Josse de Voogd - Redrawing Europe's Map

21WINTER 2014 / 2015

E L E C T O R A L G E O G R A P H Y

SW

ISH

PH

OTO

S

21

Redrawing Europes Map

J O S S E D E V O O G D

NIJMEGEN, NetherlandsAu-tumn falls in the leafy eastern neighborhoods of the Dutch city of Nijmegen. The vines winding up the sides of the late 19th century brick homes are turning yellow and brown. Inside, large book shelves line the walls. Stickers saying No to advertising mail adorn letter boxes, but quality newspapers

are welcome. People go to their work at the university or in nonprofit organiza-tions. Children with names like Fleur and Sanne are brought to school in cargo bikes. When they grow older, they will study a semester in a foreign country. Freelance hipsters are working on their notebooks in coffee bars. Nearby is a refugee center. A raft of volunteers, many jobless but with

at SAARL UNIVERSITAETS on January 17, 2015wpj.sagepub.comDownloaded from

22 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL

E U R O P E U N D E R F I R E

Josse de Voogd, an independent researcher specializing in electoral geography and

based in the Netherlands, has a multidisciplinary background in anthropology, devel-

opment studies, geography, and international relations.

college degrees, are willing to help visitors find their way around town.

Foreigners can enrich a society is often heard. Locals even go as far as to apologize for the whiteness of their area. Fortunately

the neighborhood has several Turkish baker-ies. At times, theres disdain for Dutch folk culture, while traditions from else-where are embraced as exotic. Though there are few coun-tries where progres-sive values are more embraced than in the Netherlands, nation-alism is with equal frequency a non-start-er here. Neighbors embrace art markets, car-free Sundays, and multicultural festi-vals. As the electoral map shows, eastern Nijmegen is one of the most impor-tant strongholds for

GroenLinks, the Dutch Green Left party and D66, the progressive liberal party.

A few miles to the west, vines have given way to paved gardens. Row houses built in the 1980s are covered with shut-ters on windows that reveal pairs of shiny vases standing symmetrically. Large dogs are walked on spacious but monotonous green lawns. Cars are pimped out with spoilers. A pink colored plaque next to

front the door reveals that the childrens names are Kevin and Shirley. Income lev-els are not that much lower than in the eastern part of town, but education levels are. Dad works in construction and faces competition from cheaper East European workers, while mom is a housekeeper for the elderly, a sector also under constant strain. When they go to a restaurant or on a holiday trip, they prefer a simple package tour, and they watch commer-cial entertainment shows. Social cohesion in the neighborhood is not as strong as a few decades ago. But if the Dutch soccer team plays, people color their streets with orange flags. Folks can argue about park-ing tariffs and speed bumps, while taking their cars to the shopping mallwhere they often find groups of young Moroccans lounging aimlessly.

The Netherlands multicultural soci-ety is also visible at the soccer club. The teams are growing more ethnically diverse, but few immigrant parents are willing to volunteer to keep the club running. Many complaints about foreigners are becom-ing more vocal, preceded by an I am not a racist, but... Immigrants are believed to profit disproportionately from the wel-fare state, seem overwhelmingly present in crime statistics, and urgently need to adapt to Dutch cultural norms. The Netherlands should be The Netherlands again is an-other increasingly frequent refrain. People are angry about European integration and dont want to cut our pensions to help out those lazy Greeks. Strong politicians who talk straight and say what we think are becoming increasingly popular. Voters

a new right-wing populism

is emerging from a

remarkable combination

of anti-government

sentiment and nostalgia for

a time when government cared more

about its citizens.


23WINTER 2014 / 2015


of anti-government sentiment and nostal-gia for a time when government cared more about its citizens. And it thrives both in traditionally rightist areas populated with small entrepreneurs and in the remote fringes of the cities, as well as declining industrial regions and working class neigh-borhoods that had long been bastions of the left. The rise of populism and its geograph-ic translation also reflect how left and right are becoming increasingly blurred, with both populist streams often deriving their support from the same areas.

In addition to this widespread Euro-skeptic and populist trend, numerous re-gionalist movements seem to have gained momentum. Scotland organized its referen-dum on whether to seek independence from Britain. Catalonia is anxious to do so as well, despite the failure of the independence vote in Scotland. Meanwhile, an outright civil war has broken out in eastern Ukraine.

While the field of electoral geography has confined itself primarily to the national level, it is precisely the international com-parisons that are so intriguing. Indeed, merging all of Europes electoral maps cre-ates the opportunity to see just how the potency of intra-European sentiments are that effectively transcend what remains of the continents national borders. An elec-toral map of Europe has begun to emerge, showing quite an intricate patchwork of subcultures, class antagonisms, lifestyles, and ancient sentiments.

CITY AND COUNTRYSIDE

One of the main factors shaping Europes electoral geography is the division be-tween cities and the countryside. In the United Kingdom, Germany, the Nether-lands, Denmark, Switzerland, and Austria, urban regions are clearly recognizable on the map as left-wing isles in right-wing

feel betrayed by a cosmopolitan elite that is weak on crime and immigration, pro-European, and wants to help the whole world while our own poor and elderly are left to their own devices. The populist, right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV), and to a lesser extent, its leftist populist com-petitor, the Socialist Party (SP), are topping the polls in this neighborhood.

A few decades ago, the differences be-tween these two halves of town were nar-rower, with the traditional parties, the So-cial Democrats and Christian Democrats, both doing well. But today its increasingly clear that voters in both neighborhoods hold a very different view of the world, of society and politics. As a result of global-ization, migration, the rise in crime, and the growing importance of education and lifestyle, different groups in society have grown markedly apart.

EUROPES ELECTORAL MAP

The social and electoral map of Nijmegen has changed, and so has the map of the Netherlands and Europe. A similar set of observations could be made in many cit-ies across the continent. New patterns of voting behavior have emerged, reflecting new polarities in changing societies. These polarities are set in the context of centu-ries-old rivalries that still persist. One of the most striking recent developments is the rise of Euroskeptic right-wing popu-list parties. The June 2014 elections for the European Parliament turned them into major parties in several countries, particu-larly the United Kingdom, Denmark, and France. Left-wing populists got their share as well, especially in southern Europe.

With these new political movements taking center stage, electoral maps are be-ing redrawn. A new right-wing populism is emerging from a remarkable combination




surroundings. These cities are traditional-ly populated by industrial workers, intel-lectuals, and immigrants, while socialized housing often occupies a significant part of the urban landscape. At the same time, broad swaths of the middle class have left for a house with a garden in the suburbs or in the countryside, creating a rightist commuter-belt around these cities. Where social democrats and socialists dominate the more industrialized areas, cities with a highly educated population also show a strong preference for progressive parties like social-liberals and greens, so called post-materialist parties that place an em-phasis on individualism, cosmopolitanism, and multiculturalism. It is remarkable how support for these kinds of parties is concen-trated in comparable areas across the con-tinentgentrified neighborhoods built in the 19th century just outside the city cen-ter. These areas, among them Nrrebro in Copenhagen, De Pijp in Amsterdam, Pren-zlauerberg in Berlin, and Neubau in Vien-

na, are dominated by hipster cafs, organic supermarkets, galleries, and yoga studios.

Urban-rural patterns are somewhat dif-ferent in Europes periphery. In the Nordic countries, industries are primarily based in small rural towns, while the broad coun-tryside is far out of reach for affluent com-muters. These rural zones are traditionally strongholds of the left and centrist Scandi-navian agrarian parties. Most urban regions vote from right to the center, although post-materialist leftist parties have begun to win some substantial support as well, es-pecially on Stockholms Sdermalm Island, stronghold of greens and feminists.

In southern Europe, urban-rural dis-tinctions are not as clearly marked. An ex-ception is southern Spain, where cities are, at least relatively, rightist strongholds in quite leftist agricultural provinces. Medi-terranean cities display a different struc-ture from their northern European coun-terparts, with the rich traditionally living in expensive apartments in and around the

ACTION STEPS Different segments of society should try to better understand each others needs and

worldviews. This holds especially for the cosmopolitan elites that should try to empathize with the lower classes. This is definitely not the same as giving equal play to their fears.

Politicians, media, and individuals should take note of electoral geography to know where discontent derives and why it does so. Notions about populist voters are often too superficial and subjective, preventing a profound debate.

Politicians should be aware of the fragility of Europe, the complexities and arbitrariness of its borders. Many in the West, as they consider current borders as fixed, were upset about Russia annexing Crimea. But borders have always changed and will change, as shown by the recent case of the independence of Kosovo, supported by the West and anathema to Moscow.

Politicians and media should take into account the electoral geographies of countries when they react or report on events. A massive protest in one city, for example Kiev in Ukraine, may not in any sense accurately reflect the situation in other parts of the same country.

Josse de Voogd


25WINTER 2014 / 2015


regional level. Old traditions, loyalties, re-ligious affinities, and rivalries continue to prevail, overruling local class distinctions. Across the Netherlands, ignoring the phys-ical landscape, income level, or degree of urbanization, runs the Bible Belt. This area follows relentlessly a 500-year-old border with a territory formerly occupied by Cath-olic Spain and now dominated by the most orthodox Calvinists. Spains electoral geog-raphy still strongly resembles the positions during the civil war in the 1930s. The south, the Asturian mining region, Basque country, and Catalonia remain leftist or separatist, while northwestern Galicia and Castile-Len are still on the conservative right. Madrid and the Mediterranean coast switched to the right more recently. This is where most of the economic and hous-ing boom took place, until the bubble col-lapsed a few years ago.

Patterns in Portugal are consistent with neighboring Spain, the north being characterized by conservative and religious small farmers and the south by large es-tates, strong unions, and leftist sentiments. As socialist as southern Iberia has become, southern Italy, consisting of the former Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, has turned conservative. Religion and the mafia are somewhat omnipresent in this heartland of supporters of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. This controversial rightist lead-er was also backed in the far richer north, leaving the central regions like Emilia-Ro-magna and Tuscany to the left, a division that goes back centuries.

The East European countries show the most volatile party landscapes, a product of young democracies that suddenly and with no preparation succeeded rule for decades by the communist leaders of the Soviet Union. Identities are more complex, as boundaries were drawn quite arbitrarily during the last

city center. Neither the home nor garden, but the paseo, the collective evening walk, is the central point of reference. The work-ing classes live at the periphery, in cheap flats or low-rise areas that sometimes have started as squats, creating red belts around cities. As with many cultural cases, France stays somewhere in between the northwestern European and Mediterra-nean pattern. Until recently, central Paris was a rightist stronghold, surrounded by a communist high-rise banlieu, until even there the leftist yuppies advanced.

REGIONS AND REGIONALISTS

While voting patterns in urban regions are mainly consequences of segmenta-tion in terms of social status and lifestyle preferences, more factors are at play at the

This map of Europe, as it emerged from recent national and European-wide elections, shows which areas are dominated by leftist, rightist, and regionalist forces.

Leftist Rightist Regionalist

JOSSE DE VOOGD




Even in countries with more stable borders, outspoken regionalist or separatist parties take a share of the electorate, like in Scotland, Wales, and Catalonia. In Belgium, Flemish parties that want to reform or even dismantle the state dominate politics. They feel stuck with poorer and inefficient French-speaking Wallonia. And Italy has its sepa-ratist Northern League that profits from a northern sentiment of being squeezed by the poor south for subsidies it can ill-afford.

THE RISE OF POPULISM

The already long simmering north-south split in Italy has proven a precursor for the current crisis in Europe. Large money trans-fers were sent southwards, provoking op-position in the north but also in the south, which suffered under the burdens that ac-companied such largesse. There have been large cutbacks in public services, and un-employment has skyrocketed.

Since the economic crisis broke out six years ago, Euroskepticism has also advanced. Feelings of discontent are further strength-ened by longstanding issues such as immi-gration and ongoing cuts to the welfare state. In several countries, this has led to the rise of rightist, in other cases leftist, populist par-ties. This is accompanied by a blurring of positions of both right and left. Tradition-ally, the left promotes an extended welfare state and is progressive on social-cultural issues like immigration and crime, while the reverse is true for the right. But many voters, primarily the less-educated, combine pro-welfare opinions with quite conservative positions on cultural themes. In their opin-ion, public services should be improved. El-der care is often mentioned, but immigrants should be excluded and criminals should be given harsher punishments. Several right-wing populist parties were successful after adding specific leftist political views, par-

century. Countries like Poland and Roma-nia are electorally split along former inter-national borders. So the eastern old Po-land is deeply conservative on social issues and statist on economic ones, while the re-verse is true in the western part, which was removed from Germany after World War II.

Further east is Ukraine. The areas that were once part of Poland-Lithuania mas-sively support the pro-Western parties, while the East and South vote strongly pro-Russian. In Germany, more than two decades after unification of communist East with capitalist West, electoral differ-ences between the two sectors seem stron-ger than ever, with a clear preference for Die Linke (The Left) in the East. This par-ty grew out of the former communist re-gime and thrives on nostalgic sentiments toward the communist past. These strik-ing electoral gaps show the importance of phantom bordersfrontiers that officially do not exist anymore except in the minds of the voters, and yet are ubiquitous in to-days political culture.

As various countries have been pulled apart and merged and many populations have been displaced, any number of minori-ties have found themselves on the wrong side of todays borders. Hungary is just a small remnant of a great past, and Hungarians whove found themselves mired in neighbor-ing countries like Slovakia, Romania, Ser-bia, and Ukraine massively back their own political parties. After the bloody Balkan Wars, the former Yugoslavia disintegrated into six different states, but even these are far from mono-cultural. The three main ethnic groups in Bosnia are voting by and large for their own ethnic parties, a pattern that was even reinforced at the very recent October elections. Ethnic Albanians got their mi-crostate of Kosovo at the expense of Serbia, while Kosovo now includes Serbian enclaves.


27WINTER 2014 / 2015


nist era that substantial elements in their electorates view nostalgically. Hungarys Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) and Greeces Golden Dawn are outright racist and are alied with goons who attack Romas and immigrants.

Populism in the rich Alpine countries is again something different. Where else-where its realistic to consider a right-wing populism of those left behind socially and economically, in this case the winners have begun demonstrating an isolationist moun-tain mentality. The Swiss Peoples Party is strongest in the most conservative cantons where the nation was born, hardly a zone of deprivation, while It-alys Northern League also advocates the in-terests of the rich north. Equally, vot-ers in Bavaria, Ger-manys prosperous southland, are cast-ing their ballots for the more conservative regional branch of the Christian Democrats, which intends to leave no gap to its right. In southern Eu-rope, more left-wing or centrist populists are catching fire. Spain has its Podemos (We Can), and Greece its Syriza (Coalition of the Radical Left), which became that na-tions largest party during the 2014 Euro-pean election, while large stretches of Italy have embraced the Five Star Movement of the clownish populist Beppe Grillo. These parties flourish on anger about austerity measures and, somewhat contrary to their rightist northern counterparts, attract a raft of votes among young urban populations.

SUBURBS AND BORDERS

The geographical redistribution of sup-port for the populist right will be a prod-

ticularly regarding health care and pensions, to their nationalist and repressive discourses. The so-called horseshoe-model of left and right has been closed at the bottom. In ad-dition to distinctions between rich and poor, or religious and secular, a gap has emerged between the highly-educated, embracing in-dividualistic and cosmopolitan values, and profiting from open borders on the one hand, and on the other hand, the less educated, more nationalist, community-oriented, and nostalgic, who all feel threatened by global-ization and immigration.

The nature of right-wing populist move-ments differs by country, and it is dangerous to lump them together. Parties do have their own controversial hobbyhorses, and when confronted with their differences, right-wing populist leaders frequently feel an urge to distance themselves from colleagues in other countries. Nevertheless, they all profit from similar discontent in their societies, relat-ing to immigration, globalization, European integration, and economic stagnation. They all attract a comparable electorate, and often have a charismatic leader who claims to be in touch with the common people.

There are still some points of conten-tion between these rightist movements.While the Dutch Freedom Party defends hard-won gay-rights against bigoted Mus-lims, sexual diversity is strongly opposed by similar parties in other countries. Israeli actions in the Middle East are often backed by rightist populist parties in northwestern Europe, particularly in Norway, Britain, and the Netherlands, while many other rightist movements in eastern and south-ern Europe have an anti-Semitic past. The further east and southeast we go in Europe, the more rough and anti-democratic radical right- wing parties seem to become, as they are often attempting to mirror some of the more authoritarian aspects of the commu-

the new right-wing populism clearly derives its strength from outside the urban core.




ic notion. Right-wing populism seems to derive from a rejection of urban problems and paradigms like multiculturalism, cos-mopolitanism, and environmentalism. To-days populist right stands up against the out-of-touch politically correct elites and claims to represent the common sense of the ordinary people.

Apart from this anti-urban notion, it is remarkable how support for rightist populism does show the re-emergence of several old fault lines. When there is con-fusion about identities, when foreign pow-ers have ruled, or when whole populations have been displaced, there seems to be fertile ground for the emergence of popu-list zealots. The south of the Netherlands, once Spanish-controlled territory and later economically deprived, is now a prime

uct of globalization, deindustrialization, economic crisis, and aging, often shrink-ing, populations. Young, educated popu-lations in service-oriented urban regions seem to be assuming leadership roles in many countries. Inner cities are booming and trending increasingly leftist and liber-al. At the same time, industrial towns are struggling, along with older suburbs that are in decay, as the affluent opt for life in the inner city or the more remote suburbs. Exactly these kinds of areas are embrac-ing the populist right. Recent elections in Sweden confirmed these trends, with the moderate right losing ground to the left in the cities, and the populist right, like Sverigedemokraterna (Swedish Demo-crats), making substantial inroads outside the urban core.

Although earlier more radical rightist parties were often embraced by deprived areas within the large cities of France, Brit-ain, and the Netherlands, the new right-wing populism clearly derives its strength from outside the urban cores. The lower middle class suburbs, exurbs, and the countryside are the sources of many such votes. On the rightist populist map, Lon-dons eastern commuter belt, Amsterdams satellite towns, and Copenhagens suburbs stand out respectively as strongholds for Britains United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the Dutch PVV, and the Danish Peoples Party (DF). While Frances National Front clearly curls around Paris, its voters are almost absent inside the Pri-phriquethe ring road that defines the outer limits of Paris proper.

Meanwhile, the protest-vote has been suburbanized. Although problems related to immigration have been spreading as well, voting for the anti-immigrant poli-cies seem to be primarily preventive votes. The base of support is not just a geograph-

This map of a part of Europe shows in which regions right-wing populist parties do better than the national average. The map is based on either the most recent European-wide or national elections.

Above (National) AverageStronghold

JOSSE DE VOOGD


29WINTER 2014 / 2015


to both rightist former colonists and poor immigrants both from northern Africa, is a winning ground as well. During recent elections, the center of gravity of the Fronts support has moved somewhat to the north. This is partly a result of the so-called favor-ite son effect. Long thought a relatively ig-nored, deprived, and somewhat unattractive flyover country, its new charismatic leader Marine Le Pen won the election as a Europe-an Parliament candidate from what is com-monly known as La France Profonde or deep Francenot unlike Middle America.

FALLING APART?

The emergence of nationalist right-wing parties together with regionalist move-ments comes down to fundamental ques-tions about belong-ing and about how far solidarity reach-es. The construct of a united Europe has sought to challenge these issues and now seems to suffer from a certain degree of overstretch. Voters in the core nations that founded the European Union are turning against the process of ever greater integration, just as the notion of a continuously expand-ing Europe begins to run up against its natural boundaries in the east. Its enlarge-ment will be halted by complicated rela-tions with Russia and Turkey, while being slowed and restrained by its own popula-tions. The question where the outer bor-ders of Europe or the European Union lie will be an ongoing issue, filled with con-flict. This applies primarily to the eastern

place for populism, even when nowadays it is as prosperous as the rest of the coun-try. Old sentiments are persistent. People are still talking about the arrogant and cold-blooded Hollanders from the west-ern provinces to which the south was once added and quickly being subordinated. It is remarkable how the Dutch south is a stronghold of both the leftist populist SP as well as the rightist PVV. This Catho-lic area is now rapidly secularizing and in search of new heroes and identities. In short, the political spectrum is no longer left-to-right but rather bends around on itself in a Calder-like circle.

Notable cross-border patterns of sup-port for right-wing populism also exist. For instance, there is a visible protest-strip from Dutch Western Brabant, through the Belgian region of Flanders into Northern France. According to Filip Dewinter, lead-er of the right-wing Vlaams Belang (Flem-ish Interest), this is the old Flanders, which is now distributed across three countries. However, the Dutch PVV is also strong on the nations eastern border, while no dis-content is apparent on the German side. Germany has its own protest-strip along its eastern fringes, an impoverished area that was once home to World War II refu-gees from further east. Even in eastern Germany it is obvious how support for Die Linke goes along with high percent-ages for the Euroskeptic (Alternative for Germany (AfD)) and the extreme-right National Democratic Party (NDP). Given their quite similar non-conformist appear-ances, young radical supporters of the ex-treme-right and left are sometimes hardly distinguishable here.

In France, the National Front has al-ways been strong in its eastern departments, areas that had been occupied by Germany for decades. The Mediterranean coast, home

although in most countries the problem of conflict is not as immediate as in ukraine, most european societies appear increasingly fragmented.




could be the easing of tensions within some nation states. Separatist Catalonians in Spain or the Flemish in Belgium might feel less claustrophobic under a European umbrella with weak nation states and strong regions. But at the same time, in an even larger unity that lacks a common identity, people do feel alienated and will more easily fall back on old local identities, triggering a Balkaniza-tion of the whole continent.

Although in most countries the prob-ability of conflict is not as immediate as in Ukraine, most European societies appear increasingly fragmented. Mutual under-standing between groups decreases, and common interests are harder to find. Given the electoral consequences of this fragmen-tation, the formation of workable govern-ment coalitions will become a tougher sell, and political paralysis could be a scenario in many countries.

Easing tensions about European inte-gration might be helped by an understand-ing of peoples views and fears. Many are aware of the importance of international policies. But they seem to believe politi-cians and cosmopolitan elites remain more than a little out of touch with their cos-mopolitan orientation. This does not mean politicians should start blaming Europe for all their problems, which is sometimes the case. They should formulate the benefits of European cooperation beginning with peo-ples worldviews.

Politicians have a very challenging job nowadays. They should be profoundly aware of Europes complexities and turbu-lent past, and need to balance on a thin, high wire between the need to think and act on a larger scale while holding societies and nations together. l

regions, given the more weakly defined identities and loyalties in these countries, but it is deeply relevant to the whole con-tinent, as identification and solidarity de-creases the further away from home these centrifugal forces spin.

The ongoing integration and expan-sion of the European Union signifies a continuing process of re-bordering. If one border gets opened or raised, for ex-ample by joining the European Union or the Schengen Treaty that erases internal border controls, the next border becomes more important and can turn out to be a barrier for someone else. The open traffic policies create an even sharper outer bor-der thats the scene of painful attempts to migrate and complex efforts of preven-tions. High fences surround Spanish ex-claves in northern Africa, and accidents involving boats overloaded with refugees are ever more frequent. Former Yugoslavs now need to hassle their way through new borders between EU and non-EU, and be-tween Schengen and non-Schengen, to see their old neighbors. And should Ukraine be further integrated into the West, its eastern Russia-oriented areas will cer-tainly become more peripheral. The en-thusiastic acceptance by several Western European politicians of Ukraines west-ward turn often neglects the complicated divisions within this country, putting at risk Ukraines unity and relations with Russia. Electoral geography shows that many more divisions are in play than just international borders that are sometimes arbitrary and even temporary.

A different consequence of further Eu-ropean integration and the diminishing importance of some of its internal borders


Winter14_21-30_Electoral_Marks.p1Winter14_21-30_Electoral_Marks.p2Winter14_21-30_Electoral_Marks.p3Winter14_21-30_Electoral_Marks.p4Winter14_21-30_Electoral_Marks.p5Winter14_21-30_Electoral_Marks.p6Winter14_21-30_Electoral_Marks.p7Winter14_21-30_Electoral_Marks.p8Winter14_21-30_Electoral_Marks.p9Winter14_21-30_Electoral_Marks.p10

Josse de Voogd - Redrawing Europe's Map

Documents

Transcript of Josse de Voogd - Redrawing Europe's Map