JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC RESEARCH -...

Islamic University of Europa

JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC RESEARCHİslam Araştırmaları

Vol 2 No 2 December 2009

46 Vol 2 No 2 December 2009

The Hermeneutics ofIbn RushdMesut OKUMUŞ, Prof. Dr.

Hitit University

Introduction

Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) is regarded as the most rationalist philosopher in thehistory of classic Islamic thought. From his boyhood onwards, he studied med-ical science, mathematics, and philosophy along with such Islamic sciences asQur’ânic exegesis, Hadîth, theology, and jurisprudence. Apart from the Islamicsciences, he composed in the advanced years of his life many books in a widerange of fields such as logics, physics, metaphysics, psychology, medical sci-ences, politics, and ethics. Following in the footsteps of his father and grandfa-ther, he functioned as a jurist first in Sevilla and then in Cordova. Historians andbiographers describe him as possessing an acute mind, a deep understanding, astrong analytical power as well as an articulate and lucid style of writing.1

Having studied the science of Hadîth along with Qur’ânic exegesis, jurispru-dence, and the methodology of jurisprudence, he memorized Imâm Mâlik’s(d.179/795) al-Muwatta’ as part of the curriculum of the traditional Islamiclearning in Andalusia.2 In addition to his many original works in religious andphilosophical sciences, he produced a vast literature in the genre of commen-taries and summaries. In the discipline of the methodology of jurisprudence thatlays down the general principles of the Islamic jurisprudence, he composed abook entitled al-Darûrî fî usûl al-fiqh (The Necessary in the Methodology ofJurisprudence). Though this work is a summary of al-Ghazzâlî’s (d. 505/1111)al-Mustasfâ, he says in the end of the book that it is an original work in certain

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respects.3 On the practical issues of jurisprudence, he composed Bidâyat al-mujtahid wa nihâyat al-muqtasid. Literally meaning the end of the intermediatelevel and the beginning of the advanced level in the study of jurisprudence, thisbook, in which he strongly encourages ijtihâd, is unique in the field. As impliedby the title of the work, Ibn Rushd tries in it to explain the differences of inter-pretation among the various legal schools, expounding the reasons behind thelegal disagreements, hence taking an important step towards re-opening the gateof ijtihâd as part of his overall project. By the overall project, we mean his holis-tic intellectual struggle to restore the balance that collapsed in the whole fieldsof knowledge ranging from philosophy to religion.4

Ibn Rushd thus should be viewed as a passionate and efficient restorer in thefullest sense of the word in both religion and philosophy. Through his correc-tions of the misunderstandings of Aristotle by his followers, Greek and Muslim,he immensely contributed to the comprehension of the real Aristotelian philos-ophy. So, he paved the way for the Enlightenment in Europe. His views con-cerning the controversial relation between religion and philosophy as well as hisFasl al-maqâl, in which he addresses this issue, well demonstrate his reforma-tive and restorative outlook.

Since this study is intended to examine the hermeneutics of Ibn Rushd, it is con-cerned with philosophy and philosophical sciences on one hand and with reli-gion and religious disciplines on the other. To explain Ibn Rushd’s stance vis-à-vis the question of hermeneutics, we will try to clarify what he means by suchterms as philosophy, religion, and interpretation and elucidate his views on therelation between religion and philosophy. Then we will proceed to illustrate hisviews on the hermeneutics of religious texts, the necessary method for deter-mining the texts to be interpreted, and who is authorized to fulfill this precari-ous task. Lastly, we will analyze his views as to the methods and procedures inaccordance which the scholars will interpret the religious texts. By this plan, wewill try to provide an insight into his hermeneutics.

a. The Nature of Philosophy and Religion

It seems difficult to form a perfect definition of philosophy that may enjoy theunanimity of philosophers, for each has a differing notion of philosophy.5

However, since the subject of this study is the hermeneutics of Ibn Rushd, hisview and definition of philosophy concern us in the first place. In his Fasl al-maqâl, Ibn Rushd defines philosophy precisely and concisely as follows:“Philosophy is nothing but contemplating on the beings in the respect that theyindicate their Creator.”6 His addition “in the respect that they indicate theirCreator” is taken as the token of his conceiving philosophy as a teleologicalendeavor.7 In another of his works, he defines philosophy as “nothing but know-ing the causes of a thing.”8

In his works, in which he handles the relation between religion and philosophy,by religion (al-dîn) he seems to exclusively mean Islam as revealed to the



Prophet Muhammad, and by the Law-Giver (shâri‘) both the Qur’ân and theProphet Muhammad. This is evidenced by the fact that in many contexts in Faslal-maqâl and in al-Kashf, he mentions the name of the Prophet immediatelyafter the term Law-Giver.9

Yet one needs to consider the fact that Ibn Rushd takes philosophy as the total-ity of sciences whereas many disciplines that were at his time counted as thebranches of philosophy gained independence from philosophy later. In otherwords, Ibn Rushd’s notion of philosophy and that of ours are not the samebecause the scope of his notion of philosophy covers all the natural sciences,mathematics and metaphysics, and his conception of philosopher designates thescholars who are well-versed in all these disciplines, whereas mathematics,medical and natural sciences are no longer the subjects and branches of philos-ophy as studied at the philosophy departments of today’s universities. So, oneneeds to bear this fact in mind when trying to understand and explain the priv-ileged status he grants to the philosophers in hermeneutics.

b. The Relation Between Religion and Philosophy

In Fasl al-maqâl, Ibn Rushd discusses philosophy and philosophical disciplinesfrom the perspective of religion as well as the legitimacy of philosophy from areligious viewpoint. He stresses this point in the introduction, too, by saying thathe will try to look at philosophy from the perspective of religion and analyze theposition of philosophy and logics from the viewpoint of Law (sharî‘a). He addsthat during his discussion, he will try to conclude if philosophy is permissible orapprehensible from the Islamic point of view, and if not apprehensible, he willtry to conclude whether it is a recommended or an obligatory task.10

In fact, Ibn Rushd maintains that philosophy and religion have the same goal,which is acquiring a right and correct knowledge and performing a right action,eventually obtaining praiseworthy moral traits. To him, studying religion andphilosophy without having morality is detrimental to both religion and philoso-phy in final analysis. Therefore, both jurist and philosopher should be fair intheir judgments, observe the moral principles, and seek a virtuous and morallife. Ibn Rushd himself acted upon this principle in his life, putting in practicewhat he pronounced, trying to be honest and sincere in this sense. In otherwords, he strove to be both a righteous jurist and a virtuous philosopher.11

Ibn Rushd identifies the primary goal of Law as training the people with rightknowledge and encouraging them to do moral deeds. The right knowledge,called the knowledge of God (marifatullâh) too, designates knowing the beingsas they are in reality as well as being aware of the factors leading to felicity andwretchedness in the next world. The practical knowledge is performing the gooddeeds that will bring about felicity in this world and in the next as well as avoid-ing the evil actions that will cause wretchedness in both worlds.

The practical knowledge is concerned with the realm of actions that are divid-ed into the bodily actions and the actions and states of heart, like perseverance,



thankfulness etc. While the former is addressed by the discipline of jurispru-dence, the latter is treated by ethics. The latter is also called the sciences ofasceticism and the sciences of the next world (zuhd and ‘ulûmu’l-âhira) in thecategorization of religious sciences. Ibn Rushd informs that al-Ghazzâlî (d.505/1111) in many of his works focused on these sciences, addressing the issuesthat will lead to piety and felicity.12

Ibn Rushd’s Fasl al-maqâl, mostly concerned with the religion-philosophy rela-tion, is in fact a detailed and in-depth answer to the views of al-Ghazzâlî’s as setforth in his Faysal al-tafriqa.13 In the latter work, the author addresses the sub-ject of hermeneutics, the position of the Islamic schools of hermeneutics, theissue of declaring one to be unbeliever, the necessary conditions for an accept-able interpretation. Then he lays down his own hermeneutical method in accor-dance with the fivefold categorization of beings special to him. As for the mainconcern of Fasl al-maqâl, it is to prove the possibility of removing the outwarddisharmony between philosophy and religion by interpreting the religious state-ments in conformity with Law. So we can describe its general subject ashermeneutics, too.14

In this important book, Ibn Rushd attempts at investigating the philosophicalthought from a religious standpoint, discussing if philosophy is apprehensible,obligatory or recommended, to speak in the terminology of the Islamic jurispru-dence. He tries to address this issue first in reference to the two primary sourcesof Law, i.e., the Qur’ân and the Sunna and then on the basis of the consensus ofthe scholars and analogical reasoning, regarded as the auxiliary proofs in Law.Therefore, Hourani seems to be right when he points out that the Fasl al-maqâlis not a philosophical work that addresses the classic subjects of philosophy, buta philosophical treatise that investigates the position and legitimacy of philoso-phy from a religious point of view.15 Given the fact that Ibn Rushd is both ascholar of Islamic law and a philosopher, it is normal that he tries to defend andearn legitimacy for philosophy in his jurist robe against those who challenge thelegitimacy of philosophy.16

Departing from the the Qur’ânic verses and the sayings of the Prophet thatencourage contemplation and reflection, Ibn Rushd tries to illustrate anddemonstrate the necessity of philosophy from both a religious and rational per-spective,17 concluding that contemplating on beings through reasoning, i.e.,philosophizing, is not only permissible but obligatory from a religious point ofview.18 He takes Law’s summoning the people to examine beings with therational faculty as a clear invitation to the task of philosophizing.19 So, he holdsthat Law itself defines philosophizing as an obligatory act, let alone forbiddingor banning it.

Referring to rational thought, termed “nazar”, i.e. reflection in the Arabic philo-sophical language, with the word “i‘tibâr”, meaning taking lesson, the Qur’âncalls on people to contemplation and reflection, both of which amount to the



same effect of proceeding from the known to the unknown, i.e., analogical rea-soning. Therefore what is meant here is to reach the Creator by reflecting on andthinking over the creatures.20

In another work of his, Ibn Rushd points out that via three ways are receivedrulings from the Prophet, viz., via his statements, actions, and approvals. Hestresses that the vast majority of the Muslim scholars used the method of ana-logical reasoning as a source of Law after the Sunna to decide the issues that arenot clarified by the Law-Giver, even though the Zahirites disapproved of thevalidity of analogical reasoning in the realm of religion, holding that no rulingcan be asserted on the issues about which Law-Giver kept silent.21

Ibn Rushd’s al-Kashf ‘an manâhij al-adilla is in fact an extension of the Faslal-maqâl. In the former, the author handles the issue of hermeneutics, analyzingand criticizing the varying positions of the Islamic schools of hermeneutics,their methods of demonstration, eventually exposing his own hermeneuticalprinciples.

In the introductory remarks of his al-Kashf, the author divides Law into twomain groups as the evident rulings and the ambiguous ones that need beinginterpreted. He defines the former as the obligatory task that is determined bythe vast majority of the scholars (jumhûr) and the latter as the obligatory dutydetermined by some scholars (‘ulamâ’). However, as we will clarify soon, hemakes a special definition of the terms jumhûr and ‘ulamâ’. He is of the opin-ion that the due task of the jumhûr is to explain Law just as it appears, abandon-ing interpreting the religious texts away. It is not permissible for the scholars tounfold the intricate interpretation of Law to the common people, as ordained by‘Alî, the son-in-law of the Prophet and the fourth of the Rightly Guided Caliphs:“Explain the intricate issues to people as they can understand. Otherwise, areyou willing that they belie God and His Messenger?!”22

In the introduction, Ibn Rushd explains the reason of his composing the presentbook as the following: “In this book, I intend, as far as I can, to examine the out-ward aspects of the tenets of creed that Law made incumbent upon the peopleas well as to expound the purpose of the Law-Giver, the Prophet. People arehaving trouble in relation to this issue, and due to it have appeared many devi-ated sects and a variety of schools, each of them considering itself to be firmlyrooted in the pristine Law23 and the others either to be innovators or unbeliev-ers, whose goods are permissible to spoil and blood to shed. They all turnedaway from the purpose of the Law-Giver because they are mistaken and mis-guided in understanding the purpose of Law.”24

Informing that the schools in his age are four, the first of whom is the Ashariteswho are qualified as Ahl al-Sunna by the majority of the Muslim community,and the rest being the Mutazila, the Bâtiniyya, and the Hashawiyya. To him, allthese groups held discrepant beliefs of God and interpreted the scriptural word-



ings away in accordance with their own doctrines. Arguing that their interpreta-tions and doctrines are the pristine Law, they declared followers of the otherdoctrines to be either unbeliever or innovator. Comparing their attitudes and thepurpose of Law, one can recognize that most of such doctrines have stemmedfrom the false and innovated interpretations.”25

After clarifying the unsound interpretations of various sects, he proceeds toexplain the right doctrine as to the issue: “Brushing aside the things that areinterpolated in the principles of Law by means of the unsound interpretations, Iwill expose the doctrine integral to the faith and essential to Law, investigatingthe real purpose of the Law-Giver.”26

Looked from this perspective, both of the works prove to move towards thesame goal, written as part of a restoration project, aiming at fixing the brokenrelations between religion and philosophy and putting hermeneutics on the righttrack.

Ibn Rushd sees no disharmony or conflict between religion and philosophy, try-ing to prove that these two truths do not contradict each other. In the Fasl al-maqâl which he composed primarily to address this issue, he makes the follow-ing point: “Since the divine Law is true and calls on to the way of reasoning anddeliberation that leads to the knowledge of truth, we, as the Muslim communi-ty, certainly know that the demonstrative reasoning do not lead to any resultsthat are inharmonious with Law. This is because what is true does not conflictwhat is true; on the contrary, they agree and support each other.”27

These statements of Ibn Rushd are taken by the Latin scholastics of the thirteenthcentury as his adoption of the theory of double truth. This theory argues that therevealed truths are right within the realm of religion while the philosophicaltruths are right within the realm of philosophy. Thus, since they do not encounter,they do not clash either. The proponents of this approach hold that Ibn Rushdaccepts both statements to be right, describing his general acceptance as the maintheme of the treatise.28 On the other hand, some scholars maintain that he doesnot adopt two distinct truths, one being special to the elites and the other to thecommon people; rather, he espouses the unity of truth though its perception dif-fers from the sight of scholars to that of the common people, and this differencegoes back to their diversity in the degree of consciousness and knowledge.29

What Ibn Rushd concludes from his discussion of the relation between religionand philosophy as regards the religious position of philosophy is the fact that theQur’ân encourages the scientific and teleological investigation of the universeas a subject matter of philosophy. Therefore, studying philosophy, including theAncient Greek philosophy, is clearly approved of and even encouraged by thelofty book of Islam. Ibn Rushd believes that no disharmony can occur betweenreligion and philosophy in essence. The incidental damages caused by philoso-phy are partial and accidental, and not essential. Therefore, for the purpose of



counteracting the damages caused by the quasi-philosophers, the subtle art ofphilosophizing should be performed by the qualified persons, i.e., those whohave the sufficient intellectual capacity for wielding the demonstrative proofs,instead of banning philosophy and censuring philosophical books.30 Thus, IbnRushd disapproves of a total ban on philosophy and philosophical works due tothe individual mistakes and partial damages for this would amount to the effectof inhibiting the command of Law.31

Ibn Rushd thinks that the outward disharmony between religion and philosophycan be removed by interpreting the religious texts away. But such subtle andintricate interpretations need being carried out by the experts, not by the com-mon and unqualified people, and being kept among the experts, and should notbe allowed to pass into circulation among the common people.32 The relationIbn Rushd envisages between philosophy and religion is that of twins. So thesetwo can only be brothers, and not enemies. He expresses this fact in his follow-ing historic words: “Philosophy is the friend and twin of Law, who is fed fromthe same breast.”33

c. The Nature of the Qur’ânic Verses

The seventh verse of the Sura Ål-u Imrân cites some key terms for the under-standing of the Qur’ân and divides the verses into the clear (muhkam) andambiguous (mutashâbih) as contrasted with each other.34 In this verse firstcomes the term clear and is followed by and contrasted with the terms ambigu-ous and interpretation. The verse also reads that the clear verses are the essenceand core of the divine speech. On the basis of this stress, some researchers assertthat the clear verses involve the fundamental moral and legal principles.35

The following statements of the same verse emphasize that the ambiguous vers-es may be misused by the malevolent to instigate sedition: “It is He who has sentdown to you the Book, some verses of which are clear, being the mother of theBook, and some others being ambiguous. But those in whose hearts is perversi-ty follow the part thereof that is ambiguous to instigate sedition and make theirinterpretation, but no one knows its interpretation except Allah and those whoare firmly grounded in knowledge say: “We believe in the Book; the whole ofit is from our Lord”. Only men of understanding grasp the message.”36

Among the scholars there is a disagreement over the reading of the verse. Someof them read it as “But no one knows its interpretation except Allah. And thosewho are firmly grounded in knowledge say: “We believe in the book…” while theothers read as “But no one knows its interpretation except Allah and those whoare firmly grounded in knowledge. They say: “We believe in the Book…” Thisdifference in reading has given rise to differing views on the interpretation of thisverse as well as on the determining of ambiguous verses and their interpretation.Ibn Rushd prefers the second reading as long as by “those who are firmly ground-ed in knowledge” is meant the philosophers.37 But if the theologians and the com-



mon people are concerned, the verse should be read in the first variant and theymust keep away from interpretation. In short, a variety of views have been setforth as to the definition of the terms “clear”, “ambiguous” and “interpretation”and severe debates took place over the determination and interpretation of theambiguous statements. In consequence of these disagreements and debates, anumber of doctrinal sects arose and acquired different titles according to theirapproach to the religious texts. Each sect claimed its own interpretation andapproach as well as its own definition and explanation to be right, while criticiz-ing and blaming the others to the extent of declaring them to be unbeliever.

d. Ibn Rushd’s Definition of Interpretation

Al-Ghazzâlî defines interpretation (ta’wîl) as “explaining a word or phrase in asense that is different from its outer literal sense.” He also regards any interpre-tation as carrying the word from its literal and original sense to an allegoricaland figurative meaning. But he conditions this shift from the literal to the figu-rative on the existence of a semantic or contextual evidence.38

Ibn Rushd takes up al-Ghazzâlî’s definition of interpretation in general termsbecause he also views interpretation as “taking a word from its original sense toan allegorical meaning.”39 Ibn Rushd says that in the allegorical interpretation,one should not ignore and violate the linguistic conventions special to theArabic language.40 So, Ibn Rushd’s definition of interpretation is somewhat dif-ferent from that of al-Ghazzâlî since the latter clarifies the condition of interpre-tation being supported by a semantic or contextual evidence while this condi-tion is not so clearly expressed in the former.41 Ibn Rushd’s definition of inter-pretation and the following delimitation suggest that some words and phrasesmay possess allegorical connotations apart from their original denotations. Thesame delimitation implies his acceptance of the fact that such allegorical mean-ings do come into existence in Arabic as in other languages. In connection withthe matter of interpretation, this approach rules out arbitrariness in determiningthe allegorical meanings, requiring to remain within the range of senses thatexist in the Arabic convention. Not to keep within these lawful semantic bordersin interpretation will lead to arbitrariness and chaos, ending up with the alter-ation and distortion of the intended meaning.

Inspired by this hermeneutic principle of Ibn Rushd, Abû Ishâq al-Shâtibî (d.790/1388), another Andalusian scholar, says as the following: “Any meaningdrawn from the Qur’ân without conforming to the linguistic conventions of theArabic language has no place in the Qur’ânic sciences. No use is made of suchmeaning that failed to make use of the Qur’ân.”42

The definition of interpretation by al-Ghazzâlî and Ibn Rushd by and large havebeen accepted by the later Islamic scholars. For instance, Sayyid Sharîf al-Jurjânî (d. 816/1413) makes the definition of interpretation as the following:“Literally meaning reversing, the Arabic word ta’wîl in religious terminology



designates reversing a word from its literal sense to one of its [semantically andlinguistically] possible meanings that is in harmony with the Book and theSunna. For example, if one says by the verse “You bring the living out of thedead and You bring the dead out of the living”43 is meant the hatching of chick,this is called tafsîr, i.e., explanation. But if he goes as far as to say that by thisverse is meant the coming out of unbeliever from the believer and vice-versa,and the coming out of ignorant from the learned and vice versa, this is ta’wîl,i.e., interpretation.”44

In fact, Ibn Rushd’s definition of interpretation is not enough to answer someimportant questions and resolve some significant problems, some of which areas follows: determining the number and limits of the religious texts to be inter-preted, deciding which one of the alternative or possible meanings existingwithin the realm of linguistic borders is right and valid, who will make this deci-sion etc. For the linguistic rules only determine the borders, but the questionwhich one of the meanings should be picked out persists. After the definition ofinterpretation is needed to resolve the following problems, too: First, who willdecide whether or not a religious statement is allegorical? Then, which princi-ples will be relied on in making the correct and decisive interpretation of them?As regards the first question, Ibn Rushd suggests a solution different from thatof al-Ghazzâlî. Concerning the second one, he adopts al-Ghazzâlî’s hermeneu-tical principles, instead of proposing new ones.

e. The Authority and Realm of Interpretation

Principally, Ibn Rushd accepts that the religious statements whose literal sense isin disharmony with the results of the demonstrative reasoning can be interpretedaway in conformity with the conventions of the Arabic language. Yet he does notclarify the number and realm of such statements, only setting a general frame-work. He points out the absence of consensus over the number of the religiousstatements that need being interpreted away. So it is not necessary, in his opin-ion, to take all the religious statements in their literal sense, neither is right tointerpret all of them away. In spite of their agreement on this point, the scholarsdisagreed on the statements that need being interpreted away and need not.Neither does Ibn Rushd himself draw a clear-cut line as regards the number andrealm of the statements to be interpreted away, sufficing himself with quoting theapproach of two different legal and creedal schools to the same verse. He informsthat the Ash’arites tend to interpret away the verse “All-Gracious is firmly estab-lished on the throne” as well as the saying of the Prophet known as “hadîth al-nuzûl (the descent of God)” while the Hanbalites take both of the texts in theirliteral sense and systematically refrain from the interpretation.45

In his discussion of who is authorized to interpret the religious statements, hecategorizes people into three groups and appoints a due and lawful task for eachgroup. Thus, people are divided into three main groups vis-à-vis the interpreta-tion of the religious texts:



“1. The first group is not authorized for any sort of interpretation at all. Calledthe Rhetorical People (ahl al-khatabah), they constitute the majority of people.

2. The second group has authority for the argumentative and dialectical inter-pretation. Called the Dialectical People (ahl al-jadal), these are given to dialec-tics either by nature or by habit or by both.

3. The third is authorized for the absolute interpretation. Called theDemonstrative People (ahl al-burhân), these are the philosophers who areinclined to wisdom both by their nature and by their arts.”46

By the Demonstrative People, Ibn Rushd means the philosophers, while by theDialectical People, he means the theologians (mutakallimûn), and by theRhetorical People the masses (jumhûr). However, he defines the masses as “allthe people who are not interested in the art of demonstration, regardless ofwhether they are well-versed in theology or not.47 So he defines the masses asbroadly as to include all the people to the exception of the philosophers. He thusfinds the theologians, viz., the Mutazilates and the Asharites, unqalified for thistask. For him, since they lack the demonstrative knowledge, they have noauthority for the task of interpretation.48

Ibn Rushd introduces the method of the Qur’ân as the best method for the pur-pose of training the masses as to the issue of interpretation. He believes that theearly Muslims attained a genuine piety because they did not adventure to inter-pret the religious texts away. However, since the following generations soughtfalse interpretations, this attitude undermined love and solidarity among themand caused devastating clashes and the rise of different sects on one hand anddid away with sincerity and piety, gist of the religion, on the other. Whoeverfrom the masses is willing to stay aloof from deviation, he must turn his atten-tion to the Qur’ân and suffice himself with its evident meaning because it isopen to all.49

Ibn Rushd holds that the Qur’ânic statements that are explained to the public hasthree characteristics that indicate the miraculous nature of the Qur’ân (i‘jâz):

1. No statement is more perfect than the Qur’ânic statements in terms of per-suading the people and being confirmed by them.

2. If the nature of these statements necessitates an interpretation, only theDemonstrative People can accomplish this task to some extent.

3. These statements contain some signs that lead the people of truth to the cor-rect interpretation. However, these features lack in Asharism and in Mutazilism.In other words, the interpretations of these two schools are not successful or cor-rect, nor do they contain any sign that points to truth. This is the reason behindthe spread and increase of innovations among the people.50

If one contemplates on the Qur’ân, he finds that it contains the three ways rele-vant respectively to the demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical people, com-



ing to realize that there can be no common way for training the people betterthan the ways mentioned in the Qur’ân. In addition, Law’s primary target audi-ence is majority people though it does contain some warnings to the elites.51 Asfor the masses and majority people, who cannot grasp beyond the rhetoricalstatements, they must understand the religious texts in their literal sense. Thus,it is not permissible for the masses to know the interpretations, nor is permissi-ble to write for them what they cannot understand. If one divulges the interpre-tation to the masses, this amounts to leading them astray.52

Ibn Rushd holds that if one considers the religious method, he realizes that itcontains two characteristics: certainty and simplicity. As regards the authorityfor the task of interpretation, he does not regard the theologians as qualified andcompetent. By including them in the category of the masses, he disapproves ofthe explanation of the interpretation, peculiar to the philosophers, to the dialec-ticals, i.e., the theologians aside from the masses and majority people.53

Ibn Rushd categorizes the doctrinal sects into four groups as the Asharites, theMutazilates, the Batiniyya, and the Hashwiyya, leveling serious criticisms at theviews of each of them. Yet he thinks that the fourth errs most because they relyonly on narrations to the exclusion of the rational thought. The remaininggroups are ranked in different degrees. Though the best and most systematic ofthem are the Asharists, they also fail to pass beyond the dialectical nature infinal analysis.54 But he admits that not much Mutazilite literature reachedAndalusia, though he had a general idea about their teachings. He mentions aswell as criticizes the Mutazilite views on such issues as the divine attributes,prophethood, the Hereafter, and the divine predestination. Though he studied allclassic Islamic sciences, he does not like theology so much for he finds it disor-dered and not so scientific as philosophy.55 Categorizing all the people as themasses except for those who are interested in the art of demonstration, he arguesthat the theologians cannot transcend the border of the masses though they mas-ter theology. He points out that theology is not so powerful as philosophy foreven its richest and highest part relies in final analysis on dialectics, and not ondemonstration, and dialectics has no power of leading to truth.56

As is seen, Ibn Rushd tries to check the careless and arbitrary interpretations bysetting some conditions and rules for the task of interpretation on one hand andkeep the masses and theologians away from this task. This attitude of Ibn Rushdis similar to that of al-Ghazzâlî in that the latter also tries to keep the commonpeople away from the theological debates. But Ibn Rushd disagrees with al-Ghazzâlî on the definition of the masses and the elites as well as on the matterwho will exercise the authority of interpretation because particularly in his lateworks, like al-Iljâm, al-Ghazzâlî grants this authority to the Sufis, whom hedescribes as the elites, while Ibn Rushd assigns it to the philosophers.57



f. Erring in Interpretation

Though Ibn Rushd principally grants the authority of exerting interpretation tothe philosophers, the Demonstrative People, he does not guarantee that theirinterpretations be correct and infallible all the time. On the contrary, he admitsthat they may err in their interpretation. However, he argues that while the peo-ple of the other two groups will commit a sin and even fall into the pit of infi-delity as a result of their erroneous interpretation, the Demonstrative People willbe excused and even obtaion one reward if they make a mistake in interpretation.

Ibn Rushd likens those who are disagreed on the interpretation of an ambiguousstatement to the experts of law who get reward if they hit the mark and areexcused if they miss in relation to a judicial issue. This is because it is neces-sary, and not voluntary, to confirm an opinion as a result of the proof thatappears to be convincing, as the Prophet said: “If a jurist makes a judgment andhits the mark, he gets two rewards; but if he mistakes, he gets one reward.” IbnRushd believes that the scholars to whom God assigned the authority of inter-pretation are like these jurists. Such kinds of mistakes that the philosophers maymake in Law are tolerable and excusable for they make them in contemplatingupon the intricate matters and it is Law that made it incumbent upon them tocontemplate upon them. Yet the mistakes made by the people who are not fromthis group are not only inexcusable, but also accountable and sinful.58

Ibn Rushd examines the errors in Law under two general titles:

1. The first are the excusable mistakes of the contemplative people, being similarto the mistakes by a skilled physician in diagnosis or to the mistakes by a quali-fied and authorized jurist in judgment. However, the errors in such fields thatrequire expertise are not excusable given that they are caused by the inexpert.

2. The second are the grave mistakes in the fundamentals of Law that are notexcused. If one errs in the fundamentals of Law, he falls outside the pale ofIslam, and if he errs not in such fundamentals, he perpetrates innovation. Thisis because in the former case the error has occurred over a subject that requiresknowing the whole sorts of proofs. In this regard, he has made a mistake in thesubject which everyone can and must know. For example, denying the existenceand oneness of God, prophethood, the felicity and wretchedness in the Hereafteris error of such kind for it puts one outside the pale of Islam.59

Afterwards, Ibn Rushd dwells on the excusable and inexcusable mistakes,explaining how the philosophers fulfill the task of interpretation.

g. The Necessary Methods for the Interpretation

Ibn Rushd devotes the last chapter of his al-Kashf to the discussion of the per-missible and impermissible kinds of interpretations with regard to the creedalmatters as well as to the explanation of who will exert this authority. So he com-pletes the elaboration of his hermeneutics that is largely culled from al-Ghazâlî.60



To Ibn Rushd, there are five kinds of senses in Law, which are grouped into twomain categories. The first category has no further division while the second hasfour divisions, totalling five kinds.

1. The first category is the taking of a statement in the literal and evident mean-ing. This can be called the level of real sense, too.

2. The second category is the taking of the word not in literal sense; instead, oneof the allegorical senses is preferred. This can be called the level of allegoricalsense.

The second category branches off into four divisions:

a. The first division can be explained as the following: The comprehension ofthe meaning, whose allegorical character is clarified, requires a set of compoundand far syllogisms, several arts as well as a long time. So this meaning can begrasped and accepted only by the people of a higher intellectual capacity. Thatthe clarified similitude is not the thing for which it is mentioned as a similitudeis also known through a far knowledge.

b. This is the opposite of the first one. In this, both the similitude and the thingfor which it is mentioned as a similitude is known through a near knowledge.By this, Ibn Rushd means that: Both that the clarified thing is a similitude andwhy it is such is known with ease.

c. That the clarified thing is mentioned as a similitude for another meaning isknown through a near knowledge while the comprehension of the reason it ismentioned as such requires a far knowledge.

d. This is the opposite of the third one, which is: That the clarified thing is men-tioned as a similitude is known through a far knowledge, while the reason it isas such is known through a near knowledge.

Ibn Rushd thinks that in the first of the first two divisions, i.e., the context inwhich the real sense is meant, it is definitely wrong to adventure upon the inter-pretation. In the first item of the second division, the interpretation can beundertaken only by the scholars who are firmly grounded in knowledge, asexpressed in the verse, namely, by the philosophers. It is not permissible toreveal this interpretation except to the scholars who are firmly grounded inknowledge. But the task of interpreting the near similitude in the second item ofthe second division is obligatory.

The disclosure of the interpretation of the third division needs to be deliberatedbecause that similitude is designed to stimulate the feelings and imaginations ofpeople, and not because the point for which the similitude is struck is difficultto understand. Of this kind is the saying of the Prophet “The Black Stone is theright hand of God on earth.”61 The fact that this and the likes of religious state-ments are similitude are known naturally or through a near knowledge while thecomprehension of the reason they are such calls for a far knowledge. So the task



of interpreting such statements should be left to the erudite scholars. To thosewho feel that they are similitude but cannot fathom why they are such is saidthat they are from the ambiguous texts whose meanings can only be understoodby the scholars of a deep knowledge; or else, the similitude in queation isexplained to them as they can understand more easily in accordance with thedegree of their intellectual capacity and learning. Ibn Rushd thinks that thismethod is more to-the point because it better serves to the purpose of dispellingthe doubts in the minds.

As regards the interpretation of the texts categorized in the third division, IbnRushd asserts the necessity of some principles. Yet he does not clarify them,informing that al-Ghazzâli already fulfilled this task by devising a fivefold cat-egorization of being in his Faysal al-tafriqa, viz., being in itself or in reality,being in the senses, being in the mind or intellect, being in imagination, andbeing in similitude or analogy. He adds that the hermeneutical method of al-Ghazzâlî that relies upon this fivefold categorization of being should be adopt-ed and implemented.62

Al-Ghazzâlî says that the learned elites should carry out the task of interpreta-tion on the basis of the following fivefold categorization of being that indicatesthe modes of existence of a thing: 1. Being in itself or in reality (al-wujûd al-dhâtî) ; 2. being in the senses (al-wujûd al-hissî); 3. being in imagination (al-wujûd al-khayâlî); 4. being in the mind or in the intellect (al-wujûd al-‘aqlî); 5.being in similitude or in analogy (al-wujûd al-shibhî). By being in itself, hemeans the mode of the existence of a thing in itself regardless of its being in thesenses or in the mind. The religious statements that are uttered in that mode ofbeing should be taken in their real and literal sense without interpreting themaway. Being in the senses is the mode of the existence of a thing in the organsof perception as in the five outer senses. We can understand this mode of beingas the imprinting of the image of an object on the senses. Being in imaginationis the sensible form of an object in the imaginative faculty of the animal soul.The conjuring up of a horse or elephant may be given as an example for this cat-egory. Being in the mind is the essence and meaning of a thing. This indicatesthe intellectual perception of a thing without beholding its form in the senses, inimagination, and in actuality. Being in similitude is the similarity of a thing toanother thing in some of its features and qualities.63

Al-Ghazzâlî illustrates the application of this fivefold existential categorizationto the hermeneutics of the religious texts. First he gives the following examplefor the being in the senses: “On the day of the Resurrection, death will bebrought forth in the form of a nice ram and be slaughtered between the Hell andParadise.64 He thinks that this narration needs being interpreted for the one whoknows on the basis of demonstration that death is an accident and the accidentscannot corporealise. Therefore, it is difficult for this person to believe in theappearance of death in the form of a ram. So this is a similitude struck to make

the people of Paradise believe that there is no death any more and forever justas one gives up all hope of the revival of the slaughtered ram. Therefore, thebeing in the narration needs being taken as being in the senses, and not being inreality.65 In a similar way, the saying of the Prophet “Paradise has been shownto me on the surface of this wall”66 should be taken as being in the senses, andnot as being in reality.

As an example for being in imagination, al-Ghazzâlî cites the saying of theProphet “As if I see Jonah is supplicating with his woolen robe on his back andmountains are accompanying him, and God responds “Here I am, o Jonah!””67

To al-Ghazzâlî, it is clear that the Prophet Muhammad conjured up the ProphetJonah supplicating, who had lived long before him. The narration implies thatsuch an image appeared in the imagination of the Prophet just as a sleeping per-son sees something in his dream. What is of primary importance is thus not whatthe Prophet has seen, but the message he imparts by the similitude. In addition,the phrase “as if (ka’annî)” signifies that it is an experience that the Prophet hadin imagination, and not an actual event. So, he concludes that this saying needsbeing interpreted as being in imagination.

As example for being in the mind, al-Ghazzâlî mentions the saying of theProphet “The person who will be the last one to get out of Hell will be grantedas ten times as this universe.”68 To him, the literal sense of this saying indicatesthe existence of a Paradise that is ten times longer, wider, and larger than thepresent universe. Saying that if one takes the saying in its literal meaning, hewill be bewildered, he argues that the difference in this context is an intellectu-al difference. He compares this difference to “This gem equals so many timesthis horse.” So the difference meant in the saying is not the difference in phys-ical largeness or smallness, but the difference in value. So the point here is themeaning, and not the physical magnitude perceived by the senses or imagina-tion.69 He also claims that the saying “God squeezed the clay of Adam for fortymornings by His hand”70 calls for an intellectual interpretation. He says that theone who knows one the grounds of demonstration that no hand can be thoughtof God may take the hand as an incorporeal and intellectual hand.

As an example for being in similitude, the thinker mentions such states that areattributed to God as anger, passion, joy, patience, and the likes. He holds thatthe one who knows by demonstration that such states cannot exist for God in thefirst four modes of being and that God is dissimilar to other beings in reality andin quiddity, he may interpret His anger as His will to punish, that is, as an ana-logical attribute. So the anger and passion as attributed to God in the religioustexts need being interpreted respectively as His will to punish and award.71 Tosum up, he thinks that such qualities and states are used in association with Godin religious texts figuratively to help the people understand God’s actions. Theythus need being interpreted as being in similitude.



Al-Ghazzâlî concludes that if one accepts the words of the Law-Giver accord-ing to any of the five modes of being, he is a believer; but if one disapproves ofthem in all of the categories and denies them in all of the senses, saying that theyare nonsense, the Prophet used these kinds of statements to confound the peo-ple and get worldly benefit is truly blasphemous. In addition, he says that everyhigher interpretation in hierarchy naturally involves the lower one. If a disagree-ment occurs over interpretation, recourse should be taken to the authority of thedemonstrative proofs.72

Adopting this categorization of al-Ghazzâlî, Ibn Rushd proposes that if one ofthe groups of people thinks that some certain points in the religious texts areimpossible to take as being in itself or in reality, the remaining modes of beingshould be investigated to determine which one of them is most convincing andplausible. Then, the point is interpreted according to the mode of being in whichthe point seems most convincing to the group in question. To him, the follow-ing sayings of the Prophet are of this kind: “I have seen all the prophets, evenHell and Paradise on this post of mine. Between the Pool and my pulpit, thereis one of the gardens of Paradise. My pulpit is over my Pool. All of the son ofAdam is eaten by soil except for the coccyx.” The philosopher holds that it iseasy to know that these are all allegorical although the comprehension of thereason they are such calls for a far knowledge and an intellectual effort. Thus,it is lawful for those who know that such texts are allegorical to interpret themaccording to one of the remaining four modes of being that seems most plausi-ble. But it is not lawful to have recourse to interpretation in other contexts.73

Ibn Rushd points out that al-Ghazzâlî did not clarify what procedure to be fol-lowed in the contexts in which both of the aspects, that the point in the text is asimilitude and the reason the point is such, are known with difficulty, andwhether or not the point is a similitude is doubtful in the first sight. Though hediscards this doubt as false, Ibn Rushd however says that one need not adven-ture upon interpretation right away, but strive to remove the doubt first. In hisopinion, the Asharites and the Mutazilates erred in interpretation because theyfailed to follow the described procedure.

Ibn Rushd ends his hermeneutical discussion and work with the elucidation ofthe fourth division. He describes the fourth division as the opposite of the thirdone, that is: once that the point is a similitude is known with difficulty, the rea-son it is such is known with ease. He thinks that the interpretation of the textsin this category is also open to discussion. For him, since the group of peoplewho happened to know the reason the point is a similitude are not from thosewho are firmly grounded in knowledge, they can know that it is a similitudeonly doubtfully or by surmise. Given the fact that its being a similitude relies onsurmise and the principle in Law is to stay away from interpretation as far aspossible, one should avoid interpretation in this context. On the other hand,since the similarity between the similitude and the point for which the simili-



tude is struck is strong, the option of interpretation is also on the table. Yet if thetwo groups are allowed for interpretation, many strange doctrines that areincompatible with the evident sense of Law may arise, and when such doctrinesare divulged, the common people deny them. This is the erroneous state thatbefell the Sufis as well as the scholars who took up this method of interpreta-tion.74

Ibn Rushd thinks that since the people, who are unaware of the fivefold modesof being and the accompanying hermeneutical procedure, and unable to distin-guish who are authorized to perform interpretation and who are not, meddled inthis subtle and risky task, giving rise to a deep religious crisis. As a result, themembers of clashing hermeneutical sects began declaring each other to be blas-phemous. These are all the implications of failing to know the goal of Law andgoing against it.

Some of the modern researchers regard Ibn Rushd as the founder of hermeneu-tics due to his attempt to condition the task of interpretation on certain rules. Forexample, Mona Abousenna views the philosopher as such because of his theo-ry of allegorical interpretation. In his view, on the basis of demonstrative rea-soning, Ibn Rushd worked out a synthesis between the device and the message,i.e., between the language and the contents. Thus, he ushered in theEnlightenment that would take place in Europe six centuries after his death. Allin all, Ibn Rushd moved beyond the literal meanings of the religious texts byintroducing and adopting the allegorical and figurative way of understandingand interpretation in hermeneutics.75

Conclusion

Defining philosophy as contemplating upon the beings in the respect that theyindicate their Creator, Ibn Rushd sees no disharmony between religion and phi-losophy; rather, he views them as the twins who are congruous, supporting eachother, and fed from the same breast. He defines the term ta’wîl as “taking a wordout of its original literal sense to an allegorical meanings.” In attempt to checkthe arbitrary and erroneus interpretations, he conditioned the determining ofallegorical sense on the Arabic linguistic conventions.

Though Ibn Rushd thinks that not all of the religious texts can be taken in theirliteral senses, nor can all of them be interpreted allegorically, he does not clari-fy the number and limit of the texts to be interpreted. However, he principallyaccepts the need for having resort to interpretation in the contexts where theresults of rational thought and the religious texts are seemingly in conflict. Buthe recognizes the authority of interpretation exclusively for the philosophers,denying the theologians and the masses of this right.

As to the practical procedure of interpretation, he did not develop an originalmethod; rather, he adopted the procedure resting on the fivefold categorizationof being as designed by al-Ghazzâlî. The endeavors to develop a hermeneutical



methodology by the Muslim thinkers who are interested in philosophy andjurisprudence like al-Ghazzâlî and Ibn Rushd have contributed to the preventionof arbitrariness and misuse in the task of interpreting religious texts. In addition,such endeavors have brought a balance and order to the matter of understand-ing the religious statements regarded as ambiguous. These effort developed intoa formulation in the Majalla, the Islamic civil code of the Ottoman State. So theprinciple has been established that the religious texts are primarily to be takenin their literal sense and to the allegorical interpretation is taken recourse onlywhen the literal sense seems impossible. In addition, it is adopted as a rule thatthe task of necessary interpretation is to be fulfilled by the qualified scholars ina strict conformity with the described procedure.

One should take account of the difference in the scope of philosophical sciencesin the age of Ibn Rushd and the present time, as well as the difference in thequalities of the philosophers, called the Demonstrative People, at his time andtoday. So the people Ibn Rushd describes as philosopher and eligible for the taskof interpretation are those who are well-versed in logics, mathematics, the nat-ural religious sciences along with the classic Islamic sciences. Nevertheless, hisclaim that the experts on the theoretical branches of philosophy are exclusivelythe Demonstrative People in our age when specialization in all disciplines hasreached its peak seems pretty debateful.

We can say that Ibn Rushd both benefited from the available literature in thefield of hermeneutics and made a significant contribution to the field from thestandpoint of definition, conditions, and procedure. But his assignment of thetask of interpretation to the philosophers to the exclusion of the others has notbeen accepted by the exegetes, theologians, and jurists. His suggestion of hid-ing the interpretation of the religious texts from the common people seems prac-tically impossible in the Age of the Media.

REFERENCES

1 George F. Hourani, Averroes: On The Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, Londra 1961, p. 15.2 H. Bekir Karlığa, “İbn Rüşd”, İslam Ansiklopedisi (DİA), Istanbul 1999, XX, 257. 3 Ibn Rushd, al-Darûrî fî usûl al-fiqh, ed. by Jamâladdîn al-‘Alawî, Dâr al-Gharb al-Islâmî, Beirut

1994, p. 146.4 M. ‘Åbid al-Jâbirî, Ibn Rushd: Sîra wa Fikr, Markazu Dirâsât al-Wahda al-‘Arabiyya, First

Edition, Beirut 1998, s.89.5 Hourani, Averroes, p. 15.6 Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqâl fi taqrîri mâ bayn al-sharî‘a wa al-hikma min al-ittisâl, ed. by M.

‘Abdulwâhid ‘Usrî, Markazu Dirâsât al-Wahda al-‘Arabiyya, supervised by M. ‘Åbid al-Jâbirî,Second Edition, Lubnan 1999, p. 85.

7 Hourani, Averroes, p. 21.8 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf ‘an manâhij al-adilla fi ‘aqâid al-milla, ed. by Mustafâ Hanafî, Markazu

Dirâsât al-Wahda al-‘Arabiyya, supervised by M. ‘Åbid al-Jâbirî, First Edition, Beirut 1998, p.113; al-Jâbirî, Ibn Rushd, p. 94.



9 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 99–100.10 Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqâl, p. 85.11 Ansârî informs that when Ibn Rushd was asked after he had faced and overcome some serious

troubles, “Which trouble did affect you most?”, he said: “My most sad time was when the mobsof stupids expelled me and my son ‘Abdullâh from the mosque when we entered the mosque toperform the afternoon prayer.? See Ridâuddîn bin Fakhraddîn, Ibn Rushd, Turkish translation byKaya Nuri, Necmi İstikbal Matbaası, Istanbul 1924, p. 36; Hourani, Averroes, p. 38-39; al-Jâbirî,Ibn Rushd, p. 261.

12 Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqâl, p. 115; Iysa A. Bello, The Mediavel Islamic Controversy BetweenPhilosophy and Orthodoxy, E. J. Brill, New York 1989, p. 69.

13 Hourani, Averroes, p. 5.14 Hourani, Averroes, p. 23.15 Hourani, Averroes, p. 19.16 İlhan Kutluer, İslam’ın Klasik Çağında Felsefe Tasavvuru, İz Yayıncılık, Istanbul 1996, p. 166.17 In this context, Ibn Rushd cites the following verses: “Take lesson o you with insight!” (The Sûra

al-Hashr, 59: 2); “Do they see nothing in the government of the heavens and the earth?” (The Sûraal-A‘râf, 7: 184); “So We showed Abraham the power and the laws of the heavens and the earth.”(The Sûra al-An‘âm, 6: 75); “Do they not look at the camels, how they are made? And at the sky,how it is raised high?” (The Sûra al-Ghâshiya, 88: 16-17) “Do they not contemplate the wondersof creation in the heavens and the earth?” (The Sûra Ål-u ‘Imrân, 3: 191). He also informs of theexistence of many other verses on this matter. See Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqâl, p. 86-87.

18 Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqâl, p. 98; Hilmi Ziya Ülken, “İbn Rüşd”, İslam Ansiklopedisi, MEBYayınları, Istanbul 1968, Second Edition, V, 796.

19 Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqâl, p. 96. , Istanbul 1968, II. Baskı, V, 796.20 Al-Jâbirî, Ibn Rushd, p. 99-100.21 Ibn Rushd, Bidâyat al-mujtahid wa nihâyat al-muqtasid, Kahraman Yayınları, Istanbul 1985, I, 2.22 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 99.23 The statement “al-sharî‘a al-ûlâ” occurring in the Arabic text is explained by the editor as the Law

in the age time of the Prophet and his companions, i.e., the path of the pious forefathers, and Ahlal-Sunna. See Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 100.

24 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 99-100.25 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 100.26 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 100.27 Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqâl, p. 96.28 Hourani, Averroes, p. 23; Kutluer, Felsefe Tasavvuru, p. 213.29 Al-Jâbirî, Ibn Rushd, p. 180; Kutluer, Felsefe Tasavvuru, p. 214.30 Hourani, Averroes, p. 21-22.31 Ibn Rushd, Felsefe Din İlişkileri (Fasl al-maqâl), Turkish translation by Süleyman Uludağ,

Dergâh Yayınları, Istanbul 1985, p. 147.32 Hourani, Averroes, p. 2.33 Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqâl, p. 125.34 Suhbî al-Sâlih, al-Mabâhis fî ulûm al-qur’ân, Dersaadet, no date, p. 281.35 See Muhammad Asad, Kur’an Mesajı (The Message of the Qur’an), Turkish translation by Cahit

Koytak and Ahmet Ertürk, İşaret Yayınları, Istanbul 1999, p. 1329.36 The Sura Ål-u ‘Imrân, 3: 7.37 Hourani, Averroes, p. 24, 53-54; Bello, The Mediavel Islamic Controversy, p. 69.38 Abû Hâmid al-Ghazzâlî, İljâm al-‘âwâm, (in Majmû‘at al-rasâil, Dâr al-Fikr, Beirut 1996), p.

306; al-Mustasfâ fî ‘ilm al-usûl, Dâr al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, Beirut 1993, p. 196.



39 Ibn Rushd, Felsefe-Din İlişkileri, (Fasl al-mâqâl), p. 113.40 Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqâl, p. 97.41 Bello, The Mediavel Islamic Controversy, p. 67.42 Hammâdî ‘Abidî, Ibn Rushd wa ‘ulûm al-shar‘iyya al-islâmiyya, Dâr al-Fikr al-‘Arabî, Beirut

1991, p. 197.43 The Sura Ål-u ‘Imrân, 3: 27.44 Sayyid Sharîf Jurjânî, al-Ta‘rifât, ed. by ‘Abdurrahmân Umayra, ‘Ålam al-Kutub, Beirut 1987, p.

77.45 Ibn Rushd, Felsefe Din İlişkileri (Fasl al-maqâl), p.114-115.46 Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqâl, p. 118; Bello, The Medieval Islamic Controversy, p. 70.47 Ibn Rushd, Felsefe Din İlişkileri, p. 150-151; 242.48 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 135-136; Hourani, Averroes, p. 24.49 Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqâl, p. 124; Bello, The Medieval Islamic Controversy, 73-74.50 Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqâl, p. 124; Bello, The Medieval, Islamic Controversy, p. 74.51 Ibn Rushd, Felsefe Din İlişkileri (Fasl al-maqâl), p. 151, 160.52 Ibn Rushd, Felsefe Din İlişkileri (Fasl al-maqâl), s.153.53 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 135-136; 21354 Hilmi Ziya Ülken, “İbn Rüşd”, İslam Ansiklopedisi, V, 789.55 Hourani, Averroes, p. 2.56 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 135-136; Felsefe-Din İlişkileri (al-Kashf), p. 242.57 Ibn Rushd views Sufism as subjective and philosophy as objective. Though he accepts the exis-

tence of the Sufi knowledge, he does not see it as a generally valid way of attaining knowledgefor he thinks that otherwise the rational thought will be meaningless. See Ibn Rushd, Felsefe-Dinİlişkileri (al-Kashf), p. 214.

58 Ibn Rushd, Felsefe-Din İlişkileri (Fasl al-maqâl), p. 133-134.59 Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqâl, p. 108; Felsefe Din İlişkileri, p. 135.60 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 204.61 Al-Ghazzâlî, Ihyâu ‘ulûm al-din, Dâru Nahr-i Nîl, Egypt, no date, I, 95.62 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 205. 63 Ghazzâlî, Faysal al-tafriqa, (in Majmû‘at al-Rasâil al-Imâm Ghazzâlî), Dâr al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya,

Beirut 1996, p. 240-241.64 For the varients of the saying, see al-Bukhârî, al-Jâmi‘, al-Tafsîr 19; al-Muslim, al-Sahîh, al-

Janna, 40, 41; Ahmad bin Hanbal, al-Musnad, II, 377, 423, 513, III, 9.65 Al-Ghazzâlî, İhyâ, IV, 23.66 Al-Bukhârî, al-Jâmi‘, al-Salât 51, al-Mawâqît, 11, al-Muslim, al-Jâmi‘, al-Fadâil, 134, 135, 136.67 For the varients of the saying, see al-Muslim, al-Jâmi‘, al-±mân, 269; Ibn Mâja, al-Sunan, al-

Manâsik, 2891; Ibn Hanbal, II, 216.68 Al-Bukhâri, al-Jâmi‘, Riqâq, 6571; al-Muslim, al-Jâmi‘, I‘lâm, 83, 186, 187.69 Al-Ghazzâlî, Faysal al-tafriqa, p. 242; Ihyâ, IV, 27.70 Al-Bukhârî, al-Muslim, al-Jâmi‘, al-Anbiyâ 3; al-Muslim, al-Jâmi‘, al-Qadar, 15.71 Al-Ghazzâlî, Faysal al-tafriqa, p. 243.72 Al-Ghazzâlî, Faysal al-tafriqa, p. 243-244.73 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 206-207; Felsefe-Din İlişkileri, p. 361-362.74 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf, p. 208.75 Mona Abousenna, “Ibn Rushd, Founder of Hermeneutics” (in , Prometheus Books, New York,

1996), p. 107.



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