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Journal of Strategic Affairs
SSII Journal Summer 2018
Volume III, Issue No. 1
Editorial Board
Director General : Dr. Shireen Mazari
Members : Amina Afzal
Muhammad Shoaib
Publication Officer : Muhammad Adnan
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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE ISLAMABAD
Vol. III Summer 2018 Number 1
Page
Comment
Kashmir: A Potential Blueprint for Conflict Resolution
Dr.Shireen M Mazari 1
The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review: Global and Regional
Security
Ambassador (Retd)Munir Akram 11
Articles
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
Muhammad Shoaib 21
Changing Nature of the Communist Party of China
M. Abdul Qadeer 53
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
Moiz Khan 70
Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications
for Pakistan
Kashif Hussain 101
Book Review
Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments
Amina Afzal 124
1
Kashmir: A Potential Blueprint for Conflict
Resolution
Dr. Shireen M Mazari
The Kashmir conflict has once again come centre stage
in the aftermath of the continuing Indian violence being
perpetrated by the Occupying security forces against
unarmed Kashmiris. This time it is a UN body that has
finally taken the initiative with the publication of the
first ever Report by the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
released on 14 June 2018. Unfortunately the previous
Pakistan government (PMLN) and the present Caretaker
set up failed to move proactively on Kashmir in the
wake of this Report – reflecting a serious lapse in
responsible foreign policy. All that Pakistan did was
meekly welcome the Report even as India was
vehemently criticising it. The Report is a credible
account of the Human Rights situation that prevails on
both sides of Kashmir and is a first step, since the UNSC
resolutions, of the UN recognising its responsibility to
resolve the Kashmir issue in accordance with said
resolutions.
The Report should have formed the basis for proactive
diplomacy on the part of Pakistan in global capitals and
international forums from the UN to the OIC beginning
with an immediate invitation to the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) to send in
his team for assessing the situation on the ground in
AJK. Pakistan should have done it when the report was
being drafted, instead of indulging in the usual “we will
if India will” approach, as it would have shown
Pakistan’s good intentions. There are times in diplomacy
when it is more advantageous to adopt a “we will do it
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2
because we think its right regardless of what India does”
approach.
Anyhow, beyond the invitation to the UNHCHR and
taking advantage of the OHCHR’s Report, Pakistan
should have moved proactively on the following and
should still do so:
One: Drawn attention on all international forums,
including INGOs dealing with human rights as well as
legal forums, to the human rights violations by India in
IOK as identified in the Report which are in violation of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary
International Humanitarian Law.
Two: With the Report refreshing the memory of the
international community on Kashmir, Pakistan should
have reaffirmed at all forums the continuing legitimacy
of the Kashmiris struggle for self determination. It seems
Pakistan’s hidebound decision makers are not aware that
even after 9/11, the principle of self-determination has
been recognised as distinct from terrorism – the Almaty
Declaration of 4 June 2002 reaffirmed its commitment to
the right of self-determination for people remaining
under foreign occupation (II:15). This Declaration was
adopted by the Heads of State/Government of Member
States of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence
Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Both Pakistan and
India are parties to this Declaration. Not only does the
Declaration reaffirm the principle of self-determination,
it emphasises that this principle must be exercised “in
accordance with the UN Charter and international law”.
Non-fulfillment of this will pose a threat “to regional
and international peace”. For Pakistan, what could have
been a clearer reaffirmation of its position on the
Kashmir dispute?
Comment
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Pakistan should also not be hesitant in reiterating the
UNSC resolutions on Kashmir and stating their linkage
to similar UNSC resolutions on East Timor (UNSC
Resolution 384 of December 1975 and UNSC
Resolution 389 of 1976), which were enforced in 1999
leading to East Timor’s independence from Indonesia
through a UN-conducted plebiscite. It was not that
Indonesia wanted this but it was pressured, especially by
the US, into conceding to the plebiscite. While the
struggle against Indonesian occupation was going on by
the East Timorese, their leaders, Jose Ramos-Horta and
Bishop Carlos Ximenes, were awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize in 1996. It is crucial to remind the world of the
parallels between Kashmir and East Timor at all
diplomatic forums including bilaterally by our diplomats
in the countries they are serving in. Unfortunately our
state and successive governments have chosen to remain
ignorant on this linkage.
In fact, the case of the Kashmiris before the UN is even
stronger because the occupying power itself took the
dispute to the UN under Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement
of Disputes. So both Pakistan and India agreed to have
UN intervention and to the plebiscite.
Three: In the wake of the Report, Pakistan should have
immediately demanded the UNSC insist on the return of
UNMOGIP and other independent observers into IOK.
Four: Most important, this was the time for the
government to present a blueprint for conflict resolution
premised upon the principle of self-determination and a
plebiscite. At the end of the day, Pakistan cannot simply
continue to pay lip service to UNSC resolutions and the
principle of self-determination. Nor can it move away
from the UNSC framework on which its legitimacy as a
party to the dispute rests. It is unfortunate that the State
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4
and successive governments have failed to work on a
proper blueprint for conflict resolution on the Kashmir
dispute within the framework of these resolutions and
the self-determination principle. The Musharraf four
points (which were never discussed or worked out in
detail before being made public) were a non-starter
because they failed to remain within this legal
framework. Other “backdoor” diplomacy solutions have
primarily rested on some sort of arrangement that seeks
to legitimise the LOC as the border – not realising that
the LOC is the problem and cannot become the solution.
Yet, there exist today a variety of conflict resolution
models that have been successfully enforced in different
parts of Europe where territorial disputes linked with the
issue of self-determination prevailed. There was a short
period a decade or so ago when the Europeans were even
advocating different European models as viable for the
settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
The Aland Island case
For many years Pakistanis visiting Sweden were cited
the case of the Aland Islands, which were part of the
territory ceded to Russia by Sweden in September 1809,
and they became part of the semi-autonomous Grand
Duchy of Finland. From 1917, the primarily Swedish-
descent residents of the Islands kept up efforts to have
the Islands ceded back to Sweden. A petition for
succession from Finland was signed by 96.2 % of
Aland’s native adults. Swedish nationalism grew as anti-
Swedish sentiment grew in Finland as a result Finland’s
own struggle to retain its autonomy in the face of
Russification. Finland was not prepared to cede the
Islands but was prepared to give them an autonomous
status instead of renewing them. The dispute was
brought before the League of Nations in 1921 and the
Comment
5
decision was to allow Finland to retain sovereignty over
the province but within this framework, the Aland
Islands were made an autonomous territory. So Finland
had to ensure that the Aland residents maintained the
Swedish language as well as their own culture and
heritage. Also, the Islands were to be given a neutral and
demilitarised status. Aland has its own flag, issues its
own postage stamps, has its own police force and is a
member of the Nordic Council. Having visited Aland in
1989, one saw the whole arrangement for oneself.
Obviously it works well for Sweden and Finland, but
how relevant is this example in the context of Kashmir.
The relevancy is simply not there. To begin with,
Kashmir was not ceded to India through a treaty between
Pakistan and India in the aftermath of a war.
Geographically, also, islands can be granted autonomy
and be demilitarised more rationally than land-locked
territories contiguous to both antagonists. Also, and most
importantly, the Kashmir issue is not a territorial dispute
but an issue of the right of self-determination for the
people of Kashmir – a right given to them by the
international community through UNSC resolutions. The
Aland solution would mean continuation of Indian
sovereignty over Kashmir – something the Kashmiris
have never accepted. The only relevancy of the Aland
Islands case is that it went before the League of Nations,
which offered a solution and both parties to the dispute
accepted the solution. India took the Kashmir issue to
the UNSC under Chapter VI of the Charter, relating to
Pacific Settlement of Disputes. This signified that India
accepted Kashmir as a dispute between itself and
Pakistan and sought a peaceful resolution through UN
intervention. It did not appeal to the UN under Chapter
VII, accusing Pakistan of aggression against Indian
“sovereign” territory. So the historical context of
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6
Kashmir and the prevailing dynamics make the Aland
Islands solution inapplicable in this region.
The Trieste case
In 1921 Italy had formally annexed parts of Austria-
Hungary that it had captured in World War I, including
the city of Trieste. The area’s population comprised
mainly Slovenians with some Croats and a large number
of Italians who lived mainly in the city itself. After
World War II the area was claimed by Yugoslavia,
mainly because the population outside the city of Trieste
was predominantly Slovenian. The Western powers
opposed this claim. Hence, the Free Territory of Trieste
was established after World War II in 1947, under the
protection of the UNSC, as a neutral state that comprised
the city of Trieste, a narrow strip of coastal territory
connecting it to Italy, Slovenia and Istria. However,
when the UNSC was unable to agree on a governor for
the Territory, Anglo- American forces occupied Zone A,
which comprised Italian-speaking city of Trieste and its
surrounding areas, while the Yugoslavs occupied Zone
B, which was the remainder of the Free Territory.
Tension between Italy and Yugoslavia continued till
1954 when a compromise solution was reached in the
Treaty of Osimo. The territory was formally divided
along the zone border and basically this amounted to a
partition of the Free Territory, which then ceased to
exist.
Again, this was primarily a historical territorial dispute
between two member states of the UN, so it is not
applicable to the Kashmir dispute. Also, a Trieste-type
solution basically means legitimisation of the existing
status quo and division of Kashmir – which would not
address the root cause of the problem: that of the right of
Comment
7
self-determination. Nor does the Trieste-type solution
allow for the option of a future referendum.
The Andorra case
This is a lesser-known case, but is extremely interesting
and may well have a greater relevance within the
Kashmir context. Andorra is located in the Pyrenees
Mountains on the French-Spanish border and is a
parliamentary co-principality comprising the Bishop of
Urgel (Spain) and the French President. This joint
suzerainty (but not sovereignty) of the French state and
the Spanish Bishops of Urgel has prevailed since 1278.
Andorra has closer ties to Spain with Catalan as its
official language and has, over the decades, become an
important tourist and winter sports destination as well as
a wealthy international financial centre because of its
banking facilities, low taxes and no customs duties. In
1993, a constitution was ratified and approved which
made Andorra a sovereign parliamentary democracy that
retained the “co-princes” as heads of state, but the head
of government retains executive power. It became a
member of the UN in 1993 as a sovereign state. The
“two princes” serve coequally with limited powers that
do not include veto over government acts. They are
represented in Andorra by a delegate. Defence of the
country is the responsibility of France and Spain and
Andorra has no currency of its own but uses that of its
two neighbours – which effectively now means a single
currency, the euro.
The Andorra model has a certain attraction, especially
for those who advocate the Independence option for a
united State of Jammu and Kashmir. It also offers India
a less unpalatable option than seeing the whole of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir becoming a part of
Pakistan – which would in all probability still be the
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8
outcome if a general plebiscite was held in that State.
But the stumbling block is on the issue of Independence
– which both Pakistan and India have not conceded to,
as this option is not part of the UNSC resolutions.
Interestingly, some Kashmiris are also now referring to
the Andorra model. It certainly needs greater
exploration, with alternatives to full sovereignty in the
form of UN trusteeship for a limited period, and so on.
The Good Friday Agreement (Northern Ireland)
The Good Friday Agreement, which resolved the
Northern Ireland conflict. This Agreement was plugged
actively by the US, which put pressure especially on the
UK, in order to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict.
This model has a direct relevance to the case of Kashmir
because it is premised on two interrelated principles.
One, it recognises “the legitimacy of whatever choice is
freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern
Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to
continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a
sovereign united Ireland” (that is going with the
Republic of Ireland). There is also a provision for a
periodic holding (every seven years) of a referendum in
case the people of Northern Ireland appear to change
their minds. Two, that deweaponisation will follow the
implementation of the settlement. Through this
Agreement, the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 was
repealed.
The Agreement is an international agreement between
the British and Irish governments with two components:
the legal agreement between the UK and the Republic of
Ireland; and a lengthier agreement signed between eight
political parties involved in the Northern Ireland conflict
and the two governments (UK and Irish). While the
Comment
9
agreement between the two governments is the actual
legal agreement, it incorporates, in its Schedules, the two
governments’ agreement with the eight political parties.
It is the principles underlying this settlement that are
extremely relevant to Kashmir and need to be the
starting point of any substantive solution relating to this
dispute. In fact, out of all the conflict resolution models,
this is the only one that is premised on the principle of
the right of self-determination and not merely territorial
control. Equally important Pakistan has to remember its
legitimacy as a party to the Kashmir dispute rests
entirely on UNSC resolutions so any solution, which
Pakistan puts forward, has to be within the UNSC
resolutions’ framework and that is premised on the
principle of self-determination.
It is unfathomable why the Pakistani State has failed to
move on this unless the assumption has been to simply
manage the conflict rather than resolve it. After all, in a
tunnel-vision approach, once Kashmir is resolved, both
the Pakistani and Indian States will have to revisit their
investments in the hostility paradigm. However many
critical issues remain fluid for Pakistan until the Kashmir
dispute is resolved – including the status of Gilgit
Baltistan (previously referred to as the Northern Areas)
and the international border between Pakistan and China.
In the 1963 Border Agreement between Pakistan and
China Article 6 clearly stated the following:
“The two parties have agreed that after the
settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan
and India, the sovereign authority concerned will
reopen negotiations with the Government of the
People's Republic of China on the boundary as
described in Article Two of the present agreement, so
as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the
present agreement, provided that in the event of the
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10
sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of
the present agreement and of the aforesaid protocol
shall be maintained in the formal boundary treaty to
be signed between the People’s Republic of China
and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”
These issues need to be resolved on a permanent basis so
that the state of Pakistan has legal clarity regarding its
borders and so that the ambivalence being maintained by
the state of Pakistan towards Gilgit Baltistan, causing
increasing unrest amongst the people there, can come to
an end.
11
The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review:
Global and Regional Security
Ambassador (Retd) Munir Akram *
The US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 2018 is an
important document. Its importance can be seen
from a comparison between this document and the
2010 review issued by the Obama Administration.
Whereas the 2010 review justified US nuclear
weapons retention and modernisation it was done in
the context of an effort or larger objective of
containing nuclear weapons, avoiding nuclear war
and promoting nonproliferation and arms control.
By contrast, the 2018 review issued by the Trump
Administration is a document which is a de-facto
justification for America’s nuclear rearmament and
the pursuit of an aggressive foreign and security
policy which justifies the endorsement the number
of weapons moderisation listed in the document. US
Defence Secretary, James Mattis has said that
competition between great powers, not terrorism, is
now the main focus of America’s national security.1
The statement is important even from the
perspective of Pakistan and our region because the
game has become global rather than local.
The document seeks to justify a number of policy
goals, and highlights the following: Firstly the
threat from Russia. It accuses Russia of having
violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
* Adapted from the author’s talk at the Pakistan Institute of
Parliamentary Services (PIPS) Islamabad.
Journal of Strategic Affairs
12
(INF) treaty; they are also accused of a doctrine that
envisages the use of low yield nuclear weapons;
they have also been accused of another doctrine
which envisages the first use of nuclear weapons
and the American posture is justified in response to
that policy.
An unstated fact is that Russia’s entire rearmament
process started because of two developments. The
first being the expansion of NATO. When the
Soviet Union collapsed there was an informal
understanding given to the Russians by the former
US Secretary of State, James Baker, that NATO
would not be expanded to the borders of new Russia
and especially that it would not include any of the
former Soviet Republics. However, NATO invited
almost everybody from Europe to join in except for
Russia and therefore it was quite clear that the
purpose of NATO and the posture of NATO is an
anti-Russia posture. This was the beginning of the
rationalisation for Russia’s rearmament. Secondly,
the US walked out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty and this was the other significant
development which led to Russian nuclear
rearmament. It was one of the most important arms
control treaties in history because it recognised that
the threat of the Mutual Assured Destruction
(MAD) doctrine would become less credible if there
was a credible Anti-Ballistic Missile system
(ABMs) in place and although systems had been
developed by both sides it was agreed that they
would be limited to one each, one system to protect
the command and control by the US and one system
to protect the command and control by the
Comment
13
Russians. Once that treaty was abrogated by the US,
the Russians obviously needed to rethink how
deterrence would be maintained.
Deterrence would be maintained by taking the more
expensive route of developing the comprehensive
ballistic missile defence system which the US had
developed. The US has got at least three systems in
place: the battle field systems, the theatre systems
and the strategic systems. The Russians decided to
limit themselves to the mid-range systems, i.e. the
S300 and S400 which are very good systems. The
US chose the more extreme route and is still trying
to perfect ballistic missile defence against ICBMs.
However, in order to maintain deterrence the
Russians had to multiply or re-multiply the number
of warheads that they maintain but they have not yet
breached the limits of the START treaty.
Nevertheless, the plan was to cut down nuclear
weapons to a very low level in the aftermath of the
end of the Cold War but this objective had to be
revised in light of the two developments that were
initiated by the US. So, the justification against the
Russian moderisation presented in this nuclear
posture review is very partial and one-sided
statement of the case, to say the least.
Secondly, the document justifies moderisation by a
reference to China’s nuclear developments. When
the cold war ended China had, by all estimates, 300
nuclear warheads as compared to approximately
22,000 plus that were maintained by the US and the
Soviet Union. To now argue that China has
expanded its nuclear forces and provides a
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14
justification for a US response is a little rich, to say
the least. Because China expanded from 300, it is
not known publicly as to how many nuclear
warheads China has and how many of these are
ICBMs or mid-range or short-range weapons but
certainly the numbers are nowhere close to 22,000
or even 4000 or so that are actively deployed by the
US and Russia today. So, I think the justification of
a US response to Chinese moderisation from 300 to
whatever… 500, 1000, 1200 is not a very credible
argument for the response that the US has
developed.
The NPR then targets two specific smaller powers.
One is North Korea and the other is Iran. I think the
nuclear posture review perhaps is a little behind the
curve as far as describing the situation of North
Korea because in subsequent to the writing to this
document the North Koreans have gone much far
ahead in testing their ICBM capabilities which now
pose a credible threat to the US. North Korea is
ahead of Pakistan as far as the capability for ICBMs
is concerned. It is a credible threat to the US
because even with ABMs the US can never be
certain that a nuclear missile fired by North Korea
would not get through, therefore, it is a much more
credible threat. But, who forced them? How did
North Korea actually come to this stage of
developing nuclear warheads and ICBMs? I think
people forget that in 1995-96 there was an
agreement by North Korea to scrap its graphite
reactor and then in 2000 at the behest of the Chinese
the 6-party talks started and they were making such
good progress that the North Koreans were ready to
Comment
15
scrap major parts of their nuclear programme.
However in 2002 the US imposed sanctions on
North Korea for completely unrelated reasons.
North Koreans abrogated the 6-party talks, walked
out of it and conducted nuclear explosions. The
reaction therefore was provoked on part of the US
imposing sanctions within a process that was
making progress.
The last country focused in the NPR is Iran. Here,
the justification provided for the Iranian threat is
even less credible than the justification against
Russia, China and North Korea because the Iranians
have agreed in the joint programme to freeze their
nuclear programme and give up the enriched
uranium, to limit the enrichment to a lower level at
least for 15 years. However, the US now feels 15
years is not enough and after 15 years the Iranians
will be free to do anything they want. The
understanding on which 15 years was agreed by the
P5+1 was that in 15 years the security issues which
may compel Iran to go down the nuclear route
would be resolved and that there would be no
further justification for Iran’s nuclear program. Of
course, that is now being questioned by Trump and
they want to re-open the whole issue and Trump has
now demanded from his European partners that they
must get from Iranians a commitment to indefinite
oprationality of the joint agreement and a freeze on
missile testing. Iranians have rejected both these
conditions.
So, these are the policy objectives for which the
NPR seeks to acquire endorsement from the
political system in Washington and from the
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16
international community. It also seeks endorsement
for a number of weapon systems that are justified
by these policy goals and policy recommendations.
In summary this implies a complete modernisation
and replacement of nuclear triad i.e. the land based,
sea based and air based systems. The sea based
Ohio Class Submarines are to be replaced
eventually by the Columbia Class submarines and
with new SLBMs and SLCMs which would be a
new development. The land based ICBMs are to be
replaced by new ICBMs in re-enforced 450 silos
and the air force with present fleet of 40 B-52s and
25 B-2s will be replaced by a larger fleet of the 2-
As and new missile systems including stand-off
missile systems with the B-52s. Nothing will be
scrapped and much will be modernized. The nuclear
force will be huge. The force which is below the
strategic range is, of course, under no constraint
except for the INF treaty so there are a numbers of
short range nuclear weapons that are in the
possession of US which would continue to be
oprationalised. These are the two goals of the
document.
So, what are the implications?
In my opinion there are five implications of the
NPR. First of all, obviously there is a new missile
and nuclear arms race that this will trigger and has
already triggered. This huge arms race would be
based on new technologies, using artificial
intelligence, autonomous weapons and all kinds of
new weapon systems. Secondly and because of the
variety and complexity of the weapon systems there
Comment
17
will be greater likelihood of the use of the nuclear
weapons and the likelihood of the use of non-
nuclear weapons. Thirdly, there will be greater
threat to both nuclear capable and to non-nuclear
weapon states. This would be a major detraction
from international obligations that have been
undertaken by the US and other five recognised
nuclear power states under resolution 255 of the
Security Council which provides negative security
guarantees to states which are parties to the NPT.
So, there will be at least theoretical strategic nuclear
threat to the non-nuclear states and especially
because the document states quite explicitly that the
US reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the
case of a strategic non-nuclear attack and this is a
clear violation of the resolution 255. Fourthly, and
this is being widely discussed that wars have
become more complex. People have been talking
about ‘hybrid wars’, the phrase was coined by a
Russian General some years ago but obviously the
two wars that are likely to take place are ‘complex
wars’, which could be fought at sub-conventional
levels with new technologies and with new
approaches so that the predictability of the outbreak
of conflicts and outcome of conflicts will both
become very uncertain thus complicating the task of
peace makers and the United Nations. There is also
the likelihood of more frequent preemptive and
preventive wars. These are now explicitly justified
in the doctrines that are coming out especially from
the US and Western Powers with regard to the need
for preventive wars, terrorism would take over
nuclear weapons or response to terrorist incidents.
And lastly for all those who have concluded the
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18
nuclear ban treaty, they are likely to be disappointed
because there is no time soon that nuclear weapons
are going away.
In the regional context obviously there is Russia,
China, North Korea and Iran all of which have been
spelled out in the document itself. The policy
towards Russia is most obvious. Regarding China
too it is clear what the US wants. China’s
containment would be at the technological level
because the number of their nuclear weapons is not
that high and recent decisions on US trade policy
are clear indications of the fact that there will be
constraints put on Chinese acquisition of US source
technology and that is the core of competition vis-à-
vis China.
On North Korea, Trump has agreed to the summit
with Kim Jong Un. The stakes are very high and
there is danger of coming back to square one if the
summit fails.
On Iran, I think the danger of miscalculation of
threats leading to a nuclear conflict is not so much
because of the nuclear dimension. The nuclear
dimension may provide a justification for what both
the US and Israel want i.e. to eliminate Iran’s
perpetuity to be an expansionist power. The
Iranians have now created a corridor between
Tehran and Lebanon which is directly threatening
the Israelis and these are facts on the ground which
are not going to be acceptable to the US for Israel
and therefore there is a great danger in the fact that
Comment
19
this particular situation could lead to the use of
force in the near future.
Fortunately for South Asia it is not mentioned
explicitly in the document, but it is covered in the
context of non-proliferation. It is also covered in
context of the American pre-occupation with what
the document refers to as the Asia Pacific region
and what is now being called the Indo Pacific
region. Change in wording is very significant for
Pakistan. We have to take into account that there is
a profoundly developed alliance between the US
and India and this alliance will have specific
implications for Pakistan. For Pakistan’s defence
posture, for India’s doctrines of limited war, threat
of limited conflict, Cold Start etc have not invited
any words of caution or criticism from the west. So,
we have to presume that these threats enjoy implicit
acceptance in Washington and some of the NATO
capitals because these have been used by the
Indians for their own regional objectives and have
been reinforced to some extent by statement issued
by the US. So, we have to be very careful in terms
of this alliance that is emerging. If seen together
with efforts which have been made to declare
Pakistan a sponsor of terrorism the threat then
transforms into a very real and dangerous scenario.
May be it is not wise to read too much into how it
will ultimately develop and where we are going
with this kind of scenario. Perhaps we are too much
into it, perhaps nobody is too foolish to take on a
nuclear weapon state such as Pakistan but of course
mistakes have been made in history and blunders
are possible. The record of behavior that we have
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20
seen and which is manifested in the NPR does not
provide much comfort that a blunder of such a
magnitude would not take place.
References
1. “Mattis: US National Security Focus no Longer
Terrorism,” BBC, January 19, 2018.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42752298
21
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
Muhammad Shoaib
Introduction
As the conflict in Syria becomes increasingly complex,
the country’s civil war has turned into a proxy war
battleground for major powers. The current conflict in
Syria presents a complex and unmanageable
humanitarian crisis, with severe human rights
violations.1 The Arab Uprising made its way to Syria on
January 26, 2011 and it became the starting point for the
ensuing unrest in the country. The Syrian regime
forcefully resisted the wave of public protests that were
demanding the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad. This created a new theatre whereby rebel groups
started emerging and taking control of Syrian territory.
The weakening of the Syrian state system and the
subsequent power vacuum encouraged Daesh (ISIS) to
infiltrate and take hold of much of the Syrian territory.
As the chaos unfolds, “unconstructive” foreign
interference continues to prolong the war further. The
proxy war in Syria is reminiscent of the Cold War period
where two camps were engaged in establishing their
dominance through indirect confrontations.2 Foreign
powers are once again supporting the warring parties
within Syria to serve their own national interests. The
US, Turkey and some Gulf states including Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates are allied with the US and are pushing for
Assad’s ouster. Although Turkey became part of
coalition air strikes against Daesh and other al Qaeda-
allied militants, differences over Kurds (YPG militia)3
have since taken over Turkey-US relations. Meanwhile
Russia and Iran are supporting the Assad regime.
Journal of Strategic Affairs
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Moscow maintains that it will continue its campaign
against militants and remain involved in Syria. Iran also
supports the Assad regime and remains involved in Syria
against the US-led coalition.
Even after several cessation-of-hostilities resolutions by
the United Nations Security Council, ceasefire
implementation in Syria remains fractured. It is also
unclear how efforts through the Geneva and Moscow
peace processes would manage the complexities and
help end the war. It is now believed that the conflict has
transformed into a global race for influence between the
US-NATO bloc and its Gulf allies and the Russia-led
counter-alliance camp. This great power competition in
Syria poses several questions that this study seeks to
answer. These include:
What are the interests of great powers in Syria? How are
these powers involved in Syria and what are their aims
and objectives? What are the implications of the great
powers’ involvement in the Syrian Crisis?
Although there are several actors involved in the Syrian
war, this study focuses on the interests and involvement
of US and Russia. Western perspective dominates most
of the available literature. Secondary sources of data
collection would be used, primarily from published
journals, books and newspaper articles, from both print
and online publications.
Background
On March 18, 2011, demonstrations broke out in the
southern Syrian city of Dar’a and in several other cities
and villages in the north of the country, including Hama
and Banyas.4 This outbreak indicated the arrival of the
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
23
‘Arab Spring’, which had already made its appearance in
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.5
Initially, the demonstrations in Syria were confined to
rural and peripheral areas.6 However, they soon spread
across the country. This can be attributed to the brutal
means employed by the Assad regime such as calling the
Army into action to repress the demonstrations.7 Within
a few weeks, the protests turned into a widespread
popular uprising against Bashar al-Assad’s government,
and ultimately, into an intense and indecisive civil war.
Owing to the involvement of some Sunni rebel groups,
the struggle in Syria took on an ethnic character, and
subsequently, a religious character as well. It became a
holy war for Islamic groups, some native to Syria and
others made up of Sunni volunteers who reached the
country from across the Arab and Muslim world. In their
view, they were fighting against the Alawites. Alawites
are a minority group accounting for a small percentage
of Syria’s population. The group is an offshoot of the
Shia sect of Islam and have ruled Syria for 40 years.
Alawites are allies of the Shiite camp in the Middle East,
comprising the Iranian state and the Hezbollah in
Lebanon.8
In April 2011, when the Syrian Army sent a column of
tanks to end the anti-government movement,9 the
situation escalated into a military conflict leading
ultimately to a civil war. The early insurgency phase
started in July 2011 and lasted until April 2012.10
This
period was characterised by the rise of armed opposition
militias and the beginning of an armed rebellion against
the Syrian regime. This period also saw the formation of
the Free Syrian Army (FSA), when some rebel officers
of the Armed Forces declared the establishment of an
organised opposition military force aimed at de-throning
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President Bashar al-Assad. Between 2012 and December
2013, the civil war intensified11
following the failure of
UN supported cease fire attempts. On June 12, 2012, the
UN officially declared that Syria was in a state of civil
war.
In April 2013, Syrian rebel factions, including Ahrar al
Sham12
and the Al-Nusra Front13
declared war on the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Daesh
which was gaining dominance in the Syrian war. The
militant group was carrying out indiscriminate killings
against regime forces and rebels. Although Daesh was
initially created in Iraq following the 2003 US
invasion.14
The civil war in Syria and the emerging
power vacuum there led to the infiltration of Daesh into
the country. Daesh sought to capture Syrian territories
and establish an Islamic Caliphate there.
In May 2015, Daesh took advantage of the Syrian Civil
War to conquer further large swathes of Syrian territory.
Different rebel groups were already fighting Daesh
where the group had established its bases. The fighting
intensified with the rise of several other Islamist forces
who were fighting against Daesh as well as each other.
By June 2016, following five years of fighting, the
number of people killed in the fighting had reached
almost half a million.15
About ten million Syrians,
approximately half of the country’s population, lost their
homes, and about eight million became refugees.16
Although this exodus was the direct result of the war of
extermination conducted by both sides, it can also be
attributed to the Syrian regime’s deliberate policy of
cleansing areas suspected of supporting the rebels.
The Syrian conflict led to the de facto dissolution of the
Syrian state into several different political entities: the
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
25
state of ISIS (Daesh), located in eastern Syria and
northern Iraq; the remains of the original Syrian state,
led by the Assad dynasty and enjoying Russian and
Iranian patronage, located in western Syria; the
autonomous Kurdish enclaves, located in the eastern and
northern parts of Syrian territory; and the enclaves held
in significant portions of northern and southern Syria by
rebel groups, headed by Fatah al-Sham Front (formerly,
the Support Front for the People of Syria, the al-Nusra
Front, or Jabhat al-Nusra), affiliated until late July 2016
with al-Qaeda.17
Interestingly, a June 2006 article titled “Blood Borders”
was published in the US Armed Forces Journal.18
Written by a retired US army officer Ralph Peters, the
article carried a new map of the Middle East. Peters had
predicted a collapse of the existing territorial boundaries
and a division of Arab Muslim states based on sectarian
and ethnic lines. The Blood Borders map divided Syria
into several entities. It also predicted the creation of a
‘Free Kurdistan’ combining parts of Iranian and Syrian
Kurdish majority areas. Blood Borders referred to Syria
as a loser state in the new Middle East with much of its
territory divided on the basis of ethnicity. Interestingly,
the contemporary situation in Syria conforms to the
same map of the new Middle East whereby chaos and
divisions among regional states is evident. In order to
analyse the external involvement in Syria and the
interests of major powers there, it is pertinent to
highlight the geopolitical and geostrategic significance
of the country.
Geostrategic and Geopolitical Significance of Syria
Syria is located at the crossroads of the Middle East,
Central Asia and South to Southeast Asia and, for these
regions, provides a vital transit hub and outlet to the
Journal of Strategic Affairs
26
Levant and Mediterranean waters.19
As discussed, from
an offensive-realist approach, great powers (the US and
Russia in this study) always seek opportunities to
acquire more power in order to feel more secure. Great
powers thus have an inherent tendency to maximise their
power. This theoretical analysis significantly describes
the post-9/11 behaviour of these powers, which conform
to the offensive-realist logic and exhibit their strategic
objective of attaining primacy in the post-Cold War
global order.20
Policy-makers have now started valuing
the political control of hydrocarbon export routes
beyond energy security. This means the political control
of such routes has implications for national security.
Therefore, the security of energy flows has now become
a matter of interest for states rather than being just a
corporate matter. As a result, the involvement of state
governments in the security of energy routes has
increased considerably.21
Therefore, to understand the
involvement of major powers in the Syrian conflict, a
discussion of the geopolitical importance of Syria is
necessary.
Examining the Syrian conflict at the macro-level,
especially in the realm of the impact of great powers on
security concepts, reveals that Syria has become the
victim of security and resource oriented international
competition.22
On the one hand, Syria remains critical to
the strategic stability of the region and, on the other, its
energy offerings bear substantial implications for the
finances and geopolitical advantage of external powers.23
In the first instance, Syria is relevant as a transit route
for arms shipments from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, a
major component of the ‘Shiite axis’ or ‘Shia crescent’.24
This strategic corridor stretching from the Middle East to
the Eurasian landmass doubles as a reverse pathway to
sea, with its so-called ‘door to the sea’ located in the
section of sea that lies east of the Mediterranean i.e. the
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
27
Syrian coastline.25
Regarding this, Syria offers Iran
military resilience, enhancing its responsiveness to
foreign assaults and air strikes.26
Whoever wields control
over Syria would thus be able to manipulate the Shia
axis’ ground supply route. Therefore, control over Syria
would determine Iran’s military responsiveness at any
given time.27
On the economic front, Syria has proven gas reserves of
284 billion cubic metres (bcm); oil reserves of 2.5 billion
barrels (bb); shale gas reserves of 50 billion tonnes
(bt);28
and usual outputs of 385,000 barrels per day
(b/d).29
The conflict saw an increase in oil and gas
production levels and the withdrawal of (foreign)
investors from the country’s energy sector. The EU,
which accounts for most of Syrian hydrocarbon sales,30
was unavoidably affected when shortages to European
refiners raised prices in its physical oil market.
Following the US sanctions on Syrian energy exports in
2011, the EU also imposed a ban on Syrian energy
exports. However, the sanctions imposed by the EU
were not as widely drawn as the US sanctions, because
of increased involvement of some EU companies in
Syria’s oil industry. Out of 385,000 barrels of oil
produced per day, Syria exported about 150,000 barrels
per day, of which most was being exported to European
countries, particularly the Netherlands, Italy, France and
Spain.31
This underscores the importance of Syrian
hydrocarbons for the energy needs of Europe and, by
extension, the world.32
Although the economic viability
of energy resources in Syrian surroundings is still being
debated, it assumes strategic significance based on
findings that proven and potential reserves can improve
the wider supply to international markets. Hence, the
international rivalries for control of Eurasian energy
resources extend to the geographic choke points and
waterways of the Syrian locale which, according to
Journal of Strategic Affairs
28
Jeffrey Mankoff, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow at
the CSIS, hold vast hydrocarbons crucial to the ever-
evolving global industrial economy.33
External Involvement
Owing to Syria’s geostrategic importance, the Syrian
Crisis is no longer an internal matter. It has become an
arena of regional and international struggle. In this
regard, Bashar al-Assad, as well as his rivals, were
influenced by the superpowers, primarily the US and
Russia, and regional powers including Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, Turkey, and Iran. This outside involvement only
exacerbated the crisis in Syria and led to the prolonged
conflict.
As the conflict unfolded, Daesh expanded its influence
and conquered more and more territory in the Middle
East. The group took advantage of the Syrian Civil War
to conquer Syrian territories in May 2015. Daesh wanted
to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region, thereby
exploiting the Islamic principles of governance in
justifying its territorial gains in Syria.34
These principles
envisage Jihad, a holy war, to bring the surrounding
political entity into compliance with Islam.35
This
concept led Daesh to fight for the creation of an Islamic
state or a caliphate in Syria and Iraq.
Similarly, the expansion of NATO also undermined the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. For
example, when Russia suddenly raided territories held
by Syrian opposition groups, it triggered a response from
NATO. A Russian warplane was shot down by the
Turkish Army (Turkey is a NATO member) on the
Syrian border on November 24, 2015 because the plane
had invaded Turkish airspace several times within five
minutes, so they shot it down.36
NATO continued to
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
29
strengthen and enlarge its Response Force.37
Six new
command centres were built to plan military strategies
and facilitate military exercises. Peace activists warned
against NATO’s increasing involvement in the conflict.
Sharat G. Lin, President of the San Jose Peace and
Justice Centre said, “The main thing to understand is that
no matter what the conflict is in Syria – and there are
many factions – this is something that the Syrian people
will have to solve on their own,”38
In other words,
Intervention in Syria by NATO or Great Powers might
probably further destabilise Syria.
Expansion of the NATO, invasion of Daesh and the
intervention of Great Powers worsened the original civil
war in Syria. In February 2012, Russia and China vetoed
the Western-backed Arab Resolution at the UN Security
Council, which was a plan calling on President Bashar
al-Assad to resign. The US was angered by their vetoes
and blamed these countries for protecting Bashar al-
Assad. Russia and China actually acted in self-interest:
Russia intended to preserve its influence in the region
through its military ties with Syria.39
An original conflict between Syrian opposition groups
and the Syrian government changed to a civil war and
finally escalated into a global conflict. Western
intervention undermined the internal sovereignty of
Syria. Sovereignty, by definition, is the supreme power
or authority of a state to govern itself or another state.40
In other words, one will not have power over another
one. There are two types of sovereignty. Internal
sovereignty implies every state can act as it wishes and
independent of other powers within its own territory;
External sovereignty implies all states are legally equal
and no legitimate authority can tell a state what to do.
This fundamental principle of international relations can
Journal of Strategic Affairs
30
be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia following the
Thirty Year’s War.
Since great powers always seek opportunities to attain
more power in order to feel more secure,41
this
perspective exhibits the changing nature of the Middle
East where there is a rivalry between camps led by the
US and Russia, working to resolve regional crises. These
camps are also engaged in a competition over the result
of the settlement that would eventually be reached. The
powers involved are also struggling to get a share in the
emerging leadership and economic opportunities that
have arisen in the region. Consequently, geopolitical
realism and perceptions of security dilemmas shape
much of their actions and permit the crisis to define the
dynamics of global stability more negatively.
The intensification of external involvement whereby no
single armed group exists without an international
connection has seen scholars and analysts reconsider the
roles of intervening global powers which they believe
collide head-on. According to David Hartwell, Middle
East analyst at IHS Jane’s, the intervening powers have
simply made matters worse.42
Foreign powers in support
of the warring parties, the US and some Gulf states
pushing for Assad’s ouster, and Russia and Iran backing
his rule, continue to defend their unmentioned national
interests. The ongoing violence has seen Daesh overrun
vast territory whereby it has committed bloodshed
against local ethnic and religious minorities, moderate
Sunnis, and hostages from various Western countries.43
The capability of terrorist groups to inflict severe
damage to major powers and their forces, brought fears
about the country becoming a refuge for extremist
groupings and reinforced the basis for external military
support.44
Great powers’ involvement in the Syrian
conflict, both militarily and politically serves their
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
31
individual geostrategic and geopolitical interests in the
region.
US Interests and its Involvement in the Syrian
Civil War
The Middle East was largely overlooked in US foreign
policy until the mid-20th century when President
Roosevelt declared in 1941 that “the defence” of the
“Middle East” was integral for the defence of the US.45
This was mainly due to Saudi Arabia’s developing
relations with the US, specifically American oil
companies’ interest in exploiting the enormous oil
reserves of the Kingdom.46
Therefore, Roosevelt became
interested in the Middle East because of oil. As the
Second World War burned oil at a massive rate, the
President wanted to ensure American access to as much
as possible.
In the wake of World War II, the Soviet Union began to
look south and, in August 1957, in response to an
accusation by the Syrian government that the US had
sponsored an attempt to overthrow it, US Ambassador
Loy W. Henderson was sent to Syria. Upon his return,
Henderson wrote a report stating his concern that Syria
would fall victim to “international communism”.47
Soviet designs in the region continued to worry
Washington and it was President Nixon’s stance that
“the US would view any effort by the Soviet Union to
seek predominance in the Middle East as a matter of
grave concern”.48
The hostile relationship between
Washington and Damascus was historically caused by
the Syrian government’s support of the US’ opponents,
whether in the Arab-Israeli conflict, during the Cold War
or the more recent “war on terrorism”.
Journal of Strategic Affairs
32
US-Syria relations in the aftermath of the Second World
War were shaped by the politics of the Arab-Israeli
conflict and the Cold War.49
After 9/11, the US intended
to ally with Syria in its war on terror. Syria’s long-
standing hostility toward Saddam Hussein, US-Syrian
cooperation against al-Qaeda and the Bush
Administration’s opposition to a congressional bill
placing sanctions on Syria at the end of 2002 reflected a
relatively stable US-Syria relationship.50
However, Hezbollah activities, from 2002 and 2003, on
the Israeli border created tension between Syria and the
US.51
Following his ascendance to power, Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad was rather interested in
reform related to economic liberalisation and
establishing contacts with groups accused of terrorism
such as Hezbollah and Hamas. The groups were
considered a deterrent against potential American or
Israeli attacks against either Iran or Syria.52
The US-led war against Iraq was the breaking point in
Syria-US relations. Syria did not join the US coalition
against Iraq and in fact became a vocal opponent of the
war. Damascus didn’t adjust to the new US policies
following September 11, 2001.53
After the Iraq war,
Washington accused Syria of multiple offences,
including hiding Iraq’s “weapons of mass destruction”,
the destruction of which was the US’ actual goal in the
war.54
The passage of the Syrian Accountability Act in
2003 allowed various sanctions to be imposed on Syria
by the US President.55
As a consequence, relations
between the two nations deteriorated further.
Bashar depended on the authoritarian structure of
power.56
For instance, he ordered the Syrian Army to use
a column of tanks to suppress anti-government protests
by killing protesters and even the civilians. President
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
33
Barack Obama said, “Assad must halt his campaign of
killing and crimes against his own people now. He must
step aside and allow a democratic transition to proceed
immediately,”57
International condemnation for the
Assad regime intensified further in August, 2013 in the
wake of a chemical weapons attack on a suburb in
Damascus.
A United Nations inspection team confirmed the use of
chemical weapons at the site.58
After announcing in
August 2012 that the use of chemical weapons by Assad
on his own people could potentially lead to military
intervention by the US,59
US President Obama agreed to
delay any military action to allow Russia to pursue its
proposed diplomatic solution.60
Russia remains Syria’s
most powerful international ally, supplying the Assad
regime with weapons and equipment to continue the
battle with the growing rebel groups,61
and defending the
regime from formal condemnation by the UNSC.62
Even
though the US had stated its reluctance to give weapons
to the rebels because of the groups’ extremist tendencies,
on June 14, 2013, Washington finally announced “it
would give the rebels “direct military aid” after
concluding Syrian troops had used chemical weapons”.63
This change in policy toward Syria followed reports
which stated that in 2012, US organisations were
suspected of operating in other Middle Eastern countries
to help oversee US military support of the rebel
groups.64
The US’ position against extremist groups was
widely known, but its arming of such groups raised
many questions. While Syria itself is not a threat to the
US, wider international implications of the Syrian civil
war make it resemble the Cold War period, with the US
and Russia arming their chosen sides as proxy
combatants in order to achieve their goals and secure
their interests.
Journal of Strategic Affairs
34
Hence, the US offered military training and provided a
large number of military resources to some of the
opposition factions in order to recognise the legitimacy
of the opposite camp, even as Russia provided military
and financial support to the Syrian Army. For the US
and its Western allies, there are three major long-term
goals and interests in Syria which they want to secure
through their support to opposition factions in the Syrian
conflict.65
These interests include isolating Iran and
bolstering the strategic and economic alliance with Arab
allies like Qatar, which invests in Europe and offers an
alternative to Russian gas.
Isolating Iran
One of the pillars of the US foreign policy is to isolate
Iran. This can be attributed to a number of reasons
including Iran’s nuclear programme as well as its
interference in regional affairs. The fall of a strategic
ally of Iran such as Bashar al-Assad would be a blow to
Iran in its showdown against the US and Israel. Indeed,
the strategic alliance with Damascus allows Iran to
maintain its Shia “axis of resistance” (Iraq-Syria-
Lebanon with the Hezbollah).66
Indeed, these
partnerships allow Tehran to counter the isolation
imposed by the US sanctions. They also allow Tehran to
maintain proxies that serve as a leverage utilised for
negotiations on the nuclear issue with world powers.67
These proxies also help Iran to counter the threats of
Israeli attacks. With this in mind, replacement of Bashar
al-Assad by a regime that would agree to isolate Iran
would favour the interests of the US, and also the rival
Arab countries in the Persian Gulf (mainly Saudi Arabia,
Qatar and the UAE), as well as Israel.68
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
35
Maintaining the Strategic and Economic Alliance
with the Persian Gulf Allies and the Geopolitics of
Gas
According to retired NATO Secretary General Wesley
Clark, a memo from the Office of the US Secretary of
Defence just a few weeks after 9/11 revealed plans to
“attack and destroy the governments in 7 countries in
five years”, starting with Iraq and moving on to “Syria,
Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Iran.”69
In a
subsequent interview, Clark argues that this strategy is
fundamentally about control of the region’s vast oil and
gas resources.70
Much of the US strategy in Syria was described in a
2008 US Army-funded RAND report, titled, “Unfolding
the Future of the Long War”. The report noted that “the
economies of the industrialised states will continue to
rely heavily on oil, thus making it a strategically
important resource.” As most oil will be produced in the
Middle East, the US has “motive for maintaining
stability in and good relations with Middle Eastern
states”:71
“The geographic area of proven oil reserves
coincides with the power base of much of the Salafi-
jihadist network. This creates a linkage between oil
supplies and the long war that is not easily broken or
simply characterised... For the foreseeable future,
world oil production growth and total output will be
dominated by Persian Gulf resources... The region
will therefore remain a strategic priority, and this
priority will interact strongly with that of prosecuting
the long war.”
In this context, the report identified several potential
trajectories for regional policy focused on protecting
access to Gulf oil supplies. Exploring different scenarios
Journal of Strategic Affairs
36
for this trajectory, the report speculated that the US may
concentrate “on shoring up the traditional Sunni regimes
in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan as a way of
containing Iranian power and influence in the Middle
East and Persian Gulf.” Noting that this could actually
empower al-Qaeda jihadists, the report concluded that
doing so could further Western interests by bogging
down jihadi activity with internal sectarian rivalry rather
than targeting the US.
The US also wants to maintain the security of its
European allies. Therefore, it also wants to maintain
alliances with some of the Persian Gulf states who are
important for maintaining energy flows to Europe.
Europe has significant gas energy needs and much of it
comes from Russia. Qatar shares the largest gas field in
the world with Iran, the South Pars or North Dome.72
Tensions exist between the two countries because Iran is
unable to extract its gas as quickly as Qatar, mainly
because of the sanctions imposed on Iran. Tehran
disapproves of the Qatari extraction which according to
it is “emptying” the common gas field. Iran, Iraq and
Syria had also signed an agreement for the construction
of a pipeline supposed to transport gas from the Persian
Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea in order to supply Europe.
However, Qatar transports its gas through the Strait of
Hormuz and it remains dependent on Iran for its exports
(with LNG tankers which then need to pass through the
Suez Canal). The Emirate had plans to build a gas
pipeline through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. But,
Bashar al-Assad blocked this project, preferring to sign
an agreement with Iran instead. One of the reasons was
to preserve its long-term energy deals with Russia.73
As
a result, Europe, which is largely dependent on Russia’s
Gazprom for its energy needs, has an interest in seeking
a competitor to lower its increasing expenditure on gas.74
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
37
It is understandable that a Sunni power could protect a
Qatar-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Syria pipeline to diversify its
sources.
Consequently, the centrepiece is Syria and geostrategic
realities explain why Syria has become the victim of this
proxy war. The different geostrategic interests in Syria
explain the positions of the permanent members of the
UN Security Council, and the existing deadlock. It also
explains the difference in the actions and narratives from
world powers competing and advancing their own
national interest in the Syrian theatre.
Short-term Objectives
Apart from the stated long-term objectives, the US also
aims to achieve some immediate goals in the Syrian
theatre. In the short term, the primary US goal is to
defeat Daesh. It was the emergence of Daesh threat
which prompted the US to intervene directly in Syria
and defeating Daesh appears to be its top priority. Even
after the Syrian regime announced the defeat of Daesh in
2017, the terrorist group carried out significant terror
operations in the country which suggests that the group
is still active and has the ability to retake parts of the
Syrian territory. The US would also want to defeat or at
least weaken other Islamic extremist elements among the
anti-Assad rebels. The United States’ second main
interest is to end the civil war. Doing so is the only way
to stop the killing, end the flow of refugees to Europe,
and restore order. Peace in Syria would help end
extremism and pose a lesser threat to the outside world.
The third US interest is to oust President Bashar al-
Assad. The US and its European allies blame him for
turning an episode of domestic protest into a bloody civil
war. They do not believe that any peace process can
succeed in Syria with Assad in power. However, in
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38
recent statements, they have softened this position to
reflect a willingness for Assad to play a “transitional”
role. The reality on ground may compel them to accept a
longer-term role for Assad if there seems to be no
prospect of displacing him. Finally, the US would want
to dominate the peace process in Syria so that the post-
war situation remains under its control and it could
reassert its diplomatic strength and status in the
international system. Notwithstanding the US’ goals,
Russia remains actively involved in order to secure its
competing goals and interests in Syria.
Russian Interests and Involvement in the Conflict
Russia has historical interests in the Middle East,
particularly in Syria. Russia’s association with the ruling
Assad family can be traced back to 1970. Syria was a
Soviet client in the days of the Soviet Union; it is the
only Soviet client in the area that Russia has managed to
maintain. In 1971, a Russia-Syria agreement under
Hafez al-Assad’s regime permitted the Soviet Union to
build a naval military base in Tartus, allowing the Soviet
Union to maintain its presence in the Middle East.75
Currently, Bashar al-Assad is Russia’s only ally in the
Mediterranean. Russia now has ports at Tartus and
Latakia and also a small airbase at Latakia. Russia needs
to keep Assad in power and hang on to those bases,
which complement their naval base in Crimea in
projecting power into the Mediterranean. Before Russia
intervened, Assad’s troops were being defeated in the
war, and fewer men were available for Syrian Armed
Forces. The Assad regime was becoming weak and
unstable.
The Western regime and its involvement threatened
Russia with the oldest and most important alliance in the
Middle East. It was the increasing suspicions of Western
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
39
intentions that Russia supported Bashar al-Assad’s
regime. Alexander Golts, a Russian military editor said,
“Russian leaders view Syria as our major ally in the
Middle East, with whom we have good political, military,
and economic ties. Foreign policy experiments, which
include cooperating greatly with the West, would not
probably occur under President Vladimir Putin’s
regime.”76
Due to the weapons contracts between Russia and Syria,
Russia has been resisting international pressure to
impose sanctions against the Assad regime.77
In 2015,
Russia suggested that Syrian opposition groups, pushed
for the democratic revolution with the help of the US
and its Western allies, led to the Syrian Civil War.
Russia set up T-90 tanks, howitzers, armoured personnel
carriers, marines and the prefab housing for personnel in
the airbase located in Latakia.78
Former US President
Barack Obama said those military build-ups would
threaten both world peace and stability. He then blamed
Russia for its presence and military establishment in
Syria.
Russia continued to support the Syrian regime due to its
national interests. In the contemporary scenario, Syria
remains a battlefield between the US and Russia. The
military actions of both the US and Russia continue to
fuel the Syrian Civil War. They have widened the gap
between Syrian opposition groups and the Syrian
government, causing a perpetual Syrian crisis.
Russia is an energy-exporting country that considers the
Middle East vital for dominating world markets.
Russia’s monopoly via its ex-Soviet supply
infrastructure from the East, next to its immense gas
reserves, is the backbone of its supremacy in gas
supplies to Europe.79
For instance, in the event of
Journal of Strategic Affairs
40
heightened tensions in Russo-Western relations, the
option of switching off the energy supplies to Europe is
tantamount to vast political power for Russia. Russia’s
management of energy flow to Europe holds massive
political leverage for the country. For example, when the
US-proposed Nabucco80
pipeline struggled, Russia
profited immensely in gas purchases from Turkmenistan
at US$100 per 1000 cubic metres, and sales to Europe at
a minimum value of US$250,77 to include its 2009
energy agreements with Ukraine that drove the price of
gas to US$350 and above.81
It should be noted that the operation of Russian strategy
is subject to the ongoing debate, because it nests within
several broader sets of policy concerns on engaging US
influence region-wide as well as economic integration
with states of the post-Soviet era, including domestic
reconstruction and modernisation. However, since 2012,
Moscow has upheld the function of a strategic policy or
unified plan of action which according to it is based on
dialogue.82
In spite of Russia positioning itself as a
peacekeeper, supporting the constitutionally recognised
government’s battle with jihadists in Syria and military
support of Syria through the port at Tartus also remain
important goals for Russia.
Moreover, Russia is also employing state-owned energy
companies Lukoil and Gazprom, and pipeline network
operator Transneft, as the key instruments for
reinforcing links with the post-Soviet states. It is
creating alternative economic structures that can help
renew old ties and encourage new friendships.
Therefore, the expansion of its existing pipeline system
region-wide is very important for Russia.83
It can be
argued that Russia’s use of ‘soft power concepts’ in its
strategy of influencing public and policy discourse,
transnational financial interconnections and reconfiguring
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
41
geopolitical alliances, support its goals of having access
to the hydrocarbons of the region and also to regain a
dominant position in the post-Cold War order.
Russia views the US insistence on the Qatar‒Turkey
pipeline as a strategy to project Turkey as a regional
energy hub for the export of hydrocarbon resources of
the greater Middle East to Europe, and hence isolate
Russia strategically from Europe.84
Consequently, it has
continually developed its well-known energy leverage as
a counter-measure. Russia and its allies are considering
an oil route to the West, from Iran via southern Iraq and
Syria to the Mediterranean and to Europe, otherwise
known as the Islamic pipeline.85
Outflows through the
Islamic pipeline would undermine the US attempt to
push the Qatar‒Turkey pipeline as the main export
pipeline to Western markets, and defeat plans to bypass
Russia and hence weaken its dominance regionally and
globally. In July 2012, Syria’s conclusion of a wide
range of agreements on pipeline construction86
marked a
decisive victory for Russia over Middle Eastern export
channels, reinforcing its grip on energy resources in the
region as well as its monopoly in the supply of natural
gas to US-led international oil markets.
Russian aid to Assad will also increase Russia’s leverage
over him. As discussed, Syria is a potential path for
natural gas pipelines from Russia to the Mediterranean,
and Syria has signed gas exploration contracts with
Russia. On the downside, Assad was accused of
atrocities against his people, including attacks against
civilians with sarin, chlorine, and barrel bombs. His
refusal to negotiate with protesters, firing on them
instead, was the beginning of the civil war. Even with all
this mounting anti-Assad narrative, it is in Russia’s
interest to keep Assad in power and stabilise the country.
Journal of Strategic Affairs
42
Although Russia and Iran are in the same camp in the
Syrian crisis, Russia may also be keeping a check on
Iran. Russia seems to have planned its Syria operation
with Iran, but according to reports, differences have
emerged between Russia and Iran over the preferred
outcome in Syria.87
Russia’s interest is to prevail over
Iran in influencing Syria therefore it may want to keep a
check on Iran’s role in Syria. Putin is trying to stabilise
the Middle East. This is one of Putin’s stated goals of the
Syrian intervention.88
Western intervention destabilised
Iraq and Libya, with no resolution in sight. Although
Syria’s civil war originated within the country, Putin
seems to believe that all such instability can be attributed
to Western intervention.89
Therefore, supporting Assad’s
existing government would serve to stabilise Syria and
perhaps the surrounding area.
Instability in the area is particularly dangerous for
Russia, as its population includes over 10% Muslims,
many of them in the volatile Caucasus region, not far
from Syria. Some Russians have even joined anti-Assad
forces in Syria, and they could cause disruption upon
their return to Russia.90
The downside is that Russia is
entering the conflict on the side of Shia Iran and Alawite
Assad, thereby alienating Sunni powers in the area.91
It
should be noted that forty Syrian insurgent groups have
vowed enmity against Russia due to its bombing
campaigns against them.92
Within Russia, most Muslims
are Sunni and not happy about the side Russia has taken.
So Russian intervention may further inflame the very
instability it wants to curtail.
Another Russian aim in Syria is to have a place at the
peace negotiations. That probably would not have been
the case without Russian military intervention. Russia
wants to challenge Western domination and claim a
more powerful position in the world. Putin’s tactics
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
43
seem to be focused on gaining more attention for
Russia’s military capabilities, like the cruise missiles
launched at Syria from the Caspian Sea,93
and on
attaining a Yalta-like conference with Western leaders to
define great-power spheres of interest. Russia remained
successful in convening Sochi peace talks which are
parallel to the UN-led Western peace initiatives.
Conclusion
In Syria, major powers are influencing the warring
parties towards a shared goal of achieving stability in the
region, and also to ensure a role in defining the future of
Syria. At the same time, the major powers continue their
involvement in the country in order to secure their own
crucial interests. The redefined competition between the
US and Russia and their rival strategies in Syria reflect
the offensive-realist arguments. Syria presents the main
connection between the contending pipeline projects and
export routes of great powers. The major powers are
vying to regulate oil and gas production from the region
and eventually dominate its global transportation and
trade.
As the warring parties in Syria continue to receive
increasing support from external actors, the conflict has
acquired the character of a proxy war in which
international, regional and subnational conflicts are
being fought out. Great powers in Syria treat the conflict
as a zero-sum game, where success for one is
automatically a defeat for the other. The conflict in Syria
provides Russia with the golden opportunity to
consolidate its strategic footing in the Middle East. The
political vacuum that had been created has allowed
Russia to initiate a game changing move through direct
military intervention in Syria and deepen its involvement
in the region. Through its reinforcement of the Syrian
Journal of Strategic Affairs
44
regime, Russian has attained the status of a dominant
player in shaping the future of the Middle East. Russia’s
new role has forced the US to accept Russia’s new
dominant role in Syria in particular and in the Middle
East as a whole. This has also made Russian President
Vladimir Putin important for any political solution in the
region.
Though there are strategic differences between Russia
and the US regarding the Syrian conflict, the rise of
extremist organisations, especially the emergence of
Daesh is a matter of great concern for both global
powers. The rise of Daesh has caused deep tension in the
region and around the world by its killing of minorities,
institutionalising sex slavery, defeating state armies and
executing opponents through extreme acts of violence.
The group has also waged terror attacks in other Middle
Eastern countries and in Europe. Thousands of young
men and women from Europe joined the group. The
Cold War-like situation in Syria might be a zero-sum
game for some but, common security threats are
emerging from this conflict which need to be addressed
collectively by all the stakeholders.
References
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45
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Ahrar al-Sham also known as Harkat Ahrar al-Sham al-
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Al-Nusra or Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as jabhat fatah
al-Sham after July 2016 and also known as al-Qaeda in
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Juan Cole, “How the United States Helped Create the
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wp/2015/11/23/how-the-united-states-helped-create-the-
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https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-
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Ibid. 17.
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Ibonye, “Strategic Wisdom.” 24.
Mills, “Risky Routes.” 25.
Ibonye, “Strategic Wisdom.” 26.
Roxane Farmanfarmaian, “Redrawing the Middle East
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JubinGoodarziSyriaAndIranDiplomaticAllianceAndPowe
rPoliticsInTheMiddleEastLibrar/Jubin+Goodarzi+Syria+a
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he+Middle+East+Library+of+Modern+Middle+East+Stu
dies_djvu.txt. 28.
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Syria, U.S. Energy Information Administration, February
18, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/countries/
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Mikael Eriksson and Francesco Giumelli, “Why the EU’s
Sanctions Against Assad’s Syria Will Backfire,” Foreign
Affairs, December 1, 2011, www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/136705/mikaeleriksson-and-francesco-
giumelli/why-the-eus-sanctions-against-assads-syria-will-
backfire. 31.
Syria Sanctions: EU Follows US Ban on Oil Imports, and
Expands List of Designated Persons, HFW, September
2011, http://www.hfw.com/Syria-Sanctions-EU-Follows-
US-Ban 32.
Simon Mee, Giulia Segreti, and Anna Fifield, “Italy seeks
to Delay EU Oil Embargo on Syria,” Financial Times,
August 30, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4248317c-d326-11e0-
9ba8-00144feab49a.html. 33.
Mankoff, Eastern Mediterranean Energy. 34.
According to Islamic principles, there is no distinction
between religion and politics. In theological terms, Islam
does not draw a line between worldly power and divine
authority, representing itself as a faith system as well as
the moral guidelines of which apply to all aspects.
However, certain Islamic conservatives argue that
sovereignty belongs to the God only, so the sovereign
claims of governments are illegitimate. According to the
Islamic view, the world is separated into two domains:
The domain of Islam (dar al-Islam) which implies those
lands under Muslim rulers’ control; the domain of war
(dar al-harb) includes territories without Muslim rule and
Journal of Strategic Affairs
48
with which they are potentially in conflict. See Louise
Fawcett, Islam and International Relations in the Middle
East in International Relations of the Middle East 3rd ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 168-171. 35.
Ibid. 36.
“Turkey’s Downing of Russian Warplane - What We
Know,” BBC, December1, 2015,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581. 37.
Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, “The US‒NATO March to
War and The 21st Century Great Game,” Global
Research (December 5, 2010),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/
index.php?context=va&aid=22170. 38.
Elaine Pasquini, “Activists Call for No Intervention in
Syria By U.S., NATO Or Israel,” Washington Report on
Middle East Affairs 32(7) (2013), 42,
https://www.wrmea.org/013-september/northern-
california-chronicle-activists-call-for-no-intervention-in-
syria-by-u.s.-nato-or-israel.html. 39.
“Syria Veto: No Heroes, No Villains,” The Straits Times,
February 8, 2012, http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/
newspapers/digitised/issue/straitstimes20120208-1#. 40.
Fawcett, Islam and International Relations. 41.
Ibonye, “Strategic Wisdom.” 42.
Cited in “Syria Becoming Wider Global, Regional Proxy
War,” Reuters, June 13, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/06/13/us-syria-global-proxy-
idUSBRE85C13720120613. 43.
Regional Situation Report For Syria Crisis, UNFPA, 45,
May 2016. 44.
Bruce Crumley, “On Tracking Syria’s Western Jihadis,”
News Deeply Syria Deeply, April 17, 2014,
http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/04/5168/trackin
g-syrias-western-jihadis. 45.
Ismael, 1974. 46.
Bruce Riedel, Muhammad bin Salman’s U.S. Visit Marks
75 years of U.S.-Saudi Ties, Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/
03/12/muhammed-bin-salmans-u-s-visit-marks-75-years-
of-u-s-saudi-ties/
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
49
47.
Carol Sorby, “The Struggle for Syria (The Road Towards
the United Arab Republic),” Asian and African Studies 9,
no. 2 (2000), 213-234, https://www.sav.sk/journals/
uploads/ 080610437_Sorby.pdf. 48.
Ibid, 116. 49.
Reyna Harrison, The US in Syria: A Realistic View of
International Relations, Diablo Valley College,
kropfpolisci.com/ir.sample.paper.harrison.pdf. 50.
Robert G. Rabil, Syria, the United States, and the War on
Terror in the Middle East (London: Praeger Security
International Westport, Connecticut, 2006). 51.
Armenak Tokmajyan, “Hezbollah’s Military Intervention
in Syria: Political choice or religious obligation?,”
Approaching Religion 4, no. 2 (December 2014),
https://journal.fi/ar/article/view/67554/27850. 52.
Itamar Rabinovich, “Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis,”
Analysis Paper no. 28, The Saban Center for Middle East
Policy at Brookings, November 2012. 53.
Mark Gasiorowski ed., The Government and Politics of
the Middle East and North Africa (Boulder, Colo:
Westview Press, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1002/
pad.4230030123. 54.
Ibid, 292. 55.
Fact Sheet: Implementing the Syria Accountability and
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (Fact
sheet), May 11, 2008, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/05/2004051
1-7.html 56.
Hillary Mann Leverett, U.S. Policies Toward Israel and
Iran: What are the Linkages?, Middle East Policy
Council, July 2010, https://www.mepc.org/us-policies-
toward-israel-and-iran-what-are-linkages-1. 57.
“Obama To Syrian Civilians: U.S. Stands with You,”
Huffington Post, April 5, 2012,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/04/obama-to-
syrian-citizens_n_1254348.html. 58.
David Usborne, “Syria Gas Attacks: the Clear and
Concise Evidence from UN Chemical Weapons
Inspectors,” The Independent, September 16, 2013,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
Journal of Strategic Affairs
50
east/syria-gas-attacks-the-clear-and-concise-evidence-
from-un-chemical-weapons-inspectors-8820454.html. 59.
James S. Brady, Remarks by the President to the White
House Press Corps, The White House Office of the Press
Secretary, August 20, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-
house-press-corps. 60.
Mark Landler and Jonathan Weisman, “Obama Delays
Syria Strike to Focus on a Russian Plan,” The New York
Times, September 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/09/11/world/middleeast/syrian-
chemicalarsenal.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 61.
“Who Is Supplying Weapons To The Warring Sides In
Syria?,” BBC, June 14, 2013,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22906965. 62.
“Russia Will Give UN ‘Proof’ of Syria Rebel Chemical
Use,” BBC, September 18, 2013,
https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-24140475. 63.
“US Says It Will Give Military Aid to Syria Rebels,”
BBC, June 14, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
us-canada-22899289 64.
“Who Is Supplying Weapons.” 65.
Milad Jokar, “War in Syria: Geopolitics of the Conflict,”
Huffington Post, December 6, 2017,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/milad-jokar/war-in-
syria-geopolitics-_b_2378683.html 66.
Jane Kinninmont, “The Syria Conflict and the Geopolitics
of the Region,” European Institute of the Mediterranean,
2014, http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/historic-de-
publicacions/anuari-de-la-mediterrania/sumaris/
avancaments-anuari-2013/The%20Syria%20Conflict_
Med2014.pdf. 67.
Jokar, War in Syria. 68.
Ibid. 69.
Nafeez Ahmed, “Syria Intervention Plan Fuelled By Oil
Interests, Not Chemical Weapon Concern,” The
Guardian, August 30, 2013,
https://www.theguardian.com/ environment/earth-
insight/2013/aug/30/syria-chemical-attack-war-
intervention-oil-gas-energy-pipelines.
Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers
51
70.
Ibid. 71.
Christopher G. Pernin et al., Unfolding the Future of the
Long War (Arroyo Center: Rand Corporation, 2008),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs
/2008/RAND_MG738.pdf. 72.
South Pars is the Iranian name and North Dome is the
Qatari name of the gas field. 73.
Jokar, War in Syria. 74.
Ibid. 75.
Tung Yui Li, “The Role of Power Plays in the Syrian
Crisis,” Hong Kong Baptist University, 2016, http://
repository.hkbu.edu.hk/lib_ugaward/10/. 76.
Fred Weir, “Why Russia Is Willing To Sell Arms To
Syria,” The Christian Science Monitor, January 12, 2012,
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0119/Wh
y-Russia-is-willing-to-sell-arms-to-Syria 77.
Yossef Bodansky, “Russia, Syria, and the West: Finally,
at the Crossroads?,” Defence & Foreign Affairs Strategic
Policy 43, no. 9 (2015). 78.
Ibid. 79.
Nikolay Kozhanov, “Russian Policy Across the Middle
East: Motivations and Methods,” Chatham House,
February 2018, www.chathamhouse.org/sites/.../2018-02-
21-russian-policy-middle-east-kozhanov.pdf. 80.
The Nabucco pipeline is a US-proposed gas pipeline for
construction across Europe via Bulgaria, Romania and
Hungary to carry gas from Turkey across Europe to
Austria. 81.
Pavel Polityuk and Richard Balmforth, “Ukraine Signs
$10 billion Shale Gas Deal with Chevron,” Reuters,
November 5, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/
11/05/us-ukraine-chevronidUSBRE9A40ML20131105. 82.
“The President’s Address to the Federal Assembly,”
Kremlin.ru, December 12, 2013, http://www.kremlin.ru/
transcripts/19825. 83.
Philip Stephens, “How Donald Trump has Played
Vladimir Putin’s Game,” Financial Times, July 6, 2017,
https://www.ft.com/content/a27e426a-6179-11e7-8814-
0ac7eb84e5f1.
Journal of Strategic Affairs
52
84.
Emre Iseri, “The US Grand Strategy and the Eurasian
Heartland in the Twenty-First Century,” Geopolitics 14,
no.1 (2009), 26-46, https://doi.org/10.1080/
14650040802578658. 85.
Ibid. 86.
Ibid. 87.
Syria and Beyond: Managing Russian Ambitions in the
Middle East, Policy Workshop Report, Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton
University, January 2018, http://wws.princeton.edu/
sites/default/files/content/USandRussiaPWFinalReport_0
3.07.2018.pdf. 88.
Ron ben Yishai, “In Syria, Iran Is Getting In Putin’s Way
Too,” Ynet News, May 31, 2018,
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
5273601,00.html. 89.
Judey Dempsey, “Should the West Work with Russia on
Syria?,” Carnegie Europe, September 16, 2015,
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=61294. 90.
Cheryl Rofer, “Russian And American Interests in Syria,”
Nuclear Diner, October 15, 2013,
https://nucleardiner.wordpress.com/2015/10/13/russian-
and-american-interests-in-syria/. 91.
Paul Goble, “Some of Russia’s Sunni Muslim Majority
Angered by Putin’s Support of Shiite Syria and Iran,”
Window on Eurasia, October 7, 2015,
http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/10/some-of-
russias-sunni-muslim-majority.html. 92.
Bassem Mroue and Sarah El Deeb, “Syrian Insurgent
Groups Vow to Attack Russian Forces,” Al Arabiya,
October 6, 2015, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/
News/middle-east/2015/10/06/Syrian-insurgent-groups-
vow-to-attack-Russian-forces.html?utm_source=
Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20
Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report. 93.
“Russian Missiles Strike Syria from Caspian Sea,” BBC,
October 7, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-
middle-east-34462539/russian-missiles-strike-syria-from-
caspian-sea.
53
Changing Nature of the Communist Party
of China
Muhammad Abdul Qadeer
Introduction
In order to understand the People’s Republic of China’s
(PRC) exponential growth and its steady rise during the
last century, it is necessary to study the Communist
Party of China (CPC) which has maintained a firm
political monopoly in the country. Although advocates
of multi-party-political system have argued that only
Western-style democracy can ensure progress, the CPC
has proven otherwise. Not only has it remained
successful in carrying out a range of internal reforms, it
has also carried out reforms relating to other sectors of
the state, society, and economy in China.
The CPC has also been successful in managing the
country’s huge population because it has led the Chinese
economy to long-term rapid development through trade
liberalisation and export development. China has also
seen a rapid improvement in people’s living standards.
Between 2012 and 2017, the CPC lifted a total of 68.53
million people out of poverty and the country’s national
poverty rate dropped from 10.2 % to 3.1 %.1 This is
regarded as one of the CPC’s major accomplishments. In
the realm of defence, achieving the modernisation of
national defence and the armed forces is another
important objective of the CPC. The Party has increased
the military’s fighting ability through rapid
modernisation of its army, navy, air force and strategic
support force.2 In October 2017, China’s paramount
leader, Xi Jinping announced that the CPC would build
“world-class military” by the 2050.3
Journal of Strategic Affairs
54
Meanwhile, the most prominent objective of the CPC is
its strong emphasis on the advent of a “new era” for
China in which CPC will lead the country to a new
round of economic reforms and to realise socialist
modernisation by 2035.4 In this regard, the CPC has
played a crucial role in pushing ambitious economic
policies such as the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR)
initiative. In the foreign policy domain, China has
displaced US-led order in Asia by strengthening its
defence and economic partnerships with long time
American allies like Pakistan, the Philippines and
Indonesia.5
This study will focus on the CPC as an institution rather
than on the political system in China. It will examine the
CPC’s strengths, weaknesses and flexibility in adjusting
to new conditions. It will also explore the CPC’s
evolution and development and examine how the CPC
has survived when so many other communist parties
failed to remain afloat.
Background
China remained in a constant state of turmoil between
1839 and 1945. It was the most turbulent era in China’s
history as it suffered a series of military defeats at the
hand of foreign powers and faced almost 100 years of
wars, including the Opium War6 and the War of
Resistance against Japanese Aggression.7 In China, this
period is dubbed the “Century of National
Humiliation.”8
The military defeats weakened the Qing dynasty which
had ruled China since 1644. In 1911, a group of
revolutionaries in southern China led a successful revolt
against the Qing dynasty during the Xinhai Revolution.
The revolt led to the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in
Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China
55
1912 ending centuries of imperial rule in the country.
The end of imperial rule led to the establishment of the
Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist government in China
headed by a Chinese revolutionary, Sun Yat-sen. Many
saw the establishment of the KMT as the beginning of a
new age of nationalism in China. The KMT governed all
or parts of mainland China from 1928 to 1949.9
However, the new government failed to unify the
country under its control. The Qing withdrawal had
created a power vacuum in certain regions, resulting in
the rise of warlords. These warlords controlled their
territories in China and claimed independence from the
KMT government. This resulted in what is known as the
‘May Fourth Movement’ in which thousands of students
rallied in Beijing against the KMT government in
1919.10
It was during this time, when Marxism started to
spread throughout the country. Furthermore, the 1917
Russian October Socialist revolution which transformed
Russia from an imperial monarchy into a Communist
state also attracted the attention of Chinese masses.11
By
1921, communism had found its way into China and the
CPC was formally established with the help of Russia’s
Communist International (Comintern).12
The CPC and KMT remained primary rivals to each
other most of the time due to their differing narratives.
The KMT focused on nationalism and relied on
intellectuals who were more worried about national
humiliation. It staunchly advocated for cancellation of
all “unequal treaties” signed between the Qing Dynasty
and Western powers. The “unequal treaty” was most
commonly referred to as the Treaty of Nanking which
was concluded between Britain and China after the end
of First Opium War in 1842. Under the treaty, China was
forced to open a series of “treaty ports” along the
Chinese coast to Britain.13
Over the next few years China
Journal of Strategic Affairs
56
concluded a series of similar treaties with other powers
including the United States, Japan and France granting
certain rights to foreign-owned businesses while
compromising China’s sovereignty.14
Meanwhile, the
CPC focused on class struggle rather than national
consciousness.15
However, in 1926 the two parties supported each other
for a short period to fight against warlords.16
Also
between 1937 and 1945, both fought together against the
Japanese invasion. The Japanese forces surrendered and
were forced to retreat from China after World War II
ended in 1945. Following Japanese surrender, a power
struggle began between the KMT government led by
Chiang Kai-shek and the CPC led by Mao Zedong, a
Chinese communist revolutionary, triggering a Civil
War in the country.17
By October, 1949, the Communist
Party of China was successful in gaining control in
mainland China after Mao Zedong’s Communist Party
defeated the Kuomintang government. Chiang Kai-shek
fled to the island of Taiwan where he established a
government in exile, whereas, the CPC rose to power in
mainland China .18
Organisation of the Communist Party of China
(CPC)
Initially, the CPC began as an underground, Marxist-
Leninist party that operated on the principle of the
communist doctrine of “democratic centralism”. In
democratic centralism, the party is the only permitted
political player and its decisions are binding on party
members.19
According to basic principles of democratic
centralism in China, individual party members are
subordinate to the party organisations. Although, the
CPC allows for debate and discussion on policy matters
Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China
57
among party members, however, it requires absolute
support of policy once a decision is made.
In China’s democratic centralism there is a political
hierarchy whereby senior party officials expect
disciplined compliance from junior officials.20
Promotion within the party requires experience and
effectiveness in performing one’s job. However, the
CPC’s meritocracy often suffers when dealing with
those dubbed as “princelings”, meaning a relative of one
of the early senior CPC officials. Some CPC leaders use
their influence to secure positions of authority for their
family members, regardless of their abilities or
experience. The “princelings” remain a significant
political force in China. Xi Jinping is one example of a
“princeling” in China whose father, Xi Zhongxun served
as a Secretary General and Vice Premier of the State
Council during the 1950s.21
The Communist Party of China is headed by the party’s
Political Bureau (Politburo) and its Standing Committee.
The Politburo is headed by the party’s General
Secretary. However, of more significance than the
Politburo is its Standing Committee which is the most
powerful policy making body in China.22
Meanwhile, the National People’s Congress (NPC)
usually acts as a “rubberstamp” for decisions already
made earlier by Communist Party. It is China’s
unicameral legislative body.23
Despite the stature
accorded to the NPC in China’s constitution, the NPC
has very little political power. The Secretariat is another
political institution for the CPC which is described in
China’s constitution as an administrative body. Its role is
to supervise party matters and implement decisions
made by the Politburo and its Standing Committee.
Journal of Strategic Affairs
58
The other key institution in China is the CPC-controlled
Central Military Commission (CMC) that exercises
command and control over the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). PLA is in charge of military and defence
affairs, including the formulation of China’s military
strategy.
Evolution of the Communist Party of China
China was governed until 1954 without a constitution
and the CPC leadership comprised the same soldiers
who had freed various parts of the country. During those
years, the CPC mobilised all political and economic
forces that were not opposed to the revolution.
However, over the years, the CPC pursued a variety of
political reforms to strengthen a state governance system
as well as the administrative systems of the country.
Moreover, the CPC has undergone significant shifts in
its economic policies since 1949. The economic reform
policies were initially more gradual. For instance, after
Mao Zedong gained power in China, he began a host of
economic policies and reforms to rebuild the country.
Among the most important were his land reforms. Under
Mao, China seized land from wealthy owners and
redistributed them to landless peasants. He transformed
China from an agricultural economy to a Communist
society and abolished private ownership of land,
property and industry.24
Similarly, in 1958, Mao initiated the Great Leap
Forward, a movement which sought to rapidly
industrialise the country.25
However, the Great Leap
Forward ended in failure. By 1961, there was a
widespread famine and food shortage due to lowered
agricultural production. Many people lost their lives due
Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China
59
to the famine, and as a result, Mao lost political clout
within the CPC.
In 1966, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in China
to reassert his authority and to preserve true communist
system in China.26
He warned the public that capitalism
was a threat to the development of the country and urged
citizens to eliminate anything related to capitalist
culture.
The Cultural Revolution lasted for at least 10 years up
until Mao’s death in 1976.27
After Mao’s death, a power
struggle ensued within China which saw the
marginalisation of Mao’s ‘Gang of Four’ supporters, a
powerful group led by Mao’s last wife, Jian Qing and
strong proponents of the cultural revolution. The
members of this influential group were arrested and put
under trial.
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping - viewed as the main architect
of China’s economic liberalisation programme - became
the de-facto leader of the CPC.28
He denounced Mao’s
actions. Under his leadership, China saw dramatic policy
shift. This period is called the “Period of Reform and
Opening Up.”29
In 1975, Deng enacted the “Four
Modernisations” programme, which sought to revive the
Chinese economy so that the country could be
transformed into an advanced industrial nation. It
focused on the modernisation of Agriculture, Industry,
Science and Technology and National Defence.30
Mao’s push for continuous socialist transformations was
reversed by Deng’s policy of “de-collectivisation”.
China also underwent major social and economic
transformations and it was during his tenure that China
experienced unprecedented economic growth. Deng
introduced drastic economic reforms and liberalised
Journal of Strategic Affairs
60
China’s trade policies through opening up to the global
economy.31
Deng also introduced collegial management in the party,
replacing the cult of personality under Mao. The CPC
under Deng opened its doors for intellectuals and re-
established its mandate to carry out “socialism with
Chinese characteristics”.32
During the reform era, Deng transformed the party from
strongman rule to collective leadership among the elite
and institutionalised the transfer of power from one
leader to the next, with each president serving a
maximum of two five-year terms.33
Deng also
established a rules-based system for succession whereby
leadership succession could take place according to legal
guidelines rather than personality struggles.34
By the end of 1989, Deng retired from the Party’s top
position and Jiang Zemin rose to prominence becoming
General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and
Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission. In
1993, Jiang Zemin became President of China.35
Jiang
was successful in establishing himself as a leader at par
with Mao and Deng Xiaoping. He put forward the
“Three Represents” Theory which was written into the
CPC’s constitution at the 16th Party Congress in 2002.
The theory embraced private entrepreneurs and focussed
on the economic freedom and political control
introduced by his predecessor Deng Xiaoping.36
In 2002, Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as General
Secretary of the CPC. Hu presented the concept of
“Scientific Outlook on Development” which was
eventually written into the CPC Constitution at the
Party’s 17th National Congress in 2007. The scientific
outlook concept called for the harmonious development
Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China
61
of economy and society and improvement of science and
technology.37
In November 2012, Xi Jinping set forth the new political
slogan of the “China Dream” a concept for realising the
“rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. The “Chinese
Dream” involves multiple aspects including the “dream
of a strong nation,” and the “dream of a strong army.”
However, soon after Xi took over as CPC’s chief in
2012, he began dismantling the architecture established
by Deng Xiaoping to avoid succession fights. Xi took
over the leadership of all of the top policy making
committees such as foreign affairs, national security and
management of the economy inside the party.38
In
March, 2013, the National People’s Congress elected Xi
as China’s President. In October 2016, the CPC declared
Xi Jinping as China’s “Core Leader”, suggesting the rise
of a new strongman in China. The title was previously
held by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In October,
2017 the 19th Party Congress enshrined Xi’s political
thinking - “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” - into the CPC’s
constitution. In February 2018, China’s Communist
Party cleared the way for President Xi Jinping to stay in
power indefinitely, by abolishing term limits on the
Presidency.39
The rules on leadership term limits were
set by Deng Xiaoping to prevent a repeat of the Cultural
Revolution which was inspired by the cult worship of
Mao Zedong.
Likewise, in the external domain, Xi broke Deng
Xiaoping’s dictum of “hide your capabilities and bide
your time” which meant that China should “keep a low
profile” in the context of China’s diplomatic policy until
the country is integrated in the global economic
system.40
Journal of Strategic Affairs
62
Xi declared that China is ready to “take centre stage in
the world.” His Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is as
much an economic programme as it is a geopolitical
campaign to take China to the centre of world affairs.
Under the BRI, Xi expanded Chinese business, military
and diplomatic influence around the world.
However, the party’s ideological foundation has
remained Marxist-Leninist despite the changing
leadership over the years. Consequently, the names of
the most significant Chinese leaders and their theories
have been recognised in the party’s constitution. In the
most recent version of the party’s statute, “Mao Zedong
Thought,”41
“Deng Xiaoping Theory,”42
, Jiang Zemin
“Three Represents” and “Xi Jinping Thought”43
are all
part of the CPC’s fundamental doctrine, “Socialism with
Chinese characteristics” which adheres to Marxism but
at the same time calls for adopting pragmatic policies
not otherwise seen as particularly socialist in their
nature.44
The Challenges for the Communist Party of China
Despite Beijing remaining authoritarian at home, it has
become more cooperative abroad especially on issues
like climate change, trade and North Korea. Beijing is
the third-largest donor of the United Nations. China’s
new stance toward the world is a result of the continued
strength of the Chinese economy and the growing
political confidence of the CPC.
However, China faces a number of difficult domestic
and external challenges that, if not addressed by the
country’s leaders, could undermine its stability. Most
important among these are issues related to China’s legal
system which has drawn much attention in the press.
Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China
63
China’s judicial system has seen number of positive
steps since the 15th National Congress of the CPC,
which includes, increased transparency of court
proceedings, improved professionalism of judges,
improvement in litigation procedure, method of trial and
judicial management.45
However, despite these reforms,
the CPC still has a final say over political cases
especially in situations involving senior politicians.46
In China there is a consensus amongst ruling elite that
the country requires a different kind of legal system
from Western models which strengthen the Communist
Party’s leadership instead of weakening it.47
Corruption
is another issue for China’s Communist Party. It was
reported that hundreds of party’s members including
high-level officials were expelled or arrested for
corruption charges in China by the end of 2016.48
Notwithstanding these problems, the CPC has assisted
millions of people out of poverty during the last four
decades and rapid economic growth has boosted the
livelihoods of millions in China.49
However, after nearly
40 years of economic reform at home and opening to the
global economy during the 1980s, China is amongst the
countries with most unequal income distribution in the
world.50
Therefore, on the domestic front, it is speculated
that the next-generation of CPC leaders may bring about
another round of reforms within the CPC. However, it
still remains unclear what kind of reforms, the next
generation of CPC leaders would adopt in the coming
years.
On the foreign policy front, China’s territorial issues in
the South China Sea and East China Sea have negatively
impacted relations with its neighbours including, Japan,
Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines
and Taiwan.51
In years to come, the CPC leadership may
Journal of Strategic Affairs
64
confront increased tensions between China and its
neighbours in tackling these problematic issues. Thus,
Chinese leaders and party members would be required to
carry out effective diplomacy to peacefully resolve the
territorial matters with its neighbours.
Conclusion
Western observers look at China’s political reform in
terms of whether it is becoming more democratic or not.
However, democratisation is not the only standard of
measuring the development of a country. A strong
regulatory and governing foundation laid down during
Deng’s period has made China the world’s second
largest economy after the US. Scholars across the globe
are anticipating that China will soon become the world’s
largest economy.
While China has emerged as a major player in
international politics and a leading world economy, it
views itself as the world’s other superpower assuming
itself as an alternative to the US. In view of that, China
is attempting to reshape the global economic system
through trade and investment partnerships. Hence the
CPC leadership has vowed to support the multilateral
trading system and to promote economic globalisation.
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details-idUSKCN1GC1J7.
Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China
65
3. “CPC to Build World-Class Armed Forces by Mid-21st
Century: Xi,” Xinhua, October 18, 2017,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/18/c_
136688500.htm. 4. “Xi Says China to Basically Realise Socialist
Modernisation by 2035,” Xinhua, November, 18, 2017,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcong
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Worth $46 Billion,” Reuters, April 20, 2015,
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1842, known as the Opium War. It started after British
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to the Opium War of 1839-1842. The Opium War ended
with the Treaty of Nanking. The Chinese paid the British
a multimillion dollar indemnity and ceded Hong Kong to
Britain. China remembers this war as a beginning of
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provinces of China known as Manchuria and later
launched a full-scale attack on China. This initiated the
Sino-Japanese War in 1937 thus leading to the Japanese
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Shanghai. China was militarily weak and could not match
the modern Japanese troops. 8. Alison Kaufman, “The Century of Humiliation and
China’s National Narratives,” (Testimony before the U.S-
China Economic and Security Review Commission
Hearing on “China’s Narratives Regarding National
Security Policy”, March 10, 2011). 9. Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation:
Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign
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66
relations, (New York; Colombia University Press, 2012),
78-79. 10.
“The Evolution of China’s Communist Party, 90 Years in
the Making,” China Briefing, July 1, 2011,
http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2011/07/01/the-
evolution-of-chinas-communist-party-90-years-in-the-
making.html. 11.
Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation. 12.
Ibid. 13.
“The First Opium War, Episode 47”, BBC, February 21,
2006, https://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/empire/
episodes/episode_47.shtml. 14.
Catherine Ladds, “China and Treaty-Port Imperialism,”
Hong Kong Baptist University,
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/97811184
55074.wbeoe079. 15.
Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 82. 16.
Ibid. 79. 17.
Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political
Struggle 1945-1949 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
1999). 18.
“History Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975),” BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/chiang_kais
hek.shtml. 19.
“The Communist Party of China,” An Illustrated History
of the Communist Party of China,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/45981.htm 20.
Ibid. 21.
Bo Zhiyue, “Who Are China’s ‘Princelings’?,” The
Diplomat, November, 24, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/
2015/11/who-are-chinas-princelings/. 22.
“Inside China’s Ruling Party,” BBC,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/02/china_p
arty_congress/china_ruling_party/how_china_is_ruled/ht
ml/politburo.stm. 23.
“National People’s Congress,” The National People’s
Congress of the People’s Republic of China,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_28
46.htm.
Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China
67
24.
Mo Zhang, “From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted
Chinese Property Law and the Protection of Property
Rights in China,” Berkeley Business Law Journal 5 no. 2
(2008): 320. 25.
“Evolution of China’s Revolution: from Bloody
Repression to Capitalism Red in Tooth and Claw, The
Telegraph, September 27, 2009,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/
6235611/Evolution-of-Chinas-revolution-from-bloody-
repression-to-capitalism-red-in-tooth-and-claw.html. 26.
“History, Mao Zedong (1893-1976),” BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/mao_zedon
g.shtml. 27.
Ibid. 28.
Alexander Pantsov and Steven Levine, Deng Xiaoping: A
Revolutionary Life (New York: Oxford University Press,
2015). 29.
David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy
and Adaptation (Washington DC: University of California
Press, 2008). 30.
David Wen-wei Chang, China under Deng Xiaoping:
Political and Economic Reform (Macmillan, 1991). 31.
Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of
China, (Belknap Press, 2013). 32.
Ibid. 33.
Ibid. 34.
Catherine Keyser, “Three Chinese Leaders: Mao Zedong,
Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping,” Asia For Educators,
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_leaders.
htm. 35.
“Jiang Zemin Biography,” ChinaVitae,
http://chinavitae.com/biography/Jiang_Zemin/full. 36.
“How will the world remember Jiang Zemin?,” CNN,
November 7, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/2002/
WORLD/asiapcf/east/10/29/profile.jiang.zemin/. 37.
Scientific Outlook on Development becomes CPC’s
Theoretical Guidance, ChinaDaily, November, 11, 2008,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2012-11/08/content_
15892786.htm.
Journal of Strategic Affairs
68
38.
John Pomfret, “Xi Jinping’s Power Grab Could Lead to a
‘Political Catastrophe’ in China,” The Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-
opinions/wp/2018/02/26/xi-jinpings-power-grab-could-
lead-to-a-political-catastrophe-in-
china/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.58574d8304a4. 39.
John Ruwitch, “Timeline - The Rise of Chinese Leader Xi
Jinping,” Reuters, March 16, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-xi-
timeline/timeline-the-rise-of-chinese-leader-xi-jinping-
idUSKCN1GS0ZA. 40.
David Pilling, “No one is immune from Beijing’s ‘gravity
machine’”, Financial Times, December 12, 2013
https://www.ft.com/content/32470bd8-619d-11e3-b7f1-
00144feabdc0 41.
In China Mao’s Thought is part of the official doctrine of
the Communist Party of China, however, since the 1978
beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s market economy-oriented
reforms, the concept of “socialism with Chinese
characteristics” has come to the forefront of Chinese
politics. Mao has advocated that peasants should be the
bulwark of the revolutionary energy, led by the working
class in China. 42.
The idea of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was
one of the most significant creations of Deng Xiaoping.
Deng, by adopting a market economy to China’s own
condition, successfully achieved unprecedented economic
success. The theory does not claim to reject Marxism–
Leninism or Mao Zedong Thought but instead seeks to
adapt them to the existing socio-economic conditions of
China. 43.
Xi Jinping Thought promotes the supremacy of the
Communist Party. Xi’s philosophy teaches that the goal
of a powerful, unified China can be achieved only if the
Communist Party stays firmly in control of China. 44.
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, People’s Daily,
September 30, 2007, http://en.people.cn/90002/92169/
92211/6275043.html.
Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China
69
45.
“Chinese Legal Reform,” Paul Tsai China Center, Yale
Law School, https://law.yale.edu/china-center/programs/
chinese-legal-reform. 46.
“With Legal Reforms, China wants Less Interfering in
Cases, Fewer Death Penalty Crimes,” Reuters, March 10,
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parliament-legal/with-legal-reforms-china-wants-less-
interfering-in-cases-fewer-death-penalty-crimes-
idUSBREA290C320140310. 47.
China’s Top Court Says No to West’s Model of Judicial
Independence, Reuters, February 26, 2015,
https://in.reuters.com/article/china-law/chinas-top-court-
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“China has Lifted 600 Million People out of Poverty,”
CCTV, October, 18, 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/2014/
10/18/VIDE1413584528072923.shtml. 50.
Sidney Leng, “China’s Dirty Little Secret: Its Growing
Wealth Gap,” South China Morning Post, July, 7, 2017,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/21017
75/chinas-rich-grabbing-bigger-slice-pie-ever. 51.
Amanda Macias, “China’s in the Hot Seat on 2 Major
Foreign-Policy Issues,” Business Insider, August 27,
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korea-south-china-sea-2016-8.
70
THE IMPLICATIONS OF INDIA AND
ISRAEL’S GROWING DEFENCE
COOPERATION
Moiz Khan
Introduction
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel in
July 2017 and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu’s reciprocal visit to India in January 2018 are
evidence of an intensification of the bilateral partnership
between India and Israel in the areas of defence,
intelligence and trade. Though the two countries are
increasing their cooperation in other fields as well,
defence remains the main pillar of bilateral relations.
India serves as a major market for Israeli arms; between
2012 and 2016, the country was the recipient of 41% of
Israeli arms exports.1 According to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India was
the third largest arms importer in the period 2013-2017,
and the country’s imports increased by 24% between
2008–12 and 2013–17.2 Russia accounted for 62 per cent
of India’s arms imports in 2013–17 while the country’s
arms imports from the US arms imports from the USA
increased by 557% between 2008–12 and 2013–17.
Moreover, during these two periods India’s arms imports
from Israel also increased by 285%, making Israel the
third largest supplier to India.3
Collectively, Israel’s military sales to India range from
Phalcon airborne warning and control systems
(AWACS) and Searcher, Heron and Harop unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Aerostat and Green Pine
radars, and Barak air defence systems.4 Apart from arms
procurements, India and Israel also conduct joint
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
71
military exercises to help India improve its military’s
operational capabilities.5
With reference to the aforementioned developments, this
paper is an effort to provide a comprehensive
understanding of India-Israel defence cooperation and its
implications for South Asian strategic stability. The
study will discuss Pakistan’s threat perceptions and
security challenges arising out of the military
cooperation.
The study would examine the following questions: what
sort of arms procurement deals are being signed between
India and Israel? What aims and purposes do India and
Israel seek to achieve with the help of their defence
cooperation deals? What are the implications of Israeli
arms transfers to India and how do they affect both
Pakistan’s threat perceptions and defence policies?
Historical Overview
When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited
Israel in July 2017 to mark the 25th anniversary of
diplomatic relations between the two countries,6 he
became the first Indian Prime Minister to officially visit
Israel since the establishment of bilateral ties between
the two countries in 1992. Though India-Israel relations
go back a long way,7 they had become stagnant owing to
India’s fear of upsetting its relations with Arab countries
and its support for the Palestinian demand for statehood.8
Prime Minister Modi’s visit highlights a significant
change in India’s foreign policy outlook. While
reiterating India’s support for a ‘two state-solution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ during the visit,9 Modi
clearly signalled that India’s relationship would not be
hyphenating Israel and Palestine.10
The two countries
announced a ‘strategic partnership’ and signed numerous
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72
agreements in various key areas including water
management, agriculture, research and development and
space.11
In January 2018, Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu visited India. His visit provided greater
impetus to the India-Israel bilateral partnership.12
The
visit was significant also because it occurred despite
India’s vote in favour of a UNGA resolution rejecting
US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.13
India’s Israel policy has always been guided by the
notion of realpolitik. In a 1949 letter by the India Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to his Chief Ministers, he
clearly articulated the flexible approach based on realism
that would guide India’s policy towards Israel. In his
letter he said,
Any action that we may take must be guided not only
by idealistic considerations but also a realistic
appraisal of the situation. Our general policy in the
past has been favourable to the Arabs and, at the
same time, not hostile to the Jews. That policy
continues. For the present, we have said that we are
not recognising Israel. But this is not an irrevocable
decision and the matter will no doubt be considered
afresh in view of subsequent developments.14
Throughout history, India’s economic interests in the
Middle East determined the country’s policy towards
Israel. After recognising Israel in 1950, India took nearly
forty-two years to establish full diplomatic relations with
the country in 1992.15
India had already delayed the
recognition of Israel for two and half years after it came
into being on May 14, 1948.16
It finally established its
diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992 only when it was
deemed realistic and economically advantageous for the
country.17
There were various reasons behind these
delays. India’s major concern was its trade relations with
the Arab world. India served as a large market for the
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
73
Arab World and their mutual trade included, tea, spices,
gems, jewellery, and engineering goods.18
It was thought
that the large volume of trade between India and the
Arab countries would be jeopardised if India were to
recognise Israel.19
India was reluctant to hurt Muslims’ sentiments attached
to the partition of Palestine both within the country and
outside.20
India, therefore, had to follow a pro-
Palestinian policy for national cohesion at home and in
order not to antagonise Muslims of Arab states. Another
major reason for not recognising Israel was India’s
position and role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
which prevented it from supporting Israel. Since NAM
was supportive of anti-colonial struggles around the
world, India considered efforts of establishing a Jewish
state a last adventure of British colonialism.21
Notwithstanding Gandhi’s sympathy towards European
Jews, he could also not overlook Palestinians struggle
against colonialism. Gandhi considered imposition of
Jews on Palestinians wrong and inhuman.22
Despite all
these reservations, India awarded a de-facto recognition
to Israel in 1950 after both Iran and Turkey two leading
Muslim majority countries lent a de-facto recognition to
the country.23
Though India still remained reluctant in establishing full
diplomatic relations with Israel following the
recognition, the end of the Cold War provided India an
opportunity to review its policy towards Israel.24
After
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s main
diplomatic and strategic ally during the period, India had
to revisit its foreign policy to adjust it towards the
changing international order where the US had emerged
as the sole dominant power. Indian leaders realised that
normalisation of ties with Israel would be important for
India’s eventual rapprochement with the US, since the
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74
American Jewish lobby had an effective influence over
the US ‘political establishment. Moreover, the initiation
of the Arab-Israeli peace process backed by the US also
served as an opportunity for reluctant states to consider
developing relations with Israel.25
The October 1991
peace conference in Madrid, a formal gathering with
Israel sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union to
revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process involving
majority of Arab countries, forced India to evaluate
Israel’s importance in the Middle East and benefits that
could be accrued by strengthening diplomatic relations
with the country.26
Domestically, the ascendance of the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the Indian political
system helped remove hesitations about Israel. The BJP
with its Nationalist and Hindu outlook perceived Israel
not as a diplomatic burden but a potential ally.27
The first
formal call for full relations with Israel came forward in
the BJP convention of October 1991. This call made the
Congress Party to also adopt a realistic approach towards
Israel.28
As a result, India accorded full diplomatic
recognition to Israel on January 29, 1992, and embassies
were established in each other’s countries.29
Diamonds and Defence
The Indo-Israel relations are often described as being
made up of ‘diamonds and defence.’30
This attribution to
their relationship is based on the fact that diamonds and
defence items are the two main commodities in their
bilateral trade. Nearly half of the imports of the two
countries comprise diamonds polishing and processing
trade while approximately 40% of Israeli arms are
transferred to India.31
Since India’s relationship with
Israel has flourished across a wide range of areas
including agriculture, water management, science and
technology, tourism, agriculture and other forms of
trade, defence cooperation between the two countries
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
75
continues to dominate the bilateral relations for last 25
years.
India emerged as a very vast weapons market for Israeli
defence industries to export their weapons and help the
country’s economy. For India, Israel became a preferred
source for acquiring latest military equipment. India
sought Israeli weapons basically for two reasons;
Russian failure to provide promised weapons on time
and at suitable price and; difficulties that India faced in
developing the desired weapons at home.32
However,
during the initial years, India sought Israeli military
technology companies to help upgrade its aging Soviet-
era military aircrafts and other equipment as Israel had a
sound reputation in retrofitting of old weapons.33
Today,
Israel is the third largest exporter of arms to India, after
the US and Russia. Data from SIPRI shows that defence
exports from Israel are related to aircraft, air defence
systems, armoured vehicles, artillery, missiles, naval
weapons, sensors, ships and other defence products and
technologies.34
Netanyahu’s January 2018 visit to India
also revolved around weapons deals. During
Netanyahu’s visit, he confirmed that the $500-million
Spike anti-tank guided missile deal between India and
Israel was back on the table which had been cancelled by
India prior to Netanyahu’s visit.35
Meanwhile, India’s
Defence Ministry also confirmed in January 2018 a plan
to purchase 131 surface-to-air Barak missiles from Israel
in a $70 million deal36
and approved the purchase of
assault rifles and carbines from Israel to meet the
immediate requirement of troops.37
Apart from weapons sales, both India and Israel are also
engaged in the field of co-development and co-
production of weapons. This engagement helps India to
redesign and to strengthen its firms in manufacturing
latest military technologies as part of its so called ‘Make
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76
in India’ policy. It also confirms with the Indian requests
for technology transfer and emphasis on domestic
production. A long list of Israeli military items, such as
ammunition, UAV parts, and even missiles (Spike anti-
armour, the Python-4 air-to-air, Barak-8 surface-to-air)
are now being produced in India.38
This element of co-
production in both the countries’ defence trade would
also lower Indian dependence on importing weapons.39
Defence cooperation between the two countries can be
attributed to several reasons. For India, the demonstrated
capability of Israeli weapons systems remains its main
interest. Similarly, for Israel, India’s market for weapons
trade serves as huge impetus for strengthening of
bilateral defence engagements.40
It implies that India’s
quest for latest military technologies and Israel’s efforts
to further widen the market for its military products
complement each other. By enhancing defence trade
with Israel, India also sought opportunities to emulate
Israeli technology in developing its own defence
industry.41
Defence Engagements in Various Domains
Defence collaboration between India and Israel started
even before the establishment of diplomatic relations.
The two countries helped each other in their individual
conflicts even during the frosty years of their relations.
Israel provided covert military assistance to India during
its wars of 1962, 1965 and 1971 and the 1999 Kargil
Conflict.42
India helped Israel covertly with military
equipment during the ‘Six-Day War’ of 1967,43
by
providing Israel with spare parts for Mystere and
Ouragan aircraft, as well as AX-13 tanks.44
On the request of former Indian Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru Israel came to help India in 1962 by
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
77
supplying mortars for the Indian Army delivered by
ships flying the Israeli flag overruling Indian requests for
anonymity.45
Similarly, during India’s 196546
and 1971
war47
with Pakistan, Israel again supplied mortars and
ammunition. These mortars equipped two of India’s
Artillery Regiments and proved highly effective with
their steep trajectory and heavy calibre charge especially
in mountainous terrain.48
After Research and Analysis
Wing’s inception (RAW) in 1968, its relation with
Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, commenced
despite the killing of Indian soldiers serving in United
Nations Emergency Force in Gaza by Israeli air and
artillery strikes during Israel’s 1967 Six-day war.49
After the fruition of diplomatic relations in 1992,
defence cooperation between Indian and Israeli Air
Forces also commenced when the two countries signed a
pact for the purchase of Searcher and Ranger Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in 1992.50
In 1993, Israel also
showed a willingness to upgrade India’s old Soviet
equipment. For this purpose, two Israel-based companies
Elbit systems and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI)
entered into a contract with India to upgrade Indian Air
Force’s (IAF) ageing MiG-21 fighter aircraft.51
Another important Israeli contribution came
immediately in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil War, in
the domain of surveillance and target acquisition. India
purchased the Long-Range Reconnaissance and
Observation System for its army.52
The Indian Army
deployed these systems along with hand-held thermal
imagers that greatly enhanced its anti-infiltration
measures and those reconnaissance and observation
systems are still being used by the army deployed along
the Line of Control and along the International Border.53
During the Kargil War India also received laser-guided
bombs for modified IAF Mirages from Israel.54
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78
To overhaul its naval capabilities, India had signed a
deal for the purchase of two Super Dvora Mk-2 fast
patrol boats from the IAI worth $10 million in 1996. For
the deal, Israel was also willing to transfer the
technology of patrol boats. The IAI awarded licences for
India to manufacture these boats in its Goa Shipyard.
While two of these boats were purchased from the IAI,
an additional six were manufactured in India in
subsequent years.55
The Dvora MK-2 boats are
significant for offshore operations, naval intelligence,
and command and control at sea.56
As these vessels are
equipped with day and night surveillance and weapon
locating systems, they are important for detecting and
destroy enemy fast boats.57
In addition to Dvora MK-2
boats, the IAI also supplied India the fast attack craft
INFACT T-82 in 2003. With an operating speed of 40
knots in a 550-mile area, these vessels are the fastest
ones so far in the Indian Navy. These vessels have also
enhanced the Indian Navy’s offensive and defensive
operational capabilities.58
Further in the domain of surveillance, India also
purchased Heron Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (and
Searchers) manufactured by Israel Aerospace Industries
(IAI) in 2003. Heron UAVs are the main systems
deployed with the Indian Army aerial surveillance
operations.59
In order to upgrade its main battle tanks (MBTs), India
had approached Israeli defence firms to refurbish its
ageing T-72 tank with thermal imaging and better fire
control. India’s Alpha Design Technologies (ADT)
entered collaborated with Israeli firm Elop-Elbit
company in this regard in 2014. In 2016, India received
170 upgraded thermal kits for its T-72 Tanks and
upgradations for 1000 T-72 tanks with thermal imaging
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
79
or night vision capabilities.60
The upgradation of the T-
72 MBTs provide the Indian army with the capabilities
required to fight without any time barrier at night. The
Elop-Elbit is also in contract with India to upgrade the
Infantry Command Vehicles in the IA.61
The company
has already transferred over 300 thermal imager
standalone kits (TISK) which would add night vision
capabilities for main gun firing and missiles.
Approximately, some 969 such command vehicles had
been upgraded by the end of 2015.62
In 2015, the IAF also acquired the EHUD air combat
manoeuvring instrumentation (ACMI) system from
Israel.63
The IAF is among the leading air forces in the
world having incorporated this system in its training
modules.64
Apart from providing real-time high
dependability weapons simulation and hit/miss
assessments for live training, the system would also it
would help the Indian military to improve its overall
coordination and synchronisation among its three arms
(Air Force, Army and Navy) in any future conflict. 65
Moreover, in order to enhance its land forces’
capabilities of anti-tank war, India has signed a deal with
Israel for Spike Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM). On
January 17, 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu said that the $500-million Spike anti-tank
guided missile deal between India and Israel was back
on the table. Earlier, India had formally scrapped the
deal for Spike missiles for unknown reasons with
Israel’s state-owned defence contractor Rafael Advanced
Defence Systems a week before Netanyahu’s visit to the
country. On January 3, 2018, Rafael had confirmed the
cancellation of the deal. However, India is now reviving
the deal because the country considers the Spike missiles
battle-proven. The missile has a longer range and is
lighter than the Indian Nag missile.66
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Other specialised equipment, that India purchased from
Israel, including the Tavor lightweight assault rifles and
Galil sniper rifles, have also been inducted a few years
earlier with all three services of the Indian military.67
Moreover, Punj Lloyd from India and Israel Weapon
Industries (IWI) are also considering a deal to set up a
factory in central India to manufacture these weapons.68
In order to further enhance the fire-power of the Indian
Army, the Indian Government approved the purchase of
another set of assault rifles and carbines from Israel to
meet the immediate requirement of troops in January
2018. India’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC),
headed by Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman,
cleared the procurement of 72,000 assault rifles and
93,895 carbines worth $553 million. According to media
reports, the procurement would be made available to the
forces in two tranches – one fourth by the state-owned
Ordnance Factory Board and the remaining by local
private industry.69
India-Israel Space Cooperation
As a part of growing ties, India and Israel also maintain
a high-level cooperation in the field of space technology.
This cooperation was officially initiated when Shimon
Peres, then Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
visited Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in
January 2002. Following the visit, an agreement on
space cooperation was signed between the former head
of Israel’s Space Research Programme Col. Aby Har-
Even and former ISRO Chairman Dr K. Kasturiarangan
in November 2002. Consequently, India launched two
Israeli satellites including Synthetic Aperture Radar
(SAR) surveillance satellite in 2008,70
and SAR imaging
satellite RISAT-2 on board a domestically built Polar
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
81
Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) from the Sriharikota
Space Centre in 2009.71
Given the interests and capabilities available in the
domain of space in both India and Israel, cooperation in
space is likely to be strengthened in future. The main
element in space collaboration is that Israel remains
interested in Indian space launching capabilities, while
its small satellites have attracted Indian attention. Since
Israel considers Indian space launchers reliable, India
signed various MoUs with Israel in the domain of space
during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Israel in July
2017.72
The Indian space programme has been thriving since its
inception. With its successful space launches and various
space programmes, the Indian space mission is emerging
as a new space power. For example, in June 2016, the
ISRO launched 20 satellites in a single payload.73
Similarly, in February 2017, it successfully launched
104 satellites on a single rocket and set a world record.74
This prowess of the Indian space programme has
attracted the attention of other countries including Israel
for mutual collaboration. However, India’s bilateral
cooperation with Israel has raised concerns in Pakistan.
Though India claims that its satellites are mainly for
weather, communication and navigation purposes, they
could ultimately be used for military purposes due to
their multipurpose nature.75
Currently, the Indian
military is using 13 satellites Cartosat-1 and 2 series and
Risat-1 and Risat-2, GSAT-7 or INSAT-4F.76
As
discussed earlier, Risat-2 is an Israeli satellite which can
be used for multipurpose while the Cartosat-1 and 2
satellites are also fitted with Israeli technology for high
resolution imagery.77
This dual-use satellite network
gives India a technological advantage which can be used
for tactical and strategic goals against Pakistan. These
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82
satellites not only remove India’s dependence over
foreign satellites for intelligence and surveillance but
also provide the country with the capability to monitor
activities around its borders through high-resolution
imagery, intelligence gathering, and navigation. Not
only do such capabilities help prevent possible attacks,
they also enable a prompt response to incoming attacks
against India.78
India-Israel Engagement in Air and Missile
Defence Systems
The strategic collaboration between India and Israel
encompasses engagement in the purchase and co-
development of interceptor missile systems, radars and
other related technologies. In this regard, India signed a
contract with the IAI and Rafael for the supply of nine
Barak-I Anti-Missile Defence (AMD) systems in 2001.
With this contract, India not only acquired missile
defence system for its naval vessels but also opened
more avenues for cooperation and collaboration in future
years. 79
In March 2018, the Indian Ministry of Defence
contracted IAI and Rafael to deliver the Indian Navy 131
additional Barak-1 missiles. The contract is valued at
$70 million. Barak-1 is a supersonic missile with an
operational range of 10 kilometres.80
Similarly, in 2009, India signed a deal with Israel for the
supply of quick reaction surface-to-air missiles (QR-
SAM).81
Initially, the Indian Government approved
proposals to augment air defence capabilities for eight
regiments with QR-SAM worth $2.2 billion in 2012.82
The SPYDER QR-SAM has the potential to engage
targets at 360° and the missiles can be launched within
five seconds of its readiness mode. It has the capability
of intercepting cruise missiles, short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs), aircrafts or drones at 15km range.83
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
83
In May 2017, India conducted successful tests of its first
newly acquired Spyder systems.84
A trial of system’s
Python and Derby missiles was conducted to validate
various parameters and checking its operational
readiness.85
To further upgrade the strategic cooperation, India and
Israel signed a major deal in March 2010 to jointly
develop the Long-Range Surface to Air Missile
(LRSAM) system for the Indian Navy (IN), involving
the Defence Research and Development Organisation
(DRDO) of India and the IAI. The deal worth $1.4
billion provided Indian with an opportunity to acquire
design and manufacturing technology of the system.86
A
similar contract has also been signed between the two
countries for the development of same systems for the
Indian Army and IAF. These systems for the Army and
the IAF were called Medium Range Surface to Air
Missiles (MRSAM) systems. These two systems,
LRSAM and MRSAM are also called the ‘Barak 8’ or
‘Barak NG’ missile systems. Though the initial
collaboration between the two countries on Barak 8 co-
development began in 2006 and was approved in 2009,
the Indian Government finally approved the deal worth
$2.5 billion for the purchase of MRSAM in February
2017.87
The Indian Army will deploy the system by
2023. Similarly, India contracted IAI for the delivery of
LRSAM for its navy in May 2017, and the delivery was
made in September 2017.88
The aforementioned air defence systems will help India
to maintain a multi-layered defence shield. Though these
systems may prove effective against cruise and short-
range ballistic missile, they are ineffective against long-
range ballistic missiles. In order to fill the gap, India is
indigenously developing a two-layered ballistic missile
defence (BMD) system involving exo-atmospheric and
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84
endo-atmospheric interceptor missiles. For an efficient
system, India entered into negotiations with Israel to buy
its Arrow-2 anti-missile system’s Green Pine radar.
However, Israel could not transfer the radar system to
India without US’ approval as the system had been
jointly developed. The former Bush Administrator
approved the Israeli Green Pine radar system for sale to
India. After the approval, India purchased 3 Green Pine
radars in 2001.89
The US influence was not limited to the sale of Green
Pine radars. The US also allowed Israel to sell the IAI-
developed Phalcon Airborne Early Warning and Control
(AEW&C). Israel’s dependence on the US, in terms of
economic packages, access to dual-use items, and
influence in multilateral forums, had a huge impact on
its weapons trade. The US can easily block or pressurise
Israel to suspend any weapons deal. In 2000, for
example the US pressurised Israel to drop the sale of
Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control Systems
(AWACS) sale to China. However, the sale of same
strategic AWACS to India had been approved by the US.
A trilateral deal involving Russia, Israel and India was
signed in 2004 for the sale of AWACS on three similar
IL-76 modified platforms.90
India received these
AWACS during 2009-2011.91
The US influence over India-Israel relations has
remained constant. The country’s role in the
development of defence cooperation between India and
Israel has been impressive, even if not favourable at all
the times. For example, the Administration of former US
President Bill Clinton opposed Israeli military sales to
India owing to technology transfer regimes, Israel-US
co-production provisions, and arms embargos over
India’s nuclear tests of 1998.92
Israel did not join the US
weapons embargo on India. Instead, Israel finalised a
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
85
deal to sell India advanced electronic equipment for its
warplanes. Though the equipment had no American
technology and it was indigenously developed by Israel,
the US opposed the deal and called it contrary to arms
control agreements. Despite the US opposition, Israel
moved forward with the deal.93
However, this situation became favourable for India
during George W. Bush’s tenure who openly supported
the India-Israel partnership. The US’s approval for the
purchase of Phalcon AWACS marked the evolution of
the US position on its policy regarding transfer of
technology to India. The success behind Phalcon
AWACS was the result of BJP’s political lobbying in the
US. In order to mobilise the US support, the BJP
government in 2000s actively engaged Jewish
organisations in the US and gave an effective push for
India-US rapprochement for allowing Israel’s sensitive
defence sales to India.94
With the help of Jewish
organisations, India not only achieved US’ support for
its defence cooperation with Israel but also had Israel an
direct source for acquiring US defence technology
including the Green Pine Radar.95
These developments
imply that the US has, direct or indirect, leverage over
India-Israel defence engagements. Since the post 9/11
time period has witnessed a convergence of interests
between India and US, the US has tacitly been approving
Israel’s military sales and transfer of technology to
India.
However, the growing defence cooperation between
India and Israel also started creating problems for US
defence industries in gaining contracts from India. For
example, India had originally considered purchasing the
US-made ‘Javelin’ ATGMs and negotiations were
‘nearly completed’ for the two countries to jointly
develop the ATGM by late 2016.96
Reluctance from the
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86
US on technology sharing stalled the negotiations.
Alternatively, India reached Israel and successfully
negotiated deal for Spike ATGMs.97
It implies that
Israeli defence industries are appealing partners for India
and their mutual cooperation in joint ventures,
production and research and development in high-
technology military equipment would remain intact in
the future as well. It is because Israel has shown greater
flexibility in its policy of transfer of technology.
Moreover, Israel imposes minimal conditions over its
arms contracts. This flexibility has helped Israel gain a
stable position for its defence industry in the Indian
weapons markets.98
The Future of India-Israel Defence Cooperation
Though the official acknowledgement of exact financial
volume trade is not known, a large section of Israeli
arms exports is made to India.99
The defence trade
between the two countries ranges from sale of bullets to
radars, air deterrent systems including AWACS, and
UAVs, and co-development of missile defence systems.
The bilateral defence cooperation is not merely restricted
to sale of weapons but it has extended to joint ventures
and joint manufacturing, including transfer of
technology as well as joint research and development in
defence and security fields,100
suggesting a strategic
partnership between the two countries.
Although the ever-thriving Indo-Israeli defence
cooperation has mutual benefits for both the country’s
individual markets, there are also obstacles and
disadvantages, especially for Israel. Israeli arms and
military technology are popular in the world for their
technological sophistication and integrity. Israel’s
willingness to transfer technology to India under various
trade deals would not only provide India the technology
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
87
but also help the country in acquiring the expertise in the
development of arms and equipment. This possibility
could allow India to use Israel’s technology for its own
weapons and its sale for its own use in the future.101
The
waning Indian dependence on Israeli weapons would
also result in lowering of defence trade between the two
countries, since at numerous times, India has tried to
remain restricted to local weapons. For example India
once cancelled a deal with Israel for Barak 8 interceptor
missiles in favour of its Akash and Trishul interceptors. 102
In January 2018, India’s DRDO also cancelled Spike
anti-tank missile deal with Israel for unknown reasons
but it was revived back during Netanyahu’s visit to
India.103
These examples imply that Israeli companies
could possibly face challenges due to India’s policy of
strengthening local manufacturing through its ‘Make in
India’ programme.104
Consequently, India’s self-reliance
and indigenisation in the defence sector could negatively
impact Israeli defence trade and market in the long run.
Notwithstanding these problems, India-Israel relations
will continue to expand, with increased cooperation in
the domains of defence and space.
Security Implications for Pakistan
Given that the defence aspect of the India-Israel
relationship is the main pillar of their bilateral ties,
Israeli defence cooperation is also increasing Pakistan’s
security concerns and threat perceptions. India is
engaged in a rapid modernisation of both its
conventional and strategic military assets for deterrence
and dissuasion. India’s huge military infrastructure
continues to expand with the help of indigenous weapon
development and foreign defence trade. Weapons trade
with Israel is not only enhancing India’s military
strength quantitatively but also qualitatively. Indian
military modernisation is increasing Pakistan’s
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88
vulnerability vis-à-vis India at both conventional and
strategic levels.
Conventionally, the Indian military is already stronger
than that of Pakistan. With a 2:1 disparity ratio in
army,105
the IAF and the Indian Navy also has an
advantage of 1.9:1 ratio over Pakistan.106
This
quantitative disparity further increases with Indian
imports of sophisticated weapons in the region. The
mixed array of indigenous and foreign weapons adds
into Indian confidence of launching a limited war with
Pakistan under the country’s nuclear threshold. On the
other hand, Pakistan is adopting measures against the
increasing threat of India’s Cold Start doctrine that calls
for rapid limited conventional attack against Pakistan.107
However, Israeli weapons including armed and
surveillance and reconnaissance UAVs and AWACS
efficiently enhances Indian intelligence surveillance
capabilities against Pakistan. With these capabilities,
India poses a potential threat to Pakistan’s Command
and Control assets. During war time, these assets along
with Israeli satellites may also be used to locate
Pakistan’s military assets, their mobility, missile launch
sites and radars. Even during peace time, India can
maintain a constant watch over Pakistan’s military
movement, giving the country an opportunity to develop
counter-measures.
At the strategic level also, Israel’s help in developing
India’s indigenous strategic BMD system and transfer of
other air and missile defence systems are also increasing
Pakistan’s threat perceptions.108
The growing number of
anti-missile systems in India is also very destabilising
the deterrence between India and Pakistan in the
region.109
As effective deterrence rests on the condition
of mutual vulnerabilities, the presence of an effective
BMD systems with an actor in a given region
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
89
undermines the ‘fear of mutual assured destruction
(MAD)’ between the states.110
Consequently, such a
situation not only creates a security dilemma by inducing
a false sense of security with BMD possessor, but also
influences an arms race in the region.111
The deployment of multi-layered anti-missile systems
both at land and sea would reduce Indian vulnerability
against Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise missiles by
affecting the possible penetration of these missiles into
the Indian territory.112
India’s sense of invulnerability
may induce a false sense of security to the country and
would ultimately act as an incentive for conducting pre-
emptive strike against Pakistan. Moreover, the growing
BMD capabilities of India would also affect Pakistan’s
strategic calculation.113
It has pushed Pakistan to
consider enhancing its nuclear arsenal both
quantitatively and qualitatively. In order to overwhelm
Indian BMD systems, Pakistan is considering an
increase in its offensive capabilities by adding more
lethal nuclear warheads. Therefore, Indian import or
development of missile defence systems would engage
both the countries in an unending strategic arms race.
Pakistan has always expressed concerns about India’s
military modernisation, development of the BMD
systems and nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean region.
These developments led Pakistan to adopt ‘Full
Spectrum Deterrence’ nuclear posture in face of growing
challenges from India. Pakistan maintains that the
country “would not remain oblivious to the evolving
security dynamics in South Asia and would maintain a
full spectrum deterrence capability to deter all forms of
aggression without entering into an arms race with any
other country.”114
However, the FSD policy is not a shift
from its decade old nuclear policy of Credible Minimum
Deterrence.115
Moreover, Pakistan has always shown
Journal of Strategic Affairs
90
restraint and responsibility while adopting measures
aimed at preserving deterrence stability in the region. In
April 2011. Pakistan conducted the first launch of its
surface-to-surface short-range ballistic missile Nasr to
deter the evolving threats at all the levels of the threat
spectrum.116
Pakistan’s Nasr tactical nuclear weapon
(TNW) was developed to fill the gap at the tactical level
of conflict and as direct response to India’s Cold Start
doctrine (CSD).117
The CSD basically calls for up to 8
independent armoured brigades to penetrate up to 50
kilometres into Pakistan to capture territory in an event
of a limited conflict under the country’s nuclear
threshold. Israel’s continued transfer of sophisticated
weapons and air defence systems enhances India’s
offensive capabilities which could allow the country to
easily operationalise it’s CSD strategy against Pakistan.
Therefore, to further augment its defence, Pakistan tested
two other important weapons in January 2017, including
Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM)118
and medium-range surface-to-surface ballistic missile
Ababeel (MRBM), which is capable of carrying multiple
independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).119
The successful development of Babur-3 provides
Pakistan with a credible second-strike capability,
enabling the country to launch nuclear weapons from
deep sea.120
In order to further augment the regional
strategic stability, Pakistan developed Ababeel MRBM
to ensure survival ability of its offensive missiles against
India’s anti-missile systems. 121
Conclusion
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between
India and Israel in 1992, their bilateral relationship has
now grown to a full strategic partnership. India-Israel
relations have flourished across a wide range of areas
including agriculture, commerce, science and
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
91
technology, space and trade. However, defence
cooperation between the two countries is a dominating
factor in the overall relationship. Indo-Israeli defence
engagement comprises not only weapons sale but also
involves elements of co-development and transfer of
technology. Israel has proven to be an appealing supplier
of state-of-the-art weapons and technology to India over
the last two decades. Furthermore, India-Israel defence
cooperation would continue in the coming years. Since
US-India interests are now converging, the US would
also likely not object to the transfer of weapons and
technology from Israel to India. More significantly,
India would also have an indirect access to US weapons
components through Israel. Though India is still
dependent on Israeli weapons and would remain so for at
least a foreseeable future, the country may potentially
become self-sufficient in the development of
sophisticated weapons technology owing to the transfer
of Israeli technology to the country under its trade deals.
Israeli arms procurement by India including weapons for
surveillance and reconnaissance and anti-missile systems
directly influence Pakistan’s sense of security. Israeli
weapons in the region not only affect deterrence stability
but also intensify the arms race in South Asia.
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The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
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Journal of Strategic Affairs
94
(2002): 198. 27.
Ibid, 199. 28.
Ibid. 199. 29.
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Ibid. 32.
Inbar, ‘The Indian-Israeli Entente’, 97. 33.
Bidanda M Chengappa, “India-Israel Relations: Politico-
Military Dimensions,” CLAWS Journal (2010), 251. 34.
“Asia and the Middle East lead rising trend in arms
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Judah Ari Gross, “India Shoots Down $500m Missile
Deal with Israel ahead of Netanyahu Visit,” The Times of
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india-shoots-down-500m-missile-deal-with-israel-ahead-
of-netanyahu-visit/. 37.
Vishnu Som, “In Rs. 3,547 Crore Deal, Assault Rifles,
Carbines Purchase Fast-Tracked,” NDTV, January 16,
2018, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/government-fast-
tracks-purchase-of-assault-rifles-carbines-for-rs-3547-
crore-after-11-year-wait-1800806. 38.
Inbar, “Israel and India: Looking Back and Ahead.” 375. 39.
Ibid.
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
95
40.
Prakash Gopal, “India–Israel Defence Engagement: A
Naval Perspective,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 4 (2017):
343. 41.
Ibid. 42.
Joshua Falk, “India's Israel Policy: The Merits of a
Pragmatic Approach,” Stanford Journal of International
Relations (2009): 2-3. 43.
Prithvi Ram Mudiam, ‘Indian Power Projection in Greater
Middle East’, in Global Politics, ed, M. Parvizi Amineh,
(Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007), 420. 44.
Ibid. 45.
Ibid. 46.
Nicolas Blarel, The Evolution of India’s Israel Policy
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 158. 47.
Ibid. 48.
Ibid, 159. 49.
Ibid. 186. 50.
Ibid, 281. 51.
Gopal, “India–Israel Defence Engagement.” 343. 52.
K.P. Nayar, ‘Why India Chose Rafale’, The Telegraph,
February 6, 2012, https://www.telegraphindia.com/
1120206/jsp/frontpage/story_15098135.jsp. 53.
Suhasini Haider, “Paradigm shift after Israel’s aid during
Kargil,” The Hindu, July 21, 2014,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/paradigm-shift-
after-israels-aid-during-kargil/article6234801.ece. 54.
Nayar, “Why India Chose Rafale.” 55.
Efraim Inbar and Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, “Indo-Israeli
Defense Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century,” Middle
East Security and Policy Studies no. 93 (2012): 4. 56.
“Super Dvora II,” Bharat Rakshak, http://www.bharat-
rakshak.com/NAVY/Ships/Active/170-Super-Dvora.html. 57.
Ibid. 58.
Inbar and Ningthoujam, “Indo-Israeli Defense
Cooperation.” 6. 59.
Robert O. Freedman, Contemporary Israel (Philadelphia:
West View, 2010), 442. 60.
“The Secret of T-72 Main Battle Tanks Improved Night
Vision,” The Hindu, February 19, 2015,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/bangalore/the-
Journal of Strategic Affairs
96
secret-of-t72-main-battle-tanks-improved-night-
vision/article6911932.ece. 61.
Ibid. 62.
Ibid. 63.
Joseph Weiss, “IAI Presents an Impressive Array of
Technologies,” Indian Defence Review, February 18,
2015, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/iai-
presents-an-impressive-array-of-technologies/. 64.
“IAI will Supply Elbit Systems Components Worth $13
million for the Ehud, Air Combat Maneuvering
Instrumentation (ACMI) Systems,” Israeli Aircraft
Industries, April 5, 2011,
http://www.iai.co.il/Shared/UserControls/Print/PopUp.asp
x?lang=en&docid=42456. 65.
Ibid. 66.
“Scrapped Spike missile deal back on table, says
Netanyahu,” The Hindu, January 18, 2018,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/scrapped-spike-
missile-deal-back-on-table-says-
netanyahu/article22463823.ece. 67.
Nayanima Basu, ‘Punj Lloyd ties up with Israeli co to
manufacture assault rifles in India’, The Hindu, May 4,
2017, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/
companies/punj-lloyd-ties-up-with-israeli-co-to-
manufacture-assault-rifles-in-india/article9680111.ece. 68.
Ibid. 69.
“Defence Acquisition Council nod to procurement of
assault rifles, carbines worth Rs 3,547 crore,” The Times
of India, January 16, 2018,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/dac-nod-to-
procurement-of-assault-rifles-carbines-worth-rs-3547-
crore/articleshow/62525551.cms. 70.
Neeta Lal, “India’s Eye in the Sky Takes Aim,” World
Security Network, April 21, 2009,
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/India-Israel-
Palestine/Lal-Neeta/Indias-eye-in-the-sky-takes-aim. 71.
Indrani Bagchi, “Military surveillance gets a boost with
RISAT-2,” The Times of India, April 21, 2009,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Military-
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
97
surveillance-gets-a-boost-with-RISAT-2/articleshow/
4426913.cms. 72.
“India-Israel Sign Seven MoUs on Space, Water
Conservation, Agriculture; Plan to set up $40 million
R&D Fund,” First Post, June 26, 2018,
https://www.firstpost.com/india/india-israel-sign-seven-
mous-on-space-water-conservation-agriculture-plan-to-
set-up-40-million-rd-fund-3779445.html. 73.
“PSLV-C34 Successfully Launches 20 Satellites in a
Single Flight,” Government of India, Department of
Space, Indian Space Research Organisation, June 22,
2016, https://www.isro.gov.in/update/22-jun-2016/pslv-
c34-successfully-launches-20-satellites-single-flight. 74.
“PSLV-C37 Successfully Launches 104 Satellites in a
Single Flight,” Government of India, Department of
Space, Indian Space Research Organisation, February 15,
2017, https://www.isro.gov.in/pslv-c37-successfully-
launches-104-satellites-single-flight. 75.
Raja Mansoor, “Pakistan Is Losing the Space Race,” The
Diplomat, February 1, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/
2018/02/pakistan-is-losing-the-space-race/. 76.
Ibid. 77.
Ibid. 78.
Ibid. 79.
Nicolas Blarel, The Evolution of India’s Israel Policy:
Continuity, Change, and Compromise since 1922 (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 300. 80.
Rahul Udoshi, “India Orders Additional Barak-1 Short-
Range SAMs,” Jane's 360, March 26, 2018,
http://www.janes.com/article/78846/india-orders-
additional-barak-1-short-range-sams. 81.
“Govt Nod for Rs 4k cr Israeli Surface-to-Air Missile
System,” Times of India, August 19, 2009,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-nod-for-
Rs-4k-cr-Israeli-surface-toair-missile%20system/
articleshow/4908764.cms?referral=PM. 82.
Masood ur Rehm Khattak, “Strategic Significance of
Indo-Israel Defence Collaboration: Implications for
Pakistan’s Security,” IPRI 16, no. 2 (2016): 52. 83.
Ibid.
Journal of Strategic Affairs
98
84.
“Israeli Spyder Missile Test a Hit,” The New Indian
Express, May 12, 2017, www.newindianexpress.com/
states/odisha/2017/may/12/israeli-spyder-missile-test-a-
hit-1603851--1.html. 85.
Ibid. 86.
Efraim Inbar and Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, Indo-Israeli
Defense Cooperation in The Twenty-First Century, Rubin
Centre in Research for International Affairs, December
22, 2011, http://www.rubincenter.org/2011/12/indo-
israeli-defense-cooperation-in-the-twenty-first-century/. 87.
“India Approves $2.5 billion Missile Deal with Israel,”
The Express Tribune, February 24, 2017,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1337386/india-approves-2-5-
billion-missile-deal-israel/. 88.
Lopamudra Roy, “IAI Delivers First Domestically Built
LRSAM to Indian Navy, “Naval Technology, September
5, 2017, https://www.naval-technology.com/news/
newsiai-delivers-first-domestically-built-lrsam-to-indian-
navy-5917555/. 89.
R. N. Ganesh, “Nuclear Missile-Related Risks in South
Asia.” In The Next Arms Race, ed, Henry D. Sokolski,
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 305-355. 90.
Yiftah S. Shapir, “Israel’s Arms Sales to India,” Strategic
Assessment 2, no. 3 (2009): 30-34. 91.
Khattak, “Strategic Significance of Indo-Israel Defence
Collaboration.” 92.
Nicolas Blarel, “Assessing US Influence over India–Israel
Relations: A Difficult Equation to Balance? Strategic
Analysis 41, no. 4 (2017): 394. 93.
Ibid. 94.
Jason A. Kirk, ‘Indian-Americans and the US–India
Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?’,
Foreign Policy Analysis 4 no. 3 (2008), 275–300. 95.
Blarel, “Assessing US Influence over India–Israel
Relations,” 395. 96.
Vivek Raghuvanshi, “US, India Said to be Nearing
Javelin Co-Production Agreement,” Defence September
21, 2016, https://www.defensenews.com/land/
2016/09/21/us-india-said-to-be-nearing-javelin-co-
production-agreement/.
The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence
Cooperation
99
97.
Rahul Singh, ‘India, Israel seal $2 billion missile deals:
What it means for New Delhi?’, Hindustan Times, April
7, 2017, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-
news/india-israel-seal-2-billion-missile-deals-what-it-
means-for-new-delhi/story-
xgm5OC7iYHNtuX1YDCV10J.html. 98.
Blarel, “Assessing US Influence over India–Israel
Relations,” 395. 99.
“Asia and the Middle East Lead Rising Trend in Arms
Imports.” 100.
Herb Keinon, “Netanyahu: Modi Is Revolutionizing
Israel-India Ties,” The Jerusalem Post, January 16, 2018,
https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/India-Israel/WATCH-
Netanyahu-and-Modi-pledge-strong-ties-in-joint-
statement-536783. 101.
Shapir, “Israel’s Arms Sales to India,” 35. 102.
Ibid, 36. 103.
Scrapped Spike missile deal back on table, says
Netanyahu.” 104.
Shapir, “Israel’s Arms Sales to India,” 36. 105.
“The Military Balance”, International Institute for
Strategic Studies (2015): 251, 278. 106.
Ibid. 107.
C. Raja Mohan, “Fernandes Unveils Limited War
Doctrine”, The Hindu, January 25, 2000,
http://www.thehindu.com/2000/01/25/stories/01250001.ht
m. 108.
Ganesh, “Nuclear Missile-Related Risks in South Asia.” 109.
Frank P. Harvey, “The Future of Strategic Stability and
Nuclear Deterrence,” International Journal 58, no. 2
(Spring, 2003): 321-22. 110.
Robert Powell, “Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age,” The
American Political Science Review 83, no. 1 (March
1989): 61; 67. 111.
Feroz Hassan Khan, “Prospects for Indian and Pakistani
Arms Control,” in The Next Arms Race, ed. Henry D.
Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July
2012), 358. 112.
Ibid. 113.
Ibid.
Journal of Strategic Affairs
100
114.
Press Release, No PR-133/2013-ISPR, Inter Services
Public Relations, September 5, 2013,
https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-
detail.php?id=2361. 115.
Press Release, No. PR 133/2013 ISPR, Inter Services
Public Relations, September 5, 2013,
https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-
press_release&date=2013/9/5. 116.
“Press Release, No. PR94/2011-ISPR, Inter Services
Public Relations, April 19, 2011.
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/books/turabian/turabian_c
itationguide.html. 117.
Press release, No PR-344/2017-ISPR, Inter Services
Public Relations, July 5, 2017, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/
press-release-detail.php?id=4097. 118.
Press Release, No PR-10/2017-ISPR, Inter Services
Public Relations, January 9, 2017,
https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-
detail.php?id=3672. 119.
Press Release, No PR-34/2017-ISPR, Inter Services
Public Relations, January 24, 2017, www.ispr.gov.pk/
press-release-detail.php?id=3705. 120.
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Press Release, No PR-34/2017-ISPR.
101
Afghanistan and the New Great Game:
Implications for Pakistan
Kashif Hussain
Introduction
For much of the late 19th and early 20
th centuries the
former British and Russian empires remained locked in
what is known as the ‘Great Game’. With Central Asia
forming part of the Russian empire and South Asia being
colonised by the British, Afghanistan served as the
buffer zone between their respective spheres of
influence. With the end of the Second World War the
Great Game also came to an end. However, the post 9/11
geostrategic maneuvers around Afghanistan gave rise to
the so called ‘New Great Game’. In this new game,
various regional and extra-regional powers are trying to
increase their influence in Afghanistan in order to gain
regional hegemony.
Ostensibly, the US intervened in Afghanistan to fight
terrorism. However, the long term US’ presence in the
country indicates that it is carefully, selectively and very
deliberately deploying its resources on the Eurasian
continent.1The vast landmass of Asia and Europe
combined constitutes the Eurasian continent.2 Within
Eurasia Afghanistan holds a significant geostrategic
position for connecting Southern, Southeastern, Western
and Central Asia. The reasons for the US to deploy its
military in Afghanistan are also clear. Doing so has
enabled the US to keep a check on China and Russia,
both of which could eventually emerge as dominant and
antagonistic Asian powers.3
In order to enhance its presence in the region, the US has
also maneuvered the complex South Asian power
Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan
102
relations to its advantage.4 It has struck a strategic
partnership with India, which already had tense relations
with China. The growing Indo-US partnership in turn
has strengthened the China-Pakistan strategic nexus.
China has launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
and selected the Pakistani corridor to access the Middle
East, Central Asia and beyond, through the CPEC.5 The
refusal of both the US and India to recognise CPEC not
only adds complexity to the situation but is a
manifestation of the rivalry between the two camps.6
Interestingly, Russia is also favouring China and
Pakistan in matters relating to Afghanistan. Against the
Indo-US wish to find a military solution to the Afghan
conflict, Russia supports Sino-Pakistan efforts for a
political breakthrough.7
Pakistan’s role is also pivotal for its geostrategic
leverage8 vis-à-vis Afghanistan and for connecting West,
Central and Southeast Asia. Pakistan also remains
important in terms of its history of political influence
over the Afghan Taliban.9 For the United States (US),
Pakistan is also vital for ensuring a smooth supply of
logistics to its mission in Afghanistan.10
The country’s
significance for China is evident in its mega investment
in the shape of the CPEC. Meanwhile, Russia is also
enhancing its bilateral relations with Pakistan, keeping in
view its central role in the changing geostrategic
environment.
In view of the emerging geostrategic trends this paper
discusses the following:
What are the key strategic objectives of various
players involved in the New Great Game in
Afghanistan?
Journal of Strategic Affairs
103
How does Pakistan’s geostrategic location
influence the US, Chinese and Russian policies in
pursuance of their interests in the region?
What implications and policy options exist for
Pakistan in light of the emerging New Great
Game?
The US Geostrategy in the Region
The interplay of strategy and geography in world affairs
led to the creation of the term ‘geostrategy’. Coined by
Frederic L. Shuman in 1942, geostrategy was the
translation of the German term ‘Wehrgeopolitik’ used by
the German geostrategist Karl Haushofer.11
Zbigniew
Brzezinski is one of the most prominent contemporary
advocates of geostrategy. His famous book The Grand
Chessboard is an instrumental guide available in order to
comprehend the US’ underlying geostrategic maneuvers
in the Eurasian continent. He defines the subject as, “the
strategic management of geopolitical objectives”.12
In
explaining the required elements for the US to be able to
exercise its geostrategic power and employ its
geostrategic skill, Brzezinski emphasised ‘the careful,
selective and very deliberate deployment of American
resources on Eurasian chessboard’.13
According to the
writer, the global primacy of the US will depend on how
America deals with the complex Eurasian power
relations and its ability to prevent the emergence of a
dominant and antagonistic Asian power.14
In pursuit of Brzezinski’s geostrategic
recommendations15
to wield greater geopolitical
advantage over the Eurasian continent, the US has
adopted attributes of ‘offensive realism’.16
John J.
Mearsheimer’s theory of ‘offensive realism’ is built on
five core assumptions. The first assumption is that there
is anarchy in the international system, which means that
Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan
104
there is no hierarchically superior, coercive power that
can guarantee limits on the behaviour of states.17
Second,
all great powers possess offensive military capabilities,
which they are capable of using against other states.18
Third, states can never be certain that other states will
refrain from using those offensive military
capabilities.19
Fourth, states seek to maintain their
survival above all other goals.20
Fifth, states are rational
actors, which means that they consider the immediate
and long-term consequences of their actions, and think
strategically about how to survive.21
Mearsheimer further
argues that the best way for great powers to ensure their
survival is to maximise power and pursue hegemony.22
The prospects for a state becoming global hegemon23
are
meagre due to vastness of the world territory hence the
need for great powers to pursue regional
hegemony.24
China’s bid for regional hegemony has thus
prompted the US and most of China’s neighbours to try
and contain China.25
Afghanistan serves as a focal area for the US to keep a
check on China’s growing interests in South and Central
Asia which could ultimately become a threat to US’
hegemony in the overall Asia Pacific region.26
To this
end, the US has chosen to partner with China’s
unfriendly neighbour, India.27
Interestingly, the US is not only encouraging India’s
involvement in Afghanistan but also favours a greater
position for New-Delhi in the greater Asia Pacific
region.28
India plays an important role within US’ counter
China policy in South Asia and the wider Asia Pacific
region.29
The 2018 US National Defence Strategy (NDS)
clearly singled out China as a strategic competitor
possessing revisionist objectives to attain regional
hegemony in the Asia pacific region.30
One of the
objectives outlined in the NDS document is clearly
Journal of Strategic Affairs
105
bolstering partners against coercion.31
In December
2016, the US Embassy and Consulates in India outlined
a fact sheet endorsing the defence relations of both
countries; and finalised India’s designation as a “Major
Defence Partner”.32
The Indo-US nuclear deal and the
defence partnership between the two countries can also
be explained in the light of the US’ efforts to contain
China. The US struck a civil nuclear deal with India in
2008. It was followed by close cooperation in building
India’s anti-ballistic missile systems.33
Over the years,
the US has become one of India’s largest arms
exporters.34
Both countries signed the Logistic Support
Agreement (LSA) in August 2016. The agreement
governs the use of each other’s land, air and naval bases
for repair and resupply. Moreover, the US is enhancing
India’s military capabilities in order to bring New-Delhi
at par with China.35
The fact that the US remains wary of China’s Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) is evident from the fact that Alice
G. Wells, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for South and Central Asia voiced concern about China’s
fast-moving Belt and Road Initiative during the US-
India forum held in April 2018.36
Wells emphasised that
through this initiative Beijing pumps cash into
infrastructure projects to buy access to resources around
the region.37
The CPEC, which is a flagship project of
the BRI, envisages taking China’s peaceful rise to new
heights by overhauling Pakistan’s infrastructure;
moreover it also acts as a counter-balance to the growing
Indo-US partnership.38
At the same time, Russia’s role is changing in the region
owing to the Afghan situation. Traditionally, Moscow
has been a close ally of India in the region.39
Although,
both India and Russia still maintain cordial relations,
their interests seem to be diverging in Afghanistan.40
Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan
106
Even as India and the US remain focused on fighting the
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, Moscow wants a
political reconciliation and streamlining of the Taliban in
order to focus attention on the rising Daesh threat.41
In
fact, the danger of Daesh for both Pakistan and Russia
has brought the two countries closer.42
In 2014, Russia
lifted its arms embargo on Pakistan.43
Since then,
Russia-Pakistan strategic relations have been growing.
In addition to that, Moscow’s endorsement of the BRI
and its plans to connect it with Eurasian Economic
Union (EEU) has meant Russia siding on the Sino-Pak
camp.44
The New Great Game
US’ Interests
The Bilateral Security Agreement signed between the
former Obama Admiration and Government of
Afghanistan in 2014 clearly reflects the US’ strategic
objective to ensure its long term presence in
Afghanistan. The agreement permits the stay of the US
and NATO troops in Afghanistan until the end of 2024
and beyond.45
The US Military will have access to nine
major land and airbases, including Bagram, Jalalabad,
Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Helmand, Gardez and
Shindand.46
For the US, Afghanistan serves as a vital
geostrategic point not only to keep a check on Russian
influence in Central Asia but also to deny any prospect
of China becoming a regional hegemon.47
Additionally, the US has shown its willingness to
connect the Central Asian energy resources through
pipelines with South Asia. In 2011, former US Secretary
of State, Hillary Clinton, shared her vision with her
German and Afghan counterparts on the sidelines of
66th United Nations General Assembly’s conference. It
Journal of Strategic Affairs
107
asserted the revival of the old concept of Silk Road.
Clinton expressed her willingness to build rail tracks,
highways and energy resource pipelines.48
The revival of the New Silk Road would promote
economic growth throughout Central Asia by integrating
the region into the global economy through introduction
of advanced infrastructure and effective cross-border
trade.49
Yet another important objective of the new Silk
Road initiative is to provide an economic boost to
Afghanistan.50
Various initiatives have been taken as a
result. Projects like Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-
India (TAPI) pipeline and CASA-1000 which aim to
provide energy from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India are integral parts of the
US’ new Silk Road Strategy.51
On February 23, 2018
Afghanistan’s section of TAPI pipeline project was
launched in Herat.52
The 1,814-kilometer pipeline would
pass through the territories of Herat, Farah, Nimroz,
Helmand and Kandahar provinces of Afghanistan, then
via Quetta and Multan in Pakistan the final destination
of the pipeline would be the Indian town of Fazilka. The
envisaged $22.5 billion project is expected to be
completed by 2019.
China’s Interests
China’s unprecedented economic growth during the last
couple of decades has helped the country reduce poverty
and unemployment at home and increase its national
wealth. Though, the south and centre remain wealthier
and more prosperous, the largest western autonomous
region of Sinkiang is comparatively underdeveloped.53
One of the reasons for the underdevelopment of
Sinkiang is its location far from the sea-lanes of South
China. An even the bigger challenge exists in the shape
of the rise of extremism in Sinkiang.54
In order to ensure
Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan
108
the spillover effects of economic prosperity to the
northwest of the country, China needs complete stability
in conflict ridden Afghanistan (adjacent to Sinkiang) to
stop the spread of extremism to the chinese mainland.55
Achieving this strategic goal would also help the country
to successfully implement President Xi’s geo-economic
vision (BRI) to replace the Northwest’s costly
communication dependence from South China Sea to the
sea-lanes of Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.56
In order to ensure cheap access to energy resources
China has enhanced its relations with Pakistan through
its mega investment in the shape of the CPEC. China is
also making efforts to enhance Pakistan’s military
capabilities, so that the country would serve as a
counter-balance to India.57
Pakistan is significant for
China to keep a check on India at such a time when the
former has become a key part of the US’ counter China
policy.58
Interestingly, military assistance from China is
also vital for Pakistan, especially because the US has
cut-off almost its entire military related support to the
country.59
China has become the largest arms exporter to
Pakistan surpassing the US.60
In August 2017, the
former inked a deal with Pakistan to provide it with eight
new stealth attack submarines to form the sea-based arm
of Islamabad’s growing nuclear second-strike triad.61
One of China’s key interests in the region remains
stabilising Afghanistan in order to curb the spread of
extremism to Sinkiang. To that end, China is making
serious efforts for Afghanistan’s economic
reconstruction and political reconciliation. The country
is an active member of the ‘Heart of Asia - Istanbul
Process’ (the process sought to bring cooperation
between Afghanistan and its neighbors). The resolve for
a political reconciliation between the National Unity
Government of Afghanistan (NUG) and the Taliban is
Journal of Strategic Affairs
109
also reflective in China’s efforts to activate the
Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG).62
Though the
QCG has not been able to yield any viable results,
Afghanistan continues to look towards China for
asserting influence over Pakistan to bring the Taliban to
the negotiating table.63
In this regard, China continues its
efforts to ensure a smooth relationship between Kabul
and Islamabad. On June 24, 2017, Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi after consulting both the foreign
offices in Islamabad and Kabul established a crisis
management mechanism.64
Most recently, Beijing hosted
the first China-Pakistan-Afghanistan tri-lateral dialogue
mechanism to maintain a smooth and workable
environment for Afghan political reconciliation.65
The
political reconciliation would lead to a stable
Afghanistan which is essential for China to curb the
spread of extremism to its mainland.
As far as Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction is
concerned, China remains one of the largest sources of
foreign direct investment.66
The country is also investing
in Afghanistan’s housing sector.67
Additionally, efforts
are being to uplift the quality of higher education in
Afghanistan.68
Most importantly, under BRI China is
working on at least three infrastructural projects in
Afghanistan which would not only uplift the economic
conditions of the conflict ridden country but also assist
to connect entire Eurasian continent.69
Russian Interests
Afghanistan has always remained geostrategically
important for Moscow. Even during the late 19th and
early 20th century the former Russian Empire did not
allow the British to take control of the Afghan territory.
Afghanistan served as a buffer zone keeping the British
influence away from Central Asia. The Soviet invasion
Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan
110
of Afghanistan during the 1980s also reflects the
country’s importance for Moscow. The former Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan in order to support the
communist government of the People’s Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against a growing
insurgency.70
However, experts have also pointed
towards the Soviet Union’s larger objective to access the
warm waters of the Arabian Sea and markets of the
Middle East through Pakistan.71
Another reason which
prompted the Soviets to invade Afghanistan was the
threat of the US influence’ spreading to Afghanistan and
Central Asia from Pakistan and Iran.72
This can be
attributed to the fact that during 1970s, Pakistan and Iran
were part of the US led Central Treaty Organisation
(CENTO).73
However, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan failed and the USSR collapsed as a result in
1992. Almost a decade later, the US embarked on the
second Afghan invasion in reaction to the 9/11 terror
attacks. Russia initially supported the US invasion.74
However, Washington’s inability to bring stability to the
Afghanistan during the last 17-years and the consequent
rise of the Daesh in the war torn country has changed
Moscow’s perceptions. Russia deems it necessary to
politically reconcile with the Taliban in order to
collectively fight the Daesh threat.
Moscow deems it necessary to curb the Daesh threat
before it spreads to mainland Russia through Central
Asia. Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov has
stated his concern that the Daesh’s presence in
Afghanistan “increases the risk of terrorists entering
Central Asia, from where it’s not difficult for them to get
to Russia, and further.”75
For that purpose, Russia wants
political mainstreaming of the Taliban in order to
collectively fight the Daesh threat. However, the United
States and National Unity Government of Afghanistan
seem more concentrated on fighting the Taliban than
Journal of Strategic Affairs
111
confronting the Daesh.76
This may be because Daesh has
been a rival to the Taliban in Afghanistan, with both
groups clashing as a consequence of rising strategic
competition.77
In fact, observers have accused the United
States and the NUG of collaborating with the Daesh
against the Taliban. While the United States has denied
this claim, it may be true that the United States and the
NUG are underestimating the threat of Daesh because it
perceives the group’s struggles with their primary
adversary (the Taliban) as a strategic asset to their
ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.
Owing to the situation, Moscow has not only transferred
significant military technology to Islamabad after lifting
its arm embargo in 2014 and increasing military to
military collaboration by holding joint exercises but also
by establishing an anti-terror commission to counter the
rising threat of Daesh from Afghanistan.78
As far as Central and South Asian integration is
concerned, Russia has endorsed China’s BRI and plans
to connect it with its vision of Eurasian Economic
Union.79
That in turn would serve to fulfil Russia’s
access to the warm waters of Arabian Sea via Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Central.80
A considerable Russia
presence in the Arabian Sea would help to strengthen
Sino-Pak nexus to counter the US.
Pakistan and the New Great Game
Notwithstanding the 16-year long Pak-US collaboration
in Afghanistan, the situation in the country is far from
stable. The Pakistan-US collaboration in the immediate
aftermath of the 2002 US-led invasion of Afghanistan
was fruitful. Consequently, in 2004 the US extended its
‘major non-NATO ally’ status to Pakistan recognising
the country’s efforts in the war against terror. The real
Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan
112
shift in Pakistan’s attitude towards the US followed the
invasion of Iraq.81
It was at that time when Pakistan
became skeptical about the US’ willingness to remain in
Afghanistan once the war was over.82
The Pakistani
leadership recognised the fact that once the military
operation was over, Afghanistan would require a new
government and reconstruction efforts for which the
Taliban leadership would be useful.83
Pakistan thus
urged the United States to distinguish between the
Taliban that wanted to strike a peace deal and those who
wanted to continue fighting.84
However the US wanted
Pakistan to not distinguish between different Taliban
factions.85
Since then it continues to criticise Pakistan’s
policy vis-a-vis the Taliban. The US alleges that
Pakistan assists various factions of the Afghan Taliban
in their activities against the US mission in
Afghanistan.86
This suspicion in turn has encouraged a
greater Indian role in Afghanistan, which has resulted in
a worsening of Pak-US relations.87
On its part, Islamabad contends that the greater Indian
involvement in Afghanistan allows New-Delhi to help
fuel anti-Pakistan segments in Kabul. Those anti-
Pakistan entities, in turn, carry out various illegal
activities, including terrorist attacks from across the
porous Durand Line.88
Not only does the US encourage India’s greater
involvement in Afghanistan, despite Pakistan’s
annoyance, it has also reduced its defence collaboration
with Islamabad. Even as Pakistan is being criticised for
its alleged differentiation between good and bad Taliban,
military aid to Islamabad is declining. There was a 73%
drop in US security aid to Pakistan from 2011 to 2015.89
In 2016 the US also cancelled the subsidised sale of
eight F-16 fighter jets.90
Pakistan received $225 million
in US foreign military financing in 2016 and in 2017 a
Journal of Strategic Affairs
113
reduction of $125 million has been proposed for the first
US budget under President Trump.91
Recently, the US
suspended its entire security aid to Pakistan.92
However, for the US’ strategic objective of long term
survival in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s cooperation is
essential as the country provides the shortest sea route to
Kabul. The US has been utilising Pakistani territory to
maintain logistics to its mission in Afghanistan. In
addition to that, without Pakistan’s assistance, it would
be difficult for the US to convince the Taliban for
political settlement of the Afghan conflict, due to the
history of the Pakistan’s influence over the insurgent
group.93
Moreover, Pakistan also holds a central role in the US’
New Silk Road concept. The implementations of TAPI
and CASA-1000 projects would not be possible without
Pakistan’s collaboration. However, the US seems to be
undermining Pakistan’s significance for the achievement
of its own objectives in the region.
As far as China is concerned, Pakistan is not only the
largest market for Chinese armaments but Islamabad
also secures Beijing’s larger interest in the Indian Ocean
with respect to its energy security. China’s aims to
achieve superiority over India in South Asia cannot be
fulfilled without Pakistan’s assistance. Pakistan’s crucial
location and the establishment of one the world deepest
sea ports of Gawadar are vital in this regard. Moreover,
the CPEC and its centrality to the overall BRI increases
Pakistan’s significance for China. The 3000 km road
link under CPEC connects the Gawadar port with
China’s Sinkiang province and provides Beijing with a
shorter route for the markets of Europe, Central Asia and
the Middle East.94
The corridor would also serve to
reduce its dependence on the Strait of Malacca in the
Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan
114
Indian Ocean, through which more than three quarters of
its oil imports are currently being shipped.95
China
deems its dependence on Malacca Strait a strategic
vulnerability due to the US’ predominance over these
maritime expanses.96
For Russia too Islamabad remains important to achieve
its changing strategic interests in the region. Russia
acknowledges the Taliban’s position in Afghanistan as
the US remains unable to defeat the insurgent group.
Russia also acknowledges that Pakistan holds
considerable influence over the Taliban. In addition to
that, the rising threat of Daesh in Afghanistan is a
common danger for Russia, Pakistan and the Taliban.
Keeping this convergence of interest in view, Russia has
extended its strategic relations with Pakistan during the
last couple of years. Secondly, the successful
implementation of CPEC and Russia’s Plans to connect
the EEU with the BRI provide Moscow with the
opportunity to access the warms waters of the Arabian
Sea.
Conclusion
‘Containing China’ is one of main reasons for the
prolonged US presence in Afghanistan and its growing
strategic partnership with India. Their offensive policies
in the region have strengthened the already strong Sino-
Pak relation. Moreover, the CPEC offers immense
opportunities for countries to uplift the socio-economic
condition of the entire region.
With China surpassing the US in fulfilling Pakistan’s
military and civil nuclear needs, Washington has much
to lose as result of weak relations with Islamabad. The
US cannot maintain the logistics to its mission in
Afghanistan without Pakistan’s help. Pakistan is also
Journal of Strategic Affairs
115
vital for bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table,
without which the end to the US problems in
Afghanistan seem improbable.
As far as Russia is concerned, Islamabad must capitalise
on its growing relations with Moscow by further
exploring its defence industry and making way for its
energy market. The increased Russo-Pak cooperation
should be viewed in the context of increasingly complex
challenges being faced by Moscow in the evolving
Afghan scenario. Russia considers Pakistan an important
player for the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Keeping in
view Russia’s longstanding relations with India and its
growing relations with Pakistan, Moscow could
ultimately be in a position to mediate to help resolve the
outstanding issues between the two countries.
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Michael Clarke, “China’s Afghanistan Dilemma,”
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for India, Pakistan Defence,” August 24, 2010.
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/chinese-military-assistance-
to-pakistan-and-implications-for-india.70404/ 58.
Iskandar Rehman, “Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India’s
Counter-Containment of China in Asia,” Asian Security,
(2009), 120. 59.
Anwar Iqbal, “America Suspends Entire Security Aid to
Pakistan,” Dawn, January 5, 2018.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1380876 60.
“Pakistan Shuns US for Chinese High Tech Weapons,”
Financial Times, April 18, 2018.
https://www.ft.com/content/8dbce0a0-3713-11e8-8b98-
2f31af407cc8 61.
Franz-Stefan Gady, “China to Supply Pakistan with 8
New Stealth Attack Submarines by 2028,” The Diplomat,
August 30, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/china-
to-supply-pakistan-with-8-new-stealth-attack-submarines-
by-2028/ 62.
Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) is a four-nation
group working for reconciliation in Afghanistan which
includes Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the US. The
group aims to initiate reconciliation process between
civilian government in Afghanistan and the Taliban to
preserve Afghanistan’s unity, sovereignty and territorial
integrity and achieve lasting peace and stability in
Afghanistan and the region. 63.
Arushi Kumar, “Why China’s One Belt One Road
Matters for Afghanistan,” South Asia Voices, May 12,
2017. https://southasianvoices.org/why-china-one-belt-
one-road-matters-afghanistan/ 64.
Baqir Sajjad, “China Brokers Pak-Afghan Crisis
Mechanism,” Dawn, June 26, 2017.
Journal of Strategic Affairs
121
https://www.dawn.com/news/1341752/china-brokers-pak-
afghan-crisis-mechanism 65.
“China Hosts Meeting to Improve Afghanistan-Pakistan
Relations,” Xinhua Net, December 12, 2017.
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-
12/26/c_136853473.htm 66.
“The Belt and Road Upgrades China-Afghanistan
Relations,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in
Afghanistan, March 25, 2016. http://af.china-
embassy.org/eng/sgxw/t1350774.htm 67.
“Afghanistan Housing Project Underlines China’s
Growing Role,” Reuters, March 22, 2017.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-china-
housing-idUSKBN16T0KV 68.
“China will Provide 500 scholarships over 5 Years to
Afghans to Study in China,” Aid Data, June 1, 2015.
http://china.aiddata.org/projects/37861 69.
China intends to extend CPEC into Afghanistan through a
set of six proposed projects including the Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan energy transmission line; a
motorway or rail connection from Peshawar in Pakistan to
Kunduz and extending into Central Asia; a motorway
project between Peshawar and Kabul; a road link between
Torkham and Kabul to join an existing road with
Pakistan; railway lines linking Pakistan’s Landi-Kotal
with Jalalabad and Pakistan’s Chaman to SpeenBoldak.
Additionally, the Five Nations Railway Corridor (FNRC)
is another project under BRI which runs through China,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Iran, connecting
China with the Iranian ports of Chabahar and Bandar
Abbas. 70.
“Afghan War,” Encyclopedia Britannica.
http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/turabian/turabian-
notes-and-bibliography-citation-quick-guide.html 71.
David C. George, “Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan:
Causes and Future Options,” Air War College (1986): 1,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a178357.pdf 72.
“Russia and Afghanistan,” Institute for the study of war,
February 5, 2018.
http://www.understandingwar.org/russia-and-afghanistan
Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan
122
73.
“Central Treaty Organisation,” Encyclopedia Iranica.
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/central-treaty-
organization-cento-a-mutual-defense-and-economic-
cooperation-pact-among-persia-turkey-and-pakistan-wi 74.
Russia and Afghanistan, Institute for the study of war,
February 5, 2018. 75.
“Pakistan Shares Russian Concern over Daesh Presence
in Afghanistan,” Pakistan Today, February 20, 2018.
https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/02/20/pakistan-
shares-russias-concern-over-daesh-presence-in-
afghanistan-says-asif/ 76.
“163 Rebels Dead in Weeks of Helmand Operation,”
Pajhwok Afghan News, November 5, 2017.
http://archive.pajhwok.com/en/2017/11/05/163-rebels-
dead-weeks-helmand-operation 77.
“Islamic State-Taliban Clash in Afghanistan Dozens
Killed,” Business Insider, April 26, 2017.
http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-islamic-state-taliban-
clash-in-afghanistan-dozens-killed-2017-4 78.
Kashif Hussain, “Russia-Pakistan Strategic Convergence:
Countering Daesh in Afghanistan,” South Asian Voices,
April 11, 2018. https://southasianvoices.org/russia-
pakistan-strategic-convergence-daesh/ 79.
Reid Standish, “China and Russia.” 80.
Raza Khan, “Russia’s CPEC Dream is Pakistan’s
Dilemma,” Express Tribune, September 6, 2017.
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1498597/russias-cpec-dream-
pakistans-dilemma/ 81.
Hussain Nadim, “Neither Friend nor Foe: Pakistan, the
United States and the war in Afghanistan,” Lowy Institute
(2017).
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/neither-friend-
nor-foe-pakistan-united-states-and-war-afghanistan 82.
Ibid. 83.
Ibid. 84.
Ibid. 85.
Ibid. 86.
Mushahid Hussian, “Trump’s Afghanistan Policy: the
View from Islamabad,” CNN, August 23, 2017.
Journal of Strategic Affairs
123
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/22/opinions/pakistan-
view-on-trump-afghan-hussain-opinion/index.html 87.
Ibid. 88.
Ibid. 89.
“US Security Assistance to Pakistan Declines to 73%,
Dawn,” August 23, 2016.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1279382 90.
Ankit Panda, “US won’t Subsidies Pakistan’s Purchase
of F-16 Fighter Jets,” The Diplomat, May 4, 2016.
https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/us-wont-subsidize-
pakistans-purchase-of-f-16-fighter-jets/ 91.
“US military Aid to Pakistan to have $125m Cut,” The
News, May 26, 2017.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/206723-US-military-
aid-to-Pakistan-to-have-125m-cut 92.
Iqbal, “America.” 93.
Alex Vatanka, Iran and Pakistan. 94.
Hussain, “The China Pakistan,” 20. 95.
Ibid. 96.
Ibid.
Journal of Strategic Affairs
124
BOOK REVIEW
Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments:
US Crisis Management in South Asia
Moeed Yusuf
Stanford University Press, 2018
PP 320
Following the end of bi-polarity, nuclear weapons have
become an important part of the foreign and security
policies of not only South Asia but also the Middle East
and East Asia. In the second nuclear age, a strategic
environment characterised by a multipolar nuclear order,
the prevention of nuclear war no longer depends on the
security calculations of the two super powers. The
emergence of the second nuclear age implies that the
only way to handle regional nuclear crises would require
a new strategic framework and also the political means
to deal with regional rivalries. Moeed Yusuf’s theory of
brokered bargaining offers both an innovative
framework and within a analysis of the important role
played by a third party mediator with enough political
influence to avert nuclear war in South Asia.
In “Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments,” Moeed
Yusuf, Associate Vice President of the Asia Centre at
the US Institute of Peace critically examines the South
Asian nuclear rivalry in the context of a unipolar world.
According to Yusuf, third party mediation, led
principally by the United States, has played an important
role in managing three South Asian crises after May
1998. Yusuf’s book is an effort to explain how the
three-way interaction between India Pakistan and the
United States unfolded during the Kargil Crisis, the
2001-2002 Military Standoff and the Mumbai Crisis
between India and Pakistan. Yusuf contends that the
dynamic of brokered bargaining by the United States
Book Review
125
was as much a consequence of the United States’
“sensitivities” to escalation risks as it was to India and
Pakistan’s sensitivities to “third party preferences given
its power to tilt the crisis decisively against them.” In
doing so he also highlights that this three way dynamic
involved signalling to multiple audiences and hence
introduced elements of misperception and inadvertence.
According to Yusuf, traditional deterrence frameworks
evolved during the Cold War are inadequate to
understand regional nuclear rivalries whether in South
Asia or elsewhere.The emergence of the second nuclear
age has indeed resulted in a strategic environment, which
cannot be understood using the traditional deterrence
models. In South Asia for example the US has played a
decisive role in diffusing several crisis situations, hence
the need to understand “crisis behaviour centered on
third party mediation.” Although third party roles
remained important during the Cold War also, Yusuf
argues that the role played by third parties was “ in the
context of formal alliance politics” and “did not take
away from the overbearing reality of the superpower
rivalry defining the bipolar global order.” Highlighting
the role of third party mediators in the regional context,
Yusuf outlines the reasons that shape a third party’s
outlook on regional crises. He argues that the choices
that the third party makes rest on the condition of
“regional nuclearisation” on the one hand and global
uni-polarity on the other.
Yusuf then goes on to examine the outcome of three
Indo-Pakistan crises using the brokered bargaining
model to draw out both differences and similarities
between the three situations. Using the trilateral model
Yusuf highlights how Delhi, Islamabad and Washington
DC, each used signaling in order to influence the other
two players and their respective policies. Yusuf
Journal of Strategic Affairs
126
concludes that the US played an essential role in
diffusing the Kargil conflict by throwing its weight
behind India vis-à-vis Pakistan even as it sought “India’s
assurance that it would not expand the conflict outside
the Kargil theater.”
According to Yusuf, the so called Twin Peaks Crisis of
2001-2002 once again saw the importance of third party
mediation in helping avert conflict in South Asia.
Despite the US’ heavy commitments in Afghanistan,
decision makers in Washington DC supported US
involvement in South Asia to end the crisis. On their
part, both India and Pakistan ultimately “wanted the
United States to act as a separator” leading to a situation
where “India was urged to show restraint and Pakistan
was pushed to deliver” on the pledges that it had
previously made. The US also played an important role
as “a conduit for information sharing” between India and
Pakistan as leadership in both countries failed to
communicate directly.
Yusuf argues that the Mumbai Crisis was different than
its predecessors in that India decided to “collate all the
information, piece together the picture and then act”
rather than taking swift action against Pakistan. It chose
instead to use “aggressive and threatening rhetoric “ to
convince Pakistan to make concessions. In this situation
to the United States played a crucial role in the context
of information sharing between the two countries and
helped prevent a crisis that otherwise had the potential to
spiral out of control.
Despite the strong arguments made in favour of third
party mediation and the successful role it has played in
managing conflict in South Asia, Yusuf’s assertion that
the brokered bargaining model can offer lessons for
crises between potential rivals in the Middle East, on the
Book Review
127
Korean Peninsula or between China and India is perhaps
too simplistic. The role of the third party mediator
depends on several factors, which are unique to every
crisis and Yusuf himself identifies these differences in
comparing the three conflicts in South Asia. These
factors include but are not limited to the roles and
attitudes of the individual leaders, the regional and
global environment and also the time frames within
which a crisis matures. All these factors together create a
unique dynamic every time a crisis occurs and a
mediator may or may not be able to deal effectively with
crises in different settings.
However this does not mean that Yusuf’s theory of
brokered bargaining isn’t without merit. Third party
mediation has assumed an important role in managing
regional nuclear conflict and will remain relevant in the
future also. The requirements for deterrence in the
regional context have become more complex not only
because deterrence relationships have multiplied but
more so because they are more interdependent and
interlinked. As such, the decision-making and policies in
one relationship will invariably impact other
relationships. Yusuf’s book provides sufficient food for
thought for policy makers to envision how future
conflicts in South Asia or other regions may unfold. It
also cautions the reader however that brokered
bargaining remains fraught with risk. In a real crisis
regional rivals and third party mediators could easily
create greater confusion and instability in the absence of
a clear understanding of crisis behavior or proper tools
to ensure peaceful outcomes.
Amina Afzal