JOINT PUB 3-12

DOCTRINEFOR

JOINT NUCLEAROPERATIONS

29 APRIL 1993

A large body of joint doctrine (and its supporting tactics, techniques,and procedures) has been and is being developed by the US Armed Forcesthrough the combined efforts of the Joint Staff, Services, and combatantcommands. The following chart displays an overview of the developmentprocess for these publications.

MAKING A JOINT PUB

PROJECTPROPOSAL

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All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organizedinto a comprehensive hierarchy. Joint Pub 3–04 .1 is located in theoperations series of joint publications .

Joint Pub 1–01, "Joint Publication System, " provides a detailed list ofall joint publications. Joint pubs are also available on CD–ROM throughthe Joint Electronic Library (JEL) . For information, contact : JointDoctrine Division, J-7, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon Washington, D. C.20318–7000 .

Reply ZIP Code: Joint Pub 3-1220318-0400 29 April 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution List

Subject: Joint Publication 3-12, "Doctrine for Joint NuclearOperations"

1. This publication has been developed under the direction ofthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forthdoctrine and military guidance to govern the joint activitiesand performance of the Armed Forces of the United States.

2. Recommendations for changes to this publication should besubmitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.20318-7000.

3. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change sourcedocument information reflected in this publication, thatdirectorate will include a proposed change to this publicationas an enclosure to its proposal.

4. The Military Services and other organizations arerequested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, whenchanges to source documents reflected in this publication areinitiated.

5. Additional copies of this publication can be obtainedthrough Service publication centers.

6. Local reproduction is authorized and access tounclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access toand reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation5200.1-R.

7. The lead agent for this publication is the US StrategicCommand.

8. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is theJ-5 (Strategic Nuclear Policy Branch, Nuclear, and ChemicalDivision).

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

H. L. SHEFFIELDCaptain, USNSecretary, Joint Staff

Enclosure

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Distribution:

By Secretary, Joint Staff:

Joint Staff OSD NSA CIA JWC USELMNORADFEMA DISA DIA DLA DMA DNANDU MCCDC JEWC AFSC JDC DISA-JIEOCIO

Additional copies may be obtained from the Secretary,Joint Staff (Documents Division).

Five copies each to: Offices of CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC,USCG

Copies each to:

USLANTCOM (25) USCENTCOM (25) USEUCOM (25) FORSCOM (25)USPACOM (25) USSOUTHCOM (25) USSPACECOM (25)USSOCOM (25) USSTRATCOM (25) USTRANSCOM (25)

Additional copies should be obtained from the MilitaryService assigned administrative support responsibility byDOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, "Support of theHeadquarters of Unified, Specified and Subordinate JointCommands."

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center,2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898.

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center,2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896.

Navy: CO, Navy Aviation Supply Office,Distribution Division (Code 03443)5801 Tabor Ave, Philadelphia, PA 19120-5000.

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics Base,Albany, GA 31704-5000.

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JOINT PUB 3-12DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIOPNS

RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

_____________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________

In accordance with the procedures contained in Joint Pub 1-01,change recommendations to this publication will be forwardedto:

Urgent: Joint Doctrine DivisionOperational Plans and Interoperability

Directorate, J-7Joint StaffWashington, D.C. 20138-7000

Routine: (Same as above)

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DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

PREFACE

1. Purpose. This publication sets forth doctrine for thecombatant commander to use for the conduct of joint nuclearoperations. This manual:

a. Guides the joint planning and employment of US nuclearforces.

b. Provides the US Government position for combineddoctrine, consistent with existing security procedures.

c. Provides a basis for joint training.

d. Provides instructional material for the militaryeducation system.

e. Informs US Government agencies concerning the jointemployment of US nuclear forces.

2. Application

a. Doctrine established in this publication applies tothe Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, combatantcommands, components, subordinate unified commands, jointtask forces, and other subordinate commands. Theprinciples and guidelines contained herein also apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attached to forcesof another Service or when significant forces of oneService support forces of another Service.

b. The doctrine in this publication is authoritative butnot directive. Commanders will exercise judgment inapplying the procedures herein to accomplish theirmissions. This doctrine should be followed, except when,in the judgement of the commander, exceptional

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circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arisebetween the contents of this publication and the contentsof Service publications, this publication will takeprecedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, normally in consultation with the other members ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current andspecific guidance.

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3. Scope. This publication provides guidelines for the jointemployment of forces in nuclear operations. It is written forthose who:

a. Provide strategic direction to joint forces (Secretaryof Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, andcommanders of combatant commands).

b. Employ joint forces (combatant commanders, commandersof subunified commands, or joint task forces).

c. Support or are supported by joint forces (combatantcommanders, component commands, joint task forces, andChiefs of the Services).

4. Basis. The following documents provide the basis for thispublication:

a. Joint Pub 1-02, "DOD Dictionary of Military andAssociated Terms."

b. NUWEP, "Guidance for the Employment of NuclearWeapons"

c. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan--Annex C (Nuclear).

d. National Military Strategy Document--Annex B(Nuclear).

e. Joint Pub O-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces."

f. Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."

g. SIOP-(YR) (Basic).

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I OBJECTIVES............................................ I-1

General.............................................. I-1The Spectrum of Potential Conflict................... I-2

II EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES................................. II-1

Fundamental Considerations.......................... II-1Considerations in Force Planning and Employment..... II-2Targeting Considerations............................ II-4Operations in a WMD Environment..................... II-7

III INTEGRATED OPERATIONS............................... III-1

Strategic Force Integration........................ III-1Nonstrategic Nuclear Force Integration............. III-2Offense/Defense Integration........................ III-6

APPENDIX

A TREATY OBLIGATIONS.................................... A-1B USER EVALUATION REPORT................................ B-1

GLOSSARY

Part I--Abbreviations and Acronyms.................... GL-1Part II--Terms and Definitions........................ GL-2

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CHAPTER I

OBJECTIVES

1. General

a. National Security Objectives and Nuclear Forces. Thepermanent security interest of the United States is itssurvival as a free and independent nation, with itsfundamental values intact and its institutions and peoplesecure. This is best achieved by a defense posture thatmakes possible war outcomes so uncertain and dangerous, ascalculated by potential enemies, as to remove all incentivefor initiating attack under any circumstance. Thus, thefundamental purpose of US nuclear forces is to deter the useof weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly nuclearweapons, and to serve as a hedge against the emergence of anoverwhelming conventional threat.

b. Strategy. Creditable and capable nuclear forces areessential for national security. During World War II,nuclear weapons were instrumental in ending the war on termsfavorable to the allies. The US post-war strategy has beenone of deterrence, and nuclear forces have been developed,deployed, and maintained for the purpose of deterringlarge-scale aggression against the United States and itsallies.

c. Object of Deterrence. The political leadership of anopposing nation is the central object of deterrence becausethat is where the ultimate decision to use military forcelies. Deterrence in the form of a large-scale attack (eitherWMD or conventional) requires that US forces and command andcontrol (C2) systems be viewed by enemy leadership as capableof inflicting such damage upon their military forces andmeans of support, or upon their country, as to effectivelydeny them the military option. Deterrence of the employmentof enemy WMD, whether it be nuclear, biological, or chemical,requires that the enemy leadership believes the United Stateshas both the ability and will to respond promptly and withselective responses that are credible (commensurate with thescale or scope of enemy attacks and the nature of USinterests at stake) and militarily effective. Any deterrenceassumes an opposing nation’s political leadership will actaccording to the logic of national self-interest, althoughthis self-interest will be viewed through differing culturalperspectives and the

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dictates of given situations. Although nations posses-sing WMD have largely refrained from using them, theircontinuing proliferation and the means to deliver themincreases the possibility that someday a nation may, throughmiscalculation or by deliberate choice, employ those weapons.This assumption does not rule out the possibility that anopponent may be willing to risk destruction ordisproportionate loss in following a course of action basedon perceived necessity, whether rational or in a totallyobjective sense. In such cases deterrence, even based on thethreat of massive destruction, may fail.

d. Force Capabilities. Deterrence is founded in real forcecapabilities and the national determination to use thoseforces if necessary. To have a credible effect on anadversary, US military forces must be capable of achieving USnational objectives throughout the operational continuum.Capabilities must range from nation building or civilmilitary operations through direct denial of battlefieldobjectives and conventional defeat of enemy forces to thefull-scale destruction of enemy warmaking and economicinfrastructures, while minimizing the enemy’s ability toretaliate. These capabilities require maintaining a diversemix of conventional forces capable of high-intensity,sustained, and coordinated air, land, and sea operations;survivable and capable nuclear forces; and the command,control, communications, and computer systems required tocontrol these forces. The mix of these forces must becapable of holding at risk those assets most valued by enemyleaders and providing a range of options in response toattack. It is possible, however, that an adversary maymisperceive or purposefully ignore a credible threat.Therefore, should deterrence fail, forces of all types (bothconventional and nuclear) must be structured, deployed, andready to provide a variety of options designed to controlescalation and terminate the conflict on terms favorable tothe United States and its allies.

2. The Spectrum of Potential Conflict. US nuclear forces serveto deter the use of WMD across the spectrum of potentialconflict. From a massive exchange of nuclear weapons to limiteduse on a regional battlefield, US nuclear capabilities mustconfront an enemy with risks of unacceptable damage anddisproportionate loss should the enemy choose to introduce WMD ina conflict.

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a. Peacetime and Crisis Considerations

(1) Forces and Strategy. Deterence must be carefullyweighed in the design of US forces and strategy. As aminimum, nuclear forces and strategy must pass thefollowing tests:

(a) Survivability. US forces must be able tosurvive a first strike and endure conventional andescalatory attrition with sufficient retaliatorystrength to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemyin a counterstrike.

(b) Credibility. The potential aggressor mustbelieve the United States could and would usenuclear weapons to attain its security objectives.

(c) Safety. The risk of failure through accident,unauthorized use, or miscalculation must beminimized.

(d) Security. Secure manufacture, transpor-tation, and storage that are free from terroristthreat, theft, loss, and unauthorized access must beprovided.

(2) Regional Contingencies. WMD deterrence should bethe first priority. The proliferation of WMDtechnologies and industrial capabilities in the world mayallow a potential aggressor to develop a WMD arsenalcapable of being employed against US forces deployed to aregional crisis. WMD used on US forces would cause asignificant tactical or operational loss; greatly changethe character of the war, putting the outcome in doubtand threatening escalation; leave the United States witha difficult choice: to retaliate or not to retaliate. Aselective capability of being able to use lower-yieldweapons in retaliation, without destablizing theconflict, is a useful alternative for the US NationalCommand Authorities (NCA).

(3) Conventional Threats. Because nuclear forces alsoserve as a hedge against the emergence of an overwhelmingconventional threat, the deterrent effect of nuclearweapons extends to enemy calculations concerningconventional conflict as well. The potential employmentof nuclear weapons at theater level, when combined withthe means and

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resolve to use them, makes the prospects of conflict ofany type more dangerous and the outcome more difficult toassess. The resulting uncertainty could reduce apotential aggressor’s willingness to risk escalation byinitiating conflict. At the same time, a credibledefensive capability that includes the means to threatento employ nuclear weapons could bolster the resolve ofallies to resist enemy attempts at political coercion.

(4) Conflict Avoidance. Conflict can often be avoidedby pursuing alternative mechanisms and disincentives toconflict such as nonproliferation, counterproliferation,arms control and verification, and confidence buildingmeasures during peacetime operations. These measuresmake conflict or war less likely by improvingcommunication, reducing opportunities for miscalculation,providing ways to resolve crises, and reducing thedestructive capacity of available arsenals.

(5) Readiness. Increased readiness levels may benecessary to deter aggression. Consequently, anincreased risk of attack, prompted by enemy war readinessmeasures, may require that US forces be maintained atvisibly increased states of alert. Certain types ofdelivery systems can be postured to send a clear warning.Alert posturing of nuclear delivery systems to dispersallocations can send a forceful message that demonstratesthe national will to use nuclear weapons if necessary.For example, the generation of nuclear forces to higheralert levels during the October 1973 Mideast Crisis senta strong signal. However, the danger also exists thatthe enemy may perceive either an exploitablevulnerability or the threat of imminent use. Therefore,increased readiness postures intended to signal nationalresolve must be accompanied by measures that would allowfor deescalation. Public affairs measures must also betaken to minimize the possi-bility that public concern over the conflict mightdevelop into mass panic upon implementation of USreadiness measures.

(6) Escalation. Should a crisis become so severe as toprompt the United States to place all its nuclear forcesat a high level of readiness, the United States must alsobe prepared to posture its nuclear forces as quickly aspossible. Nuclear forces should be generated and managedto ensure a sustained high

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level of readiness. Conventional forces and intell-igence activities would have to be prudently managed toensure avoidance of inadvertent escalation or mistakenwarnings of nuclear attack. In the event the crisis issuccessfully resolved without employ-ment of nuclear weapons, reductions in the alert postureof nuclear forces must be carefully managed, taking intoaccount enemy force readiness. This would ensure that nodestabilizing military advantage accrued to the enemyduring the de-escalation phase of the conflict.

b. Wartime Considerations

(1) Deterring the Use of WMD. In war, as in peacetimeor during crisis, deterrence of WMD attack depends on theenemy’s perception of its warfighting (and winning)capabilities and will relative to those of the UnitedStates. However, wartime circumstances may alter suchperceptions, possibly because of changes in the strategicsituation. Shifts in the strategic balance may resultfrom military action in which one side sufferssignificant destruction of military forces and industrialand economic infrastructures. Thus, a prolongedconventional conflict may lower the nuclear threshold byposing greater costs to a nation and, therefore, makenuclear attack appear to be a less risky option.

(2) Failure of Deterrence. Should deterrence fail, itis the objective of the United States to repel or defeata military attack and terminate the conflict on termsfavorable to the United States and its allies.Accomplishing this objective requires the capability formeasured and effective response to any level ofaggression while seeking to control the in-tensity and scope of conflict and destruction.Employment plans, in conjunction with political and othermilitary action, must provide for selected militaryoperations. Specific nuclear objectives are specified inAnnex C to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

(3) Controlling Escalation. Nuclear weapons mayinfluence the objectives and conduct of conventionalwarfare. Additionally, conventional warfare may resultin attrition of nuclear forces and supporting systems(through antisubmarine warfare, conventional attacks intheater, sabotage, or antisatellite warfare), eitherunintended or deliberate, which

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could affect the forces available for nuclear employ-ment. If this attrition results in a radical change inthe strategic force posture by eliminating intermediateretaliatory steps, there may be a rapid escalation. Theability to precisely gauge the attrition of conventionaland nuclear forces will directly effect calculations onthe termination of war and the escalation to nuclear war.

c. Post-Wartime Considerations

(1) War Termination. The fundamental differencesbetween a potential nuclear war and previous militaryconflicts involve the speed, scope, and degree ofdestruction inherent in nuclear weapons employment, aswell as the uncertainty of negotiating opportun-ities and enduring control over military forces.Depending on the scope and intensity of a nuclear war,how and under what conditions it is brought to aconclusion may be very different from previous wars.Terminating a global war involving the use of largenumbers of WMD on both sides and the degradation and ordestruction of their central means of control could bevastly more difficult than ending a theater or regionalnuclear conflict involving the relatively constrained useof a limited number of nuclear weapons. In the lattercase, war-termination strategies may more readily lead toa cessation of hostilities, assuming that thebelligerents’ interests in war termination are mutual.

(2) Termination Strategy. The objective of terminationstrategy should be to end a conflict at the lowest levelof destruction possible, consistent with nationalobjectives. However, there can be no assurances that aconflict involving weapons of mass destruction could becontrollable or would be of short duration. Nor arenegotiations opportunities and the capacity for enduringcontrol over military forces clear. Therefore, USnuclear forces, supporting command control,communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) systems(e.g., sensors, communications, command facilities), andemployment planning must provide the capability to denyenemy war aims, even in a conflict of indefiniteduration.

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(3) Reserve Forces. Adequate nuclear reserve forcesreduce opportunities for another nation to dominate orcoerce behavior before, during, or after the use of WMD.Such forces provide the US with the capability tocontinue to deny enemy war aims, influence other nations,and exert leverage for war termination.

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CHAPTER II

EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

1. Fundamental Considerations

a. Implementing the National Military Strategy. Thedecision to employ nuclear weapons at any level requires theexplicit decision of the President. Senior commanders shouldbe consulted and, based on their considered judgment, makerecommendations affecting nuclear policy decisions on forcestructure, weapons and/or force capabilities, and alternativeemployment options. Consequently, those responsible for theoperational planning and the direction of US nuclear forcesmust fully appreciate the numerous and often complex factorsthat influence the US nuclear planning process, and wouldlikely shape US decisions on the possible use of nuclearweapons. Clearly, the use of nuclear weapons represents asignificant escalation from conventional warfare and iscaused by some action, event, or perceived threat. However,the fundamental determinant of action is the politicalobjective sought in the use of nuclear or other types offorces. The decision to use nuclear weapons involves manypolitical considerations. Together, these considerationswill have an impact not only on the decision to use nuclearweapons, but also on how they will be employed. Otherprominent planning and employment factors include thestrategic situation, type and extent of operations to beconducted, military effectiveness, damage-limitationmeasures, environmental and ecological impacts, and how suchconsiderations may interact.

b. International Reaction. International reaction towardthe nation that first employs WMD is an important politicalconsideration. The United States and its allies havearticulated their abhorrence of unrestricted warfare,codifying "laws of war" and turning to definitions of "justwar." The tremendous destructive capability of WMD and theconsequences of their use have given rise to a number of armscontrol agreements (refer to Appendix A) restrictingdeployment and use, and in the case of the 1987Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, even prohibitingthe development of an entire class of weapons. At the sametime, it is important to recognize that there is no customaryor conventional international law to prohibit nations fromemploying nuclear weapons in armed conflict. Therefore, theuse of

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nuclear weapons against enemy combatants and other militaryobjectives is lawful. The nation that initiates the use ofnuclear weapons, however, may find itself the target of worldcondemnation.

2. Considerations in Force Planning and Employment

a. Employment Options. Combatant commanders responsible forthe employment of nuclear forces must ensure those forces arefully capable of executing the full range of employment optionsrequired by the NCA. To this end, employment planning mustfully consider the characteristics and limitations of thenuclear forces available and seek to optimize both thesurvivability and combat effectiveness of these forces.

b. Characteristics. To provide the desired capabilities,nuclear forces must be diverse, flexible, effective,survivable, enduring, and responsive. If no one weaponsystem possesses all of the desired characteristics, avariety of systems may be necessary.

(1) Force Diversity. To confront any potentialaggressor with insurmountable attack and defensiveproblems and to hedge against the failure of any one UScomponent, nuclear forces must be diverse. The UnitedStates maintains a strategic Triad of intercontinentalballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-launched ballisticmissiles (SLBMs), and bombers as a hedge againstunforeseen developments that might threaten USretaliatory capabilities. Each leg of the Triad hasunique capabilities that complement those of the otherlegs. Nonstrategic nuclear forces (NSNF) offer optionsshort of strategic response in those situations whereescalation control is desired. In addition, NSNFincreases the overall deterrent value of US forces bytheir direct deterrence at regional level. Bothstrategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces hold regionaltargets at risk.

(2) Flexibility and Effectiveness. To providedeployment and employment options that allow the UnitedStates to maintain effective deterrence and, ifnecessary, successfully execute a broad array of missionsagainst the full spectrum of potential targets, forcesmust be flexible and effective. Flexibility allowsengaging the enemy at an appropriate level or place withthe capability of escalating or de-escalating the levelof conflict, if desired. Flexibility is importantbecause deterrent credibility hinges on having aconvincing capability

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to execute a variety of nuclear and nonnuclear options.The flexible application of responses tailored to theprovocation would afford greater control over thepossible escalation of conflict. Flexibility is alsoessential in escalation management because availablenuclear and conventional weapons can be tailored forspecific military and political outcomes withoutdestablization of the conflict.

(3) Survivability and Endurance. US nuclear forces andC4I must be able to survive enemy attacks to convincepotential aggressors that, in any scenario, sufficient UScapability will remain to deliver a devastatingretaliatory strike. Nuclear forces and C4I must also beable to survive enemy attacks for both warfightingutility and deterrence purposes. Survivability isenhanced by a combination of multiple redundant systems,mobility, number of weapons, hardened sites, andemployment concept. (For example, mobility, increasessurvivability, because the forces cannot be attacked withany certainty of destruction due to the unpredictabilityof the location of the weapon at the time of attack.)Survivability also strengthens deterrence by providingnuclear forces for continued retaliation against theenemy.

(4) Responsiveness. Some targets must be struck quicklyonce a decision to employ nuclear weapons has been made.Just as important is the requirement to promptly strikehigh-priority, time-sensitive targets that emerge afterthe conflict begins. Because force employmentrequirements may evolve at irregular intervals, somesurviving nuclear weapons must be capable of strikingthese targets within the brief time available.Responsiveness (measured as the interval between thedecision to strike a specific target and detonation of aweapon over that target) is critical to ensure engagingsome emerging targets.

c. Other Considerations. Strategic stability, centralizedcontrol, and C4I systems are also important considerations innuclear force planning and employment.

(1) Strategic Stability. A crucial goal in designingand fielding US nuclear forces is to forge a balance ofmilitary capabilities between the United States andpotential adversaries that reduces the incentives forpotential adversaries to seek a

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decisive military advantage (in peacetime militaryoperations or in hostilities other than war) or toinitiate conflict. Such stability is a function ofrelative capabilities at all potential levels of conflictand requires the constant assessment of nuclear andconventional forces.

(2) Centralized Control. Centralized control ensuresthat US national policy decisions directly affectdeployment or employment of nuclear forces. Militarily,centralized control provides clarity of purpose and unityof command while ensuring nuclear forces are responsive,properly used, and integrated. It guides a broad plan ofaction while providing the flexibility for subordinatecommanders to plan authorized attacks in the mostoperationally effective manner.

(3) C4I. C4I must support the employment of nuclearweapons through all phases of a conflict. C4I must beable to provide the appropriate political and militaryauthority with a survivable, secure, and endurable C4Icapability through which execution, direction,assessment, and termination of nuclear operations can beensured during all phases of a conflict, especially inits termination. Reporting residual capabilityassessment information through C4I systems is essentialto providing the NCA with an understanding of themilitary capabilities remaining in a post-attackenvironment. Because of their central importance to USresponse capabilities, the destruction or degradation ofC4I systems will likely be a primary enemy objective.Consequently, such systems must be robust, redundant(where essential to guarantee continuity of operations),and rapidly recoverable.

3. Targeting Considerations

a. Preplanning. Guidance for planning nuclear strikes ispromulgated from the NCA to the combatant commanders throughdocuments such as National Security Directives, the PolicyGuidance for Nuclear Weapons Employment, and/or the JSCP,Annex C. The combatant commanders then preplan nucleartargets using this guidance.

b. Target Planning. Conditions leading to US employment ofnuclear weapons may not necessarily lead to an all-outexchange of WMD. Consequently, several strategies or factorsmust be considered in planning joint nuclear operations.

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(1) Countervalue Targeting. Countervalue targetingstrategy directs the destruction or neutralization ofselected enemy military and military-related activities,such as industries, resources, and/or institutions thatcontribute to the enemy’s ability to wage war. Ingeneral, weapons required to implement this strategy neednot be as numerous or accurate as those required toimplement a counterforce targeting strategy, becausecountervalue targets generally tend to be softer andunprotected in relation to counterforce targets.

(2) Counterforce Targeting. Counterforce targeting is astrategy to employ forces to destroy, or render impotent,military capabilities of an enemy force. Typicalcounterforce targets include bomber bases,ballistic-missile submarine bases, ICBM silos,antiballistic and air defense installations, C2 centers,and WMD storage facilities. Generally, the nuclearforces required to implement a counterforce targetingstrategy are larger and weapon systems more accurate,than the forces and weapons required to implement acountervalue strategy, because counter-force targetsgenerally tend to be harder, more protected, difficultto find, and more mobile than countervalue targets.

(3) Prioritization of Targets. Targets are normallyprioritized based upon the overall targeting strategy.Further refinement of target priorities will be madewithin each target category (e.g., industrial, military,energy facilities, storage facilities, weapon storageareas) based on the operational situation and theobjectives established by the appropriate command authority.

(4) Layering. Layering is a targeting methodology thatplans employing more than one weapon against a target toincrease the probability of its destruction or to improvethe confidence that a weapon will arrive and detonate onthat target and achieve a specified level of damage.

(5) Crosstargeting. At the same time it incorporates theconcept of "layering," crosstargeting also uses differentplatforms for employment against one target to increase theprobability of at least one weapon arriving at that target.Using different

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delivery platforms such as ICBMs, SLBMs, or aircraft-delivered weapons increases the probability of achievingthe desired damage or target coverage.

(6) Preplanned Options. Preplanned options are a meansof maintaining centralized control while minimizing theimpact on response time. These options should be capableof being executed individually or in combination withother options to expand the attack either functionally orgeographically.

(7) Emergent Targets and Adaptive Planning. Even afterthe initial laydown of nuclear weapons, there may be aresidual requirement to strike additional (follow onand/or emerging) targets in support of retaliatory orwar-termination objectives. Commanders must maintain thecapability to rapidly strike previously unidentified ornewly emerging targets. This capability includesplanning for and being able to perform "ad hoc" planningon newly identified targets and maintaining a pool offorces specifically reserved for striking previouslyunidentified targets. It is important to recognize thatsuccess in engaging emerging targets depends heavily uponthe speed with which they are identified, targeted, andstruck.

(8) Collateral Damage. US forces will limit collateraldamage consistent with employment purposes and desiredeffect on the target (see JSCP, Annex C, for a moredetailed discussion).

(9) Damage Criteria. Damage criteria are standardsidentifying specific levels of destruction or materieldamage required for a particular target category. Thesecriteria are normally levied on the executing commanderby higher authority, in accordance with national strategyand policy. These criteria vary for the intensity of thedamage and also vary by particular target category,class, or type. Commanders must estimate the number andcharacteristics of the weapons and delivery systems thatwill be needed to achieve the level of desired damage todesignated targets while minimizing undesirablecollateral effects. Damage criteria, based on the natureof the target (size, hardness, mobility) as well as itsproximity to military or nonmilitary assets, provide ameans by which to determine how

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best to strike particular targets and, following theattack, to evaluate whether the target or target setsreceived the amount of damage required to meetoperational objectives.

4. Operations in a WMD Environment

a. WMD Effects. The immediate and prolonged effects ofWMD--including blast, thermal radiation, prompt (gamma andneutron) and residual radiation--pose unprecedented physicaland psychological problems for combat forces and noncombatantpopulations alike. Not only must US forces be prepared tosurvive and perhaps, operate in a WMD environment for longperiods of time, but they must have effective, sustained C4Ito accomplish their missions. Military planners must contendwith significant challenges in a WMD environment. Whenplanning operations in such an environment, planners shouldrefer to authoritative documents detailing WMD effectspublished by the Department of Defense, Department of Energy,or qualified scientific authority and incorporate mitigatingor avoidance measures into operational planning.

b. Mitigation Efforts. Mitigation of WMD effects, and atleast partial preservation of the operational and functionalcapabilities of people and equipment, requires the followingspecific actions be taken by commanders:

(1) Plan in advance and warn personnel. Planning andwarning, in conjunction with systematic, precautionarysurvivability measures (such as dispersal of vital combatand support assets, increased force mobility,concealment, deception, individual protective measures,and nuclear hardening) can reduce the physical andpsychological trauma.

(2) Partially offset long-term degradation ofeffectiveness produced by nuclear, biological, andchemical warfare through comprehensive force training,preconditioning, and protection.

(3) Establish and carefully assess operating proceduresto avoid disproportionate or unacceptable loss ofpersonnel, units, or equipment and to ensure continuityof operations during the initial and subsequent phases ofa conflict involving WMD.

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INTEGRATED OPERATIONS

1. Strategic Force Integration

a. Effective Integration. To effectively integrate nuclearoperations into a coherent whole is a fundamental nationalrequirement: the most efficient use of available resourcesto ensure national security. By eliminating duplicate targetcoverages and ensuring optimal tasking and synchronization ofUS nuclear forces prior to and during conflict or war throughsystematic and thorough coordination of mission planning,commanders can promote economy of effort.

b. Integrated Operational Planning. An integratedoperational plan, or a series of sequential plans, predicatedon commonly agreed strategic objectives, is an absoluteprerequisite to unity and, hence, economy of effort. Clarityof joint operational guidance as well as a commonappreciation of its fundamental objectives are vitalprerequisites to a more effective identification,prioritization, and assignment of targets, and thedeconfliction of their associated means of coverage.

c. Global Force Integration. United States StrategicCommand accomplishes detailed analyses of weapons effects andtargeting systems and optimizes weapons application. Thesetargeting functions include deconflicting nuclear operationsby time, space, and geography.

(1) Integration of aircraft forces should beaccomplished for the employment of nuclear weapons insupport of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)and theater nuclear options. Aircraft and air-launchedmissile planning factors should be developed to includepre-launch survivability, probability to penetrate,weapons systems reliability, circular error probable,weapon system performance characteristics, and sortieseparation criteria.

(2) ICBMs or SLBMs should be employed based on ananalysis of weapon-system characteristics, capabilities,and limitations. ICBM or SLBM pre-launch survivabilityand probability to penetrate planning factors must alsobe developed. Analyzing the effects of nuclearenvironments before and during launch, in powered andballistic flight, and during reentry is essential.Equally important is consideration of the effect of enemydefense capabilities and limitations.

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(3) Strategic nuclear forces may also be used to targetand hold regional targets at risk.

2. Nonstrategic Nuclear Force Integration

a. General. The employment of NSNF such as dual-capableaircraft and nuclear TOMAHAWK land-attack missiles is boundby the same nuclear policy constraints as strategic nuclearforces. Approval for their use rests with the President.Weapons and systems may be deployed into theaters, but localcommanders have no authority to employ them until it isspecifically granted. NCA control and constraint of NSNFweapons has seven elements:

(1) A decision to use nuclear weapons.

(2) The number, type, and yields of weapons.

(3) Types of targets to be attacked.

(4) Geographical area for employment.

(5) Timing and duration of employment.

(6) Damage constraints.

(7) Target analysis.

Treaties and agreements between the United States and itsallies may impose additional restrictions on the use ofnuclear weapons (refer to Appendix A). Host-nationgovernments have legitimate interests and affect whatotherwise could be prudent unilateral operations. Commandand coordination chains may become complex and lengthy.Specific consultation and coordination procedures are statedin treaties or should be developed by specific agreementsprior to deployment of nuclear forces into a theater.

b. Theater Nuclear Posture. Nuclear forces deployed to ortasked to support theater nuclear requirements linkconventional forces to the full nuclear capability of the US.This linkage must be strong and visible to the extent ofbeing capable of deterring a potential enemy from believingpolitical and/or military advantage can be achieved by meansof threats to employ nuclear, biological, or chemical weaponsor by the threatened or actual execution of an all-outconventional offensive. Specific conditions for employmentare provided in Annex C to JSCP.

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c. NSNF Employment. In the event of a deterioratingmilitary situation, employment of NSNF weapons must becapable of favorably altering the operational situation tothe advantage of the user. Otherwise, the risks of usingnuclear weapons might outweigh any conceivable advantage.Complete destruction of enemy forces is not necessarilyrequired to achieve the desired objective; rather,containment and a demonstrated will to employ additionalnuclear firepower toward a specific goal is the preferredmethod. Employment of weapons and yields must be kept at thelowest level possible to reduce the possibility that theenemy will in turn escalate the conflict.

d. Employment Options. NSNF employment options define thetype and number of weapons as well as the employment area.Options can range from the selective employment of a limitednumber of nuclear weapons against a carefully constrainedpreplanned or emerging target set to a general laydown ofweapons against a larger and/or more diverse set of targets.An option or portion of an option can be be used to send asignal. Such an option should be very restrictive, withtight limits on area and time so that the adversary willrecognize the "signal" and not simply assume that we havemoved to general nuclear war.

e. Planning and Coordination

(1) The employment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons isconstrained, both politically and militarily, to agreater degree than employment of conventional weapons.High-level political and military decisions, treaties,and agreements dealing with employment of nuclear weaponswill continue to cause the evolution of nuclear weaponemployment doctrine. However, advance planning andcoordination must be part of employment.

(2) Theater combatant commanders are responsible fordefining theater objectives, selecting targets, anddeveloping plans required to support those objectives.Detailed mission planning, when required, is generallyaccomplished at the theater combatant commander level,with USSTRATCOM assistance where appropriate. Combatantcommanders may also be tasked to develop adaptivelyplanned options to strike previously unidentifiedtargets. Because the strike is meant to be decisive, ittakes precedence over other missions.

(3) After conflict occurs, combatant commanders may alsobe tasked to develop adaptively planned options to striketargets not previously identified. Nuclear

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weapons planning is continuous and is fully integratedwith planning for conventional weapons. Each commanderwith a nuclear planning capability identifies andrequests authorization to strike any targets necessary toaccomplish his mission. Individual nuclear targetrequests are further refined, approved, or disapprovedand combined at each command echelon into an option orsub-option. Ad hoc planning can also use preplannedoptions as starting points and modify the preplannedoption or sub-option given the situation actuallyexperienced. When recommendations from combatantcommanders and the situation result in a Presidentialdecision to escalate the conflict to employment ofnuclear weapons, specific guidance, including targetidentification, refinement, and constraints, along withselected number of weapons are released to the theatercombatant commander for employment. If the decision isto disapprove escalation or employment of nuclearweapons, the planned strikes may be retained as a basisfor further target planning or for strike by otherweapons.

(4) Joint nuclear operations are planned, coordinated,and controlled by the combatant commander. Componentcommanders also plan and coordinate execution of theirportions of the joint operation. The possibility thatconventional theater operations may escalate to use ofnuclear weapons within the theater must be a key planningconsideration. Planning should consider enemycapabilities and intentions and the vulnerability of USforces to those capabilities. Planning should alsoencompass recommendations for response to an enemy firstuse of any weapon of mass destruction, a battlefieldasymmetry, or an operational-level situation offeringpotential for conflict termination.

(5) The planning and coordination of multinationalmilitary operations is extremely complex, owing todifferences in tactical and operational doctrine and thediversity of kinds of combat and combat support systemsemployed by the various national forces. Nuclearoperations will compound the complexity inherent incoalition operations. Standard combined nuclearoperational procedures and terminology, organization ofliaison teams, and combined training must be developedand its use encouraged. Commanders must anticipate thatcombined NSNF operations will prove difficult to plan,coordinate, and execute but must be prepared to carry outthese operations as directed by the NCA.

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(6) Theater-level combined and joint planning of nuclearresources must include consideration and evaluation ofcertain basic parameters:

(a) The quantity of nuclear weapons available (NSNFgeneration and reconstitution capabilities of theServices), characteristics of these weapons, and thedelivery requirements to place them over approvedtargets at the correct time.

(b) The trade-off considerations on selection ofdelivery systems for nuclear weapons for specifictargets; i.e., flexibility, mobility, missionsurvivability, availability, and competing missionrequirements.

(c) Weapons and delivery systems that should bekept in reserve.

(d) The expected survivability and vulnerability ofremaining and reserve assets.

(e) Deconfliction criteria and measures to preventor reduce fratricide.

(f) Collateral damage restrictions consistent withtarget damage criteria.

(g) The magnitude and nature of follow-onconventional, nuclear, or mixed operations.

(h) The expected retaliation--conventional,nuclear, biological, or chemical.

(7) Basic employment considerations are closely tied tothe capabilities of assigned nuclear weapons systems(assigned forces are those weapons, delivery systems, andsupporting systems under the combatant command (commandauthority) of the combatant commander). Dual-capableaircraft can strike a variety of targets in the battlearea as well as deep targets. Sea- and air-launchedcruise missiles also provide the capability for nuclearstrikes against targets of known location.

f. Command and Control. The combatant commander has thepivotal role in deciding how best to employ NSNF resources.For the combatant commander, the key element in C2 is timing.The pace of modern war dictates streamlined and efficientmethods of C2. To facilitate timely decisionmaking, eitherin response to a combatant commander request

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or to support a "top-down" release, the NCA must have themost current and available situation information andintelligence and must be familiar with the commander’s plansand options. Top-down communication does not mean the NCAshould directly target nuclear weapons or conduct apiecemeal, weapon-by-weapon release. Top-down communicationsensure critical orders are received for execution and canalso be helpful in reducing survivability and vulnerabilityproblems of C4I systems.

3. Offense-Defense Integration

a. General. Offensive and defensive forces should beintegrated to ensure interoperability. For integration to besuccessful, offensive and defensive forces should bedoctrinally and procedurally linked. Defensive systemsinclude space warning and defense capabilies, air defensewarning and interceptors, ballistic-missile defense warning,and a worldwide Integrated Tactical Warning and AttackAssessment (ITW/AA) system. These systems, coupled withadditional passive defense measures, offer a damagelimitation potential to US warfighting capabilities. Activetheater ballistic-missile defense interception capabilitiesadd an additional dimension to defense capability. Defensiveforces can directly support offensive forces in fiveimportant areas.

(1) In a strategic application, strategic defensivesystems offer the potential of improving US deterrentposture by increasing the enemy’s uncertainty ofachieving its attack objectives.

(2) In regional conflicts, missile defense offersprotection against potential adversaries acquiringballistic-missile technology. Although offense isnecessary for retaliation and conflict control, defensemay also play an important, complementary role innonstrategic applications (e.g., irrational actorscenarios).

(3) In a synergistic application, defenses allow aregional commander to consider employing offensivecounterforce strikes on the enemy, while enjoying somesense of security from catastrophic results if the enemylaunches under attack.

(4) Early warning forces include an integrated tacticalwarning and assessment capability, providing the NCA withenough warning to maximize the survivability of US

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and allied forces. Deterrence is, therefore, enhancedbecause of the increased survivability of US retaliatoryforce.

(5) Air defenses against an air breathing threat alsoserve to enhance our deterrent capabilities by increasingthe enemy’s uncertainty that weapon systems will arriveat their targets.

b. Integration. Considerations include flight corridors;land, air, and sea forces; impact point prediction (IPP)information; priority of defended assets and enemy targets;decision timelines; employment concepts; and C4I linkages ofthe offensive and defensive forces.

(1) Flight Corridors. When strategic offensive nuclearforces launch, ballistic missiles and aircraft could bein the same flight corridors simultaneously.Blue-on-blue engagements over the friendly territorycould affect both strategic aircraft and ICBM flyout.Commanders should create and ensure strict adherence toflight plans through corridors that avoid potential enemylaunch sites and defense intercept areas. This planningshould include using alternate landing sites (in case theprimary runway is under attack during the return flight)and (when friendly defenses are active) immediatelyidentifying and transmitting ingress and egress routes.These routes should avoid areas scanned by defenses toreduce potential execution against friendly aircraft.

(2) Land, Air, and Sea Forces. The employment of land,air, and sea forces into or through an area that has ahigh probability of having enemy nuclear warheads ornuclear delivery systems must be avoided to the maximumextent practical. These areas may be high-prioritytargets and, therefore, have the greatest potential fornuclear detonations (NUDETs), as the result of attackoperations or defensive intercepts.

(3) Utilize Impact Point Prediction Information. Groundand space systems can provide the commandernear-real-time IPP information following the launch ofenemy missiles. Dependent on the location of forces, thecommander can use the IPP data to move threatened forcesor other targets, execute intercept of enemy missiles, orallow a missile to reach its predicted impact point whenit is expected to detonate in a nonthreatening area(e.g., desolate, uninhabited land or waters).

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(4) Defended Assets and Enemy Targets. A priority listfor defended assets and enemy targets must be maintained.This list should help commanders in their decisionprocess for employment of forces as resources are reducedover time in a conflict including execution of passiveprotection measures. (Based on these priorities, activedefenses should be deployed near the highest priorityresources to maintain effective execution of offensiveforces). Priority lists for defended assets shouldinclude protection of C4 nodes, supply points, andpopulation centers.

(5) Decision Timelines. The decisionmaker may berequired to review and select defensive and offensiveactions within severely compressed timelines.Consideration must be given to procedures and equipmentallowing informed decisions in this environment.Predelegated defensive engagement authority should beconsidered under certain conditions to permit efficientengagement of ballistic-missile threats. The commandermust evaluate the situation, weigh the options, andexecute the optimum offense-defense force in a relativelyshort period of time. The time is limited because of therelatively short flight time of tactical missiles (TM)and potential increased uncertainty of mobile offensiveforce target locations. Deployment of air defensesagainst an air-breathing threat should be accomplishedearly enough to send an unmistakable signal of NCAconcern and resolve, thereby maximizing the deterrentpotential of these forces.

(6) Employment Concepts

(a) Command. Normally, unity of command is greatlydesired. However, strategic offense or defenseintegration may be a case where the United Statesmust promote integrated operations without requiringabsolute unity of command. Very short timelinesimpact decisions that must be made. In a matter ofseconds for the defense, and minutes for theoffense, critical decisions must be made in concertwith discussions with the NCA. It may be beyond thecapability of one commander to do this for bothstrategic offensive and strategic defensive forces.However, force commonalities must be considered andconflicts avoided. Nevertheless, the joint forcecommander should have access to near-real-timetradeoff analysis when considering the execution ofany forces.

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(b) Independent Operations. Independent operationsshould be employed to maximize the output of theoffense and defense. Under situations where theoffense and defense are not utilizing the sameflight corridors or airspace, independent operationswill allow both forces freedom to execute operationswithout restriction.

(7) C4I linkages. C4I linkages assets may be shared byboth offense and defense to acquire information and getthe execution orders to the forces. The offense anddefense C4I nodes should maintain survivable (robust andredundant) communications with each other and be able tooperate independently if enemy attacks eliminateindividual nodes (for this reason, collocation of offenseand defense nodes should be avoided). In addition toproviding warning of a nuclear attack and the datanecessary to initiate a defensive response, defensive C4Isystems also provide valuable information to update theoffensive commander regarding counterforce targetingoptions. C4I systems and processing nodes:Near-real-time data receipt and processing will benecessary to target the TM threats and their launchers(for counterforce actions). Adequate surveillancesystems and associated C4I systems are required toprovide timely warning of a bomber or cruise missile andballistic-missile attack. Certain processing nodes willbe required to analyze the proper intercept locations oflaunched enemy TMs and provide tradeoff information tothe decisionmaker if deconfliction is required betweenoffensive and defensive forces.

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APPENDIX A

TREATY OBLIGATIONS

1. Outer Space Treaty. Prohibits the placement, installation,or stationing of nuclear weapons in orbit around the earth, inouter space, or on celestial bodies. Suborbital nuclear missilesare not prohibited by this treaty. Withdrawal provision (ArticleXVI) requires 1 year prior written notice.*

2. Seabed Arms Control Treaty. Prohibits placement of nuclearweapons (nuclear launching devices, storage or testingfacilities) on the ocean floor beyond a 12-nautical-mile coastalzone measured from the baseline of the territorial sea, asstated in the Convention of the Territorial Sea and theContiguous Zone of 1958. Withdrawal provision (Article VIII)requires 3 months advance notice.*

3. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Prohibits testing of nuclearweapons in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater (includingterritorial water or high seas). Restricts underground testingto the extent that radioactive debris would pass outside thetesting state. Withdrawal provision (Article IV) requires 3months advance notice.*

4. Nonproliferation Treaty. Prohibits nuclear states frompassing nuclear weapons, weapons technology, and weapons gradefissionable material to nonnuclear states. Transfer offissionable material to nonnuclear states for peaceful purposesis subject to safeguards to prevent diversion of the materialinto weapons development. Withdrawal provision (Article X)requires 3 months advance notice.*

5. Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.This treaty and its protocols essentially make Latin America anuclear-free zone. The United States is not a party to theoriginal treaty and ratified the Protocols subject to"understandings and declarations." Withdrawal provisions inProtocol I, Article 2, and Protocol II, Article 4, incorporatethe denunciation provision in Article XXX of the original treaty.*

6. Antarctic Treaty. Prohibits establishment of military bases,fortifications, maneuver, any testing of any type of weapons,including nuclear, or disposal of nuclear wastes in Antarctica.Limited withdrawal provision (Article XII) requires 2 years notice.*

7. Bilateral Nuclear Arms Control Agreements. The United Statesand the former Soviet Union have concluded a number of bilateralagreements designed to restrain the development ofnuclear

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warheads and launchers and to lessen the danger of miscalculationthat could trigger nuclear conflict. Among these agreements arethe:

a. Direct Communication MOU of 1963.

b. Direct Communication Agreement of 1971.

c. Accidents Measures Agreement of 1971.

d. 1973 Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War.

e. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 and its Protocolof 1974.

f. Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974.

g. 1976 Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.

h. Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) Agreement of 1973and 1977 (SALT I, Interim Agreement has expired; SALT IIwas never ratified).

i. Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987.

j. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Agreement:Signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev on 31 July 1991;agreement awaits full ratification and entry into force.

Additionally, some US military basing rights agreements restrictthe storage or installation of nuclear weapons in the hostcountry.

_________________* Withdrawal provisions of the identified agreements permit a

state to denounce its treaty obligations if it decides thatextraordinary events, related to the subject matter of anytreaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of the state.In time of conflict, or impending conflict, a state party tothese treaties may take steps to begin the withdrawalprocess.

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APPENDIX B

USERS EVALUATION REPORTON JOINT PUB 3-12

1. Users in the field are highly encouraged to directlysubmit comments on this pub. Please fill out and send in thefollowing: Users’ POC, unit address, and phone (DSN) number.

2. Content

a. Does the pub provide a conceptual framework for thetopic?

b. Is the information provided accurate? What needs tobe updated?

c. Is the information provided useful? If not, how canit be improved?

d. Is this pub consistent with other joint pubs?

e. Can this pub be better organized for the bestunderstanding of the doctrine and/or JTTP? How?

3. Writing and Appearance

a. Where does the pub need some revision to make thewriting clear and concise? What words would you use?

b. Are the charts and figures clear and understandable?How would you revise them?

4. Recommended urgent change(s) (if any).

5. Other

6. Please fold and mail comments to the Joint Doctrine Center(additional pages may be attached if desired) or FAX to DSN564-3990 or COMM (804) 444-3990.

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(FOLD)--------------------------------------------------------------

FROM:

THE JOINT DOCTRINE CENTERBLDG R-52

1283 CV Towway RoadNorfolk, VA 23511-2491

--------------------------------------------------------------(FOLD)

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GLOSSARY

PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BMD ballistic missile defense

C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and

computersC4I command, control, communications, computers,

and intelligence

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missileIPP impact point predictionITW/AA integrated tactical warning/attack

assessment

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

NCA National Command AuthoritiesNSNF nonstrategic nuclear forcesNUDET nuclear detonation

SIOP Single Integrated Operational PlanSLBM sea-launched ballistic missile

TM tactical missile

USSTRATCOM US Strategic Command

WMD weapons of mass destruction

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GLOSSARY

Part II--TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

command, control, communications, and computer systems.Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizationalstructures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communicationsdesigned to support a commander’s exercise of command andcontrol, through all phases of the operational continuum. Alsocalled C4 systems. (Joint Pub 1-02)

conflict. An armed struggle or clash between organized partieswithin a nation or between nations in order to achieve limitedpolitical or military objectives. While regular forces are ofteninvolved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict isoften protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, andconstrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within thisstate, military power in response to threats may be exercised inan indirect manner while supportive of other elements of nationalpower. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused,and direct application of force. (Identified in Joint Test Pub3-0 as a term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02.)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to theUnited States, its territories, citizens, military forces, andpossessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and createsa condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or militaryimportance that commitment of US military forces and resources iscontemplated to achieve national objectives. (Identified inJoint Test Pub 3-0 as a term and definition for Joint Pub 1-02.)

residual forces. Unexpended portions of the remaining UnitedStates forces that have an immediate combat potential forcontinued military operations, and that have been deliberatelywithheld from utilization. (Joint Pub 1-02)

withhold (nuclear). The limiting of authority to employ nuclearweapons by denying their use within specified geographical areasor certain countries. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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