Jorg Meurkes - Research Seminar Final Paper

8/13/2019 Jorg Meurkes - Research Seminar Final Paper

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Jorg Meurkes (5908884)

Cultural Analysis Research Seminar: Final Paper

Lecturers: Dr. Murat Aydemir, Dr. Joost de Bloois

17 January 2013

Black Pete and the Meaning of Existence

The recent controversy over the figure ofZwarte Piet(Black Pete)Sinterklaass jolly, black

faced sidekickis exemplary for how we have come to understand social or cultural critique.

First, artist and activist Quincy Gairo stirred up the debate with an astute observation, claiming

that Black Pete is Racism.1Of course, it is not hard to see that Petes black face, curly hair,

deep red lipstick and big golden earrings have apparent racist overtones. However, defenders of

the tradition ensured the activists that, although the Black Pete figure might appearracist to

them, really he is not. For anyone who grew up in the tradition, it is clear that in the mythology

Black Pete is not portrayed, conceived, or explained as a dumb, little negro slave. Rob Wijnberg,

explicitly taking issue with Gairosexistential claim (Black PeteisRacist), took it a step further,

claiming that even race doesnt reallyexist: it is just a cultural construction (1). According to

Wijnberg, the Dutch are to be lauded for not seeing any racism in the figure of Black Pete. Not

surprisingly, activists categorically refused this attack. Yet, the formof their critical reply wasoften similar to Wijnbergs. For their counterclaim was that although Black Pete might appear to

the traditionalists as an innocent, non-racist folk-figure, he reallyis a racist figure implying

that if the Dutch cannot see that Black Pete is racist, this is probably due to a distorted or partial

view on reality (i.e. a false consciousness).To win the argument, both sides tried to back their critique with the actual facts. Gairo,

for example, explained that his argument was a sincere and factually informed opinion, which

in a transparent manner brings clarity to the history of the figure and its transnational

connections with racist imagery.2The National Institute for the Study of Dutch Slavery and its

Legacy (NiNsee) welcomed this strategy, as it stated that most Dutch are unable to critically

1See http://zwartepietisracisme.tumblr.com/2Dat is ook de gedachte achter Zwarte Piet Is Racisme, een oprechte en feitelijk onderbouwde mening

dat op een heldere manier duidelijkheid verschaft over de geschiedenis van de figuur en zijntransnationale connecties in racistische beeldcultuur.


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look at a tradition that started only in the 19th century, implying that the racist origin of the

tradition is often ignored (1).3However, at the same time journalist Albert-Jan Scheer claimed

that, had we studied history proper, we would find out that Black Pete has never been a racist-

figure. In fact Black Pete was an old European mythological archetype, a demon or trickster:

Pete is no afro, no Creole, no negro, no ethnic equatorial African, no Moor and no slave or even

a servant of Sinterklaas history does not start in 1850(Scheer 1).4Based on the same set of

arguments, Jeroen Adema concluded that the Anti Black Pete lobbyists were no more than

badly informed whiners.5According to Adema, there was not a shred of racism in Black

Pete.

Thus, the criticism seems to be understood as showing reality as it is by asserting facts,

thereby debunking mystifications, illusions or distortions. Both sides claimed to have a more

transparent and more correct representation of the situation, while accusing the other of

blindness. Both were able to investigate and assert - in their eyes -true facts, in order to debunk

their adversaries position as badly informed or uncritical. In this way, the debate quickly ran

into a stalemate. It seems that the question whether or not Black Pete is racism can be answered

both ways, depending on the position one wants to defend. There seems to be no objective way

to judge who is right or wrong: both claims can equally be defended. In this light, both parties

under the guise of an objective, factually informed critiquemerely tried to impose their own

subjective interpretation of reality. Thus, we have two realities, rather than one, without any

measure that shows which version is to be privileged. How is this possible? How can the critical

method, which intends to bring objectivity and clarity to a situation, with the aim of

distinguishing between truth and error, end up in relativism? In this paper I will argue that this

problem arises because of an implicit ontological assumption that of the existence of an

ontologically complete World,distinguished from our true or false representations of it. I will

show that this assumption is untenable, opening up the space for a different ontology, and

3Ondanks dat bijna elke buitenlander, ongeacht huidskleur er toch wel anders tegenaan kijkt en hetgrotendeels met de stelling eens is, lukt het de meeste Nederlanders niet om zelf kritisch te kijken naareen traditie die pas vanaf de 19e eeuw plaatsvindt.4Piet is geen Afro, geen creool, geen negerpage, geen etnisch equatoriale Afrikaan, geen Moor en geenslaaf of zelfs geen knecht van Sinterklaas . . . Zwarte Piet is een archetype, net als Sinterklaas zelf, eenhybride wezen, het resultaat van wat ze in de godsdienstwetenschap noemen: syncretisme . . . De

geschiedenis begint niet in 1850. Als je alleen het laatste stukje ervan meeneemt, slaat deze hele discussienergens op.5Anti-Zwarte Piet lobbyisten zijn slecht geinformeerde aanstellers.


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consequently a better understanding of critique. Based on Markus Gabriels fields of sense

ontology, I will formulate a form of critique in which both interpretations in the Black Pete

debate can be asserted to exist, however, not on the same level.

Why the critic seems always right

As we have seen, both sides in the Black Pete debate understand critique as debunking a

uncritical, badly informed representation of the world (i.e. Black Pete is or is not racism),

replacing it with a better and more transparent conception based on the objectivity of facts. This

is, of course, a very common conception of critique. The natural sciences, for example, are often

understood in a similar way. By systematically investigating the world, the natural sciences offer

an objective world view, thereby disproving superstitious beliefs, religious dogmas or political

ideologies. Richard Dawkins, the well known evolutionary biologist and self-proclaimed

militant atheist, for example, vehemently tries to dismiss religious world views in favor of a

scientific understanding of the world. Likewise, the social sciences investigate the social world,

assert social facts, on the basis of which certain beliefs and conceptions of the world can be

shown to be distorted or mystified. In all cases, the critic assumes the existence of multiple, but

contradictory representations of the same situation. The role of the critic then is to show which

representations are correct, and which representations are an illusion. His task is to find out

precisely what is true, or which theory comes closest to the truth: which interpretation best

reflects the actual state of things. In the Black Pete debate, for example, the activists judged the

representation of Black Pete as being racism as correct, thereby dismissing the contradictory

representation of the figure as being innocent as an illusion.

As we can see, critique is conditioned by the existence of multiple theories

(representations, conceptions, ideas etc.) that lay claim on the same domain. For critique to be

possible, there must exist on the one hand, a myriad of possibly fallible theories, and on the other

a single domain for which they compete. If there did not exist multiple theories, there was no

need to judge between which theory was true and which was false. If they did not lay claim on

the same domain, they would not come into conflict. Normally, we associate this domain to

which our theories refer with that what actually exists, or the world. A scientific theory,

string theory for example, claims that all that actually exists are tiny strings. A die hard

constructivist sociological theory, may contend that, scientific facts are socially constructed, such


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that all what actually exists are, not strings, but socially constructed representations based on

social conventions. Here, we have two contradictory theories, that lay claim on, and thus

compete for the same domain. That domain is that what actually exists, i.e. the world. Similarly,

in the Black Pete debate two competing theories, on the one hand the theory that Black Pete is

racism, and on the other, there is no shred of racism in Black Pete, were both lay claim on the

same domain: the actual state of things. Thus, it seems that for critique to be possible it must

assume, on the one hand, a myriad of theories that can either be true or false (they are in

principle fallible), and on the other a single domainthe Worldto which they refer (i.e. which

they claim to represent). It assumes a split between conceptions, and the world as it actually

exist. Some conceptions are in accordance with the actual world, some are not. In our case, the

discussion became centered around the question: is Black Pete really a racist-figure, or is he

really a non-racist folk-figure? Who has got it right, and who lives in a world of illusions?

The answer is: both (and therefore neither). Both got it right, and both live in a world of

illusions, depending on which argument one wants to defend. Because of its ontological

assumption (that is, its assumption as to what exists: here, the split between the actual world, and

our theories which may or may not successfully refer to it), criticism is able to explain a

representation of a certain object as either true or false. That is, an object described by some

theory or world view can either actuallyexist, or merely appearto exist. For example, natural

science would claim that only spatiotemporal objects (e.g. a table) actually exists. Things such as

God or Free Willonly appear to exist. In a similar way, a social scientist may be able to

show that spatiotemporal objects such as tables merely appear to exist: in reality, table is

nothing more than a socially constructed concept. Any object is thus assumed to be either real, or

imagined. This is what Bruno Latour has called the fact and the fairy position, a distinction on

which much of criticism is premised. The critic determines an object to be in either a fact (real)

or a fairy (imagined) position. The fairy position: is very well known and is used over and over

again by many social scientists who associate criticism with antifetishism. The role of the critic

is then to show that what the nave believers are doing with objects is simply a projection of their

wishes onto a material entity that does nothing at all by itself(Latour 237). As we have seen,

this is precisely what happens when the critic debunks a theory as merely an appearance. But

in order to do this, the critic must mobilize his conception of reality that he thinks is true, i.e.

factual. The naive believersfalse conception: is now explainedby the powerful effects of


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indisputable matters of fact: You, ordinary fetishists, believe you are free but, in reality, you are

acted on by forces you are not conscious of. Look at them, look, you blind idiot(238).

The critic is able to ascribe an object to one of these two positions, which he can cleverly

play out against each other. From the activists point of view, for example, the traditionalist idea

that the figure o Black Pete is non-racist is merely an appearance. At the same time, he can show

that his own conception of Black Pete as a racist figure is based on the actual facts, by which he

can show that his opponent is wrong. And yet, starting from the traditionalist point of view, the

argument can easily be reversed. They are just as able to claim, on the basis of facts, that,

actually, the activists live in a fairy world: Cantyou see that youre making a problem out of

nothing? We never saw Black Pete as a racist-figure! To say that Black Pete is racism is pure

make-believe. Just look at history, look at the facts! It seems that Latour has a point: Do you

see now why it feels so good to be a critical mind? Why critique, this most ambiguous

pharmakon, has become such a potent euphoric drug? You are always right!(239). Para-

doxically, precisely because the critic assumes he is able to distinguish between conceptions of

objects that exist in the world (facts) and conceptions of objects that do not exist in the world

(fictions), the critic is always right. The critical practice thus ensures that the position one wants

to that defend is true beforehand. The question whether or not Black Pete is racism can be

answered both ways, depending on the position one wants to defend. In this light, both parties

under the guise of an objective, factually informed critiquemerely tried to impose their own

subjective interpretation of reality. It seems that we have to opt for relativism: there is no

objective way to decide which claim is to be privileged over the other. However, as we have

seen, this option only arises because of the initial assumption: that critique must distinguish

between facts (truth), that refer to objects in the actually existing world, and fictions (error), that

do not refer to anything real.

If relativism is understood as the claim that a true, objective representation of the world is

impossible, it must accept the same premise as the critic: that in order for a representation to be

objective it must refer to a single actual world. For the relativist, as for the critics, two

contradictory claims as Black Pete is racism and Black Pete is not racismcannot both be

objectively true. Relativism does not deny the existence of a world-in-itself, only that a

objective representation of this world is impossible. Thus we can conclude that if question

whether or not Black Pete is Racism must be settled by reference to a single domain, the real


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world, we are unable to definitively determine which of our representations are true and which

are not. If that is the case, relativism is our only option. However, if this basic assumption of

modern criticism (and by implication, relativism)that of a single world with reference to which

theories must be judged true or false in order to establish what existcan be proven to be false,

we have the possibility to formulate a different understanding of the meaning of existence (i.e. a

different ontology), and consequently different understanding of critique which avoids

relativism.

Why the Worlddoes not exist

As we have seen, criticism as it is often understood is expected to show reality as it is by

asserting facts in order to debunk fictions. The critic has to distinguish theories that refer to

things that actually exist in the world, from theories refer to things that do not actually exist in

the world. The latter are shown to be illusions: they do not refer to anything real, they merely

exist in uncritical or badly informed minds (the idea of God, for example). Things that truly

exist are normally understood to exist in the world. But what do we actually mean when we refer

to the world? The world seems to refer to the totality of things that exist; the world is the sum-

total of all that actually exist, or, as Wittgenstein famously put it: the world is everything that is

the case (25). Today, the question what is referred to as the worldis often answered in

accordance with the scientific world view: all that exist, exist in space and time, i.e. in the

universe (Gabriel 10). For us moderns, this seems are relatively safe and plausible definition. On

this view, tables, chairs, trees, atoms, humans (and many more things) exist; God, witches, and

aliens do not.

However, as Markus Gabriel has convincingly argued, when we examine our use of the

word existence, this definition is clearly limited (Die Welt 14). There are many things that can

be said to exist, that nonetheless do not exist in space and time. A math teacher would certainly

claim that, in mathematics, the number 9 exists, even when one has a hard time finding it in

somewhere in universe. Another example would be thefactthat the earth is bigger than the

moon. This fact exists: it is simply true that the earth is bigger than the moon. However, the fact

that expresses this relation cannot itself be encountered in space-time. The objects that we refer

to as : earth and moon can obviously be found in the universe, but not thefact that expresses

the relation of size between the two. Furthermore, we know that there exist a hobbit named


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Frodo in the Lord of the Rings saga, but it is unlikely that we meet him somewhere in the streets

of Amsterdam. We can also assert that there exists a figure named Jesus that performs miracles,

in the bible. Claims of existence are thus locative: things that exist, exist somewhere. However,

the Universe (understood as spatiotemporal reality) is simply not the only domain where things

can be said to exist. Frodo exist in the Lord of the World Saga, but not in the universe. The

question ifsomething exist, also depends on the question where it exist. Strictly speaking, the

Universe is rather provincial6(Die Welt 22). The World simply cannot be equated with the

Universe. Things we claim to exist, exceed the domain we call the Universe.

So what then is the domain we refer to as the World? At this point we could try to claim

that the World is, not only the sum total of all objects that exist in the spatiotemporal domain (the

universe), but rather the sum total of everything that can be said to exists (regardless of the

domain where it exists). The World, then, is the all encompassing domain in which all other

domains (the universe, mathematics, the Lord of the Rings saga) exist. The World, we could say,

is the domain of al domains. However, if something that exists, must existsomewhere,where

does the world itself exist? We could try to imagine the world as a giant object in which

everything that we know to exist is gathered together. Quickly it becomes clear that we can only

imagine this object against the background of another space in which it exist. However, this

background itself also exist, and because the world is the sum total of everything that exist, we

must include in our giant object. Obviously, this newly constructed giant object we call the

world, can only appear against yet another background. This is, on pain of infinite regress,

impossible. Therefore, Gabriel concludes, the World, conceived as the domain of all domains,

for logical reasons, cannot exist (21). The world cannot exist, because it does not exist in the

world. From this Gabriel concludes that everything exist (Harry Potter, elementary particles,

nation states etc.), except everything itself (the all encompassing world). There does not exist a

single domain (or World) with reference to which our theories can be true or false. Rather, there

exist transfinitely many domains (or worlds) with reference to which our theories can be true or

false. For example, in the physical world there exist particles, but no witches. In the novels of

J.K Rowling, there exist a guy named Harry Potter, but in this world there are no electromagnetic

forces as described in physics.

6Genau genommen is das Universum ziemlich provinziell.


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Gabriel understands metaphysics as the false ontological assumption that there exist just

one all encompassing World (Die Welt 10). This means that two widespread contemporary world

views (which both inform much of todayscritique), remain thoroughly metaphysical. First, the

scientific world view. As we have seen, it assumes that the actually existing World is the

universe, the sum total of spatiotemporal objects. It beliefs that only this physical world,

accessible through the scientific method, truly exist. The way we normally perceive the world are

mere appearances. We might think we live in the Netherlands, but in reality the Netherlands does

not exist: there only exist atoms, strings etc. Second, social constructivism, assumes precisely the

opposite. It assumes that the actually existing World consist of nothing but appearances,

including scientific theories. Physical objects and scientific facts do not really exist, they are

socially constructed. On the one hand, the scientific world view kicks out the existence of our

perceptions, and on the other hand, constructivism kicks out the existence of physical objects and

scientific facts. In other words, both assert their theory of the World as the only truly existing

one, thereby denying the existence of the other. However, both are false, as both are premised on

the false ontological assumption of an all encompassing World. Both remain metaphysical. They

adhere to ontic monism (the idea that there exist only one World). According to Gabriel, ontic

monism picks out its preferred domain and defines it as the only really existing domain

thereby drawing a sharp line between appearance (all other theories) and reality (the single

true general theory) (Gabriel & iek16).

This denying of the existence of objects that do not comply with ones (metaphysical)

theory of the World is what Gabriel calls an ontological reduction(Die Welt 53) It is precisely

this move that much of todays critique is guilty of: the privileging of ones own theory of what

exist. For example, if one adheres to the scientific world view, one may claim that all human

behavior is fully determined by the workings of the brain, thereby dismissing any appearance of

free will as an illusion. Or, one dismisses the magical spells described in Harry Potter novels as

childish babble, because they do not correspond with the physical laws. In both cases, one simply

refuses to admit that there exist multiple domains, guided by different rules, through which

things can become intelligible. However, as it makes no sense to talk about the existence of

magic in a physics lecture, it similarly does not makes sense to deny the existence of magic in a

Harry Potter novel. Physics lectures and Harry Potter novels constitute of different domains that

cannot be reduced to one another. If a single all encompassing World does not exist, criticism


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must not simply show whether or not something exist, it must also take into account where

something exist.

By showing the assumption of an all encompassing World as untenable, Gabriel opens up

the possibility for a new ontology. For Gabriel, existence means appearance in a field of sense.

The way an object appears in a field of sense, depends on the rules that constitute a field of

sense. This can be made clear with Gabriels allegory of the cubes:

Imagine that there are three cubes on a table, a blue, a white, and a red cube. If you ask

yourself the question: how many objects are there on the table, a spontaneous and true

answer states that there are three. In this case, the rule of the count, the sense holding the

situation together, might consist in the rule to count the cubes or the colors. If you were

to count atoms instead of colors or cubes, the number of objects on the table would bemuch larger than three. You might also just count the three cubes as one artifact, say, as a

particular work of art, or as a representation of the French flag. In my view, the rules that

determine how many objects there are, are senses, and for each sense there is a field of

sense, the objects that appear in its range. (The Meaning of Existence 80)

We can see that a particular situation can have different senses. The sense is determined by the

rules which determine the answer to a question, in this case, how many objects there are. In one

sense, there are three (three cubes), in another sense there is only one (a work of art), and in yet

another there are a lot (strings). By switching between different questions and answers, we move

between different fields of sense, (i.e. different worlds, or domains). First the world of geometry,

then the world of art, and finally the world of physics. However, these senses are of the same

situation, and although they constitute different perspectives, they are all objective. What

exists thusdepends as much on the rules that govern the domain in which the object becomes

intelligible, as on the object itself. Similarly, when watching a Harry Potter movie, one may ask

oneself the question if there exist magic in the world of Harry Potter. The answer would be yes.

But if, in the same situation, one asks oneself if actor Daniel Radcliff has supernatural powers,

the answer will be negative. Again, one switches between different domains, different fields of

sense, different perspectives on the same situation, which are nonetheless objective. So what can

this ontology mean for criticism, particularly in the case of the Black Pete debate?


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Toward a new understanding of critique

The critique that both sides in the Black Pete controversy aimed at each other was premised on

an assumption of the existence of the World. As such, critics were expected to show reality as it

is by asserting facts in order to debunk fictions.We saw that if our understanding of critique is

premised on the belief of an preexisting world in reference to which our disputes must be settled,

we cannot avoid relativism (as both positions seemed to be equally defendable). However,

because this ontological assumption can be shown to untenable (a metaphysical remnant), we can

formulate a new ontology and by implication a different understanding of critique. Drawing upon

Gabriels fields of sense ontology, I think we can mobilize two new criteria. First, we must not

only show if the racist figure of Black Pete exist, but also where he exist. Existence is

appearance in a field of sense, and the rules governing the field of sense constitute the sense of a

thing that appears in it. Second, we should examine whether or not the participants in the debate

are guilty of an ontological reductionism: the privileging of a particular domain as the only really

existing domain.

What becomes immediately clear, is that the innocent figure of Black Pete defended by

the traditionalist appears in a particular field of sense: the mythology of Sinterklaas. Here, Black

Pete is Sinterklaas jolly sidekick, a trickster, acrobat, jokester etc. Racism however, is not part

of the story. Parents usually do not explain to their children that the black faced figure is a dumb,

negro slave that must obey his tall white male (heterosexual?) oppressor Sinterklaas. If one

would go to an celebration of the festival, one would normally not encounter this explanation.

Race simply does not make sense in this domain. It is thus not surprising that most Dutch had

such a strong reaction against Gairos claim, that Black Pete is racism. For them, racism was

never part of the story. To say that Pete is a racist figure, literally does not makes sense for the

traditionalists.

This, however, does not undermine the claim of the activists: that Black Pete isracism.

The claim does not point to the field of sense Sinterklaas mythology.Rather, the assertion of

the existence of racism in the figure, was located in the domain Dutch Society. Regardless of

the fact whether or not they were aware of this, for them, the figure of Black Pete appeared in a

different field of sense. In the field of sense Dutch Society figures dressed like Black Pete

(black faced, curly hear etc.) accompanied by a tall white male can legitimately be called racist.


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The rules that govern this domainfor example, that discrimination and racism are forbidden,

that the racist and colonial past are relevant, that certain people will be offended by racist

imagery, that a single tall white man bossing around peoples of color is racist etc. - will tell us

that Black Pete has obvious racist overtones. Here, Black Pete as a racist figure exists. The

societal rules that govern the domain Dutch Society, may notapply to the Mythology, but here

they do, and they are extremely relevant.. Here, the imagery is not innocent. In this domain, to

claim that Black Pete is Racism makes a lot of sense. We can thus say that, on the one hand, the

racist figure exist in Dutch society, but not in the Sinterklaas Mythology, and on the other

hand, the innocent figure exist in the mythology, but not in Dutch society.

Next, we see that both sides are guilty of an ontological reductionism. The traditionalist

tried to assert the existence of the innocent figure, as the only true interpretation. Based on their

sense that there is no shred of racism in Black Pete in the mythology, they erroneously think that

racism does not exist at all. In other words, they reduced the question of the existence of racism

in Black Pete, to the question whether racism exists in their understanding of the mythology.

They privilege a particular field of sense, and thereby dismiss any other sense that might be

made of the situation. On the other hand, the activist were prone to reduce the question of racism

to be solely determined in the domain of Dutch Society. Both tried to claim that their own sense

of the situation, was the only true interpretation. That enabled them to dismiss their opponents as

deluded, badly informed and uncritical. However, because there does exist a single domain (the

World), but rather multiple field of sense, we can assert that both senses of the figure exist.

But there is a final twist. According to our ontology, the very debate that we have

analyzed itselfconstitutes another field of sense. Because this debate exist, it existssomewhere.

Where?Normally we understand these kinds of debates to take place in the public space, or

civil society. Implicitly, the question in which field of sense the question whether or not Black

Pete is racism, was determined by the activist as Dutch Society. Apublic debate normally is

not about whether Harry Potter is a wizard with magic powers. Rather, a public debate is about

public space itself, i.e. society. While the activist made the mistake to claim that Black Pete is

racism as such, they were probably right in claiming that Black Pete is racismin Dutch

Society. Their claim was located in the right field of sense: the field of sense specified by the

debate (i.e. public space, civil society). They do not need to commit to an ontological reduction.

They can admit that Black Pete is not to be associated with racism, in the mythology. But in the


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debate, this the question irrelevant. What is important is the question whether or not Black Pete

is racism in Dutch Society, and here the activist have a much stronger argument. The

traditionalist claim, the other hand, depends on the rules set by a mythology. The claim that

something does not exist in society, because it does not exist a fairy tale, is simply misguided. It

is true that their exist not a shred of racism of Black Pete in the fable of Sinterklaas. However,

we cannot claim that, because there exist magic in Harry Potter movies, there exist magic in the

physical world. Likewise, we cannot claim that, because there exist no racism in the Sinterklaas

mythology, there exist no racism in a scene comprising a black faced figure that hops around a

tall white master in Dutch society.

In this paper I have argued that much of todays criticism still relies on a (implicit) conception of

the world, a certain ontology, that gives rise to a problem: if the question of existence must be

settled by reference to a single domain, the real world, we are unable to definitively determine

which of our representations are true and which are not. However, because this assumption can

proven to be untenable, it is possible to formulate a new ontology that allows for existence of

multiple domains fields of sense. Drawing on this ontology, I have formulated two critical tools.

In the case of Black Pete this meant, first, that we must not only show if the racist figure of

Black Pete exist, but also where he exist. Second, we should examine whether or not the

participants in the debate are guilty of an ontological reductionism: the privileging of a particular

domain as the only really existing domain. This made clear that both Black Pete figures

defended, racist and innocent, can be said to exist in their respective fields of sense (society and

mythology). While both sides of the debate commit an ontological reductionism, the activist can

be said to have the stronger case, as they located their version of Black Pete (racist) in the

relevant field of sense (Dutch Society).

Works Cited

Adema, Jeroen. Anti-Zwarte Piet Lobbyisten zijn slecht genformeerde aanstellers. n.p., n.d. Web. 17Jan. 2014.

Gabriel, Markus, and Slavoj iek. Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity in GermanIdealism. Continuum, 2009. Print.

Gabriel, Markus. The Meaning of "Existence" and the Contingency of Sense. Speculations (IV). 2013.74-83.


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Gabriel, Markus. Warum es die Welt nicht gibt. Berlin: Ullstein, 2013. Print.

Scheer, Arnold Jan. Zwarte Piet Is Nooit Een Slaaf Geweest. VK. N. p., n.d. Web. 17 Jan. 2014.

Wijnberg, Rob. Wat We Niet Zien. De Correspondent. N. p., n.d. Web. 17 Jan. 2014.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. Routledge, 1990. Print.

Zwarte Piet Is Racisme Is Taboe.NiNsee (Nationaal instituut Nederlands slavernijverleden enerfenis). N. p., n.d. Web. 18 Jan. 2014.

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