinforcing obstaclesand minefields to counter an enemythreat.

• Degrade Enemy Air Capability. Minescan pose a significant obstacle to theenemy’s ability to recover and resumeoperations after an air base attack. Anydelays can provide friendly forces with

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an important opportunity to furthersuppress the enemy’s ability to defendagainst follow-on attacks, leading to theenemy’s loss of control of the air.

• Fix the Enemy. Air- and artillery-delivered scatterable mines and specialoperations forces (SOF) emplaced minescan disrupt and delay the enemy’s retreatduring pursuit and exploitation. They canalso be used to disrupt the commitmentof the enemy’s reserve and follow-upforces.

c. Defensive. In the defense, the priorityfor barrier, obstacle, and minefieldemplacement is directed toward degradingthe enemy’s ability to maneuver. Asecondary objective is to destroy or attrit theenemy force. Other objectives include thesupport of economy of force measures andthe retention of key terrain or areas ofsignificant political, strategic, operational, ortactical value (See Figure II-1).

• Integrate Systems. Defensivereinforcement is achieved by integrating

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Prevent enemy reinforcement or counterattack

Facilitate economy of force

Provide security

Degrade enemy air capabilities

Fix the enemy

Integrate systems of barriers, obstacles, minefields,and fires

Identify reinforcing obstacles and minefields early

Identify assets to restore the integrity of a barrier,obstacle, or minefield if breached by the enemy

Create massive obstacles in land operations

OFFENSIVEEnhances and protects the friendly force's ability to maneuver

DEFENSIVEDirected toward degrading the enemy's ability to maneuver

Figure II-1. Planning Considerations

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systems of barriers, obstacles, minefields,and fires. The objective is to degradeenemy movement, assist counterattacks,and facilitate future friendly offensiveoperations.

• Identify Obstacles and Minefields.Reinforcing obstacles and minefields areidentified as early as possible, becausethe development of a barrier, obstacle,or minefield system in depth requirestime, the commitment of engineer orspecialized resources, extensive logisticsupport, and/or other forces such asoverwatching maneuver elements.

• Identify Assets. Plans include theidentification of assets to restore theintegrity of a barrier, obstacle, orminefield if breached by the enemy. Thisis especially important if the obstructionis critical to operational success.

• Create Massive Obstacles. Inoperations involving land forces, massiveobstacle creation should be consideredin situations where friendly forces controla major dam on a river. Control of thedam provides the option of limited,controlled flooding or destruction of thedam to create both a destructive flood

surge and flooded areas. However, theeffect on friendly maneuver and futureoperations should be evaluated.

d. Air-Delivered Scatterable Mines. Theemployment of air-delivered scatterable minesrequires close coordination betweencomponents during both the planning andemployment phases of the operation. Thecoordination for the employment of air-delivered scatterable mines is a combinedeffort of the Joint Targeting CoordinationBoard (JTCB), the joint force engineer, andthe joint force air component commander(JFACC). The JFACC is responsible forplanning and delivery of the munition. Theplanning and integration of minefields intothe barrier plan is the responsibility of the jointforce engineer. The JTCB is responsible forfacilitating joint forces targeting operationsby establishing a forum to ensure support andsynchronization of JFC objectives as well asintegrating and deconflicting all joint forcecomponent operations. To ensure acoordinated effort, a general concept ofoperations is developed that includes suchissues as identification of objectives, timing,minefield placement, and ingress or egressroutes. Coordination must be effected if minesare deployed where friendly ground, SOF, orcombat search and rescue forces may be

A main priority in defense is the degradation of enemy ability to maneuver.

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operating or in locations that lie within theground force’s boundaries. Once emplaced,the mines remain active until detonated oruntil the mines self-destruct or self-disarmafter a preset period of time. Required self-destruct or self-disarm times depend upon theoperational or tactical situation and are notnecessarily related to the proximity of friendlyforces. US air-delivered scatterable mines areall designed to self-destruct. Air-deliveredscatterable mines are selected when they arethe optimum means available to support theJFC’s concept of operations.

• Employing air-delivered scatterablemines requires prior coordination withand approval from the commanderwithin whose boundaries the mines areemployed. Specific coordinationprocedures should provide an optimumbalance between requirements for controland flexibility in execution. In areas closeto friendly forces or where friendly forcesmay operate before the mines self-destruct, detailed coordination isessential. Upon approval, the location ofemployment will be reported by theemploying force to the appropriateground force commander.

• Air-delivered scatterable mines are mosteffective when combined with otherweapons to delay, disrupt, destroy, orturn enemy forces. They cancomplement and extend mineemplacement capabilities and effectsbeyond the range of land or maritimeforces’ internal mine-delivery systems.For example, air-delivered scatterablemines can be used to secure flanks ofground units, close breaches inminefields and obstacles, or protect anamphibious objective area (AOA).

• In early stages of contingency operationsor at extended ranges, air-deliverablescatterable mines may be the onlyavailable mining capability.

• Minefields employed in direct support ofground forces have limited effectivenessif unobserved and not covered by somemeans of fire or fire support.

• If air-delivered scatterable mines are theonly type of ordnance that will satisfythe ground force commander’srequirements, their use should bespecified in the ground forcecommander’s request. Similarly, ifemployment of air-delivered scatterablemines in a specified area is not acceptable(i.e., the desired effect) this should alsobe specified in the ground force plan.

e. Denial Considerations. A denialmeasure prohibits or restricts the enemy useof space, personnel, supplies, or facilities.Denial operations may include destruction,removal, or the erection of obstructions.

• The combatant commanderestablishes the theater policiesgoverning denial operations incoordination with allied or friendlygovernments. Detailed planning andexecution are subsequently delegated tosubordinate commanders. In developingdenial policies, consideration must begiven to those facilities and areasrequired to support life in the post-hostility period regardless of theoutcome of the conflict. The long-rangesocial, economic, political, andpsychological effects of destruction ofcivil properties and material must beweighed against the military advantagesachieved. The purpose of the law of wartoward denial operations is to ensurethat the violence of hostilities isdirected toward the enemy’s forces andis not used to cause purposeless,unnecessary human misery and physicaldestruction.

• Denial operations usually do not focusupon immediate enemy destruction, but

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rather on contributing to futurefriendly operations. Denial operationsmay have a major impact on thecivilian population . Denial targetsfrequently involve civil facilities andstructures, such as electrical powergeneration facilities and ports, andrequire careful judgment regarding themilitary importance versus the impact onthe civilian population.

f. Deception. Deception is defined as thosemeasures designed to mislead the enemy bymanipulation, distortion, or falsification ofevidence to induce the enemy to react in amanner prejudicial to enemy interests. Thereare two basic approaches to deception. Thefirst is to increase uncertainty in order toforestall the enemy’s timely reaction. Thesecond is to misdirect the enemy toward aline of action that favors friendly operations.Barriers, obstacles, and minefields cansupport the aims of both approaches. Timeand enemy surveillance techniques willdetermine the best method of employingbarriers, obstacles, and minefields in supportof deception. Allowing the enemy to observeunits or vessels engaged or preparing toengage in seemingly realistic employment orbreaching operations transmits a specificmessage to the enemy. Operations must beplanned so that their execution will notinadvertently reveal friendly plans. Theemployment of phony obstacles andminefields are deception techniques.Allowing the enemy access to manipulatedor distorted friendly OPLANs that supportobservations of friendly activity maysignificantly enhance the believability of thedeception.

g. Political and Psychological. Theprimary objective of employing barriers,obstacles, and minefields may be deterrencerather than physical destruction. Accordingly,political and psychological considerationsare key aspects that have far-reachingimplications. From a political perspective,

such measures will signal friendly resolve totake actions required to protect nationalinterests. Psychological deterrence is alsoachieved. Although the degree ofpsychological deterrence cannot be quantified,the mere suspicion that mines have been laidcan adversely affect enemy planning andoperations in excess of the actual threat. Thepsychological impact of mines can beincreased by news-media exposure of theirexistence and lack of a ready capability toimplement countermeasures.

6. General Planning Sequence

Barrier, obstacle, and minefield planningis integrated with operations and firesupport planning. It is integrated with thecommander’s intent, intelligence preparationof the battlespace, concept of operations, andfire support plans at each level. This providesfor the synchronization and focusing offriendly forces’ efforts before the plan ispassed to the next subordinate level.Continual coordination between all levelsof command ensures the best utilization ofnatural barriers and obstacles andminimizes requirements for reinforcingobstacles and minefields.

a. The planning sequence begins with thereceipt of a mission or task and ends with thecompletion of a campaign or major operation.

b. During the initiation phase, the JFCmay issue a warning order to subordinatecommanders and allocate barrier, obstacle,and minefield employment and supporttasks for planning.

c. During the concept developmentphase, the JFC conducts a detailedintelligence analysis of missions, enemyforces, friendly forces, terrain, and timeavailable. From this analysis, the JFCexpresses the overall intent and issuesplanning guidance. This guidance normallyincludes the identification of areas or zones

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that require operational-level barriers,obstacles, and/or minefields; critical targetsor enemy functions for attack; sequencing ofbarrier, obstacle, and minefield employmentand desired effects; logistic priorities; ROE;and the employment of obstacles andminefields to support denial operations.

d. During the plan development phase,the JFC’s staff initially assesses the terrain,weather, and climate to identify existingoperational-level barriers, obstacles, and limitsimposed by expected weather. The need foradditional barriers, obstacles, andminefields is identified. Areas suitable forenhancement and reinforcement are identified.Special attention is given to identifying areasthat could be reinforced to form massive areaobstacles. The terrain is evaluated from bothfriendly and enemy perspectives. Theevaluation considers the enemy’s ability andwillingness to cross difficult terrain. Friendlycapabilities should not be assumed to be thesame as enemy capabilities. Both friendly andenemy perspectives and capabilities areevaluated to estimate options available to eachside. The terrain and climate assessmentsduring the initial stage of the plandevelopment phase will enhance theintegration of barriers, obstacles, andminefields into the overall plan.

e. Once the JFC’s staff has determined whatoperational barriers and obstacles exist withinthe operational area, formulation of theformal barrier and obstacle plan isinitiated . This may include the employmentof reinforcing barriers, obstacles, andminefields. Emphasis is placed onmaximizing the effectiveness of existingbarriers and obstacles. Each barrier andobstacle plan requires an estimate of possibleor probable enemy actions to identifyopportunities for offensive and defensiveaction. When completed, the plan shouldclearly delineate operational barriers,obstacles, and minefields and their

intended effect on the campaign oroperation.

• The JFC and JFC staff must consider thevarious component weapons systemsand delivery assets available to deliveror emplace the selected reinforcingbarriers, obstacles, and minefields. Thedelivery and/or emplacement assets mustbe identified and allocated accordingly.The JFC is also responsible forintegrating this support into the overallcampaign or operation.

• The barrier and obstacle plan formulationshould also identify areas that mustremain free of obstacles or minefieldsto facilitate friendly maneuver. Suchareas are necessary to exploit theadvantages gained from enemy reactionsand vulnerabilities. At the tactical levelin ground operations, this is achievedthrough the designation of obstacle zonesand belts.

• Although sustainment is a Servicecomponent responsibility, the JFCmust consider the capabilities,vulnerabilities, and limitations oflogistic systems in the planning andexecution of the operation. To achieveflexibility, the JFC must anticipatecurrent and future requirements, thepotential for degradation by enemyaction, and the ability to sustainoperations throughout an entire operationor campaign.

• The barrier, obstacle, and minefieldguidance contained in the OPLANshould provide for the necessary controlof obstacle and/or minefield areas andobstacle and/or minefield restrictedareas. It may designate critical obstaclesand reserve the execution of selectedobstacles. However, restrictions placedon subordinate commanders should be

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limited to those deemed necessary by theJFC. At a minimum, guidance shoulddelineate any special reporting,recording, and marking responsibilities.

• The development of the joint campaignor OPLAN necessarily includesestimates from the componentcommanders as to how their assets andcapabilities can best support the JFC’sobjectives.

f. The JFC reviews and approves theconcept of employment for operationalbarriers, obstacles, and minefields as wellas the denial plan. As part of this approvalprocess, the JFC verifies that the concept ofoperations meets intent and guidance andfacilitates synchronization to produce the mosteffective employment of operational barriers,obstacles, and mines.

g. Once formal approval of the OPLAN isobtained, subordinate and supportingcommanders develop their own plans. Indoing so, they can determine how existing andreinforcing barriers, obstacles, and minefieldswill affect maneuver, what conditions areimposed on battle plans, and how to employsupporting obstacles. Although this isaddressed as a separate step, subordinate andsupporting commanders develop plansconcurrently with those of the JFC.

h. The barrier, obstacle, and mine warfareplan is published, if required, as an appendixof an annex to the theater campaign plan,OPLAN, or OPORD. In addition, thereporting of execution or employment ofbarriers, obstacles, and minefields should beaddressed in OPLAN or OPORD annexes andappendixes (e.g., ROE and in unit standardoperation procedures).

i. Although employment is addressedseparately in this publication, planning andemployment are a continuous process. Asone operation is executed, the next one is

planned, coordinated, and executed. Inaddition, planners must closely monitorexecution and be prepared to adapt theplan, and future plans, in response tochanging circumstances. This may involvereapportioning and reallocating assets andreprioritizing support for barrier, obstacle, andminefield emplacement.

j. Plans for the removal or deactivation ofmines, barriers, and obstacles may need to beformulated and employed during or afterhostilities or other operations.

7. Planning Support

a. Intelligence. Planning for operationsinvolving barrier, obstacle, and mine warfarerequires timely, continuous, and reliable all-source counterintelligence and intelligencesupport (See Figure II-2).

• Collection, production, anddissemination of intelligenceinformation must start duringpeacetime. Tasks include identifyingand evaluating worldwide mine-production facilities and storagecapabilities (to include on-handquantities). For each potential operation,analysts must evaluate types, quantities,and capabilities of mines, barriers, andobstacles available to the adversary. Theevaluation includes technical informationon each type of mine (characteristics,description, capability, and vulnerabilities).This information should be posted onIntelink and Intelink-S and disseminated(hardcopy and electronically) to planningstaffs.

• During campaign or operationplanning, Joint Intelligence Preparationof the Battlespace is used to identifyenemy mine, barrier, and obstacle storagelocations; topographic, hydrographic,and oceanographic information; actualand potential locations for enemy mine,

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barrier, and obstacle employment; theadversary’s doctrine, tactics, techniques,and procedures for countering andemploying them; fire support to supportmine, barriers, and obstacles (doctrine,capabilities, unit locations); breachingcapabilities (assets, doctrine and tactics,techniques, and procedures); and currentand future operational capabilities (SeeJoint Pub 2-01.3, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for Joint

Intelligence Preparation of theBattlespace”). Intelligence shouldprovide and update this informationto the JFC and staff in time for the staffto include it in the planning process.

• Once conflict begins, intelligencecollection (including reconnaissanceand combat units) must: locate enemybarrier, mine, and obstacle locations;identify and locate enemy fire support;

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTTASKS

Tasks include identifying and evaluating...

worldwide mine-production capabilities and facilities

types, quantities, and capabilities of mines, barriers, andobstacles available

technical information on each type of mine(characteristics, description, capability, andvulnerabilities)

enemy mine, barrier, and obstacle storage locations

topographic, hydrographic, and oceanographicinformation

actual and potential locations for enemy mine, barrier,and obstacle employment

the enemy's doctrine, tactics, techniques, andprocedures for employing mines, barriers, and obstacles

enemy fire support for mines, barriers, and obstacles(doctrine, capabilities, unit locations)

enemy breaching capabilities (assets, doctrine, andtactics, techniques, and procedures)

the enemy's current and future operational capabilities

Figure II-2. Intelligence Support Tasks

II-11


identify remaining enemy employmentcapabilities; and locate enemy breachingassets. This information, particularly anyupdates, must be pushed down to tacticalechelons. Given known enemy doctrine,tactics, techniques, and procedures,intelligence must advise the JFC as tohow the enemy will react to friendlyoperations.

Doctrine and responsibilities forintelligence support are addressed in JP 2-0,“Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support toOperations.”

b. Logistics. Planning for the use ofbarriers, obstacles, and mines involves theacquisition, storage, maintenance,distribution , and security of the materiel.Logistic planners must be included early inthe planning process to ensure propercoordination and timely acquisition of theresources that will be needed to execute theplan.

• Acquisition and Storage. Anticipationis key to a sound acquisition and storageplan. Planners must ensure that theproper mix of mines and minefield,obstacle, and barrier emplacingmaterials and counterobstacleequipment and materiel are madeavailable in time to meet the demands ofthe OPLAN. Requirements at theoperational level must be anticipated toprevent delays in delivery of the materialto a theater. Unless they are specialmunitions, the storage of mines will

normally be handled like any othermunitions.

• Distribution. The execution of thislogistic function is crucial to the successof the OPLAN. It helps transform theOPLAN into tactical operations. Logisticplanners must ensure the availability ofsufficient resources to transportbarrier and/or obstacle material andmines to the place of employment ordeployment.

• Legal Concerns. Because the use,possession, transfer, and stockpiling oflandmines are highly regulated undervarious international agreements,international movement and storage ofmines must be fully coordinated to avoidlegal and political problems.

c. Communications. Planning for andemployment of barriers, obstacles, and minesrequire communication and emplacement tofacilitate joint and multinational coordinationand information flow to inform friendly forces(and, when necessary, civilians) of locations.These activities require that secure,interoperable command, control, andcommunications systems are available tosupport the mission. This includesdeveloping an architecture and coordinatingsystems, personnel, automation, frequencies,and cryptographic support. To facilitateinteroperability, ensure that the architecturedeveloped is compliant with the standards setforth in Department of Defense JointTechnical Architecture.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIEMPLOYMENT

III-1

1. General

The objective of barrier, obstacle, and minewarfare employment is to delay, disrupt, andattrit enemy forces and protect friendly forces.This employment is not an end in itself, but isan adjunct to other military capabilities. Thischapter addresses responsibilities andconsiderations used to canalize, delay, disrupt,and/or attrit the enemy and protect friendlyforces relative to employment of barriers,obstacles, and mines in support of land,maritime, and air operations.

2. Employment Principles

Employment principles are listed in FigureIII-1 and described below:

a. Barriers, obstacles, and minefieldsshould be evaluated from both an offensiveand a defensive posture. Current doctrineallows the JFC a range of offensive anddefensive options. Typically, the optionselected will combine elements of static anddynamic types of defense or a combinationof defense along one sector and offense inanother sector.

b. Barriers, obstacles, and minefieldsshould directly support the JFC’s plan.They should be carefully matched to theterrain with a maneuver concept that focuseson enemy forces as objectives.

c. Reinforcing obstacles should beintegrated with existing barriers andobstacles to support the JFC’s intent and

“Gentlemen, I don’t know whether we will make history tomorrow, but we willcertainly change geography.”

Sir Herbert Plumer(To press conference the day before the

blowing up of Messines Ridge, 6 June 1917)

operational concept. When possible, thesereinforcing obstacles are used to close gapsor routes between existing barriers orobstacles. Reinforcing obstacles may also beemployed on their own to support tacticalobjectives. The locations selected for theseobstacles should be difficult to bypass, therebydelaying the enemy or requiring the enemyto change plans.

d. Barriers, obstacles, and minefields aremore effective when employed in depth. Aseries of simple obstacles is often moreeffective than one large elaborate obstacle.Any barrier, obstacle, or minefield can bebreached if the enemy is willing to expendthe time, effort, and resources necessary.When employed in depth, the cumulativeeffect of successive barriers, obstacles, and/or minefields exposes the enemy to friendlyfires and disrupts the enemy’s plan of action.

e. By varying the type, design, andlocation of reinforcing obstacles, theenemy’s breaching operation is made moredifficult. Scatterable mines permit rapidmining anywhere in the battle area,confronting the attacker with a completelynew situation almost instantly. The self-destruct feature of the scatterable mine alsoprovides surprise by allowing unexpectedfriendly movement through a recently minedarea where mines have just self-destructed.However, the locations of these recentlymined areas must be furnished immediatelyto affected friendly forces, because a verysmall percentage of mines may not have self-destructed as designed. Surprise is also

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achieved by using phony obstacles thatdeceive the enemy as to the extent, pattern,and density of the barrier, obstacle, orminefield system. Phony obstacles mayproduce greater results once the enemy hasbeen sensitized to expect real obstacles andminefields.

f. The effectiveness of barrier, obstacle,and mine employment can be affected bythe air situation. Forces possessing airsuperiority may undertake large-scale, time-consuming barrier, obstacle, and/or minefieldemplacement and/or countermine operationswithout extreme security measures. Forces

without air superiority may lose theadvantages of concealment and surpriseand either have their barriers, obstacles, andminefields detected and exploited by theenemy or have their breaching operationsimpeded.

g. Coverage by observation and by fireis essential in order to restrict enemybreaching efforts, maneuver, and massing offorces and to increase the destruction of theenemy. Planned on-call fires are ideal for thispurpose. Land barriers, obstacles, andminefields not covered by direct or indirectfire provide only minimal delays or diversions,

Figure III-1. Employment Principles for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines

EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPLES FOR BARRIERS,OBSTACLES, AND MINES

Should be evaluated from both an offensive and adefensive posture

Should directly support the JFC's plan

Reinforcing obstacles should be integrated with existingbarriers and obstacles to support the JFC's intent andoperational concept

Should be employed in depth (a series of simpleobstacles is often more effective than one largeelaborate obstacle)

Reinforcing obstacles should vary in type, design, andlocation (makes the enemy's breaching operation moredifficult)

Barrier, obstacle, and mine employment effectivenesscan be affected by the air situation

Should provide coverage by observation and, ifnecessary, by fire

III-3

Employment

which may be all that is needed. An exampleof where minimal delay or diversion wouldsupport JFC objectives is the use of air-delivered scatterable mines in an interdictionrole.

3. Land Operations

Barriers, obstacles, and mine warfaresupport the theater campaign or majoroperation by assisting the JFC inaccomplishing assigned missions.

a. Resources. Most manmade barriers andobstacles are designed to enhance friendlyfires or facilitate the maneuver of friendlyforces by extending or improving theeffectiveness of existing barriers andobstacles. Predominant resources tosupport ground operations are listed inFigure III-2 and described below:

• Land Mines. Land mines are categorizedas conventional or scatterable. Bothcategories provide antitank andantipersonnel capabilities. With theexception of the United States Forces,

Korea, US forces are limited to the useof self-destructing antipersonnel mines.

•• Conventional mines are no longerthe most commonly used and arenormally emplaced before the battlebegins in friendly terrain to support themain battle area. Many of these minesare activated by pressure or contact.These mines are laid by hand ormechanical means, buried or surface laid,and normally emplaced in a pattern toaid in recording. Mechanical layingmay be restricted by terrain conditions.The emplacement of conventionalminefields is normally time-, manpower-,and logistic-intensive.

•• Scatterable mines are the mostcommonly used and are emplacedwithout regard to classical patterns.Although locations of each individualmine cannot be precisely recorded,scatterable minefields can be accuratelyrecorded to within plus or minus 10meters when emplaced. They areemplaced by ground mine dispensingsystems, artillery, aircraft, or by hand.They are designed to self-destruct aftera set period of time, ranging from 4 hoursto 15 days. Scatterable minessignificantly reduce manpowerrequirements associated with minewarfare. Smaller and lighter, these minesoffer a reduction in logistic requirementsbecause of their reduced bulk and weight.Scatterable mines also make it possibleto emplace minefields quickly and,importantly, to do so deep in the enemy’srear area such as at an air base, LOCs,air defense site, or an assembly area. Air-delivered scatterable mines allow greaterflexibility to time-shift the availablefixed- and rotary-wing aircraft andartillery to interdict mobile enemy forceswithout the weapons system having toacquire enemy forces, as is the case withdirect attack munitions. This makes it

LAND OPERATIONSSUPPORT RESOURCES

LAND MINESconventionalscatterable

DEMOLITION OBSTACLESpreliminaryreserved

CONSTRUCTED OBSTACLES

FLAME FIELD EXPEDIENTS

Figure III-2. Land OperationsSupport Resources

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possible to interdict enemy forcesmoving during darkness or poor weatherwithout requiring sophisticated nightand/or weather target acquisitioncapabilities. In certain circumstances,air-delivered scatterable mines also makeit possible to attack enemy unitswithout the delivery aircraft or systembeing exposed to the enemy’s point airdefenses, reducing the need for standoffmunitions. These capabilities greatlyenhance the ability to delay and confuseenemy forces, thereby creating theopportunity to destroy the enemy withother fires. The main disadvantage ofscatterable mine employment is that themost flexible and responsive means ofdelivery — aircraft and artillery — haveadditional and perhaps more criticalroles on the battlefield. Otherdisadvantages include the time and highnumber of artillery rounds or aircraftsorties required to emplace a minefieldand increased exposure of emplacingartillery to counter battery fires andemplacing aircraft or helicopters toenemy air defenses. Planning scatterablemine obstacles must include detailedintegration of the employment methodwith self-destruct times, observation of

“trigger points,” and counterattackroutes. Surface conditions also affectemployment; i.e., scatterable mines areespecially ineffective on snow cover.Planners must consider the possibility ofunduly endangering civilians in theemployment of scatterable mines andremain mindful of the commander’s legalduty to prevent killing or injuringcivilians. All scatterable minefieldrecords are essential to assist in clearingminefields after the termination ofhostilities.

• Demolition Obstacles. Demolitionobstacles are created by the detonationof explosives. Demolition is generallyused to create tactical level obstacles.However, it can also be used to createoperational obstacles such as thedestruction of major dams, bridges, andrailways as well as highways throughbuilt-up areas or terrain chokepoints.Demolition obstacles are classified aspreliminary or reserved obstacles.Operational-level demolition obstaclesmay require lengthy completion time andlarge quantities of demolition materialsbecause of the size and characteristics ofthe target.

Demolition obstacles can also be used to create operationalobstacles such as destruction of bridges.

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Employment

•• Preliminary demolition obstaclesare those planned by subordinatecommanders, are not considered criticalto the JFC’s plan, and can be detonatedas soon as they are prepared or as thesituation dictates.

•• Reserved obstacles are those deemedcritical to the JFC’s or subordinatecommander’s plan and are detonated onlywhen directed by the commander whodesignated them.

• Constructed Obstacles. Constructedobstacles are manmade, usuallywithout the use of explosives. Typicaltactical examples are barbed wireobstacles and tank ditches. Operationaland strategic barriers and obstacles mayalso be constructed. Examples arefortified areas and lines. These large-scale obstructions generally requireextensive time, manpower, equipment,and material. Constructed barriers andobstacles should be emplaced beforehostilities or in areas not subject toobserved fires, because constructionpersonnel can be exposed to all types ofenemy fire.

• Flame Field Expedients (FFE). Whenmines, barrier materials, or engineerresources are not available or are in shortsupply, the JFC may have to rely onfield-expedient flame explosives foremployment in place of obstacles andminefields. FFE can be hastilyconstructed from materials found on thebattlefield, such as containers, fuel, andexplosive devices. FFE can provide aquick, effective means for providing alimited offensive and defensive obstaclecapability, because the explodingfireballs of flame can stun dismountedtroops and degrade armored vehicles.

b. Offensive Employment. In the offensethe JFC, through the JFC staff, identifies

priority locations and plans andcoordinates the joint emplacement ofbarriers, obstacles, and minefields. Undersome circumstances, the JFC may designatethe systems that subordinate commandersutilize for emplacement. These barriers,obstacles, and minefields generally focus onisolating the battlefield, facilitating economyof force, enhancing overall force security, andblocking or delaying an enemy’s withdrawal.During planning and deployment, care mustbe taken to ensure that the mobility of theattacking force is not hindered. Key factorsfor consideration in offensive employmentare:

• Current enemy situation, capabilities,intent, and probable courses of action(COAs);

• Accurate terrain analysis to determinewhere friendly forces are vulnerable tocounterattack;

• Preplanning, deconfliction, andcoordination with other components;

• C2 of obstacle and mine emplacement;and

• Information flow to inform friendlyforces of friendly and enemy barrier,obstacle, and minefield locations usingthe standard report formats.

c. Defensive Employment. As in theoffense, the JFC, through the JFC staff,identifies priority locations and plans andcoordinates the joint emplacement of barriers,obstacles, and minefields. Under somecircumstances, the JFC may designate thesystems that subordinate commanders use foremplacement. The primary intent ofdefensive barrier, obstacle, and minewarfare employment is to degrade enemycapabilities by disrupting combat formationsand delaying their movement, interfering withC2, and confusing enemy commanders. The

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secondary intent is to destroy or attrit enemyforces. Key factors for consideration indefensive employment are as follows:

• Current enemy situation, capabilities,intent, and probable COAs.

• Accurate terrain analysis to determinewhere friendly forces are vulnerable toenemy attack.

• Preplanning, deconfliction, andcoordination with other components.

• C2 of obstacle and mine emplacement.

• Information flow to inform friendlyforces of friendly and enemy barrier,obstacle, and minefield locations usingthe standard report formats.

• Barrier, obstacle, and minefieldemplacement which must be integratedto complement the plan for defense.

• Conventional minefields and other time-or labor-intensive obstacles that can beemplaced before the beginning ofhostilities, reducing the exposure toenemy fire. (This also increases the timeavailable to mass the large amount ofsupplies needed to construct the barriers,obstacles, and minefields.)

• Preplanned employment of scatterableminefields throughout the battlefield.The choice of scatterable systems ismission-dependent. Ground emplacedmine scattering systems are best forrapidly emplacing large minefields infriendly controlled areas. Artillery oraircraft-delivered systems are employedthroughout the battlefield. Theappropriateness of artillery or aircraftdelivery systems varies depending on thethreat conditions and other missionpriorities; however, organic systemsshould be employed whenever possible.

• Analysis of the effects of scatterablemines in the defense with respect to self-destruct times. The timetable for friendlyoperations may be upset or causefratricide if the wrong self-destructsettings are used.

• Smoke, used as a limited obstacle tocanalize or slow advancing enemy forces.When combined with barriers, obstacles,and/or minefields, smoke can enhancethe vulnerability of enemy forces bylimiting their visual, target-acquisition,and intelligence-gathering capabilities.

d. Reporting, Recording, and Marking.The immediate reporting of friendly andenemy barriers, obstacles, unexplodedordnance hazards, and minefield locationsto higher headquarters is essential.Emplacing units are responsible for immediatereporting of each obstacle and minefield,intent (i.e., barrier or obstacle plan), initiation,completion, and recording completion of theobstacle. Positive control and a rapid flow ofinformation on mine emplacement arenecessary. Both friendly and enemyminefields are reported and marked becauseof their lethality to both friendly forces andnoncombatants. Records and reports arecritical to the immediate conflict and willbecome vital in facilitating posthostilitiesclearance. Reporting, recording, andmarking of all minefields must beaccomplished in accordance with acceptedprocedures as listed below.

• Reports. Once emplaced, minefields andunexploded ordnance hazards are lethaland unable to distinguish between friendand foe. For this reason, positive controland a rapid and continuous flow ofinformation is necessary (See theVariable Message Format [VMF]Message Number K05.16, “LandMinefield Laying Report” established inthe VMF “TIDP-TE, Volume III, AnnexA”).

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•• Conventional Minefields. Threereports are required of tactical unitsemplacing conventional minefields:Report of Intention , Report ofInitiation , and Report of Completion.The report formats are listed in AppendixA, “Mine, Countermine, and ObstacleReports.” These reports are transmittedto the authorizing headquarters. Theircontents are integrated with terrainintelligence and disseminated throughintelligence channels.

•• Scatterable Minefields. The speedand responsiveness of scatterable-mineemployment require accurate, uniform,and timely reports. All information onscatterable-mine employment isimmediately reported by the emplacingunit for dissemination to all affectedunits. To facilitate reporting andrecording, a simple, uniform procedureis used that combines the report andrecord into one document. This is thescatterable minefield record andreport listed in Appendix A, “Mine,Countermine, and Obstacle Reports.” Itis applicable to all Service deliverysystems. In addition, if scatterable minesare to be emplaced within a land forcecommander’s boundaries, regardless offire support coordination line placement,the emplacing unit immediatelydisseminates a scatterable minefieldwarning (SCATMINEWARN) to allpotentially affected units. The format forthis warning message is listed inAppendix A, “Mine, Countermine, andObstacle Reports.” Timely warning isessential because of the potential forfriendly fratricide and serious degradationof mobility. This warning is given duringthe planning phase of the operation andfollowed up with another warning givingthe actual location immediately afteremplacement.

•• Enemy Minefields. As specified inthe OPLAN, any detection, encounter,or knowledge of enemy minefields ormining activities by tactical units isreported to higher headquarters by thefastest means available. The reportformat used is listed in Appendix A,“Mine, Countermine, and ObstacleReports.”

•• Unexploded Explosive Ordnance(UXO). Immediate reporting isessential. UXO hazard areas are lethaland unable to distinguish between friendand foe. Positive control and a rapid,continuous flow of information arenecessary. Land forces units send aUXO spot report (Appendix A, “Mine,Countermine, and Obstacle Reports”)relaying information on a confirmedUXO location and reporting locationswhere submunition ordnance has beenemployed. The UXO Spot Report is adetailed, swift, two-way reportingsystem that makes clear where the UXOhazard areas are, what the mission impactis, and who the affected units are. UXOhazard areas are treated as obstacles.

•• Joint Minelaying Operations(MINEOPS). The MINEOPS report isused to exchange information betweenall components and joint headquarters.It provides the location, characteristics,and status of components’ minelayingoperations. It is also used to request,task, modify, report, plan, and approveminelaying operations, as appropriate.The report format is specified by MIL-STD-6040, “U.S. Message TextFormatting Program,” and listed inAppendix A, “Mine, Countermine, andObstacle Reports.”

•• Obstacles Other Than Minefields.The sensitive information report is

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used to provide information onbarriers and obstacles (other thanminefields) that may have a significantimpact on current planning oroperations. This report is used toexchange information between all jointforce headquarters and components. Thereport format is specified byMIL-STD-6040, “U.S. Message TextFormatting Program,” and as listed inAppendix A, “Mine, Countermine, andObstacle Reports.”

• Records. Minefield records must beprepared and include all knowninformation required in the specifiedformats. The level of information willvary based on friendly versus enemyemplaced minefields and the type ofemplacing systems utilized. Theserecords facilitate troop safety, futureoperations, and clearing operations whenthe hostilities are concluded.

•• Conventional Minefields. Asspecified in the OPLAN, minefieldrecords are prepared by the emplacingunit for each conventional minefield andforwarded to the appropriate staffproponent designated to maintain therecords on file. All conventionalminefields, except those emplaced as partof a unit’s defensive perimeter, arerecorded on Department of Army (DA)Form 1355 (Minefield Record). Thoseminefields that are part of a unit’sdefensive perimeter are recorded usingDA Form 1355-1-R (Hasty ProtectiveMinefield Record).

•• Scatterable Minefields. The recordof scatterable minefields is submitted aspart of the minefield report, as discussedabove.

•• Retention of Records. A finalrepository for both friendly and enemyminefield reports must be designated in

the appropriate OPLAN or OPORDannex or appendix. If a Servicecomponent commander is designated asthe joint force land componentcommander, then that commanderbecomes the command repository for allminefield reports and records. Thisbecomes critical at cessation of hostilities,as the battlefield must be cleared.Clearance may be accomplished byseveral means: friendly forces,belligerent forces under the auspices ofthe UN Security Council, contractors, orany combination of these.

• Marking. The marking of minefields isaccomplished using methods found instandardization agreement (STANAG)203b, FM 20-32, and joint task forceestablished standing operating procedures.

•• Conventional minefields andunexploded ordnance hazard areas aremarked as necessary to protect friendlyforces and civilians. The fencing ofminefields, both friendly and enemy, infriendly controlled areas is required.

•• Scatterable Minefields. Minefieldsare marked as soon as they are employedor discovered to protect friendly troopsand noncombatants. Ground-emplacedscatterable minefields are marked by landforces, and require highly accuratepositioning or survey data from theemplacing unit. However, it is unrealisticto expect artillery- and aircraft-emplacedminefields to be marked in the samemanner as ground-emplaced scatterablemines. Scatterable minefield markingmay be unnecessary or impossible inmany cases. Scatterable mines placed inenemy terrain are a prime example. Forthis reason, units operating in the vicinityof these scatterable minefields mustknow the time of emplacement, self-destruction duration period set, and aimpoint or lateral boundaries of the safety

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zones, and must also use extreme caution.The unit that finds the minefield isresponsible for marking and reporting it.Immediate warning is essential becauseof the potential impact on friendlymobility and potential fratricide.

•• Enemy Minefields. Minefields aremarked and reported immediately whendiscovered to protect friendly troops andcivilians.

4. Air Operations

a. Air-delivered scatterable mines can beused effectively in support of landoperations.

• Air-delivered scatterable mines can beused as part of a synchronized andintegrated plan to support landrequirements.

Further guidance on air operations insupport of land operations may be obtainedfrom JP 3-03, “Doctrine for Joint InterdictionOperations,” and JP 3-09, “Doctrine for JointFire Support.”

• Air-delivered scatterable mines can beused for the purposes listed in FigureIII-3 .

• Air-delivered scatterable mines may beused to support friendly rear areaoperations. They may be used to denyenemy airborne drop zones, air assaultlanding and pickup zones, or to augmentthe defenses of friendly facilities andLOCs.

• During the planning phase, coordinationis required at the JFC level among thecomponents to ensure that the use ofair-delivered scatterable mines will notnegatively impact or restrict currentor future ground operations. The landforce commander having the area of

operations in which air-deliveredscatterable mines are to be employed isnormally responsible for the coordinationof their use with the scheme of maneuverto ensure unity of effort.

• During the execution phase, recordingand reporting of air-deliveredscatterable mines are essential at alllevels of command. During theexecution phase, the componentcommander tasked with delivering minesfrom aircraft is responsible to report thespecifics of each air emplaced minefieldto the JFC and other componentcommanders. This report provides theapproving authority, target description,unit emplacing the mines, method ofemplacement, actual (not the planned)location of emplaced mines, date andtime of emplacement, self-destructduration period, aim point or lateralboundaries of the safety zone, unit or titleof person submitting the report, remarks,and date and time of the report.Immediate reporting and warningmessages before emplacement areessential. These reports and warningsare necessary to warn friendly forces andreduce the potential for fratricide andserious degradation of ground forcemobility.

• All scatterable minefield records areessential to assist in clearing minefieldsafter the termination of hostilities.

b. Air-delivered scatterable mines can beused effectively for counterair missions, suchas airfield attacks, suppression of enemy airdefenses (SEAD), and theater missile defense(TMD) attack operations.

• An objective of an attack on an enemyairfield is to delay or disruptmovements from that base. Air-delivered scatterable mines will extendthe effect of the air attack by restricting

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ground movements on the base. Theinitial impact will be to either stop or slowaircraft movement until the taxiways andrunways are cleared or else force theenemy to risk aircraft damage byencountering the mines. Air-deliveredscatterable mines are also effective inpreventing or delaying repairs on thedamaged portions of the airfield.

• Similarly, the use of air-deliveredscatterable mines during SEAD

attacks will delay the repair and returnto operational status by elements ofenemy air defense systems. Actualdestruction of entire portions of airdefense systems may be difficult becauseof system redundancy and dispersedequipment. Use of mines will restrictaccess to those undestroyed portions ofthe system after an attack and prolongthe loss of use of those portions destroyedand damaged. Mines will also causerepair personnel to expose themselves to

AIR-DELIVERED SCATTERABLE MINES

Air-delivered scatterable mines can be used to...

disrupt and destroy enemy unit concentrations(including armored units)

disrupt enemy field artillery (including surface-to-surface missiles) and air defense systemsmovement and resupply

disrupt enemy helicopter forward operating basesas well as fixed- and rotary-wing airfields

disrupt counterattacks and other enemy operations

protect the flanks of friendly exploiting forces

disrupt enemy logistic support

close breached friendly minefields or otherobstacles

disrupt enemy river crossing operations, coastallandings, and beachhead operations

Figure III-3. Air-Delivered Scatterable Mines

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additional attacks and risk essentialelectronic test and repair personnel andequipment.

• Air-delivered scatterable mines canalso contribute to TMD operations.Such munitions can deny enemy forcesaccess to preferred launch areas, inhibitmovement, damage missile transporter,erector, and launchers, and curtail reloadoperations.

c. Interdiction attacks may include theemployment of air-delivered scatterablemines. Scatterable mines not only delayrepairs to interdiction targets, but also willdamage any vehicles or personnel that attemptto use or transit the interdiction target area.Mines can deny and delay access to storageand manufacturing facilities, holding areas,transshipment points, and power generatingand transmission stations. Typically, themajor damage on interdiction targets willcome from weapons with an immediateeffect. However, mixing even a few mineswith other munitions will create uncertaintyand fear among the repair crews or users ofthe target areas.

5. Maritime Operations

The NCA has tasked the Commanderin Chief, US Atlantic Command(USCINCACOM), Commander in Chief,US Central Command, Commanderin Chief, US Pacific Command(USCINCPAC), Commander in Chief, USSouthern Command, and the USCommander in Chief, Europe with theresponsibility for the conduct of maritimemine warfare within their areas ofresponsibility and in support of othercombatant commanders’ maritime minewarfare requirements. These commandershave delegated the responsibility for planningmaritime mine warfare operations to theirNavy component commanders. The Navy

component commander’s mine warfare planis integrated with the geographic combatantcommander’s concept of operations. Thegeographic combatant commander’s intentand planning guidance provide direction onsuch matters as operational sequencing,critical targets, desired effects, priorities, andlimitations. Using this information, the Navycomponent commander determines how bestto use available assets and developsappropriate COAs to support the theater plan.When approved by the geographic combatantcommander, the maritime mine warfare planis implemented.

a. Planning. Navy component commandershave three ways in which to executeminefield planning. If time constraints arecritical, Navy component staffs may conductplanning for quick-reaction minefields. Ifthe minefield plan has been developed inadvance and is appropriate for tasking, it maybe used. If sufficient time is available, aminefield plan may be developed to meet aspecific need.

• Minefield plans are developed forspecific fields by the Navy’sCommander, M ine War fa reCommand (COMINEWARCOM) , inresponse to Navy component commandertasking. COMINEWARCOM plannerswork with the tasking commander toformulate mining scenarios consistentwith OPLANs and intelligence estimatesof anticipated enemy traffic and reactioncapabilities. For each intendedminefield, a detailed design is preparedfor specified primary and secondarytargets, using standardized formats, andsubmitted to the tasking commander forapproval. Upon acceptance, all necessarydocumentation is assembled into anumbered minefield planning folder(MFPF) that is distributed to fleetusers to be maintained for futureimplementation.

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• Once an MFPF is created,COMINEWARCOM continuallyevaluates and updates the plan asnecessary. Individual MFPFs includeminefield plans, mine requirements, andmine settings. These MFPFs provide adefinitive basis for inventory planning,stockpile pre-positioning, and logisticsupport capabilities. In the event ofhostilities, the preplanned minefields canbe executed without further planning.

b. Objective. The aim of maritimemining is, in conjunction with other maritimeand air assets, control of the sea. Miningcan be used at all levels of war and acrossthe range of military operations to achievethe objectives of friendly forces. Miningcan delay and attrit enemy maritime forcesand can deny them the unrestricted use of seaareas of passage. Barriers, obstacles, andminefields can also protect friendly harbors,channels, and seaways, as well as shorelinessusceptible to enemy amphibious operations.For planning purposes, the minefield ratherthan the mine should be regarded as theweapon. The basic types of minefields arecharacterized as offensive, defensive, orprotective (See Figure III-4).

• Offensive Mining. Offensiveminefields, which include strategic fields,are those planted in enemy-controlled

waters. These minefields pose the mostdirect threat to the enemy and, whencompleted, pose little threat to friendlyforces. Offensive minefields are laid byaircraft or submarines because theseminefields are usually in close proximityto the enemy. Offensive and strategicminefields consist of mines that have themost countermeasure resistance tocomplicate the enemy’s minecountermeasures (MCM) problem. Theuse of phony mines or mine-like objectswithin a field can help this aim. Strategicminefields are long-term fields laid todeny enemy use of sea routes required tosupport and execute the enemy war effort.Strategic fields should be laid as soon aspossible after commencement ofhostilities and should be as heavily minedas assets permit, because replenishmentmay be extremely difficult.

TYPES OF MARITIMEMINEFIELDS

OFFENSIVE

DEFENSIVE

PROTECTIVE

Figure III-4. Types of Maritime Minefields

Offensive minefields are laid by aircraft orsubmarines because of their close proximity tothe enemy.

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Employment

• Defensive Mining. Defensiveminefields are those employed incontested waters to intercept thetransit of enemy combatant forces.Because of defensive minefield locations,employment planning must considerneutral and friendly force transits inaddition to those of the enemy. Minefieldlanes may be planned to facilitate friendlyforce passage, but keep in mind that thesame waters may be mined by enemyforces as well. For these reasons,defensive minefields should be laid withthe utmost navigational accuracy.

• Protective Mining. Protectiveminefields are those employed infriendly waters to protect friendlyports, harbors, or inshore SLOCs.Protective minefields are the easiest toplan and lay and can use almost any typeof maritime mine. Navigational accuracyfor laying the field is vital becausefriendly forces will use the transitchannels on a regular basis. Protectivefields require that all users, includingneutrals, be aware of or be led throughthe safe routes.

c. Resources

• Sea Mines. The sea mine is essentiallyan explosive charge in a casing that islaid underwater to destroy ships.Mines can be positioned on the seabed,moored at a predetermined case depth,or floated. The bottom mine is laid onthe seabed and held in place by its ownweight. The moored sea mine has abuoyant case and is held in place at apredetermined depth by an anchor.Floating sea mines are not held in placeand are subject to tides, currents, andwinds. Their use represents, in mostsituations, a violation of international law.Therefore, US doctrine does not providefor employment of floating mines. Thethree methods of activating mines are

contact, influence, and controlled.Contact mines must be hit by a ship orsubmarine to be activated. Influencemines are activated by the acoustic,magnetic, seismic, electric potential, orpressure influences (singularly or incombination) from a ship or submarine.Controlled mines are activated from aremote control station when the target iswithin range.

• Allocation. Mines to support the miningplans are allocated to the Navycomponent commanders, who in turnprescribe which mines go to specificstockpiling sites. If the capacities ofstockpile sites are insufficient, theresidual mines are stocked in thecontinental United States. The Chief ofNaval Operations has designatedCOMINEWARCOM as the minewarfare technical advisor to theN a v y component commanders.COMINEWARCOM maintains andmonitors the mine stockpile and makesrecommendations concerning readiness.When directed, the stored mines areassembled and prepared for laying.

d. US Air Force (USAF) MaritimeMining Support. USAF aircraft may beemployed for maritime mining.Requirements are developed during thedeliberate planning process. Upon conflictinitiation, a geographic combatantcommander requiring USAF support abovethat available through the Air Forcecomponent commander will direct the requestthrough the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff to the NCA. After approving the request,the NCA will task a geographic combatantcommander to provide appropriate forces tothe requesting combatant commander.Command relationships over thetransferred forces will be as specified in theestablishing directive. The JFC willapportion sorties to the mining role as requiredto support the concept of operations. Planning

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support for mining missions will becoordinated by the supporting combatantcommander with the theater planning staff,USAF and Navy component commanders,and COMINEWARCOM. Logistic supportis provided in accordance with joint miningagreements between the US Air Force, USNavy, and the combatant commanders.

e. Operations. A minelaying operationconsists of planning the minefield, preparingthe material and personnel to conduct thelaying, planning the laying mission, laying themines, conducting follow-on surveillance and,if required, replenishing the minefield. Thenumbered fleet commanders coordinatemission planning and conduct miningoperations as directed by the Navycomponen t commander o r JFC.COMINEWARCOM provides assistance tothe numbered fleet commanders by providingplanning, technical, and mine maintenancesupport personnel as required.

• Platform Advantages and Disadvantages.Aircraft, submarines, and ships are allcapable of laying mines if properlyequipped. Although US doctrine doesnot provide for US surface ship layingof mines, many allied surface shipspossess this capability.

•• Almost any aircraft capable ofcarrying bombs can carry sea mines.The advantages of using aircraft arespeed, flexibility, range, invulnerabilityto enemy mines, and the ability to laymines in all water depths. Disadvantagesinclude less accurate mine laying andvulnerability to enemy surface and airdefenses. This vulnerability requiresdedicated air combat and enemysuppression assets to support mine-layingmission ingress or egress. Loss ofsurprise resulting from overt minedelivery may also be a disadvantage.However, this should be weighed againstthe immediate and powerful

psychological impact that such anoperation would be likely to produce.

•• Submarines have the advantages ofbeing able to conduct covert mining.Disadvantages include limited minecapacity, vulnerability to enemy mines,and the inability to operate in relativelyshallow water.

•• Surface ships have the advantagesof long-range, large mine capacity, andaccuracy in laying. Disadvantages areslow movement and vulnerability toenemy reaction. No surface ship in theUS Navy is currently equipped to laymines.

• Mine and Minelayer Availability. Thecriteria for selecting the platform for amining operation are probability ofmission success, the importance oftime, availability , and expectedcasualty rate. If heavy enemyopposition is expected, the use ofsubmarine or aircraft layers might beindicated. Distance from mine storageto loading area and numbers and typesof mines required must also beconsidered. All these factors willinfluence the ability to meet operationaltime lines and will determine the numberof laying platforms required.

• Escort Requirements. The expectedenemy reaction to the laying of aminefield, and the platforms to beused, will determine whether acovering force will be required. Thecovert laying of a field in an area out ofimmediate enemy defense range may notrequire cover. However, the laying ofminefields by aircraft or ship in all butfriendly waters will, in most cases,require protective covering forces. As aresult, in addition to the usual minelayingrequirements, covering forcerequirements must be addressed.

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• Replenishment and NeutralizationRequirements. Consideration must begiven to the length of time a minefieldis required to remain effective. EnemyMCM or natural causes may reduce minelife expectancy and necessitatereplenishment of the minefield.Conversely, operational needs mayrequire the passage of friendly forcesthrough a mined area at a given point intime. In this case, the mines may be setto neutralize themselves at a specific timeto permit the passage.

• Record ing and Repor t i ngRequirements. Air-delivered minefieldrecords are essential to assist in clearing

minefields after the termination ofhostilities. For joint US missions, theJoint MINEOPS report is used toexchange information between allcomponents and joint headquarters. Itprovides the location, characteristics, andstatus of component minelayingoperations. It is also used to request, task,modify, report, plan, and approveminelaying operations, as appropriate.The report format is specified by MIL-STD-6040, “U.S. Message TextFormatting Program” (See Appendix A,“Mine, Countermine, and ObstacleReports”). NWP 1-03.1, “OperationalReports,” may be consulted for morespecific information on required reports.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVCOUNTERING ENEMY EMPLOYMENT

IV-1

1. General

Enemy use of barriers, obstacles, and minescan affect the timing and strength of friendlyoperations. Success in countering enemyefforts is attained when friendly forces canmaneuver with minimal damage or delay toreach the original objective beyond theobstruction. This chapter providesinformation and guidance on counteringenemy barrier, obstacle, and mineemployment in land and maritimeenvironments.

2. Land Operations

a. General. Successful land operationsdepend on the freedom to maneuver. Terrainconditions, enemy tactics, integrated fires,barriers, obstacles, and minefields can limitfriendly maneuver capability. Successfulenemy operations use fire, existing terrain,manmade obstacles, and minefields torestrict friendly freedom of maneuver. Tocounter this, friendly forces must be able togain positional advantage and mass combatpower at a critical time and place and toovercome any natural or manmade barriers,obstacles, and minefields.

b. Resources. Operations to counter theuse of natural and manmade barriers,obstacles, and minefields by enemy forcesmay involve the e m p l o y m e n t o fconventional, airmobile, airdropped,amphibious, or special operations forces.

“My first reaction was to notify someone else that we had struck a mine. Wehad to keep the ship from sinking. Another immediate reaction was that thiswas what we had been preparing for months. I had total confidence that mycrew would do the right thing — that they would do what they had beentrained to do.”

Commanding Officer, USS Princeton(On striking an Iraqi mine in the Persian Gulf, 18 Feb 1991 )

These operations are normally supported bycombat engineer forces. Military advisorypersonnel or US units may also be employedto assist a friendly nation to counter minesand booby traps or to enhance the mobility ofHN forces. Specialized reduction assetsinclude mine detection equipment; explosivedevices and line charges; tank-mountedrollers, rakes, and plows; combat engineervehicles; and various types of rafts and bridgesfor dry or wet gaps.

c. Planning and Operational Support

• Intelligence. Operational success incountering enemy use of barriers,obstacles, and minefields depends largelyon the ability of the JFC to “see” theoperational area. Intelligence-collectionplans identify specifically taskedpriority intelligence requirements(PIR). In any operation where enemybarriers, obstacles, and minefields caninterfere with friendly maneuver,information about them or areas expectedto contain them become PIR.

•• Intelligence collection by nationaland theater reconnaissance andsurveillance assets becomes thefoundation for developing an analysis ofthe enemy’s probable employment ofbarrier, obstacle, and minefield systemsand fortifications. This information canverify enemy intentions, plans, anddefensive strength and identify the mine

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types and fuses the enemy has employed.The timely availability of national andtheater reconnaissance and surveillancewill help the commander determine thebest mix of reduction or clearingtechniques, forces, and equipment thatoffer the best chances for success.

•• Obtaining intelligence on theenemy’s use of barriers, obstacles, andminefields requires all availablecollection assets, ranging from nationalcollection assets down to tactical unitinformation that locates and identifiesfortifications and obstacle emplacements.When operations commence, intelligenceis continually verified and updated fromactual barrier, obstacle, and minefieldencounters.

• Deception. Deception is an importantelement in the successful reduction orbypassing of enemy barriers,obstacles, and minefields. The use offeints and raids, manipulation ofelectronic signals, use of dummyequipment, staging of engineerequipment, and the employment of otheroperations security measures will affordthe breaching forces an added measure

of security and enhance the probabilityof surprise. However, deception plansmust be consistent with the theaterdeception themes.

• Logistics. Any operations to counter theenemy’s use of barriers, obstacles, andminefields may result in equipmentdamage or loss. Logistic support mustbe provided for the replacement oftactical bridging, combat engineerequipment, line charges and explosives,lane-marking materials, and any othermaterials to conduct and maintainbreaching operations. In addition, stocksof artillery delivered and air-deliveredscatterable mines must be maintainedto counter enemy attacks during friendlybreaching operations. Logistic supportmust occur swiftly and not delay thecontinuing movement of forces or criticalsupplies. These conditions must bethoroughly anticipated in the planningphase.

d. Planning Considerations

• General. The JFC is concerned withidentifying large scale natural andmanmade barriers, obstacles, and

Logistic planning must provide for replacement of special equipment andmaterials to support breaching operations.

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minefields that provide the enemy witha distinct operational advantage.

•• Breaching major barriers,obstacles, and minefields requireslong-range planning well in advanceof encountering the obstruction. Anearly decision on logistic supportrequirements is important to ensureavailability of special equipment andmaterial.

•• Major barriers, obstacles, andminefield systems can require asignificant expenditure of time if theyare to be reduced. Whenever it isoperationally sound, barriers, obstacles,and minefields should be bypassed.

•• Continual emphasis is placed on earlydetection and reporting of barriers,obstacles, and minefields. It is alsoimportant to determine the type andquality of mines employed to ensurethat suitable countermine measures areemployed.

•• Successful breaching operationsrequire the conduct of special trainingand rehearsals.

•• Suppress, obscure, secure, andreduce are the breaching fundamentalsthat must be applied to ensure successwhen breaching against a defendingenemy (See Figure IV-1). Suppressionis the focus of all available fires on enemypersonnel, weapons, or equipment toprevent effective fires on friendlybreaching, assault, and support forces.Obscuration hampers enemyobservation and target acquisition andconceals friendly activities andmovement. Friendly forces secure thebreaching site to prevent the enemy from

DESERT STORM BREACHING OPERATIONS

Coalition ground forces south of Kuwait faced a series of formidable defensivepositions that the Iraqis had built during the five months before OperationDESERT STORM. Coalition air power was used in several ways to help disruptthese defenses. B-52s bombed the minefields with 750-lb M-117 and 500-lbMK-82 bombs; MC-130s dropped 15,000-lb BLU-82 bombs to create over-pressure and detonate mines. A few days before G-day, USMC AV-8Bs droppednapalm on the Iraqi forces trenches and also were used against minefields.F-117s dropped 500-lb LGBs on oil pipes and distribution points in the firetrenches. In addition to this extensive bombing to reduce the size of the Iraqiminefields and obstacles, most ground units used their organic countermineand counterobstacle equipment to breach enemy minefields and obstacles.

SOURCE: Final Report to CongressConduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, 1992

Figure IV-1. Breaching Fundamentals

BREACHINGFUNDAMENTALS

SOSR

uppress

bscure

ecure

educe

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interfering with the breaching andpassage of the assault force through thelanes created. Reduction means creatinglanes through or over the obstruction toallow the attacking force to pass.

•• The JFC may designate theselection of breaching zones for majorbarriers, obstacles, and minefieldsystems. This designation is based upondefensibility, ability to maneuver anddeploy the force, and capability tocontinue the operation.

•• Operational vulnerability may bereduced through crossing on a wide front(limited only by the terrain and quantitiesof reduction assets available), crossingin as many places as possible, crossingby night or in poor visibility or usingobscurants, and employing a deceptionplan.

• Offensive Planning Considerations

•• Continuous intelligence collection isrequired to verify and update theassessments provided by priorintelligence.

•• Early identification of enemy andnatural obstructions may allow the JFCto avoid or minimize the number andseverity of enemy barriers, obstacles, andminefield systems and to limit thenumber of friendly casualties.

•• Emphasis is placed on maintainingthe momentum of the attack throughfreedom of movement and maneuver.The obstruction is seldom the objectivebut normally is an impediment tosecuring the true operational objective.Maintaining momentum requires theattacking force to quickly pass throughor around barriers, obstacles, andminefields. Emphasis is placed on the

capture of major roads, bridges, passes,and other terrain features essential formobility to enhance future operations.

•• Advance planning is necessary tocoordinate the transfer of informationconcerning barriers, obstacles, andminefields to follow-on engineer units asthey are reduced. This planning isnecessary to widen and mark assaultforce breaches and to clear and markadditional routes for follow-on forces.

•• Planning must also address clearingand reduction operations of friendlyand enemy barriers, obstacles, andminefields to allow movement of combatsupport and combat service supportelements.

•• Successful breaching of enemybarriers, obstacles, and minefieldsrequires special planning and support.When possible, the breach will be madeas a continuation of the attack, usingmultiple lanes, across a broad front toreduce congestion and vulnerability.However, the availability of reductionassets, crossing sites, and combat powermay dictate crossing on a narrow front.If a deliberate breach is required, an earlydecision is mandatory to obtain thenecessary logistic support andconcentration of combat power. Plansshould anticipate the need to breachenemy barriers, obstacles, andminefields employed in depth.Deceptive and covering smoke providean added measure of security whilebreaching by denying intelligence to theenemy concerning where the breach willoccur and by impeding enemy targetacquisition.

•• Logistic support must facilitate boththe continuation of the offense and thetransition to the defense, if necessary.

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• Defensive Planning Considerations. Inthe defense, friendly counterattacksand spoiling attacks must not beimpeded by barriers and obstaclesthroughout the defensive area. Planningmust take into consideration the need tomaintain freedom of movement andmaneuver of friendly forces.

• Military Operations Other Than War.In other military operations forces willbe impeded by barriers, mines, andobstacles that are often controlled byseveral different factions.

•• Advance planning and coordinationmust be done with former warringfactions (FWF) to obtain detailedinformation on known obstacles andmines. In addition, friendly forces alsomust coordinate movement and clearingoperations with representatives fromthese factions.

•• Planning must take intoconsideration the tremendous amountof time involved in deliberate clearingof large mined areas and the accuracy ofmarking, recording, and disseminatingminefield data.

e. Planning Sequence. The planningsequence begins with JFC’s detailedanalysis of missions, forces available,terrain, enemy forces, and time.Emphasis is placed on the integration ofbarrier, obstacle, and minefield planningwith the development of OPLANs.

• Portions of the battlespace containingnatural operational level barriers andobstacles suitable for reinforcement bythe enemy are identified through terrainanalysis.

• The terrain should be evaluated from bothfriendly and enemy perspectives. Theresults of the terrain analysis are

integrated into the development of theconcept of operations.

• The early analysis of operationalbarriers and obstacles includesestimates from the componentcommanders on how best to support theJFC’s concept of operations.

• The JFC issues planning guidance forcountering enemy barriers, obstacles, andminefields. The guidance may includepriority of engineer support, fire support,logistic support, C2 measures, andsequencing of breaching operations.Guidance provides the focus forintelligence and targeting and forms thebasis for staff estimates and thedevelopment of COAs.

• During plan formulation, emphasis isplaced on minimizing the effectivenessof existing enemy barriers, obstacles,and minefields. Emphasis is also placedon maximizing opportunities to achievea bypass or an in-stride breach. For eachbarrier, obstacle, and minefield, adetermination is made of the possible orprobable enemy actions when they areencountered. This will assist inidentifying friendly options for offensiveaction.

• Once the JFC plan is approved,suppor t ing and subord ina tecommanders finalize their plans.

f. Operations

• Employment. Breaching a majorbarrier, obstacle, or minefield is adifficult and risky task. Forces mustexecute breaching aggressively. Forcesand supporting fires are synchronized tominimize losses and enhance rapidpassage through the obstruction.Breaching operations are summarized inFigure IV-2 and described below.

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•• Preparation. Before a majorcounterobstacle operation, units willrequire training and rehearsals incounterobstacle operations. Breachingoperations require special equipment andmaterial that may require time to obtainand prepare for employment.

•• Detection. Efforts must be made todetect minefields and other major

obstacles using all available means.Common indicators include mines,minefield markers, locations of enemydefensive positions, evidence of terrainmodification, major natural obstacles,and other manmade obstacles.

•• Reconnaissance. After detection, thecharacteristics and limitation of enemybarriers, obstacles, and minefields must

Figure IV-2. Breaching Operations

BREACHING OPERATIONS

Reducing a major barrier,obstacle, or minefield is adifficult and risky task.Forces must executebreaching aggressively.Forces and supportingfires are synchronized tominimize losses andenhance rapid passagethrough the obstruction.

PREPARATION

Obtain any specialequipment ormaterial required

DETECTION

Detect minefieldsand other majorobstacles

RECONNAISSANCE

Determine thecharacteristics andlimitation of enemybarriers, obstacles,and minefields

BYPASS

Apparent bypassroutes may be part ofthe enemy's plan toturn and disruptfriendly forces

BREACHING

Training andRehearsalsThroughout

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be determined using both ground andaerial reconnaissance and remoteimagery.

•• Bypass. Although bypass is anattractive option, apparent bypassroutes around major obstacles andminefields may be part of the enemy’splan to turn and disrupt friendly forces.

•• Breaching. When the JFC decidesthat it is necessary to reduce a majorobstacle or minefield, a combined armsin-stride , deliberate, assault, orclandestine breaching operation may bedirected. (1) In-Stride Breaching. In-stride breaching is a very rapid techniqueusing standard actions on contact andnormal movement techniques. It consistsof preplanned, well-trained, and well-rehearsed breaching actions andreduction procedures by pre-designatedcombined arms elements. The in-stridebreach takes advantage of surprise andinitiative to get through the obstructionwith minimal loss of momentum. Itmaintains the momentum of the attackby denying the enemy time to mass forcesto cover the obstacle or minefield. A JFCconducts an in-stride breach against aweak defender; lightly defended orvery simple barriers, obstacles, andminefields; or when an unclear situationmakes it necessary for subordinate unitsto be capable of independent breachingoperations to accomplish the mission.When conducting an in-stride breach, thecommander uses all the resources at handto maintain momentum through theobstacle and to the objective. (2)Deliberate Breaching. Deliberatebreaching is a scheme of maneuverspecifically designed to cross a heavilydefended, extensive, or complex enemybarrier, obstacle, or minefield to continuethe mission. A deliberate breachingoperation may be required if an in-stridebreach is not feasible or has failed.

Deliberate breaching operations arecharacterized by thorough reconnaissance,detailed planning, extensive preparation,and explicit rehearsal. C2, timing, anddeception are critical. (3) AssaultBreaching. Assault breaching isspecifically designed to penetrate anenemy’s protective barriers, obstacles,and minefields and destroy the defenderin detail. (4) Clandestine Breaching.Clandestine breaching is used bydismounted forces during limitedvisibility. It is silently executed toachieve surprise and minimize casualties.It relies on stealth, manual reduction, anddismounted maneuver.

• Recording and Reporting. Anyknowledge, detection, or encounter ofenemy barriers, obstacles, or minefieldsis reported immediately throughappropriate channels and incorporatedin intelligence data.

•• Spot reports provide the tacticalcommander the initial source of barrier,obstacle, and minefield intelligence. Thisinformation is reported to higherheadquarters by the fastest meansavailable.

•• As specified in the OPLAN, detailedinformation on enemy minefields istransmitted to the appropriate Servicecomponent or joint force headquarters,where they are maintained on file. Theformat used for this information is listedin Appendix A, “Mine, Countermine, andObstacle Reports.”

•• The Joint Mine CountermeasuresOperations (MCMOPS) report is usedto exchange tactical informationbetween all components and jointheadquarters. It provides the locationand status of component MCMOPS,including breaching and clearing. It isalso used to request, task, plan, report,

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modify, and approve MCMOPS, asappropriate. The report format isspecified in MIL-STD-6040, “U.S.Message Text Formatting Program,” andlisted in Appendix A, “Mine,Countermine, and Obstacle Reports.”

• Marking. Marking is necessary todefine the limits of the breached path,lane, or gap and, eventually, theboundaries of the mined area. Propermarking is critical to the safe and swiftmovement of units and to protect friendlyforces and civilians.

• Minefield Clearing. Minefield clearingis the t o ta l e l im ina t ion o rneutralization of mines from a definedarea.

•• Breaching operations are usuallyconducted under enemy fires. However,clearing operations are not generallyconducted under fire.

•• A limited clearing operation can beconducted by follow-on engineers andexplosive ordnance disposal (EOD)detachments after the force conductingthe breaching operation has reduced theminefield and secured the area. It mayalso be tasked to eliminate all mines in aminefield previously identified, reported,and marked in a friendly area ofoperations that hinders mobility or is ahazard to friendly forces or civilians.

•• Before clearing operations commence,both theater records of friendly, enemy,and FWF minefields installed in the areaand appropriate intelligence reportsshould be provided to the clearing unit,to include locations of suspectedminefields.

•• Minefields suspected of containingchemical mines are marked andbypassed, if possible. All use or

suspected use of chemical mines, whetherenemy or friendly, must be reported as asuspected violation of international lawand the law of war.

•• Deliberate clearing operationsshould be conducted during daylighthours when dealing with uncertain areas.Friendly forces should treat areas theyhave cleared as not suspect.

•• Post-hostilities clearing operationsin non-US emplaced minefields are notconducted by US units. US units clearmines only as required for militaryoperations. Clearance after cessation ofhostilities may be provided by otherfriendly forces, belligerent forces underthe auspices of the UN Security Council,civilian contract workers, forces from thecountry concerned, or a combination ofany of these. US forces may providetechnical advice, training, and otherassistance, as appropriate.

3. Maritime MineCountermeasures

Maritime MCM include all actionsundertaken to prevent enemy mines fromaltering friendly forces’ maritime plans oroperations. MCM reduce the threat andeffects of enemy-laid sea mines on friendlynaval force and seaborne logistic force accessto and transit of selected waterways.

a. General. MCM are divided into twobroad areas: proactive and enabling MCM(See Figure IV-3).

• Proactive MCM. The most effectivemeans of countering a mine threat is toprevent the laying of mines. ProactiveMCM destroy enemy minemanufacturing and storage facilities ormine laying platforms before themines are laid. Although an adjunct ofmine warfare, proactive MCMOPS are

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not normally conducted by mine warfareforces. Therefore, staff MCM plannersmust ensure that enemy mine layer, minestorage and, ultimately, mine productionfacilities and assets are considered forinclusion on joint target lists.

• Enabling MCM. Enabling countermeasuresare designed to counter mines oncethey have been laid. Some enablingMCMOPS are undertaken following thetermination of conflict solely to eliminateor reduce the threat to shipping posed byresidual sea mines. However, mostenabling MCMOPS are undertakenduring conflict to permit (enable) othermaritime operations, such as powerprojection, to be conducted. EnablingMCM includes passive and activeMCM.

•• Passive MCM reduce the threatfrom emplaced mines withoutphysically attacking the mine itself.Three primary passive measures are

practiced: localization of the threat,detection and avoidance of the minefield,and risk reduction. (1) Localization ofthe threat involves the establishment ofa system of transit routes, referred to asQ-routes, which will be used by all shipsin order to minimize exposure inpotentially mined waters. Establishmentof transit routes should be one of the firststeps taken by MCM planners, if theroutes have not been previouslydesignated, to minimize exposure ofshipping and permit concentration ofactive MCM efforts. (2) Detection andavoidance of minefields can beaccomplished by employing intelligenceinformation or organic MCM forces.When the location has been established,shipping may be routed around the area.(3) Risk reduction is primarily practicedby individual ships rather than plannedand executed by MCM forces. Risk maybe reduced by controlling the degree ofpotential interaction with a mine sensor.Against contact mines, a reduction in

MARITIME MINE COUNTERMEASURES

PROACTIVE

ENABLING

Prevent the laying of mines through...

Counter mines once they have been laid through...

destroying enemy mine manufacturing facilitiesdestroying enemy mine storage facilitiesdestroying enemy mine laying platforms

localization of threat utilizing Q-routesDetection and avoidance of minefieldsrisk reduction

minehuntingminesweeping

Passive mine countermeasures

Active mine countermeasures

Figure IV-3. Maritime Mine Countermeasures

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draft and posting additional lookouts canreduce the number of mines with whichthe ship’s hull might make contact.Influence mines can be denied therequired activation signals by controllingthe ship’s emissions. Using built-inmagnetic field reduction equipment,silencing a ship to minimize radiatednoise, or using minimum speeds toreduce the pressure signature of a shipare examples of operational riskreduction. Other types of risk reductioninvolve the enhancement of shipsurvivability in the event of minedetonation. Such measures can involveincreased structural integrity andimproved damage-control capability.

•• Active MCM are applied whenpassive measures alone cannot protecttraffic. This entails physical interferencewith the explosive functioning of themine or actually destroying it.Minehunting and minesweeping arethe primary techniques employed inactive MCM. Both require detailedintelligence and extensive planning bythe MCM commander to counter thethreat effectively. (1) Minehunting.

Minehunting involves the use of minedetection and neutralization systemsto counter individual sea mines.M inehun t ing i s p re fe r red tominesweeping if time permits. High-resolution sensors are used to locatemines. When located, remote-controlled vehicles or EOD diversvisually identify the mines and plantcharges to destroy them. Minehuntingposes less risk to MCM forces, coversan area more thoroughly, and provides ahigher probability of mine detection thanminesweeping. (2) Minesweeping.Minesweeping is conducted by eithersurface craft or aircraft and involvesthe towing of mechanical, influence, orexplosive sweep systems. Mechanicalsweeping employs specially equippedcables to sever moored mine cables sothat the mines float to the surface. Themines are then destroyed by explosivecharge upon approval of the localcommander. Influence sweepinginvolves the use of towed or streameddevices that emit acoustic, magnetic, orcombination acoustic-magnetic signals totrigger influence-type mines. Explosivesweep ing causes sympathe t i c

A primary method of protecting shipping from enemy mines is indetection and avoidance of minefields.

IV-11


detonations in, damages, or displaces themine. At present, the only methodcapable of activating a sophisticatedpressure mine is the use of an actual ship.This is not a practical routine sweepmethod.

b. Intelligence Support

• Intelligence Gathering. Beforemaritime MCMOPS, intelligence mayindicate the types, quantities, orlocations of mine storage sites. This

COALITION MINE COUNTERMEASURE OPERATIONS

The US mine warfare concept [during DESERT STORM] was designed arounda European war scenario which relied on North Atlantic Treaty Organizationallies to participate substantially in mine warfare operations, especially in minecountermeasures (MCM). The Navy’s MCM capabilities in the Persian Gulfconsisted of surface mine countermeasures (SMCM), aviation minecountermeasures (AMCM), and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams.SMCM capabilities included the newly commissioned USS Avenger (MCM1)class MCM ship and two 30-year-old USS Aggressive and USS Acme (MSO422 and 508) class minesweepers. The AMCM capability consisted of six MH-53E AMCM helicopters. More than 20 US EOD teams and a 23-man Australianteam also were deployed to neutralize or destroy detected mines.

Before the start of Operation DESERT STORM, the US ability to gatherintelligence on Iraqi minefield locations, or observe and counter Iraqiminelaying activity in international waters (generally considered a hostile actunder international law), was degraded by restrictions on naval and airoperations in the northern Persian Gulf. To avoid any possibility of provokingIraqi military action before Coalition defensive and later offensive preparationswere complete, CINCCENT restricted naval surface forces in the Gulf tooperating south of the 27°30’N parallel (approximately 72 miles south of theKuwaiti-Saudi border) until early January [1991]. Similar restrictions kept theflight paths of aircraft south of 27°45’N (approximately 55 miles south of theKuwait-Saudi border) unless tactically required to exceed that limit. Thoserestrictions precluded gathering intelligence on Iraqi mining activity and alsoprevented NAVCENT from acting to deter or counter Iraqi forces from settingmines adrift in the Gulf.

After the Royal Saudi Naval Force discovered the first drifting mine in December[1990], the US Mine Countermeasures Group (USMCMG) found and destroyedsix drifting mines before Operation DESERT STORM started. On 24 January,the USMCMG left Abu Dhabi and conducted training and maintenance whileen route to its designated MCM operating area in the northern Persian Gulf.On 14 February, the oceanographic survey vessel HMS Herald and five RoyalNavy mine hunters joined the USMCMG. This task force started its MCMoperations on 16 February, 60 miles east of the Kuwaiti coast, working initiallyto clear a 15-mile long, 1,000 yard wide path to a 10-mile by 3.5-mile FSA southof Faylaka Island.

SOURCE: Final Report to CongressConduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, 1992

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information enables the surveillance ofmine storage sites with overhead sensorsystems and intelligence assets to detectmovement of mine assets. All source-derived intelligence of mine movementto minelaying platforms and thesubsequent movement of the minelayingplatforms can provide advanceinformation on the type, size, andlocation of enemy minefields. Wheremining is a possible threat, particularlyin areas of military operations other thanwar, tracking and dedicatedintelligence collection against thisthreat must begin early and be regularenough to provide confident estimates ofmine activity. A joint MCM trackingteam could be established to focuscollection efforts in this area.

• Mine Exploitation. A key to counteringany mine is a detailed knowledge of themine sensor and targeting circuitry. All-source derived intelligence on theenemy minelaying operation can aidin determining the type of sensor andstyle of target processing used.However, more accurate data can beacquired by actually exploiting a mine

recovered during MCMOPS. The mineexploitation may provide information onmine settings and mine modificationintelligence.

c. Planning Considerations. The MCMplanning process starts with an estimate ofthe situation and a mission statement andresults ultimately in production of an MCMtasking order. Some aspects of the missiondefinition must be provided by the taskingcommander.

• Objectives. The mission statementincludes an objective for active MCM,an acceptable risk factor, and a specificoperation area. In some cases, ameasure of the effectiveness of theoperation will be required. The MCMcommander must choose a specificobjective from the list in Figure IV-4 asdescribed below.

•• Exploratory. The objective ofexploration is to determine whether ornot mines are present. This is usuallythe first objective when an enemyminefield is suspected. If no mines arefound, the confidence level of search

Minesweeping is a method of active maritime countermeasure and isconducted by either surface craft or aircraft.

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accuracy is the measure of effectiveness.If mines are found, the operation usuallytransitions to a reconnaissance objective.

•• Reconnaissance. Reconnaissanceoperations are designed to make a rapidassessment of the limits of a mined areaand the estimated number and typesof mines present. The measure ofeffectiveness is normally a valuejudgment based on the degree ofcoverage for a given area using anestablished probability of detection.

•• Breakthrough. The breakthroughobjective is directed when a rapidoperation is required to open channelsand staging areas for an amphibiousoperation or break-in and/or break-out of

a port. This objective would be selectedwhen there is insufficient time or forcesfor high percentage clearance operations.For breakthrough operations, the taskingcommander should indicate the amountof time available for MCMOPS. TheMCM commander should respond withthe following estimates: (1) Initialthreat to traffic that will remainfollowing the MCMOPS that can beconducted in the available time; and (2)Additional reduction of the threatachievable with additional time providedfor MCMOPS.

•• Attrition. Attrition operations call forcontinuous or frequent MCM effortsto keep the threat of mines to shiptraffic as low as possible when traffic

Figure IV-4. Maritime Mine Countermeasure Mission Objectives

MARITIME MINE COUNTERMEASURE MISSIONOBJECTIVES

EXPLORATORY

Determine whether or not mines are present

RECONNAISSANCE

Make a rapid assessment of mined area limits, types ofmines, and numbers

BREAKTHROUGH

Open channels and staging areas for amphibious operationor break-in and/or break-out of a port

ATTRITION

Make continuous or frequent efforts to keep the threat ofmines to ship traffic low

CLEARANCE

Attempt to remove all mines from assigned areas

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must continue to transit the mined watersfor a comparatively long period of time.Attrition is employed when mines cannotbe quickly cleared because of factorssuch as enemy minefield replenishmentor use of mines with arming delay or highship counter settings. The taskingcommander should provide the MCMcommander with a desired initial threatto shipping goal and require reporting ofestimated attainment of that goal.

•• Clearance. The objective of clearingis to remove all the mine threat fromthe assigned area. Because it is difficultto ensure that all mines are cleared, apercentage goal is assigned for mineremoval to permit the MCM commanderto measure and report progress. For aclearing objective to be appropriate,MCM forces must be adequate to do thejob in the time available, traffic throughthe field must be delayed until theclearance is completed, enemyreplenishment of the field must beunlikely, and the majority of the minesmust be vulnerable to at least one formof active MCM. Clearing assumes thatthe mine types are known or can bereasonably estimated. A special case ofthe clearing objective is limitedclearing, in which a minefield iscleared of only specified mine types.Limited clearing may be directed if thereare inadequate MCM forces to conductclearing operations in the time availableor if available countermeasures are noteffective against all mine types in thefield. If the characteristics of the minesin a field can only be assumed, partialclearing can be tailored to the type of shipthat must transit the field.

• Risk Directives. Some MCMtechniques are inherently risky whenused against certain mine types. Todetermine the proper MCM technique to

employ, the MCM commander must,in addition to an objective, be given someindication of the maximum acceptabledegree of risk to MCM forces. Whenoperations are constrained by time, asomewhat greater degree of risk must beaccepted to accomplish the objective.

• MCM Asset Availability. MCM tacticsare determined by the time and assetsavailable. The time required to moveMCM units to the minefield area asopposed to the time available forcompletion of MCMOPS is a keydetermination. A primary mission ofairborne MCM (AMCM) forces is toprovide short-notice, rapid response toany mining threat. These forces sacrificesome degree of effectiveness and staminato maximize response capability. On theother hand, surface MCM (SMCM)forces are more effective but, because ofrelatively slow transit speeds, have longresponse times. For long distances,heavy lift ships can transport SMCMunits to the area of operations morequickly than the MCM ships could transiton their own. Whenever time andcircumstances permit, AMCM assetsshould be used for precursory minefieldsweeping before operating SMCMassets. This provides greater safetymargins for surface craft, which lack thehelicopter’s relative immunity to mines.

• Amphibious Operations. MCM andamphibious breaching in support ofamphibious operations need to besynchronized within the overallamphibious task force (ATF) timeline.Planning a successful MCM and/oramphibious breaching operation requiresthe combined efforts of the commander,ATF (CATF), commander, landing force(CLF), and MCM commander. Earlydialogue between CATF, CLF, and theMCM commander will aid planners to

IV-15


identify detailed mission requirements.These considerations include:

•• Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance. A collection plan is ajoint effort of the ATF intelligenceorganizations. Intelligence efforts shouldconcentrate on establishing the type andlocation of the mine threat in the AOA,AOA characteristics, enemy locations,and intelligence on obstacles in the surfzone and beyond.

•• Synchronization. MCM andamphibious breaching operations requireprecise synchronization to ensuremaximum effects of supporting arms andto minimize the risk to friendly forces.The determination of the ATF generalCOA dictates the size and compositionof the landing force (LF) and the generallocation and number of lanes required.Lane requirements and enemy obstacleconstruction will dictate size andcomposition of the breach force. Reverseplanning should be used to ensure thatactions at the obstacles support action onthe objective.

•• Breaching Fundamentals. Suppression,obscuration, security, and reduction areapplied to all amphibious breachingoperations to ensure success whenbreaching against a defending enemy.

•• Organization. ATF forces must beorganized to quickly and effectivelyreduce obstacles and expedite LFmovement to the objective. Forcesshould be task-organized into support,breach, and assault organizations.

•• Command and Control. Unity ofcommand is critical in MCM and/oramphibious breaching operations. CATF,with the assistance of a breach forceadvisor from the CLF staff, executes the

clearance effort from the surf zone to thehigh water mark (HWM) and/or craftlanding zone (CLZ) using task-organizedNavy, SOF, and LF elements. The MCMcommander mine clearance efforts beginat the seaward edge of the mine threatarea to the surf zone, and the CLF task-organizes breaching elements in theassault waves to continue the breachingeffort at the HWM, CLZs, and landingzones.

• Support Requirements. DeployedMCM ships and helicopter and EODun i ts a re no t se l f - sus ta in ing .Commun ica t ions , o rdnance ,recompression chamber, supply,personnel support, and petroleum,oils, and lubricants must be providedfor these units. In addition, ships willrequire magnetic and acoustic calibrationrange services and intermediatemaintenance support. Helicopter unitswill require hangar space, maintenance,and ground support equipment. Supportmay be provided to ships and EOD unitsby an assigned MCM support ship or anadjacent shore facility. Helicoptersupport may be provided by an adjacentairfield or by an air-capable MCMsupport ship. When operating nearhostile enemy areas, force protectionsupport requirements exist for all MCMplatforms.

d. Organizational Support

• Maritime Defense Zone Commands.When activated, the maritime defensezone commanders Atlantic and Pacificare responsible to USCINCACOM andUSCINCPAC, respect ively, forintegrated maritime defenseoperations, including mining andMCM , within their respective US coastaland inland waterway regions.Operational forces will be allocated by

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the fleet commanders and Coast Guardarea commanders.

• Commander, Mine WarfareCommand. COMINEWARCOM isresponsible to the Chief of NavalOperations for oversight of Navy minewarfare programs and, throughUSCINCACOM, for the training andreadiness of mine warfare forces.These forces, which include AMCM,S M C M , and u n d e r w a t e r m i n ecountermeasures units as well as MCMcommanders and staffs, are prepared todeploy on short notice to support anycombatant command, as required.COMINEWARCOM supports thesecommanders in planning MCM exercisesand operations.

e. Operational Considerations. When anenemy minefield is encountered, a number ofdecisions must be made. If the minefield isnot on a primary SLOC or operational route,the best action may be to warn and divertshipping around the area. If the minefield isin an essential area, the decision must be madeas to what type of MCM to employ. Thenumber and types of mines, availability ofMCM forces, and time available willdetermine the type of MCM to employ. Itmay also be possible to counter a minefieldin a critical area by sending forces over it (e.g.,vertical assault or vertical resupply) ratherthan through or around it.

• Integrated Operations. IntegratedMCMOPS make optimum use of allavailable MCM assets and tactics to meetthe needs of the mission. Considerationmust be given to both mutual supportand mutual interference. The MCMcommander must consider the potentialreduction of risk that could be madepossible through the sequentialapplication of an integrated force.Support from MCM helicopters may

significantly reduce the risk to SMCMvessels if shallow moored mines andsensitive influence mines are sweptbefore the SMCM employment.However, if influence sweeping isperformed concurrent with EODoperations, there may be a serious risk toEOD divers in close proximity as a resultof sweep-generated mine detonations.The MCM commander must planoperations to exploit the strongcapabilities of each MCM element andschedule events to accomplish themission in the fastest manner consistentwith the risk directive.

• Multinational Force Coordination.Enemy mining frequently results in amultinational MCM effort. It is possibleto have MCMOPS conducted by severalnational forces in close proximity withouthaving a single command structure. Toconduct such operations safely andefficiently, agreements to coordinateoperational areas and communications,as a minimum, must be established toprevent mutual interference.

• Q-Routes and Route Survey. AQ-route is a preplanned system ofdormant shipping lanes that can beactivated partially or totally by the areacommander after it has been determinedthat mining has occurred. The Q-routeminimizes the area an MCMcommander has to clear to provide safepassage for shipping and reduces theforce required to conduct MCM. Routesurvey operations are conducted alongQ-routes during peacetime for severalpurposes. First, a survey is conducted todetermine if the route is favorable forminehunting. If it is not, a change of routewill be recommended. Next, theestablished route is surveyed to collectenvironmental data with which to supportwartime operations. The route is then

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periodically surveyed to locate, evaluate,and catalog minelike objects. This data basecan be used in conflict to determine if mininghas occurred and, if it has, to reduce the timerequired to clear the route.

• Reporting Requirements. TheMCMOPS report is used to exchangeMCM tactical information between allcomponents and joint headquarters. It

OPERATION END SWEEP

Concurrent with the formal signing of the Paris Agreement on Ending the Warand Restoring Peace in Vietnam on 27 January 1973, American and Vietnameseofficials signed a separate, but directly related protocol providing for the USneutralization of mines in North Vietnam’s waters. The attendant US Navymineclearing operation was called Operation END SWEEP.

The significance of END SWEEP extended well beyond tactically clearing minesfrom Haiphong harbor. Indeed, the operation proved to be one of the fewdiplomatic tools remaining on the US side as the struggle in Indochinacontinued even after the signing of the cease-fire agreement.

Seen in this context, the US pledge at Paris to neutralize the thousands ofmines American forces laid during the war assumed added significance. Themine clearance protocol was one of the few tools that the US administrationpossessed during 1973 to moderate Communist actions in Indochina. Indeed,the END SWEEP task force to clear mines from North Vietnamese waters mayhave been the most important factor that year in deterring large-scaleCommunist offensives.

In addition to the diplomatic aspects, END SWEEP, which lasted from 6 Februaryto 18 July 1973, stands out as a unique US naval operation. Not since theeffort at Wonsan during the first year of the Korean War had the Navy carriedout such a major mine countermeasures mission. END SWEEP involved a totalof 10 ocean minesweepers, 9 amphibious ships, 6 fleet tugs, 3 salvage ships,and 19 destroyers. Twenty-four CH-53D Sea Stallions from Marine helicoptersquadrons HMM 165 and HMH 463 and another thirteen CH-53Ds from theNavy’s Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 12 took part. With aherculean mobilization effort—a testament to organizational flexibility and ableleadership—the Navy concentrated in the United States and the Western Pacificthe necessary mine countermeasures forces, ships, aircraft, and equipment,trained the personnel for the task, and completed plans for its execution.

provides the location and status ofService component MCMOPS, includingbreaching and clearing. It is also used torequest, task, plan, report, modify, andapprove MCMOPS, as appropriate. Thereport format is specified in MIL-STD-6040, “U.S. Message Text FormattingProgram,” and listed in Appendix A,“Mine, Countermine, and ObstacleReports.”

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END SWEEP witnessed the first major operational employment of aircraft insupport of mine clearance—airmobile mine countermeasures. Task Force 78successfully tested new equipment, including the Mark 105 hydrofoil sled andthe Magnetic Orange Pipe that the specially configured CH-53s towed to detectmagnetic and acoustic mines. The Raydist “T” Precise Navigation System wasanother innovative device that passed the test during END SWEEP. Finally,the mine countermeasures warriors improved their tactics, techniques, andprocedures for handling the “weapons that wait.”

The Navy’s 1973 experience off North Vietnam proved invaluable in the 1974minesweeping of the Suez Canal and during Persian Gulf operations in 1987-88 and 1991. The Service gained a better understanding of how airbornecountermeasures fit into mine warfare. END SWEEP showed that aircraft unitswere able to deploy quickly overseas, operate in relative safety from explodingordnance, and detect shallow-water magnetic and acoustic mines. The Navyalso learned that ocean minesweepers and other surface vessels were stillessential for all-weather, day-night activity and dealing with pressure minesand deep-water moored mines.

Operation END SWEEP demonstrated persuasively that mine countermeasureswas a valuable component of naval warfare and a useful instrument of Americanforeign policy.

SOURCE: Dr. Edward J. Marolda, “Operation END SWEEP,”Naval Historical Center, 1993

APPENDIX AMINE, COUNTERMINE, AND OBSTACLE REPORTS

A-1

1. Land Forces Reports

Once emplaced, minefields are lethal and unable to distinguish between friend and enemy.For this reason, positive control and continuous flow of information is necessary. Reporting,recording, and marking of minefields must be performed using methods that are consistentand well understood. The basic differences between conventional and scatterable mines requirethat they be treated differently with respect to reporting, recording, and marking.

a. Conventional Minefield Reporting. A minefield report is an oral, electronic, or writtencommunication concerning mining activities, friendly or enemy. These reports documentinformation on friendly and enemy minefields. The information is transmitted throughoperation channels and furnished to intelligence staff officers. It is then processed, integratedwith terrain intelligence, and disseminated through intelligence channels to affected units.Mandatory conventional minefield reports are:

• Report of Intention• Report of Initiation• Report of Completion

These reports will be submitted by the emplacing unit commanders through operationschannels to the operations officer (J-3 and/or G-3) of the authorizing headquarters. Thatheadquarters will integrate the reports with terrain intelligence and disseminate them throughtactical intelligence. The reports should be sent by secure means.

• Report of Intention. The Report of Intention is made as soon as it is decided to lay theminefield. It doubles as a request when initiated at levels below those with authority toemplace. This report, when required, includes the following required data (STANAG2036) on the proposed minefield:

•• Tactical purpose;•• Type of minefield;•• Estimated number and types of mines;•• Whether mines are surface laid or buried;•• Whether antihandling devices are used;•• Location of minefield;•• Location and width of lanes and gaps; and•• Proposed date and time for starting and completing.

Conventional minefields which are part of an operation or general defense plan that hasbeen approved by the authorizing commander do not require a Report of Intention.Their inclusions in such a plan implies an intention to lay.

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Joint Pub 3-15

• Report of Initiation. The Report of Initiation is a mandatory report made by the layingunit when installation begins. It informs higher headquarters that emplacement has begunand the area is no longer safe for friendly movement and maneuver.

• Report of Completion. The Report of Completion is usually an oral report to theauthorizing commander that the minefield is complete and functional. The Report ofCompletion is followed as rapidly as possible by the completed DA Form 1355 (MinefieldRecord) or DA Form 1355-1-R (Hasty Protective Minefield Record). Completion of theminefield records is the responsibility of the laying unit.

b. Scatterable Minefield Reporting. Accurate, timely, and uniform reporting anddissemination of scatterable minefield emplacement information is a must. Fluid and fast-moving tactical situations require that complete information on scatterable mine employmentbe known and passed on in a simple, rapid manner to all units that could be affected. Thevariety of emplacing systems and emplacing units preclude the use of locally devised reportingand dissemination methods. Scatterable minefields must also be recorded to facilitate clearing.They need not be recorded in the detail required when emplacing conventional mines, sincethe locations of individual scatterable mines are unknown. Shown below is a relativelysimple reporting procedure that will be used for scatterable mines. It is applicable for alldelivery systems and can be sent in a voice, digital, or hard copy mode.

• Scatterable Minefield Report and Record Form (Front Side)

LINE # INFORMATION REQUIRED DATA - INST ON BACK1 APPROVING AUTHORITY2 TGT/ OBSTACLE #3 TYPE EMPLACING SYSTEM4 TYPE MINES5 SELF-DESTRUCT PERIOD6 AIM PT/CORNER PTS OF MINEFIELD789101112131415 SIZE SAFETY ZONE FROM AIM PT16 UNIT EMPLACING MINES/RPT #17 PERSON COMPLETING RPT18 DTG OF REPORT19 REMARKS

A-3

Mine, Countermine, and Obstacle Reports

• Scatterable Minefield Report and Record Form (back side)

LINE # INSTRUCTIONS1 Approving Authority. Enter approving authority. CDR 3AD2 Target/Obstacle Number. If the minefield is part of an obstacle plan, enter the obstacle

number 2XXX0157. This number represents 11 Corps, target number 157. If the minefield isnot a part of an obstacle plan or does not have a number, then leave blank or enter NA.

3 Type Emplacing System. Enter the type system that emplaced the minefield, such asARTY, Volcano.

4 Type Mines. Enter AP for antipersonnel mines, AT for antitank mines. If both, enterAP/AT.

5 Self-Destruct Period. Enter the time period in which the minefield will self-destruct.6-14 Aim Point/Corner Points of the Minefield. If the system used to emplace the

minefield uses a single aim point to deliver the mines, enter that aim point MB 10102935. Ifthe system has distinct corner points such as Volcano, enter those corner points MB 17954790,MB 18604860, MB 18504890, MB 18054895, MB 17804850.

15 Size Safety Zone from Aim Point. If an aim point is given in Line 6, enter the sizesafety zone from that aim point. Example: Artillery emplaces a minefield from aim point MB10102935 and the safety zone is 1,OOOM x 1,OOOM, enter 500M so that personnel plottingor receiving the information can plot the coordinate and go 500M in each direction from theaim point and plot the safety zone.

16 Unit Emplacing Mines and Report Number. BCO 23ENGB BN 4. Reports shouldbe numbered consecutively. This would be the fourth minefield that B Company has emplaced.

17 Person Completing the Report. SFC Hollind18 Date-Time Group of Report. 160735ZOCT9619 Remarks. Any other items the reporting unit may feel are important.

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Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

• Scatterable Minefield Report and Record Form (Sample)

LINE # INFORMATION REQUIRED DATA - INST ON BACK1 APPROVING AUTHORITY 2BDE3AD2 TGT / OBSTACLE # NA3 TYPE EMPLACING SYSTEM Volcano4 TYPE MINES AT/AP5 SELF-DESTRUCT PERIOD 101630Z-102130ZOCT966 AIM PT/CORNER PTS OF MINEFIELD7 MB 179554908 MB 186048609 MB 1850489010 MB 1805489511 MB 1780485012131415 SIZE SAFETY ZONE FROM AIM PT NA16 UNIT EMPLACING MINES/RPT# BC023ENGR/417 PERSON COMPLETING RPT 1LT JENNINGS18 DTG OF REPORT 051400ZOCT9619 REMARKS MINEFIELD AROUND TANK DITCH

A-5


• SCATMINEWARN

Units which may be affected by the emplacement of scatterable mines will need toreceive a warning to alert them. This warning message may be disseminated prior to orafter the mines are emplaced. Only the very basic information should be included toprevent tie up of communication systems. The following procedure is a convenient,easily sent message which provides the necessary information.

Scatterable Minefield Warning Report

LINE MESSAGE

ALPHA Emplacing System.BRAVO AT YES/NOCHARLIEAP YES/NODELTA # aim points/corners points.ECHO Grid coordinates of aim points and/or corner points and size safety zone.FOXTROT DTG of self-destruct period

Examples of a warning message based upon the previous Scatterable Minefield Reportand Record are as follows:

SCATMINEWARN (Example 1) SCATMINEWARN (Example 2)ALPHA ARTY ALPHA VolcanoBRAVO Yes BRAVO YesCHARLIE Yes CHARLIE YesDELTA One DELTA FiveECHO MB 10102935 500M ECHO MB 17954790FOXTROT 081610Z-081900ZOCT96 MB 18604860

MB 18504890MB 18054895MB 17804850

FOXTROT 101630Z-102130ZOCT96

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Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

• Enemy Minefield Reporting and Recording

Any detection, encounter, or knowledge of enemy minefields or mining activities mustbe reported by the fastest reliable means. The report is made to the next higher commander,and must include all known information about the minefield. The report is normallymade through operation channels. Specific information is outlined in STANAG 2096and is as follows:

LINE INFORMATIONALPHA Map sheet designationBRAVO Date and time of collection of informationCHARLIE Type of minefield (AT, AP) (self-destructing)DELTA Coordinates of minefield extremitiesECHO Depth of minefieldFOXTROT Enemy weapons or surveillanceGOLF Estimated time to breach minefieldHOTEL Estimated material and equipment needed to breach minefieldINDIA Routes for bypassing minefield (if any)JULIET Coordinates of lane entry (if any)KILO Coordinates of lane exit (if any)LIMA Width of lanes, in meters (if any)ZULU Other:

A-7


• UXO Spot Report

The UXO spot report is a detailed, swift, two-way reporting system that makes clearwhere the UXO hazard areas are, what their priorities are, and which units are affectedby them. The report is used to request help in handling a UXO hazard that is beyond aunit’s ability to handle and that affects the unit’s mission. This report helps commandersset priorities based on the battlefield situation. The UXO spot report is the first-echelonreport that is sent when a UXO is encountered. The report consists of nine lines and issent by the fastest means available.

LINE # INFORMATION1. Date-Time Group: DTG item was discovered2. Reporting Activity: (Unit identification code) and location (grid of UXO).3. Contact Method: Radio frequency, call sign, point of contact and telephone number.4. Type of Ordnance: Dropped, projected, placed or thrown. If available, supply thesubgroup. Give the size of the hazard area.5. NBC Contamination: Be as specific as possible.6. Resources Threatened:Report any equipment, facilities, or other assets that arethreatened.7. Impact on Mission: Provide a short description of current tactical situation andhow the presence of UXO affects mission.8. Protective Measures:Describe any measures you have taken to protect personneland equipment.9. Recommended Priority: Recommend a priority for response by EOD or engineers.

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Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

• US Message Text Format Messages:

UNCLASSIFIED MIL-STD-60405.1.1 MESSAGE TEXT FORMATSIMPL DATE: 1 JANUARY 1997

(U) INDEX REFERENCE NUMBER: C114 STATUS: AGREED DAT

MTF IDENTIFIER: SIREP

MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT NAME: SENSITIVE INFORMATION REPORT

FUNCTION OR PURPOSE: THE SIREP IS USED TO PROVIDE SENSITIVEINFORMATION ON EVENTS OR CONDITIONS THAT MAY HAVE ASIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON CURRENT PLANNING OF AN OPERATION,BUT OF LESS TIME CRITICALITY THAN A TACREP. THIS MESSAGEPROVES A SENSITIVE FILE MAINTENANCE UPDATE MECHANISM.

SPONSORS: DIA

RELATED DOCUMENTS:

MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT:

SEG RPT OCC SETID SEQ FIELD OCCURRENCESET FORMAT NAME(C) EXER 1 /M/O// EXERCISE

IDENTIFICATION(0) OPER 2 /M/O/O/O// OPERATION

IDENTIFICATION DATA(M) MSGID 3 /M/M/O/O/O/O// SIREP(0) REF 4 /M/M/M/M/O/O/*O// REFERENCE(C) AMPN 5 M// AMPLIFICATION(C) NARR 6 /M// NARRATIVE

INFORMATION(0) COLLINFO 7 /O/O/O/O// COLLECTOR

INFORMATION(C) HEADING 8 /M// GROUND ACTIVITY(C) lEUNITEQ 9 /*M/M/M/M// ENEMY UNIT AND

EQUIPMENT(0) lESTATUS 10 /*M/M/M/M/M/M// ENEMY STATUS

AND ACTIVITYINFORMATION

(0) lEEMTLOC 11 /*M/M/M/M/M/M// LAST KNOWN ENEMYEMITTER LOCATION

(0) 2EDES TIN 12 /*M/M/M// ENEMY DESTINATIONINFORMATION

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

A-9


(C) GENTEXT 13 /M/M// GROUND ACTIVITYSUMMARY

(C) HEADING 14 /M// AIR ACTIVITY(C) 2EACSTAT 15 /*M/M/M/M/M/M// ENEMY AIRCRAFT

STATUS(0) 2EACLOC 16 /*M/M/M/M/M/M/M// ENEMY AIRCRAFT

LOCATION ANDMOVEMENT INFO

(0) 2EACORD 17 /*M/M/M// ENEMY AIRCRAFTORDNANCE ANDDESTINATION

(0) 2EDESTIN 18 /*M/M/M// ENEMY DESTINATIONINFORMATION

(C) GENTEXT l9 /M/M// AIR ACTIVITY SUMMARY(C) HEADING 20 /M// MARITIME ACTIVITY(C) 3MTGTQNT21 /*M/M/M/M/M/M/M// MARITIME TARGETS,

QUANTITY AND TYPE(0) 3MTGTDSG 22 /*M/M/M/M/M// MARITIME TARGET

DESIGNATION(0) 3MTGTLOC 23 /*M/M/M/M/M/M// MARITIME TARGET

LOCATIONINFORMATION

(0) 3MTGTINF 24 /*M/M/M/O/M/M/M// MARITIME TARGETINFORMATION

(0) 3MTGTACT 25 /*M/M/M/M// MARITIME TARGETDESTINATION AND/ORACTIVITY

(C) GENTEXT 26 /M/M// MARITIME ACTIVITYSUMMARY

(0) GENTEXT 27 /M/M// ENEMY COMMUNICATIONSACTIVITY

(C) HEADING 28 /M// ENEMY LOSSES(0) ENLOS 29 /M/M/M/M/M/M/M/M// ENEMY PERSONNEL

LOSS COUNT(0) lCAPEQ 30 /*M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENT

CAPTURED(C) 4DESEQ 31 /*M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENT

DESTROYED(C) 4DAMEQ 32 *M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENT

DAMAGE(C) 1ABANDEQ 33 /*M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENT

ABANDONED(C) GENTEXT 34 /M/M// ENEMY LOSS SUMMARY(C) HEADING 35 /M// FRIENDLY LOSSES(0) FRLOS 36 /M/M/M/M/M/M/M// FRIENDLY PERSONNEL

LOSS COUNT


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Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

(0) CAPEQ 37 /*M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENTCAPTURED

(C) 4DESEQ 38 /*M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENTDESTROYED

(C) 4DAMEQ 39 /*M/M/M/M// COUNT OF EQUIPMENTDAMAGE

(C) GENTEXT 40 /M/M// FRIENDLY LOSSSUMMARY

(C) HEADING 41 /M// BARRIERS ANDOBSTACLES

(0) 1BARRIER 42 /*M/M/M// BARRIER OR OBSTACLEINFORMATION

(C) HEADING 43 /M// INSTALLATION DATA(0) 7TGTTYPE 44 /*M/M/M/M/M// TARGET TYPE, STATUS

AND/OR LOCATION INFO(C) 7AREANAM 45 /*M/M// AREA NAME(0) GENTEXT 46 /M/M// INSTALLATION ACTIVITY(C) HEADING 47 /M// PERSONALITIES(0) 8EPERDAT 48 /*M/M/M/M/M// ENEMY PERSONNEL

PERSONAL DATA(0) DECL 49 /M// MESSAGE

DOWNGRADING ORDECLASSIFICATION D.

STRUCTURAL NOTATION:

1. (1) P ([2] e )2. (3)F1 A “SIREP”3. (5) M (([4]F2 = FF646-1) L ([4] Q= 1))4. (6) M (([4] e> 1) ~ ( [4],NF2 = FF646-1))5. (8) MP ([9] e )6. (8)F1 A “GROUND ACTIVITY”7. (9) M (([10] 8) / ([11] D) / ([12] 0))8. (10)F1 = [9]F1,N9. (11)F1 = [9]F1,N10. (12)F1 = [9]F1,N11. (13) M ([9] 8)12. (13)F1 A “GROUND ACTIVITY SUMMARY”13. (14) MP ([15] S)14. (14)F1 A “AIR ACTIVITY”15. (15) M (([16] 8) / ([17] @) / ([18] 8))16. (16)F1 = [15]F1,N17. (17)F1 = [15]F1,N

A-11


UNCLASSIFIEDFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MIL-STD-6040

5.1.1 MESSAGE TEXT FORMATSIMPL DATE: 1 JANUARY 1997

(OU) INDEX REFERENCE NUMBER: C327 STATUS: AGREED D

MTF IDENTIFIER: MCMREP

MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT NAME: MCM REPORT

FUNCTION OR PURPOSE: THE MCMREP PROVIDES A SITUATION REPORTON MCM OPERATIONS AND THE AREA IMPACTED BY PRESENTOR FUTURE MCM OPERATIONS.

SPONSORS:

RELATED DOCUMENTS: FOR FURTHER U.S. IMPLEMENTATIONGUIDANCE, SEE JIEO CIRCULAR 9152, ITEMS 42 AND 51.


SEG RPT OCC SETID SEQ FIELD OCCURRENCE SET FORMAT NAME(C) EXER 1 /M/O// EXERCISE

IDENTIFICATION(0)(O) OPER 2 /M/O/O/O// OPERATION

IDENTIFICATIONDATA

(M) MSGID 3 /M/M/O/O/O/O/ / MCMREP* (0) REF 4 /M/M/M/M/O/O/*O// REFERENCE

(C) AMPN 5 /M// AMPLIFICATION(C) NARR 6 /M// NARRATIVE

INFORMATION* (0) MXPN 7 /M/M/O/O/O/O/O// MINE EXPLOSION

(0) MDETDAT 8 /0/0/0/0/0/0/0// MINE DETECTIONDATA

* (0) MOPS 9 /M/O// MCM OPERATIONS INPROGRESS

(0) MTASK 10 /M/M/O/*O/O// MCM TASK* (0) MINE 11 /M/O/O/O/O/O/O// MINE INFORMATION* (0) MSUM 12 /M/O// SUMMARY OF

MINEFIELDS* (0) MTYPE 13 /M/O// TYPE OF MINE

(0) PGRSS 14 /M/O/O/O/O/O/O/O/O/O/O/*O// PROGRESS OF MCMTASK


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Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

* (0) NOOP 15 /M/O/O/O// SHIPSNON-OPERATIONAL

* (0) UWCOND 16 /M/O/O/O/O/O/O/O/O// UNDERWATERCONDITIONS

(0) CONM~RK17 /M/O/O/O// CONTACT MARKER(0) MZONE 18 /M/M/M/*O/O// STATUS OF MINE

ZONE(C) AMPN 19 /M// AMPLIFICATION

* (M) MBUOY 20 /M/O/O/O/O// MCM BUOY(0) MAP 21 /M/O/*O/O/O// MAP DATA

INFORMATION(0) LOGSIT 22 /0/0/0/0/0/0/0// LOGISTICS

SITUATION(0) ASORT 23 /0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0// AIR SORTIE(C) AMPN 24 /M// AMPLIFICATION(0) ASUM 25 /0/0/0/0/0// AIR SUMMARY(0) DIVDAT 26 /0/0/0/0/0/0// DIVER DATA(0) ENVIRN 27 /0/0/0/0/0// ENVIRONMENT(0) CHRON 28 /0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0// CHRONOLOGY(0) NAV 29 /O/O/O// NAVIGATION(C) AMPN 30 /M// AMPLIFICATION(0) AKNLDG 31 /M/*O// ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REQUIREMENT(0) DECL 32 /M// MESSAGE

DOWNGRADING ORDECLASSIFICATION D.


1. (1) P ([2] @)2. (3)F1 A “MCMREP”3. (5) M (([4]F2 = FF646-1) & ([4] e= 1) )4. (6) M (([4] e> 1) & ([4],NF2 = FF646-1))5. (19) M ([18]F3 = “CLOSED”)6. (24) M ([23]F2 = “99”)7. (30) M ([29]F2 = “99”)

NATURAL LANGUAGE EQUIVALENT:

1. SET 1 (EXER) IS PROHIBITED, IF SET 2 (OPER) OCCURS.2. SET 3 (MSGID) FIELD 1 MUST EQUAL “MCMREP.”3. SET 5 (AMPN) IS MANDATORY, IF [SET 4 (REF) FIELD 2 EQUALS FFIRN/FUD 646-1 AND THE NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES OF SET 4 (REF) EQUALS 1].4. SET 6 (NARR) IS MANDATORY, IF [THE NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES OFSET 4 (REF) IS GREATER THAN 1 AND FIELD 2 IN SOME OCCURRENCE OFSET 4 (REF) EQUALS FFIRN/FUD 646-1].

A-13


5. SET 19 (AM~N) IS MANDATORY, IF SET 18 (MZONE) FIELD 3 EQUALS“CLOSED.”6. SET 24 (AMPN) IS MANDATORY, IF SET 23 (ASORT) FIELD 2 EQUALS “99.”7. SET 30 (AMPN) IS MANDATORY, IF SET 29 (NAY) FIELD 2 EQUALS “99.”

REMARKS:

THE PAGE MARKINGS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELATEDDOCUMENT FOR THE AGGREGATE MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT.

REVISION DATE: 21 JUL 1995

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Joint Pub 3-15

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYUNCLASSIFIED MIL-STD- 6040

5.1.1 MESSAGE TEXT FORMATSIMPL DATE: 1 JANUARY 1997

(U) INDEX REFERENCE NUMBER: C440 STATUS: AGREED DAT

MTF IDENTIFIER: MINEOPS

MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT NAME: JOINT MINELAYING OPERATIONS

FUNCTION OR PURPOSE: THE MINEOPS IS USED FOR THE JOINT EXCHANGEOF INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, CHARACTERISTICS, ANDSTATUS OF COMPONENT SERVICES’ MINELAYING OPERATIONS. IT ISALSO USED TO REQUEST, TASK, MODIFY, REPORT, PLAN, ANDAPPROVE MINELAYING OPERATIONS.

SPONSORS: USN/USAF

RELATED DOCUMENTS:


SEG RPT OCC SETID SEQ FIELD OCCURRENCE SET FORMAT NAME

(C) EXER 1 /M/O// EXERCISE IDENTIFICATION

(0) OPER 2 /M/O/O/O// OPERATION IDENTIFICATIONDATA

(M) MSGID 3 /M/M/O/O/O/O// MINEOPS* (0) REF 4 /M/M/M/M/O/O/*O// REFERENCE


INFORMATIONM (M) MWACT 7 /M// MINE WARFARE

OPERATIONS ACTIVITY

[O (M) MINEFLD 8 /M/M/M/M/M/*M// MINEFIELD INFORMATION

[[ * (0) MAP 9 /M/O/*O/O/O// MAP DATA INFORMATION

[[ (C) POMOE 10 /M/M/M/M/M/M/O/O/O/O/O// PLANNED OVERALL MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS


A-15


[[ (M) 5TIME 11 /*M/M/M/M/M/M/M/O/C// MINEFIELD TIME ANDSTATUS INFORMATION

[[ (0) 5MFLD 12 /*M/M/M/O/O/O/C/O// MINEFIELD INFORMATION

[[ * (0) MDELTYP 13 /M/M/M/M// MINE DELIVERY AND TYPE

[[ * (0) UNITDES 14 /M/M/M/O// MINELAYING UNITDESIGNATOR INFORMATION

[[ (0) 5MLINE 15 /*M/M/M/M/M/M/ MINELINES[[ (0) 5MLOC 16 /*M/M/M/O/C// MINE LOAD LOCATION[[ * (C) MCPOS 17 /M/M/M/M/M/M/M/O// MINE CASE AND

POSITION[ END OF SEGMENT

END OF SEGMENT

(0) DECL 18 /M// MESSAGE DOWNGRADING ORDECLASSIFICATION D.


1. (1) P ([2] @ )2. (3) F1 A “MINEOPS”3. (5) M (([4]F2 = FF646-1) & ([4] Q= 1))

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Joint Pub 3-15

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED MIL-STD-60405.1.1 MESSAGE TEXT FORMATSIMPL DATE: 1 JANUARY 1997

(U) INDEX REFERENCE NUMBER: C441 STATUS: AGREED

MTF IDENTIFIER: MCMOPS

MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT NAME: JOINT MINE COUNTERMEASURESOPERATIONS

FUNCTION OR PURPOSE: THE MCMOPS IS USED FOR THE JOINT EXCHANGEOF INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION AND STATUS OF COMPONENTSERVICES MINE COUNTERMEASURES (MCM) OPERATIONS. IT IS ALSOUSED TO REQUEST, TASK, PLAN, REPORT, MODIFY, AND APPROVEMINE COUNTERMEASURES OPERATIONS.

SPONSORS: USN/USAF

RELATED DOCUMENTS:


SEG RPT OCCSETID SEQ FIELD OCCURRENCESET FORMAT NAME

(C) EXER 1 /M/O// EXERCISE IDENTIFICATION

(0) OPER 2 /M/O/O/O// OPERATIONIDENTIFICATION DATA

(M) MSGID 3 /M/M/O/O/O/O// MCMOPS* (0) REF 4 /M/M/M/M/O/O/*O// REFERENCE


INFORMATIONM (M) MWACT 7 /M// MINE WARFARE

OPERATIONS ACTIVITY

[M (M) MCMACT 8 /M/M/M/M/O/O/O/O/O/O/*O// MINE COUNTERMEASURES ACTIVITY

[[ * (0) MAP 9 /M/O/*O/O/O// MAP DATA INFORMATION

[[ * (C) VESVEH 10 /M/M/*M/M// VESSEL/VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION

[[ * (0) MDA 11 /0/*0/0// MINE DANGER AREA


A-17


[[ * (0) SAFELANE 12 /M/M/M/M/M/O/*M// LANE OF SAFE PASSAGE

[[ * (0) LDTHCORD 13 /M/M/M/*M// LEAD-THROUGH COORDINATION

[ END OF SEGMENT[ END OF SEGMENT

(0) DECL 14 /M// MESSAGE DOWNGRADING OR DECLASSIFICATION D.


1. (1) P ([2] @)2. (3)F1 A “MCMOPS”3. (5) M (([4]F2 = FF646-1) & ([4] Q= 1))4. (6) M (([4] @> 1) & ([4],NF2 = FF646-1))5. (10) M ([12] @)

NATURAL LANGUAGE EQUIVALENT:

UNCLASSIFIED

A-18

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-15

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX BREFERENCES

B-1

The development of Joint Pub 3-15 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Joint Publications

a. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

b. Joint Pub 1-01, “Joint Publication System, JointDoctrine and Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures Development Program.”

c. Joint Pub 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

d. Joint Pub 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

e. Joint Pub 2-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint IntelligencePreparation of the Battlespace.”

f. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

g. Joint Pub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.”

h. Joint Pub 3-02.1, “Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations.”

i. Joint Pub 3-03, “Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.”

j. Joint Pub 3-04, “Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (AIR).”

k. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”

l. Joint Pub 3-06, “Doctrine for Joint Riverine Operations.”

m. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

n. Joint Pub 3-07.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign HumanitarianAssistance.”

o. Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.”

p. Joint Pub 3-10, “Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations.”

q. Joint Pub 3-10.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.”

r. Joint Pub 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.”

s. Joint Pub 3-34, “Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

B-2

Appendix B

Joint Pub 3-15

t. Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”

u. Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”

v. Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”

w. Joint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

x. CJCS Instruction 3121.01, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.”

y. CJCS Manual 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (PlanningFormats and Guidance).”

2. Multi-Service

a. NWP 1-14M / MCWP 5-2.1, “The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of NavalOperations.”

b. NWP 3-06M/FMFM 7-5, “Doctrine for Navy/Marine Corps Joint Riverine Operations.”

c. NWP 3-15/MCWP 3-3.1.2 “Mine Warfare.”

d. TRADOC Pam 525-43/TAC Pam 50-27, “Military Operations: US Joint OperationalConcept and Procedures for Coordination of Employment of Air Delivered Mines (J Mine).”

e. Variable Message Format (VMF) Message Number K05.16, “Land Minefield LayingReport,” TIDP-TE, Volume III, Annex A.

3. US Army

a. FM 3-100, “NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke, and Flame Operations.”

b. FM 5-10, “The Engineer Platoon.”

c. FM 5-34, “Engineer Field Data.”

d. FM 5-71-100, “Division Engineer Combat Operations.”

e. FM 5-71.2, “Armored Task Force Engineer Combat Operations.”

f. FM 5-71.3, “Brigade Engineer Combat Operations (Armored).”

g. FM 5-100, “Engineer Combat Operations.”

h. FM 5-100-15, “Corps Engineer Operations.”

i. FM 5-103, “Survivability.”

B-3

References

j. FM 5-116, “Engineer Operations, Echelons Above Corps.”

k. FM 5-250, “Explosives and Demolitions.”

l. FM 6-20, “Fire Support in the Air Land Battle.”

m. FM 6-20-30, “Fire Support for Corps and Division Operations.”

n. FM 20-32, “Mine/Countermine Operations.”

o. FM 27-10, “Law of Land Warfare.”

p. FM 71-100, “Divisions Operations.”

q. FM 90-7, “Combined Arms Obstacle Integration.”

r. FM 90-13, “Combined Arms River Crossing Operations.”

s. FM 90-13-1, “Combined Arms Breaching Operations.”

t. FM 100-5, “Operations.”

u. FM 100-7 (Draft), “The Army in Theater Operations.”

v. FM 100-15, “Corps Operations.”

w. FM 101-5-1, “Operational Terms and Symbols.”

x. TC 5-250.1, “Modernized Demolition Initiator.”

y. TRADOC Pam 525-18, “Military Operations: US Army Operational Concepts forCountermine Operations.”

z. TRADOC Pam 525-19, “USA Operational Concept for Land Mine Warfare.”

4. US Navy

a. NDP 1-14, “Naval Warfare.”

b. NWP 1-03.1, “Operational Reports.”

c. NWP 1-14M / MCWP 5-2.1, “Commander’s Handbook on the Law of NavalOperations.”

d. NWP 3-02.4, “Explosive Ordnance Disposal.”

e. NWP 3-05, “Naval Special Warfare.”

B-4

Appendix B

Joint Pub 3-15

f. NWP 3-10, “Naval Coastal Warfare Doctrine.”

g. NWP 3-15, “Mine Warfare.”

h. NWP 3-15.2.1, “Mine Countermeasures Operations.”

i. NWP 3-15.2.2, “Airborne Mine Countermeasures Operations.”

j. NWP 3-15.3, “Mining Operations.”

k. NWP 3-15.4.1, “Mine Countermeasures Planning and Procedures.”

l. NWP 3-15.4.1, VOL I, “Mine Countermeasures Planning and Procedures (DataAppendices).”

m. NWP 3-15.4.2, “Minefield Planning.”

n. NWP 3-56, “Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual.”

o. NWP 5-00.3M, “The Amphibious Task Force Plan.”

p. NWP 5-01, “Naval Operational Planning.”

5. US Air Force

a. AFDD 1, “Air Force Basic Doctrine.”

b. AFDD 1-1, “Air Force Task List.”

c. AFDD 2, “Organization & Employment.”

d. AFDD 2-1.3, “Counterland.”

e. AFDD 2-1.4, “Countersea.”

f. AFDD 2-5, “Information Operations.”

6. US Marine Corps

a. MCDP 1, “Warfighting.”

b. MCDP 1-2, “Campaigning.”

c. MCDP 4, “Logistics.”

d. MCWP 3-1, “Ground Combat Operations.”

B-5

References

e. MCWP 3-16.2, “TTP for Fire Support Coordination.”

f. MCWP 3-17, “Engineer Operations.”

g. MCWP 5-1, “Marine Corps Planning.”

7. NATO

a. ATP 1(C), Vol I, “Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions.”

b. ATP 6A (Navy) (Air), Vol I, “Allied Doctrine of Mine Warfare, Policies, and Principles.”

c. ATP 8(A), “Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.”

d. ATP 24(A) (Navy), “Tactical Instructions and Procedures for the Conduct of MineWarfare Operations.”

e. ATP 37, “Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations.”

f. STANAG 1242, “Allied Doctrine of Mine Warfare Policy and Principles.”

g. STANAG 1257, “NATO Mine Delivery Systems.”

h. STANAG 1323, “NATO Minefield Planning Guidance.”

i. STANAG 1400, “Mining and Minelaying - Planning and Evaluation, Tactics, andExecution.”

j. STANAG 2017, “Orders to the Demolition Commander and the Demolition FiringCommander.”

k. STANAG 2036, “Land Minefield Laying, Marking, Recording and ReportingProcedures.”

l. STANAG 2096, “Reporting Engineer Information in the Field.”

m. STANAG 2123, “Obstacle Folder.”

n. STANAG 2394, ATP 52, “Land Force Combat Engineer Doctrine.”

o. STANAG 2889, “Marking of Hazardous Areas and Routes Through Them.”

p. STANAG 2963, “Coordination of Field Artillery Delivered Scatterable Mines.”

q. STANAG 2990, “Principles and Procedures for the Employment in Land Warfare ofScatterable Mines With a Limited Laid Life.”

B-6

Appendix B

Joint Pub 3-15

r. STANAG 2991, “NATO Glossary of Combat Engineer Terms and Definitions-AAP-19.”

s. STANAG 2991, AAP 19, “NATO Combat Engineer Glossary.”

APPENDIX CADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

C-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theUnited States Atlantic Command Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division,Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor forthis publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes Joint Pub 3-15, 30 June 93, “Joint Doctrine for Barriers,Obstacles, and Mine Warfare.”

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CSA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-FDQ//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

C-2

Appendix C

Joint Pub 3-15

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AMCM airborne mine countermeasuresAOA amphibious objective areaATF amphibious task force

C2 command and controlCATF commander, amphibious task forceCCW 1980 United Nations Convention on Conventional WeaponsCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCLF commander, landing forceCLZ craft landing zoneCOA course of actionCOMINEWARCOM Commander, Mine Warfare Command

DA Department of Army

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

FFE flame field expedientsFM field manualFWF former warring factions

HN host nationHWM high water mark

JFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board

LF landing forceLOC line of communications

MCM mine countermeasuresMCMOPS mine countermeasures operationsMFPF minefield planning folderMINEOPS joint minelaying operations

NCA National Command AuthoritiesNWP naval warfare publication

OPLAN operation planOPORD operation order

PIR priority intelligence requirements

ROE rules of engagement

SCATMINEWARN scatterable minefield warningSEAD suppression of enemy air defensesSLOC sea line of communicationSMCM surface mine countermeasuresSOF special operations forcesSTANAG standardization agreement (NATO)

TMD theater missile defense

UN United NationsUSAF United States Air ForceUSCINCACOM Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic CommandUSCINCPAC Commander in Chief, United States Pacific CommandUXO unexploded explosive ordnance

VMF variable message format

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-15

acoustic mine. A mine with an acousticcircuit which responds to the acoustic fieldof a ship or sweep. (Joint Pub 1-02)

attrition sweeping. The continuoussweeping of minefields to keep the risk ofmines to all ships as low as possible. (JointPub 1-02)

barrier. A coordinated series of obstaclesdesigned or employed to channel, direct,restrict, delay, or stop the movement of anopposing force and to impose additionallosses in personnel, time, and equipmenton the opposing force. Barriers can existnaturally, be manmade, or a combinationof both. (Joint Pub 1-02)

barrier, obstacle, and mine warfare plan.A comprehensive, coordinated plan thatincludes responsibilities, general locationof unspecified and specific barriers,obstacles, and minefields, specialinstructions, limitations, coordination, andcompletion times. The plan may designatelocations of obstacle zones or belts. It isnormally prepared as an annex to acampaign plan, operation plan, or operationorder. (Joint Pub 1-02)

bottom mine. A mine with negativebuoyancy which remains on the seabed.Also called ground mine. (Joint Pub 1-02)

clearing operation. An operation designedto clear or neutralize all mines and obstaclesfrom a route or area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

controllable mine. A mine which after layingcan be controlled by the user, to the extentof making the mine safe or live, or to firethe mine. (Joint Pub 1-02)

conventional mines. Land mines, other thannuclear or chemical, which are not designedto self-destruct. They are designed to be

emplaced by hand or mechanical means.Conventional mines can be buried orsurface laid and are normally emplaced ina pattern to aid in recording. (Joint Pub1-02)

defensive minefield. 1. In naval minewarfare, a minefield laid in internationalwaters or international straits with thedeclared intention of controlling shippingin defense of sea communications. 2. Inland mine warfare, a minefield laid inaccordance with an established plan toprevent a penetration between positions andto strengthen the defense of the positionsthemselves. (Joint Pub 1-02)

denial measure. An action to hinder or denythe enemy the use of space, personnel, orfacilities. It may include destruction,removal, contamination, or erection ofobstructions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

enabling mine countermeasures.Countermeasures designed to countermines once they have been laid. Thisincludes both passive and active minecountermeasures. (Joint Pub 1-02)

exploratory hunting. In naval mine warfare,a parallel operation to search sweeping, inwhich a sample of the route or area issubjected to minehunting procedures todetermine the presence or absence of mines.(Joint Pub 1-02)

flame field expedients. Simple, handmadedevices used to produce flame orillumination. Also called FFE. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

floating mine. In naval mine warfare, a minevisible on the surface. (Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-3

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-4

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-15

influence mine. A mine actuated by the effectof a target on some physical condition inthe vicinity of the mine or on radiationsemanating from the mine. (Joint Pub 1-02)

magnetic mine. A mine which responds tothe magnetic field of a target. (Joint Pub1-02)

mine. 1. In land mine warfare, an explosiveor other material, normally encased,designed to destroy or damage groundvehicles, boats, or aircraft, or designed towound, kill, or otherwise incapacitatepersonnel. It is designed to be detonatedby the action of its victim, by the passageof time, or by controlled means. 2. In navalmine warfare, an explosive device laid inthe water with the intention of damagingor sinking ships or of deterring shippingfrom entering an area. The term does notinclude devices attached to the bottoms ofships or to harbor installations by personneloperating underwater, nor does it includedevices which explode immediately onexpiration of a predetermined time afterlaying. (This term and its definition modifythe existing term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

mine countermeasures. All methods forpreventing or reducing damage or dangerfrom mines. Also called MCM. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

minefield. 1. In land warfare, an area ofground containing mines emplaced with orwithout a pattern. 2. In naval warfare, anarea of water containing mines laid with orwithout a pattern. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

minefield density. In land mine warfare, theaverage number of mines per meter ofminefield front, or the average number ofmines per square meter of minefield. (JointPub 1-02)

minefield lane. A marked lane, unmined, orcleared of mines, leading through aminefield. (Joint Pub 1-02)

minefield marking. Visible marking of allpoints required in laying a minefield andindicating the extent of such minefields.(Joint Pub 1-02)

minefield record. A complete written recordof all pertinent information concerned on aminefield, submitted on a standard form bythe officer in charge of the layingoperations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

minefield report. An oral, electronic, orwritten communication concerning miningactivities, friendly or enemy, submitted ina standard format by the fastest securemeans available. (Joint Pub 1-02)

minehunting. Employment of sensor andneutralization systems, whether air, surface,or subsurface, to locate and dispose ofindividual mines. Minehunting isconducted to eliminate mines in a knownfield when sweeping is not feasible ordesirable, or to verify the presence orabsence of mines in a given area. (JointPub 1-02)

minesweeping. The technique of clearingmines using either mechanical, explosive,or influence sweep equipment. Mechanicalsweeping removes, disturbs, or otherwiseneutralizes the mine; explosive sweepingcauses sympathetic detonations in,damages, or displaces the mine; andinfluence sweeping produces either theacoustic and/or magnetic influence requiredto detonate the mine. (Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-5

Glossary

mine warfare. The strategic, operational, andtactical use of mines and minecountermeasures. Mine warfare is dividedinto two basic subdivisions: the laying ofmines to degrade the enemy’s capabilitiesto wage land, air, and maritime warfare; andthe countering of enemy-laid mines topermit friendly maneuver or use of selectedland or sea areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mine weapons. The collective term for allweapons which may be used in minewarfare. (Joint Pub 1-02)

moored mine. A contact or influence-operated mine of positive buoyancy heldbelow the surface by a mooring attached toa sinker or anchor on the bottom. (JointPub 1-02)

numbered fleet. A major tactical unit of theNavy immediately subordinate to a majorfleet command and comprising various taskforces, elements, groups, and units for thepurpose of prosecuting specific navaloperations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

obstacle. Any obstruction designed oremployed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block themovement of an opposing force, and toimpose additional losses in personnel, time,and equipment on the opposing force.Obstacles can exist naturally or can bemanmade, or can be a combination of both.(Joint Pub 1-02)

obstacle belt. A brigade-level command andcontrol measure, normally givengraphically, to show where within anobstacle zone the ground tacticalcommander plans to limit friendly obstacleemployment and focus the defense. Itassigns an intent to the obstacle plan andprovides the necessary guidance on theoverall effect of obstacles within a belt.(Joint Pub1-02)

obstacle restricted areas. A command andcontrol measure used to limit the type ornumber of obstacles within an area. (JointPub 1-02 )

obstacle zone. A division-level commandand control measure, normally donegraphically, to designate specific land areaswhere lower echelons are allowed toemploy tactical obstacles. (Joint Pub 1-02)

offensive minefield. In naval mine warfare,a minefield laid in enemy territorial wateror waters under enemy control. (Joint Pub1-02)

phoney minefield. An area free of live minesused to simulate a minefield, or section ofa minefield, with the object of deceivingthe enemy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

pressure mine. 1. In land mine warfare, amine whose fuse responds to the directpressure of a target. 2. In naval minewarfare, a mine whose circuit responds tothe hydrodynamic pressure field of a target.(Joint Pub 1-02)

proactive mine countermeasures. Measuresintended to prevent the enemy fromsuccessfully laying mines. (Joint Pub 1-02)

protective minefield. 1. In land minewarfare, a minefield employed to assist aunit in its local, close-in protection. 2. Innaval mine warfare, a minefield laid infriendly territorial waters to protect ports,harbors, anchorages, coasts and coastalroutes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Q-route. A system of preplanned shippinglanes in mined or potentially mined watersused to minimize the area the minecountermeasures commander has to keepclear of mines to provide safe passage forfriendly shipping. (Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-15

reduction. The creation of lanes through aminefield or obstacle to allow passage ofthe attacking ground force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

reinforcing obstacles. Those obstaclesspecifically constructed, emplaced, ordetonated through military effort anddesigned to strengthen existing terrain todisrupt, fix, turn, or block enemymovement. (Joint Pub 1-02)

reserved obstacles. Those demolitionobstacles that are deemed critical to theplan for which the authority to detonateis reserved by the designatingcommander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

scatterable mine. In land mine warfare, amine laid without regard to classicalpattern and which is designed to bedelivered by aircraft, artillery, missile,ground dispenser, or by hand. Once laid,it normally has a limited life. (Joint Pub1-02)

search sweeping. In naval mine warfare,the operation of sweeping a sample ofroute or area to determine whether poisedmines are present. (Joint Pub 1-02)

ship counter. In naval mine warfare, a devicein a mine which prevents the mine fromdetonating until a preset number ofactuations has taken place. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategic mining. A long-term miningoperation designed to deny the enemy theuse of specific sea routes or sea areas. (JointPub 1-02)

tactical obstacles. Those obstacles employedto disrupt enemy formations, to turn theminto a desired area, to fix them in positionunder direct and indirect fires, and to blockenemy penetrations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unexploded explosive ordnance. Explosiveordnance which has been primed, fused,armed or otherwise prepared for action, andwhich has been fired, dropped, launched,projected, or placed in such a manner as toconstitute a hazard to operations,installations, personnel or material andremains unexploded either by malfunctionor design or for any other cause. Also calledUXO. (This term and its definition modifythe existing term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

!

!

!

The CINCS receive the puband begin to assess it duringuse

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each pub and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

!

!

!

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

!

!

!

STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications. Thediagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-15 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0 JOINT PUB 2-0 JOINT PUB 3-0

PERSONNEL

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

!

!

!

Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS,Services, and Joint Staff

!

!

!

STEP #3Two Drafts

JOINT PUB 1

JOINTWARFARE

JOINT PUB 0-2

UNAAF

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