Jordanian Society Living Conditions in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Jon Hanssen-Bauer, Jon Pedersen and

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Jordanian SocietyLiving Conditions inthe Hashemite Kingdom of

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© Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science 1998ISBN 82-7422-217-2

Cover page: Premraj SivasamyCover photo: Are HovdenakPrinted in Norway by: Falch Hurtigtrykk

FafoInstitute for Applied Social ScienceP.O.Box 2947 TøyenN-0608 Oslohttp://www.fafo.no/engelsk/

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Authors:

Marie W. ArnebergTaleb AwadDavid DruryJon Hanssen-BauerLaurie Blome JacobsenNawaf KalaldehHiam Omar KalimatAbdelhalim A. KharabshehSa’ad KharabsehSami KhouryIssa NassarJon PedersenSara RandallTeleb Abu ShararSiri StørmerÅge A. Tiltnes

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The Jordan Living Conditions SurveyThe Project Team

Jordan Departmentof Statistics

Jordanian AcademicsTaleb AwadNawaf KalaldehHiam Omar KalimatSa’ad KharabshehSami KhouryIssa NassarTeleb Abu Sharar

FafoJon Hanssen-BauerJon PedersenÅge A. TiltnesDavid DruryAkram AtallahRuba Saleh AtallahDag H. TuastadRania MaktabiMarie W. ArnebergLaurie Blome JacobsenSara RandallSiri StørmerGeir O. PedersenLena EndresenJan DietzAre Hovdnak

Project National DirectorDr. Abdulhadi Alawin

Director General of Statistics

Abdallah Abdelaziz Zou’bi

Abdelhalim A. Kharabsheh

Fahad HiyariWajdi Akeel

Fathi NsourIkhlas ArankiKamal Al-SalehZeinab DabbaghKhadija Dar MousaMoustafa SalamehMohammed AssafMohammed JundiAbed AwadhJamal Sa’addeenAlaa Neshawat

Project Executive Director, first phase

Project Executive Director, second phase

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Contents

Preface .................................................................................................. 9List of Figures ............................................................................................... 12List of Tables ................................................................................................. 21List of Abbreviations .................................................................................... 25Arabic terms used......................................................................................... 26

Chapter 1 Introduction: Jordan Living Conditions Survey ............ 29Introduction ................................................................................................. 29The Concept of Living Conditions ............................................................... 30Implementation of the Survey: A Phased Marathon .................................. 36The JLCS data set .......................................................................................... 40The JLCS reporting ....................................................................................... 41The Content of the Report .......................................................................... 42

Chapter 2 The Population of Jordan ............................................... 51Summary ....................................................................................................... 51Introduction ................................................................................................. 51Age-Sex Structure ........................................................................................ 53The measurement of fertility ....................................................................... 62Fertility ......................................................................................................... 63Mortality ....................................................................................................... 81Direct and indirect measures of mortality .................................................. 82

Chapter 3 Housing and Infrastructure ............................................ 97Summary ....................................................................................................... 97The Dwelling ................................................................................................ 98Neighbourhoods in the JLCS ..................................................................... 100

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Chapter 4 Education ....................................................................... 129Summary ..................................................................................................... 129Introduction: Recent Education Reforms .................................................. 130The Educational Ladder in Jordan ............................................................. 132Availability of Schools ................................................................................ 133Education in the General Population ........................................................ 134Current Enrolment in Education ............................................................... 139Parents’ Attitudes About Education.......................................................... 148Report Card: Satisfaction Ratings andSome Suggestions for the Schools ............................................................. 158

Chapter 5 Health and Health Services .......................................... 165Summary ..................................................................................................... 165Introduction ............................................................................................... 166Health Status .............................................................................................. 166Self-Assessed General Health ..................................................................... 167Disease and illness ...................................................................................... 167Health Services ........................................................................................... 186Appendix 5.1: Logistic Regression on Self-Perceived Global Health ........ 195

Chapter 6 Household Income and Wealth ..................................... 197Summary ..................................................................................................... 197The Distribution of Income ........................................................................ 198Economic Resources and Income ............................................................... 204The Relation of Gender, Age and Education to Income ........................... 212Determinants of Poverty ............................................................................ 214Economic Mobility ..................................................................................... 218Household Wealth ..................................................................................... 220 Appendix 6.1 ............................................................................................. 223Appendix 6.2 .............................................................................................. 224Appendix 6.3 Logistic Regression on Poverty ........................................... 225

Chapter 7 Work and Working Conditions ..................................... 227Summary ..................................................................................................... 227The Labour Force ....................................................................................... 228How much do the economically active work? Employment,underemployment and unemployment. ................................................... 236The Activities of the Employed .................................................................. 243

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Work Environment ..................................................................................... 250Job Training ................................................................................................ 255Appendix 7.1 Logistic Regression on Labour Force Participation ............ 256

Chapter 8 Social Network .............................................................. 259Summary ..................................................................................................... 259Introduction ............................................................................................... 260Close Networks: Family Life and Living With Relatives ............................ 262Visiting Relatives: Expressing Closeness .................................................... 276Use of Clan or Village Institutions ............................................................. 280Help and Support Among Family, Friends and Neighbours ..................... 282

Chapter 9 Attitudes and Public Life .............................................. 293Summary ..................................................................................................... 293Introduction ............................................................................................... 294Public Participation .................................................................................... 298Women in Public Space .............................................................................. 306Attitudes Towards Western Influence ....................................................... 312Appendix 9.1 Logistic Regression On Media Consumption ..................... 314

Chapter 10 Children and youth ..................................................... 315Summary ..................................................................................................... 315Introduction ............................................................................................... 316Prenatal Care .............................................................................................. 317Delivery and Postnatal Care ....................................................................... 320Few Women Receive Postnatal Care ......................................................... 322Birth Intervals ............................................................................................. 323Short Spacings Most Common Among Young Women andSecond - Third Children ............................................................................. 325Infant and Child Mortality ......................................................................... 326Trends in Infant and Child Mortality by Five-Year Periods ....................... 327Improvements in Infant Mortality Rates Due Largely to Fewer NeonatalDeaths ......................................................................................................... 327Breast-Feeding Practices ............................................................................ 334Infant and Childhood Nutrition ................................................................ 337Illness in Infants and Young Children ........................................................ 342Caretaker of Young Children and Play Activities ...................................... 344The Family Environment for Children and Youth ..................................... 344Health Care for Children and Youth ......................................................... 349Education and Dropouts ............................................................................ 352

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Chapter 11 Living Conditions in Jordan:a Holistic View ................................................................................. 355Living Conditions in Jordan: A Summary .................................................. 355Infrastructure and Income ......................................................................... 359How Are Living Conditions Structured? .................................................... 361A Map of Jordan ........................................................................................ 364A Different Map of Jordan ........................................................................ 367Becoming Poor in Jordan ........................................................................... 370“Tradition” and “Modernity” .................................................................... 374The Future .................................................................................................. 377Conclusion .................................................................................................. 379

Appendix 1 The JLCS Sample ......................................................... 381Summary ..................................................................................................... 381Requirements of the Sampling Design...................................................... 381First Stage Selection: Selection of PSUs ..................................................... 384Third Stage Selection: Selection of Individuals From the Households ..... 386Unit Non-Response: The Household .......................................................... 390Unit Non-Response: Individuals ................................................................. 392Non-Response Adjustment ........................................................................ 393Sampling and Non-Sampling Errors .......................................................... 394Non-Sampling Errors .................................................................................. 394Sampling Errors .......................................................................................... 395

Appendix 2 Some Notes on Statistical Methods ......................... 411

References ........................................................................................ 417

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Preface

In this publication, the living conditions of the population of the HashemiteKingdom of Jordan is portrayed. The analysis is based on the results from the JordanLiving Conditions Survey (JLCS). The survey has been implemented jointly by theJordan Department of Statistics (DOS) and Fafo Institute of Applied Social Sciences,with Dr. Abdulhadi Alawin, Director General of DOS as the project’s NationalDirector.

After consultations between the ministries of foreign affairs of Jordan andNorway in 1992, the authorities in the two countries agreed to cooperate on a studyon living conditions in Jordan. The cooperation should pursue two sets of objec-tives. The first was to build a sustainable statistical capacity in Jordan to supportthe Government’s efforts in improving the living conditions of the population. Thesecond objective was to produce the first set of high-quality, updated and policy-relevant analyses of living conditions of the Jordanian population, including therefugees and children, along a wide range of socio-economic and health indicators.

In February 1993, the Ministry of Planning on behalf of the Governmentof Jordan signed the project contract with Fafo in Amman. Fafo and the JordanDepartment of Statistics started the implementation of the project in the secondhalf of 1994, but the project really picked up momentum as the funding was securedin the middle of 1995. In January 1996, the Advisory Board for the project chairedby the Minister of Planning, gave its final approval of the questionnaire, and thefieldwork was launched the same month.

Canada joined the project at an early stage and concurred with Norway inproviding the necessary funding for the project. Canada channeled their contribu-tion through their International Development Research Center (IDRC) and theCIDA. UNICEF in Amman has been the core local partner to the project, as themain part of the funding was provided from Norway as a contribution to UNICEF’sstatistical program in Jordan.

A high number of local academics and professionals, as well as local andinternational organizations and institutions have contributed to the project. Somehave taken part in the project’s technical committee or on its advisory board. Othershave participated in the workshops and seminars that have been held during theproject, or have been consulted by the researchers on a more informal basis. Thisway, the project has become a true Jordanian one, and a cooperative research effort

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that has benefited from the insights and competence of close to two hundreds ofprofessionals in the country.

The Jordan Department of Statistics has already issued a first report provid-ing the core tabulations of the results (DOS 1997). UNICEF has published the mainfindings concerning mothers and children in their country analysis (UNICEF 1997),and equally UNDP has made use of several indicators from the survey (UNDP1997). Fafo has presented the results concerning Palestinian refugees and displacedpersons in a separate report (Arneberg 1997). It is with great pride that we herebyintroduce in-depth analysis of the results that completes the reporting from theproject. It is our hope that this book will serve as a baseline for future studies ofJordanian living conditions.

We would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to theGovernment of Jordan for inviting us to do the present study, and in particular toHis Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan for his interest and support. We are thank-ful to Her Excellency Dr. Rima Khalaf, Minister of Planning, for her encourage-ment and follow-up. She has chaired the project’s Advisory Board on behalf of theGovernment. We have enjoyed generous hospitality during our frequent visits tothe country.

We are profoundly indebted to Dr. Abdulhadi Alawin, Director General ofthe Department of Statistics, for his efforts to guide the project to a successful end,and to all his staff for their collegial and professional work. The DOS team wasdirected first by Dr. Abdallah Abdelaziz Zou’bi and later by Mr. AbdelhalimKharabsheh. A full list of our contributing colleagues is given overleaf. We wouldlike to commend the Department of Statistics for the outstanding work it has de-livered in the implementation of the fieldwork and for the resulting quality of thedata set.

We are thankful to Dr. Hussein Shakhatreh, Director for the Human Reso-urces Planning Department in the Ministry of Planning, for his kind support duringthe initial phases of the project. The positive support from the Department forRefugee Issues and Mr. Abdelkarim Abulhaija has been of great help.

We also thank the Governments of Norway and Canada for financial sup-port and encouragement. We have enjoyed the cooperation with the Middle EastDesk in Oslo, and we have always felt welcome and supported by the Norwegianand the Canadian embassies in Amman. Tove S. Kijewski always kept her embassyand residence open to us and shared emphatically our high spirits as well as moretaxing moments. We are grateful to our partners and friends in IDRC and UNICEFAmman for their day to day follow-up, their project steering and professional con-tributions. In particular we would like to mention Area Representative Dorrit Ale-opaeus-Ståhl and her predecessor Victoria Rialp, as well as Program OfficerDr. Ayman A. Abulaban and Senior Programme Assistant Mrs. Muna Idriz. We are

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also deeply grateful to Senior Programme Officer Dr. Anwar Islam in IDRC for hisinterested and valuable contributions.

Our very special thanks go to our eight Jordanian colleagues. They deliveredthe first drafts on very short time, and contributed substantially to the quality ofthis report. We are very happy for the trustful relationship we have experienced withcolleagues in Jordan, that, in the end, made this cooperation possible across national,institutional and professional borders.

On the Fafo side, the project has been directed by Research Director JonHanssen-Bauer. Through dedicated and hard work he has contributed to the highprofessional standard of the project. Researcher Åge A. Tiltnes has been a dedicat-ed, stable and able contributor all over the project’s lifetime. Research Director JonPedersen is to be credited for raising the quality of the survey to high professionalstandards through his invaluable input to almost all areas. We thank Ms. RubaAtallah who made a tremendous job as project assistant in the critical phases of thestudy, as well as Coordinator Akram Atallah for his highly professional input. ThePublication Department at Fafo, and in particular Premraj Sivasamy, must be com-mended for a very demanding work of editing the manuscript for printing.

Lastly, we would like to mention our former Director General Terje Rød-Larsen, who designed the project at the outset and made the necessary contacts inJordan, and former head of the Center for International Studies, Geir O. Pedersen,who backed the launching of the project work in 1993.

In spite of all contributions and support, it goes without saying that any erroror misunderstanding in this report is the sole responsibility of Fafo and the editors.

Oslo, April 1998Arne GrønningsæterManaging DirectorCenter for International Studies, Fafo

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List of Figures

Chapter 1 Introduction: Jordan Living Conditions SurveyFigure 1.1 Measures of living conditions .................................................................................... 31

Figure 1.2 Measures of living conditions ................................................................................... 32

Figure 1.3 Modules or dimensions of the living conditions survey .......................................... 34

Figure 1.4 The JLCS schedule and main milestones .................................................................... 37

Figure 1.5 JLCS: Six reporting domains ....................................................................................... 38

Chapter 2 The Population of JordanFigure 2.1 Size of the population in Jordan are census years. Other years are estimates. ..... 52

Figure 2.2 Age and sex structure ................................................................................................. 53

Figure 2.3 Sex ratios ...................................................................................................................... 55

Figure 2.4 Marital status by age, women .................................................................................... 56

Figure 2.5 Marital status by age, men ......................................................................................... 57

Figure 2.6 Mean age at marriage ................................................................................................ 58

Figure 2.7 Proportions of women single by age ........................................................................ 58

Figure 2.8 Proportions women single at time of the survey and 10 years earlier ................... 59

Figure 2.9 Proportions men single at time of the survey and 10 years earlier ........................ 59

Figure 2.10 Mean age at first marriage according to education .............................................. 60

Figure 2.11 Proportions of women single by education ............................................................ 61

Figure 2.12 Proportions of women single by education 10 years before survey ..................... 61

Figure 2.13 Mean age at marriage according to labour force status ....................................... 62

Figure 2.14 Proportions single by labour force status ............................................................... 62

Figure 2.15 Total fertility rates 1985-95 ...................................................................................... 65

Figure 2.16 Age specific fertility rates 1985-95 .......................................................................... 65

Figure 2.17 Total fertility 1995 and completed parity by region andsocioeconomic characteristics ................................................................................................ 66

Figure 2.18 Recent estimates of Total Fertility Rates in Arab countries. .................................. 68

Figure 2.19 Reported parity for males and females ................................................................... 69

Figure 2.20 Male fertility rates ..................................................................................................... 71

Figure 2.21 Male parity by educational achievement ................................................................ 71

Figure 2.22 Ideal family size by gender of respondent ............................................................. 71

Figure 2.23 Ideal family size by education, women ................................................................... 72

Figure 2.24 Ideal family size by education, men ........................................................................ 73

Figure 2.26 Life expectancy at age 20 from orphanhood and widowhood data. ................... 84

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Figure 2.27: Life expectancy at age 20 from orphanhood and widowhood data. .................. 84

Figure 2.28 Percentage of governorate residents born in governorate by age ...................... 86

Figure 2.29: Percentage of governorate residents born in West Bank,the Gaza Strip or Israel ........................................................................................................... 87

Figure 2.30 Percentage of governorate residents by residence 5 years previously ................. 88

Figure 2.31 Age specific migration rates in last 5 years: all movements by sex ...................... 89

Figure 2.32 Main activity in place of migration ......................................................................... 89

Figure 2.33: Age specific migration rates: females by movement since 1991 ......................... 90

Figure 2.34 Age specific migration rates: males by movement since 1991 .............................. 90

Figure 2.35 Working male migrants and total population by education ................................ 91

Figure 2.36 Female age structure of relatives abroad ............................................................... 92

Figure 2.37 Male age structure of relatives abroad ................................................................... 93

Figure 2.38 Residence country of relatives abroad .................................................................... 00

Figure 2.39 Female relatives: main reason for being overseas by region ................................ 95

Figure 2.40 Male relatives: main reason for being overseas by region .................................... 96

Chapter 3 Housing and InfrastructureFigure 3.1 Percentage of households in different types of dwelling, by neighbourhood ..... 99

Figure 3.2 Main housing types by region .................................................................................. 101

Figure 3.3 Owning and renting: Percentage of households by type of dwelling ................. 103

Figure 3.4 Owning and renting: Percentage of households by income group ..................... 103

Figure 3.5 Persons per room and per room used for sleeping by size of household ............ 106

Figure 3.6 Percent of households with housing and sanitation amenities,by Urban/ rural location ....................................................................................................... 107

Figure 3.7 Number of amenities by type of dwelling,neighbourhood and family .................................................................................................. 109

Figure 3.8 Nuisances and disturbances in the indoor environment.Percentage of all households .............................................................................................. 111

Figure 3.9 Energy sources used for room and water heating ................................................. 112

Figure 3.10 Percentage of households with access to local services, by neighbourhood

Figure 3.11 Percent of households exposed to outdoor pollution, by neighbourhood ....... 117

Figure 3.12 Satisfaction with the Dwelling ............................................................................... 120

Figure 3.13 General satisfaction with housing, by type of dwelling,income, refugee camp, and overcrowding ......................................................................... 121

Figure 3.14 Satisfaction with the neighbourhood ................................................................... 122

Figure 3.15 Going places: Groups with high proportions of householdswho plan to move................................................................................................................. 125

Figure 3.16 Reasons for moving within the area, or to another area .................................... 126

Figure 3.17 Destinations of urban and rural households planningto move out of their home areas ........................................................................................ 127

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Chapter 4 EducationFigure 4.1 Percentage of households in walking distance of schools .................................... 133

Figure 4.2 Satisfaction with availability of schools in the neighbourhood ........................... 134

Figure 4.3 People ever enrolled in school, by age group, sex and urban-rural ..................... 135

Figure 4.4 Illiteracy by age group, sex and urban-rural ........................................................... 136

Figure 4.5 Highest level of education completed or currently enrolled ................................ 138

Figure 4.6 Distribution of currently enrolled students by level and sex ................................ 140

Figure 4.7 Secondary school enrolment in the Academic and Vocational streams ............... 141

Figure 4.8 Distribution of students by type of school and level ............................................. 142

Figure 4.9 Type of basic school attended, by income group ................................................... 143

Figure 4.10 Students who are enrolled or have completed Basic school (age 6-16) orSecondary school (age 17-18): Percentage by age and other measures .......................... 145

Figure 4.11 Reasons for not being enrolled in school ............................................................. 146

Figure 4.12 Do you expect your child to complete Basic school? ........................................... 149

Figure 4.13 Expectations for the child after completing the Basic cycle ................................ 150

Figure 4.14 Parents’ preferences for vocational vs. academic secondary school ................... 151

Figure 4.15 Main reason for preferring Academic or Vocationalsecondary education: Parents who expect their children to attend secondary school .. 152

Figure 4.16 Expectations about the highest level of school the child will reach .................. 155

Figure 4.17 Support for women’s education, and expectations about children’s highesteducation level (If going on to secondary school: ............................................................. 156

Figure 4.18 Where higher education was completed, by sex (B.A., M.A., Ph.D.),High Diploma ........................................................................................................................ 157

Figure 4.19 Satisfaction with the development of public schools:All randomly selected individuals ....................................................................................... 158

Figure 4.20 Quality of education in the school your child now attends:Parents with children in Basic school .................................................................................. 159

Figure 4.21 Parents’ opinions about improvements needed in their child’s Basic school .... 161

Chapter 5 Health and Health ServicesFigure 5.1 Self-assessed general health by sex of respondent ................................................ 169

Figure 5.2 Self-perceived good and bad health by sex and age ............................................. 170

Figure 5.3 Individuals stating that their health is ‘very good’ by selected characteristics:chronic health problems, smoking habits, indoor housing conditions,level of education, yearly household income, and type of residential area ................... 171

Figure 5.4 Prevalence of prolonged illness and injury according to geographicregion, type of residential area, Palestinian refugee status and yearly householdincome; all household members .......................................................................................... 173

Figure 5.5 Prevalence of prolonged illness and injury according to ten-year age groups;entire surveyed population .................................................................................................. 174

Figure 5.6 Adults’ ability to perform certain everyday activities ............................................ 175

Figure 5.7 Difficulties in performing everyday life activities, according to sex and yearlyhousehold income , and labour force participation .......................................................... 176

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Figure 5.8 Smoking habits by sex: regularity of smoking; average number of cigarettessmoked daily among regular smokers; and average age when started smoking ........... 177

Figure 5.9 Prevalence of regular smokers by sex and age groups; RSI 15 years or older ..... 178

Figure 5.10 The adult population according to seven indicators ofpsychological distress ........................................................................................................... 180

Figure 5.11 Men and women according to the reported numberof symptoms of psychological distress ................................................................................ 181

Figure 5.12 Individuals of three income groups according to thereported number of symptoms of psychological distress; RSI 15 years or older ............. 181

Figure 5.13 Prevalence of acute and severe acute illness or injury. ‘Severe’ is defined aspreventing the person from carrying out normal duties .................................................. 182

Figure 5.14 Place of consultation following acute illness or injury by Palestinianrefugee status, yearly household income and health insurance coverage ..................... 183

Figure 5.15 Reason for not seeking professional help during acuteillness or injury by yearly household income ..................................................................... 184

Figure 5.16 Cost per consultation by yearly household income,type of place consulted and health insurance coverage ................................................... 185

Figure 5.17 Cost for medication by yearly household income,type of place consulted and health insurance coverage ................................................... 185

Figure 5.18 Households with various health services within five to ten minutes walkingdistance from dwelling by urban rural status .................................................................... 187

Figure 5.19 Households with at least one health centre, hospital orphysician within five to ten minutes walking distance from dwellingby type of residential area ................................................................................................... 187

Figure 5.20 Households with certain health services within five to tenminutes walking distance from dwelling by geographic region ..................................... 188

Figure 5.21 Individuals covered by health insurance, by type of insurance .......................... 190

Figure 5.22 Health insurance coverage by type of insurance and geographic region .......... 190

Figure 5.23 Individuals’ health insurance coverage by type of insurance, and according tourban-rural status, Palestinian refugee status, and yearly household income ............... 191

Figure 5.24 Households’ satisfaction with local health services, according to whether theyhave any health centre or physician or not within their immediate living area ............ 192

Figure 5.25 Respondents stating that the public health system has developed poorly, byhighest level of education completed ................................................................................ 193

Figure 5.26 Respondents saying that the public health system has developedexcellently, by level of satisfaction with local health facilities ......................................... 193

Figure 5.27 Households’ opinion about treatment and service given by selected healthinstitutions following acute illness or injury ...................................................................... 194

Chapter 6 Household Income and WealthFigure 6.1 Distribution of annual household income .............................................................. 198

Figure 6.2 Cummulative distribution of annual household income by household’s ............. 199

Figure 6.3 Percentage of households with annualincome less than 1450 JD, by household income sources. ................................................ 200

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Figure 6.4 Supplementary income sources. .............................................................................. 201

Figure 6.5 Cummulative distribution of annual household income bysex of household head ......................................................................................................... 202

Figure 6.6 Cummulative distribution of annual household income byrefugee status and nationality ............................................................................................ 203

Figure 6.7 Cummulative distribution of annual household income bylabour market status of household main provider in household ..................................... 207

Figure 6.8 Cummulative distribution of annual householdincome by industry of main provider in household ......................................................... 209

Figure 6.9 Cummulative distribution of annual household income byeducation of household head ............................................................................................. 211

Figure 6.10 Percent of households with annual income less than JD 1450,by sex, age and education of household head .................................................................. 213

Figure 6.11 Percent of low-income hoseholds who consider themselves as poor ................. 215

Figure 6.12 Reported change in household income from 1994 to 1995 ................................ 218

Figure 6.13 Reported change in household income from 1994 to 1995,by employment industry of main provider ......................................................................... 219

Figure 6.14 Reported change in household income from 1994 to 1995,by main household’s income source and domain ............................................................. 219

Figure 6.15 Expectations for the future among the poor, by education ofhead of household ................................................................................................................ 220

Figure 6.16 Ownership of capital and durable goods, by household income ....................... 221

Chapter 7 Work and Working ConditionsFigure 7.1 Labour force categorisation by sex. Percent of total population ......................... 230

Figure 7.2 Labour force participation by sex, age and education .......................................... 231

Figure 7.3 Labour force participation by sex, age and marital status .................................... 232

Figure 7.4 Labour force participation rates among women by age,education and marital status ............................................................................................... 232

Figure 7.5 Labour force participation by nationality and refugee status.Percent of persons 15 years of age and above ................................................................... 233

Figure 7.6 Reasons for not working. Percent of men 15 years ofage and above who are outside the labour force, by their main activity ....................... 235

Figure 7.7 Reasons for not working. Percent of women 15 years of age andabove who are outside the labour force, by their main activity ...................................... 235

Figure 7.8 Gender-specific employment rates. Percent of persons in the labour force ........ 237

Figure 7.9 Employment and unemployment by marital status. Percent of persons in the

Figure 7.10 Unemployment and part time employment by selectedindividual characteristics. Percent of persons in the labour force ................................... 240

Figure 7.11 Reasons for being unemployed. Percent of unemployed men by education .... 241

Figure 7.12 Reasons for being unemployed. Percent of unemployed women by education241

Figure 7.13 Employment status. Percent of employed persons by education and sex ......... 243

Figure 7.14 Industry structure for men. Percent of employed men by education ................ 245

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Figure 7.15 Industry structure for women. Percent of employed women by education ...... 246

Figure 7.16 Industry structure by refugee status and citizenship. Men ................................. 246

Figure 7.17 Industry structure by refugee status and citizenship. Women ............................ 247

Figure 7.18 Occupational structure for men. Percent of employed men by education ........ 248

Figure 7.19 Occupational structure for women. Percent of employedwomen by education ............................................................................................................ 248

Figure 7.20 Occupational structure for men, by refugee status and nationality .................. 249

Figure 7.21 Occupational structure for women, by refugee status and nationality ............. 249

Figure 7.22 Distribution of actual weekly working hours in all jobs.Percent of employed persons .............................................................................................. 250

Figure 7.23 Percent of employed persons with irregular working hours,by industry and employment status .................................................................................... 252

Figure 7.24 Clustering of bad working conditions. Cumulative percent of employed personsby number of hazards and industry .................................................................................... 253

Figure 7.25 Job training .............................................................................................................. 254

Figure 7.26 Person or institution who paid for the training. Percent of those who

Chapter 8 Social NetworkFigure 8.1 Extended, nuclear and single person households by type of

neighbourhood, domain, and sex and age of household head ....................................... 264

Figure 8.2 Households having family and relatives nearby, by type of neighbourhood,domain, sex and age of household head, if head of household lived same place orelsewhere 5 years ago .......................................................................................................... 265

Figure 8.3 Categories of relatives living nearby by sex of spouses, in percent of the house-holds having the category of relatives living nearby ........................................................ 267

Figure 8.4 Lineal and collateral relatives of both spouses living nearby ............................... 268

Figure 8.5 Type of network: Lineal and collateral relatives, in percent of thehouseholds in the category. ................................................................................................. 269

Figure 8.6: Size of local household networks ........................................................................... 270

Figure 8.7 The village household network: Many relatives and both linealand collateral relatives. ........................................................................................................ 271

Figure 8.8 Satisfaction with distance to relatives and friends. ............................................... 272

Figure 8.9 Unsatisfied with the distance to relatives. .............................................................. 273

Figure 8.10 Visits with relatives during last two weeks ........................................................... 277

Figure 8.11 Respondents with visits last two weeks, by sex,age group, position in the household, types of relatives living nearby,size of household network nearby and reporting domain ............................................... 278

Figure 8.12 Respondents with daily visits last two weeks, in percent,by sex, age group, position in the household, types of relativesliving nearby, size of household network nearby and reporting domain. ...................... 279

Figure 8.13 Visits among relatives by type of neighbourhood, in percentof the population living in each type of neighbourhood ................................................. 279

Figure 8.14 Attendance to gatherings in and outside of the diwanand rabita, by type of gathering. ........................................................................................ 281

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Figure 8.15 Help given and received, by kind of help and status of other person. .............. 282

Figure 8.16 Givers, exchangers and receivers of help, by sex. ................................................. 287

Figure 8.17 Givers, exchangers and receivers of help, by age group ..................................... 287

Figure 8.18 Receivers, exchangers and givers of help, by level ofcompleted education ........................................................................................................... 288

Figure 8.19 Receivers, exchangers and givers of help, by income group ............................... 288

Figure 8.20 Financial help and transfers given and received during the last year,by income groups ................................................................................................................. 289

Figure 8.21 Households receiving remittances from relatives and households receivingretirement pensions and/or social security from the Government, by importance asincome source ....................................................................................................................... 290

Chapter 9 Attitudes and Public LifeFigure 9.1 Persons 15 years and above who received news from any newspaper,

radio, or TV the day preceding the interview by various characteristics:sex, highest level of education completed, yearly household income,and broad age groups .......................................................................................................... 296

Figure 9.2 Newspaper consumption. Number of newspapers read the day prior to theinterview, by sex, highest level of education and yearly household income .................. 297

Figure 9.3 Consumption of non-Jordanian radio and television news theday prior to the interview, by nationality of source .......................................................... 297

Figure 9.4 Persons 20 years or more who have ever voted in local ornational elections by age groups, Palestinian refugee status, governorate,organisational membership and news consumption ......................................................... 299

Figure 9.5 Persons 20 years or more who have ever campaigned for acandidate in local or national elections by sex, age groups, education, Palestinianrefugee status, news consumption, organisational membership and voting ................. 301

Figure 9.7 Respondent’s hamulah or ashira or village has a guesthouse;by urban-rural status, governorate and Palestinian refugee status ................................. 304

Figure 9.8 Persons 15 years or older who attended at least one politicalmeeting during the 12 months preceding the interview; by sex, age groups,highest level of education completed, Palestinian refugee status, newsconsumption, organisational membership, ever voted, and ever campaigned .............. 306

Figure 9.9 Individuals 15 years or older who are opposed to women doing thefollowing activities: participate in voluntary social work, vote, be a memberof a local council, be a minister or parliamentarian ......................................................... 308

Figure 9.10 Views on women’s public participation by age groups and sex. ........................ 308

Figure 9.11 Women who can go alone, with company, or can not go to certainplaces: study abroad, visit relatives abroad, visit relatives outside of town,visit relatives in town, go to a doctor, go to the local market, and visit neighbours ..... 310

Figure 9.12 Freedom of movement and public participation. ................................................ 311

Figure 9.13 Freedom of movement and women’s views on women’spublic participation .............................................................................................................. 312

Figure 9.14 Opinions about influence from the developed countries. .................................. 313

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Chapter 10 Children and youthFigure 10.1 Prenatal health care during last pregnancy by income ....................................... 317

Figure 10.2 Prenatal health care during last pregnancy by urban or rural status ................. 318

Figure 10.3 Number of health visits during last pregnancy by mother’s education ............. 319

Figure 10.4 Month of first visit by mother’s education, latest pregnancy ............................. 319

Figure 10.5 Tetanus injection during pregnancy by household yearly income ..................... 320

Figure 10.6 Delivery location for 2 most recent births (1991-96) ............................................ 320

Figure 10.7 Location of delivery and delivery assistance for 2 latestbirths by background variables (1991-96) .......................................................................... 322

Figure 10.8 Cumulative percent of birth intervals for 10 and 5 years preceding surveycompared to all years. (1986-96) n=8726, (1991-96) n=4552, n=19351 ............................ 324

Figure 10.9 Median birth intervals by background characteristics(1985-90 compared to 1991-96) ........................................................................................... 324

Figure10.10 Birth intervals in months by background characteristics (1991-96). .................. 325

Figure 10.11 Infant and child mortality by 5-year groups. ...................................................... 327

Figure 10.12 Component measures of total under-5 mortality by 5-year groups. ................ 328

Figure 10.13 Infant and child mortality by socio-economic characteristics (1990-94) ........... 332

Figure 10.14 Percent of births with low birth weights bybackground variables, latest 2 births .................................................................................. 333

Figure 10.15 Duration of breast-feeding - 2 most recent births ............................................. 335

Figure 10.16 Duration child breast-fed by mother’s education .............................................. 336

Figure 10.17 Stunting in children aged 12-59 months by background characteristics ......... 340

Figure 10.18 Completed vaccination among 1, 1.5, 2 and 3-year-olds ................................... 341

Figure 10.19 Type of illness in children who had illness during thelast two weeks (children under 5 years) ............................................................................. 342

Figure 10.20 Household size by household head and urban/rural ......................................... 345

Figure 10.21 The general crowding index (GCI) among children 0-15years of age by age groups .................................................................................................. 346

Figure 10.22 The general crowding index (GCI) among children 0-15 yearsof age by location ................................................................................................................. 347

Figure 10.23 The general crowding index (GCI) among children 0-15 yearsof age by household yearly income .................................................................................... 347

Figure 10.24 The distribution of GCI by smoke inside houses and illness among children

Figure 10.25 The GCI by noise inside the building among children 0-15 years of age ......... 348

Figure 10.26 The GCI and acute illness of children 5-15 years of age .................................... 349

Figure 10.27 Children’s leisure activities by income group ..................................................... 351

Figure 10.28 Time spent in front of TV the day before interview.Children aged 5 years to 15 ................................................................................................. 352

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Chapter 11 Living Conditions in Jordan:a Holistic ViewFigure 11.1 Geographical distribution of key individual living condition

characteristics in Jordan. ...................................................................................................... 364

Figure 11.2 Geographical distribution of key household living conditioncharacteristics in Jordan. ...................................................................................................... 365

Figure 11.3 Category score correspondence plot of household socio economicadaptations in Jordan. ......................................................................................................... 368

Figure 11.4 Object score correspondence plot of household socioeconomic adaptations in Jordan. ........................................................................................ 369

Figure 11.5 CHAID classification tree of “Ability to raise JD100”. .......................................... 372

Figure 11.6 Frequency of different residence five years ago by householdincome groups. ..................................................................................................................... 373

Figure 11.7 Correspondence plot of cultural configurations in Jordan ................................. 375

Figure 11.8 Development of population structure of Jordan. 1995-2010 .............................. 377

Appendix 1Figure A1.1 JLCS sample number of households compared to total number of households 382

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List of Tables

Chapter 2 The Population of JordanTable 2.1 Dependency ratios by region, household characteristics .......................................... 54

Table 2.2 Jordan Total Fertility 1976-1996. From selected surveys ............................................ 64

Table 2.4 Total Fertility 1976 & 1996, by education of women ................................................. 66

Table 2.5 Contraceptive use by ideal family size: men and women ......................................... 74

Table 2.6 Discussion with spouse about desired number of children byreported contraceptive use ................................................................................................... 75

Table 2.7 Bongaarts indices for Jordan- 1976 and 1996 ............................................................ 76

Table 2.8: Breastfeeding patterns- 1976 and 1996 ..................................................................... 78

Table 2.9 Bongaarts indices for Arab countries with moderate fertility .................................. 78

Table 2.10 Bongaarts indices by region and socioeconomic subgroup .................................... 79

Table 2.11 Percent distribution of births born since 1.1.91 by preceding birth interval ........ 80

Table2.12 Infant mortality (1q0) and child mortality (5q0) by selectedcharacteristics: 1990-95 .......................................................................................................... 81

Table 2.13 Proportions never widowed by age .......................................................................... 83

Table 2.14 Life expectancy at birth (e0); JLCS and other sources ............................................... 85

Chapter 3 Housing and InfrastructureTable 3.1 Number of rooms in the living quarters, and rooms used for sleeping

Chapter 4 EducationTable 4.1 Illiteracy (did not attend Basic school) by sex, 1961 to 1995 ................................... 136

Table 4.2 Gross enrolment by school cycle and sex, 1992-93 and 1995-96 ............................. 145

Chapter 6 Household Income and WealthTable 6.1 Characteristics of households whose main income source is

transfer income, versus households whose main income source is employment .......... 201

Table 6.2 Distribution of annual total household income....................................................... 204

Table 6.3 Characteristics of low-income households versus high-income households .......... 205

Table 6.4 Characteristics of the households by employment status ofmain provider in the household .......................................................................................... 208

Table 6.5 The relationship between sex and age, health,education and household size ............................................................................................. 213

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Chapter 7 Work and Working ConditionsTable 7.1 The labour force of Jordan ........................................................................................ 229

Table 7.2 Gender- and domain specific labour force participation rates ............................... 233

Table 7.3 Gender specific unemployment rates in Jordan, 1991-1996.In percent of the labour force ............................................................................................. 237

Table 7.4 Types of labour under-utilisation .............................................................................. 238

Table 7.5 The structure of employment .................................................................................... 244

Table 7.6 The structure of employment .................................................................................... 247

Table 7.7 Industry composition by occupation ......................................................................... 247

Table 7.8 Average weekly work hours by industry and employment status in main job ..... 251

Chapter 8 Social NetworkTable 8.1 Household types, in percent of all households ........................................................ 263

Table 8.2 Types and size of household networks ..................................................................... 270

Table 8.3 Relation to latest husband, in percent of all marriages .......................................... 273

Table 8.4 First marriage preference by education .................................................................... 274

Table 8.5 Locality and endogamy by refugee status ................................................................ 275

Table 8.6 Help and transfers to relatives and friends, by givers and receivers ...................... 283

Table 8.7 Givers and receivers of help, by categories of others .............................................. 283

Table 8.8 Types of support given and received during the lasttwo weeks, by categories of others. In percent of all respondents ................................. 285

Table 8.9 Reasons for financial help or transfers in cash or in kind given toor received from relatives during the last twelve months ................................................ 286

Table 8.10 Households receiving remittances from relatives .................................................. 290

Chapter 9 Attitudes and Public LifeTable 9.1 Views on women’s public participation according to

various background variables .............................................................................................. 309

Chapter 10 Children and youthTable 10.1 Infant and child mortality by demographic characteristics (1990-94). ................. 330

Table 10.2 Malnourishment in children 12-59 months by background characteristics ......... 338

Table 10.4 Household size among the children 0-15 years of age .......................................... 345

Table 10.5 Reason for dropping out by household income. ................................................... 353

Table 10.6 Reason for dropping out by household head education level ............................. 353

Chapter 11 Living Conditions in Jordan:a Holistic ViewTable 11.1 Basic social indicators for Jordan as revealed by the JLCS .................................... 356

Table 11.2 Individual living condition components by Urban-Rural status ............................ 366

Table 11.3 Living condition characteristics of the household by geographical divisions ..... 366

Table 11.4 Percentage of population in different age groups, 1995-2010 ............................ 378

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Appendix 1Table A1.1 Respondents in JLCS ................................................................................................. 383

Table A1.2 Notation .................................................................................................................... 387

Table A1.3 Non-response categories in JLCS ............................................................................. 390

Table A1.4 Non-response rates in JLCS ...................................................................................... 391

Table A1.5 Response rates for sub groups in the survey .......................................................... 392

Table A1.6 Notation for non-response adjustment .................................................................. 393

Table A1.7 Sampling errors for selected household variables ................................................. 397

Table A1.8 Sampling errors for selected variables pertaining to individuals ........................ 403

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List of Abbreviations

DHS Demography and Health Survey

DOS Jordan Department of Statistics

DPT Diphteria- Pertussis- Tetanus vaccine

ESCWA United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

GCI General Crowding Index

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GNP Gross National Product

GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit

HSCL Hopkins Symptoms Check-List

HUDC Housing and Urban Development Corporation, Jordan

IDRC International Development Research Center, Canada

ILO International Labour Office

JD Jordanian Dinar (approximately USD 0.7)

JFS Jordan Fertility Survey

JLCS Jordan Living Conditions Survey

JPFHS Jordan Population and Family Health Survey (1990)

MENA Middle East and North Africa Economic Conference

MOP Ministry of Planning, Jordan

ODA British Overseas Development Agency

PSU Primary Sampling Unit

SCI Sleeping Crowding Index

TFR Total Fertility Rate

TOS Temporary Out of Scope (sampling)

TV Television

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNRWA United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestinien Refugees in the

Near East

WHO World Health Organization

WHO/CDC World Health Organization/ Centers for Disease Control

CHAPTER 1

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Arabic terms used(Approximate meaning in English)

‘Amm Father’s brother‘AmmA Father’s sister‘Asabiya Closeness or solidarity, used in the context of villageAb FatherAkh Brother‘Ard HonourAshira Descent group, clan or segment of a clanBint DaughterBint ‘amm Father’s brother’s daughterBint ‘amma Father’s sister’s daughterBint khâl Mother’s brother’s daughterBint khâla Mother’s sister’s daughterDar Traditional house, householdDinar Jordanian currency unit (Jordanian Dinar or JD), exchanged

at the rate of USD 0.7Diwan Guesthouse or clan or village institution used for

social gatherings and family politicsDiwaniyya In Kuwait used for a traditional, semi-public gathering taking

place in the homeDunum 1,000 square metresGovernorate Major administrative unit in JordanHakura Garden plot used for growing vegetables, kitchen gardenHamulah Descent group, clan or segment of a clanHara NeighbourhoodIbn SonIbn ‘amm Father’s brother’s sonIbn ‘amma Father’s sister’s sonIbn khâl Mother’s brother’s sonIbn khâla Mother’s sister’s sonJaha Delegation of notables; institution used for example to ask for

a bride or to resolve an inter-tribal conflictJam’iyya Traditional form of savings, saving clubsKhâl Mother’s brotherKhâla Mother’s sisterNasib Father-in-law

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Nasibã Used for in-laws in generalRabita Guesthouse or clan or village institution used for social

gatherings and family politicsRamadan The Muslim holy month of fastingUkht SisterUmm MotherVillage Used to refer to the localisation pattern based on closeness and

family (clan) relationshipsZawj HusbandZawja Wife

28

CONTENTS CHAPTER 1

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Jon Hanssen-Bauer and Abdelhalim Kharabsheh

Chapter 1 Introduction: The Jordan LivingConditions Survey

Introduction

In this report, the main results from the Jordan Living Conditions Survey (JLCS)are analysed and presented. It offers an overview of the living conditions of thepopulation of Jordan, as seen through interviews with a representative sample of6,000 households from all over the country. These interviews were conducted dur-ing the first quarter of 1996. To date, the survey is the most comprehensive attemptmade in Jordan to describe the living conditions of individuals and households alongall major dimensions in one single analytical operation. In that sense, the presentstudy is intended as a baseline that summarises the situation in 1996 and on whichfuture studies can build.

Since Jordan acquired its independence in 1946, the country’s history anddevelopment has been intimately influenced by the Israeli-Arab conflict and thevarious wars that the Middle East has endured over the past half century. Followingthe 1948 war, the country became host to a huge number of Palestinian refugees.The West Bank was annexed and united with the East Bank in 1950, and all WestBankers were given full Jordanian citizenship and representation in the Parliament.As a result of the 1967 Israeli-Arab war, Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel andreceived a new wave of refugees and so-called “displaced” from the OccupiedTerritories. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent war,large numbers of work migrants to the Gulf States were expelled and returned. Thisoccasioned the third major population influx into Jordan. Jordan agreed to send ajoint Jordanian and Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference inMadrid in 1991 and became the second Arab country after Egypt to sign peace withIsrael three years later. According to the 1994 census, the population totalled 4.2million persons, and the JLCS shows that 44 percent of the population consistedof Palestinian refugees and displaced in 1996.

In the midst of the turmoil of international politics, Jordan has been build-ing its democratic institutions and the country has experienced significant economicdevelopment. Measured by the most commonly used indicators of social and eco-nomic welfare, Jordan fares well when compared to other countries.

CHAPTER 2

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The overwhelming majority of the population has access to basic infrastructure likesafe water, sanitation and electricity. Although the housing standard appears mod-est on average and the majority of the families are living under crowded conditions,there is little evidence of precarious housing and squatter-like areas. The educationsystem has been given priority, and it currently provides the young generation, girlsand boys alike, with access to primary and secondary schooling.

While half of the households report that they have an annual income of lessthan approximately JD 2000, only one percent report that they earn more than JD9600, and around 20 percent seem to be economically vulnerable. Even though totalfertility rates are still fairly high, at 4.3 in 1995, they are falling. Life expectancyhas risen in recent years, and now stands at around 70 years. Infant and child mor-tality has fallen, and under-5 mortality is now at 32 deaths per 1,000 births, whichis lower than the average for other middle-income economies (39 in 1995). Thestudy finds some indications of malnutrition of children.

This report undertakes a systematic and detailed account of the situation asper 1996. Before presenting the various contributions to the report, we will describethe conceptual bases for the study and provide some background information aboutthe survey and the data set.

The Concept of Living Conditions

The concept of ‘living conditions’ (NOU 1993, Ringen 1997) has guided this sur-vey. In the following, we will explore this concept through making four observa-tions: The first observation is that in studying welfare and the distribution of wel-fare in a society we need to distinguish between subjective satisfaction and someobservable “reality”. Second, the concept of living conditions is constructed on anotion of choice and of equality of access to resources. The third point concernsthe multidimensional nature of the measures. Lastly, we will discuss the issue ofdefining the unit of observation when measuring living conditions.

Living Conditions and Quality of LifeIn studies of social phenomena, we face the problem that conditions are experiencedby individuals, and individuals differ in their perception and evaluation of the con-ditions under which they are living their lives. Two individuals may experience thesame conditions of life very differently. We all know that what may be acceptableto some is experienced as sub-standard by others; this may lead to quite different

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subjective levels of satisfaction for the two. The conditions under which our livesunfold are interpreted and coloured by our individual aspirations for a good life,by our experience and by our expectations. What is good housing for one familymay be unacceptable to others, even if the two families seem to have the same basicneeds.

One tradition within this field of research tries primarily to measure thesubjective satisfaction that individuals are able to draw from life. We call this theQuality of Life tradition. Researchers within this tradition are concerned about howthe constitution of the personality and the self interact with external structures toproduce a sense of quality of life.

The Living Conditions tradition takes another approach, putting mostemphasis on the mapping of more easily observable conditions, although therespondents’ evaluations of the living conditions also form part of what is beingsurveyed. One reason for this emphasis is that the results are better suited for mak-ing policy. Policy makers are more concerned about observable conditions thanabout the satisfaction that an individual may derive from them. Taste and aspira-tions differ, and we cannot reasonably make choices on behalf of others. Individu-als should be left to make their own choices. Rather, policy makers should limitthemselves to issues that seem to be similarly interpreted across broad segments ofthe population and focus on improving conditions that most people would agreeare sub-standard. There are two reasons for this. The first is the problem of meas-uring individual satisfaction. The other is that individual values – such as satisfac-tion – belong to the domain of the political process itself.

However, this distinction between subjective evaluations and opinions onthe one hand, and “objective” conditions on the other, is far from easy to make. Tosome extent, all survey results based on interviewing are presentations of opinions,

Figure 1.1 Measures of living conditions

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as they portray what respondents believe to be the case. In some instances, we aremore willing to consider those opinions as objective facts.

Living Conditions as Access to Resources and ParticipationOne way of proceeding is to accept that individuals evaluate situations differently,pursue different life projects, and do so with different access to resources. Giventhat two persons have the same access to the same resources, they exploit thoseresources according to their own aspirations. If the result is different levels of liv-ing conditions, society should hold the individual responsible for their own choice.But society should also make efforts to provide equal access to fundamental resourc-es. We can accept that women choose lives that are different from men’s, but weshould not accept that women have fewer opportunities for building their livesbecause they are not allowed access to education, to health, to cultural resources. Itis normally agreed that all children have equal right to health and education, irre-spective of the wealth of their parents.

However, even if the access to resources is reasonably equal, we cannot im-pute all differences in outcomes to differences in choices. Resources must be investedlike forms of capital in various markets or arenas to be transformed into quality oflife. For example, through employment education is transformed into income andthe material and social means of living. Such markets and arenas may function in a

Figure 1.2 Measures of living conditions

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way that creates entry barriers for some, as well as creating mechanisms for une-qual distribution of the “revenues” on the invested capital. It may not be sufficientfor society to ensure that girls have equal access to education, if young women aremarginalised in the labour market or receive less pay for the same work.

The living conditions tradition focuses our attention on resources and thecharacteristics of social arenas, as well as on how the respondents perceive their sit-uation and on what they get out of their various investments, choices and projects.Such outcomes must form an important part of the analysis of living conditions. Ifwe conceptualise the outcomes as various living conditions components, such ashousing, political influence, education, income etc., they may be related in threedifferent ways.

First, the various components of living conditions may be linked in a waythat creates heaping or clustering. This means that poor conditions along one com-ponent may be systematically linked to poor conditions along another. We mayimagine that poor education is linked with poor income and poverty, as well as withpoor working conditions and poor health – or that all good things come together.

Second, living conditions components may be linked in a way to compen-sate for one another. Poor housing may be compensated by relatively low cost andbetter access to well-paying workplaces. Other people may have low initial educa-tion, but have stimulating work with good access to training.

Third, the components may be independent of each other and show noparticular pattern of interaction.

In addition to these three points we may add a forth consideration, namelythe strength of the differences among persons and groups. If differences are large,then heaping, compensation and independence become much more importantconsiderations than if they are small.

For policy purposes, we are interested in all three relations between livingcondition components. We are interested in negative heaping where one liabilitytends to be linked with several others, thus adding to the total negative exposure.Targeted policy measures are needed to address such pockets of highly exposed areas,or vulnerable groups. However, we are just as interested in the heaping of livingconditions assets. Groups that exhibit positive heaping are building up humanresources that may be exploited or serve as examples in development. If we can spotpockets of such rich assets that are under-utilised by society, this will be of interestfor policy formulation.

The compensatory linking of living conditions components also gives im-portant messages to policy makers, in that they provide information on the kindsof strategies that people employ in order to cope with difficult situations. How agiven household exploits the range of resources it has in order to compensate for,say, the income loss because a member of the household has fallen ill, may give

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insights into areas where a little help from public policy may make huge differencesin the household’s ability to cope.

When living conditions components are distributed randomly in relation toeach other, they also tell an important story to policy makers. The different com-ponents have to be considered as independent, and action with regard to one willnot necessarily have effects on others.

The points we have raised here imply a definition of welfare or living con-ditions that centres around notions of human choice and human participation. Weare mainly concerned with “the individual’s command over resources (...) by the helpof which the individual can control and consciously direct his conditions of life”(Titmus 1958). We are concerned with measuring the “degree to which people canparticipate in social, political and economical decision-making and can work crea-tively and productively to shape their own futures” (UNDP 1993).

Living Conditions Are MultifacetedThis discussion also leads us to another point: If living conditions tend to be or-dered, is there one dimension that dominates over the others? Or, can we expectthat differences in access to economic resources determine all other distributions?This is essentially a debate about the nature of poverty. We may think that povertysimply is a lack of income, and that this lack of income is at the bottom of the oth-er problems experienced by the poor. In that case a war on poverty should start witha battle over labour participation and participation in economic life – or by structural

Figure 1.3 Modules or dimensions of the living conditions survey

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adjustment. The appropriate policy would be to raise the general income level whileat the same time trying to avoid reducing the income of any household.

On the other hand, we may think that poverty is multifaceted, that manyfactors combine to create the situation. If this is the case, there will be no singleindicator that can “measure adequately all the dimensions of the hardship peoplein poverty face” (World Bank 1994: 3). Then, policy concerns would have to bedirected at alleviating specific sector problems. To focus only on income gaps willnot yield the desired results.

The living conditions tradition takes the latter stand as the starting point.It refuses to assume that all dimensions may appropriately be reduced to one, andasserts that the interdependence or independence of living conditions liabilities isan empirical question, i.e. one that has to be tested. To do this, we need instrumentsthat are able to measure the various dimensions and their correlations. Therefore,we design instruments that link indicators across sectors in order to search for heap-ing, for compensation and for independence. In this way the living conditions sur-vey acts as a valuable complement to sector surveys, because it can provide a viewacross sectors in addition to the depth that topical instruments provide into a giv-en sector. The living conditions survey can also provide a useful baseline to link thevarious indicators into a broad picture at a given point in time.

This approach has both strengths and weaknesses. One advantage is thepotential for broad analysis, and the fact that economic measures become one setof factors among others. The living conditions tradition normally puts less effortinto constructing a poverty line and into assessing in detail whether given house-holds fall below or above this line. We are less preoccupied with the prevalence anddepth of poverty, than with the analysis of association between poverty and otherkinds of hardship. Thus, we also become less dependent on exact measures of in-come and expenditure, and we leave this issue to special purpose surveys.

A disadvantage is the size of the survey that may be needed. We often wishto include too much in the same instruments. Eager to cover the whole range ofindicators, we end up choosing between slim measures of each component or a hugequestionnaire. This is the reason why it is essential to bring producers and users ofthe statistics together. In order to strike the best balance, we need to discuss the mostimportant policy issues that we want to explore, so that we can prioritise more ef-ficiently.

Unit of AnalysisLet us now turn to the last point, namely what we should take as the unit of analysis.We have so far mainly considered living conditions as they affect the individual.We certainly can talk about the individual’s living conditions. On the other hand,

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if the only focus is the individual, we lose important dimensions. Many of ourconditions of life are influenced by or mediated through the household or the family,through the neighbourhood or through social networks of which the individual isa member. The building standard of a house affects all the persons living in it.Environmental problems like water shortages affect large segments of the popula-tion. When one family member loses his or her job, the burden affects the wholehousehold, as the jobless will be dependent on the others. The family shares livingconditions and the individual seldom makes life choices independent of her or hissocial bonds and obligations.

Therefore, it becomes natural to measure living conditions both on the in-dividual and on the household level. In some situations, however, to interview onerepresentative of the household is enough, because this individual will tell us howthe situation is for the whole household. We can ask the person to represent thehousehold for some questions, and for others, we can ask more individually-ori-ented questions to the person.

Having presented the main concepts that guided the design of the JordanLiving Conditions Survey, we now turn to a description of how the project wasimplemented and how the concepts were transformed into a Jordanian project.

Implementation of the Survey: A Phased Marathon

Discussions on the project began in 1992 and the main contract was signed in Feb-ruary 1993. The project was approved by the Government of Jordan in a ministe-rial council meeting on 7 March 1993. In this meeting the Advisory Board – theministerial committee which supervised the project execution, headed by the Min-ister of Planning – was also nominated. Implementation of the project started in1994, when the funding was ensured in principle. During the second half of 1994,the Jordan Department of Statistics and Fafo defined the main parameters for thestudy, such as the statistical content, the sample design, the budget, schedule andorganisation plan for survey. They also applied formally for the required funding.The results of this work were summarised in a Survey Definition Report that waspresented to the Minister of Planning in January 1995 and formally agreed by thepartners on 1 April. Figure 1.4 shows how the different tasks of the project wereexecuted over time.

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CONTENTS

Design of the Instruments: A Comprehensive and ParticipatoryProcessThe Department of Statistics and Fafo started the survey design in February 1995.Dr. Abdelhadi Alawin, director general of DOS, assumed the role as the project’snational director and chaired a Technical Committee that consisted of membersfrom several government and non-government organisations. The technical com-mittee provided insights, expertise and advice to the project concerning technicalmatters. In addition both DOS and Fafo visited and consulted a high number ofinstitutions, experts and professionals all over Jordan to present the study and totake guidance and ideas to be incorporated into the survey design and implement-ation.

In practice, the technical committee had few meetings. The main occasionsfor consulting the committee, as well as the broader network of experts and insti-tutions, were two workshops organised during the project. The first of these work-shops was held in March 1995 to discuss survey design. Some 80 professionals andexperts from Jordan participated in the two-day workshop. They reviewed the mainprinciples and bases for the design, and provided detailed comments regardingcontent and methodology to each of the planned modules. The result was a com-prehensive set of suggestions about policy issues that are of importance for the de-velopment of the Jordanian society and about questions to be further elucidatedby the survey. These ideas were integrated into the design of the questionnaires bythe project team during a one-week intensive workshop in Oslo in April. The Osloworkshop resulted in a first draft of the Household, Person, and Women andChildren questionnaires.

Figure 1.4 The JLCS schedule and main milestones

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The survey design was completed during 1995. The sample was prepared from Juneto August (see Appendix 1). The aim of the sample was to ensure representative-ness with a very cost-effective sample. In order to enable reporting for six majorgeographical areas in Jordan, referred to as reporting domains, 900 households ofthe total sample were allocated to each of these domains, except for Amman to which1,500 were allocated. All in all the sample of approximately 6,000 households isfully representative for the country, but it requires weighting during the statisticalanalysis.

The draft questionnaires were discussed in detail by the project team in aseries of workshops held in Amman over the summer and the autumn. The pur-pose was to adapt existing models to the Jordanian reality. The models used werethe various Nordic living conditions surveys, as well as similar Fafo studies. Fafohad earlier made such surveys in different areas like the West Bank and Gaza(Heiberg and Øvensen 1993), in the Baltic (Hernes and Knudsen 1991, Aasland1996) and in Russia (Hansen 1994). Particular efforts were taken to review the avail-able statistics and studies in Jordan and to adapt experience, models and results intothe design of the JLCS. The questionnaires were prepared in English and then

Figure 1.5 JLCS: Six reporting domains

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translated into Arabic. The project team also prepared the field manuals for super-visors and interviewers, as well as training materials.

The instruments were tested in the field in November-December 1995. Aftertraining of the field staff, 144 interviews were conducted and the results and expe-rience were analysed by the project team. Under the direction of the technical com-mittee, the questionnaires were revised and finally approved by the Advisory Boardand the Minister of Planning in January 1996.

Fieldwork from January to April 1996The field organisation was mobilised and trained in December 1995, with a refresh-ment course at fieldwork start-up on 20 January 1996. The field organisation wasdistributed in 9 teams and consisted of 4 field supervisors, 9 supervisors, and 46interviewers. They were selected from the permanent staff of DOS for the supervi-sors and among interviewers who had previously participated in the census in 1994.They were given 23 days of training, including the refreshment course. The train-ing included an introduction to interviewing methods and skills and a detailedintroduction to the concepts and questions of the questionnaires. The use of theinstruments to measure weight, height and upper-arm circumference on childrenwas practised on children from the Sundus Nursery in Amman. Special training wasprovided to editors, coders and data entry personnel.

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The fieldwork started first in Amman, Balqaa, Zarqa, Madaba and Irbid (25 April1996), and thereafter extended gradually to the remaining Governorates (Jerash 2March, Kerak 9 March, Ajloun 10 March, Tafiela 14 March, Maan 17 March, Aqaba20 March and Mafraq 23 March). The main fieldwork was completed on 18 April1996, after 65 days of work. Another 20 days were spent in revisiting uncontactedhouseholds or persons who were absent during the main phase. Data entry startedthree weeks after the start of the fieldwork and was completed on 12 May. The resultof the fieldwork was a response rate of 94.7 percent (5,919 households) of the 6,251households in the sample. There were only 25 refusals, and for 301 households nocontact was established. A comprehensive description of the work processes is pub-lished by Department of Statistics (DOS 1997).

The electronic files were subsequently analysed and cleaned during severalmonths of testing and preliminary analyses. During this phase, special analyses weremade by joint Fafo and DOS teams to provide UNICEF with data required for theircountry analysis of Jordan (UNICEF 1997). After approval by the Prime Ministerof Jordan in November 1997, the complete data set was released to Fafo to facili-tate the main analysis.

Data Analysis: Reporting in Four PublicationsThe UNICEF report was the first publication to report on the results of the survey.The main analysis for the remaining reports started as soon as the data files wereready for use. During a first phase, all analysis was conducted in the DOS officesin Amman by Fafo and DOS researchers. Later, more people were involved.

A preliminary report was prepared by DOS and presented to the JordanianAuthorities and the Advisory Board. The tables were then refined and presented aspreliminary results to the technical committee and the project network in a work-shop organised in November 1996. During this workshop, the same professionalsand experts as in the design workshop participated. After being divided into groups

The JLCS data set

Target sample: 6,000 householdsActual sample: 6,251 householdsCompleted household interviews: 5,919Randomly selected individuals: 5,503Women interviews: 4,977Children: 23,974Response rate: 94.7Non-resolved (no contact): 301 cases

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according to themes, the participants studied the preliminary tables and providedtheir comments, ideas and guidance for the analysis and for the tabulation report.

This guidance was reviewed by the project teams in a one-week workshopin Oslo in February 1997. Here the final analysis plan for the tabulation report wasagreed upon, and the available tables were discussed in detail. The full draft of thetabulation report was submitted to a final review by Fafo researchers in Amman inJune 1997, before the report was edited for publication and issued in December1997 (DOS 1997).

Fafo prepared and published a special report on the results concerning Pal-estinian refugees and displaced living in Jordan (Arneberg 1997). The report waspublished after presentation to a meeting of the Refugee Working Group in Aqabain December 1997.

The Oslo workshop also defined the outline of the present analytical orbaseline report. The Department of Statistics recruited the Jordanian authors of thereport in May and their work started immediately. With the support of DOS, whichproduced all tables requested by the local academics for their analysis, the authorsprepared the first drafts of the report during the summer. Fafo undertook the ex-tension and editing of these chapters in August 1997. The final drafts were submittedto a final review by the Jordanian authors at the turn of the year, and were later alsoreviewed by DOS technical staff. In June 1998, the National Director Dr. Abdul-hadi Alawin, Director General of DOS, approved the publication of this book.

The JLCS reporting

Unicef, 1997, Situation of Jordanian Women and Children, Amman: UNICEF

Department of Statistics, 1997, The Jordan Living Conditions Survey, Tabulation Report,

Amman: Department of Statistics

Arneberg, Marie W. 1997, Living Conditions for Refugees and Displaced in Jordan, Fafo

report nr. 237, Oslo: Fafo.

Hanssen-Bauer, J., J. Pedersen, Å. A. Tiltnes, 1998, Jordanian Society. Living Conditions in

the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Fafo report nr. 253, Oslo: Fafo

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The Content of the Report

The purpose of the present publication is to portray the living conditions of theJordanian population as captured by the survey during the first quarter of 1996.Our goal in this book is to give an overview of the general results concerning thepopulation of Jordan, covering all the major topics included in the survey. In gen-eral, we have chosen to follow the dimensions defined as modules in figure 1.3 tostructure the content of the book. In the following we present a summary of thedifferent chapters.

Population, Housing and InfrastructureIn the next chapter, chapter two, Nawaf Kalaldeh and Sara Randall analyse the char-acteristics of the population and migration. According to them, the JLCS revealsthat demographically Jordan is a country in transition. Education levels, particu-larly of women have increased enormously over the last two decades, and it is like-ly that this has accelerated the changes, although now the country is becoming moreuniform in its demographic behaviour. Having lagged behind some neighbours itis now in the throes of a rapid fertility decline affecting all strata of society, withmodern family planning methods used extensively.

Mortality is extremely low, with infant and child mortality at the levelsexhibited by the developed Western European countries in the early 1970s. Lifeexpectancy, at around 70, is very high, and the past legacy of excess female mortal-ity has disappeared, with women now surviving much longer than men.The population is still growing rapidly - a consequence of fertility which is still wellabove replacement, and the in-built legacy of past high fertility - a rapidly increas-ing female population of childbearing years. Coupled with the low mortality, thishigh growth will inevitably be maintained for a couple of decades.

In chapter three, housing conditions, environmental issues and the availa-bility of services and infrastructure form the topic for analysis for Teleb Abu Shararand David Drury. The researchers claim that despite its lack of natural resourcesand the challenge of absorbing three major waves of immigration, Jordan has donean impressive job of providing housing and basic infrastructure. The overwhelm-ing majority of Jordanians live in permanent, substantial housing in form of apart-ments, dars, or villas. Some of the housing stock is in poor condition, but there isrelatively little of the improvised squatter type of housing found in many develop-ing countries. Home ownership is quite widespread, although there is not muchvariation in the size of available housing. Most living quarters have between twoand four rooms, and large numbers of families with children live with more than 3persons per room and 4 per sleeping room.

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The results of the JLCS show that most urban and rural households have water pipedinto their living quarters, 99 percent have electrical power services, and 81 percenthave a paved road to the house. Basic housing and sanitation amenities are widelyavailable for the population as a whole, but some areas and groups of people arebetter served than others. People are generally satisfied with their housing, buthousing cost and living space get lower approval ratings. Water supply is a matterof concern for people in urban fringe and rural areas. There are high levels of con-cern about environmental issues, in particular regarding air and water quality.

Basic services, like mosques and churches, grocery stores, basic and second-ary schools, and health centres, are available to most people within walking distance.However, post offices, banks, police stations and cultural centres are more seldomavailable close to home. Respondents were generally satisfied with their neighbour-hoods, but people in urban areas are much more likely to be concerned about traf-fic and children’s safety. Lower income groups and rural people were less satisfiedwith public transport and shopping. All segments of the population expresseddissatisfaction about the lack of work and business opportunities and culturalinstitutions in the vicinity. About 19 percent of the sample say they plan to moveduring the next two years.

Education and HealthIn chapter four, Issa Nassar and David Drury analyse the results concerning edu-cation and training. They write that Jordan has undertaken a series of wide-rangingreforms of its education system, and school opportunities have expanded rapidlyin the past 15 years. Illiteracy rates have fallen by one-half, to about 14 percent forthe population as a whole, and an active school-building program has put a basicschool within walking distance of nearly 80 percent of all households. Ninety-fivepercent of all children in the age groups eligible for basic school are currently en-rolled, and 70 percent of those in the secondary school-aged population. The greatestgains have been for women, and girls actually have higher enrolment rates than boysat some stages of education. Among the working-aged population, 42 percent nowhave a secondary or higher education. Refugees have dropout rates and educationlevels similar to those of the non-refugee population, and higher rates of literacy.

However, many forms of inequality remain. Functional literacy is still rela-tively low for adult women in rural areas, even among women in their 20’s and 30’s.Basic and secondary school dropout rates are significantly higher for rural and lower-income children, and especially those from less-educated households. These fami-lies also have lower expectations for their children who are still in school, and thereare large differences in the expectations of parents who support and do not support

44

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higher education for women. There is also a growing tendency for middle and upper-income families to send their children to private schools.

As part of its efforts to create a more skilled labour force, Jordan has placedspecial emphasis on vocational education in recent years. Currently about 20 percentof all secondary school students are enrolled in the vocational stream. Low-incomechildren, boys, and refugees have relatively high rates of vocational enrolment; ruralchildren are under-represented. Vocational education remains an unpopular choiceamong parents, although that may change now that it has become possible to con-tinue on to higher education after taking a vocational secondary degree.

For the most part the Jordanian public is satisfied with the nation’s schoolsystem, and that is true of parents who have children now attending basic schoolalso. Among the general public, urban people, men, richer and better-educatedrespondents tended to be more critical. Among parents, those with children in pri-vate schools gave the highest ratings; UNWRA schools received mixed evaluationsfrom respondents. About 60 percent of all parents with children in the Basic cycleoffered suggestions about improvements needed in the schools. The problems men-tioned most often concerned teachers’ lack of qualifications or skills, overcrowd-ing in the classroom, and the quality of textbooks and curricula.

In chapter five, the health of the population and the availability and use ofhealth services are examined by Sa’ad Kharabseh and Åge A. Tiltnes. They find thatnearly four out of five adult respondents believe that their general health is very goodor good. Less than 5 percent describe it as bad or very bad. More men than womenperceive their health to be very good, and health is poorer in urban areas and in thedensely populated Palestinian refugee camps than elsewhere. Seven percent of thepopulation has some kind of a lasting health problem and 3.5 percent have a severeproblem. The health indicators point to increasing health problems with increas-ing age, but also to the fact that individuals in the lower-income social strata sufferfrom more health problems than people belonging to higher-income groups.

Twenty-four percent of all persons above the age of fifteen are daily smok-ers, 44 percent of the men and 5 percent of the women. Moreover, 67 percent of alldwellings inhabited by children under fifteen years of age are used for regular smok-ing. This might indicate that passive smoking is a big national health problem.

The survey’s measures of anxiety and depression indicate that psychologi-cal distress is somewhat more widespread among women than among men, and ishigher in the poorer segments of the population.

Eleven percent of the persons more than five years old had been acutely illor suffered from an injury during the two weeks preceding the interview. Fourpercent had been affected so severely that they were prevented from carrying out‘normal duties’. Sixty-four percent of the afflicted persons sought help from thehealth care system. While 39 percent consulted the private health sector, 55 percent

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visited a public health centre or hospital. The rest went to an UNRWA clinic or toa pharmacy. Individuals tend to pay the same for consultation and medication acrossincome groups.

Physical access to health services seems to be good, as 67 percent of allinterviewed households have at least one physician, health centre or hospital with-in five to ten minutes walking distance from their living quarters. The situation isbest in the densely populated governorates as well as in the refugee camps. Fifty-five percent of Jordanian nationals and 20 percent among non-Jordanians are cov-ered by health insurance. The coverage is poorest in the most heavily populated areas,such as Amman, and in the lowest income groups. Seven out of ten families assertthat they are very satisfied or rather satisfied with the local health services regard-less of type of health institution.

Household Economics: Income, Work and EmploymentIn chapter six, Taleb Awad and Marie W. Arneberg describe the survey households’income and wealth. They find that wage employment is the most important deter-minant of economic welfare. More than 60 percent of the households report em-ployment to be the most important source of income and another 10 percent re-port it to be the second most important source. Less than 20 percent reportself-employment as main source of income. Household income is not dependenton whether employment is in the form of wage employment or self-employment,as long as the household has at least one employed member. Whether they havelabour resources or not, most households receive some form of transfer of income.

The most successful adaptation in terms of income is to have more than oneincome source, i.e. to combine wage employment with self-employment. Only one-half of the households that have access to arable land in fact utilise it for farming.Households whose main provider is unemployed or economically inactive face ahigh risk of living in poverty. They survive on gifts and transfers from relatives aswell as from Governmental and private organisations. Female headed households,camp refugees, and households in Balqa and Madaba are over-represented in thisgroup.

Education is the key to improving household income, as education can beshown in the data to both raise the chances of being employed and give access tobetter-paying jobs. Households headed by a person without any education have aneight times higher risk of being poor than households headed by a person with post-secondary education.

The economic changes in Jordan that followed the Gulf war seem to still havean impact on the incomes of Jordanian households. Households with income frompublic sector sources have, in general been unaffected, but self-employed traders still

46

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complain about income losses. The construction boom that followed the influx ofGulf workers to Jordan seemed to be over by the time of the survey, and householdsdepending on employment in the construction sector were among those witheconomuic problems. As Palestinian refugees are found in greater numbers in thesesectors and less in the public sector, they have experienced reduced incomes some-what more commonly than other Jordanians.

Income mobility appears to be low, and income differences may be increas-ing over time. Poorer households more often report that their income declinedduring the year prior to the interview. They also have lower expectations for thefuture, and their pessimism increases with the duration of their poverty. Education,again, gives cause for more optimism among the poorer households.

In chapter seven, the subject is labour force participation and employment,analysed by Taleb Awad and Marie W. Arneberg. They find that the labour force inJordan includes only 25 percent of the population, and 44 percent of all adults. Thisis small compared to other countries, due to the large proportion of the popula-tion that is under working age and low participation in the work force by women.

Only 15 percent of adult women are in the labour force, as most women stopworking when they enter marriage. Higher education is the most decisive factor forkeeping women in the labour force as 50 percent of women with higher educationcontinue to be economically active after marrying. Attitudes towards women andsocial restrictions also influence female economic activity. For men, a health prob-lem is the most important reason for dropping out of the labour force. Women notonly have lower labour force participation rates than men, but also are more likelyto work part time and more often unemployed.

While the general unemployment rate is 17 percent, it is 15 percent for menand 27 percent for women. Unemployment for men drops when education increases,but this is not the case for women as more than 30 percent of women with highereducation are unemployed. Female unemployment lasts longer than for men, andthe majority of unemployed women have never worked.

Unemployment is also high among the young, with 25 percent of men and48 percent of women in the age group 15 to 24 years. In the refugee camps, unem-ployment rates are 26 percent for men in general and nearly 40 percent for menbelow 25 years of age. For elderly people, part-time work is common, as 20 percentof employed men and nearly 40 percent of employed women above 55 years of agework part time.

A lack of jobs appears to be the most important reason for unemployment.There also is some frictional unemployment among highly-educated men and wom-en without education, due to incompatibility between the jobs offered and theperson’s available skills. Although low-status occupations are predominantly sign

47

CONTENTS

of low education, they also include some 8 percent of men with higher education -an indication of under-utilisation of skills in the Jordanian labour market.

The public sector is the largest employer in Jordan, and 20 percent of allemployed men work in public administration. Among male Jordanian non-refu-gees with any education, as many as 37 percent work in public administration.Women predominantly work in education and health services (44 percent of allemployed women). Among non-Jordanian workers, men work mainly in the con-struction sector, while women are cleaners and housemaids.

Employees in the service sector are the least exposed to dangerous workingenvironments, while construction workers most often report exposure to work-related dangers. These workers seldom have access to equipment to protect them-selves against accidents and exposure to hazards. Less than 15 percent of theemployed population receive updated, job-relevant training paid by the employer.Most of these employees work in the public sector.

Social Network, Attitudes and Participation in Public LifeIn chapter eight, Hiam Omar Kalimat and Jon Hanssen-Bauer explore some as-pects of the social networks of households and individuals in Jordanian society. Theyfind that the family holds a strong position as the basic social unit. Relatives tendto live close together in the same localities, and a high number of spouses chose theirpartners from among relatives and from the same social group. There are some dif-ferences in the household networks between urban and rural areas. Migration alsoinfluences the shape and the size of the household’s networks.

Most of the population live in households with other family members, andvery few live alone in single-person households. Three-quarters of Jordanian house-holds have relatives living within a close distance. Only 26 percent do not have closerelatives within the same neighbourhood, and 2 percent have no family at all. Nineout of ten households report that they are satisfied with the distance to relatives.

The most common situation is to have relatives on the husband’s father’s sideliving close by, but other relatives are frequently also neighbours. It is more com-mon to be surrounded by relatives from the same descent line than by collateral kinlike uncles, aunts, or cousins. However, nearly one-half of the population has bothkinds of relatives living nearby. In addition, almost 2 out of 5 households have manyrelatives living in their neighbourhood. More than one-third of the population havethis kind of complex and extensive household network around them. In this sense,the localisation pattern found in present day Jordan corresponds to descriptions ofthe ‘traditional’ village. An overwhelming majority seem to be satisfied with thisway of living.

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The closeness between relatives is expressed by frequent visits: Only 15 percent ofthe total population had not visited or received visits from any relative during thetwo weeks prior to the interview. The clan institutions rabita and diwan are present,but do not play a very significant role in the ordinary life of the Jordanians.

Help and support given among relatives form an important part of the socialsecurity system and the safety net for the Jordanian population. Only one-half ofthe population did not receive or give any help over the two weeks prior to theinterview or any transfers over the last year. Help and transfers flow from the able,the young, the economically active, educated and relatively well-off person towardsthose who are poorer, older, less educated, often women, and outside the labourforce. Transfers from relatives are cited as often as retirement pensions and socialsecurity from the Government, as one of the three most important sources of in-come for the household. These transfers, however, flow to different and often poorerhouseholds.

In chapter nine, Hiam Omar Kalimat and Åge A. Tiltnes study public life.Dealing mainly with participation in public life and attitudes towards such partic-ipation, this chapter finds that there are substantial differences between Jordanianwomen and men. Approximately six in ten Jordanians above the age of twenty haveever voted in a municipal or national election, with only minor variation betweenthe sexes. However, when considering a second indicator of electoral politics, cam-paigning, we notice that men have been more active. While 15 percent of men havebeen involved in electoral campaigning, only 9 percent of women have. Six timesas many men as women (12 percent versus 2 percent) are members of at least onevoluntary organisation. Not surprisingly, Jordanian men are also more frequent users ofwhat we have called ‘guesthouses’, that is rabitas and diwans and similar institutions.

Turning from actual participation to attitudes towards such participation,we see that the gender difference persists. About double the number of men areopposed to female involvement in political and associational life than women. Yet,the authors’ main conclusion is that there is a general ‘psychological’ barrier againstfemale public and political participation in Jordanian society. For example, one-thirdof the interviewed individuals above the age of fifteen are against having women inthe elected local or national councils, or in the government.

This chapter also looks at the consumption of news through modern media.Three in four Jordanians were found to have obtained news from a newspaper, radioor TV station the day preceding the interview. TV is clearly the most popular sourceof information, followed by radio and newspapers. More men than women followthe news. The widest gender gap is for newspaper consumption, due to higher illit-eracy rates among women. Nearly three in ten Jordanians supplement the mentionedthree Jordanian information sources with non-Jordanian TV news at least once aweek. Twenty percent of the adult respondents watched non-Jordanian Arab

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channels during the week before the interview; 15 percent watched Israeli news;while 2 percent followed news put on the air by western TV stations.

Children and Youth WelfareIn chapter ten, Sami Khoury, Laurie Blome Jacobsen and Siri Størmer depict theliving conditions for children and youth. They find that the health conditions ofJordanian children, from the newborn to teenager, are generally good. Palestinianrefugees in Jordan do not appear to have worse child health conditions than non-refugees, and for a number of indicators, showed a tendency towards better childhealth.

On the other hand, several categories of individuals were associated, to agreater or lesser degree depending on the indicator and age of the child, to poorerhealth outcomes. Low annual household income was consistently associated withpoor health indicators in infants and children, and lower educational achievementin youth. The authors found that the children of women with no education wereassociated with significantly poorer results on health indicators, particularly so foryoung children. One important exception to this is the duration of breast-feeding.Women with no education or only basic education had a significantly lower risk ofstopping breast-feeding than highly-educated women. The mother’s educationproved to be most influential in cases of comparison between children born touneducated mothers and children born to mothers with high levels of education,with differentials according to other levels of education inconsistent.

Considering living conditions indicators for children under 5 years of age,levels of prenatal care, assisted deliveries, infant and child mortality, and vaccina-tion coverage were all better than those in most MENA and middle-income coun-tries. However, some problem areas impacting the health of young children exist,such as postnatal care (only 5 percent of Jordanian women received a postnatal healthcare check), malnutrition and short birth intervals.

Although still below rates reported for other MENA countries, some 14percent of Jordanian children under 5 years showed malnutrition in the form ofstunting.

Median birth intervals in Jordan have increased over the last 2 decades, butnot considerably - only 4 percent since 1990. Average birth intervals (30 months)are slightly over the minimum considered healthy by international health agencies.

Considering youth aged 5 to 15 years, the mother’s education has less effecton the health of these older children. Income and household conditions includingcrowding, smoking in the home and sanitation facilities as they related to youthhealth, showed no association with the degree of illness in youth of this age group.Household income, however, was associated with how youth spend their leisure time

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– with youth from higher income families participating more in social, educationaland sporting activities than lower income groups. Youth from low-income familiesare also more likely to drop out of school. The probability of dropping out of basicschool is almost two times higher among this group than children from other incomegroups.

Conclusions: A Holistic View of the Living Conditions in JordanIn chapter eleven, Jon Pedersen concludes the analysis by summing up the mainfindings and by integrating them into a holistic view of the living conditions in thecountry. He claims that the chapters paint a varied picture of Jordan, but perhapsalso a picture that is rosier than many could expect. This may stem from the waycomparisons are made, he writes, and from the colour of the pictures with whichJordan is compared. Jordan is a low middle income country in World Bank terms,with many of the characteristics of such countries: adequate coverage of basic needsfor the majority, but with rooms for improvement. It still fares well compared tomany such countries, especially when one considers its poor natural resource base.During the 1970'ies and early 80'ies Jordan's improvement in the field of healthwas for instance much better than in other Arab countries. The access to basic liv-ing conditions assets is evenly good across the various Governorates of the country,even if Amman and the South come out as better off than the others.

A characteristic of Jordan is also that it is a redistributive social formation.The government uses a large amount of its income in subsidies, in the maintenanceof a large public sector, in education and health. Traditionally it has used more ofits income on health than comparable countries. Jordan does not distinguish itselfin any particular way as regards income inequalities. Although the structuraladjustment and the present social productivity program have reduced governmentinvolvement and is likely to reduce it further, the redistributive aspects are still animportant feature of the Jordanian society.

The picture of general and good access to infrastructure and coverage of basicneeds may be explained in different ways. It seems likely that it has been achievedmore as a result of the governmental redistributive efforts than through a generaland even access to productive resources for the households. The households appearto face challenges in ensuring their economic viability, a fact that is illustrated bythe predominant role that remittances and transfers play in the household econo-mies. This analysis finds that level of education is the most important determinantof household affluence, and for those with only basic education access to employ-ment is the decisive factor for becoming economically independent. Consequently,even if social differentiation is at present relatively moderate, it is likely to increasein the future.

CHAPTER 2

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Chapter 2 The Population of Jordan

Sara Randall and Nawaf Kalaldeh

Summary

The JLCS has revealed that demographically Jordan is a country in transition.Education levels, particularly of women, have increased enormously over the lasttwo decades, and it is likely that this factor has accelerated the changes, althoughnow the country is becoming more uniform in its demographic behaviour. Havinglagged behind some neighbours it is now in the throes of a rapid fertility declineaffecting all strata of society, with modern family planning used extensively. Mor-tality is extremely low, with infant and child mortality at the levels exhibited by thedeveloped Western European countries in the early 1970s. Life expectancy, at around70 is very high, and the past legacy of excess female mortality has now disappeared,with women surviving much longer than men. The population is still growing rap-idly – a consequence of fertility which is still well above replacement, and the inbuiltlegacy of past high fertility - a rapidly increasing female population of childbearingyears. Coupled with the low mortality, this high growth will inevitably be main-tained for a couple of decades.

Introduction

The population of Jordan has a history of sudden shocks and changes to its com-position. The 1948 war resulted in an influx of refugees from present day Israel.The 1967 war resulted in the loss of the West Bank, as well as substantial displace-ment of West Bankers across the river to the East Bank of Jordan. Economic devel-opment in the Gulf resulted in both Jordanians and refugees leaving on long termmigration to Kuwait and other Gulf countries. When the 1990 Gulf crisis erupted,200-300 thousand persons arrived in Jordan in the course of a few months. WhileJordan has been a major provider of labor for the Gulf countries, it has also seenlabor migration into the country, principally of Egyptians. As for its internaldevelopment, Jordan has substantially reduced mortality levels in recent years,

CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 1

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though some of the decline may have levelled off. There are clear signs that fertilityhas started to decline.

The size of the Jordanian population has been estimated at various times byseveral agencies, including the Jordanian Department of Statistics, The World Bank,UNPD and US Bureau of the Census. Prior to the 1994 census, no census had takenplace since 1979. Given both the unpredictable migration patterns and a more rapidfertility decline than anybody expected, it is not surprising that many estimates ofthe 1994 population missed the mark completely. The 1994 census found apopulation of 4.139 million (Department of Statistics 1997). In contrast, UNPD(1995) in their 1994 revision of population projections estimated the populationin 1995 to be 5.44 million (up from 4.26 in 1990), and the World Bank (Bos et al.1994:286) a much lower one of 4.41 million in 1995 (up from 3,278 million in1990). The US Bureau of the Census had estimated the 1994 population to be 3.87million Jordanians (i.e. not including foreigners), while the census found 3.82million Jordanians (Adlakha 1997). The Department of Statistics in Jordan hadestimated the population to be 4.152 million (Department of Statistics 1997:17).Current estimates of the historical development of the population of Jordan are givenin figure 2.1.

Although no direct data were available on the demographic dynamics of theJordanian population as measured by the JLCS, by combining the fertility andmortality data examined in detail below, the crude birth rate was estimated at 33.5

Figure 2.1 Size of the population in Jordan 1979 to 1994. 1979 and 1994 are census years.Other years are estimates. Source: Department of Statistics 1995: 16

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per thousand, the crude death rate at 4.251 per thousand and the natural increaseat 2.9 percent. This compares with the most recent figures of a crude death rate of5.0 and growth rate of 3.5 percent produced by the Department of Statistics(Adlakha 1997) based on the 1994 census2.

Age-Sex Structure

The pyramidical age-sex structure is a classic example of a population with past highfertility and mortality (figure 2.2) and current high growth rates partly because ofrapidly growing numbers of women of reproductive age. The structure is very sim-ilar to the 1994 census with the sharp decline in cohort size for men between 25–29 and 30–34, presumably caused by outmigration in the older age group. It isinteresting that the more or less equal sizes of the youngest three cohorts shown bythe 1990 Jordan Population and Family Health Survey (JPFHS, figure 2, p11) is

1 Crude Birth Rate estimated using the age specific fertility rates for 1995 combined withobserved age structure of the population at survey. Crude Death Rate estimated by combin-ing infant and child mortality measures (1990-95) with adult mortality estimates from thewidowhood data (approx. 1990-95), using routine COMBIN from MORTPAK-LITE (UN Popu-lation Division, 1990) and the Coale Demeny West Life Table, to produce male and femalelife tables.

2 The Crude Birth Rate has so far (November 1997) not been estimated from the 1994 census.

Figure 2.2 Age and sex structure

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not reflected in either the census or the JLCS, suggesting possible underreportingof younger children in the JPFHS.

Dependency RatiosThis broad based pyramid has repercussions for the dependency ratios, which aredominated by dependents under 15 (42.5 percent) rather than old people (2.9percent). The dependency ratio (here defined as population under 15 and 65+divided by those aged 15-64) can be considered in various ways: the overall depend-ency ratio in the population; the proportion of the population living in householdswith a high dependency ratio, and the proportion of households with a highdependency ratio. All three of these ratios are shown in table 2.1, from which it canbe seen that the lowest dependency is in Amman, followed by Balqa and Madaba,whereas the highest is in Jarash and Ajloun and is largely a consequence of the higherfertility in this area (see fertility section). In table 2.1, if column 3 is smaller thancolumn 2 then households with a high dependency ratio are also large households- to be expected when the major cause of high dependency is high fertility. Theexception to this pattern is for female headed households, where a higher percent-age of households have high dependency, but the percentage of individuals in highlydependent households is lower. Rural areas have higher dependency ratios than urban

Table 2.1 Dependency ratios by region, household characteristics

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)2(

htiwsdlohesuoh%ycnedneped76.0>oitar

)3(

nammA 47. 3.31 9.01

qarfaM&aqraZ 19. 5.71 1.41

abadaM&aqlaB 97. 4.51 8.21

dibrI 68. 4.71 2.51

nuoljA&hsaraJ 89. 2.32 5.91

htuoS 59. 7.91 3.61

nabrU 08. 6.51 9.21

laruR 29. 3.81 2.51

eegufeR 38. 4.61 2.31

eegufernoN 28. 0.61 6.31

dlohesuohdedaehelaM 2.61 5.21

dlohesuohdedaehelameF 6.61 2.02

55

CONTENTS

areas, both because of more under 15s (urban 41.8 percent, rural 44.9 percent) andmore elderly people (urban 2.9 percent, rural 3.1 percent). Refugees do not differfrom non-refugees.

The overall dependency ratio here is identical to that published for Jordanby IPPF (Population Reference Bureau: IPPF, Arab World Region) and very simi-lar to that for the Arab world as a whole (42 percent under 15, 54 percent 15-64, 4percent 65+).

Sex RatiosSex ratios by age are extremely constant at around 106 (figure 2.3). The lower sexratios between ages 30 and 50 are probably a function of male outmigration (seesection on migration). The irregularities around age 55 are probably a function ofage misreporting3 and have been smoothed accordingly. A decrease in sex ratios atolder ages is usually expected, with the ratios being substantially below 100 for theover 60s, reflecting lower female mortality in older ages. This decrease is not observedhere. This is either a function of underreporting of elderly women, or a past legacyof excess female mortality - something which has been observed in other Arab

Figure 2.3 Sex ratios

3 There was a substantial deficit of women reported as age 54 and an excess of those aged55. This is a consequence of the fact that those aged 54 had to answer the woman’squestionnaire whereas those aged 55 didn’t.

56

CONTENTS

Figure 2.4 Marital status by age, women

populations (Tabutin 1991). However, given current mortality patterns (see mor-tality section) with much lower female mortality at older ages, past excess femalemortality would have had to have been extremely high, and underreporting of old-er women is more likely.

Marital StatusUntil recently, marriage was universal for both men and women with low incidenceof both divorce and separation. Proportions of widows start to rise significantly afterage 50 for women, and most women are widows after age 80 (figure 2.4); most menonce married, remain married (figure 2.5).

5.6 percent men are polygamous, the majority with two wives. Polygamy ismore frequent at older ages with 11 percent married men over 70 being polygamous.It is not clear whether this is a function of the life cycle - men over 70 have hadmore opportunity to marry more wives, or whether it is a legacy from higherpolygyny rates in the past. 6.3 percent women are in polygamous unions, theproportions being fairly constant, with between 8-10 percent women in a polyga-mous marriage, in each age group between 30 and 70. For both sexes polygamy isfar more frequent amongst those with no schooling. 12 percent men with no school-ing are polygamous compared to less than 3 percent of those with secondaryschooling or more. The percentages of women in polygamous marriages by educa-tional achievement are similar to those of men. There is clearly an interaction with

57

CONTENTS

age - more of the uneducated are older - but it is an indication that polygamy as aninstitution may be declining.

Measuring Age at First MarriageThere are problems in examining age at first marriage from cross sectional marriagedata, especially if the marriage pattern is changing fairly rapidly, as it appears to bein Jordan. Where data on age at first marriage are available, mean age can be calcu-lated, but depending on the age after which few marriages occur, younger age groupsare truncated, and the mean ages for older groups reflect the age at marriage of 10or more years ago. If age at first marriage is rising rapidly, this may be slightly mis-leading. The Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (SMAM) is also a misleading meas-ure if age at first marriage is changing rapidly, or if the proportions permanentlysingle change significantly4.

Male mean age at marriage has remained relatively stable around 25 over thelast 40 years (figure 2.6), whereas that of women has risen steadily from 17 in 70year olds to above 20 for women in their late 20s5. This has reduced the spousalage gap, which may well also change the nature of the marital relationship.

4 For this reason the SMAMs calculated from the JLCS are not presented here.

5 The apparent fall in age at marriage for the youngest age-groups in figure 5 is a selectioneffect. Only those already married by the time of the survey are included, and by definitionthese are younger.

Figure 2.5 Marital status by age, men

58

CONTENTS

Figure 2.6 Mean age at marriage

Figure 2.7 Proportions of women single by age. Sources: JFS 1976, JFFHS 1983, JPFHS 19916

6 References to the surveys mentioned here and later in this chapter are the following: JordanFertility Survey 1976: Department of Statistics 1979, Jordan Fertility and Family Health Survey1983: Department of Statistics 1984, Jordan Population and Family Health Survey 1990: Zoubiet al 1992.

59

CONTENTS

Proportions never marrying appear to be increasing quite rapidly, although in a cross-sectional survey it is quite difficult to determine trends, and a movement towardslater age at marriage can appear as an increase in proportions single. Figure 2.7 usesdata from several recent surveys to show a trend of increasing proportions single atolder ages, probably of women who will now never marry. Using just JLCS data, acomparison between the proportions single at the survey, and the estimated

Figure 2.9 Proportions men single at time of the survey and 10 years earlier

Figure 2.8 Proportions women single at time of the survey and 10 years earlier

60

CONTENTS

proportions single 10 years earlier7 (figures 8 and 9), show a significant shift,especially for women, where 15 percent of 25-29 year olds were single in 1986, but30 percent were single in 1996. This suggests that the past pattern of universal mar-riage may be changing - something which has already been observed among neigh-bouring Palestinians of the Occupied Territories (PCBS 1996).

Marital Status and Socio-Economic StatusMarital status differs little by refugee status, but both educational achievement andparticipation in the labour force are correlated with different women’s marriagedynamics.

Mean age at first marriage has been declining for all women with secondaryor more education (figure 2.10). Even excluding the points for the youngest twoage groups - because of selection effect - the decline is maintained. Nevertheless,both secondary educated and higher educated women still marry at higher ages thanthose with basic education, and it is the fact that more and more younger womenare achieving these higher levels of education that is causing the overall age at mar-riage to rise. What appears to be changing is the differences between the subgroups- as the highly educated become more frequent throughout society, theirdemographic behaviour is becoming less unique and less differentiated from the

Figure 2.10 Mean age at first marriage according to education

7 This was estimated using reported age at first marriage. Where age at first marriage wasmissing, cases were omitted from both numerator and denominator. Missing data were mostmarked for older people.

61

CONTENTS

Figure 2.12 Proportions of women single by education 10 years before survey

Figure 2.11 Proportions of women single by education

masses. In general, women with higher education are more likely to remain singleinto their late 40s than less educated women (figure 2.11). Between 1986 and 1996,the increases in proportions single were most marked for those with basic and sec-ondary education, and rather surprisingly, least marked for those with higher edu-cation (figure 2.12), particularly at younger ages.

Women in the labour force have a higher mean age at marriage than thosenot in the labour force (figure 2.13) and this group shows a substantial shift inproportions single over the last decade, especially in the late twenties and thirties

62

CONTENTS

(figure 2.14). These women are however dominated by women with higher educa-tion. 51 percent women in the labour force have higher education although only10.5 percent of the total female population have higher education, and 50 percentof those with higher education are in the labour force compared to 3.6 percent ofthose with basic education who make up the majority of women.

Figure 2.13 Mean age at marriage according to labour force status

Figure 2.14 Proportions single by labour force status

63

CONTENTS

It is not clear to what degree the socio-economic characteristics are a cause, or aconsequence of the marriage pattern. Unmarried women are more likely to work;higher education also tends to postpone marriage while studies continue and oftenreduces the numbers of acceptable husbands available.

Fertility

In the JLCS the fertility measures were derived from birth histories. Each marriedwoman between 15 and 54 years of age were asked to give details of every child thatshe had delivered. In the birth history the interviewer recorded each child born tothe woman, the date of birth, the sex, and if the child was still alive.

The Jordan Living Conditions Survey provides further evidence of the Jor-danian fertility decline documented by various recent studies (see table 3.1 in JP-FHS report). Annual TFRs calculated from JLCS data show a decline from above6 in 1985 and 1986 to a low of 4.3 in 1995 (figure 2.15). The data from the JLCSgive similar results to estimates from earlier surveys (table 2.2).

From the age specific fertility schedules (figure 2.16) it can be seen that thisdecline is occurring at all ages, although it has been most marked for women aged25-29, and least marked for those aged 30-34: evidence of a shift also to later child-bearing in recent years.

There is substantial variation in total fertility, both by region and by socio-economic sub group (table 2.3). Differences by region and socio-economic char-acteristics appear to be diminishing over time. The regions had much more homog-enous fertility in 1995 compared to 1985-9, the minor differences by refugee statushad disappeared, and urban-rural differentials are reduced due to a much more rapidfertility decline in rural areas.

The measurement of fertility

Fertility is commonly measured by the Age Specific Fertility Rates and the Total

Fertility Rate (TFR). Age specific fertility rates are the yearly average number of

children to which women in each age group give birth. The total fertility rate is

the number of children a woman would give birth to if she were to live the re-

productive period having the current age specific fertility rates at every age. The

number of children that a woman has at a given time is referred to as her parity.

64

CONTENTS

Table 2.2 Jordan Total Fertility 1976-1996. From selected surveys

94-51RFT 44-51RFT

)6-4791(6791SFJ 4.7 1.7

)38-0891(3891SHFFJ 6.6 4.6

)09-7891(0991SHFPJ 6.5 5.5

6991SCLJ

)48-0891( aN 29.6

)98-5891( 29.5 68.5

)49-0991( 40.5 99.4

)69-4991( 25.4 74.4

Table 2.3 Total Fertility by region and socio-economic status

98-5891 49-0991 5991 nemowN45-51

noigeR

nammA 30,5 93,4 47,3 1902

qarfaM&aqraZ 94,6 16,5 00,5 4911

abadaM&aqlaB 25,5 08,4 99,4 7331

dibrI 77,6 93,5 44,4 1231

nuoljA&hsaraJ 17,7 90,6 44,5 4821

htuoS 77,6 57,5 67,4 9721

sutatseegufeR

eegufernoN 12,6 21,5 04,4 4835

eegufeR 35,5 88,4 43,4 2213

rehtomfonoitacudE

gniloohcsoN 93,7 52,6 70,6 1011

sselrocisaB 63,6 14,5 47,4 1904

yradnoceS 94,4 83,4 93,3 3781

rehgiH 53,4 21,4 09,3 8241

sutatslarur-nabrU

nabrU 56,5 97,4 62,4 8026

laruR 40,7 99,5 38,4 8922

noigileR

milsuM 60,6 61,5 94,4 4128

naitsirhC 74,2 88,1 8 an 282

6991yraurbeFnisutatsecrofruobaL

ecrofruobalnitoN 94,6 75,5 77,4 1607

ecrofruobalnI 78,3 61,3 00,3 5441

8 The numbers here are very small - only 78 births

65

CONTENTS

Figure 2.16 Age specific fertility rates 1985-95

It is not possible to calculate total fertility rates before 1985 because of truncation.However a comparison between final achieved parity for women aged 45-54 (womenwhose childbearing was largely during the high fertility years) and the total fertility(reflecting recent current fertility rates) shows the extent of fertility decline. Thedecline is widespread and occurs throughout Jordan. All regions show a decline ofover 3 children, refugees and non-refugees, urban and rural (figure 2.17). The onlysubgroup to show little change is women with higher education. Older women with

Figure 2.15 Total fertility rates 1985-95

66

CONTENTS

Figure 2.17 Total fertility 1995 and completed parity by region and socioeconomiccharacteristics

9Source: JFS 1976: Table 5.21, p52, Table 3.7 p21.

Table 2.4 Total Fertility 1976 & 1996, by education of women

ytilitreF-revefoegatnecrepdethgieW

94-51nemowdeirram

nadroJytilitreF

6791yevruS 9

gniviLnadroJsnoitidnoC6991yevruS

ytilitreFnadroJ6791yevruS

gniviLnadroJsnoitidnoC6991yevruS

gniloohcsoN 10.9 70.6 4.86 3.31

yramirpetelpmocnI 04.8

47.44.91

8.15cisaB/yramirP 70.6

yrotaraperP 20.5 7.5

yradnoceS 71.3 93.3 6.4 5.71

rehgiH 93.2 09.3 0.2 3.71

nadroJllA 43.7 83.4 - -

67

CONTENTS

higher education have a completed fertility of around 4 children, and current totalfertility is very similar. Fertility for women with secondary education has alsodeclined less than for other groups. This stability of completed fertility for the besteducated suggests that the fertility decline might well stabilise out at a total fertili-ty of around 4 rather than declining further towards replacement. This is furtherconfirmed by an examination of ideal family size below.

A comparison of Jordanian fertility in 1995 with that measured by theJordanian Fertility Survey in 1976 shows the extent of the fertility decline but alsothe interaction with education of women (table 2.4). Twenty years ago the indirectcorrelation of total fertility and education was linear and very marked. The samedirection of association is present in the JLCS but is less marked. Fertility for thosewith no schooling and those with basic education has declined considerably, but atthe same time the dominant educational group has become those with basic edu-cation, compared to those with no education twenty years ago. This reinforces thedecline at a national level. However at secondary and higher educational levels thepicture is rather different. The tiny minority (2 percent) of ever-married women withhigher education in 1976 have swelled to 17 percent of ever married women andtheir fertility has increased. When they were extremely unique in terms of theireducational behaviour, they were similarly very different in fertility behaviour; nowthe personal or family requirements to achieve such a high educational level are nolonger so different to the rest of society, and as this subgroup of society becomesless special, fertility behaviour becomes more like that of the rest of the population.A similar increase in fertility at higher educational echelons as higher educationbecame more ubiquitous was also observed amongst Palestinians of the Occupiedterritories (Randall 1998)

Jordanian Fertility in the Context of Other Arab CountriesA recent paper by Hoda Rashad which examines the fertility decline in the Arabworld, points out the general homogeneity of Arab fertility levels. She documentsthat in the 1950s, with the exception of Lebanon, all Arab countries, both Africanand Asian had TFRs around 7. Fertility decline started in most Arab countries inthe 1970s, but during the 1960s Jordanian fertility had risen to a high of 8 and wasthe highest in the Arab world. The Jordanian decline lagged behind many AsianArab countries but was under way by the early 1980s. The most recent TFR dataavailable are summarised in figure 2.18; these TFRs all date from after 1985 butbecause of the rapidly changing fertility, comparisons with slightly different datesmay be rather misleading. Jordan in 1995 (JLCS) has a fertility level similar or

68

CONTENTS

Figure 2.18 Recent estimates of Total Fertility Rates in Arab countries.

slightly higher than the African Arab countries, but is clearly in the lower fertilitygrouping of Asian Arab countries.10

Male FertilityThe JLCS also provide some data for a smaller sub-sample on male fertility. Thesedata are not in birth history format but in the simpler Brass type questions (childrenever born, children surviving etc). Reported parity for males (figure 2.19) shows thelater pattern of family building for men - a reflection of later age at marriage, and aslightly higher completed fertility than women (on average). This is probably a func-tion of time - more of these men had their children during the past high fertilityperiod. Higher levels of polygamy for men at older ages have a minor effect on fer-tility: reported parity for polygamous men over 55 was 11.17, and for monogamousmen was 8.81 but since only around 10 percent men are polygamous this has littleeffect on population level fertility.

Source: Rashad 1997, Fafo*

10 The data in figure 18 for the following countries are UN estimates for 1985-89 and there-fore may be rather too high: Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE. The data for West Bankand Gaza Strip are from the Palestinian demographic survey 1995 (PCBS 1996).

69

CONTENTS

Figure 2.19 Reported parity for males and females

Men’s fertility is highest in their early thirties, and is low after the mid fifties (figure2.20), closely reflecting ages at marriage and spousal age differences. There is anapparent inconsistency in the reported fertility, with the male total fertility (7.4)for the year before the survey (from question on births in the last year) being sub-stantially higher than that of women (4.4) for 1995 (based on birth history datafor 1995). Several reasons combine to create this phenomenon. Men were askedabout all births, which could include illegitimate births, plus, in the case of polyg-amy, births from either wife. There may have been problems with the referenceperiod for men11. The main effect however is an artefact of the way total fertility iscalculated. This gives equal weight to each age specific rate irrespective of the cohortsize, and the fact that more male cohorts than female cohorts have children canincrease the TFR substantially.

Data on fertility are not available for enough men for detailed examinationof socio-economic or regional groupings. Parity by educational achievement showsthe same pattern as for females, with some irregularities due to small numbers,especially for those with no schooling (figure 2.21) . Men with higher educationhave higher fertility than women at that level, and as far as one can tell, educationhas a less marked effect on male fertility than on that of women.

11 Matched data for 1499 couples where the man was a randomly selected individual showedvery close correlation between the births reported by each.

70

CONTENTS

Fertility Preferences and Contraceptive UseIdeal family size questions were asked of a subsample of men and women as werequestions on contraceptive knowledge and use. These will not be considered in detailin this chapter, but the recent fertility declines mean that they are of particularinterest, especially in the light of predictions about further fertility decline.

Various non-numeric answers were coded including “stupid question”, “upto God”, “as many as possible” and “don’t know”. All of these responses are

Figure 2.20 Male fertility rates

Figure 2.21 Male parity by educational achievement

71

CONTENTS

Figure 2.22 Ideal family size by gender of respondent

considered here together as non-numeric responses; they are dominated by thosereplying “up to God”. Men were more likely to give non-numeric responses thanwomen (figure 2.22), but of the numeric responses the mode for both sexes is 4 chil-dren with around 10 percent of both men and women having 2,3,5 and 6 as idealsizes. Considering educational achievement of respondents (figures 2.23 and 2.24)- the variable which shows most variability between subgroups - those with noeducation show the greatest likelihood of non-numeric responses. These non-edu-cated are a very small minority in the younger age groups, especially for men, and

72

CONTENTS

Figure 2.23 Ideal family size by education, women

thus have little influence on current childbearing patterns. However even those withhigher education show a high proportion of non-numerical responses. All educa-tional groupings (except none) of both sexes have a modal ideal family size of 4,suggesting that the fertility decline may plateau out once 4 children is reached, asit has done for those with higher education. Although women with only basiceducation (the majority) have slightly higher ideal family sizes than those withsecondary or higher education, for men, educational achievement has little effecton the ideal family size at present with the exception of those with no education.

In terms of future fertility trends however, ideal family size will only haveany meaning if people actually try and achieve it through using family planning.People who provided data on both ideal family size and on contraceptive use fallinto four categories:

73

CONTENTS

• those with more living children than their ideal family size;

• those with exactly the same number of living children as their ideal family size;

• those with less children than their ideal family size; and

• those with a non-numeric answer to family size.

In terms of current contraceptive use and the logic of attaining desired family size,those in the first two groups should all be using contraception, whereas those inthe third, might be using it for spacing and the last group provides no information.

Figure 2.24 Ideal family size by education, men

74

CONTENTS

Table 2.5 Contraceptive use by ideal family size: men and women

yltnerruc%nredomgnisunoitpecartnoc

yltnerruc%gnisu

lanoitidartnoitpecartnoc

gnisutoN%noitpecartnoc

llA n

neM

laedi> 4.74 3.6 4.64 3.21 501

laedi= 3.04 7.11 0.84 9.22 212

laedi< 5.13 3.01 2.85 2.33 414

ciremun-non 7.22 6.8 7.86 7.13 203

latoT 7.23 6.9 7.75

nemoW

laedi> 7.84 6.12 7.92 3.12 002

laedi= 4.15 3.71 3.13 6.82 123

laedi< 0.33 4.12 6.54 5.53 615

ciremun-non 4.62 3.91 3.45 6.41 751

latot 4.93 0.02 6.04 - -

>ideal: Has more living children than stated ideal family size=ideal: Has ideal family size<ideal: Has less living children than ideal family sizeNon-numeric: Non-numeric ideal family size

Men: Currently married men with a non-pregnant wife under 50Women: Currently married non-pregnant women 50 and under

12 Data for those aged 15-49 are used here.

The data (table 2.5) suggest a sizeable unmet need for family planning, but also somediscrepancies between male and female behaviour. It should be noted that the maleand female responses are not from the same couples so some difference is expected.

More Women Report Current Contraceptive Use Than MenData on current contraceptive use were collected for all currently married, non-pregnant women aged 15-5012, and for all currently married men with a non-pregnant wife aged under 50. Overall 7 percent more women report using moderncontraception than men, twice as many women report traditional contraception and17 percent less women report no contraceptive use. For all methods, including maleinitiated methods such as condom use and withdrawal, women report slightly higherlevels of current contraceptive use (figure 2.25). There are several reasonable expla-nations for this; response errors by either sex are quite possible: women may havebeen made to feel by interviewers that contraceptive use was desirable and exagger-ated their contraceptive use, men may have felt the opposite. It is also quite possible

75

CONTENTS

that women are using contraception without the knowledge of their husbands. Evenwhere men did report contraceptive use, in 70.1 percent cases their wife initiateduse, suggesting that despite their moderate ideal family sizes, men are less preparedto turn these ideals into practice than women. Both men and women report simi-lar levels of discussion with their spouses about the number of children they wouldlike (table 2.6). However the fact that around 30 percent contraceptive users reportno discussion suggests that despite the relative high levels of contraceptive knowl-edge and use, and the rapid fertility decline, such topics are not always easily dis-cussed between spouses.13

Table 2.6 Discussion with spouse about desired number of children by reported contracep-tive use

gnitropernem%efiwhtiwnoissucsid

gnitropernemow%dnabsuhhtiwnoissucsid

noitpecartnocnredomgnisU 9.37 4.66

noitpecartnoclanoitidartgnisU 7.46 0.47

esuevitpecartnocoN 5.95 3.06

Figure 2.25 Current contraceptive use

13 The rather narrow definition of the question may however be the reason for the 30 per-cent reporting no discussion, since the question was about ideal number of children ratherthan contraceptive use.

76

CONTENTS

Changing Marriage Pattern and Increasing ContraceptionContribute to Fertility DeclineIt is well established that in populations with low levels of pathological infertilityand where almost all childbearing occurs within marriage, four factors have mosteffect in reducing fertility from its theoretical maximum (about 15.3 children perwoman) to the observed figure. The method for measuring their impact has beenmost widely developed by Bongaarts (Bongaarts 1982, Bongaarts & Potter 1983)and the indices used indicate the degree to which the marriage pattern, the post-partum non-susceptible period14, contraception and where applicable abortion15,are the major factors in reducing fertility. If an index has no effect on total fertilityits value is one. Thus the lower the index (between 0 and 1) the greater the fertilityreducing effect.

Table 2.7 compares the values for Jordan in 1976 and 1996. Using Bongaarts'(1982) recommended methods for calculation, the indices for the JLCS underesti-mate fertility somewhat but there are several reasons why this might be so.

Table 2.7 Bongaarts indices for Jordan; 197616 and 1996

devresbORFT

latoTlatiraMytilitreF

etaR

foecnelaverPevitpecartnoc

esu

esUssenevitceffe

fonoitaruDmutrap-tsoP

ytilibadnucefni


14.7 59.9 42.0 48.0 5.6

6991SCLJ 83.4 7.7 )nemow(54.0 78.0 *4.9

)nem(63.0 09.0 #)0.4(

(b) IndicesegairraM

Cm

noitpecartnoCCc

mutraptsoPytilibadnucefni

Ci

etamitsEledoMRFT


547.0 287.0 8.0 31.7

6991SCLJ 965.0 )nemow(755.0 *827.0 *56.3

)nem(946.0 #988.0 )nem(71.4

#)64.4(

* Using Bongaarts equation and median duration of breast feeding# Using 4 months as a realistic estimation given supplementation practices

16 Data for Jordan 1976 taken from Bongaarts 1982, tables 2 and 3.

14 The post-partum non-susceptible period is influenced mainly by postpartum abstinence andbreastfeeding behaviour. It is assumed in this population that breastfeeding is generally long-er than post-partum abstinence, and therefore the latter can be ignored.

15 Here we assume there is no induced abortion.

77

CONTENTS

• Prevalence of contraception may be overstated. As mentioned above, menreport lower levels of contraceptive use than women. If men’s levels are used(see figure 2.21) the model estimate of total fertility becomes 4.11, which iscloser to the observed TFR.

• There may be an overlap of contraceptive use with the non-susceptible periodwhich would lead to an overestimate of fertility reducing effect of contra-ception.

• The use effectiveness of the contraceptive methods may be overstated. Theestimates were taken from those provided by Bongaarts for developing coun-tries (Bongaarts 1982).

• The postpartum infecundable period may be overestimated. It is likely thatthe equation used to translate breastfeeding duration (taken from Bongaarts1982) into duration of postpartum infecundability overestimates the latter.Jordanian women are well nourished and from JLCS data it can be seen thatsupplementing breastfeeding begins early. Of those who breastfeed 30 per-cent already give milk or solid supplements by 1 month and over 50 percentby 3 months. Thus it is likely that total duration of breastfeeding is a poorindicator of amenorrhoea. If the postpartum infecundable period is takenas 4 months (a reasonable assumption given the supplementation levels),estimated total fertility (4.46) is very close to the observed value (4.38).

JLCS data on breastfeeding do suggest that breastfeeding has increased both in termsof uptake and duration since 20 years ago. Current status data are available onbreastfeeding along with data on duration of breastfeeding for weaned and deadchildren. Life table analysis was used to estimate median duration of breastfeedingat 14.02 months. Unfortunately there is no directly comparable measure for Jordanin 1976 where duration of breastfeeding in the last closed interval was calculated(Department of Statistics 1979: section 8.2)17. There is evidence that breastfeedinguptake is increasing (table 2.8), with proportions of women never breastfeedingdecreasing with age in 1996, and these proportions not breastfeeding are lower atyounger ages than twenty years earlier; however the different methodologies makecomparisons difficult.

Despite these caveats, a comparison of the Bongaarts indices between 1976and 1996 demonstrates that both the marriage pattern and increased contraceptive

17 Breastfeeding data in both surveys have some problems. The 1976 survey had very substan-tial heaping on multiples of six months (Jordan Fertility Survey: figure 8.1) and the JLCScontained a number of inconsistencies.

78

CONTENTS

use have been important in the Jordanian fertility decline but changes in postpar-tum infecundability are small. This pattern is similar to that observed in several otherArab countries which have fertility rates similar to those of Jordan. Marriage andpostpartum infecundible indices are similar to the other Arab countries, and con-traceptive prevalence is similar to Algeria, Egypt, Bahrain and Syria. As Rashad says“marriage is playing a key role in bringing down fertility in the Arab countries con-sidered” (1997: 14) and Jordan is no exception to this (table 2.9).

It is also possible to examine the levels of the different Bongaarts indices bysocio-economic and regional subgroup. Although interesting in their own right, theyare in general little help in explaining the observed differentials in total fertility.Marital, contraceptive and breastfeeding behaviour is remarkably homogenous acrossthe spectrum of Jordanian society (table 2.10).

The index of marriage, Cm is particularly homogenous with two notable

exceptions. Marital status is the main explanation for the fertility differences between

Table 2.8: Breastfeeding patterns 1976 and 1996

6791yevruSytilitreFnadroJ 6991SCLJ

egA

naeMnoitarud

:gnideeftsaerbdesolctsal

lavretni

FBton% naideMnoitarud

:gnideeftsaerbtnerrucmorf

atadsutats

FBton%

52< 0.11 3.7 0.31 0.6

43-52 7.11 9.7 5.31 1.5

44-53 0.21 7.7 7.61 4.8

+54 3.41 1.2 2.42 4.9

Sources: JFS, Principal Reports, vol.1, table 8.2

Table 2.9 Bongaarts indices for Arab countries with moderate fertility

RFT Cm Ci Cc

acirfAhtroN

aireglA 04.4 35.0 77.0 35.0

tpygE 39.3 96.0 47.0 45.0

naduS 06.4 46.0 46.0 19.0

aisinuT 05.4 5.0 7.0 56.0

aisAtseW

niarhaB 91.4 65.0 8.0 45.0

rataQ 94.4 94.0 8.0 47.0

airyS 02.4 75.0 57.0 36.0

nadroJ 83.4 75.0 47.0 85.0

79

CONTENTS

those women in, and not in the labour force, suggesting that those who work do soin great part because they are not married. Those with higher education also have alower C

m - but there is a close correlation between higher education and labour force

participation and further analysis is needed to disentangle their relative importance.Contraceptive use is also remarkably constant throughout the country. Rural use islower than urban, but not much, and education has little systematic effect on con-traceptive use (but see footnote to table 2.10). The similar levels of fertility andindices for refugees and non-refugees is all the more surprising when one considersthat the populations whence come the refugees have much higher fertility, especiallyin Gaza (see figure 2.18), despite having higher educational participation than Jor-dan (Randall 1998). This suggests that it is neither geographical origins nor the factof being a refugee which is important in determining fertility, but the wider socio-political context.

Thus not only does the Arab world tend to be somewhat homogenous andsynchronous in its fertility behaviour, but Jordan itself is now internally rather similar.

18 The sample with data on contraception in this group is very small, and the age structure isvery different from the other educational groups being dominated by older women 17 per-cent of whom have been sterilised (compared to 4 percent nationally). This leads to the ap-parently very high level of contraceptive use.

Table 2.10 Bongaarts indices by region and socioeconomic subgroup

)59-4991(RFT Cm Ci Cc

noigeR

nammA 40.4 65.0 77.0 35.0

qarfaM&aqraZ 00.5 36.0 37.0 26.0

abadaM&aqlaB 03.4 25.0 17.0 16.0

dibrI 77.4 85.0 37.0 06.0

htuoSnuoljA&hsaraJ 65.5 26.0 7.0 56.0

68.4 85.0 27.0 85.0

noitacudE

enoN 07.5 85.0 56.0 46.0 81

cisaB 10.5 56.0 37.0 06.0

yradnoceS 76.3 45.0 67.0 94.0

rehgiH 09.3 84.0 87.0 45.0

sutatseegufeR

eegufertoN 25.4 75.0 37.0 95.0

eegufeR 05.4 85.0 67.0 65.0

larur-nabrU

nabrU 14.4 85.0 37.0 55.0

laruR 59.4 75.0 67.0 86.0

sutatsecrofruobaL

ecrofruobalnitoN 89.4 36.0 37.0 85.0

ecrofruobalnI 19.2 24.0 87.0 65.0

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An increase In Birth Intervals Since 1990A comparison of preceding birth intervals for all births in the 5 years before the JLCSwith birth intervals in the 5 years up to 1990 (Zoubi et al. 1992: table 3.8) showsthat preceding birth intervals have lengthened by on average 1.5 months for all socio-economic and spatial subgroups (table 2.11), but with the basic overall differen-tials remaining very similar. The percentage of very short birth intervals (less than18 months) has decreased from 26.8 percent to 23.7 percent births and thepercentage of intervals over three years has increased from 18.8 percent to 26.3percent intervals. This suggests that one component of the fertility decline is a use

Table 2.11 Percent distribution of births born since 1.1.91 by preceding birth interval

htribsuoiverpecnisshtnomforebmuNnaideM

SHFPJSCLJN

71-7 32-81 53-42 74-63 +84 6991 0991 -

egA

91-51 9.45 0.82 1.41 3.2 7.0 4.71 5.61 761

92-02 6.82 7.32 2.92 2.11 3.7 5.32 9.02 6952

93-03 0.51 3.71 0.03 0.51 7.22 0.03 0.62 3171

+04 6.6 5.31 4.72 5.12 0.13 6.63 5.03 802

redrohtriB

3-2 4.23 6.32 8.62 0.01 3.7 4.22 5.02 8781

6-4 0.91 8.81 1.92 4.41 7.81 8.72 7.42 0261

+7 9.41 2.02 4.23 1.51 4.71 0.82 2.62 6811

htribroirP

elaM 3.22 7.02 7.92 1.31 2.41 1.62 7.42 8732

elameF 1.52 5.12 0.82 4.21 0.31 9.42 5.32 6032

evilA 2.32 1.12 1.92 9.21 7.31 8.52 2.42 9154

daeD 8.04 0.32 9.02 3.5 0.01 7.91 8.81 461

ecnediseR

nabrU 3.32 5.02 2.82 0.31 0.51 0.62 an 5923

laruR 8.42 0.32 1.13 9.11 2.9 2.42 8.32 9831

noitacudE

enoN 7.71 5.02 4.53 5.41 9.11 0.72 1.62 107

cisaB 5.32 4.12 9.72 3.31 9.31 6.52 6.42 0252

yradnoceS 0.52 2.22 0.72 3.11 6.41 6.42 1.32 276

rehgiH 7.72 7.91 9.82 7.01 0.31 6.42 5.12 387

ecrofruobaL

nitoN 4.32 0.12 8.82 2.31 6.31 7.52 an 2304

nI 7.52 7.12 7.92 4.9 6.31 3.42 an 256

sutatseegufeR

eegufertoN 4.22 7.12 6.92 0.31 3.31 7.52 an 7403

eegufeR 5.52 2.02 8.72 4.21 1.41 4.52 an 0361

latoT 7.32 1.12 9.82 7.21 6.31 5.52 0.42 7174

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of contraception for increasing birth intervals and slowing the pace of childbear-ing. The reduction in very short intervals will also have beneficial repercussions forchild welfare.

Mortality

Two sources of data are available on mortality in the JLCS. The birth histories forwomen allow for direct computation of infant and child mortality and indirectquestions on orphanhood and widowhood allow for estimates of adult mortality.

Infant and Child MortalityInfant and child mortality are both very low for a developing country (table 2.12)and confirm the decline showed in the JPHFS and other sources such as the census.The overall low Jordanian mortality means that there are very few events (childdeaths) rendering differentials by subgroup rather subject to random fluctuations.This is particularly marked when looking at regional differentials. Given that the

Table2.12 Infant mortality (1q0) and child mortality (5q0) by selected characteristics: 1990-95

1q0 5q0

nadroJllA 1.82 0.23

xeS

elaM 2.92 1.33

elameF 0.72 8.03

nabrU 3.92 3.33

laruR 3.42 9.72

sutatseegufeR

eegufertoN 2.13 4.63

eegufeR 9.32 8.52

noitacudelanretaM

dednettatoN 7.04 0.64

cisaB 5.62 7.92

yradnoceS 5.82 7.33

rehgiH 5.22 5.52

niamoD

nammA 3.32 2.82

qarfaM&aqraZ 6.42 7.52

abadaM&aqlaB 8.43 4.73

dibrI 1.13 0.63

nuoljA&hsareJ 2.12 7.03

htuoS 3.34 3.54

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rank order of mortality in the regions changes with each five year period, probablyall that can be said with certainty is that Amman has lower child mortality thanmuch of the rest of Jordan. Female infant and child mortality is now lower thanthat of males, but in 1985-89, female neonatal mortality was lower and postneo-natal mortality higher than for boys. In the five year period prior to that, femalemortality was higher throughout the early childhood period.

Probably the most surprising factor is the higher mortality observed amongstthe non-refugee population compared to the refugees and the fact that overall, underfive mortality has been lower for refugees since 1980. However the components ofthe differences change, with apparently lower postneonatal mortality in the 1980’sand lower neonatal mortality in the 1990s. This is all the more surprising when oneconsiders that in all the other demographic measures the two subpopulations arenow indistinguishable, although in the recent past (1985–94) fertility was also high-er amongst the non-refugees (table 2.3). In the different regions there is littlecorrelation between fertility and mortality; Jerash and Ajloun have the highestfertility, but the lowest infant mortality, whereas South has moderately low fertili-ty but very high infant mortality. Children of mothers with no education are at great-est risk of dying, and those of women with higher education have the lowest risk.Until 1990, secondary education or more conferred a significant child mortalityadvantage over those with basic education, but in the last five years child mortalityhas apparently risen for the better educated and fallen for those with basic educa-tion, making the groups indistinguishable. Some of this may be an artefact of smallnumbers of events, some of it a function of the rapid declines in fertility observedamongst the less well educated, although birth intervals have increased for all sub-groups and remain very similar.

Direct and indirect measures of mortality

In the JLCS , both direct and indirect measures of mortality are used. The directmeasures of infant and child mortality are based on birth histories. From thebirth histories it is possible to calculate the number of children that were bornduring a period, and how many of those that subsequently died. It is then possi-ble to estimate mortality directlyby dividing the number of deaths by the numberof children. (In practice the computation is somewhat more complicated. The exactmethod used is described in Curtis 1995).

Adult mortality is estimated from questions concerning whether or not thespouse of a person is still alive, and if a person’s mother and father are still alive.Computations based on such data are called indirect, because they arrive indirectlyat demographic measures through the use of models. Such models are based on sev-eral assumptions, principally relating to stability of fertility and mortality patterns.

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Adult MortalityQuestions on orphanhood and widowhood allow indirect estimates of adultmortality (United Nations 1983). Probably the most informative measure to emergefrom such estimates is e

20 (the expectation of life at age 20), and these estimates can

be given approximate time locations in order to detect trends. Unfortunately, thenature of the orphanhood estimates means that they refer to periods more than 10years prior to the survey. Estimates from widowhood are more recent, but dependon reports of proportions widowed for younger age groups of married men andwomen. Mortality in these age groups is now so low in Jordan that the proportionsnever widowed is close to 1 (table 2.13), and it is impossible to do the estimates forany population subgroups because too many age groups have no widows or widower.

Estimates were made using ORPHAN and WIDOW19 (from the programmeMORTPAK.LITE, United Nations 1990). Figure 2.26 shows that female lifeexpectancy at age 20 is considerably higher than that of men, a difference in theorder of 7-9 years (average e

20 for the four most recent age groups, using the West

model life table, e20

female= 57.9, e20

male=50.9). The orphanhood and widowhoodestimates for women are broadly consistent, suggesting a moderate increase in e

20

over the last 15 years. Male orphanhood estimates slightly lower mortality than malewidowhood, but there is still a considerable difference by sex.

Comparable estimates from the 1976 Jordan Fertility Survey (using data fromtables 6.5 and 6.6, Jordan Fertility Survey, 1976, Principal report, Volume 1) sug-gest that improvements in female adult mortality are greater than those for men inthe period since the late 1960s and early 1970s (figure 2.27). Then the difference

19 This method is very sensitive to the values of SMAM used, and assumes relatively stablemarriage patterns in the past decades. We know that this assumption is violated here (seesection on marital status above), but that much of the change in proportions single is veryrecent. Thus instead of using the SMAM from the survey date (28 for men and 24.6 forwomen), the SMAM for 10 years prior to the survey (1986) were used (26.6 for men and 22.65for women). The mortality estimates using the latter were much more consistent with theorphanhood estimates.

Table 2.13 Proportions never widowed by age

gnitroperselaM gnitroperselameF

42-02 599,0

92-52 899,0 699,0

43-03 799,0 989,0

93-53 099,0 659,0

44-04 889,0 139,0

94-54 379,0 509,0

45-05 569,0 938,0

95-55 559,0 857,0

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Figure 2.26 Life expectancy at age 20 from orphanhood and widowhood data. West ModelLife Table, men and women

Figure 2.27: Life expectancy at age 20 from orphanhood and widowhood data. West ModelLife Table, men and women, JLCS and Jordan Family Survey 1976

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between the two e20

was around 5 years. This, coupled with the more rapid declinein female infant and child mortality for females means that the life expectancy atbirth shows substantial differences between the sexes (table 2.14). This female lifeexpectancy is rather high, but is an indication of the extent of mortality decline inthis population. The difference in life expectancy between the sexes from the JLCSis greater than from some other sources (e.g. National Population Commission1991) because they used infant and child mortality to estimate adult mortality.Clearly this is inappropriate in Jordan, where the female advantage is much greaterfor adults than for children. A recent estimate based on household reports on deathsduring the 12 months prior to the census using the so-called Brass Growth BalanceMethod also found a smaller difference between the sexes (Adlakha 1997:12).

20 Estimated using COMBIN (Mortpak.lite) combining the measures of infant and child mor-tality from the birth histories, with the mean e20 of 4 age groups estimated using widow-hood, and using the UN General Standard.

21 Source: Adlakha 1997:12, using Brass Growth Balance method for adult mortality and Chil-dren Ever Born/Children Surviving for infant and child mortality.

22 Source: National Population Commission 1991. Only estimates of infant mortality rates wereused to obtain life expectancies

Table 2.14 Life expectancy at birth (e0); JLCS and other sources

ecruoS eselaM 0 eselameF 0

)59-0991(SCLJ 02 4,76 9,67

4991yevruselpmas%01 12 6,76 5,96

0991noissimmoCnoitalupoPlanoitaN 22 0,46 0,86

MigrationThere are two sources of data in the JLCS on migration. Both sources have problemsand can provide only a partial and approximate picture of Jordanian migration. Fromthe questions on people’s place of birth, and place of residence five years before thesurvey, it is possible to look at some aspects of net migration. The questions on closefamily members living abroad provide some more, rather limited and biased infor-mation on international migration. Our understanding of motivations and genu-ine processes of migration is limited by the nature of the evidence, and thus thissection will restrict itself to an overview of the flows and the characteristics of movers.Any examination of migration in Jordan is further complicated by the issue ofPalestine. Most Palestinian refugees are entitled to Jordanian citizenship, whilst thisis true of some their kin remaining in Gaza or West Bank. The nature of the Pales-tinian conflict has meant that a substantial proportion of the population has un-dertaken a lifetime move, but the nature of this move is not one of choice oftenassociated with migration. Much of the analysis below treats people born in the WestBank, the Gaza Strip or present day Israel separately, to try and distinguish between

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Figure 2.28 Percentage of governorate residents born in governorate by age

these two obviously different types of migration. Migration was only consideredabove the governorate level; people who moved within the governorate are hereconsidered to be non-movers.

Lifetime MigrationQuestions on birthplace give evidence of movements within the country and fromoutside. In all governorates around 90 percent of those under 15 were born in thegovernorate (figure 2.28). This homogeneity is lacking at other ages, with Amman,

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Zarqa and to a lesser extent Balqa and Aqaba having over half of some age groupsborn elsewhere. Ajloun, Karak and Maan are the governorates who have receivedthe lowest proportions of migrants from elsewhere. However, once one takes accountof Palestinian migration (figure 2.29), most of the variation is accounted for, witharound 70 percent of those over 50 in Amman and Zarqa being born in the WestBank, the Gaza Strip or Israel. Many of these are refugees from the Occupiedterritories, but others probably migrated before 1948 and do not consider them-selves displaced or as refugees.

A question on place of residence 5 years before the survey allows for anexamination of more recent migration. However it must be remembered that onthe international scale this includes return migrants - in particular people whoreturned because of the Gulf war, and in-migrants to Jordan who have been thereless than 5 years. From figure 2.30 it is clear that the population is not very mobile,with around 10 percent of each governorate having lived somewhere else 5 yearspreviously. Surprisingly Amman the capital does not contain noticeably moremigrants than other Governorates. These recent migrants have been subdivided intopeople who were in:

Figure 2.29: Percentage of governorate residents born in West Bank, the Gaza Strip or Israel

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Figure 2.30 Percentage of governorate residents by residence 5 years previously

Elsewhere Jordan - Any other governorate in Jordan Gulf - The Gulf states & Iraq Other Arab state - Dominated by Egypt & Syria Elsewhere - Anywhere else in the world, dominated by Sri

Lanka (probably domestic workers) and USA.

With the exception of Amman and Zarqa where most movers were previously inthe Gulf, the majority of movers were internal to Jordan. Few people have come orreturned to anywhere in Jordan from outside the Arab world. Age specific migrationrates (figure 2.31) - which are not proper rates, but the proportion of people by ageat survey who lived elsewhere 5 years previously, show very similar patterns for malesand females up to their early 20s - reflecting family moves and moves in relation toeducation. Then, during the prime working years male rates increase up to 18 per-cent in their mid twenties, decreasing linearly until old age. Women lag about 5years behind men, reflecting the fact that a majority of women move to accompa-ny their spouse (figure 2.32) and this tendency is more pronounced at older ages.

Age specific migration rates differ for both sexes according to where peoplecame from 5 years previously (figures 33 and 34). Rates for Gulf returnees are sim-ilar for all ages, because of the nature of the return, precipitated by the Gulf crisis,rather than people choosing to leave. Probably many of these would not havereturned without the crisis. Internal and movers from overseas peak for both menand women in their late twenties and early thirties, a typical age pattern of migra-tion reflecting the many changes that occur then: finishing studies, marriage and

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establishing a career. Women appear to have more diverse motives for movementthan men (figure 2.32) most men were either students or working. These workingmen are of interest because, with the exception of students, they are probably theprime stimulus to movement; women following spouses or family only movebecause of others’ moves.

Figure 2.31 Age specific migration rates in last 5 years: all movements by sex

Figure 2.32 Main activity in place of migration

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Figure 2.33: Age specific migration rates: females by movement since 1991

Figure 2.34 Age specific migration rates: males by movement since 1991

The best index for encapsulating the socio-economic characteristics of moving menis their educational achievement - occupation is too fluid and diverse. Figure 2.35shows the education profile of the total male population over 15, and that for men,working 5 years ago and who have since moved. Internal migrants differ little fromthe national profile but with slightly more men with higher education. Men previ-ously in the Gulf are better educated than the average Jordanian, reflecting the

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CONTENTS

demand for trained and skilled workers in the Gulf. Seventy-three percent of theseGulf migrants are Jordanian and are probably return migrants, 16 percent are Iraqiand have presumably come to Jordan for work. The migrant group who differs mostfrom the national education profile is those who were overseas other than the Gulf5 years ago; these are dominated by those with no education. Further examinationreveals that these are not Jordanians returned home, but migrant workers in Jor-dan. Only 7 percent are Jordanian, 7 percent Syrian and 83 percent are Egyptian.Thus a disproportionate number of in-migrants to Jordan are poorly educatedmanual labourers.

Which Jordanians Go Abroad?Questions were asked in every household on close family members living overseas,with some limited information on these people. There are several problems ininterpreting these data:

• In-migrants to Jordan may have left all their family behind, and thus reportsubstantial numbers of close relatives abroad - people who may have no linkwith Jordan at all, but will be numerically many more than the single Jorda-nians who may be abroad alone. This is particularly marked for Egyptians.

• Jordanian families who have migrated permanently overseas with their fam-ilies are less likely to have relatives behind to report them than single tem-porary labour migrants.

Figure 2.35 Working male migrants and total population by education (movement since 1991)

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Figure 2.36 Female age structure of relatives abroad

• Palestinians who came to Jordan in great numbers, or became Jordanians,have a substantial number of close relatives abroad, often without anymigration having taken place on either side.

Thus these data have to be treated with extreme caution, and can give little morethan a general picture of some aspects of migration overseas.

Age-Sex Structure of Relatives AbroadBecause of the first problem outlined above, all the data below are only for peoplewhose relative interviewed in the JLCS was Jordanian. This excludes most of theEgyptian and Syrian kin, but includes most of the kin in West Bank, the Gaza Stripand Israel. Under age 40 there are approximately equal numbers of relatives in WestBank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, who become dominated by women at older ages(unlike the Jordanians at home - see section on age-sex structure above). Most ofthe older relatives abroad are reported to be in the West Bank, Gaza Strip or Israel(figures 2.36 and 2.37). This is consistent with data from the demographic survey

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Figure 2.37 Male age structure of relatives abroad

from the West Bank and Gaza, which also show a large number of relatives in Jordan.Young adults overseas are preponderant, with substantially more men than wom-en, and very few children. This is a very typical migration specific age pattern,especially for non-Palestinians, suggesting that much of the outmigration fromJordan may be temporary, for study or work.

Relatives living in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel were excluded from thefollowing graphs and discussion because they had probably not emigrated there.Rather, it is more likely that the respondent was an immigrant to Jordan althoughthere is some migration to the West Bank and Gaza for reasons of marriage, familyreunification and also returnees because of the peace process.

Where Are Overseas Kin of Jordanians?Numerically most men are in the USA and Canada, with similar numbers in SaudiArabia (figure 2.38). Women are more likely to be in Saudi Arabia, accompanyingtheir families. Other important destinations are other Gulf States and Syria (although

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Figure 2.38 Residence country of relatives abroad (excluding West Bank, Gaza Strip andIsrael)

see below for Syria). Eastern Europe (including Russia) receives many men most ofwhom are there for study.

Principal Reasons for Being OverseasFour receiving regions were examined (figures 2.39 and 2.40). Men went to the Gulfprimarily for work, and 10 percent women there were also there primarily for work,although the majority of women went to accompany husbands or other family. Thepicture in the USA and Canada is somewhat similar, with study slightly more im-portant. Relatives in the non-Gulf Arab world however are different - both men andwomen are largely settled there, reflecting much longer term migration, and rather

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Figure 2.39 Female relatives: main reason for being overseas by region

more probably of migrants into Jordan (now with Jordanian citizenship) reportingon those they have left behind. This group is dominated by people in Syria. Menelsewhere in the world have gone either for work or study, and women to accom-pany family and husbands or themselves settled there. Similar numbers of men andwomen are settled elsewhere (34 men, 41 women) - but because of the far greaternumbers of men, the percentages are very different.

Overall Migration In and Out of JordanThe troubled history of the Palestinians dominates numerically any examinationof Jordanian migration - although from the indirect data available here, it is diffi-cult to quantify those movements, especially since so many people clearly have closekin in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Apart from that, migration is mainly withinthe Arab world, with people leaving Jordan to work in the Gulf, and people fromelsewhere in the Arab world, in particular Egypt coming to work in Jordan.

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Figure 2.40 Male relatives: main reason for being overseas by region

Migration to and from Syria is clearly more long term, reflecting the proximity andsimilarity of the two countries. The USA and Canada are the most important non-Arab destinations, with both work and study prime motives.

CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 1

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Chapter 3 Housing and Infrastructure

David Drury and T.M. Abu-Sharar

Summary

Despite its lack of natural resources and the challenge of absorbing three major wavesof immigration, Jordan has done an impressive job of providing housing and basicinfrastructure. The overwhelming majority of Jordanians (over 98 percent) live inpermanent, substantial housing in the form of apartments, dars, or villas. Some ofthe housing stock is in poor condition, but there is relatively little of the impro-vised squatter-type housing found in the poorer areas of many developing coun-tries. Home ownership is quite widespread in the population, and is found in roughlyequal proportions in high and low income groups. However, there is not muchvariation in the size of available housing, probably as a result of high land and build-ing costs. Most living quarters have between two and four rooms, and large num-bers of families with children live with three or more persons per room and fourpersons per sleeping room. At the same time, there are high proportions of vacantunits in both urban and rural areas.

Most urban and rural households have water piped into their living quar-ters, 99 percent have electrical power services, and 81 percent have a paved road tothe house. Although basic housing and sanitation amenities are widely available forthe population as a whole, some areas and groups of people are much better servedthan others. People are generally satisfied with their housing, but housing cost andliving space get relatively low approval ratings. Water supply is also a matter of someconcern, particularly for people in urban fringe and rural areas.

There are high levels of general concern about air and water quality. Thisconcern is greatest among people in urban areas, and is probably determined as muchby the household’s environmental awareness as it is by the family’s actual livingconditions.

Basic services are available to most people within easy walking distance, butother services are not. A majority of all households in both urban and rural areaslive reasonably close to a mosque or church and a grocery store, Basic and second-ary school, and health centre. However post offices, banks, police stations and

CHAPTER 4 CHAPTER 2

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cultural centres are seldom available close to home. Refugee camps have better accessto local services than any other type of neighbourhood.

Respondents were generally satisfied with their neighbourhoods, but peo-ple in urban areas are much more likely to be concerned about traffic and children’ssafety. Lower income groups and rural people were less satisfied with public trans-port and shopping. All segments of the population expressed dissatisfaction aboutthe lack of cultural institutions and work and business opportunities in the neigh-bourhood.

About 19 percent of the sample say they plan to move during the next twoyears. For those planning to move within the area, housing conditions are by farthe most important reason. The reasons for moving to another area are more com-plex, and include a desire for a better neighbourhood or services, work opportuni-ties, or to be near relatives. Rural to urban migration will continue in the near future,but at a very modest rate. Amman was by far the most common destination, butmost planned moves are urban to urban.

The Dwelling

The House as a Social IdealOne of the most widely shared social values in Jordan is the ideal of owning a fam-ily house. Families will save and plan for years to buy a piece of land on which thefuture house can be built. If this dream is realised, the ideal house design makes itpossible to expand the dwelling to accommodate a growing family or a three-gen-eration household living together. Those who are unable to buy land in the citycentre may move to an urban fringe area where land is more affordable, or scale downtheir dream to that of buying an apartment. They may seek loans from relatives orbanks and deprive themselves of some modern conveniences in order to pay backthe debt.

As Jordan is a country with modest social security guarantees and limitedpublic recreational facilities, the home will serve as a reservoir of family wealth anda refuge of security and comfort. The household will spend much of its leisure timethere, exchanging visits or in indoor family activities. So they will pay great atten-tion to the home and neighbourhood environment. The neighbourhood will pro-vide easy access to a mosque or church, shops and schools; the air and water will beclean, and the area safe for children to play.

This social ideal of the house is founded on two assumptions which are sobasic that they are usually left unspoken. The first is a commitment on the part of

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the family, to plan, save, and improve. The second is a commitment by the publicauthorities, to provide for a healthy environment and to ensure that the ideal willremain within reach for most of the population. In this chapter we will examine towhat extent – and for whom – the dream has come true.

Dwelling Types and NeighbourhoodsIn figure 3.1 we see the mixture of dwellings found in each type of neighbourhood.As shown in the “All Neighbourhoods” bar at the top, the overwhelming majorityof Jordanians (over 98 percent) live in permanent, substantial housing in the formof apartments, dars, or villas. There is relatively little of the improvised squatter-type housing found in the poorer areas of many developing countries. This con-clusion is reinforced by the survey data on construction materials used in the dwell-ing. The most common building materials are brick (55 percent of all dwellings),followed by cement or concrete (25 percent), cut stone (11 percent), and a combi-nation of cut stone and cement (6 percent). Although the housing stock in someareas is old and poorly maintained, only 2 percent of all dwellings are made ofimpermanent materials such as cloth, asbestos board, or wood. In part that is dueto the high structural standards enforced in city building codes. At the time of the1994 Census, two-thirds of the nation’s occupied housing units were less than 20years old and only 13 percent were more than 30 years old (DOS 1997, vol. I: 61).

Figure 3.1 Percentage of households in different types of dwelling, by neighbourhood(n= 5919)

Although all types of Jordanian neighbourhood contain a mixture of dwellings, mostareas are dominated by Dars (the traditional house) or a mixture of dars and apart-ments. Dar housing is certainly the most widespread – it makes up a substantial

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portion of all types of neighbourhood – but only 42 percent of the sample house-holds live in such houses. Across all types of neighbourhood, 55 percent of the house-holds are apartment dwellers. Apartments account for two-thirds of all housing inurban residential areas, and are common even in refugee camps and rural or semi-urban residential areas.

Villa housing makes up about 1 percent of the residential neighbourhoodsin both urban and rural areas. Villas are sometimes concentrated in exclusive areas,but more often they are found in areas dominated by apartments or dar housing.Hut and barrack dwellings, which are generally of low quality and made of imper-manent materials, make up less than 1 percent of the sample. They are primarilyfound in farm areas, although they also appear in small numbers in other neigh-bourhoods. Other types of dwelling – tents, or buildings primarily intended forwork, storage and other uses – accounted for about 1 percent of the sample, andappear mostly in farm areas.

Neighbourhoods in the JLCS

Many of the analyses in this chapter break down findings by type of neigh-bourhood. Because neighbourhoods are often quite difficult to classify in areliable way, we use a simple system that brings in the urban-to-rural dimen-sion while recognising the special characteristics of certain areas:

Urban Residential neighbourhoods: These are located entirely in urban ar-eas and contain a mixture of older or newer dar, apartment and villa housing.Seventy-two per cent of all households in the JLCS sample live in such areas.The category also includes a very small number of households living in indus-trial areas.

Refugee Camps: The neighbourhood is defined by the camp’s formal bound-aries, and does not include any surrounding squatter settlements. Almost all(96%) of the camp dwellers are in urban areas, and they make up about 5percent of the sample population.

Rural and semi-urban residential areas: This category covers housing foundin small-town and village areas, as well as the sparsely-populated areas on theouter fringes of cities where much spontaneous settlement has taken place.Ninety-five per cent of this group are rural by Department of Statistics defini-tion, and they comprise 19 percent of the sample.

Farm areas: As the name implies, most of the land in these local areas is usedfor agriculture. Of the farm-area households 81 percent are in rural places byDepartment of Statistics definition, and they make up about 3 percent of allhouseholds in the sample.

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Of course this broad classification of dwellings does not take into account differ-ences in age, size, or structural condition. Many neighbourhoods are more variedthan they would appear to be from figure 3.1, and provide niches for a variety ofhouseholds, in terms of income, occupation, size, and stage in the family cycle.

The distribution of housing types varies somewhat by geographical area, asshown in figure 3.2. The most obvious difference – the proportions of dar/villa andapartment housing – largely reflects differences in urbanisation and land values.Amman Zarqa and Irbid, for example, have significantly higher proportions of apart-ments. However, figure 3.2 also shows that two regions (Balqa/ Madaba and theSouth) had relatively high proportions of households living in impermanent hous-ing such as tents, huts or barracks, or other dwellings. These other forms of hous-ing made up about 5 percent of the sample in Madaba and Ma’an governorates and10 percent or more in Balqa and Aqaba.

Figure 3.2 Main housing types by region (n= 5919)

Vacant HousingHigh vacancy rates have been a feature of Jordan’s housing market since the 1970’s,and vacancies remain high. For all areas combined, the JLCS found a gross vacan-cy rate1 of 11 percent, the same as was reported in the National Housing Surveycarried out in 1986 (DOS, 1987). Although urban areas have a lower percentageof vacant units (9 percent, compared to 16 percent in rural areas), two-thirds of allvacancies are urban and nearly 40 percent are located in Amman governorate.

1 As defined in the JLCS, the gross vacancy rate includes all residential dwellings vacant forany reason, but does not include units planned or under construction.

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The JLCS did not collect extensive information about vacant units, but Struyk’s(1988) analysis of the National Housing Survey data suggests that there are threedistinct types of vacant housing. One type of consists of units which are being keptoff the market for family members living outside the country. A second component,found mostly in rural areas, consists of older units which have been retired fromthe active housing stock as households build new higher-quality living quarters forthemselves. A third element is housing that is built on a speculative basis, as opposedto having purchasers or tenants committed before the unit is built. Jordan’s largestock of empty housing is clearly a waste of scarce resources, considering the highlevels of overcrowding that exist (discussed below). Stuyk suggests two types ofreform to reduce vacancy rates. One is to reduce the amount of housing built forfuture use by making alternative forms of investment — such as long-term savingscertificates — more attractive for middle-class households. The second is to pro-mote changes in the tenancy laws, which currently make it extremely difficult toremove sitting tenants. If owners are confident that they can regain possession whenneeded, many units that are now held vacant would be released into the rentalmarket.

Ownership of the DwellingHome ownership is an important part of the Jordanian housing ideal, and in fact itis quite widespread in the population, as illustrated in figure 3.3. Overall, 62 per-cent of the survey households owned or were buying their dwellings, and of those,four-fifths owned their houses with no debt. Only 28 percent were renters, concen-trated mainly in apartments.2 Almost all rental properties are privately owned. Theremaining 10 percent of households occupied their homes with no payment of cashrent. Of this group, about two-thirds were living in dwellings owned by relatives;the remainder lived in housing owned by an employer (about 2 percent of the sam-ple) or had other arrangements (1 percent). As might be expected, dars, villas andtents had very high rates of family ownership, but even among apartment dwellersthe majority were owner-occupiers. Hut and barrack dwellers and those in the Otherhousing category did not rent, and were the most likely to receive housing inexchange for work.

2The proportion of renters given here is consistent with the 1994 Census, but is higher thanDoS statistics for dwelling units. In the1992 Income and Expenditure survey, for example, 70%of the dwelling units were owned and 25% rented (Jordan Department of Statistics, 1992:34). This is because the JLCS measured ownership as a percentage of all households, not asproportions of the housing stock. Vacant units – which are usually owned – were not included.

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Figure 3.3 Owning and renting: Percentage of households by type of dwelling

Home ownership is fairly well distributed across different social and economic seg-ments of the population. It is more common in rural areas (75 percent, versus 58percent of all urban households), and among families with older household heads(78 percent for heads aged 46 and above, versus 50 percent for others), but is foundin equal proportions of refugee and non-refugee families. In view of the experienceof other highly urbanised countries, it is particularly surprising that home owner-ship is so similar among richer and poorer income groups. This is illustrated in fig-ure 3.4, which shows the distribution of ownership for low, middle and high incomehouseholds.

Figure 3.4 Owning and renting: Percentage of households by income group (n= 5561)

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The proportion of renters is nearly identical in all income groups, ranging from 27percent to 29 percent . Although high income households are more likely to own(67 percent, versus 61 percent in middle and 57 percent in low income groups),lower-income households are more likely to occupy their living quarters withoutpaying cash rent. There definitely are differences in the quality and size of richerand poorer people’s dwellings, but the current broad distribution of home owner-ship is a positive sign. Housing is an important source of household wealth, andprovides incentives for savings and improvements.

However, maintaining equal access to home ownership has become moredifficult as Jordan shifts from a rural-agricultural to an urban-services oriented econ-omy. The proportion of family owners has fallen by 3 to 4 per cent since the 1979Census. Rising land prices, low-density zoning and high building standards havemade it extremely expensive to build new houses or extend existing dwellings. Theproblem is complicated by a shortage of long-term mortgage financing and restric-tions on the kinds of construction that are eligible for loans. The high proportionof households who own without debt is a positive thing in many ways. But it alsoreflects the common practice of saving to buy land, and then saving for more yearsto afford to build. Informal financing from relatives and building materials suppliershelps to bridge the affordability gap, but these options are less available to lowincome households.

Number of Rooms in the Living Quarters, and OvercrowdingWhether owners or renters, many families must put up with crowded living condi-tions to stay in houses they can afford. In the survey, housing was measured by thenumber of rooms rather than square meters. By this ‘social’ measure of space, apart-ments and dar housing are very similar in size, with a median number of 3 rooms,and 2 rooms used for sleeping. Villas are much larger, with a median of 6 roomsand 3 sleeping rooms, but all other types of housing contain only one room onaverage. There are almost no differences between urban and rural areas.

More importantly, there is not much variation in the size of available hous-ing: 79 percent of all dars and 82 percent of all apartments had between two andfour rooms, not counting kitchen, bathroom and hallways. The traditional ideal isto construct houses that can be expanded as the family grows. However, that hasbecome much more difficult to do as land and building costs rise, and high-densityapartments replace dars as the most common form of housing. The result, as wecan see from table 3.1, is that almost all families live in dwellings of four rooms orless, regardless of the size of the family. Seventy-six per cent of all households and69 percent of all people in the sample lived in places with only one or two roomsused for sleeping.

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Table 3.1 Number of rooms in the living quarters, and rooms used for sleeping:Distribution by households and persons

latoTforebmuN

smooR

fotnecrePlla

sdlohesuoH

llafotnecrePsnosreP

forebmuNrofsmooR

gnipeelS

fotnecrePlla

sdlohesuoH

llafotnecrePsnosreP

1 8 4 1 33 32

2 91 71 2 34 64

3 33 33 3 02 62

4 62 92 4 3 4

eromro5 41 71 eromro5 1 1

The typical house or apartment is not large; according to 1994 Census estimates,the median size of dwelling unit is about 100 square meters, including kitchen,hallways, toilets and storage areas (DOS 1997, vol. I: 285). Overcrowding is mostsevere among families with dependent children and extended families. For the pop-ulation as a whole, there is an average of 2 persons per room and 3.3 persons perroom used for sleeping. Among families with any children under 14 years of age,however, 32 percent have 3 or more persons per room and 42 percent have 4 or morepersons per sleeping room. Among extended families, 38 percent live with more than3 persons per room and 4 per sleeping room. For refugees and displaced persons asa whole, occupancy per room is the same as for the non-refugee population. How-ever, refugees living in camps do suffer from serious overcrowding: 40 percent ofall camp refugees have 3 or more persons per room and 44 percent have 4 or morepersons per room used for sleeping.

In some cases overcrowding is a temporary thing, to be endured while thechildren are growing up and the extended family is still together, or until larger liv-ing quarters can be found. Crowding is greatest during the middle years of the familycycle, when the household head is 35 to 54 years old. In other cases, the size of roomscan compensate for having a small number of rooms. But the fact remains that thereis a serious mismatch between the narrow range of dwelling sizes that are availableor affordable, and the much broader variation in family size that exists in Jordan.This is illustrated quite clearly in figure 3.5, which shows the average number ofpersons per room for different sizes of household. The larger the household, the morecramped are their living conditions.

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Figure 3.5 Persons per room and per room used for sleeping by size of household (n= 5918)

The reasons for overcrowding are complex, but some observers see it as the prod-uct of a segmented and inefficient housing market complicated by high vacancyrates. Several approaches have been suggested to increase the supply of affordablehousing. They include changes in zoning and lending regulations to allow higherdensities, owner-builder support, relaxing some provisions of the building codestandards, exempting new units from rent control, and regularising tenure arrange-ments (World Bank 1994: 43-44; Sims 1991; Bisharat and Tewfik 1985).

Amenities and SanitationFor many people, the most basic test of a well-functioning government is its abilityto provide basic services such as water and sanitation. Jordan has faced difficultchallenges in this respect: it is not a country naturally rich in water, agricultural landor mineral wealth, and it has absorbed three major waves of immigration in additionto its own substantial population growth. In spite of these barriers, the country hasbeen able to attain a good standard of housing amenities and infrastructure.

This is illustrated in figure 3.6, which compares urban and rural householdson ten indicators of housing and sanitation facilities as reported in the 1996 JLCSsurvey. Although rural areas lag behind the cities on some indicators, we should keepin mind that they represent only about 20 percent of the population.

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Figure 3.6 Percent of households with housing and sanitation amenities, by Urban/ rural lo-cation (n= 5912)

In figure 3.6 we see that over 90 percent of all households have a separate kitchenroom in their living quarters, but a much smaller proportion (64 percent) have aprivate bath or shower. Another 2 percent share with another household, but 34percent have no access to bathing facilities in their living quarters. Toilets inside theliving quarters are much more common, and nearly all are connected to a municipalsewage system (54 percent) or septic tank (39 percent). The high proportion of septictanks is perhaps a sign of the over-strained capacities of many local infrastructureauthorities. Where there are no resources to extend municipal connections, homeowners make do by installing their own waste systems. However only 7 percent ofthe population must resort to using latrines or other arrangements.

About two-thirds of all households have their garbage collected, but another22 percent - primarily people in urban apartments – dispose of solid waste in openpublic containers. About 6 percent of households burn their garbage or dispose ofit in other ways.

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Considering the obstacles it has faced, Jordan has done an impressive job ofproviding water for residential areas. In the 1961 Census only 49 percent of the pop-ulation had access to piped water from any source, and in 1979 it was 87 percent.Today the national average is about 95 percent: 88 percent of the urban and three-quarters of the rural households have water piped into their living quarters, andanother 9 percent (not shown) have access to piped water in the building or yard.Tanker trucks are the next most common supplier, serving as the main source for 2percent to 3 percent of the population and the backup water source for 37 percent.

Most importantly, the incidence of unsafe water supplies is extremely low.Roughly 98 percent of the sample households have access to water from municipalsystems or tanker trucks, and only 2 percent used wells, springs, boreholes, riversor canals as their main supply. However, 14 percent of all households use them asan alternative source if the main supply fails. An additional 18 percent mentionedmiscellaneous secondary water sources, including borrowing from neighbours.Although most wells and boreholes are safe, this high level of occasional use con-firms that secondary water supplies must be carefully monitored to prevent healthproblems.3

Fortunately, over 80 percent of households report that their main supply isfairly stable, with problems occurring “Almost never” or “from time to time,” mostlyduring the summer. Public (piped) water sources are among the least reliable, with17 percent of the users reporting weekly or more frequent interruptions. Wells andboreholes are the most reliable sources.

Electrical power services are very widespread, with 99 percent of the urbanand 88 percent of the rural households connected. Electricity is primarily used forlighting and appliances, not heating or cooking. In general the electrical supply isstable; 2 percent of the urban and 15 percent of rural respondents report daily orweekly interruptions. Lastly, 97 percent of the homes have some form of roomheating in the winters. The types of fuel used for heating and cooking will be de-scribed in a later section.

Who Has Amenities, and Who Does Not?Although housing and sanitation amenities are widely available for the populationas a whole, some areas and groups of people are much better served than others. Toexplore this issue we have developed an index that includes seven of the ten amenities

3 In the UN’s Human Development Report, safe water is defined as reasonable access to treatedsurface water or untreated but uncontaminated water from springs, sanitary wells and pro-tected boreholes (1997: 239). The JLCS could not apply this definition directly, due to relia-bility problems in asking about water treatment and contamination. However, the UN esti-mate for safe water access in Jordan is identical to the JLCS, at 98 percent.

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discussed above: independent kitchen, private bath or shower, inside toilet,connection to sewage network or septic tank, garbage collected, water piped intothe living quarters, and electricity connection. Thus, the highest possible score onthe index is 7, and the lowest is 0.4 For the Jordanian population as a whole theaverage amenities index score is 5.8 out of 7.

Since the average score is so high, figure 3.7 presents the index results in aslightly different way. For each group, it shows the percentages of households whichhave all amenities, and those which are lacking one, two, or three or more ameni-ties on the index. For example, for all groups in the population, 37 percent of house-holds have all amenities, another 37 percent have six of the seven, 14 percent havefive, and 12 percent have four or fewer amenities.

Figure 3.7 Number of amenities by type of dwelling, neighbourhood and family (n= 5867)

In the first part of figure 3.7 we see that there are large differences in amenities fordifferent types of housing. Dar, apartment and villa dwellers are all served at a fair-ly high standard; if one or more amenities is lacking, it is generally garbage collec-tion or a private bath or shower. Toilet, sewage, water and electricity are rarely absent.The situation is quite different for the 2 percent of the sample living in huts, barracks,4Index reliability coefficients: Alpha= .63; standardized item alpha= .70. For more informa-tion about index reliability measures, see Appendix 2.

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tents and other types of accommodation. Virtually all households in this group arelacking most facilities, and in fact the average number of amenities is approximately1.0. This does not mean that such households are exposed to life-threatening con-ditions – for example, they may use sanitary covered latrines and drink safe waterfrom a tanker truck or public tap – but it does highlight the stark contrast betweentheir housing conditions and those of the majority.

The second group of bars in figure 3.7 shows amenities by type of neigh-bourhood. Urban residential areas are well-served and refugee camp housing some-what less so. (However, refugee and displaced households outside the camps havethe same standard of amenities as non-refugees.) Services decline in rural residen-tial neighbourhoods, and drop off sharply in farm areas. Among the governorates(not shown), Amman, Zarqa and Irbid have the highest levels of amenities onaverage; Aqaba, Ma’an and Mafraq have the lowest. Balqa, Madaba, and Jerash haveslightly higher average scores, but 25 percent or more of their households lacked 3or more amenities. Lastly, we can see that – with one exception — all types of fam-ily enjoy roughly the same level of amenities on average. Single parents’ scores arelower than others, but not significantly so. The major exception is single-personhouseholds, which includes a higher proportion of workers living in non-standardaccommodation. Among low-income households, only 21 percent have all amen-ities, and 27 percent lack 3 or more. The corresponding figures for high-incomehouseholds (earning more than 2900 JD per year) are 47 percent and 5 percent.

In highlighting groups which are less well-served, we should not lose sightof the country’s strong overall record in providing the most essential infrastructurefor most segments of the population. At 83 litres per day, Jordan’s per capita homewater use is lower than most countries in the Middle East, but by UN standards ithas the highest rate of access to safe drinking water among the region’s non-indus-trialised countries, and the third highest rate of access to sanitary amenities. Its percapita electricity consumption is less than the regional average, but the proportionof households with electricity connections is among the highest (Salameh 1995;UNDP 1997: 164, 196).

The Indoor EnvironmentAlthough most households have essential amenities, the indoor environment is notalways comfortable, as shown in figure 3.8. Over 60 percent of all households saytheir living quarters are humid or damp, and nearly half find their homes cold ordifficult to heat in winter. Housing in Jordan is relatively well-designed to deal withthe summer heat: only one fifth of the sample complain of poor ventilation, and38 percent say their homes become uncomfortably hot. In general, dar and hut orbarrack dwellers suffer most from extremes of heat, cold and humidity. In contrast,

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on most measures the small sample of tent dwellers reported the lowest discomfortscores of any group, including villa owners. In terms of neighbourhood, people inurban and rural or semi-rural residential neighbourhoods report comfort levels closeto the national average. Farm areas have fewer problems, while refugee camps haveby far the highest proportions of households suffering from indoor damp (75percent), winter cold (65 percent) and summer heat (53 percent).

Figure 3.8 Nuisances and disturbances in the indoor environment. Percentage of all house-holds (n= 5900)

The last three indicators in figure 3.8 deal with man-made nuisances and distur-bances. Smoking is extremely widespread in Jordan, in both urban and rural areasand among higher and lower income groups. Over 60 percent of all householdsreport that people smoke regularly inside the living quarters. Although most homesare well-ventilated, this practice is likely to cause irritation and health problems,especially when we consider the high levels of overcrowding among families withchildren living at home (chapter 5).

Lastly, between 15 and 20 percent of the sample report disturbing levels ofnoise coming from either inside or outside the building. ‘Disturbing noise’ is definedhere as noise so loud that it is difficult to have a conversation indoors, occurringeither daily or occasionally. Fortunately, cases of disturbing noise every day wererelatively rare, occurring in about 7 percent of the sample. As shown in figure 3.8,most noise comes from outside sources such as traffic, markets and industry. Refu-gee camp dwellers were the most affected, with over one-third complaining of seri-ous noise daily or occasionally. However about 15 percent of all urban dwellers areaffected, especially those living in apartments.

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Household FuelsFor cooking, bottled propane gas is by far the most common energy source, usedin 96 percent of all households. Kerosene is the main cooking fuel for about 3 per-cent of the population, and wood or charcoal is used by 1 percent. These propor-tions have changed very little in the past 10 years. The small numbers of hut, bar-rack and tent dwellers are more likely to use fuels other than gas as their main cookingfuel, as are rural people generally, but in absolute terms the largest group of kero-sene users is urban dar dwellers. About 8 percent of the sample use more than onecooking fuel, usually a combination of gas and kerosene.

Figure 3.9 Energy sources used for room and water heating: All households

Gas is clean and convenient but somewhat expensive, and for that reason manyhouseholds turn to a variety of other energy sources for room and water heating.This is illustrated in figure 3.9. Kerosene is the most common fuel for room heat-ing, used by dar and apartment dwellers in both urban and rural areas. Dar,

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apartment and villa households also burn gas and diesel, and it appears that the useof gas has increased a great deal in the past 10 years. A 1986 survey by the Ministryof Energy and Mineral Resources (Aburas and Fromme 1991) found that liquid pro-pane was used by less than 2 percent of all households; by 1996 that proportionhad grown to nearly 20 percent. The market share of kerosene has fallen by a sim-ilar amount, from 82 percent to 66 percent. Wood or charcoal is primarily used infarm areas. Three percent of the sample – primarily low-income dar, apartment andhut or barrack households – have no room heating at all.

As in room heating, Jordanians use a wide variety of energy sources for heat-ing water. Here too gas has replaced kerosene. Gas is now the most common fuelin both urban and rural residential areas, growing from 37 percent to 67 percent ofall households as kerosene declined from 40 percent to 23 percent. The proportionusing electricity for water heating has doubled since 1986, and solar energy increasedby 3 percent, primarily in urban residential areas. The share of wood and charcoalremained constant, at 4 percent; for the most part, these appear to be the samehouseholds that use wood for room heating. Kerosene is much more common inrefugee camps than in other urban areas, for both room and water heating. Aboutone-third of all households use more than one type of fuel to heat rooms in winter,and one-fifth use multiple fuels to heat water.

The NeighbourhoodFor many families the character of the neighbourhood or hara is even more impor-tant to the quality of life than the house they live in. The hara is the centre ofeveryday social life, the setting for visits to relatives and friends, the mosque orchurch, shopping, the children’s schools, and often the workplace. Many peoplespend a large part of their day out of doors and in the neighbourhood, and theenvironment makes a difference. In this section we look at the characteristics ofJordanian neighbourhoods – their services and cultural features, infrastructure, andenvironmental nuisances and hazards. The JLCS survey’s system for classifyingneighbourhoods is described in the section on Dwellings and Neighbourhoods atthe beginning of this chapter.

Neighbourhood ServicesSince only one household out of four owns its own car or truck, it is important tobe within easy walking distance of essential services. In the Jordan Living ConditionsSurvey respondents were given a list of services and were asked which of them couldbe reached within five to ten minutes’ walking distance from the house. The answers

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suggest that many basic services are widely available locally, but services which areused less often usually require a longer walk or a trip by car or public transport.

Figure 3.10 Percentage of households with access to local services, by neighbourhood(n= 5919)

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As we can see from figure 3.10, people in most neighbourhoods can fulfil their dailyspiritual and physical needs quite close to home: almost 90 percent are near a mosqueor church and a grocery store. Basic schools are also widely available, even in ruralresidential areas and to a lesser extent in farm areas. In part this is due to the Min-istry of Education’s efforts to extend compulsory basic education to rural areas byestablishing schools wherever there are 10 or more students in the appropriate agegroups. Secondary schools show a similar pattern of equal coverage, although theyare more widely scattered due to the much larger investment needed per school.Some kind of health centre – a government or private hospital, primary health centreor UNRWA clinic – is in easy reach for almost to 60 percent of the population. (Formore information about the government’s school-building programs and healthfacilities, see chapters 4 and 5.)

The other five services shown in figure 3.10 are not so widely available. Postoffices and banks are in walking distance of only 30 percent to 40 percent of allhouseholds. Here we see quite clearly the difference between government and pri-vate services: post offices are slightly more available for people in rural residentialareas (mostly because rural towns are smaller, and the cities have relatively few branchpost offices), while banks are quite rare in rural areas. About 20 percent of the pop-ulation have a police station nearby, and only 10 percent have a local public libraryor cultural centre.

Refugee camps have better access to local services than any other type ofneighbourhood. Access is especially good for some of the less-common services, suchas health centres, post offices, banks, police stations and cultural centres. Of coursethis is due in large part to the activities of the Jordanian government and UNRWA,but it also reflects the high densities of the camps. Although it makes for crowdedand uncomfortable living conditions, high densities do make it economically fea-sible to provide a wide variety of services in a small area. Refugees and displacedpersons living outside the camps have roughly the same access to local services asthe non-refugee population.

Taken as a whole, figure 3.10 reflects a clear sense of national priorities.Through a combination of public and private sector activities, basic day-by-dayneeds for food, education, health and spiritual comfort can be met within the harafor a majority of the population, regardless of income or family type. In other anal-yses (not shown) we found that high and low income groups differed by 5 percentor less in their access to all services except secondary education and banks. All fam-ily types were equally well-covered except for one-person households, which hadsignificantly lower levels of service. For basic services the great barrier to equality isdistance, as shown in the large differences between farm areas and the rest of thepopulation. However, much remains to be done to provide access to cultural and

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intellectual resources. As we will see in a later section, this is the aspect of neigh-bourhood life that most people are unhappy about.

Paved RoadsAcross all types of dwelling and neighbourhood, 81 percent of the households havea paved road to their houses; another 10 percent have a partly-paved road, and 9percent have no paved road. As we might expect, the situation is quite different inurban and rural areas: 86 percent of the households in urban residential areas andrefugee camps have fully-paved roads, but the proportion drops to 66 percent forrural residential areas, and 49 percent for farm areas. Roughly one-quarter of all darhouseholds, three-quarters of the hut or barrack dwellers and virtually all tent dwell-ers have unpaved or partially-paved roads to the house.

Air, Water and Ground PollutionThere is growing concern about the environment in Jordan, as in many other partsof the Middle East. Jordan has a high rate of population growth, and roughly halfof its population is concentrated in the Amman-Zarqa metropolitan area. Climat-ic conditions, increases in urbanisation and high-density living, the growing num-bers of cars and trucks, new industries and older ‘rural’ practices (such as keepinganimals in the city) have all contributed to reducing air quality. Greater wealth andan expanding market economy have brought increases of 7 percent to 10 percentper year in the volume of traffic in some areas, as well as new forms of packagingand litter. Jordan has fewer water resources than any other country in the region,5

and these sources have come under extra strain from human and animal waste andindustrial discharges.

In recent years Jordan has stepped up efforts to deal with environmentalproblems. It adopted a national environmental strategy in 1991, followed by thecomprehensive Environment Protection Law of 1995 and the establishment of anindependent Public Agency for Environmental Protection. Government and non-governmental organisations have been active in promoting public awareness ofenvironmental concerns through education programmes and the mass media.Despite these positive steps, practical implementation and enforcement of the lawwas still at a very rudimentary stage at the time of the JLCS survey (see Jreisat 1997).

5 Estimated at 244 cubic meters per person in 1995; the ESCWA regional average was 2,227cubic meters. Only the West Bank and Gaza have fewer water resources, at 80 cubic metersper capita (ESCWA, 1996: 195).

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To learn about people’s perceptions of environmental problems, the JLCS asked aseries of questions about specific nuisances in the area immediately around the house,and more general questions about air, water and ground pollution in the district.figure 3.11 summarises some of the results.

Figure 3.11 Percent of households exposed to outdoor pollution, by neighbourhood (n= 5918)

In total, between 15 and 25 percent of the respondents were bothered by the fivespecific problems shown here. The exception was dust and smells from industry,mentioned by 5 percent. Although Jordan’s polluting industries are often locatednear heavily populated areas, they are few in number. Dust and exhaust fumes fromcars was a fairly common complaint in the cities, as were animal smells in rural areasand some urban neighbourhoods. One out of six respondents said that the area wasnot clean due to garbage and waste dumped in the streets and empty spaces, andonly 13 percent said that their area was ‘very clean’. Public tidiness appears to be an

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important concern: of all the environmental measures in the survey, this one hadby far the highest correlation with residents’ general satisfaction ratings concern-ing outdoor pollution and cleanliness. In addition to the measures shown, 3 per-cent of all households complained of smells from nearby sewage treatment plantsand about half – in all types of neighbourhood – were affected by general dustpollution.

The survey also asked whether, in the respondent’s opinion, there was ‘sig-nificant pollution of the air, water, or ground in this district of Jordan.’ As we cansee from figure 3.11, a clear majority of people in urban residential areas and refu-gee camps believe there is serious air pollution in their district, and so do nearlyhalf of those in urban fringe or rural residential areas and one-third of the farmpopulation. About half the sample say there is significant water pollution, with avery similar pattern of responses by neighbourhood, and about thirty percent thinkthere is ground pollution.

In interpreting these findings we should keep in mind that survey methodscapture only the subjective experience of the respondent. None of the pollutionmeasures was quantified in any way, and few people would have enough informa-tion to answer accurately even if they were. (Twenty-five per cent of the respond-ents simply answered ‘Don’t know’ to the question about ground pollution; non-response rates were 7 percent for the question about air pollution, and 5 percenton water pollution.) Thus it is difficult to draw conclusions about objective condi-tions based on general opinion questions.6

Clearly there are high levels of general concern about air and water quality,and this concern is greatest among people in urban areas. Complaints about airpollution are correlated with exposure to general dust pollution (which is mentionedby about half the population everywhere), traffic, and smells from garbage andanimals. Beyond that, it becomes harder to relate responses to facts ‘on the ground.’For example, much larger proportions of villa dwellers report air and water pollu-tion than do hut and barrack dwellers; people who use piped water report more waterpollution than those who take their water from natural sources such as wells or rivers.

Though it is possible that more privileged people are in fact exposed to higherlevels of pollution, the household’s environmental awareness also plays an impor-tant part. In logistic regression analyses of the pollution questions (not shown), wefound that better-educated and higher-income households were more likely to voiceconcerns about air, ground and water quality. This remained true even when theeffects of dwelling, neighbourhood, paved road, water source and governorate werecontrolled for statistically. An implication for policy makers is that Jordan’s success

6 For more information about the hazards of survey research on environmental questions,see Nishihara 1997: 36-45.

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in expanding education opportunities will lead to greater environmental awarenessand greater public support for reducing pollution, even if present conditions do notget any worse.

Satisfaction, and Plans for MovingA majority of people say they are satisfied with their housing conditions. Except incases of reconstruction after war or natural disaster, housing researchers find thisto be true all over the world. Those who have become accustomed to living in acertain way will say they are happy with it; others are hesitant to complain to thenice young stranger who has come to the house to interview. But for people wholive in ‘objectively’ difficult conditions, housing satisfaction can also come from asense that things have got better, or that conditions for the family will improve. Onthis count there are good reasons for many Jordanians to be satisfied, at least onsome dimensions of housing and neighbourhood quality. Since the mid-1980s therehave been a large number of urban upgrading projects carried out by the Housingand Urban Development Corporation and other Jordanian agencies, some withassistance from the World Bank and UNRWA. From 1984 to 1996, for example,HUDC created about 19,000 units of low and middle-income housing and pro-vided infrastructure for 8 million square meters of residential plots. Total construc-tion in the public and private sector averaged 4.2 million square meters per yearfrom 1990 to 1996, with roughly three-quarters of it going for residential uses(HUDC 1997; Association of Jordan Engineers 1997).

Satisfaction With the DwellingFigure 3.12 illustrates the degree of satisfaction reported for six specific measuresof housing quality. Satisfaction was measured on a five-point scale. Looking at thegeneral pattern for all six measures we find that people are generally happy with theirdwellings: roughly half the sample think their arrangements are very or rather sat-isfactory, another 10 percent to 15 percent say they are acceptable, and 15 percentto 20 percent are dissatisfied to some degree. However, there are some differencesamong the measures that are worth noting.

Two of the most important factors - housing cost and living space – getrelatively low approval ratings. Nearly 40 percent of the sample say these aspectsare unsatisfactory, or at best ‘acceptable’. The concern about space is certainlyunderstandable, given what we have seen about levels of overcrowding in figure 3.5.As might be expected, couples with children, extended families, apartment dwell-ers, hut or barrack and refugee camp dwellers give the lowest ratings, with 25 per-cent or more of each group saying they are rather or very dissatisfied.

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Dissatisfaction about the cost of housing is lower in rural areas, but it seems to bequite evenly distributed in the urban population, at about 22 percent. (Some of thefactors that may contribute to high housing costs are discussed in the section onowning and renting, above.) Although there are exceptions – villa dwellers areespecially unhappy and hut/ barrack dwellers are quite satisfied! – there are virtual-ly no differences in average cost ratings among broad income groups. Concernsabout affordability are not concentrated among the poor. This is interesting, becauselower income households do spend more of their money on housing.7 It is perhapsdue to the fact that most households try to live within their means and will sacri-fice size or quality of the dwelling – temporarily at least – to reduce cost. It mayalso be related to the ownership patterns illustrated in figure 3.4: similar propor-tions of all income groups own without debt, or rent. Those who rent usually havestable costs due to rent control, and a larger proportion of vulnerable low-incomepeople sublet from relatives or occupy without cash rent for other reasons. Dissat-isfaction does increase somewhat among households in the peak child-raising years,when crowding is most acute.

Water supply was also a matter of some concern, particularly for people inrural and semi-urban areas. The 6 percent of the sample who took their main watersupply from public taps, tanker trucks or natural sources had levels of dissatisfac-tion two to three times as high as users of piped water. That is probably due to theinconvenience of those arrangements, because non-piped water sources are report-ed to be more stable. Among users of piped water, the most dissatisfied were thosewho experienced daily or weekly interruptions in supply.

7 In the 1992 Income and Expenditure survey, households with total expenditures of less than1200 JD per year spent an average of 27% on housing and related expenses. Housing repre-sented 20% of all expenses for the 1200 to 2999 JD group, and 15% for households with totalexpenditures of 3000 JD or more (Department of Statistics, 1992: 237-239).

Figure 3.12 Satisfaction with the Dwelling: All households (n= 5917)

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Factors associated with noise, the indoor environment and housing privacy allreceived somewhat higher satisfaction ratings. As we have seen (figure 3.8), disturb-ing noise is not particularly common. Problems with cold, heat, humidity andsmoking are quite widespread, but they do not seem to be serious enough to makepeople dissatisfied. The same is true for privacy: even among the most overcrowdedhouseholds, two-thirds or more say they are satisfied with that aspect of the dwell-ing. Although it may seem remarkable to Westerners, this finding is quite consist-ent with cultural traditions that emphasise privacy between households, as opposedto the privacy of individuals within a household.

The JLCS also asked a question about overall satisfaction with housing con-ditions, and the patterns of answers is quite consistent with the specific items dis-cussed above. Overall, 82 percent of the respondents said they were very or rathersatisfied with their housing conditions, and 18 percent were dissatisfied. This isshown in figure 3.13, along with ratings broken out by type of dwelling and othervariables. The differences in overall satisfaction ratings are quite small, even amonggroups with quite different objective housing conditions. For example, people inother dwellings – huts or barracks, tents, and buildings used as workplaces – havemuch poorer standards by most measures, but they are equally satisfied. Low incomehouseholds (earning less than JD 1450 per year) are less satisfied than high incomepeople, but not by much. Other analyses by neighbourhood, family type, refugeestatus, education and other variables found few differences.

Figure 3.13 General satisfaction with housing, by type of dwelling, income, refugee camp,and overcrowding (n= 5919)

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In fact the only sizeable groups which were clearly less satisfied than the average wererefugee camp dwellers and households living at densities of 4 or more persons perroom. Camp dwellers have fewer amenities than other urban residents and face avariety of other problems, including extremes of hot and cold, noise, and overcrowd-ing. Data from the entire sample confirms that these last two factors – the amountof space, and quality of the indoor environment – are the strongest predictors of aperson’s overall contentment with his or her housing situation.8

Satisfaction With the NeighbourhoodSatisfaction with housing conditions is also closely linked to one’s feelings aboutthe neighbourhood. As we can see from figure 3.14, people tended to give highratings in response to the survey question about general satisfaction with the neigh-bourhood. Respondents were also happy about most of the specific features of theirhara, but not all; there is much more variation than we find in the assessment ofhousing conditions presented in figure 3.12.

Figure 3.14 Satisfaction with the neighbourhood: All households (n= 5908)

8 Pearson’s r = .548 for Satisfaction with housing space by General housing satisfaction; r = .444 for Indoor environment by General housing satisfaction. n= 5917, two-tailed p <.001for both variables. For more information about living conditions in refugee camps, seeArneberg, 1997; World Bank, 1994; and Helwa and Birch, 1994. Helwa and Birch’s findingsare generally similar to those found in the JLCS, but their respondents reported higher lev-els of dissatisfaction.

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Jordanian respondents give high approval ratings on two aspects of the neighbour-hood that are very important for family life, namely safety for children and distanceto relatives. Safety for children is highly correlated with the general security of theneighbourhood (not shown) and satisfaction about traffic levels. As we might expect,people in urban neighbourhoods are much more likely than rural residents to beconcerned about both traffic and children’s safety. However people in all areas tendto live near their kinsmen, and satisfaction about the distance to relatives is nearlyuniversal.

Attitudes about pollution and the environment were discussed earlier, butit is worth noting that this factor has by far the strongest correlation with respond-ents’ overall assessment of the hara.9 It is related to feelings about traffic and noise,but especially to the amount of trash and waste visible in the area.

Regarding local services, less than 15 percent of urban residents were dissat-isfied with public transport, and a majority found it very satisfactory. The situa-tion is quite different outside the cities, where distances are greater and less thanone household in five has a private car or truck. Nearly 30 percent of those in semi-urban, rural residential and farm areas rated public transport as unsatisfactory. Asimilar pattern holds for shopping and commerce: Jordan’s cities have an abundanceof local shops to meet everyday needs, and only 10 percent of urban residents ex-pressed any dissatisfaction. The proportion of dissatisfied customers was three timeshigher in rural neighbourhoods, although a majority of rural people still said theywere satisfied. Low income groups gave slightly lower ratings on shopping as wellas public transport. We will look at satisfaction with the availability of schools inthe next chapter, and health services are discussed in chapter 5.

As we can see from figure 3.14, respondents are much less happy about workor business opportunities and cultural institutions than they are about other aspectsof the hara. Unlike shopping and services, work and business opportunities receivesimilar ratings in urban and rural neighbourhoods. Lower-income and less educat-ed households tend to be less satisfied, as are single parents and refugee or displacedfamilies. Across all groups about 40 percent of the population are uneasy, althoughit is not clear whether they are dissatisfied with work opportunities in general orwould simply like to work closer to home.

Libraries and cultural centres are seldom available locally (figure 3.10), andpeople clearly care about that. Dissatisfaction is slightly higher in rural areas andlower in refugee camps (which are better served in this respect), but it is equallystrong among people of all educational backgrounds, incomes, and family types.

9 Pearson’s r = .432 for Satisfaction with outdoor pollution / cleanliness by General satisfac-tion with the hara. n= 5891, two-tailed p <.001. See Appendix 3 for more information aboutbivariate correlations.

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In some ways this is a positive sign, as it shows that Jordanians of all kinds are eagerfor new learning and cultural opportunities. It is clear that public or private effortsin this direction would be met with great enthusiasm.

Plans for MovingRegardless of how satisfied they are with the house and neighbourhood, a great manyhouseholds will change their living quarters at some point. Some of these movesare due to life-cycle changes over time, as young people marry and establish newhouseholds, or move into larger quarters to make room for children. Others movesare related to career advancement and social mobility, a desire to rejoin relatives, toescape a bad environment, or a simple need to find work. For nomadic peoples, itis a way of life. Thus a move can mean quite different things in social terms; it canbe a sign that the household is putting down deeper roots in the family and com-munity, or it can signal a break with the past and a need to build new social ties.

The JLCS survey asked a series of questions about the household’s plans tomove during the next two years, either within the local area or to another area.10

For the sample as a whole, 11 percent of the households are planning to move locally,and another 8 percent expect to move outside the area. However different segmentsof the population have quite different attitudes about moving. On the one hand,groups such as farm households, single parents, extended families and those witholder or less educated household heads are less likely than the average to want tomove. At the other extreme are the types of people shown in figure 3.15.

Some of these groups are rather small, and the same household can belongto several of them. Nonetheless, the figure provides a good overview of the mostmobile population segments in Jordan. People who are dissatisfied with their dwell-ing or hara are the most likely movers; as we have seen, many of these people arerefugee camp residents or those living at high densities per room. Married coupleswith children under the age of 14 are the main ‘life-cycle movers,’ and make up alarge part of the population. Other mobile groups include households in which thehead is unemployed and looking for work, and those with greater financial or careeroptions due to the head’s higher education. Refugees outside the camps were some-what more likely to consider moving (not shown; 21 percent, versus 16 percent fornon-refugees), but almost all these moves were local or within the same governate.

10 The term ‘other area’ was not defined precisely in the questionnaire, but most respond-ents understood it as moving to another city, town, village or rural district, or moving to adifferent area of a larger city, such as Amman or Irbid. We should also keep in mind that thesurvey captures plans or expectations about moving, rather than actual behaviour. So theseresponses probably overstate the amount of mobility that is taking place, but they remainuseful for understanding the motives and dynamics of moving.

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Figure 3.16 offers a more detailed look at the motivations for moving. As might beexpected, housing aspects are the main reason given by the vast majority of peopleplanning to move within their local area. About 10 percent cite neighbourhoodaspects, a measure which includes the outdoor environment and captures aspira-tions for a cleaner, more suburban or more prestigious living area. Another 10 per-cent seek better access to schools, health or other services, or a better social envi-ronment – which in many cases means living closer to relatives. About 4 percentwere moving because they had bought land or property.

For those planning to move away from the local area the pattern of reasonsis quite different. Housing aspects are still important, but not overwhelmingly so.Much larger proportions of respondents are seeking a better neighbourhood or serv-ices, and believe that they must leave their present area to do so. Relocation for workopportunities becomes a more important factor, as does the social environment andproximity to friends and relatives.

In a separate analysis (not shown), we examined the reasons for not moving.The question was asked of all respondents who said they were dissatisfied with theirhousing conditions or hara but said they had no plans to move. Multiple answerswere allowed, so the percentages add up to more than 100. The most common rea-sons for staying were that housing costs were reasonable (36 percent), or the familyowned the dwelling (38 percent). Twenty per cent cited schools, health or otherservices, and 9 percent found the location convenient for work. Sixteen per centstayed to be close to relatives or friends.

Figure 3.15 Going places: Groups with high proportions of households who plan to move

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Finally, figure 3.17 shows the most likely destinations of people who want to moveout of their local area. Clearly, most of Jordan’s internal migration is either withinor toward the major urban areas. Amman is the most common destination by far,mentioned by nearly 60 percent of all movers; Irbid and Zarqa account for a fur-ther 15 percent of all destinations. Slightly less than half of those who chose Ammanwere already living in some part of the governorate, so these flows represent inter-nal movement rather than net immigration. Another 33 percent of those whoselected Amman were living in nearby Zarqa.

Perhaps because of the improvements made to Jordan’s rural housing andinfrastructure, there are no signs of large migration flows from the countryside tothe cities in the near future. In the JLCS sample, rural people made up 21 percentof the population but accounted for only 14 percent of the prospective movers. How-ever, of the rural people who did plan to move outside the home area, about two-thirds cited Amman, Irbid or Zarqa governorates as their destination.

Figure 3.16 Reasons for moving within the area, or to another area (n= 1087)

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Figure 3.17 Destinations of urban and rural households planning to move out of their homeareas (n= 405)

Roughly 9 percent of the sample’s prospective movers mentioned destinations out-side Jordan. Of these, Palestine was by far the most common choice, followed byEgypt and the Gulf states. About 2 percent planned to move to Europe, the UnitedStates or Australia. There were no differences in the proportions of refugees and non-refugees who considered moving outside of Jordan.

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Chapter 4 Education

David Drury and Issa M. Nassar

Summary

Jordan has undertaken a series of wide-ranging reforms of its education system, andschool opportunities have expanded rapidly in the past 15 years. Illiteracy rates havefallen by half, to about 14 percent for the population as a whole, and an active school-building program has put a Basic school within walking distance of nearly 80 per-cent of all households. Ninety-five per cent of all children in the age groups eligi-ble for Basic school are currently enrolled, and 70 percent of those in the secondaryschool-aged population. The greatest gains have been for women, and girls actual-ly have higher enrolment rates than boys at some stages of education. Among theworking-aged population, 42 percent now have a secondary or higher education.Refugees have dropout rates and education levels similar to those of the non-refu-gee population, and higher rates of literacy.

However, many forms of inequality remain. Functional literacy is still rela-tively low for adult women in rural areas, even among women in their 20’s and 30’s.Basic and secondary school dropout rates are significantly higher for rural and lower-income children, and especially those from less-educated households. These fami-lies also have lower expectations for their children who are still in school, and thereare large differences in the expectations of parents who support and do not supporthigher education for women. There is a growing tendency for middle and upper-income families to send their children to private schools.

As part of its efforts to create a more skilled labour force, Jordan has placedspecial emphasis on vocational education in recent years. Currently about 20 per-cent of all secondary school students are enrolled in the Vocational stream. Low-income children, boys, and refugees have relatively high rates of vocationalenrolment; rural children are under-represented. Vocational education remains anunpopular choice among parents, although that may change now that it has becomepossible to continue on to higher education after taking a vocational secondarydegree.

CHAPTER 5 CHAPTER 3

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For the most part the Jordanian public is satisfied with the nation’s school system,and that is also true of parents who have children now attending Basic school.Among the general public, urban people, men, richer and better-educated respond-ents tended to be more critical. Among parents, those with children in private schoolsgave the highest ratings and UNWRA schools received mixed evaluations. About60 percent of all parents with children in the Basic cycle offered suggestions aboutimprovements needed in the schools. The problems mentioned most often con-cerned teachers’ lack of qualifications or skills, overcrowding in the classroom, andquality of textbooks and curricula.

Introduction: Recent Education Reforms

At the time of the 1994 Census nearly one-third of the Jordanian population wasenrolled in some form of education. Illiteracy had fallen dramatically in the pre-ceding 15 years, from 20 percent to 9 percent for men, and from 50 percent to 19percent for women (Ministry of Education, 1996: 6). Today, Jordan’s governmentand non-government expenditure on education is close to the average for develop-ing countries, at 3.8 percent of GNP. However, its gross enrolment ratios1 for pri-mary and secondary school are much higher than average (92 percent, versus 56percent for all developing countries and 58 percent for all Arab states), and adultliteracy rates are also well above the average (UNDP 1997: 224–25, 180–81, 164–65).

The Ministry of Education supervises all educational institutions at the pre-school, Basic and secondary level. Most schools are administered directly by the Min-istry of Education; others are run by UNRWA, the private sector, or other govern-mental institutions. In total, there were over 1.4 million students registered for the1996-97 academic year: 69,284 in the pre-school cycle, 1,099,215 in Basic educa-tion, 151,708 in the Secondary cycle, and 134,945 in community colleges anduniversities.

Jordan is a country with limited natural resources and a narrow base ofindustrialisation. There is relatively little employment in agriculture, and mostemployment is in the services sector. Women’s participation in the labour force islow, at about 15 percent, and labour force participation rates for men appear to havefallen in recent years. General unemployment stands at 17 percent, and

1 The gross enrolment ratio is the number of students enrolled in a level of education (whetherthey belong in the relevant age group for that level or not), as a percentage of the entirepopulation in the age group for that level.

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unemployment rates are much higher for women and younger people. All of thesetrends have led to undesirable economic and social results.

Jordan began to review its education system comprehensively in the mid-1980s, believing that the key to achieving comprehensive economic and socialdevelopment is to develop the nation’s human resources. The First National Con-ference for Educational Development, held in 1987, created the foundation for theEducation Act of 1994. The Act defines the structure of the education system inJordan as consisting of a two-year cycle of pre-school education, 10 years of com-pulsory Basic education, and two years of Secondary education (see Insert).

At the time of the survey, the first phase of the Educational DevelopmentPlan (1989-1995) had been implemented and had partially achieved its objectivesin the fields of teacher training and certification, general examinations and schooltests, new curricula and textbooks, educational technologies, school buildings,restructuring the education system, and vocational education and training. Thesecond phase of the Educational Development Plan (1996-2000) aims to achievethe following:

• Consolidating educational reform through staff development, developing anational system of examinations and curricula, school-based innovations,technical vocational education and training, expanding pre-school educa-tion, and enhancing non-formal education.

• Enhancing institutional development through learning resource centres,textbook publishing and distribution, feedback systems to learn from theresults of the General Secondary Education Certificate Examination, edu-cational management information systems, and a national assessmentprogram.

• Improving teaching facilities through expanding, rehabilitating andconstructing schools, equipping and furnishing schools to accommodatemore students, reducing the number of rented school buildings, and doingaway with double-shift scheduling.

The 1996 JLCS survey provides a valuable tool for assessing the Kingdom’s educa-tion system in the early stages of the current reforms. Although it does not givecomparisons over time, the survey allows us to compare education measures acrossmany different segments of the population. It also provides direct feedback from ascientifically-selected sample of parents concerning their preferences, expectations,and opinions of the school system. Drawing on the JLCS data and informationcompiled by the Ministry of Education, this chapter offers a wide-ranging

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The Educational Ladder in Jordan

Pre-school: Children at the age of at least 3 years and 8 months are allowed toenter kindergarten or pre-school, which is a non-compulsory educational cycle runmostly by the private sector. The Ministry of Education hopes to establish its ownkindergartens in the near future.

Basic school: All children at the age of at least 5 years and 8 months have toattend the Basic cycle, which is for 10 years. As this cycle is compulsory, there is astandard curriculum for all students, who are evaluated according to their aca-demic achievement in the 8th, 9th and 10th grades. Taking into considerationtheir attitudes and interests, students are then classified for joining the variousstreams of comprehensive and applied secondary education.

Secondary education: At the end of the 10th grade, all children are classifiedinto two major streams: the Comprehensive Secondary education stream (academ-ic and vocational) and the Applied Secondary education stream. The two-yearcomprehensive secondary education program leads to examinations for the Gen-eral Secondary education certificate in either the Academic or the Vocational sub-streams. The Academic sub-stream includes scientific, literary and sharia special-isations. The Vocational sub-streams covers industrial commercial, agricultural,nursing, hotel and home-economics education. Students from either the Academicor Vocational streams may continue on to higher education. In addition there isa two-year Applied Secondary stream which provides vocational education for di-rect placement in the labour market.

Higher education: Higher education in Jordan is organised and supervised by aseparate Ministry of Higher Education. It provides courses and programs leadingto the two-year Community College Associate Certificate or a four-year universi-ty Bachelor’s degree. University graduates can continue for Master’s and Ph.D.degrees in some fields.

Literacy and adult learning: The educational system provides various non-for-mal education programs, such as:• Literacy programs through evening classes• Evening classes for school leavers or dropouts• Special education programs, which provide education for adults to

continue self-learning and to sit for Basic and secondary schoolexaminations

• Non-formal vocational training (short courses)• Cultural centres programs

Other: Voluntary institutions provide financial support for the education of thedisabled and the gifted.

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introduction to the state of education in Jordan. We expect that further work withthe survey data will produce papers of interest to the education specialist.

Availability of Schools

Historically Jordan has had to cope with a rapid expansion in the demand for edu-cation due to natural population increase and large numbers of repatriated refugees.In some areas it was necessary to impose a double-shift system for buildings, whichmade it difficult to provide proper educational services. In response, the Ministryof Education gave school-building a high priority in the first phase of the Com-prehensive Educational Development Plan (1989-1995). Among the goals of theplan were to do away with all rented school buildings, abolish the double-shiftsystem, improve educational facilities in existing schools and provide land for school-buildings.

Accordingly, new school-buildings were established throughout the King-dom and new classrooms, laboratories and libraries were added to existing schools.As a result the percentage of schools with double shifts decreased from 20 percentin 1992-93 to 14 percent in 1996-97, and proportion of rented classrooms declinedby a similar amount.

As shown in figure 4.1, the school building program has already begun topay off in the form of increased accessibility for people in most areas.2 Overall, 77percent of respondents to the JLCS survey reported that there was a basic schoolwithin 5 to 10 minutes walk from their house, and 54 percent had a secondary school

Figure 4.1 Percentage of households in walking distance of schools (n= 5866)

2 The survey’s system for classifying neighbourhoods is described in chapter 3.

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located in easy walking distance. Refugee camps have the best access to basic schools,at 86 percent, but other urban neighbourhoods are almost as well-served. Ruralresidential areas have relatively good access to schools, but that is not the case forfarm areas. As part of its efforts to extend compulsory basic education, the Minis-try of Education has adopted a policy of establishing basic schools in remote areaswherever 10 students or more in the Grade 1 to 4 age-group are available.

The survey also asked about respondents’ satisfaction with the availabilityof schools in the local area, and the findings show a similar pattern. As illustratedin figure 4.2, an average of 78 percent said they were very- or rather satisfied. Sat-isfaction is highest among refugee camp dwellers, and is much lower in rural areas.The availability of schools was seldom mentioned as a reason for moving to anoth-er place, although it is not clear whether that reflects a high level of service or a lowpriority given to schools as a reason for moving.

Figure 4.2 Satisfaction with availability of schools in the neighbourhood (n= 5254)

Education in the General Population

Education has profound effects on income, employment, health, fertility, and manyother aspects of living conditions. We will explore the specific effects of educationin each of these areas in later chapters. In this section we look at education levels inthe population as a whole, with special attention to adults and people of working-age.

LiteracyThe expansion of basic education in the past 30 years has drastically reduced thehistorically large differences between the education of men and women, city people

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and rural people. One way to look at this change is to examine the proportion ofpeople in different age groups who ever attended school, as illustrated in figure 4.3.Among the youngest age group, about half are enrolled in pre-school or are justbeginning basic school. Mandatory basic education starts at age 6, and in the age 7to 25 groups virtually everyone (98 percent) has been enrolled. Beyond age 30 westart to see a divergence between men and women, urban and rural areas, and forpeople aged 50 and above the differences are quite large. For example, among peo-ple aged 50 to 64, only 33 percent of the women had access to school versus 78percent of all men. Across all age groups, 85 percent of the population have attendedschool: 89 percent for men and 81 percent for women; 87 percent in urban areas,and 79 percent in the countryside.

Figure 4.3 People ever enrolled in school, by age group, sex and urban-rural (n= 31,178)

Over the years Jordan’s Department of Statistics has collected information aboutthe proportion of adults who did not attend Basic school, and it has been used asan indicator of illiteracy in the population. By this measure illiteracy has fallen from68 percent in 1961 to 14 percent in 1994, as shown in table 4.1. Among the age15 to 45 group it now stands at 7 percent: 5 percent for men and 9 percent forwomen. Illiteracy has declined in all groups, but especially among women. The 1996JLCS survey produced results very similar to the 1994 Census: when measuredaccording to the DoS definition, it found illiteracy rates of 9 percent for men, 20percent for women, and 14 percent overall.

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Table 4.1 Illiteracy (did not attend Basic school) by sex, 1961 to 1994: Percentage of adultsaged 15 and above

raeY neM nemoW latoT

1691 74 88 86

9791 02 05 43

7891 21 33 32

1991 11 82 02

4991 9 91 41

Source: Ministry of Education 1997: 54; Ministry of Education 1996: 6.

However, the JLCS was able to ask more detailed questions than the Census, andthat made it possible to construct a definition of literacy that takes into accountthe person’s actual reading and writing abilities. A functional definition of literacyis useful, because some people may complete basic school without learning how toread and write properly, or they may lose those skills later in life. Others may pickup literacy skills through adult education programs or with no formal schooling.In the survey, people who had completed less than seven years of school were askedif they could read everyday materials such as a newspaper or letter, and if they wereable to write simple messages, such as a letter to a friend.

Using this functional measure of illiteracy, we find the same general patternsas the DoS results but with slightly higher rates. For the population aged 15 andabove, the overall rate is 17 percent - 11 percent for men and 24 percent for women.For both sexes combined, 15 percent of the urban population is non-literate, as are24 percent of those in rural areas.

Figure 4.4 Illiteracy by age group, sex and urban-rural: Persons aged 15+ (n= 20,170)

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As we can see in figure 4.4, illiteracy is far higher in the older age groups, and thedisparities between urban and rural, men and women are far greater. Less than 10percent of the population in the aged 15-30 groups is non-literate by our function-al definition. The proportion rises to about 20 percent for the 35-49 age group, 46percent for the 50 to 64 year olds, and 70 percent or more for those over 65. How-ever, figure 4.4 also shows a quite disturbing trend for rural women, who make upabout 10 percent of the sample: their illiteracy rates are twice as high as those forrural men or urban women, and this is true even for the youngest age groups. Clearly,rural women are an important target population for literacy and adult educationprograms.

Illiteracy rates are lower for refugees and displaced persons (14 percent) thanfor non-refugees (19 percent). In part that is due to the urban location of mostrefugees, and in part to UNRWA’s considerable investment in education over theyears. The disparity is small among the youngest age groups, but widens to about 8percent for people over 30.

There are also large differences by governorate. Ma’an has the highest illit-eracy rate by the JLCS definition, at 28 percent. It is followed by Mafraq (26 per-cent), Balqa (25 percent), and Karak (24 percent). The urban governorates ofAmman, Zarqa and Irbid have below-average rates.

Jordan has realised the seriousness of the illiteracy problem and its negativeimpact on all aspects of life. The 1987 Conference for Educational Developmentconfirmed the importance of non-formal education and set a goal of reducing theoverall illiteracy rate to 8 percent by the year 2000. Efforts to solve the problem focuson the following methods:

• Prevention: The most effective way to combat illiteracy is to prevent it, byproviding free compulsory basic education for all students. Jordan hasrequired 6 years of basic education since 1952. The duration of compulso-ry schooling was later extended to 9 years in accordance with the EducationAct of 1964, and to 10 years in 1987, and education is now compulsory andavailable to all children aged 6 to 16. As mentioned above, the Ministry ofEducation continues to open a class wherever 10 students become available,and has set procedures in place to limit drop-out from basic education. Wewill discuss the reasons for current drop-outs in a later section.

• Remedial and adult education: The Ministry of Education has operated anilliteracy elimination program since the 1950s. The program provides edu-cation for adults who have missed the mainstream of schooling, to help themacquire reading, writing and numerical skills. A centre for illiteracy elimi-nation is opened in every populated area whenever 10 to 15 learners are

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available; instruction and all learning materials are provided at no cost. Inaddition, the Jordanian educational system provides continuing educationfor a two-year period for adults who have already acquired basic literacy skills.Evening classes and home-study courses are available for those who wish topursue further education.

To support these efforts the Ministry of Education is encouraging other publicinitiatives to eliminate illiteracy, developing textbooks and curricula to meet the spe-cial needs of adult learners, and certifying literacy and adult education teachers. TheMinistry is giving special attention to areas such as Ghors, Ma’an and Mafraq, whichare suffering from high rates of illiteracy.

Highest Education Attained

Literacy is only one aspect of the nation’s educational profile. As we can see fromfigure 4.5, about half of the working-aged population has completed all or part ofthe Basic cycle, and over 20 percent have completed or are enrolled in some formof secondary school. One-fifth have an Intermediate Diploma or Community Col-lege degree, or have completed or are enrolled in a university-level program (Bach-elor’s, Master’s, Ph.D. or Higher Diploma).3 We would also note that Basic schoolin Jordan covers grades 1 through 10, and thus is equivalent to lower secondaryeducation in many other countries.

Urban-rural and gender differences follow the same general pattern that wehave seen in earlier tables: rural people and women are less likely to attain highereducation, and less likely to go to school at all. Most of the disparity by sex is due

3 For respondents who were educated under earlier systems, Preparatory school is coded asBasic school, and Intermediate Diploma is classified as higher education.

Figure 4.5 Highest level of education completed or currently enrolled in: Persons aged 15 to64 (n= 19,567)

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to people in older age groups; up to age 30, the proportions of men and womenwith basic, secondary and higher education vary by only 1 to 3 percent. Beyondage 35 the proportion of women with higher education drops sharply compared tomen, and the proportion with no education rises.

The situation is somewhat different with respect to urban-rural disparities.There is a consistent gap of about 5 percent in the proportion of people with sec-ondary education and a roughly 10 percent gap in higher education, and it is foundin every age group. Educational opportunities, migration, and traditional attitudestowards women are the most likely reasons: even with an ambitious school-build-ing program, it is difficult to have a secondary school within easy reach of everyrural household. Rural areas offer fewer work opportunities for those who do man-age to get a secondary or higher education, and those people are more likely tobecome urban residents over time.

There are no significant differences in the education levels of refugees andnon-refugees in the working-aged population. Slightly more non-refugees have neverattended school, but the proportions of people with basic, secondary, and highereducation are almost the same. However there are large differences in the type ofschool attended for Basic education, largely due to the activities of UNRWA. Amongnon-refugees, 86 percent went to government and 4 percent to private schools. About10 percent took their basic education outside Jordan, or at some other type of schoolsuch as sharia schools. The majority of refugees also attended government schools(54 percent), but 28 percent received their basic education from UNRWA. Largernumbers of refugees were educated in other schools or outside Jordan (15 percent),and 3 percent attended private schools. Note that these figures are for people whoare no longer enrolled; we will look at the profile of today’s students in the nextsection.

Current Enrolment in Education

Distribution of Students by CycleAccording to Ministry of Education estimates, about 1.3 million Jordanians wereenrolled in Basic or secondary education during the 1996-97 school year. The JLCSsurvey collected detailed information on about 12,000 of these students. As shownin figure 4.6, about 80 percent of all enrolment is in the Basic education grades 1to 10. Twelve per cent of all students are in academic or vocational secondary schools,and 7 percent in higher education. This last category includes university Baccalau-reate candidates (about 5 percent), community college students (1-2 percent) andMaster’s or Ph.D. students (less than 1 percent). The second part of figure 4.6 reveals

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that enrolment in the Basic and secondary cycles is quite well-balanced by sex.Women are slightly under-represented in higher education (45 percent of the total),especially in university B.A. and postgraduate courses. However, women make up

Figure 4.6 Distribution of currently enrolled students by level and sex (n= 11,800)

over half of the enrolment in the community colleges. This is probably due to thewider availability of community colleges throughout the kingdom, which makes iteasier for women students to live at home. University education is also moreexpensive, and parents give priority to sons.

As part of its efforts to create a more skilled labour force, Jordan has placedspecial emphasis on vocational education in recent years. The two vocational sec-ondary options4 have become available in more school districts, and the range ofcourse offerings has expanded and modernised. Who are the students who enter thesecondary vocational streams?

Figure 4.7 looks at the social profile of secondary enrolment in severaldimensions. In total, 80 percent of the sample’s secondary school students were inthe academic stream, and 20 percent in either the Comprehensive or Applied

4 Jordan offers two forms of vocational secondary training: Comprehensive vocational sec-ondary, and Applied secondary. For more information, see “The Educational Ladder inJordan” at the beginning of this chapter.

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vocational track. But there are large variations by sex, location, refugee status andincome. For example, only 14 percent of the girls chose vocational education, ver-sus 25 percent of the boys. The difference may perhaps be explained by a lack ofvocational courses appropriate for girls, along with social attitudes which put greaterpressure on boys to learn a marketable skill. More worrying is the low percentageof rural students (13 percent) who enter the vocational secondary stream: this isprobably not a matter of choice. Vocational training facilities are quite expensiveto provide, and it has not been possible to offer the vocational option in many sparse-ly-populated areas.

Two groups which have relatively high rates of vocational enrolment are ref-ugees (24 percent, boys and girls combined) and children from families earning lessthan 1450 JD per year (29 percent). Job-related training is clearly an attractive optionfor many of these students, who may lack property or family connections, areunlikely to get government jobs, and are expected to find work at an earlier age.Education of the household head (not shown) also has an influence. Students aremore likely to enter the vocational stream from families where the head has basicor vocational secondary education, as opposed to academic secondary or highereducation. In contrast, Academic secondary is chosen by 88 percent of students fromfamilies with higher education, and 95 percent of those in the top income bracket.

This general profile of vocational students - male, low-income, less-educatedfamilies - is not unusual. But it does have implications if Jordan wishes to expandthe vocational secondary stream. As we will see in the section on parents’ attitudes,vocational education is not a popular choice and appears to have negative socialconnotations, even among groups who might benefit from it.

Figure 4.7 Secondary school enrolment in the Academic and Vocational streams (n= 1435)

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Supervising AuthorityGovernment agencies bear the main responsibility for education at all levels, as wecan see in figure 4.8. In the JLCS sample 78 percent of students in basic educationattended government schools, most of which are operated by the Ministry of Edu-cation. About 9 percent were enrolled in private schools, and 13 percent in UNRWAschools. Eighty per cent of the refugee children in camps attend UNRWA schools,and 18 percent of those living outside the camps. Most private and UNRWA schoolsare in urban areas. According to Ministry of Education statistics, the proportion ofstudents in private Basic and secondary schools increased by about 3 percent between1992-93 and 1996-97 (Ministry of Education, 1997: 17).

Figure 4.8 Distribution of students by type of school and level (n= 11,800)

Government involvement is highest at the secondary school level, accounting for89 percent of academic and 96 percent of vocational enrolment. There are noUNRWA schools at this level. In the academic stream the share of private schoolenrolment is about the same as in the Basic cycle, at 10 percent, but there is virtu-ally no private sector involvement in secondary vocational education. Private sec-tor involvement is much stronger in higher education, which includes the commu-nity colleges and Bachelor’s degree programs. Here the government is responsiblefor about two-thirds of all enrolment, and private schools one-third. About 20 per-cent of the sample’s students in higher education are receiving financial help fromscholarships or grants.

As in other countries, the type of school that a child attends is closely linkedto the family’s economic situation. This is illustrated quite dramatically in figure4.9, which plots school enrolment against household income for the Basic cycle.Among lower and middle income groups, government schools (supplemented byUNRWA) account for 90 percent or more of all enrolment. The private sector’s share

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rises steadily from just 2 percent in the poorest families, to 58 percent among thewealthiest.5

A similar pattern holds for secondary and higher education: of the academ-ic secondary students from the two highest income groups, 30 percent or moreattend private schools, and 50 percent are in private higher education. The corre-sponding figures for the lowest income group are 6 percent and 26 percent. Eco-nomic factors also help to explain the lack of private vocational secondary schools.Properly-equipped vocational schools are expensive to operate, and higher-incomefamilies usually prefer academic education at the secondary level. The few peoplein the sample who did attend private vocational schools were all from middle orupper income households. It may be possible to get the private sector involved insecondary vocational education by setting out policies similar to those for commu-nity college education, which also includes a vocational component. However, giventhe social and economic pressures to send children to higher education, it may notbe possible to attract enough middle and upper-income students at the secondarylevel.

Age-Specific Enrolment and Drop-OutsJordan has moved steadily toward its goals of universal basic education and expand-ing secondary school enrolment, although dropouts remain a problem in some areas

Figure 4.9 Type of basic school attended, by income group (n= 9049)

5 Education costs are minimal in the Government schools, which are heavily subsidised. Theten grades of the Basic cycle are free; parents pay only a fee of five dinars or less per studentannually, and needy students are exempted. Textbooks are provided for Basic cycle studentsfor free, and books are sold to secondary cycle students at cost price.

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and for some social groups. Table 4.2 presents Ministry of Education data onenrolment by school cycle and sex for the 1992-93 and 1995-96 school years.Enrolment is calculated here as a percentage of all children in the appropriate agegroups for each cycle, and includes both government and private schools. Gross en-rolment increased to 26 percent in the Pre-school Cycle,6 95 percent in the BasicCycle and 70 percent in the Secondary Cycle.

The JLCS sample produced results that were almost identical to the Minis-try’s when the same definitions were applied. However, the survey data allow us totake a much closer look at the composition of enrolment and the reasons fordropping out. We will focus on the Basic- and secondary school aged populations,children aged 6 to 18.

Figure 4.10a plots enrolment by age in completed years, for boys and girls.Students who had already completed the cycle appropriate for their age (for exam-ple, 18 year olds who had finished secondary school) were counted with thoseenrolled. Percentages by sex are very similar, and in fact girls have slightly higherenrolment rates in secondary education. This suggests that the Ministry of Educa-tion’s outreach efforts have been successful, and it also indicates a positive develop-ment in peoples’ attitudes about women’s education. However, continuation ratesat the secondary level do give cause for some concern. National enrolment at age16 is just below 90 percent - an impressive achievement - but it drops off to about75 percent at age 17 and 62 percent at age 18. Evidently many students or theirparents do not consider secondary education worthwhile, and drop out when schoolis no longer compulsory. Of the 17 and 18 year olds who are not in school, abouthalf have a Basic education certificate and half dropped out before completing.

The last three parts of figure 4.10 illustrate some important factors relatedto dropout and continuation rates. Rural children tend to start school later thanthose in the cities; enrolment rates are similar from age 7 to 13, when more ruralchildren begin to leave school before completing Basic. Attrition rates are similarin secondary school, but overall rural enrolment rates are about 6 percent lower.

The differences are much larger when we examine the effects of householdincome and education. Children from upper-middle and higher income groups(household incomes over 2900 JD per year) are more likely to start school by age 6and to complete the Basic and secondary cycles. The pattern for the middle incomegroup is quite similar, but with more attrition going into secondary school. Clearlythe largest dropout problems are found in the low income households which makeup over 20 percent of the population. Enrolment rates are over 95 percent in thefirst four grades, but they fall off steeply after age 11. Twenty percent have dropped

6 At present, almost all pre-schools and kindergartens are established, financed and admin-istered by the private sector. The Ministry of Education’s main role is to supervise and regu-late them.

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out by the end of Basic school, and by age 18 less than half are enrolled or havecompleted secondary school.

The education level of the family makes an enormous difference. Better-educated parents are more financially secure, and there is less pressure to abandonschool to work. They are able to help more with schoolwork, have stronger

Table 4.2 Gross enrolment by school cycle and sex, 1992-93 and 1995-96: Proportion of thepopulation in eligible age groups

loohcs-erP cisaB yradnoceS

raeYcimedacA syoB slriG llA syoB slriG llA syoB slriG llA

39-2991 52 32 42 68 88 78 15 55 35

69-5991 72 42 52 49 59 59 76 37 07

Source: Ministry of Education 1997: 21.

Figure 4.10 Students who are enrolled or have completed Basic school (age 6-16) or Second-ary school (age 17-18): Percentage by age and other measures (n= 12,389)

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expectations about the child going on to secondary and higher education, andpersevere in the face of bad school performance. The end result is a significant dif-ference in dropout rates, as seen in figure 4.10d. In families where the householdhead has a secondary or higher education (30 percent of the sample), virtually allchildren are enrolled at the end of the Basic cycle and 85-90 percent are enrolled atthe secondary stage. In families where the head has not completed Basic, 78 per-cent are enrolled at age 16 and 50-60 percent afterwards. It is also worth notingthat the turning point in preventing dropouts seems to occur when the householdhead achieves a secondary education: on the one hand, the patterns are unfortu-nately similar for the children of household heads who have completed the Basiclevel or no level. On the other hand, there is almost no difference between familiesheaded by secondary and higher education graduates.

Reasons for not Enrolling or Dropping OutAs we have seen, about 5 percent of all children in the 6-16 age group and 30 per-cent of 17-18 year olds are not in school. When such cases occurred the survey askedthe reasons why, and the responses are summarised in figure 4.11.

Figure 4.11 Reasons for not being enrolled in school: Children aged 6 to 18 (n= 845)

Parents gave a great variety of reasons, and they vary somewhat between boys andgirls and younger and older children. Family poverty and the need to work was themain reason given in about 15 percent of the cases. General poverty was mentionedmore often for girls, and the need to work was cited most often for older boys.Another 3 percent - and 6 percent of the girls - dropped out for marriage or to carefor other family members. Disability was a factor in about 10 percent of the cases.

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Family opposition is still an important barrier in less-educated households, ruralareas and refugee camps: it accounted for 10 percent of the younger girls being outof school, and 20 percent of the 17 and 18 year olds. Among the Other reasons given,respondents mentioned family disintegration and concerns about the child’s safetywhile travelling to school.

Some of the more common reasons were related directly to the school or thechild’s reaction to it. About 5 percent said that schools were not available nearby,or there were transport problems; this factor was much more important in rural areas(14 percent) and for girls in the 17-18 year age group (10 percent). “Child is belowschool age” was mentioned only in connection with children who were 6 years oldat the time of interview, so they were probably too young to enter the previous Basicschool cycle. The fact that there were no cases aged 7 and above is a good sign, as itsuggests that parents are well-informed about compulsory school age. “Repeatedfailure” was mentioned in about 10 percent of the cases at both the Basic and sec-ondary levels. This reason was cited only by households where the head has a Basiceducation or less, providing further evidence that better-educated families will per-severe in keeping their children in school in spite of bad performance. “Bad treat-ment at school” (coded as Other) was also mentioned by about 1 percent, concen-trated in lower-income households.

The most common response by far - cited for 45 percent of the boys and 28percent of the girls - was that the child had no interest in school. We must keep inmind that it is parents who are answering the question, and this is a response thatwill not reflect badly on the family. But it is also true that some children are simplynot interested in school, due to low intelligence or ambition, bad experiences in theclassroom, poor family support, and many other factors not captured in the sur-vey. In any case the distribution of this answer was quite consistent across incomegroups, neighbourhood, urban-rural and family education level, with the exceptionof higher-educated heads.

The JLCS results are consistent with a study of dropouts conducted in 1995by UNICEF, the Ministry of Education, the University of Jordan and the Depart-ment of Statistics (Zoubi et al. 1995). That study found three groups of factorsassociated with dropouts from the Basic level:

• Household factors such as low parent educational level, poverty, householdsize and limited house living-space.

• Student-related reasons such as students’ unwillingness, recurrent failure,poor accomplishment, dislike of school, sickness, and the household’s needfor the child’s work.

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• Educational environment factors such as a shortage of necessary schoolfacilities, unreachable schools, weak school counselling and child-abuse bythe teachers.

In the 1995 study, dropouts among girls were most closely related to houseworkrequirements, recurrent failure, sickness and marriage. For boys, the main reasonswere hatred of schools, poor school environment, failure and physical abuse by otherstudents. Poverty, poor teaching methods, housework or paid work, and improperteacher-student relations were factors that applied to both sexes. In rural areas therewere also problems stemming from unreachable schools, the need for help in agri-cultural work, household illiteracy, students’ unwillingness to rejoin schools and ashortage of health facilities.

Regarding Basic education, the Ministry of Education’s policy for the nearfuture is to continue to provide school facilities wherever there are 10 or more stu-dents in the grade 1-4 age group, and to implement compulsory education morestrictly, so that a parent is legally obliged to have his children enrol. In secondaryeducation the Ministry will continue to expand and modernise facilities, and developvocational courses that are consistent with the changing needs of the labour mar-ket. Those who do drop out will have access to adult education and literacy classes.Such measures will help to limit the percentage of dropouts and decrease educa-tional waste.

Moreover, the survey data suggest that in combating dropouts the Ministrywill have increasing amounts of help from a powerful ally: the family. As we haveseen, better-educated parents care about school and do what they must to keep thechild enrolled. Education alone will certainly not solve the dropout problem, butthe rising levels of education in this generation - especially for women - will helpto set higher standards in the home. In the next section we take a closer look atparents’ attitudes and expectations.

Parents’ Attitudes About Education

For randomly selected respondents who had children in Basic school, the JLCSsurvey asked a series of questions about the parent’s attitudes and expectations re-garding the child’s future schooling. If there was more than one child of Basic age,the questions referred to the eldest.

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Expectations About the Child Completing Basic SchoolOf all parents with children in Basic school, 92 percent said that they expected thechild to complete. There were no differences between urban and rural parents. Asshown in figure 4.12, mothers did have somewhat higher expectations — 94 per-cent said they thought the child would finish Basic. Fathers were more pessimisticon the whole (89 percent), but their expectations are actually closer to reality. Aswe have seen, about 88 percent of all 16 year olds are still in school. Expectationsfor girls are slightly higher than for boys, but the difference is not significant. How-ever, there is a considerable gap between parents with more and less education: 97percent of those with secondary or higher education thought their children wouldcomplete, but only 87 percent of the parents who had not finished Basic themselves.Even this figure is optimistic - the reality for uneducated households is closer to 78percent - but the family’s lower expectations may well be a contributing factor.

Figure 4.12 Do you expect your child to complete Basic school? (n= 1907)

When asked the reasons why the child would not finish school, respondents gaveanswers that were broadly similar to parents whose children had already droppedout (figure 4.11). Family poverty (16 percent), not interested in school (51 percent),repeated failure (25 percent), and the need to help economically (13 percent for boys)or marriage caring for family members (11 percent for girls) were the leading rea-sons. It is also worth noting that family disintegration (7 percent) was one of themore common reasons cited for boys.

Attitudes About Secondary EducationAmong parents who do expect their children to complete Basic school, over 90percent want them to go on to secondary education. Here too there is a considerable

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gap between expectations and experience; only 76 percent of all 17 year olds wereactually enrolled. As we can see from figure 4.13, about 8 percent want their boysto begin work or an apprenticeship of some kind after completing Basic, and 2percent mentioned the armed forces or some other activity. Ninety-one per centpreferred some form of secondary school. For girls the expectations are even high-er: 3 percent will get married or do some other activity, and 97 percent will go onin school. No one mentioned work or vocational apprenticeships for girls, and youngwomen do in fact have higher secondary school enrolment. Urban and rural par-ents have the same expectations about secondary school versus non-school activi-ties. However, more parents from the lowest-income and least-educated groupsexpect the children to work or take apprenticeship training (9 percent, both sexescombined), or to get married or join the armed forces (4 percent).

Figure 4.13 is also interesting because it shows the relative proportions ofparents interested in the Academic versus the Vocational streams. Academic second-ary is especially preferred for girls (75 percent, versus 66 percent for boys), but that

Figure 4.13 Expectations for the child after completing the Basic cycle: All children who areexpected to complete Basic (n= 1759)

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is partly because more boys are expected to drop out and enter the labour force. Only10 percent of the boys and 7 percent of the girls are expected to enter vocationalsecondary school; about 15 percent of the parents have no preference. Actualenrolment in secondary school is currently about 80 percent in the academic streamand 20 percent vocational (figure 4.7), but parents’ expectations are obviously quitedifferent. The percentages change slightly if we ignore children who will go intowork or marriage, but there is still a serious mismatch between the school placesavailable and the education that parents expect. This is an important finding foradvocates of secondary education, because it suggests that vocational school is seenas a “second best” alternative in many families, to be undertaken if the child wantsit or if there is no other option.

Figure 4.14 gives an overview of preferences for parents with differentincomes and educational backgrounds. Groups are sorted according to thepercentage of respondents who prefer the Academic stream, although the differencesare usually small. Low-income parents express the strongest definite preferences forvocational secondary (13 percent for boys and girls combined) and also have a high‘No preference’ rate. Not surprisingly, responses for less-educated parents show asimilar pattern. Vocational education appears to make sense for these families becauseit opens up new job opportunities for the children; it also allows them to begin earn-ing money at an earlier age and avoids the heavy financial burdens of higher edu-cation. In addition, these parents may feel more confident that they can use family

Figure 4.14 Parents’ preferences for vocational vs. academic secondary school (n= 1673)

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Figure 4.15 Main reason for preferring Academic or Vocational secondary education: Parentswho expect their children to attend secondary school (n=1433)

connections to help the child find a job afterward, which might not be true if thechild pursued an academic course.

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At the other end of the scale we find the higher income- and education groups. Herethe respondents are less inclined toward the vocational stream and are also moresure of their choice, as we can see from the smaller percentage of ‘No preference’answers. It is interesting to note that parents who have had a vocational secondaryeducation themselves are slightly less in favour of a similar education for theirchildren, compared to their Academic peers. However the difference is not statisti-cally reliable. Rural parents appear in the middle, as their preferences are almostidentical to the population as a whole.

The reasons underlying academic and vocational preferences are quitedifferent, as illustrated in figure 4.15. In interpreting the figure, we should keep inmind that roughly eight times as many respondents are offering reasons for theAcademic stream as for the Vocational stream. For both boys and girls, preferencesfor vocational secondary seem to be driven by the prospect of higher incomes orbetter jobs, and by the child’s own preferences. The child’s abilities also play a part,especially for boys. The people who believe that vocational secondary will lead togood job prospects are mostly lower educated and low income men; mothers whoprefer the vocational stream are more likely to do so because the child wants it,especially for their girls. Social status and the chance for higher education are rarelymentioned.

For parents choosing Academic secondary, job and income opportunities area common reason; but even more important is the chance to obtain a higher edu-cation. The two are closely linked, of course, and the numbers do not tells us whetherhigher education is valued for its own sake or as a means to an economic end.Respondents from all income and education levels cite these two factors in roughlyequal proportions, although mothers put more emphasis on access to higher edu-cation. The child’s own preference is a less important factor in choosing the academicstream, and is less important for boys than for girls. Social status was mentionedby about 10 percent of the respondents, for both girls and boys and across all seg-ments of the population.

In general, these results confirm that the public’s faith in vocational educa-tion is still quite low.7 However, recent Ministry of Education data suggest that thereis growing interest in this type of school, particularly the nursing, hotel, press andindustrial specialisations, due to vocational graduates’ better work opportunities inthose fields. At the same time, enrolment is declining in the agricultural and com-mercial specialisations. Graduates are not finding jobs, because the schools have not

7 In part, that may be due to people’s actual experience. As we will see in the chapter onLabour Force and Employment, unemployment rates among academic and vocational second-ary graduates are very similar, and far fewer vocational graduates end up in white collaroccupations.

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kept pace with changes in technology and students are not acquiring the practicalskills which are now required.

By the year 2000 the Ministry of Education would like to increase the per-centage of students in the vocational stream to 50 percent of all secondary schoolenrolment among boys and 35 percent among girls. It hopes to accomplish that byexpanding the existing specialisations and creating new ones for both sexes. TheMinistry has also removed an important barrier to expansion by opening up high-er education to vocational graduates. In accordance with the new Education Plan,academic students and those in the Comprehensive vocational secondary stream willhave similar chances to enrol in universities starting in the 1997-98 academic year.This will help to reduce parents’ concerns about vocational education being a ‘deadend’ which will limit the child’s future opportunities

Expectations About Highest Level of SchoolingThe 1996 JLCS survey also asked respondents about the highest level of educationthey expected the child to reach eventually. Results are presented in figure 4.16.About 13 percent of all respondents thought their children would complete Basicor less, and another 13 percent said they would go as far as secondary school. Ninepercent were not sure. And across all segments of the population, fully 58 percentof the people say they expect the child to achieve a University degree or more, anda further 7 percent expect a community college degree.

Results like this are quite common in survey work on education; expecta-tions are heavily weighted with hope. To make all those parents’ dreams come true,higher education in Jordan would have to expand by at least 300 percent. None-theless, the findings are quite consistent with what we have seen about parents’preferences for academic studies and the reasons for those preferences. At the timeof the survey Academic secondary was the only gateway to higher studies, and manyparents were planning the children’s school careers with that in mind.

Looking more closely at figure 4.16, we see that a larger proportion of allgirls is expected to complete Basic but then will stop after an Academic secondarydegree or perhaps a Community College degree. More boys will drop out after Basic;but those who do show academic potential are expected to go on to University, andfewer will go only as far as secondary or Community College. In the end, equal pro-portions of boys and girls are expected to attend University.

The other bars of the figure show aspirations for respondents with differenteducation levels, for boys and girls combined. Less-educated parents are less sureabout their children’s futures, they expect more children to drop out, and more tostop after secondary school. Even so, 40- to 50 percent have University aspirations,

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especially for boys. Parents with a secondary or higher education are again more sureabout their plans, and between 74 percent and 84 percent want the child to have aUniversity degree. The distribution by income groups is not shown, but follows asimilar pattern.

As a whole the survey results point to two widespread attitudes among Jor-danian parents. The first is that women should be educated, whether they areexpected to work outside the home or not; the second is that good jobs come onlywith higher qualifications. This is a very positive set of ideals for any nation.Unfortunately, it is also the sort of situation which leads to costly ‘credentials infla-tion’ in countries where the government has expanded low-quality higher educa-tion to keep pace with the demands of parents rather than labour market needs.8 Inpart, the Ministry of Education’s effort to upgrade vocational education is meantto cut the spiral of credentials inflation. But to satisfy parents this training mustprove itself in the job market.

Attitudes Towards Higher Education for WomenEducation has positive impacts on women’s role and status in society, and over timeit helps to create new social values and traditions. In both ways education has openednew opportunities for women to participate in all aspects of social, economic andpolitical life.

The survey asked a series of questions about women and family life, and onequestion concerned attitudes about women in higher education. In total, 90 percent

8 Dore (1976) is a good introduction to the processes underlying credentials inflation.

Figure 4.16 Expectations about the highest level of school the child will reach (n= 1697)

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of respondents said they approve of women acquiring higher education, 9 percentwere opposed, and 1 percent were indifferent. Among men, 83 percent support, 15percent oppose and 2 percent were indifferent. Among women, 95 percent supportedand 4 percent were opposed. Although there were no differences by age group forpeople under the age of 60, or between urban and rural people, there was somevariation on income and education. Eighty-six per cent of the low-income respond-ents (of both sexes) say they support women’s higher education, versus 94 percentof those in the higher income groups; 85 percent of those with less than a Basiceducation supported, versus 96 percent of those with higher education.

Even if we allow for the effects of income and education, attitudes do makea difference in parents’ expectations about how far their children will go. Figure 4.17is similar to the previous figure, but it compares the expectations of fathers andmothers who support or oppose women’s higher education. The first four bars showexpectations for girls; we see almost no differences between fathers and mothers,but quite stark contrasts between those who do and do not support women’s edu-cation. Fully 72 percent of the supporters believe their own daughter will get auniversity education, but only 32 percent of the non-supporters. Yet the universityexpectations for boys are all very similar.

Another indicator of attitudes is the chance for women to take highereducation abroad. This is more of a historical measure, since it concerns people whohave already completed their education, but the findings are revealing. Figure 4.18

Figure 4.17 Support for women’s education, and expectations about children’s highesteducation level (If going on to secondary school: n= 1645)

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shows the distribution of places where respondents have completed Bachelor’s orhigher degrees, and the proportions of men and women who completed in eachplace.

About half of all degree-holders studied in Jordan, and of those fully 40percent were women. Thirty per cent completed degrees in other Arab countries,but only one-fifth of them were women. Europe, North America and Asia (e.g.Pakistan) account for the remaining 20 percent of degrees, but only one in ten ofthose graduates were women. From all countries combined, 72 percent of all de-gree-holders are men.

Several factors might explain the tendency to educate women close to home.One is a social ethic which seeks to keep women under close supervision and toprotect them from corrupting influences. A second, more pragmatic explanation isthat education abroad is expensive: priority is given to men, who are expected topay back that investment in the form of higher earnings. Lastly, Jordan has a numberof private universities and they are well-distributed among the major cities. Thatmakes it convenient for many young women to live at home while taking highereducation.

Figure 4.18 Where higher education was completed, by sex (B.A., M.A., Ph.D., HighDiploma: n= 1242)

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Report Card: Satisfaction Ratings and SomeSuggestions for the Schools

In this final section we examine public opinion about the overall performance ofthe public schools, parents’ assessment of specific problems in their children’sschools, and Ministry of Education plans for further upgrading of teachers andfacilities.

General Public Opinion About School ServicesAs part of a series of questions on public institutions, the survey asked all random-ly selected individuals whether the public schools have “developed their services tothe public in an excellent, good, or poor way.” This was a measure of general pub-lic opinion, since some respondents had children in school and some did not. Asillustrated in figure 4.19, most people are happy with the development of the publicschool system: of all respondents 55 percent said it was excellent, 17 percent good,and 19 percent thought the schools had developed in a poor way. About 9 percenthad no opinion. Men were more critical than women (22 percent versus 16 per-cent giving a ‘poor’ rating), and urban people less positive than rural (20 percentversus 15 percent ‘poor’ ratings).

Figure 4.19 Satisfaction with the development of public schools: All randomly selected indi-viduals (n= 5494)

The exceptions among urban dwellers were people living in refugee camps. Sixty-two per cent of camp residents rated the schools as excellent, and only 10 percentas poor. In this case it is clear that “the public schools” was understood by respond-ents to mean the UNRWA schools. In general, higher-income and better-educatedrespondents tended to be more critical of the school system, with ‘poor’ ratingsaveraging about 10 percent higher. Lower income and less educated people weremore supportive. The breakout by reporting domain (not shown) follows a similar

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pattern: the more urban regions of Amman, Zarqa/ Mafraq and Irbid received below-average ratings, while people in Jarash/ Ajloun, Balqa/ Madaba and the South gavethe public schools higher evaluations.

One possible explanation is that urban, educated and richer people havemuch higher expectations about the schools and are more likely to be frustrated ifthe system does not develop in a direction that meets their specific needs. On theother hand, poorer, rural and less educated people have seen enormous improve-ments in their children’s educational opportunities in recent years.

Parents’ Opinions About Quality of Education in TheirOwn Child’s SchoolIt is always good to receive high marks from the general public, but what about theparents? Teachers know that parents can be amazingly ignorant about what goes onin the schools their children attend, but as a group parents are a good source of usefulfeedback. Although their perspectives are strongly shaped by their own education-al backgrounds and the experiences of their own children, parents have first-handcontact with curriculum materials and receive daily reports about school from thechild’s perspective. Most importantly, if a serious conflict begins to develop betweenthe social and moral values of the school and those of the larger society, parents willbe the first to feel it.

With this in mind, the JLCS identified randomly selected respondents whohad children in Basic school and asked them to evaluate the overall quality of edu-cation the child was receiving. Results appear in figure 4.20, and show a generallyhigh degree of satisfaction with the schools. Urban and rural people’s responses werevery similar: 27 percent rated their own child’s school as excellent, and another 50percent as quite good. Thirteen per cent thought the quality of education was ad-equate, and 10 percent had serious concerns, rating it poor or very poor. Only 1percent had no opinion.

Figure 4.20 Quality of education in the school your child now attends: Parents with childrenin Basic school (n= 1879)

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In some respects evaluations of the child’s own school were similar to those for theschool system in general. Men were less supportive, and schools in Amman, Zarqa/Mafraq and Irbid received slightly lower ratings. However there were no clear pat-terns in the responses by household income or respondent’s education; the rich andthe better-educated are not less happy. The most likely reason for this is suggestedin the last three bars of figure 4.20: children at different socio-economic levels tendto go to different kinds of schools.

Evaluations for UNRWA schools are more extreme than those given to gov-ernment schools. They receive more ‘excellent’ and slightly more ‘very poor’ ratings,but fewer in the middle. Parents’ evaluations of private schools are significantlyhigher; about 90 percent rate the school as excellent or quite good, although thatmay be related to the fact that they are paying for it. As we saw in figure 4.8,UNRWA serves a primarily lower-income population and private schools are anincreasingly common alternative for the middle and upper-middle class. In the end,it appears that this sorting of children by type of school has produced a rough equi-librium in satisfaction for the time being. The larger question for policy makers iswhether Jordan’s three-way division of schools will lead to larger differences ineducational preparedness and, in the long run, to greater social inequality.

Parents’ Suggestions for ImprovementsLastly, parents were asked which aspects of their own child’s school most needed tobe improved. About 40 percent of the parents in all types of Basic school are con-tent with the quality of education provided to their children and see no need forfurther improvements. The remaining 60 percent offered a wide variety of sugges-tions, which are summarised in figure 4.21. After reviewing the main areas of con-cern as perceived by parents, we will discuss some of the Ministry of Education’scurrent efforts to make improvements.

The most commonly cited problems are that teachers are not sufficientlyqualified or skilled (18 percent across all types of school), and that there are too manypupils per class (13 percent). As expected, school overcrowding is mostly an urbancomplaint, especially for children in UNRWA schools. But concerns about teacherqualifications are surprisingly widespread across all types of parent. The mainexception is private school parents.

Inadequate textbooks or curriculum, poor teacher attitudes, and a lack ofcommitment to teaching were cited by about 10 percent of the parents, especiallythose with stronger educational backgrounds. Inadequate buildings and facilitieswere mentioned slightly more often by people in rural areas, and much more oftenby respondents with vocational secondary education, who appear to be moresensitive to the need for proper teaching facilities. Educational equipment and

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teaching methods were a greater concern for parents with children in private schoolsand -again - among respondents with vocational secondary backgrounds. Concernsabout student behaviour and discipline were slightly more common in UNRWAschools and urban areas generally. Almost no one had problems with the size of theschool, or with the school’s arrangements for communicating with parents.

Figure 4.21 Parents’ opinions about improvements needed in their child’s Basic school(n= 1907)

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Ministry of Education Efforts to Resolve CommonSchool ProblemsOur survey respondents’ concerns are genuine, and their suggestions were thoughtfuland constructive. In focusing on problems, however, we should not lose sight ofthe fact that most parents are quite satisfied with the schools their children attend.

The Ministry of Education is aware that improvement is needed in some areasand is already taking steps to resolve some of the issues raised by parents. Regard-ing school overcrowding, in government schools the average number of Basicstudents per class during the 1996-97 academic year was 29, with an average of 35in urban areas and 24 in rural areas. (Ministry of Education 1997: 28). Average classsize in urban areas has increased slightly in the last few years (up from 33 in 1993–94), but it is not unusually high by international standards.

Concerning teacher training and certification, Phase I of the General Edu-cation Development Plan has focused on raising teachers’ skills to meet the increasingrequirements of parents and employers. The Ministry of Education has set out acomprehensive training program to empower teachers with skills of critical think-ing, linking knowledge with real life, teaching through work experience and deal-ing with individual differences.

The Education Act of 1994 requires the B.A. degree for teachers in the pre-school and Basic cycles, a diploma in Education after the B.A. for Secondary cycleteachers, and a Master’s degree in a specialisation related to education for Supervisors.Those who do not meet these requirements should have their academic level raised,within the Ministry of Education’s capabilities.

In response to this legislation, the General Education Development Planincluded programs for pre-service and in-service training and certification ofteachers, designed to raise the academic levels of teachers and supervisors up to thestandards defined in the Education Act. Jordanian universities set out programs toimplement these plans accordingly. In addition, a general comprehensive plan fortraining was set out in 1990; it covered all elements of educational staff-trainingand focused on practicality and flexibility to keep pace with the rapid rate of changeexpected in the coming years. To implement the plan the Ministry of Educationhas sought co-operation with several Arab and international agencies such as BritishOverseas Development Agency, GTZ, UNICEF and the Arab League for Educa-tional, Cultural and Scientific Organisations. As a result of these efforts, thepercentage of teachers with community college diplomas declined from 59 percentin 1992 to 47 percent in 1996-97, while the percentage of teachers with B.A degreesincreased from 35 percent to 48 percent during the same period.

The Ministry has also successfully implemented an ambitious plan to pre-pare new curricula and textbooks for all basic and secondary cycles’ grades andsubjects. The new curricula have a focus on problem-solving methods, scientific and

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critical thinking, dealing with individual differences, relating knowledge to real life,and on higher intellectual skills. International organisations are helping to integratethese concepts into new curricula and textbooks in such areas as environmental andhealth-education, traffic education, democracy and human rights.

The second phase of the Educational Development Plan (1996-2000) willconcentrate on reviewing curricula and textbooks in order to consolidate thesechanges and to bring in new concepts. It will also expand the teaching of computerskills and French, and will strengthen the practical side in teaching the sciences andlistening and conversation skills in English. Textbooks will be put on computer, anda new system of evaluating and revising textbooks will be developed to achieve sim-plicity and efficiency in providing up to date information.

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Chapter 5 Health and Health Services

Sa'ad Kharabsheh and Åge A. Tiltnes

Summary

Nearly four out of five adult respondents believe that their general health is verygood or good. Less than 5 percent describe their health as bad or very bad. Moremen than women perceive their health to be very good. Furthermore, people livingin the most urbanised parts of Jordan as well as in the densely populated Palestin-ian refugee camps report poorer health than people living elsewhere.

Seven percent of the population have some kind of a lasting health problemand 3.5 percent have a severe problem. Not surprisingly, such chronic states of ill-health are strongly correlated with subjective, self-perceived general health. Amongthose above the age of forty, Jordanian women are somewhat more ambulatory andsensory impaired than men, a result in line with lower female self-perceived health.The indicators of functional impairment as well as the indicators of prolonged illnessand self-perceived general health points to the fact that individuals in the lower-income social strata suffer from more health problems than people belonging tohigher-income groups.

The survey found that 24 percent of the surveyed population above the ageof fifteen are daily smokers, 44 percent of the men and 5 percent of the women.However, 67 percent of all dwellings inhabited by under-fifteens are used for regu-lar smoking. This might indicate that passive smoking is a big national healthproblem.

Seven indicators of anxiety and depression indicate that psychological dis-tress is somewhat more widespread among women than among men, as well as inthe poorer segments of the population.

Eleven percent of the sample above the age of five had been acutely ill orsuffered from an injury during the two weeks period preceding the interview. Fourpercent had been affected so severely that they were prevented from carrying out‘normal duties’. Sixty-four percent of the afflicted persons sought help from thehealth care system, about two-thirds from a general practitioner and one-third froma specialist. Thirty-nine percent consulted the private health sector, while 55 per-cent visited a public health centre or hospital. The rest went to an UNRWA clinic

CHAPTER 6 CHAPTER 4

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or to a pharmacy. Consultation costs vary across the various institutions visited andwhether the individual is covered by health insurance or not. Yet, individuals tendto pay the same for consultation and medication across income groups.

Physical access to health services seems to be good, as 67 percent of allinterviewed households have at least one physician, health centre or hospital with-in five to ten minutes walking distance from their living quarters. The situation isbest in the densely populated governorates as well as in the compact Palestinianrefugee camps. Health insurance is another side to the accessibility of services. Fif-ty-three percent of the surveyed population, 55 percent among Jordanian nation-als and 20 percent among non-Jordanians, are covered by health insurance. Thecoverage is poorest in the most heavily populated areas, such as Amman, and in thelowest of three broad incomegroups.

Seven out of ten families assert that they are very satisfied or rather satisfiedwith the local health services. Two out of three randomly selected adults hold theopinion that the public health sector has developed excellently. Nearly nine in tenconsultations following sudden illness are viewed as very satisfactory or rather sat-isfactory. The level of satisfaction is alike for the various types of health institutions.

Introduction

Health is one of the most crucial aspects of living conditions. Good health is bothof immediate value in itself and is directly and indirectly related to other aspects ofliving conditions. For example, good health is an important resource for fullparticipation in society. A person’s health makes a difference in his or her opportu-nities in, for instance, education, the labour market, or organisations. At the sametime, one’s health is itself affected by the environment in which one lives.

Health Status

The JLCS approached health status by focusing primarily on self-perceived healthand illness. The interpretation of such data has some pitfalls. Patterns and preva-lence of self-assessed health problems reflect both underlying diseases and culturalconcepts of illness. Reported high rates of prolonged illness may, therefore, reflecta high prevalence of the corresponding diseases and disabilities, a broad definitionof the illness, or both. On the other hand, diseases and disorders are sometimes not

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reported when they are so common that they are perceived as part of the humancondition. Problems of interpretation are especially troublesome for cross-culturalor cross-country comparison, and also for comparison between different sociocul-tural groups within a population.

Nevertheless, survey data on self-reported illness have several advantages (UN1984). First, such data allow the linking of health problems with a broad range ofsocial and economic factors and other indicators of living conditions. Often infor-mation collected in surveys has better coverage than service statistics, because thesurvey includes respondents who do not come into contact with the health caresystem. Moreover, the survey puts emphasis on health conditions that are severeenough to cause the respondent to reduce temporarily or permanently his or herregular activities or to seek aid from the health care system. It could, of course, beargued that it is the medically verified needs and not the perceived needs in a pop-ulation that is of highest policy relevance. Nonetheless, it is people’s felt needs thatdetermine pressure on health services. Furthermore, survey data on assessed needsare useful to the health planners, since they might be compared to health sectorperformance data, for instance records of the help and treatment provided.

Before we move into details about the acute and chronic health situation ofthe surveyed individuals, let us have a look at how the respondents understand theirown general or global health status.

Self-Assessed General Health

The survey asked one randomly selected adult in each household (2,344 men and3,159 women) to describe his or her own health according to a five-point scale rang-ing from ‘very good’ through ‘fair’ to ‘very bad’. The question was posed becauseresearch has shown that the answer to this question in fact reflects the overall health

Disease and illness

‘Disease’ refers to pathological processes and is the health problem seen from

a medical diagnostic or the physician’s perspective.

‘Illness’ on the other hand refers to the human experience of symptoms,

distress and suffering. It concerns the layman’s perception of and response to

symptoms and disability. (Fylkesnes 1991, with reference to Chrisman and Klein-

man 1983).

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of individuals accurately. As shown by a Norwegian study, non-medical aspects ofpeople’s life situation, such as age, sex, occupation, socioeconomic status and house-hold structure, are not decisive for people’s perception of their own health withinfairly homogenous populations. What accounts for variation in perceptions is theunderlying, actual (medically defined) ill-health and disablement. Hence, ‘subjec-tive’ health seems to mirror ‘objective’ assessment rather well (Moum 1992a). Otherstudies have concluded that single-item measures of self-rated health similar to theone applied in the JLCS correlates strongly with scores on more extensive healthmeasurement scales (Mackenback et al. 1994). Analysis of Swedish data showed thatthe reliability of self-perceived general health is as good as or even better than thatof the more specific health questions, adding to the credibility of self-rated healthmeasures (Lundberg and Manderbacka 1996).

In the analysis of self-assessed health we applied a multivariate statisticaltechnique in addition to bivariate analysis. A logistic linear regression model wasused to estimate the effects of selected individual and household characteristics onthe probability of rating own general or global health as ‘very good’. For the sake ofsimplicity in presentation and argument, therefore, the subsequent analysis of self-perceived general health is mostly based on the ‘very good’ health category. Use ofall categories would have given the same main picture and conclusions. The regres-sion analysis allows us to isolate the effect of each variable, through controlling forthe effects of all the other variables in our model.

We found a significant relationship between all but one of the explanatoryvariables in the model, labour force participation. First, men perceive their healthto be better than women, as the odds for men to report very good health is 45 percenthigher than among women, other factors kept constant. Next, respondents withpost-secondary education say they have better health than respondents with second-ary or lower education. The propensity for individuals with higher education to statethat their health is very good is 28 percent higher than for individuals who havecompleted secondary school. Third, compared to people in the two lowest incomegroups, those belonging to the highest income group have a 51 percent increasedodds of answering ‘very good health’. Another variable with a statistically signifi-cant effect on global health is indoor living environment. The better the indoormilieu as measured by questions about the dwelling’s humidity, temperature andventilation, the higher the odds for reporting very good health. Individuals livingin the dwellings with the best indoor conditions have a 46 percent higher likeli-hood of very good health than those living under the worst indoor conditions.

Fifth, regular, everyday smoking has a significant negative effect on people’sglobal health. Likewise, and to no surprise, the regression analysis reveals a verystrong relationship between having a longstanding illness or disability and self-perceived general health. Also, respondents living in refugee camps and urban

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residential areas as well as those residing in Zarqa and Mafraq have a lower likeli-hood of reporting ‘very good health’ than respondents living elsewhere. Lastly, aftercontrolling for the other variables in the model, increased age was found to have anegative impact on the likelihood of reporting a ‘very good health’. See appendix 2for general information about logistic regression and chapter appendix 5.1 for thedetailed result of the logistic regression model here applied. The results on self-assessed general health are reported in more detail below.

As can be seen from figure 5.1, the majority of those asked, nearly four infive, consider their own health to be quite satisfactory. Forty-five percent of therespondents claimed their health was very good. Another 34 percent stated that itwas good, while 16.5 percent of the respondents answered that their health was fair.Four and a half percent felt that their general health situation was bad or very bad.

Figure 5.1 also discloses a difference between the sexes, in that slightly moremen than women assert their health to be very good (48 versus 42 percent). Morewomen than men state that their health is fair (20 versus 13 percent), in spite ofthe fact that women have a higher life expectancy than men (see chapter 2). How-ever, it is not unique to Jordan that women rate their global health as somewhatlower than men. To illustrate, this phenomenon was reported in the living condi-tions’ studies of Germany (Zapf et al. 1987), Estonia (Grøgaard (ed.) 1996) andLatvia (Aasland (ed.) 1996). Several factors may be involved. First, women mightbe more often but less seriously ill. Second, women may for some reason be betterat making realistic judgements about their own health (and possibly also the healthof others). Third, there might be a difference in response, in that men report lessillness. Yet, following Moum (1992a) above, there is reason to believe that the healthof Jordanian women, as that of women from several other countries, is slightly worsethan men’s health.

Health is closely related to age, and figure 5.2 demonstrates that withincreased age, people’s general health is reduced. The trend is similar for both sexes,which is reflected by parallel curves in the figure. However, from the age of 25women tend to feel less fit than men. The reports of very good health are to someextent mirrored by the reports of bad or very bad health. More women than men

Figure 5.1 Self-assessed general health by sex of respondent

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in the age groups 40-49 years and 50-59 years declare their health to be bad or verybad. Among women above the age of 50, there are more respondents reporting bador very bad health than those claiming very good health. The situation is similarfor men above the age of 60.

Figure 5.3 highlights the relationship between various individual character-istics other than age, and the respondents’ general health status. Not surprisingly,there is a wide gap between the subjectively felt health status of individuals who havesome longstanding illness or disability and those who have not. While only 5.5percent of the chronically ill state that their health is very good, 49 percent of thosewho do not suffer from lasting health problems say the same.

There is a negative relationship between smoking and good health, as smok-ing is a risk factor associated with a range of medical conditions governing diseases(WHO 1995). A recent British study paints a gloomy picture of the negative healtheffects of smoking. It found that only an estimated 42 percent of lifelong malesmokers alive at the age of 20 would be alive at 73, compared with 78 percent oflifelong male non-smokers (Phillips et al 1996). Interestingly, there seems to be anassociation between regular smoking and self-perceived general health in our data.While 39 percent of those who smoke regularly declare their health to be very good,47 percent of the non-smokers say the same. In fact, the real health gap betweensmokers and non-smokers is wider, as the inclusion of women - of whom very fewsmoke and who to a lesser extent than men report to have very good health - tendto reduce it. If we compare men who usually smoke with those who never smoke,

Figure 5.2 Self-perceived good and bad health by sex and age

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this becomes evident. Forty-one percent of the male smokers claim to have a verygood health, while 54 percent among the men who never smoke assert the same.We will return to a more detailed analysis of smoking below.

We wanted to test if the global health of interview objects belonging to house-holds with an adequate housing standard is better than the health amonginterviewees who live in dwellings of a lower standard. We constructed a simpleadditive index based on four indoor environmental factors: humidity/damp, cold/difficult to heat, uncomfortably hot in summer, and poor ventilation. (More detailsabout these housing condition indicators are found in chapter 3.) Each negativefactor was given the score ‘1’. The number of 1s for all respondents were then

Figure 5.3 Individuals stating that their health is ‘very good’ by selected characteristics: chronichealth problems, smoking habits, indoor housing conditions, level of education, yearly house-hold income, and type of residential area

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counted and the respondents grouped according to the following categories: ‘Verygood indoor environment’ = 0 (21 percent of the sample); ‘Good indoor environ-ment’ = 1 (25 percent); ‘Poor indoor environment’ = 2 (27 percent); and ‘Very poorindoor environment’ = 3-4 negative features (also 27 percent of the sample).

Figure 5.3 indicates the effect of housing conditions on self-reported health.The share of individuals reporting very good health increases with improved housingstandards, as measured by these four indicators. While 50 percent of the respond-ents residing in houses with an excellent indoor milieu assess their health as verygood, 39 percent among those dwelling under the poorest indoor environmentalconditions claim the same.

Figure 5.3 also shows that subjective global health improves with increasinglevel of education, a result in line with earlier studies (Ross and Wu 1995). Theparticularly poor health among those without any formal education in our data isdue to the disproportionately high number of older person in this category. And,as mentioned above, when controlled for the other variables in our regression modelonly post-secondary or higher education has a significant effect. The figure furtherindicates that the respondents report better health when they live in high-incomehouseholds than when they live in low-income ones. Contrasted with the lowestincome group, 16 percentage points more of adult individuals of the highest incomegroup report very good health.

Finally, figure 5.3 elucidates that there is variation in self-rated global healthaccording to type of residential area. People living in the most urbanised areas ofJordan as well as in the densely populated Palestinian refugee camps report poorerhealth than people residing in the less urbanised and farm areas. That the self-assessedglobal health of adult individuals living in Palestinian refugee camps, on average,is poorer than the health of grown-ups residing elsewhere in Jordan is due to sever-al factors. For example, the indoor housing conditions of camp dwellings are belowaverage (see chapter 3); camp residents are often poorer than people living outsidethe camps (see chapter 6); and they are more afflicted by chronic health failure thanother people (see figure 5.15 below). Yet, the regression implies that there are otherfactors than those that are included in the model, and which can be attributed tothe camps as such or their residents, which also carry explanatory power.

Chronic Illness or DisabilityThe subjective general state of health – evaluations based on objective realities aswell as influenced by cultural factors - is a powerful health indicator (Cleary 1997)and a valuable summary statement of the individual’s perception of own health(Murray et al. 1982). Yet, it is also useful to look at the prevalence of chronic healthproblems. We have already demonstrated how chronic health problems negatively

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effect individuals’ subjective health appraisal, as only one-tenth the number ofrespondents with some chronic illness or handicap compared to respondents with-out such problems reported very good general health.

How widespread are chronic health problems in Jordan? The survey askedthe following question about all household members, i.e. 35,126 individuals: “Does<name> have any illness of prolonged nature, or any afflictions due to an injury,due to a handicap, or due to age?” To get a picture of how severe the afflictions arewe posed a follow-up question: “Does <name> find it difficult to go out on his/herown without the help of other people because of the health problem or handicap?”Results show that 7 percent of the population have some kind of lasting healthproblem, while 3.5 percent have a severe problem. A severe problem was defined asfinding it ‘a bit difficult’ or ‘definitely difficult’ to go outside alone.

Figure 5.4 Prevalence of prolonged illness and injury according to geographic region, typeof residential area, Palestinian refugee status and yearly household income; all householdmembers (n = 35,126)

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The JLCS data reveal no significant gender differences regarding chronic illness, butshow some variation between other subgroups of the population. The most denselypopulated areas of Zarqa and Mafraq, and Amman have the highest proportion ofinhabitants with chronic health problems, while the predominantly rural districtsof Jerash and Ajloun as well as the four southern governorates have the lowest pro-portions (figure 5.4). Similarly respondents living in urban residential areas moreoften have permanent poor health than the residents of farm areas or areas that arerural or semiurban in character. As was the case for subjective general health assess-ment, residents of the Palestinian refugee camps are the worst off. Palestinian refu-gees in general also tend to be more afflicted by chronic health problems than othergroups. Although not shown here, this relation is robust for comparisons betweenthe various governorates.

Finally, figure 5.4 tells us that persons belonging to the lowest income groupmuch more often report prolonged illness or injury than other persons. Whereasnearly 11 percent in the low-income category have a lasting health problem and morethan 6 percent have a severe problem, the figures for the middle and high incomegroups are about 6 and 3 percent. Hence the prevalence of chronic health problemsin the poorest two-thirds of the population is about double that of the wealthiestone-third.

Figure 5.5 highlights the association between age and illness or injury of alongstanding nature. Not surprisingly, we see that the prevalence of chronic health

Figure 5.5 Prevalence of prolonged illness and injury according to ten-year age groups; en-tire surveyed population (n = 35,126)

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problems mounts with increasing age. This is both because vulnerability increaseswith age and because old people have been exposed to risk the longest.

Functional ImpairmentBecause health problems may differ considerable in magnitude and seriousness theywill influence the daily life of the affected individuals to a varying degree. Figure5.6 demonstrates adult respondents’ ability to perform five everyday activities,notably ascending and descending stairs, walking for a quick 5 minutes’ walk, car-rying an item for no less than ten metres, reading a newspaper, and following anormal conversation. Though only a limited number of activities are measured, webelieve they capture important aspects of people’s opportunity to operate freely, andas such, are good indicators of physical wellbeing.

We have constructed an additive index to investigate how the five indica-tors of ambulatory and sensory problems accumulate. Those who reported any prob-lem related to a described activity were given the score ‘1’ on that particular activity.Next we counted the number of 1’s for each respondent and grouped all respond-ents accordingly.

The result for men versus women as well as for three income groups is givenin figure 5.7. We observe that women are systematically worse off than men. Thisis due to the fact that women above the age of forty report more problems than menon four out of five of the physical health indicators. The only exception is hearing,where men and women are equally affected by problems. That women are more oftenfunctionally impaired than men is in line with the section on subjective generalhealth assessment, where we found that women judged their own health to be a littleworse than did men. Hence, subjective evaluation of general health seems to be in

Figure 5.6 Adults’ ability to perform certain everyday activities; RSI

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agreement with the self-reported, but still ‘objective’ indicators of physical healthin focus here.

Figure 5.7 further confirms the impression from the analysis above that levelof income is firmly associated with people’s health status. Sixteen percent of theinterviewed adults living in households with a yearly income of JD1450 or less havea low score on four or all five indicators of physical health. This is about ten per-centage points higher than for adult members of households with a yearly incomeexceeding JD2900.

To what extent does functional impairment restrict people’s ability to gen-erate income? To answer that question we have compared the scores of the respond-ents between the ages of 25 and 65 who form part of the work force with thoseoutside the work force. We have taken out the individuals 15 to 24 years since amajority of them are still in the educational system. As can be seen from figure 5.7,labour force participants are less troubled by physical hindrances. Yet, as many as13 percent of the Jordanians in the labour force can perform three or more of thefive activities only with some difficulty or not at all. The figures are 17 percent forwomen and 12 percent for men. This suggests that despite physical impairments,disabilities and handicaps that considerably reduce their radius of action, peoplego very far in forcing themselves to work.

Figure 5.7 Difficulties in performing everyday life activities, according to sex and yearly house-hold income (RSI 15 years or older), and labour force participation (RSI 25-65 years old). Indexbased on five indicators: go up and down stairs; go for a brisk 5 minutes walk; carry 5 kg atleast ten metres; read normal newspaper print (with glasses if necessary); and hear a normalconversation (with a hearing aid if necessary)

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This phenomenon is of course related to the (male household head’s) need to supportfamily. Most likely, however, this need is not only associated with materialisticdemands from the family itself, but is also linked to normative values and forces insociety. The necessity of maintaining a dignified life is central to the Middle East-ern culture. Dignity is closely linked to public judgement and ‘ard (honour), whichin its turn have several dimensions. While preserving ‘ard through generosity, bravery,securing sexual modesty of female family members, and protecting the householdfrom public intrusion are important, the ability to provide for basic needs is therelevant aspect to our discussion. As stated by Asef Bayat: “For a poor head of house-hold, not only would the failure to provide for his family jeopardise their survival,it would also inflict a blow to his honour.” (Bayat 1997: 61).

SmokingSmoking is one of the prime causes of disease and death in the industrialist coun-tries, and according to the World Health Organisation (WHO) “emerging as theworld’s largest single preventable cause of illness and death” (WHO 1995: 34).Cancer, coronary heart disease and disease in the respiratory system are the threemost common causes of death related to smoking (Sanner and Dybing 1994a). Towhat extent is smoking a health problem in Jordan? How many people smoke; howmuch do they smoke; and when do they take up the habit?

As seen from figure 5.8, a minority of Jordan’s inhabitants smoke. While inthe total adult population 24 percent are regular smokers, between 3 and 4 percentsmoke from time to time. There is a huge difference between men and women. While44 percent of men smoke daily, only 5 percent of women do the same. Three andone-half percent of both women and men smoke occasionally. These JLCS resultsare largely consistent with a study conducted by Jordan’s Ministry of Health (1996),

Figure 5.8 Smoking habits by sex: regularity of smoking; average number of cigarettes smokeddaily among regular smokers; and average age when started smoking; RSI 15 years or older

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which concluded that 27 percent of the population aged 25 years or more werecurrent smokers. The JLCS rate for the same age group is close at 28 percent. Therate for men is similar in the two studies, but the Ministry of Health reports a some-what higher proportion of female smokers than do we.

While only 24 percent of the Jordanian adult population smoke daily, thenegative health impact of smoking reaches more people, as 61.5 percent of all liv-ing quarters and 67 percent of all dwellings in which children below the age of fifteenlive are used for regular smoking. This indicates that passive smoking might be aconsiderable problem in Jordan. Although the JLCS does not provide data on smok-ing on the workplace, it should be well known that non-smokers are exposed tocigarette smoke at many work sites, a fact that increases further the many negativehealth-effects associated with passive smoking (Sanner and Dybing 1994b).

Figure 5.9 portrays the smoking habits in Jordan according to sex and agegroups. It is evident that the gender gap holds for people of all ages. Since we haveonly data for one point in time, however, we can not conclude with any certaintyabout the underlying causes of this picture. Several explanations might be involved.First, women might become increasingly addicted to tobacco as they grow older,while there are more quitters than beginners among men above the age of fifty. Next,the figure might reflect that Jordanian smoking habits have changed. For instance,fewer regular smokers among men in the three oldest age groups might indicate thatsmoking was less common (among young and middle-aged men) before. Finally,the result might indicate that smokers die earlier than non-smokers. None of the

Figure 5.9 Prevalence of regular smokers by sex and age groups; RSI 15 years or older

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explanations necessarily exclude each other. Perhaps most likely, the three work incombination.

Let us return to figure 5.8, which in addition to displaying daily and occa-sional smoking presents figures on average number of cigarettes smoked and theaverage age at taking up the habit. It shows that female daily smokers smoke lessthan men, on average 12 cigarettes daily contrasted to 21. The loss of life expect-ancy is greater the sooner smoking starts. On a global basis very few people startafter the age of 20 (WHO 1995). This seems to be the situation in Jordan as well,at least among men. On average daily smokers reported that they took up the habitat the age of 18. Compared to men, female daily smokers are slow starters, as theycommence smoking on the average nearly five years later.

There appears to be no significant variation in smoking with regard to suchfactors as income and education, but people residing in urban areas more oftensmoke than those living in rural areas. The survey found that 49 percent of menand 9 percent of women dwelling in urban localities smoke daily or occasionallyagainst 41 percent of rural men and 7 percent of rural women.

We know that the health benefits of smoking cessation are big. One studyfound that a person who quits smoking in the age 50-59 would reduce by 50 per-cent the risk of dying within the next sixteen years compared to a person who keepsup the habit (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1990, referred inSanner and Dybing 1994a). Almost 4 percent of Jordanian adults have once beendaily smokers, but have abandoned the habit at some point in the past. The numberof quitters as a proportion of the number of daily smokers is almost equal for men(0.147) and women (0.125).

Psychological DistressIn addition to the physical sides of health, the more psychological, mental andemotional aspects of health are naturally of great importance to people’s general well-being and living conditions. ‘Psychological distress’ is a term often used in theliterature when the topic is ‘mental health’. The two are not synonymous, however.Psychological distress is seen as a primary indicator of mental health, and symp-toms of distress are important because they are stimuli to seek care (McDowell andNewell 1996).

To measure psychological distress the JLCS used a short form of the so-calledHSCL-25, designed to tap anxiety and depression, and in turn an abbreviated ver-sion of the ‘original’ Hopkins Symptoms Check-List (HSCL) developed by Deroga-tis et al. (1974) (Moum 1992b). One randomly selected adult in each householdwas asked whether seven symptoms or problems that people sometimes have,

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bothered or distressed him or her very much, quite a bit, a little, or not at all dur-ing the last week. The symptoms were (1) worrying too much about things, (2)feeling depressed and sad (blue), (3) feeling hopeless about the future, (4) feelingof worthlessness, (5) nervousness or shakiness inside, (6) feeling continuously fearfuland anxious, and (7) headaches. According to psychological and psychiatric litera-ture the four first items are closely interrelated and measure depression, while items5, 6 and 7 also are intimately linked and indicate anxiety (Moum 1992b, Tambsand Moum 1993). The original HSCL-25 was constructed to measure symptomsof anxiety and depression only, and not poor psychological health in general. None-theless, it has been argued, the list “may serve as a good proxy to global general mentalhealth because most states of mental illness or distress are accompanied by anxietyand/or depression.” (Tambs and Moum 1993: 364). Measures of anxiety anddepression overlap and interlink because both tap a broad and general moodcharacterised by the experience of various negative affective states (Clark and Watson1991).

Figure 5.10 elucidates the respondents’ score on each of the seven items. Weobserve that between one in ten (‘feeling of worthlessness’) and nearly one-half(‘nervousness’) of the interviewed reported to have been very much or quite a bitplagued by these symptoms during the week preceding the interview.

The survey data also show that women systematically report more negativesymptoms than men; that the lowest income category is worse off on all items than

Figure 5.10 The adult population according to seven indicators of psychological distress; RSI15 years or older

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the middle and high income categories; that people dwelling in the refugee campssystematically recount more psychological symptoms than those living in urbanresidential areas, followed by inhabitants of semiurban/rural residential sites and thecoutryside; and that the Palestinian refugees suffer more from psychological distressthan the non-refugee part of the population.

Although the seven indicators capture distinct sides to psychological distress,the aim is to focus on the overall level, not each of the indicators. The limited bat-tery of questions used is no diagnostic instrument, but is constructed to get a broadoverview of the problem matter. We should use the items together to portray thespread and seriousness of psychological problems in the population. This can bedone through the construction of a simple additive index, where we presume thatthe more stressful symptoms reported, the poorer is the individual’s mental wellbe-ing. For all seven items each respondent was given the score ‘1’ if he or she hadanswered ‘very much’ or ‘quite a bit’. Otherwise he or she was given ‘0’. Next wecalculated the total scores for all respondents and assigned them a number on ourmental health index ranging from zero to seven1.

Figure 5.11 Men and women according to the reported number of symptoms of psycholog-ical distress; RSI 15 years or older

Figure 5.12 Individuals of three income groups according to the reported number of symp-toms of psychological distress; RSI 15 years or older

1 The index’ standardized item alpha = 0.8167.

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In figures 5.11 and 5.12 we display the results for men versus women as well as forall respondents according to the yearly income of their households. While 37 per-cent men did not report any signs of psychological distress, the figure for womenwas ten percentage points lower. The prevalence of one to two symptoms is aboutequal for the two sexes – we see that the two curves overlap almost perfectly. Morewomen than men, however, state that they suffer from three or more symptoms(figure 5.11). Our finding that women are more vulnerable to psychological dis-tress than men is consistent with the results of many other studies, from develop-ing as well as developed countries (Jenkins et al. 1991).

Figure 5.12 demonstrates that the poorest segment of the population is moreridden by symptoms of psychological disorder than those who belong to wealthierfamilies.

Acute Illness or InjuryFor all household members above the age of five, we wanted to know if they hadsuffered from any acute illness or injury during the two weeks preceding the inter-view. We also checked the severity of the illness or injury by enquiring if it hadprevented the individual from carrying out normal duties such as going to schoolor job, or doing housework.

Results show that 11 percent of the surveyed population had suffered froman acute health problem during the reference period, while 4 percent had sufferedfrom a severe problem. Only 4 percent of all acute afflictions were injuries. Figure5.13 displays the variation according to selected age groups. As can be seen, per-sons 10 to 24 years of age are the least affected by acute health problems. Theinterviews were conducted in the months of January, February and March. We knowthat the disease pattern is different in the various seasons. For example, illness related

Figure 5.13 Prevalence of acute and severe acute illness or injury. ‘Severe’ is defined as pre-venting the person from carrying out normal duties. Reference period: 2 weeks. All surveyedpopulation 5 years or older (n = 30,104). Interviews conducted during January, February andMarch.

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to the respiratory organs is more wide spread during the winter-months. Thereforeone should take care not to extrapolate from these findings to yearly rates.

People obviously respond differently to sudden illness and injury, and theJLCS did not set forth to get into great details about that. However, the survey askedwhether or not the acute health problem was followed by any consultation with thehealth care system, and if so, what kind of health personnel was seen; what sort ofhealth facility was contacted; did the person have to travel far; and what did theconsultation cost? Below we present the answers to these questions.

Sixty-four percent of the afflicted persons sought professional help. Of thosewho consulted someone, 63 percent saw a general practitioner, 33 percent visited aspecialist, while 3 percent went to a pharmacist. Fifty-five percent visited a govern-ment-run health institution and 39 percent visited a private health provider. Threepercent used a centre run by UNRWA, while the 3 last percent visited a pharmacy.

Figure 5.14 gives us the place of consultation according to Palestinian refugeestatus, level of yearly household income and health insurance coverage. Twenty-eightpercent of the camp refugees consulted the staff of an UNRWA clinic following theincidence, 40 percent visited the private health sector and 30 percent saw someonein the public health sector. Three percent of Palestinian refugees living outside thecamps consulted an UNRWA clinic.

Figure 5.14 Place of consultation following acute illness or injury by Palestinian refugee sta-tus, yearly household income and health insurance coverage; all surveyed population 5 yearsor older

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Not surprisingly, we see that individuals belonging to the highest income group relymore heavily on private health care than those in the medium and lower incomegroups, 50 percent against 32 and 36 percent respectively. We also observe thatindividuals that do not hold some sort of insurance card more often approach aprivate health clinic than a public health centre for consultation. This tendency isclear for all three income groups (not shown in figure). While in the low-incomegroup 39 percent without health insurance visited a private clinic, 26 percent whohad insurance did the same. For the middle-income and high-income groups thefigures are 46 and 16 percent, and 61 and 33 percent respectively.

Only 36 percent of the individuals who suffered from some kind of suddenhealth problem during the two weeks preceding the interview did not seek medicaladvice. The majority of them, four out of five, were either not ill enough to needhelp, or they treated themselves or were treated by a household member. Neverthe-less, as is revealed by figure 5.15, people belonging to different income groups putrather different weight on the various causes for not seeking help from the healthsector. While the size of the self-treatment category is approximately the same forthe three groups, affordability plays a much bigger role in the explanation given forindividuals in the low-income group.

While 23 percent of the acutely ill persons received professional medicalassistance within the hara or neighbourhood where they live, 41 percent travelledwithin the locality or town only, and 36 percent saw a medical doctor or the like inanother locality or town. People residing in rural parts of Jordan did not travel morethan people in urban areas. Fifty-five percent of all consultations were withoutcharge, while 42 percent of those who received medicines or other remedies did sowithout charge.

The individuals’ consultation and medication costs vary a great deal acrossthe different types of health institutions and according to whether the person seek-ing advice or treatment is insured or not. Acutely ill individuals from low-incomeand higher-income households tend to pay roughly the same for medical diagno-sis, advice or treatment. Figure 5.16 clearly shows that the insured pay much lessper consultation than do the non-insured. For instance, 74 against 30 percent receive

Figure 5.15 Reason for not seeking professional help during acute illness or injury by yearlyhousehold income

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consultation without charge. The figure also demonstrates that the private healthsector charges a great deal more per consultation than does the public sector. Thepublic and private sectors offer somewhat different services, which might explainpart of the difference between the two. We notice that no one paid for consulta-tion at the UNRWA clinics.

Figure 5.16 Cost per consultation by yearly household income, type of place consulted andhealth insurance coverage

Figure 5.17 Cost for medication by yearly household income, type of place consulted andhealth insurance coverage

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Figure 5.17, which exhibits the medication costs of the suddenly ill, to a large extentmirrors figure 5.16. Again, we see that the poorer segments of the population payas much as the more well-to-do; that having health insurance makes a differenceon payments; and that the services of the private health sector are far more expen-sive than the public sector services. About six in ten obtained medication from thegovernment sector without charge, while nearly nine out of ten visitors to theUNRWA clinics were not charged for the medication. Thirteen percent and 42percent of those who consulted the private clinics and private hospitals respective-ly received medicines and other remedies without charge.

Health Services

Jordan’s health care system experienced substantial capacity expansion in the early1990s, with an 18 percent increase in both hospital beds and the number of physi-cians over five years. The growth of the private sector was higher than that of thepublic sector. However, the bed to population and physician to population ratiosboth declined somewhat. Still, Jordan’s bed capacity remained comparable with theMiddle East and North Africa region and other lower middle-income countries, andits physician to population ratio was higher than most of these countries. The WorldBank has estimated that Jordan spends about eight percent of its GDP on healthcare, which is more than most middle income and even some western industrial-ised countries. (World Bank 1996).

Availability of ServicesTo have a variety of health care institutions available within the vicinity of onesdwelling is obviously a positive feature of the environment in which people live.We asked whether the households had different forms of health care providers withinfive to ten minutes walk from their dwellings or not. The national average for eachof the health institutions was as follows: government hospital, 10 percent; privatehospital, 8 percent; primary health centre, 40 percent; medical doctor, 67 percent;dentist, 32 percent; and pharmacy, 53 percent. Sixty-seven percent of all interviewedhouseholds had at least one physician, health centre or hospital nearby.

As is revealed by figure 5.18, people living in urban Jordan have better accessto nearly all kinds of services than those living in rural Jordan. The exception isprimary health centres. However, although the primary health care centres may besomewhat farther away in towns, they might still be easily available.

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Figure 5.19 shows how easy access to local health institutions varies along the urban-rural dimension when type of neighbourhood is also taken into consideration. Alocal health institution is here defined as a government or private hospital, a pri-mary health care centre, an UNRWA clinic, or a medical doctor located within fiveto ten minutes walk from the dwelling of the respondent. It is noticeable how wellinhabitants of the Palestinian refugee camps fare in comparison with the residentsof other areas. Eighty-seven percent of the camp refugees have at least one healthcentre or medical doctor nearby compared to 71 percent living in urban residentialareas and 56 percent in rural/semiurban areas. A meagre 16 percent of the house-holds in farm areas have such services within a short walking distance.

The high figure for the camps is probably due to several factors. Firstly, theresult may be understood in relation to the compactness of the camps, that is thehigh population density. Secondly, the refugee camps’ good score is due to the pres-ence of UNRWA clinics. Seventy-eight percent of the camp households have sucha clinic nearby. In addition, according to our measure camp residents have easieraccess to physicians than people living elsewhere. Fifty-nine percent of the camp

Figure 5.19 Households with at least one health centre, hospital or physician within five toten minutes walking distance from dwelling by type of residential area

Figure 5.18 Households with various health services within five to ten minutes walkingdistance from dwelling by urban rural status (n = 5,919)

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families have a doctor close to their home compared to a national average of 40percent.

The immediate availability of health services also varies across governorates.Figure 5.20 depicts the regional situation for four different kinds of health institu-tions. Conditions are best in the governorates of Zarqa and Mafraq, as well asAmman, the capital. Households in Jerash and Ajloun are the worst off. Having agovernment hospital and a primary health care centre nearby are welfare qualitiesmore evenly distributed across governorates than having a physician or a privatehospital in one’s proximity.

It can be argued that defining availability using the “five to ten minutes walk”criterion is highly ambitious. Other studies, notably the World Bank 1995 study,have defined accessibility using thirty minutes’ walk to the health facilities. Thesestudies have concluded that non-emergency accessibility to health facilities in Jor-dan is generally not a problem (World Bank 1995: 24).

Driving may compensate for difficult access on foot, but according to JLCSdata only approximately 25 percent of Jordanian families own a car. Similarly, usinga telephone to contact a health institution or someone who can assist in transpor-tation is useful. However, only one in three households (33 percent) have a tele-phone at home. We have found that 8 percent of all the surveyed households arerural households lacking a health centre or a physician nearby and at the same timehaving neither a car nor a telephone. Thirteen percent of all households are urbanhouseholds in the same situation. Since the access to public transport is better inurban areas than in the more sparsely populated rural parts of Jordan, efficient access

Figure 5.20 Households with certain health services within five to ten minutes walking distancefrom dwelling by geographic region

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to health services for the rural 8 percent is most probably worse than for the urban13 percent.2

InsuranceAnother important determinant of health services accessibility is health insurance.Insurance is here understood to include programs that give the individual free orhighly subsidised access to health services. Although the services provided mightvary considerably between the different programs, being covered by a program mustnevertheless be assumed to give the insured a benefit over the non-insured.

The Jordan Living Conditions Survey found that 53 percent of all individ-uals in the surveyed households are entitled to at least one health insurance. This ismuch lower than the estimated 80 percent given by the World Bank (1996), whichrelied on information from the various health programs themselves. Among Jorda-nian nationals 55 percent reported to form part of a health insurance scheme, whileonly 20 percent among the non-Jordanians did the same.

Health insurance: right to free or heavily subsidised health services at spe-

cific predefined health institutions or through some referral system

‘Military insurance’ is provided by the Royal Medical Services. Covers

active and retired members of the Armed Forces, Public Security, Dept. of In-

telligence, Dept. of Civil Defence and their dependents. Some other groups,

such as civilian personnel and student sat Mu’ta University and the employ-

ees of the Royal Jordanian Airlines are also covered.

‘Government’ or 'public insurance' refers first of all to the Civil Insur-

ance Program that issues insurance cards to civil servants and retirees and their

dependents, poor people and their dependents, disabled and blood donors.

‘Government insurance’ also refers to the Jordan University Hospital that

covers its employees and dependents.

‘Private insurance’ refers to the various private sector insurance

schemes in the country.

‘UNRWA’ offers health service to all registered Palestinian refugees.

It is not, strictly speaking, health insurance.

2 A better public transport system in urban areas is reflected in the households’ opinion aboutthe local public transport. While 77 percent of the urban families express their satisfaction(‘very satisfied’ or ‘rather satisfied’) with the transport services, 61 percent of the rural fam-ilies utter the same.

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As highlighted by figure 5.21, military health insurance is the most common typeof insurance (25 percent), followed by government insurance (23 percent). UNRWAand private insurance are the least widespread forms of health insurance (5 percenteach). Approximately 5 percent of the population is covered by two different healthinsurances or more.

There is variation in the prevalence of health insurance according to placeof residence. Figure 5.22 shows that Jerash and Ajloun compete very well with theother governorates. The main reason is that 51 percent of the inhabitants in thesetwo governorates report to have a military insurance, which is high above thenational average of 24 percent. At the same time the prevalence of governmentinsurance (19 percent) is just slightly below the national average (22 percent). Itappears that the heaviest populated areas have the poorest coverage. For Ammanthe comparatively low level of military insurance at 13 percent is the most evidentcause for its residents faring badly in contrast to residents of most other governo-rates. That few inhabitants of Zarqa and Mafraq have the right to governmentinsurance (14 percent against the national average of 22 percent), accounts for theoverall low score of those governorates.

Figure 5.21 Individuals covered by health insurance, by type of insurance (n = 35,593). Someare covered by more than one health insurance

Figure 5.22 Health insurance coverage by type of insurance and geographic region

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Figure 5.23 gives us the status of insurance coverage according to three socio-economic features. First, it shows that the coverage is better in rural than urbandistricts. This is primarily caused by the fact that military insurance is much morecommon among families living in the less populated areas.

Second, the figure discloses that the Palestinian refugees are covered by healthinsurance to a significantly lesser degree than non-refugees. Again, the main reasonis the uneven distribution of military insurance. While 37 percent of non-refugeeshave military insurance, only 5 percent of Palestinian refugees residing in campsand 8 percent living outside the refugee camps have the same. Non-refugees’ accessto government insurance is also 3 to 4 percentage points higher. We note thatUNRWA-based insurance is quite widespread among the refugee population. Thistype of insurance manages to close part of the gap in access to health insurance cre-ated by the asymmetric distribution of government, and especially military, insur-ance. Despite this ‘UNRWA-effect’, the insurance coverage nevertheless remainsabout 20 percentage points higher in the non-refugee part of the population.

Third, figure 5.23 demonstrates how insurance coverage varies across incomegroups. The poorest segment of the population more often lacks this welfare goodcompared to persons belonging to higher income groups. Furthermore the figuredisplays neatly how private insurance is a function of economic status. While 8percent of individuals belonging to the highest income group have private insur-ance, the percentage drops down to 4 and 1 percent for the middle and lowestincome groups respectively.

Figure 5.23 Individuals’ health insurance coverage by type of insurance, and according tourban-rural status, Palestinian refugee status, and yearly household income

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Satisfaction With ServicesIn response to the question on satisfaction with local health services, 71 percent ofthe households said that they were very satisfied or rather satisfied. Ten percentreported that the local health services were acceptable, while 18 percent claimed thatthey were rather unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the local health institutions.

Satisfaction is determined by several factors, such as availability and qualityof services, but also of what is expected. The survey did not measure the perceivedquality of local health services, but it asked about the general satisfaction with thehealth services in the living area of the various households. As can be seen from figure5.24, satisfaction with local health care facilities varies with the actual presence ofsuch institutions close to the living quarters. Of those households that have a gov-ernment or private hospital, a primary health care centre, an UNRWA clinic, or amedical doctor within 5 to 10 minutes walking distance from their dwellings,approximately 10 percent state that the services are rather or very unsatisfactory.Thirty-five percent of the households lacking such services close to the dwelling voicetheir dissatisfaction.

We asked one randomly selected adult in each household if he or she believedthat the public health system had developed its service in an excellent, good, or poorway. Two out of three persons (67 percent) stated that the public health services haddeveloped excellently, whereas 17 percent held the opinion that they had developedin a good way and 16 percent said that the public health system had developedpoorly. This ‘verdict’ is unanimous for most subgroups of the population. There isno variation in opinion between men and women, or between respondents belongingto different generations. There is no significant disagreement between the insuredand non-insured. Individuals with a chronic illness or disability do not think dif-ferently from individuals without such a health problem. However, it appears thatthe tendency to be critical toward the performance of the public health system isassociated with increasing education (figure 5.25). This result is quite consistentin the JLCS: educated respondents generally evaluate services as poorer, or problems

Figure 5.24 Households’ satisfaction with local health services, according to whether they haveany health centre or physician or not within their immediate living area (n = 5,849)

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as more important. This is likely an effect of their increased expectations to thequality, or perhaps also comparative knowledge.

When individuals evaluate the performance of the Jordanian public healthsystem, they most likely put considerable weight on the services at the local or dis-trict level, since these are the services they know best from own experience. We mustassume, therefore, that the mere presence of local public health centres, public clinics,and public hospitals, in addition to the quality of their work, influences a respond-ent’s appraisal of the public health system. That opinions about the health serviceson the local and national levels are associated is reflected in figure 5.26. It showsthat the respondents who live in households which are satisfied with the local healthfacilities more often than others rate the public health system as ‘excellent’.

As discussed above, the survey asked all households if anyone had beenacutely ill or injured during the two weeks preceding the interview. Informationabout the evaluation of the treatment were sought for all household members whohad visited a health institution because of their health problem — about 7 percentof the total sample. The result is pictured in figure 5.27, which shows a quite highlevel of satisfaction with the services received. Thus, as many as 87 percent found

Figure 5.25 Respondents stating that the public health system has developed poorly, by highestlevel of education completed; RSI 15 years or older

Figure 5.26 Respondents saying that the public health system has developed excellently, bylevel of satisfaction with local health facilities; RSI 15 years or older

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Figure 5.27 Households’ opinion about treatment and service given by selected health insti-tutions following acute illness or injury

the consultation very satisfactory or rather satisfactory. The level of satisfaction isquite similar for the various types of institutions.

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:sesacdetcelesforebmuN 3055

:atadgnissimfoesuacebdetcejerrebmuN 104

:sisylanaehtnidedulcnisesacforebmuN 2015

sieulaVtuCehT 05.

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)elamef.sv(elaM 3173, 2080, 4444,12 1 0000, 5940, 6944,1

sraeyniegA 9650,- 7200, 7447,254 1 0000, 4832,- 7449,

)noitacudeon.sv(noitacudedetelpmoC 4688,8 3 8030, 1910,

rehgiH 8242, 2011, 0358,4 1 6720, 0910, 8472,1

yradnoceS 5020, 4101, 8040, 1 0048, 0000, 7020,1

loohcscisaB 6720,- 0480, 9701, 1 5247, 0000, 8279,

)tsewol.sv(emocnidlohesuoH 3267,63 2 0000, 3460,

tsehgiH 6704, 4580, 8857,22 1 0000, 2150, 1305,1

muideM 8230, 5180, 1261, 1 2786, 0000, 4330,1

foedistuo.sv(ecrofruobalnI)ecrofruobal

4080, 2580, 0098, 1 5543, 0000, 7380,1

)aeradamonromraf.sv(aeralaitnediserfoepyT 1135,7 3 8650, 9310,

laitnedisernabrU 1393,- 6571, 1510,5 1 1520, 5910,- 9476,

pmaceegufeR 2924,- 8802, 5322,4 1 9930, 7610,- 1156,

nabru-imes/laruR 5352,- 6181, 5949,1 1 6261, 0000, 1677,

)htuoS.sv(niamodgnitropeR 1683,83 5 0000, 8950,

nammA 9330, 5801, 8790, 1 4457, 0000, 5430,1

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 1714,- 7911, 1541,21 1 5000, 8530,- 9856,

abadaMdnaaqlaB 6841, 3431, 7522,1 1 2862, 0000, 2061,1

dibrI 3222,- 9911, 5734,3 1 7360, 5310,- 7008,

nuoljAdnahsareJ 3700, 3161, 1200, 1 7369, 0000, 4700,1

)roopyrev.sv(tnemnorivneroodnI 5593,02 3 1000, 6240,

doogyreV 9673, 9980, 3375,71 1 0000, 3440, 7754,1

dooG 9782, 1380, 7400,21 1 5000, 5530, 7333,1

rooP 5781, 3180, 1023,5 1 1120, 5020, 2602,1

)reven.sv(gnikomS 2701,62 2 0000, 8250,

yliaD 7814,- 1280, 0920,62 1 0000, 0550,- 9756,

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8548,1- 6791, 1972,78 1 0000, 7301,- 9751,

tnatsnoC 0605,1 3121, 2602,451 1 0000,

Appendix 5.1: Logistic Regression on Self-PerceivedGlobal Health

196


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Chapter 6 Household Income and Wealth

Marie W. Arneberg and Taleb Awad

Summary

Wage employment is the most important determinant of economic welfare forJordanian households. More than 60 percent of all households report employmentto be the most important income source, and another 10 percent have it as a sec-ondary income source. Less than 20 percent report self employment as main incomesource. However, household income and poverty does not depend on whetheremployment is in the form of wages or self-employment, as long as the householdhas at least one employed member. Whether they have labour resources or not, mosthouseholds depend on some form of transfer income, the most commonly receivedtransfer is food coupons, but more important is monetary gifts and remittances fromrelatives.

Households whose main provider is unemployed or economically inactiveface a high risk of living in poverty. They rely on gifts and transfers from relativesand governmental or private organisations. Over-represented in this group arefemale-headed households, camp refugees and households in the domain of Balqa/Madaba.

Education is the key to improving income, as education both raises thechances of getting employment, and gives access to better paid jobs. Householdsheaded by a person without any education have 8 times the risk of being poor ashouseholds headed by a person with post-secondary education.

The 1991 Gulf War led to rapid changes in the Jordanian economy as Jor-dan was a major transit country for trade to and from Iraq, and also received a largeinflow of persons who were expelled from the Gulf countries. The loss of remittancesfrom Gulf workers was probably somewhat offset by the savings brought back bythe Gulf returnees and the subsequent construction boom. Despite positive percapita economic growth over the past few years, less than 25 percent of the house-holds in the JLCS report that their income increased during the year prior to thesurvey. While households which have their income from public sector employmentseldom complain about decreased incomes, that is not the case for householdswhichare dependent on employment in the trade or construction sectors. As many

CHAPTER 7 CHAPTER 5

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of the refugees and foreign workers are employed in these sectors, they have beensomewhat more affected by economic difficulties than other Jordanians, who aremore likely to get their income from public employment.

Income mobility is low, and the trend seems to be toward increasing differ-ences rather than evening out the distribution of income over time. Poor house-holds more often report that their income has declined during the year prior to theinterview. The poor generally have low expectations for the future, and pessimismincreases with the duration of poverty. Poor households headed by highly educatedpersons are more optimistic than those with low education, who rather tend to puttheir fate into God’s hands.

The Distribution of Income

All households interviewed in the JLCS were asked about the total annual house-hold income from all sources during 1995. Respondents were not asked to reportthe exact figure, but selected one of 10 categories. These income brackets wereconstructed so that the two lower brackets roughly corresponded to the poverty linesused in Jordan at the time.

Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of household annual income and indicatesthat the median income is approximately JD 2000. This is substantially lower that

Figure 6.1 Distribution of annual household income

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what was found in the 1992 income and expenditure survey conducted in Jordan(around JD 3000). Given the methodological differences between the two surveys,it is not surprising that JLCS underestimates income.

The JLCS indicates that 80 percent of all households in Jordan have incomefrom employment as the main source of income; 63 percent from wage labour and17 percent have self-employment as main income source. Of the remaining house-holds, 4 percent live mainly on income from property, while 16 percent have transferincome as most important source of income. A detailed breakdown of differentincome sources, and how the importance of different income sources varies withthe economic resources in the household, is shown in chapter appendix 6.1.

Figure 6.2 shows that there is a large difference in the income level betweenthose who have income from employment as main income source, and those whohave not. For example, almost 50 percent of the households with transfers as their

Figure 6.2 Cummulative distribution of annual household income by household'smain income source

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main income source have annual incomes below JD 1450, while this applies to only20 percent of households who mainly live from employment income. Whether theemployment income is generated through wage employment or self-employmentdoes not seem to have much impact on the level of income. However, this resultcould be biased because almost 20 percent of self-employed households did notreport their income.

What does seem to matter, however, is the reliance on a single or multipleincome sources. As figure 6.3 shows, households which depend solely on wage earn-ings are more likely to have low income than households which combine wages withother income. (Although it is not reported in the figure, this result holds irrespec-tive of the number of earners in the household, and hence it is not only a result ofthe fact that households with multiple income sources also have more than oneincome earner.) Moreover, as figure 6.4 shows, 90 percent of households who livemainly from employment income have some form of secondary income, but halfof the households which have transfers as main income source have no secondarysource of income.

Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show that the 16 percent of households in Jordan whichdepend mainly on income from gifts and transfers are the most economicallyvulnerable households. In order to find out more about these households, table 6.1compares some vital household characteristics of households which have transfersas main income source and those which have employment income (wages or selfemployment) as main income source. The results show that households without

Figure 6.3 Percentage of households with annual income less than 1450 JD, by householdincome sources.

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labour resources, households where head of household is old, and female-headedhouseholds are over-represented in the group which depends on transfer income.

For example, while only 10 percent of Jordanian households are headed bya woman, every third “transfer-household” is female-headed. Hence, the uneven dis-tribution of income between households headed by men and women illustrated infigure 6.5, is to a large extent caused by the dependence of female-headed house-holds on transfer income.

Figure 6.4 Supplementary income sources. Percent of households by mainhousehold income source

Table 6.1 Characteristics of households whose main income source is transfer income, versushouseholds whose main income source is employment. Percent of households

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1 The reason why some households can have employment income but no economically ac-tive members, is that household income refers to annual income, while labour force partic-ipation was asked only for the week prior to the interview.

2 In most households, it is the head that is the main provider. However, in cases where thehead is out of the labour force or unemployed, another person in the household is consideredas main provider if he or she is employed. Among female-headed households, one third havea male main provider, while only 4 percent of male-headed households have a female mainprovider.

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Figure 6.5 Cummulative distribution of annual household income by sex of household head

In general the group of Palestinian refugees who live in the refugee camps have lowerincomes than both non-refugees and refugee households outside the camps. About46 percent of households which are living in refugee camps have income below JD1450 per year, as shown in figure 6.6.

The geographical differences in income distribution are shown in table 6.2.There are some differences in the income distribution across domains. The highestoccurrence of low-income households is in the domain of Balqa/Madaba, while thelowest is in the domains of the South and Amman. This result is explainable in lightof the regional differences in labour market findings described in chapter 7. Thedomains of the South and (to a lesser extent) Amman have higher rates of labourforce participation, higher proportions of full-time employed individuals, and lowerrates of unemployment, compared to other domains. In addition, the domain ofthe South has a higher percentage of households which have multiple incomesources.

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More than 20 percent of households in these two domains have annual incomesexceeding JD 3600, while this applies to only about 13 percent of households inthe domains of Balqa/Madaba, Jerash/Ajloun and Zarqa/Mafraq. Hence the resultsindicate some geographical concentration especially of high-income households inJordan.

Table 6.2 further indicates that the richer households are most commonlyfound in the urban areas, and a clustering of low income in rural areas. However,in most domains the households with extreme low income are just as often locatedin the urban as in rural areas, which indicates a substantial amount of urban poverty,the higher cost of living in urban areas taken into account. Rural poverty is prima-rily found in the domains of Balqa/Madaba and the South.

Figure 6.6 Cummulative distribution of annual household income by refugee status and na-tionality

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Economic Resources and Income

To this point, the analysis has focused on describing some of the observed varia-tions in household income, and how high and low income is clustered in certainsocial groups and geographical areas. Table 6.3 provides a closer description of theresources available to the households in the lower and upper extremes of the incomedistribution. The first column in the table describes the 10 percent of householdswith the lowest income (or the bottom decile): how many are characterised by loweducation, lack of land, lack of employment etc. The second column describes the10 percent of households with the highest income (the top decile), and the lastcolumn gives the average figures for the whole population for comparison.

Table 6.2 Distribution of annual total household income, percent of households in the regionand by urban/rural locality

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nabrU 11 41 12 32 21 81 001 987

laruR 01 51 42 52 21 31 001 232

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nabrU 71 31 91 32 21 51 001 391

laruR 41 31 22 72 41 9 001 111

htuoS llA 01 41 81 12 41 32 001 295

nabrU 7 01 71 22 71 82 001 223

laruR 31 91 91 12 11 71 001 072

llA 01 61 81 32 31 81 001 9685

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As table 6.3 shows, many low-income households are headed by an old person orby a woman. Single-person households are also more common among low-incomehouseholds, but this is not necessarily a poverty problem as small households needless income to obtain a certain material welfare level than larger households do. Morealarming, however, are the refugee camp households, which make up 13 percent ofthe low-income households, but only 5 percent of all the households in the country.Camp households also tend to be quite large, which makes the income available toeach household member even smaller.

Table 6.3 shows a clear relationship between income and the resources avail-able to the household in the form of education, land, health, and labour. Thefollowing section discusses more thoroughly the relationship between household in-come and the household’s access to these resources. Finally, the interrelation betweensome demographic characteristics and economic resources are discussed. Chapterappendix 6.2 gives a more detailed breakdown of access to resources in the form oflabour and human capital.

Table 6.3 Characteristics of low-income households versus high-income households

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dlosraey06tsaeltasidaehdlohesuoH 14 41 71

dlosraey06tsaeltasiredivorpniaM 23 7 9

namowasidaehdlohesuoH 13 9 01

dlohesuohnosrepelgniS 91 1 5

pmaceegufernisevildlohesuoH 31 1 5

smelborphtlaehcinorhcsahredivorpniaM 23 7 21

etaretillisidaehdlohesuoH 15 7 91

sselronoitacudecisabsahdaehdlohesuoH 39 33 76

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srebmemevitcayllacimonoceonsahdlohesuoH 73 6 01

deyolpmenusiredivorpniaM 71 2 7

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dnallarutlucirganwotonseoddlohesuoH 88 66 18

tolpnedragaotsseccaevahtonseoddlohesuoH 58 95 17

latoT 001 001 001

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Income and Access to Agricultural LandAlmost 40 percent of all Jordanian households have access to agricultural land or agarden plot. About 19 percent of the households own agricultural land, of which15 percent have land inside Jordan. Around 20 percent of the landowners have smallplots of less than 5 dunums (1 dunum equals 1,000 square metres), while 20 percenthave large plots of more than 20 dunums. Agricultural land is unevenly distributedgeographically corresponding to the urban/rural structure of the country: while lessthan 10 percent of households in Amman and Zarqa/Mafraq own agricultural land,25-30 percent of households in the South and Jerash/Ajloun do. There are no dif-ferences between male and female-headed households regarding access to land.However, refugees and immigrants have far less land than other households inJordan. In addition to the landowners, some 20 percent of the households own orhave access to a hakura or garden plot, which can supply the household with addi-tional income from self-produced food.

The distribution of garden plots is less unequal than is the distribution ofland ownership. Nevertheless, few camp refugees and non-refugee immigrants haveaccess to a garden plot. As table 6.3 shows, most low-income households do nothave access to agricultural land or garden plots, but this is the case for most otherhouseholds in Jordan as well. Hence, being “land-less” is generally not a good indi-cator of economic deprivation. However, the JLCS results illustrate that land own-ership is positively associated with income, as lack of land ownership is much morecommon in the bottom than in the top decile.

The JLCS indicates that less than half of the landowners utilise the land fortheir own farming. Some probably rent it out, as almost one out of five landownersreport to have income from rent of land or buildings. However, this means that atleast one-third of all land-owners do not have any economic benefit from the land.Poor economic returns from farming coupled with availability of public employ-ment as a good substitute probably contributes to this low level of land utilisationin Jordan. The highest rate of land utilisation is found in Jerash/Ajloun, with 59percent of landowners farming, and the lowest is in the capital Amman at 21 percent.

Income and Labour ResourcesAbout 90 percent of the households in Jordan have labour resources, in the sensethat at least one household member is in the labour force either as a wage employ-ee, self-employed, or is actively seeking work. Hence, about 10 percent of house-holds have no economically active members. This is much higher than reported bythe World Bank in 1994, where only 2.5 percent of the households were found tohave no labour force members (World Bank 1994). In addition, 7 percent of the

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households in Jordan have a main provider who is unemployed. Thus, a total of 17percent of the households do not have an employed member.

As figure 6.7 shows, labour resources are a major determinant of householdincome. As mentioned, the households without any employed member constitute17 percent of all households. Yet, among the poorest 10 percent of all households,they are in majority, as 54 percent of the households do not have any employedhousehold members. Thirty-seven percent of the households in the lowest decilehave no labour resources whatsoever, and in 17 percent of the low-income house-holds the main provider is unemployed, as depicted in table 6.3.

In the highest decile, only 8 percent of the households have no employedmembers: 6 percent have no labour force members, and 2 percent have an unem-ployed main provider.

Figure 6.7 Cummulative distribution of annual household income by labour market statusof household main provider in household

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Table 6.4 Characteristics of the households by employment status of main provider in thehousehold

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According to table 6.4, the lack of labour resources is common among householdswhose main provider is old, has low education, bad health, or is a woman. Also,single-person households are highly represented among households without anylabour resources.

Households where the main provider is unemployed are different from thosewithout labour resources in many respects: the main providers are younger and havemore education, fewer are women and very few live alone. Households living inrefugee camps are also over-represented among those with an unemployed mainprovider.

The differences between male and female-headed households are large whenit comes to labour resources. Table 6.4 shows that 43 percent of the householdswithout labour resources are female-headed. To see it from another perspective, 40percent of female-headed households have no labour resources, and thus are depend-ent on income from capital, gifts and transfers, while only 6 percent of the male-headed households lack this important resource. Also, in 8 percent of female-headedand 7 percent of male-headed households, the main provider is unemployed, leav-ing 48 percent of female-headed households without any employed member, asopposed to 13 percent of the male-headed households.

Households headed by non-Jordanians (not including Palestinian refugeeswithout Jordanian citizenship) are more likely to have labour resources. This groupconstitutes about 4 percent of all households, and is mainly composed of Egyptianimmigrants who have entered Jordan specifically for the purpose of obtainingemployment. There are no significant differences in household labour resources

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between the Palestinian refugee households and the rest of the Jordanian households,nor between households in the different regions.

Households which do not have access to labour resources rely heavily ontransfers: 79 percent of these households report transfers to be their most impor-tant income source. A majority of them have relatives abroad who send money, butonly 9 percent report that they have income from the Government's poor relief fund.The group of households without labour resources is not entirely homogenoushowever, as 14 percent live mainly from rent of land and buildings and other prop-erty income.

Differences in industry and occupation can also contribute to explain thevariation in income between households, although to a much lesser degree thanunemployment and being outside the labour force. Table 6.3 showed that house-holds that depend on income from agriculture are over-represented in the bottomincome decile. Figure 6.8 shows that households depending on income from

Figure 6.8 Cummulative distribution of annual household income by industry of main providerin household

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construction also often have low incomes. Households with income from educa-tion and health services and other private services have incomes above average, whilehouseholds with income from public administration employment have incomesclose to the average among households with employed members. The transport andmanufacturing industries are not shown in the figure, but have similar distributionsto trade and public administration.

Income and Human Capital: Education and HealthHuman capital is here measured through formal education, literacy and the absenceof chronic illness or injuries. The characteristics of persons with low education andpoor health are described in chapters 4 and 5. Table 6.3 shows that more than 80percent of all the households have a literate household head, and 34 percent have ahousehold head with secondary or higher education. There are substantial differ-ences between male-headed and female-headed households: less than 50 percent ofthe female household heads can read and write, and only 15 percent have complet-ed secondary education. In addition, women who are main household providers,report chronic health problems twice as often as male providers.

Camp refugees have less human capital than others, both in the form ofeducation and health. Refugees who do not live in camps also have somewhat morehealth problems than non-refugees, while returnees from the Gulf have more edu-cation than any other group. Immigrant workers rarely report health problems, andthey also tend to have more education than others. The geographical distributionof human capital is also uneven: household heads in Amman, the capital, have farmore education than household heads in other regions.

Education is an important prerequisite for being economically self-reliant,as 30 percent of households with illiterate heads have transfer income as most im-portant income source, as opposed to 7 percent for households where the head hashigher education. Although this is to a certain extent due to the fact that illiteracyis primarily found among the old, the results show that illiterate household headsmore often than other household heads depend on transfers, regardless of their age.This negative correlation of transfers with household education applies to all typesof transfers except assistance from relatives, which shows no correlation. Other gov-ernment transfers such as poor relief payments are received by 6 percent of the illit-erate household heads, but by none of the high-education household heads. Trans-fers from private organisations are also more common among the less educatedhouseholds.

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As table 6.3 and figure 6.9 demonstrate, human capital is the main determinant ofhousehold income. In fact, the majority of households in the bottom decile have ahousehold head who can not read and write, although only 18 percent of the house-hold heads in Jordan are illiterate. In addition, 93 percent of the bottom decile ofhousehold heads have no more than basic education. At the other end of the incomedistribution, the majority of the households in the top decile are headed by a per-son with higher education, while only 8 percent of the high-income household headshave no education.

As can be seen from figure 6.9, the percentage of the households with annualincomes of more than JD 2900 increases from 17 percent for households where thehead has no education to 54 percent for households where the head has highereducation. While households headed by a person with a Bachelor’s or higher degreeare almost completely absent from the lowest income brackets, close to one-half of

Figure 6.9 Cummulative distribution of annual household income by education of householdhead

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the households where the head has never attended school have yearly incomes belowJD 1450. Surprisingly, a large share of the households headed by persons withvocational secondary education have low incomes (33 percent), compared to only13 percent for those with academic secondary. This can partly be explained by thelabour market analysis in chapter 7, indicating that vocational secondary graduatesmore commonly have lower status jobs. However, it is surprising that householdsheaded by vocational secondary graduates have lower average incomes than house-holds where the head has not even completed basic school. Finally, 35 percent ofthe households with a household head who have a Master or Ph.D. have annualincomes above JD 9600. Hence, except for vocational secondary, the results indi-cate the existence of a strong positive correlation between household income andthe education level of the household head.

Households where the main provider is in bad health are also concentratedat the lowest part of the income distribution. One in three households in the bot-tom decile have a main provider with chronic health problems, as opposed to only7 percent of the high-income households.

The Relation of Gender, Age and Education toIncome

As previously shown in figure 6.5, almost one-half of all female-headed householdshave annual incomes less than JD 1450, opposed to one out of four male-headedhouseholds. Table 6.5 gives some of the explanation of this: in general, female house-hold heads have less education and more health problems than male heads, and theymore often live alone, all factors that are correlated with low income. Female house-hold heads also tend to be older than the male heads, and age of household head isalso correlated with household income: 41 percent of households where the headis above 60 years have less than JD 1450 in annual income, 21 percent of the mid-dle-aged household heads and 36 percent of the youngest heads.

When age and sex are combined, the results show that the differences betweenmale and female-headed households are deepened by the age structure of the house-hold heads. Although female household heads have lower incomes than male headsin all age groups except for the very young, figure 6.10 indicates that old femaleheads very often have low incomes (67 percent), while the effect of age is moremoderate in male-headed households. The majority of households with old maleheads have income from employment as main income source, while for old femaleheads, income from transfer is much more important. While most households be-long to the middle-age category, regardless of the sex of the household head, it is

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evident that low income is more rare when the head is a middle-aged man (19 per-cent) than a middle-aged woman (36 percent).

Combining education and gender produces a similar effect. Educationcontributes to higher household income, and the fact that female heads have lesseducation (regardless of age) compounds the difference. Although female headswithout any education have far less income than male heads without education, the

Figure 6.10 Percent of households with annual income less than JD 1450, by sex, age andeducation of household head

Table 6.5 The relationship between sex and age, health, education and household size

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cisaB 05 43

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esaesidcinorhC 61 43

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income differences between male and female-headed households get smaller aseducation increases.

Household composition also contributes to differences between male andfemale-headed households. This is because single-person households in general havevery low incomes, and because female heads live alone more often than male heads.Figure 6.10 illustrates, however, that female heads are worse off than male heads inthis regard. That is so because single women are old, while single men are young.

To conclude, low-income households are single-person households, house-holds where the head is old, have low education or health problems. All these char-acteristics are more common among female-headed households, which explainsmost, but not all, of the observed high incidence of low income among female-headed households. Among male-headed households age and education arenegatively correlated, and households headed by older men therefore tend to havelow income. However, education seems to be more important than age in deter-mining income.

Determinants of Poverty

In the previous sections we have described the income distribution along severaldimensions, and also tried to find explanations for the observed variations in house-hold income. However, we have tried to avoid touching upon the issue of measuringpoverty, which is more complex than simply to estimate the number of householdor persons below a certain income level.

There are many attempts to define poverty, ranging from simple, absolutemeasures such as not being able to buy food to cover a minimum nutritional stand-ard, to more complex and relative definitions such as not being able to function inthe society. While household income can be used for estimating poverty by mostdefinitions, it is evident that the total income of a household is not the only deter-minant of poverty. Rather, poverty is determined by the imbalance between availa-ble income and the expenditure that is necessary for obtaining a certain materiallevel of living. Even if we would be able to define such an acceptable level (or povertyline), the required expenditures for obtaining a certain living standard will varybetween households, depending on differences in the cost of living in different partsof the country and the size and composition of the household.

In the JLCS it has proven to be a useful tool to ask the households directlyfor their own evaluation of their economic situation. Based on this, a subjectivepoverty measure is developed. The classification as poor follows if the household

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rejects all the following statements: 1) “we feel we are among the well-off in Jordan”,2) “we are not rich but manage to live well”, and 3) “we are neither rich nor poor”.

It is interesting to note that only 33 percent of the households with incomebelow JD 1450 per year consider themselves to be poor. In addition, 11 percent ofhouseholds with medium (JD 1450 to 2900) income and 3 percent of the high-income households (above JD 2900) consider themselves as poor. Figure 6.11illustrates that the main shortcoming of using total household income as a meas-ure of poverty is that household size is not taken into account. While only 20 percentof single-person households with annual income below JD 1450 think of themselvesas poor, 50 percent of the large low-income households do so. In the absence of aper capita income measure, this is an argument for using the subjective povertyassessment as a poverty indicator.

In all, 14 percent of the households consider themselves as poor (23 percentof female-headed and 13 percent of male-headed households). This is almost thesame as the poverty rate estimated by the World Bank (15 percent) after assessing arange of different poverty definitions on data from 1992 (World Bank 1994). Morerecent figures from ESCWA indicate that as much as 23 percent of the Jordanianpopulation was poor in 1995 (ESCWA 1996). This poverty measure includes a widerrange of indicators than just income, such as health, nutritional status and schoolenrolment. The JLCS indicates that poverty has at least not been reduced from 1992to 1996, despite positive per capita growth.

The analysis above has shown that the factors associated with income areinterrelated. Hence, it is not clear whether the high incidence of poverty amongfemale-headed households is caused by the general low education level among female

Figure 6.11 Percent of low-income hoseholds who consider themselves as poor

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heads, (other) factors that affect their low labour force participation rate, or by simplythe fact that they are female-headed (i.e. they lack a male provider). To furtherinvestigate the determinants of poverty in Jordan, a more sophisticated statisticalmodel is needed to isolate the effect of the single household characteristics on theprobability of living in poverty.

A logistic regression model is used for estimating the effects of selected house-hold characteristics on the probability of being poor (subjectively felt). (For moreinformation about logistic regression, see appendix 2 at the end of the book). Twomodels are estimated. The first regression is applied to all households, while thesecond is restricted to households in which at least one member is employed. Thesecond regression thus enables us to measure the effects of employment status onpoverty. The results of the two models are shown in chapter appendix 6.3.

The models find significant relationships between poverty and most of theexplanatory variables, and the predicted probability of being poor shows systemat-ically higher values for those who feel poor than for those who do not. Regretfully,the differences in the predicted probabilities between the two groups are not verylarge, and the cases are clustered around the range of 10-30 percent probability.

The two models show that the single most important determinant of pov-erty is education. The risk of being poor is 8 times as high for households wherethe head has no education than for households where the head has more than sec-ondary education. This is irrespective of whether the main provider in the house-hold is employed or not. When we only look at households that have at least oneemployed member, and control for industry and occupation of the main provider,the risk of being poor is still 5 times higher for households with uneducated headscompared to households where the heads have higher education. The householdswhose head has primary education have almost 3 times as high a risk of being poor,while those with secondary education have 2.5 times the risk of households withhighly educated household heads.

It has been shown a high incidence of both low income and high subjectivelyfelt poverty among female-headed households. In analysing the regression resultsfor all households, female headedness per se has no significant impact on the prob-ability of being poor. However, when looking at only households with at least oneemployed member, having a female head is a significant determinant and in factdoubles the risk of being poor. Thus, it appears that labour market attachment ismuch more important than sex of the head of household, and that poverty is equallycommon among households without any employed members, regardless of the sexof the head of household. However, among those households which have labourresources, female-headed households are worse off, regardless of education, numberof earners, industry and occupation. This may be caused by discrimination of womenin the labour market or - if it is not the head who is working but her sons - by lower

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earnings for the younger household members. An alternative explanation is thatemployment outside the home is a result of poverty among female household heads.For example, 10 percent of the female household heads have a husband abroad andare even better off than the average male-headed household. They do not need tohave any wage earners in the household.

With regard to the marital status of the household head, being divorced isassociated with a high risk of being poor. On the other hand, the lowest risk of beingpoor is found among widowed household heads. That the divorced have a risk ofbeing poor that is twice as high as for married people, while the widowed have lowerrisks, may be understood in light of the economic importance that relatives havefor Jordanian households. Whereas divorcing often means that persons are cut offfrom their own relatives as well as their the family-in-law, persons who are widowedare taken care of by other family members.

Household composition seems to have a strong impact on the risk of pover-ty. The number of earners in the household is less important than the dependencyratio, that is the relation between the number of mouths to feed and hands to work.(The dependency ratio is calculated by dividing the number of children and oldpersons in the household by the household size, and is a measure of the number ofdependants relative to providers in the household.)

As has been showed already, households in Amman generally have higherincome than households in other regions. The regression results show that this isnot merely due to the higher cost of living in Amman: being located in Ammanlowers the risk of being poor by almost 50 percent. Also there is a significantly higherrisk of being poor in the domain of Zarqa/Mafraq. The difference between urbanand rural areas is not significant.

Camp refugees have a risk of being poor that is twice as high as for non-ref-ugees. This is irrespective of education and employment status. The effect is evenhigher when looking at households with at least one employed member, whichimplies that camp refugees in general have lower wages than others.

Although occupation is an important determinant of poverty, industry is not.Households where the head is working as day labourer, unskilled worker or in someother elementary occupations, have twice the risk of being poor compared to house-holds where the main provider works as a professional or manager. Clerical occu-pations are also associated with lower poverty risk, while there is no significantimpact on poverty from working in service/sales occupations or as a skilled worker.Among the different industries, it is only the construction industry that is associ-ated with more poverty. Hence, households where the main provider is an unskilledlabourer working in construction have a very high risk of being poor.

The relationship between poverty and access to a garden plot or agriculturalland is more difficult to assess, as it could just as well be that high income enables

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households to acquire land, or that having access to arable land yields higher incomedue to income-generating activities. In any case, the prevalence of poverty amongthose who have a garden plot or who farm their own land is significantly lower thanamong other households.

Economic Mobility

The households interviewed in the JLCS were asked whether the household in 1995had more, the same, or less income than in 1994. More than one-half of the house-holds in Jordan experienced no change in their income during the period 1994 to1995. However, while 24 percent said that their income had increased, 22 percentsaid that it decreased during the same period.

Figure 6.12 shows that the economic mobility is very low and that the trendis toward more polarisation: it is the poor who are getting poorer while the rich getricher. These results suggest that the poverty situation is worsening over time. Itseems that the well off households are more likely to experience increases in income,while the poor households are over-represented among households that have expe-rienced income stagnation or decrease. This result is the same whether poverty ismeasured through annual income or through self-assessment.Female-headed households are not over-represented among those who have had theirincome reduced, but fewer of them have experienced growth in income than house-holds headed by men. Gulf returnees and Palestinian refugees are over-representedamong those who have experienced decreased income. This is probably because

Figure 6.12 Reported change in household income from 1994 to 1995

219

CONTENTS

Figure 6.13 Reported change in household income from 1994 to 1995, by employmentindustry of main provider

refugee households are more dependent on transfer income (camp refugees), remit-tances from abroad (all refugees), and self-employment (refugees outside camp), andthey often work with construction and trade. These economic sources seem to havebeen most severely affected by the economic changes that followed the Arab Gulfcrises of 1990-91, whereas public sector employees have experienced increased in-come more often than others.

Moreover, income change is not the same for all domains. Households inAmman more often report reduced income than other households, most likely

Figure 6.14 Reported change in household income from 1994 to 1995, by main household'sincome source and domain

220

CONTENTS

because of the importance of the trade sector in this region. Increased income ismost common in Irbid, Jerash/Ajloun and the South, reported by approximately30 percent of the households.

As mentioned, poor households are over-represented among those who havehad their income reduced, and more than two thirds of the poor households reportthat the hardship has lasted for more than five years. Moreover, the poor have littlehope for the future; around 80 percent of them believe that their economic situationwill not improve in the coming few years (of which 60 percent say that the futureis up to God). As expected, the pessimism is stronger among those who have beenpoor for a long time. Optimism seems to increase with the education of the house-hold head.

Household Wealth

Figure 6.16 reveals that more than 60 percent of households in Jordan own the housethey live in. More than 90 percent of the households own a TV set, and more than80 percent own a refrigerator, radio and cassette player. Only one in three house-holds own ordinary telephone sets. Luxury goods like video players are owned onlyby about 22 percent of the population. Four percent have personal computers,mainly high-income households. One quarter of the households own a car. Asexpected, the ownership of capital is correlated with income. Figure 6.16 shows theownership of selected durable goods broken down by household income.

Only 12 percent of the female-headed households own a car, compared to27 percent of the households headed by men. This is probably a result of both theweaker purchasing power of female-headed households and the fact that fewJordanian women drive cars. Other durable goods are just as common in female-

Figure 6.15 Expectations for the future among the poor, by education of head of household

221

CONTENTS

headed households as in male-headed ones. Palestinian refugees and Gulf return-ees tend to have more durable goods than other households, but they less often ownthe house they live in.

As households accumulate capital over time, it is not surprising that theownership of durable goods increases with age of household head. House owner-ship is strongly correlated with age, whereas for other items, there seems to be aninverse-U relationship.

Saving is not widespread among Jordanians. Only about 21 percent of thehouseholds report having any savings: 14 percent have savings in banks or similarinstitutions, and 8 percent have jam'iyya savings. Savings are more widespread

Figure 6.16 Ownership of capital and durable goods, by household income

222

CONTENTS

Figure 6.17 Ownership of capital and durable goods by age of household head

among the Gulf returnees than in any other group, but it is not known whether thesesavings were brought from the Gulf, or if the households continued to accumulatecapital after returning to Jordan.

223

CONTENTS

Appendix 6.1

Distribution of household income sources by household economic resources. Percent of house-holds which had income from a source during the last year, and percent that had it as mainincome source

llA-esuoH

sdloh

.hesuoHtuohtiw

ruobalsecruoser

.hesuoHhcihw

nwo-utlucirga

dnallaredisninadroJ

.hesuoHhtiw

etartilidaeh

.hesuoHhtiw

-cudedetadaeh

.hesuoHhtiwknab

ayyi'maj/sgnivas

emocniegaW segawhsaC 17 4 76 06 77 37

dnikniegaW 81 1 52 71 02 81

ecruosemocniniamsasegaW 36 3 65 15 37 46

fleStnemyolpme

emocniemocnitnemyolpme-flesralugeR 42 3 04 52 12 92

rofnoitcudorpemohmorfemocnIelas

3 2 9 6 1 2

ecruosemocniniamsatnemyolpmefleS 71 4 22 61 51 12

refsnarTemocni

ytiruceslaicosdnanoisneP 51 42 72 41 9 41

ylppuSfoyrtsiniMmorfsnopuoC 08 77 38 18 17 27

stfigyratenoM 22 51 42 41 72 72

tahkaZ 1 3 1 2 0

feilerrooptnemnrevoG 2 9 2 6 0 0

refsnarttnemnrevogrehtO 1 6 2 4 0 1

pihsralohcS 1 1 2 1 1 1

elbatirahcmorfrefsnarTsnoitazinagro

0 1 0 1 0

refsnartAWRNU 0 1 0 1 0 0

noitazinagrorehtomorfrefsnarT 0 1 0 0 0 0

sevitalermorfsecnattimeR 51 55 41 72 01 11

refsnartrehtO 0 1 0 0 0 0

ecruosemocniniamsaemocnirefsnarT 61 97 81 92 9 9

ytreporPemocni

rodnalfotnermorfemocnIsgnidliub

9 41 91 8 9 51

stiforptseretnI 1 2 1 0 1 3

cte,serahsmorfstiforP 2 2 5 1 3 5

emocniytreporprehtO 1 1 1 0 1 1

ecruosemocniniamsaemocniytreporP 4 41 4 4 4 6

emocniynA 001 001 001 001 001 001

forebmuNsnoitavresbo

0036 816 359 2221 0312 1131

224

CONTENTS

Appendix 6.2

Household economic resources by selected background characteristics. Percent

evaHruobal

secruoser

nwO-lucirga

larutdnal

nwO-utlucirga

dnallaredisninadroJ

ronwOevah

otsseccanedrag

tolp

-esuoHdlohdaeh

tonnacdaerdnaetirw

-esuoHdlohdaehsah

-elpmocdet

-dnocesyra

loohcs

knabevaHrosgnivas

ayyi'maj latoT

llA 09 91 51 92 91 43 12 001

daehfoxeS elaM 49 02 51 92 51 63 12 001

elameF 06 71 41 82 45 51 71 001

sutatsnezitiC seeguferpmaCdecalpsiddna

88 7 2 7 92 12 51 001

seeguferrehtOdecalpsiddna

19 21 6 52 51 53 32 001

nainadroJ-noNseegufer-non

59 91 2 6 42 34 02 001

-nonnainadroJseegufer

98 62 52 73 12 33 02 001

sutatseenruteR seenruterfluG 09 71 7 92 9 54 92 001

niamoD nammA 19 51 9 52 51 14 62 001

dnaaqraZqarfaM

09 51 01 32 02 82 81 001

dnaaqlaBabadaM

29 32 81 03 92 92 81 001

dibrI 88 52 32 53 91 13 61 001

dnahsaraJnuoljA

88 03 92 93 32 52 11 001

htuoS 19 82 72 63 82 92 22 001

225

CONTENTS

Appendix 6.3 Logistic Regression on Poverty

All households:sesacdetcelesforebmuN 9195



sieulaVtuCehT 02.

detciderP

devresbO 0 1

0 0344 879 %19.18

1 824 644 %40.15

llarevO %26.77

Variables in the equation


daehdlohesuohelameF 6970. 9971. 0691. 1 0856. 0000. 9280.1

)dewodiwsv(daehdlohesuohfosutatslatiraM 8884.9 3 5320. 2620.

decroviD 3288. 4203. 1015.8 1 5300. 8530. 3614.2

deirramreveN 4581. 3972. 7044. 1 8605. 0000. 7302.1

deirraM 8060. 4202. 1090. 1 0467. 0000. 7260.1

oitarycnednepeD 0265. 5551. 7250.31 1 3000. 7640. 1457.1

nisnosrepdeyolpmeforebmuNdlohesuoh

9911.- 4550. 8676.4 1 6030. 0320.- 0788.

)rehgihsv(daehdlohesuohfonoitacudE 4488.561 3 0000. 6771.

enoN 4680.2 6271. 4770.641 1 0000. 6861. 6550.8

cisaB 0933.1 5751. 7552.27 1 0000. 7711. 1518.3

yradnoceS 6898. 7191. 8269.12 1 0000. 8260. 1654.2

)htuoSsv(niamoD 3480.29 5 0000. 3721.

nammA 2116.- 4541. 8976.71 1 0000. 6550.- 7245.

garfaMdnaaqraZ 9503. 1541. 4544.4 1 0530. 0220. 9753.1

abadaMdnaaqlaB 2171. 7361. 6390.1 1 7592. 0000. 7681.1

dibrI 5543.- 8651. 0458.4 1 6720. 7320.- 9707.

nuoljAdnahsaraJ 7111. 8591. 7523. 1 2865. 0000. 2811.1

)larursv(nabrU 5271.- 5001. 8449.2 1 2680. 7310.- 5148.

redivorpniamfosutatstnemyolpmE)ecrofruobaledistuosv(

2125.04 2 0000. 9480.

deyolpmE 4632.- 7841. 6825.2 1 8111. 2010.- 4987.

deyolpmenU 4186. 3161. 3458.71 1 0000. 9550. 7679.1

)seegufer-nonsv(sutatseegufeR 4646.91 2 1000. 6550.

seeguferpmaC 7066. 6941. 2025.91 1 0000. 8850. 2639.1

seeguferrehtO 8480. 1390. 3038. 1 2263. 0000. 5880.1

tolpnedragsaH 7856.- 4990. 6009.34 1 0000. 9090.- 5715.

dnalmrafsnwO 6435.- 1961. 6099.9 1 6100. 7930.- 9585.

tnatsnoC 3696.1- 4951. 0722.311 1 0000.

226

CONTENTS

Variables in the equationelbairaV B .E.S dlaW fd giS R )B(pxE

daehelameF 8095. 6932. 0970.6 1 7310. 2330. 5508.1

)dewodiwsv(daehfosutatslatiraM 7201.21 3 0700. 6040.

decroviD 5163.1 9493. 8988.11 1 6000. 6150. 1209.3

deirramreveN 7913. 8773. 0617. 1 5793. 0000. 7673.1

deirraM 1114. 6882. 5820.2 1 4451. 8200. 5805.1

oitarycnednepeD 0406. 2402. 1747.8 1 1300. 6240. 5928.1

snosrepdeyolpmeforebmuN 6301.- 1750. 3882.3 1 8960. 6810.- 6109.

)rehgihsv(daehfonoitacudE 6956.76 3 0000. 9821.

enoN 9817.1 3612. 7641.36 1 0000. 4821. 4875.5

cisaB 7111.1 8491. 3965.23 1 0000. 8090. 4930.3

yradnoceS 5458. 9022. 9959.41 1 1000. 1950. 3053.2

)htuoSsv(NIAMOD 4448.55 5 0000. 2111.

nammA 4505.- 3371. 8605.8 1 5300. 9140.- 2306.

garfaMdnaaqraZ 1053. 7271. 2111.4 1 6240. 9320. 2914.1

abadaMdnaaqlaB 3412. 1391. 0232.1 1 0762. 0000. 0932.1

dibrI 4952.- 3881. 7798.1 1 3861. 0000. 5177.

nuoljAdnahsaraJ 6640.- 5642. 7530. 1 2058. 0000. 5459.

)larursv(nabrU 8131.- 0321. 6841.1 1 8382. 0000. 5678.

yratnemele/delliksnusv(redivorpniamfonoitapuccO)snoitapucco

9308.31 4 9700. 6930.

slanoisseforP 3396.- 1202. 7867.11 1 6000. 3150.- 9994.

scirelC 2654.- 4591. 0254.5 1 5910. 5030.- 7336.

selas/ecivreS 3961.- 4491. 0857. 1 0483. 0000. 3448.

srekrowdellikS 4481.- 5241. 2576.1 1 6591. 0000. 6138.

)secivresrehtO.sv(redivorpniamfoyrtsudnI 4722.12 7 4300. 1440.

erutlucirgA 9012. 7532. 2008. 1 0173. 0000. 7432.1

gnirutcafunaM 1980. 7891. 2102. 1 7356. 0000. 2390.1

noitcurtsnoC 1084. 5112. 6451.5 1 2320. 2920. 2616.1

edarT 9572.- 4802. 4357.1 1 4581. 0000. 9857.

tropsnarT 3462.- 0122. 4034.1 1 7132. 0000. 8767.

.mdacilbuP 1911. 4881. 8993. 1 2725. 0000. 5621.1

htlaehdna.udE 8141.- 6922. 3183. 1 9635. 0000. 8768.

)eegufer-nonsv(sutatseegufeR 7906.22 2 0000. 8070.

seeguferpmaC 2068. 9081. 1706.22 1 0000. 5470. 5363.2

seeguferrehtO 9661. 4211. 0302.2 1 7731. 4700. 6181.1

tolpnedragsaH 2784.- 3611. 3645.71 1 0000. 7460.- 3416.

dnalmrafsnwO 4865.- 0791. 9623.8 1 9300. 3140.- 4665.

tnatsnoC 6479.1- 0902. 9592.98 1 0000.

Houesholds with employed member:sesacdetcelesforebmuN 3394



sieulaVtuCehT 02.

detciderP

devresbO 0 1

0 9804 055 %31.88

1 463 132 %28.83

llarevO %25.28

CHAPTER 7 CHAPTER 5

227

CONTENTS

Chapter 7 Work and Working Conditions

Taleb Awad and Marie W. Arneberg

Summary

The purpose of this chapter is primarily to analyse the structure of employment andunemployment in Jordan, but also to explain why a majority of the adults in Jordanare not economically active.

The labour force in Jordan is small compared to other countries. This is dueto a relatively large share of the population being under working age, and becauseof the low labour force participation among women as most of them stop workingwhen they get married. Higher education is the most important factor in keepingwomen in the labour force, but attitudes towards women and social restrictions alsoinfluence female economic activity. For men, health problems are the most impor-tant determinant of non-participation in the labour force.

Women more often have part-time jobs. Unemployment is also higher amongwomen than among men, especially among women with higher education. Spellsof unemployment lasts longer for women than for men, and the majority of unem-ployed women have never worked. While unemployment is widespread among theyoung, and in particular among Palestinian camp refugees, part-time work is com-mon among the elderly.

The public sector is the largest employer in Jordan, and employs the major-ity of persons with higher education, except for the Palestinian refugees. Althoughlow-skill occupations are predominantly a sign of low education, they also includesome 8 percent of men with higher education, implying excess supply of personswith higher education. Among foreign workers in Jordan, men predominantly workin the construction sector, while women are cleaners and housemaids. Palestinianrefugees work mainly in trade and other commercial services.

Workers in the construction sector are highly exposed to physical hazards atwork, and they seldom have access to protective equipment. Employees in the servicesector are least exposed. Less than 15 percent of the employed population in Jordanreceive updated, job relevant training paid by the employer. Most of those whoreceive training work in the public sector. However, the high degree of job relevance

CHAPTER 8 CHAPTER 6

228

CONTENTS

among those who have ever received training indicates that there is a potential forincreasing skills by using this kind of training.

The Labour Force

The JLCS uses a modified version of the framework for analysing economic activitydeveloped by the International Labour Office (Hussmanns et al. 1990). The frame-work makes it possible to classify the working age population (all persons 15 yearsand above) on the basis of each person’s activities during a particular week, the so-called “reference period”. All persons are classified into three mutually exclusivecategories: the employed, the unemployed, and persons outside the labour force.

An employed person is defined as an individual who worked at least one hourin the reference week or who was temporarily absent from work during that week.Persons working 35 hours or more during the reference week are defined as full-time workers, while those working less are part-time workers. An unemployed personis an individual who did not work even one hour in the designated week, but whowas actively seeking work. The sum of employed and unemployed individuals makesup the current economically active population or the labour force.

Hence, the labour force does not include persons who are not working ordid not actively look for a job during the reference week, as these persons are con-sidered to be economically inactive. This does not mean that the inactive popula-tion does not contribute to the economy of a nation, as many of them take care ofimportant reproduction activities such as child rearing and domestic work. Also,many of them may want to work, but do not actively seek jobs because they havelost hope of finding work. Others might refuse to work under the prevailing wageor other working conditions that are offered them.

The Size of the Labour ForceTable 7.1 gives a breakdown of the survey sample, according to the definitionsoutlined above. It shows that about 43 percent of the total population are below15 years of age and hence are below working age. In addition, less than one-half ofthe working age population is economically active. About 83 percent of theeconomically active are employed, which leaves an overall rate of unemploymentat 17 percent. However, 20 percent of the employed individuals were only doingpart time jobs.

While figures for 1991 indicated that only 20 percent of the Jordanian pop-ulation was economically active (World Bank 1994), the corresponding JLCS figure

229

CONTENTS

for 1996 is 25 percent. However, this is still among the lowest in the Arab world,and far below the average for developing countries. The most recent HumanDevelopment Report (UNDP 1997) compares 1990 labour force figures for selectedcountries. It shows that the Jordanian labour force was 27 percent of the total pop-ulation in 1990, compared to 31 percent in Lebanon, 34 in Saudi Arabia and 28in Syria. Industrial countries had an average of 49 percent, while the average fordeveloping countries was 47 percent.

Table 7.1 The labour force of Jordan. Number of weighted observations in the survey, andpercent of the total population

)%001(24273=noitalupoplatoT

)%5.75(12412=noitalupopegagnikroWwoleB

gnikrowega

)%4.52(9549=ecrofruobalehtnisnosrePnitoNruobal

ecrof

)%1.12(3487=snosrepdeyolpmE-yolpmenU

de

emiTlluFtraPemiT

sruoHnwonknu

yliraropmeTtnesbA

rosruoh53()erom

43(rosruoh

)ssel

5055 5541 245 143 6161 16911 12851

)%8.41( )%9.3( )%5.1( )%9.0( )%3.4( )%1.23( )%5.24(

As in other Arab countries, the difference between men and women concerningeconomic activity is immense. As figure 7.1 shows, a large majority of the femalepopulation 15 years and above are outside the labour force, whereas this holds foronly a small fraction of the male population.

The labour force participation rate is defined as the share of the working agepopulation who are economically active. It is computed as the number of labourforce members as a percentage of all persons 15 years and above. The overall labourforce participation in Jordan is 44 percent. This is mainly due to the very low femaleparticipation, which is only 15 percent, in contrast to the 72 percent of economi-cally active men. As a result, only 17 percent of the economically active persons inJordan are women. The female share of the labour force was reported to rise from13 percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 1990 (UNDP 1997), and thus seems to havestagnated during this decade. This is extremely low compared to other countries.In the Arab world we find lower rates in some of the oil-producing countries only.

230

CONTENTS

In 1990 women constituted on average 44 percent of the labour force in industrialcountries and 39 percent in developing countries. In Lebanon, the female share was27 percent and in Syria 25 percent.

Figure 7.1 Labour force categorisation by sex. Percent of total population

A study by the Jordanian Department of Statistics (DoS) found that the labour forceparticipation rate was 47 percent in 1994: 77 percent for men and 15 percent forwomen (Kharabshieh 1996). This shows that the rate of participation has notchanged for females during the period 1994-1996, although the JLCS gives a 5percent lower rate for men. This can partly be explained by differences in the defi-nitions of unemployment, where DoS uses a wider definition.

Determinants of Labour Force ParticipationBesides gender, life cycle stage is the most important determinant of economicactivity, far more important than education. As figures 7.2 and 7.3 show, male la-bour force participation is around 95 percent for the age groups where men gener-ally have responsibility for providing for the family. Married men also have a high-er labour force participation rate than men who have never married, irrespective ofage. The relationship is quite the opposite for women, as women stop working whenthey get married and start to have children. However, there seem to be some smallchanges over time in favour of female labour force participation, as younger womenin general are more active than women above 45 years of age. It is particularlyinteresting that married women of child-bearing age are more economically activethan older married women, irrespective of education level.

231

CONTENTS

Figure 7.2 Labour force participation by sex, age and education

As figure 7.2 shows, education mainly has three implications for labour force par-ticipation. First, entry into the labour market naturally starts later for people withmore education. Secondly, people with higher education will retire later. Thirdly,education has much more impact on economic activity for women than for men.

232

CONTENTS

The JLCS also reveals that while the choice of academic versus vocational secondarydoes not affect men's labour force participation, women's participation is higheramong those who have vocational secondary education.

Figure 7.4 indicates that marriage has less impact on economic activityamong well-educated women than among women with low education. Marriagereduces the labour force participation rate by about one-half for women with

Figure 7.4 Labour force participation rates among women by age, education and marital status

Figure 7.3 Labour force participation by sex, age and marital status

233

CONTENTS

secondary or higher education, but participation drops to near zero for low-educatedwomen when they marry.

Geographical variation in labour force participation is modest, althoughlarger for women than for men. As shown in table 7.2, the highest rate of econom-ically active persons is found in the South, with 76 percent for men and 20 percentfor women. On the bottom is Irbid with 70 percent for men and 12 percent forwomen.

Labour force participation does not vary significantly with Palestinian refugeestatus, although camp refugees tend to have slightly lower rates and other refugeesand displaced slightly higher rates than non-refugees. As expected, figure 7.5 showsthat immigrants who are not Palestinian refugees have much higher rates than any

Table 7.2 Gender- and domain specific labour force participation rates (percent of population15 years and above)

niamoD neM nemoW llA

nammA 17 51 44

qarfaM/aqraZ 47 41 54

abadaM/aqlaB 37 02 74

dibrI 07 21 14

nuoljA/hsaraJ 07 41 24

htuoS 67 02 84

latoT 27 51 44

Figure 7.5 Labour force participation by nationality and refugee status. Percent of persons15 years of age and above

234

CONTENTS

other group, as they are usually given residence permits in Jordan only on the con-dition that their labour resources are needed.

Whether a person desires to be employed or not, and whether the personsucceeds in finding a job, is affected by many factors. Moreover, these factors areoften intertwined. To isolate the effect of each factor on economic activity, a morethorough analysis of labour force participation is required.

Logistic regression analysis can be used to explain the probability of partic-ipating in the labour force based on a set of variables relating to the individual. Thevariables describe characteristics of the individual such as age, sex of household head,marital status, and health problems (chronic disease), but they can also reflect othersocial and economic characteristics such as geographical area, refugee status, house-hold income, education, training, and urban-rural location.

The analysis, which is documented in appendix 7.1, is done separately forever-married women, never married women, and men, as these three groups areassumed to have different determinants of labour force participation. Persons whoare currently enrolled in school or have an acute illness are not included in theanalysis.

Our analysis confirms that the determinants of male labour force participa-tion are different from those of females. Although age and education are commonsignificant factors for participation in all groups, the relative importance of educationis much higher for women than for men. Highly educated women have more than10 times the probability of being in the labour force than women with basic edu-cation or less1. For men, the difference in probability between these two educationgroups is only 50 percent. Also, while vocational training significantly increases theprobability of being economically active for women, it does not for men.

Having a chronic health problem is the single most important factor for maleeconomic inactivity, and having a chronic disease reduces the probability of partic-ipating in the labour force to one-tenth the probability of a fit person. While chronichealth problems do not seem to affect the economic activity of ever-married wom-en, they have a significant effect on never married women, although the effect islower than for men.

In every household, a randomly selected adult was asked whether he or shewas in favour of women working outside the home. The response indicates that theattitude of the household is an important determinant of female participation. Theprobability of labour force participation is twice as high for all women, married ornot, in households where the respondent claims to support the idea of womenworking. Of course, the relationship could also go the other way, if opinions areaffected by whether the females in the household are working or not.1 Relative probabilities are shown as risk ratios (termed Exp B) in the right-hand column inAppendix 7.1. See Appendix 3, “Statistical methods” for more explanation of logistic regression.

235

CONTENTS

For married women, their children's age is an important determinant of economicactivity. Having a child below 7 years of age in the household reduces the probabil-ity of being in the labour force by 50 percent compared to households where theyoungest child is older.

Palestinian refugee and Gulf returnee status do not significantly affect theprobability of being in the labour force for either men or women. Geographiclocation seems to have an impact on married women’s labour force participationonly, which is not easy to explain. Married women who live in Amman, Irbid and,to a lesser degree, Zarqa/Mafraq have about one-half the probability of being in thelabour force compared to married women in the South.

For men, not being married (never married, divorced or widowed), reducesthe probability of being economically active to one-half of that of married men,irrespective of age.

Figure 7.6 Reasons for not working. Percent of men 15 years of age and above who are out-side the labour force, by their main activity

Figure 7.7 Reasons for not working. Percent of women 15 years of age and above who areoutside the labour force, by their main activity

236

CONTENTS

Reasons for not WorkingIndividuals outside the labour force account for more than 54 percent of the totalpopulation who are 15 years or older. Of those who are not employed and notactively seeking employment, as much as 80 percent say that the reason for not work-ing is that they either do not want or do not need to work. This is more widespreadamong women (83 percent) than among men (66 percent). While the majority ofmen who are outside the labour force are students, only 20 percent of the womenare students and three-quarters of them are housewives. Around a quarter of the menare disabled or retired, while this applies to only a negligible share of the women,as housewives seldom have the opportunity to retire.

The distribution of these non-labour activities does not vary across regionsor urban/rural areas either for men or women, except that Zarqa/Mafraq has a higherpercentage of housewives and lower percentage of students than all other domains.

Figures 7.6 and 7.7 show the pattern of reasons for not working. Whereasstudents almost always report that they do not need or want to work, the disabledcan not work for medical reasons, and the retired are partly too ill to work and partlydo not want or need work.

Hidden unemployment, in the form of individuals who wish to work buthave given up seeking work (discouraged workers), accounts for 3 percent of thepersons outside the labour force. Discouraged workers are mostly found amongpersons who are neither students, housewives, old or sick, but there are also somediscouraged workers among housewives and retired persons.

While only 2 percent of the housewives report social restrictions as the reason for not working, more than 20 percent of the women with no specified mainactivity give this reason. These are mainly young women below 25 years, who prob-ably are waiting to get married.

How much do the economically active work?Employment, underemployment andunemployment.

EmploymentThe employment rate is defined as the percentage of employed persons (includingthose who are temporarily absent from their jobs) relative to the size of the labourforce. The remaining share of the labour force is defined as the unemployment rate.Hence, the unemployment rate is the percentage of persons in the labour force whoare not employed, but who are actively looking for work.

237

CONTENTS

Figure 7.8 shows the activity status distribution for all economically active persons.The general employment rate is 83 percent, but it is higher for men (85 percent)than for women (73 percent). This gives a general unemployment rate of 17 percent.15 percent for men and 27 percent for women. Also, women more often have part-time jobs. As a result of both the low labour force participation rate and the highunemployment rate among women, only 15 percent of all employed persons inJordan are women. In addition, only 40 percent of the employed women have full-time jobs.

The World Bank (1994) estimated the unemployment rates in 1991 to be35 percent for women and 13 percent for men. Although there most likely are dif-ferences in methodology between the two surveys, this might imply that femaleunemployment has declined, while male unemployment has risen slightly duringthe period from 1991 to 1996. However, since the number of unemployed men ismuch higher than that of women, the overall unemployment rate has risen duringthe period. Table 7.3 shows changes in the unemployment rate over the period from1991 to 1996, indicating that the situation improved gradually from 1992, but thatthe trend was reversed for male unemployment in 1996.

As noted above, labour force participation is highly dependent on maritalstatus. As figure 7.9 shows, this is also the case for the employment pattern, asunemployment is more widespread among the never married population, irrespec-tive of gender. The highest rate of full-time employment is found among married

Figure 7.8 Gender-specific employment rates. Percent of persons in the labour force

Table 7.3 Gender specific unemployment rates in Jordan, 1991-1996. In percent of the labourforce

raeY elaM elameF llA

1991 51 53 71

3991 61 73 91

4991 31 03 61

5991 31 92 51

6991 51 72 71

Source: 1991-1995: Kharabshieh et al. (1996); 1996: JLCS

238

CONTENTS

men (65 percent), while the lowest is found among married women (39 percent).Married women have more part-time employment than other women. Althoughnot reported in the figure, the incidence of part-time employment and temporarilyabsence is much higher among married women with small children. Widows havethe highest employment rate of all women.

Under-Utilisation of LabourUnder-utilisation of labour resources is a loss for society as a whole since it meansthat productive resources are not fully utilised. It is also a problem for the individ-ual, since it in most cases is accompanied by a loss of earnings. It is widely arguedthat unemployment rates do not accurately measure the extent to which labourresources are under-utilised. Table 7.4 gives a schematic review of the different typesof labour under-utilisation. First, many employed persons in the labour force arein reality under-employed, since they are not able to work as long hours as they wish,or because they are not in a job where their skills are fully utilised, implying a lossin productivity. The former might be labelled as ‘visible under-employed’, while thelatter is ‘invisible under-employed’. Second, many persons outside the labour forcecan be considered 'discouraged workers', meaning that although they wish to work,

Table 7.4 Types of labour under-utilisation

tnemyolpmenU tnemyolpmerednU

elbisiV elbisivnI elbisiV elbisivnI

dnadeyolpmetoNkrowgnikeesylevitca

nevig,deyolpmetoNgnikeespudegaruocsid(

)srekrow

gnikeesdnadeyolpmEkrowlanoitidda

woltubdeyolpmEytivitcudorp

)erusaemottluciffid(

Source: Øvensen, (1994:29)

Figure 7.9 Employment and unemployment by marital status. Percent of persons in the labour force

239

CONTENTS

they have simply given up trying to find work, and will therefore not be visible inthe unemployment statistics.

Unfortunately, the JLCS does not provide us with information aboutemployed persons who are seeking additional work. However, other informationincluded in the survey can be used as indicators of hidden unemployment. In thissection, we will concentrate on part-time work and unemployment. Discouragedworkers were examined in the previous section, and some aspects of invisibleunderemployment in the form of under-utilisation of skills are analysed.

Especially among men who are not enrolled in school, part time employ-ment can be assumed to be involuntarily, and can thus be used as an indicator ofhidden unemployment. Figure 7.10 shows the proportion of the labour force whois unemployed or working part time.

Although the unemployment rate does not show significant geographicalvariation, the regional pattern indicates substantial hidden unemployment in Irbidand Jerash/Ajloun, due to the high incidence of men working part time. Female un-employment is much higher, reaching its peak in Zarqa/Mafraq at a rate of 38percent, and Balqa/Madaba at 34 percent, while the lowest rates are found in theSouth and Amman (22 and 23 percent respectively).

The under-utilisation of the labour force is more common among Palestin-ian refugees, and especially refugees who live in the camps, where 29 percent of thetotal labour force are unemployed. The highest rates of male unemployment arefound among camp refugees (27 percent), other refugees and displaced (16 percent)and Gulf returnees (22 percent). In contrast, male unemployment for the non-ref-ugee group was lower at 13 percent. This is, however, mainly an effect of the maleimmigrants who rarely are unemployed. Unemployment among male non-refugeeswho are Jordanian citizens is only insignificantly lower than for the refugees wholive outside the camps.

The age pattern shows that unemployment is more common among theyoung. In fact, about 60 percent of all unemployed people are less than 25 yearsold. However, part time work increases with age, and while part time work amongolder men may be voluntarily, it might also indicate hidden unemployment.

Although persons who have never attended school have a much lowerunemployment rate than persons with some education, they have a higher rate ofpart-time work, and 40 percent of them work in the agricultural sector. Accordingto the findings in chapter 6, persons without any schooling are also among the poor-est. This may support the hypothesis that they simply cannot afford to be unem-ployed, and hence take part time jobs in the absence of something better. However,it is also likely that age plays a major role here, as it is predominantly the old whohave never been to school.

240

CONTENTS

Unemployment among men with higher education is low. However, it is very highamong women with higher education, and hence the total unemployment rate forhighly educated persons is slightly above the total average.

Figure 7.10 Unemployment and part time employment by selected individual characteristics.Percent of persons in the labour force

241

CONTENTS

The unemployment rate for people with vocational secondary education is 2 per-centage points higher than for those with academic secondary. Considering the highcost of vocational training relative to academic secondary, other methods foracquiring practical skills that are more efficient and less expensive could be explored.For many occupations, a shift to flexible short-term training could be used to fillthe gap between the existing skills and the skills demanded.

On the other hand, the very high rates of unemployment among women withhigher education (31 percent) suggests that the national economy has not been ableto employ all the female graduates of the many public and private universities andcommunity colleges. In general, the results do not support the existence of strongcorrelation between unemployment and educational level, as the relationship isreversed for men: 12 percent of highly educated men are unemployed.

The high unemployment rate among well-educated women may thus becaused by discrimination against women in the labour market for highly educatedlabour. It might also be a result of the wages in the sectors available to women

Figure 7.11 Reasons for being unemployed. Percent of unemployed men by education

Figure 7.12 Reasons for being unemployed. Percent of unemployed women by education

242

CONTENTS

(primarily education services), combined with the better economic resources in thehouseholds of these women, that discourages them from being employed.

As shown in figures 7.11 and 7.12, the differences in the reasons for beingunemployed given by women and men with higher education implies that both ofthe explanations may be correct. Women more often than men give the lack of jobsas a reason for being unemployed, and they more commonly reply that they arewaiting for a job in the public sector.

The most common reason for unemployment given by the respondents issimply the lack of jobs in the area (65 percent), but this reason seems to loseimportance with increasing education. Structural unemployment due to incompat-ibility of skills is more common among men with higher education and women with-out any education. While the problem for the former is probably that the jobs offeredwill not let them utilise their skills, the problem for the latter is rather that they donot have the skills required for the available jobs.

Frictional unemployment in the form of unemployed individuals who arewaiting for a new job to start, accounts for 12 percent of total unemployment. Asmany of the unemployed women are waiting for a job in the public sector, this typeof unemployment is more common among women (21 percent of all unemployed)than men (9 percent).

Voluntary UnemploymentOnly 5 percent of the unemployed individuals refuse to take available jobs becauseof low pay and/or bad working conditions, so-called voluntary unemployment. Thisis more common among women with academic secondary education than in anyother group.

Duration of UnemploymentMost of the unemployment in Jordan (75 percent) lasts for two years or less. How-ever, long-term unemployment seems to increase with age, and women are moreexposed than men. In fact, more than 50 percent of unemployed women above theage of 25 have been unemployed for more than 2 years, and most of them have neverworked. In the group of unemployed men between 20 and 24 years old, 20 percenthave been unemployed for more than 2 years and 47 percent have never worked.For women of the same age, only 16 percent have been unemployed for more than2 years, but 77 percent have never worked.

Long-term unemployment and no working experience is also more commonamong persons with higher education, irrespective of sex. While unemployment ismore widespread among Palestinian refugees, long-term unemployment is more

243

CONTENTS

often found among the unemployed non-refugees, who also have less work experi-ence than refugees.

The Activities of the Employed

Employed persons are divided into four groups based on their main job: paidemployees, employers who employ non-family members, self-employed who do notemploy any non-family members, and unpaid workers in family business. Whilechapter 6 showed that wage employment is the main income source for 63 percentof the households, wage employment covers as much as 77 percent of all employedpersons. Self-employment is the main income source of 17 percent of the house-holds, and covers 22 percent of the employed, if employers and unpaid familyworkers are included.

Not surprisingly, women are under-represented among employers, and theyare over-represented in the group of unpaid workers in family enterprises. There areno other major differences between men and women in any other employmentcategory. Figure 7.13 shows employment status by sex and education. It is evidentthat self-employment is correlated with low education. Also, being an unpaid familyworker is quite common for women with little or no education.

Figure 7.13 Employment status. Percent of employed persons by education and sex

244

CONTENTS

Occupation and IndustryAs Jordan is endowed with few natural resources and has a relatively small manu-facturing sector, most employed persons work in the service sectors. According totable 7.5, the agriculture and construction sectors employ less than 10 percent each;14 percent work in manufacturing industries, and the remaining close to 70 percentwork in services sectors such as trade, public administration, and health and edu-cation services. While the agriculture sector employs a higher share of women work-ers, the construction and transport sectors are made up almost entirely of men. Menare also over-represented in public administration (government agencies), while theeducation and health services (private and public) is the single most important sectorfor female employment, accounting for 44 percent of employed women. Althoughthe JLCS data do not distinguish between public and private employment, otherfigures indicate that approximately 40 percent of all employed persons in Jordanwork in the public sector, including defence (see for example World Bank 1994).

Table 7.5 The structure of employment. Percent of the employed by industry

tnecreP

yrtsudnI elaM elameF latoT

yrtserof&erutlucirgA 8 41 9

erutcafunaM&gniniM 41 21 41

retawdnaygrene,noitcurtsnoC 01 1 9

edarT 81 5 61

noitacinummocdnatropsnarT 01 2 8

noitartsinimdacilbuP 02 6 81

htlaehdnanoitacudE 9 44 41

secivresrehtO 21 71 31

latoT 001 001 001

Although the industry distribution is different for men and women, figures 7.14to 7.17 indicate that education and nationality/refugee status is just as importantas gender. Agriculture is the major employer of both men and women without anyschooling. Education and health services are the dominant employers of personswith higher education, although to a much larger extent among women than amongmen. Public administration employment is more common among persons withsecondary education, in particular academic secondary. In general, education seemsto be a much more important determinant of employment sector for women thanfor men.

245

CONTENTS

Palestinian refugee status and nationality also play important roles in explaining thedistribution of employment by industries. Among male, non-refugee Jordanians themost important sector is public administration, and it accounts for around 35percent of the employed. Male camp refugees are over-represented in education andhealth services, which is due to employment by UNRWA. Non-jordanian maleemployees more often work in agriculture or construction. For women, refugees andnon-refugees tend to have quite similar distributions by industry, although Pales-tinian refugees more commonly work in manufacturing, and non-refugee Jordani-ans more often work in agriculture. For female non-Jordanian workers, however,the vast majority (80 percent) work in so-called other services, which include hoteland restaurant services, and private household servants.

With regard to regional variation, the most important industries are as fol-lows: trade and manufacturing for Amman, public administration and manufac-turing for Zarqa/Mafraq, public administration as well as education and health forboth Irbid and Jerash/Ajloun, public administration and agriculture for the South.The highest percentage of public employment is found in the Jerash/Ajloun (35percent) and Irbid (29 percent), and the lowest is found in Amman (10 percent).Employment in agriculture is more prevalent in Balqa/Madaba and the South.

Table 7.6 depicts the occupational distribution of employed persons. Almost40 percent of the employed persons in Jordan are skilled workers and drivers, andonly 17 percent work in the elementary (unskilled) occupations. According to table7.7, around 80 percent of the skilled workers are employed in agriculture, manu-facturing and construction, while drivers of course primarily work in the transportsector. However, as many as 16 percent of the drivers work in public administra-tion, and 50 percent of all persons in elementary occupations work in public

Figure 7.14 Industry structure for men. Percent of employed men by education

246

CONTENTS

administration as porters, cleaners and the like. Twenty-two percent of all employed,but 43 percent of employed women, work as professionals, predominantly ineducation and health services. Another 10 percent work as clerks in public admin-istration and other services.

As expected, figures 7.18 and 7.19 show that the majority of persons withhigher education work as professionals, while those with basic or no education workas skilled workers or in elementary occupations. It is interesting to note that personswithout any formal education most frequently work as skilled workers, and hencehave acquired skills through work rather than through education. However, as muchas 8 percent of employed men with higher education work in elementary occupa-tions (and 20 percent of other men). This under-utilisation of labour indicates that

Figure 7.15 Industry structure for women. Percent of employed women by education

Figure 7.16 Industry structure by refugee status and citizenship. Men

247

CONTENTS

Figure 7.17 Industry structure by refugee status and citizenship. Women

Table 7.6 The structure of employment. Percent of the employed by occupation

yrtsudnI tnecrepelaM tnecrepelameF tnecreplatoT

sreganamdnaslanoisseforP 91 34 22

srekrowlacirelC 9 61 01

srekrowselasdnasecivreS 51 7 41

srekrowdellikS 92 22 82

srevirD 11 0 01

snoitapuccoyratnemelE 71 31 71

latoT 001 001 001

Table 7.7 Industry composition by occupation (percent of persons in each occupation)

yrtsudnI slanoisseforP skrelCecivreSsrekrow

dellikSsrekrow

srevirDyratnemelEsnoitapucco

erutlucirgA 2 1 1 92 2 2

gnirutcafunaM 7 9 5 92 7 11

noitcurtsnoC 4 8 1 12 6 3

edarT 7 7 86 11 5 4

tropsnarT 4 9 2 2 75 4

noitartsinimdacilbuP 21 23 3 6 61 05

htlaeh/noitacudE 74 21 3 1 3 7

secivresrehtO 91 22 71 2 4 81

latoT 001 001 001 001 001 001

248

CONTENTS

too many persons acquire formal skills that are not in demand. In particular, it isdisappointing that almost 1 out of 5 employed men who have graduated fromvocational secondary do not utilise their education, but rather work as unskilledworkers. Vocational secondary is supposed to be more targeted than academicsecondary, and is also substantially more expensive. For women, however, the shareof employed, educated persons who work in elementary occupations is lower, indi-cating that females acquire formal skills that are more in line with what is neededfrom the employers point of view, or that they do not accept jobs incompatible withtheir skills or social status.

Figure 7.18 Occupational structure for men. Percent of employed men by education

Figure 7.19 Occupational structure for women. Percent of employed women by education

249

CONTENTS

For men, nationality is as important to determine occupation as it is for the industrydistribution. Figures 7.20 and 7.21 show that more than 60 percent of non-Jorda-niain male workers are skilled workers. Jordanian non-refugees are more than twiceas likely as Palestinian refugees to work in the elementary occupations. Refugees andnon-Jordanian workers are twice as likely to work in services and sales, comparedto Jordanian non-refugees. Professionals are slightly more prevalent among both maleand female Jordanian non-refugees. In general, refugee status does not have a largeimpact on female occupational choice, but nationality has: more than 70 percentof employed women from outside of Jordan work in elementary occupations, ascleaners and household servants.

Figure 7.20 Occupational structure for men, by refugee status and nationality

Figure 7.21 Occupational structure for women, by refugee status and nationality

250

CONTENTS

Work Environment

The average actual working hours for all employed individuals in Jordan is 47 hoursper week, and the majority of the employed (63 percent) are doing regular day-shiftwork. While employed women work on the average 39 hours per week, employedmen work 48 hours. Figure 7.22 shows the distribution of weekly working hoursfor employed men and women. Almost 60 percent of the women work less than 40hours per week, and 50 percent work between 20 and 40 hours. Among men, 65percent work more than 40 hours, and almost 50 percent work between 40 and 60hours per week.

Figure 7.22 Distribution of actual weekly working hours in all jobs. Percent of employedpersons

As table 7.8 shows, work hours vary significantly with industry and employmentstatus. Persons working in the trade and transport sectors have the longest workinghours, and work on average approximately 14 hours more per week than personsworking in public administration, and education and health services. Employers,and to a certain extent the self-employed, work longer hours than others, whileemployees have the shortest hours. Irregular working hours are also more commonamong employers and the self-employed, especially in the transport industry.

Exposure to physical hazards is another important dimension of workingconditions. Heavy lifting and uncomfortable working positions increase the risk ofback injuries and prolonged illness. Heavy lifting is reported mainly in the construc-tion sector. Of the employed men, 23 percent undertake activities that often involvesheavy lifting, and about 44 percent do heavy lifting sometimes. In contrast, only 4percent of women engage in work that often requires heavy lifting.

In addition, 67 percent of working men often or sometimes work inuncomfortable positions. The corresponding percentage is slightly lower for work-ing women at 64 percent. Jobs requiring repetitive movements are common in allindustries but are not specific to any sex: about 73 percent of working individuals

251

CONTENTS

Table 7.8 Average weekly work hours by industry and employment status in main job

yrtsudnIdiaP

eeyolpmereyolpmE deyolpme-fleS

diapnUnirekrow

ylimafssenisub

llA

erutlucirgA 65 84 74 34 05

gnirutcafunaM 25 25 04 44 15

noitcurtsnoC 64 45 34 63 64

edarT 55 75 35 35 45

tropsnarT 35 64 25 64 25

noitartsinimdacilbuP 93 . . . 93

htlaeh/noitacudE 73 05 84 . 83

secivresrehtO 94 35 84 36 94

latoT 64 35 94 74 74

do monotonous work either often or sometimes. Thirty-eight percent men are oftenexposed to dirt, grease, paint etc. in their work, compared to only 19 percent forwomen. Dirty work environments are more common in construction and agriculture.

Regular exposure to air pollution is greater for men (47 percent) than women(32 percent). Twenty-three percent of men have working areas characterised by toomuch dampness or water, compared to only 13 percent of women. Forty percentmen report that they work in conditions of uncomfortable heat or cold, and thefigure for women is roughly 25 percent. Twenty-nine percent of men and 18 per-cent of women complain about dry air at their workplaces. Forty-one percent ofthe working men have a noisy work environment, and 33 percent of women.

An index has been constructed on the basis of some physical hazards foundin the work environment in order to measure the clustering of bad working condi-tions in different industries. The index is presented in figure 7.24, and is based onthe presence of the following hazards: irregular work hours including shift work,regular exposure to air pollution, noise, exposure to chemically hazardous materi-als, explosives or dangerous machines without protection, working high above theground without protection, heavy lifting, uncomfortable work position, monoto-nous movements and exposure to dirt.

The results clearly indicate that the construction sector has the worst phys-ical working conditions. As much as 25 percent of the employed persons in thissector are exposed to at least 6 of these hazards, and 50 percent are exposed to 4 ormore hazards. Transportation and mining/manufacturing industries are the secondworst, while persons employed in the service producing sectors complain the leastabout their working conditions. In education and health services, only 7 percentof the employed are exposed to 4 or more of the hazards mentioned above.

252

CONTENTS

Three out of four who report that they work high above the ground (mainly inconstruction) have no access to protective means, while one-half of those who workwith dangerous machines or chemicals have access to protection.

Satisfaction with work environment, tasks and leadership is important forthe motivation and productivity of employees. Such satisfaction can be measuredthrough the degree of physical exhaustion, freedom of decision making and theability to gain new skills. Further, uncertainty about job security can be a major threatto the living conditions of a household, particularly in an environment of high andincreasing unemployment.

With regard to the degree of physical exhaustion, 40 percent of all wageemployees in Jordan, irrespective of sex, respond that they are physically exhaustedat the end of the day. Fifty percent feel that they have no or very limited influenceon how to perform their job tasks, and only 21 percent of the employed said thattheir job provides them with the opportunity to acquire new skills on a regular basis.Another 33 percent said that their job provides them the opportunity of acquiringnew skills occasionally, and almost half the employed population say they have noopportunity to acquire new skills at work.

Figure 7.23 Percent of employed persons with irregular working hours, by industry and em-ployment status

253

CONTENTS

Less than 60 percent of employees have a written contract with their employer, and30 percent are afraid of losing their job. Working without contract is more com-mon in agriculture and trade, where only one worker in four has a written contract.Half of all agricultural workers are afraid of losing their jobs. Also, employees inconstruction and manufacturing say they have highly insecure jobs, while employ-ees in public administration and education/health services are not afraid of losingtheir jobs.

Figure 7.24 Clustering of bad working conditions. Cumulative percent of employed personsby number of hazards and industry

254

CONTENTS

The incidence of exhausted workers is lowest (22 percent) in public administration,and highest (57 percent) in the construction sector. Interestingly, public adminis-tration employees complain more than others that they have very limited influenceon their tasks, while employees in education and health services are the most satis-fied in this respect. The latter also have a better opportunity than others to acquirenew skills.

Figure 7.25 Job training

Occurence of job training. Percent of employees

Type of training received. Percent of those who received job training

255

CONTENTS

Job Training

Only 35 percent of the employed have ever received any kind of training, includingon-the-job training. Of those receiving training, 83 percent use it in their currentor former job. Hence the training is in most cases job relevant. As shown in figure7.25, on-the-job training is by far the most common type of training. Employeesin public administration and education and health services receive training moreoften than other employees (almost 60 percent), and they are also more likely tofind the training relevant to their job (more than 90 percent). Other sources of train-ing are much less common: 9 percent have received training through apprentice-ship programs, 7 percent from short courses at commercial schools, 6 percent froma university or high diploma institution, and 4 percent through informal trainingby family members.

Almost 30 percent of those who received training, completed that trainingmore than 5 years ago. Taking into account that 65 percent of the employed neverhave received any training, this leaves only 25 percent of the employed with anyrecent training. As illustrated in figure 7.26, most training is paid for by the employer(56 percent). Twenty-five percent had to pay for the training themselves.

Figure 7.26 Person or institution who paid for the training. Percent of those who received job training

256

CONTENTS

Appendix 7.1 Logistic Regression on Labour ForceParticipation

Ever married women 15-60 years: not currently enrolled in school or acute ill


EGA 7703. 9440. 2899.64 1 0000. 4411. 3063.1

EGA 2 2400.- 6000. 6514.94 1 0000. 4711.- 8599.

)1(DAEHELAMEF 8367.- 2271. 2376.91 1 0000. 7170.- 9564.

egairramtsriftaega 1540. 8310. 2516.01 1 1100. 0050. 2640.1

)rehgihsv(NOITACUDE 2897.092 3 0000. 8782.

)1(ENON 6764.1- 2402. 7546.15 1 0000. 1021.- 5032.

)2(CISAB 5125.2- 3551. 6556.362 1 0000. 8572.- 3080.

)3(YRADNOCES 6596.1- 9851. 3339.311 1 0000. 4081.- 5381.

)+41sv(DLIHCTSEGNUOYFOEGA 7052.03 4 0000. 4080.

)1(0 5985.- 5381. 8123.01 1 3100. 2940.- 6455.

)2(6-1 9858.- 6171. 8860.52 1 0000. 9180.- 6324.

)3(01-7 5692.- 0812. 8948.1 1 8371. 0000. 4347.

)4(41-11 8201.- 1232. 1691. 1 9756. 0000. 3209.

)+0035sv(EMOCNI 5444.54 7 0000. 6590.

009< 0572. 6452. 1761.1 1 0082. 0000. 5613.1

0541-009 2364.- 0732. 5918.3 1 7050. 0320.- 3926.

0081-0541 6304.- 6122. 2813.3 1 5860. 6910.- 9766.

0092-0081 7673.- 3591. 0227.3 1 7350. 4220.- 1686.

0063-0092 3381. 2102. 4038. 1 1263. 0000. 2102.1

0034-0063 7315. 1722. 3811.5 1 7320. 1030. 4176.1

0035-0034 7835. 5442. 6358.4 1 6720. 8820. 8317.1

GNINIART.COV 7819. 3131. 2649.84 1 0000. 8611. 0605.2

ESAESIDCINORHC 0264.- 7242. 1426.3 1 9650. 7120.- 0036.

)tsniagasv(GNIKROWNEMOWOTEDUTITTA 2838.22 2 0000. 0470.

TROPPUS 5466. 4931. 6617.22 1 0000. 6770. 5349.1

TNEREFFIDNI 2164. 9052. 1973.3 1 0660. 0020. 0685.1

)htuoSsv(NIAMOD 6620.23 5 0000. 0080.

NAMMA 9918.- 0971. 2379.02 1 0000. 3470.- 5044.

QARFAM/AQRAZ 7435.- 6591. 7274.7 1 3600. 9930.- 9585.

ABADAM/AQLAB 9451.- 0012. 1445. 1 8064. 0000. 5658.

DIBRI 2328.- 4002. 0578.61 1 0000. 8560.- 0934.

NUOLJA/HSARAJ 2883.- 1752. 5972.2 1 1131. 0900.- 3876.

larursvNABRU 7200. 8041. 4000. 1 5489. 0000. 7200.1

)seegufertoNsv(SUTATSEEGUFER 7377.6 2 8330. 4820.

EENRUTERFLUG 1245.- 0632. 2772.5 1 6120. 9030.- 5185.

EEGUFER 3502.- 0321. 0587.2 1 2590. 1510.- 4418.

tnatsnoC 9574.7- 3138. 4278.08 1 0000.

257

CONTENTS

Never married women 15-60 years: Not currently enrolled in school or acute ill


EGA 0172. 9940. 7535.92 1 0000. 4901. 3113.1

EGA 2 8300.- 8000. 6789.12 1 0000. 2390.- 2699.

DAEHELAMEF 3390.- 5951. 2243. 1 5855. 0000. 9019.


ENON 9686.1- 0562. 8705.04 1 0000. 4921.- 1581.

CISAB 2273.2- 3851. 1226.422 1 0000. 1113.- 3390.

YRADNOCES 0388.1- 2081. 6432.901 1 0000. 9512.- 1251.

GNINIART.COV 9208. 4041. 5917.23 1 0000. 6511. 1232.2

ESAESIDCINORC 0348.1- 5814. 7793.91 1 0000. 0780.- 3851.

)tsniagasv(GNIKROWNEMOWOTEDUTITTA 0021.02 2 0000. 7380.

TROPPUS 9676. 8151. 2088.91 1 0000. 2880. 8769.1

TNEREFFIDNI 7993. 5972. 6440.2 1 8251. 4400. 4194.1

)htuoSsv(NIAMOD 2378.03 5 0000. 3590.

NAMMA 2761.- 1622. 9645. 1 6954. 0000. 0648.

QARFAM/AQRAZ 2820. 1052. 7210. 1 4019. 0000. 6820.1

ABADAM/AQLAB 1950. 0062. 6150. 1 2028. 0000. 9060.1

DIBRI 8139.- 4842. 5370.41 1 2000. 4270.- 8393.

NUOLJA/HSARAJ 8209.- 3263. 3012.6 1 7210. 8240.- 4504.

)larursv(NABRU 9611. 8751. 1945. 1 7854. 0000. 0421.1

)eegufeR-noNsv(SUTATSEEGUFER 5545.3 2 9961. 0000.

EENRUTERFLUG 3422.- 7352. 7187. 1 6673. 0000. 1997.

EEGUFER 3362.- 7241. 1504.3 1 0560. 7420.- 5867.

tnatsnoC 9475.5- 7187. 7368.05 1 0000.

258

CONTENTS

Men 15-60 years: Not currently enrolled in school or acute ill


EGA 0222. 8720. 8749.36 1 0000. 2611. 6842.1

EGA 2 5300.- 3000. 2284.901 1 0000. 1351.- 5699.


ENON 4178.- 0181. 6281.32 1 0000. 0860.- 4814.

CISAB 5814.- 6731. 1452.9 1 3200. 8930.- 1856.

YRADNOCES 1343.- 3461. 1163.4 1 8630. 7220.- 5907.

GNINIART.COV 3621. 8411. 3112.1 1 1172. 0000. 7431.1

ESAESIDCINORHC 2489.1- 2901. 8231.033 1 0000. 5762.- 5731.

)htuoSsv(NIAMOD 9571.7 5 9702. 0000.

NAMMA 2443.- 2081. 9746.3 1 1650. 0910.- 8807.

QARFAM/AQRAZ 6201.- 8002. 1162. 1 4906. 0000. 5209.

ABADAM/AQLAB 6441.- 3612. 1744. 1 7305. 0000. 3568.

DIBRI 5642.- 4391. 6426.1 1 4202. 0000. 5187.

NUOLJA/HSARAJ 5114.- 9442. 3428.2 1 8290. 4310.- 6266.

)larursv(NABRU 4071.- 1021. 9310.2 1 9551. 7100.- 3348.

)eegufertonsv(SUTATSEEGUFER 9336.2 2 0862. 0000.

EENRUTERFLUG 9281.- 6171. 7531.1 1 6682. 0000. 9238.

EEGUFER 9680. 4401. 2396. 1 1504. 0000. 8090.1

)deirramsv(DEIRRAMTON 3078.- 7761. 0649.62 1 0000. 8370.- 8814.

tnatsnoC 6551.1- 4815. 9869.4 1 8520.

CHAPTER 8 CHAPTER 6

259

CONTENTS

Chapter 8 Social Network

Hiam Omar Kalimat and Jon Hanssen-Bauer

Summary

This chapter explores some aspects of the social networks of households and indi-viduals in Jordanian society. It shows that family holds a strong position as the basicsocial unit. Relatives tend to live close together in the same localities, and a highnumber of spouses chose their partners among relatives and from the same socialgroup. There are some differences between urban and rural areas. Migration alsoinfluences the shape and the size of the household networks.

Most of the population lives in households with other family members, andvery few live alone (7 percent of the households are single person households). It isshown that three-quarters of Jordanian households live surrounded by relativeswithin close distance. Only 26 percent do not have close relatives within the sameneighbourhood, and 2 percent have no family at all. Nine out of ten householdsreport that they are satisfied with the distance to relatives.

It is most common to have relatives on the husband’s father’s side living closeby, but other relatives are frequently neighbours also. It is more common to be sur-rounded by relatives from the same descent line than by collateral kin like uncles,aunts and cousins. Almost one-half of the population has both kinds of relativesliving nearby. In addition, almost 2 out of 5 households have many relatives livingin their neighbourhood. More than one-third of the population have this kind ofcomplex and extensive household network around them. In this manner, the local-isation pattern found in present day Jordan corresponds to descriptions of the‘traditional’ village. An overwhelming majority seem to be satisfied with this wayof living.

Closeness between the relatives is expressed by frequent visits: Only 15 per-cent of the total population had not visited or had no visits from a relative duringthe two weeks prior to the interview. The clan institutions rabita and diwan arepresent, but do not play a very significant role in the ordinary life of the Jordanians.

Help and support given among relatives form an important part of the socialsecurity system and safety net for the Jordanian population. One-half of the popu-lation did not receive or give any help over the two weeks prior to the interview, or

CHAPTER 9CHAPTER 7

260

CONTENTS

any transfers over the last year. One out of four persons only gave help to relatives,while 9 percent both received and gave help from and to relatives. It is significantlyless common to engage in exchanges of help and transfers with non-relatives.

Help and transfers flow from the able, young, economically active, educat-ed and relatively well-off person towards a person who is poorer, older, less educat-ed, often female, and outside the labor force. Transfers from relatives are foundamong the three most important income sources for the households as often as re-tirement pensions and social security from Government. The transfers, however, flowto different and often poorer households.

Introduction

Individuals and households are connected to other family members, neighbours,friends, and acquaintances. The term ‘social network’ describes the web of suchrelations. The structure, extension and density of social networks vary from indi-vidual to individual and from household to household. Individuals are both borninto such networks, and extend them as they build new relationships during theirlives. When people relocate, social networks may be broken up and reshaped.

The Family and the Family Network: Living in the VillageIn Jordan, the family is a basic social unit. Through the family, social relations andsolidarity are created and reproduced, with kinship as the core constituting princi-ple. Traditionally, the norm was that three or four generations lived closely togeth-er. The lineage, or the patrilineal descent group, ideally lived within the same areaor village and formed a dense web of kinsfolk surrounding the individual. Theselocalised descent groups provided solidarity and support, and the kinship ties definedmany of the roles and relations among people living in the same area. Several de-scent groups were often recognised as linked to make up larger social and politicalentities, or clans.

One of the first known writers about social networks in the Middle East,Ibn Khaldun (died in 1406), observed that the idea of common descent was usedto invoke group feeling, what Khaldun named ‘asabiya (Khaldun 1967). He stressedthat blood relations are not natural ties guaranteeing solidarity, but rather are usedto assert group feelings of belonging. This sense of belonging is created through livingclosely together and showing solidarity through group action in conflicts with out-siders. More recent observers make the same point in demonstrating that “closeness”carries multiple layers of meaning, ranging from asserted and recognised ties of

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kinship to participation in factional alliances, ties of patronage and clientship, andcommon bonds developed through neighbourliness (Eickelman 1989:156). AbnerCohen (1970) describes this hamulah, often translated as a clan or section of a clan,as being a patronymic association. For Cohen, the hamulah identity is based upon acomplex web of patrilineal, affinal, and matrililateral ties, neighbourliness (as thehouseholds of an hamulah tend to be located in the same section of a given village),and sustained cooperation in political, economic, and ceremonial activities (referencefrom Eickelman 1989:155). However, while recognising this point, we will use theterm clan as convenient established shorthand. In Jordan the term ashira is also usedfor a group with essentially the same characteristics as the hamulah, but the ashirais often a much larger group, and therefore can be translated as “tribe”.

Common identity and closeness, or group feeling, are practically expressedin patterns of hospitality and frequent and regular visiting among relatives andneighbours. The notion of the village expresses solidarity, feeling of closeness, andpatterns of hospitality and visiting practices within a given localised area.

The Jordanian type of social organisation, common throughout the Arabworld, is affected by forces tending to break up and alter this pattern of solidarity.Increased education, modern health services, economic growth and related struc-tural adjustment, political disturbances, modern mass media, new female roles andchanging gender relations, migration and urbanisation all are factors changing thenature of social organisation. These factors also can be expected to affect families,family networks and their way of living in areas surrounded by relatives and markedby ‘asabiya.

Several observers have pointed out that in new contexts, the population tendsto reproduce the village and its characteristic social organisational patterns. This hasbeen observed, for instance, among Palestinian refugees and the manner in whichthey settle in camps (Appaduraj 1993, Sayigh 1994, Tuastad 1997). Thus, it is pos-sible to argue that the tendency to continue basic patterns of localisation and theimportance of family relations dominates over modern processes, which tend tobreak up and change traditional ways of living. In this chapter we will describe someof these characteristics related to the constitution of social networks and their con-tribution to living conditions of the Jordanian population.

Social Network Data in the Jordan Living Conditions SurveyThe Jordan Living Conditions Survey should be viewed as an explorative effort whenit comes to the analysis of social networks. There are few models that can guide howto integrate analyses of social networks into this kind of multi-topic survey. Duringthe design of the survey, the approach had to be reworked several times, mainly

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CONTENTS

because suggested solutions proved to be too time consuming in the field, too com-plex to analyse, or too difficult to pursue conceptually.

One kind of data produced by the survey is the size and composition of thegroup of relatives living nearby the household interviewed. This information isbroken down by kinds of relatives, permitting a distinction between the householdhead’s and spouse’s relations, as well as identification of the generation and genderof related individuals. This set of data can shed light on the importance of kinshipties in creating spatially close social networks. We refer to the network covered bythis data as the “household network”.

The survey also measures the density of contact, or frequency of visits,between a randomly selected adult in each household and the categories of relativesliving nearby. Third, questions were asked which measure the exchanges of servic-es, help and transfers between the person and relatives. Fourth, the interviewees wereasked about support to and from non-relative neighbours and friends. As a fifthtopic, the survey explored the existence and use of institutions associated with kin-ship like the diwan or rabita.

Finally, the survey contains more indirect information about social networks,for example data on kinship ties between spouses. In connection with the mappingof housing, environment and the availability of services, the respondents were askedabout their personal satisfaction with their social environment and the distance torelatives and friends, and satisfaction with their neighbours.

Close Networks: Family Life and Living WithRelatives

The survey results portray a picture of a population living surrounded by familyand relatives, with only minor differences between urban and rural areas. Two-thirdsof the households report that they have family and relatives living within the neigh-bourhood (hara) or within walking distance. An overwhelming majority of therespondents also express that the distance to relatives is acceptable or satisfactory.Even among those with no relatives living close by, more than two-thirds find thedistance to relatives acceptable or satisfactory. Approximately one out of ten house-holds express that they are unsatisfied with the distance to relatives.

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Few Live AloneData from the Jordan Living Conditions Survey confirm the observation describedabove that individuals live closely surrounded by family and relatives. Few live alone,as only 7 percent of the households are single-person households. Fourteen percentof the households consist of extended families, while 79 percent form nuclear house-holds. Sixty-five percent of households are made up of couples with children. Thisis shown in table 8.1.

Earlier studies in Jordan confirm these findings. To illustrate, a 1972 studyby the UNDP, cited by Thakeb (1986), found that in two areas of Amman thenuclear families dominated, as demonstrated by the fact that 67 percent of thehouseholds consisted of nuclear families in Ashrafieh and 72 percent in the Mahattaareas. The pattern found in JLCS does not differ significantly between urban andrural areas or governorates. A higher percentage of Palestinian refugees live inextended households in the refugee camps. Extended families are somewhat morecommon in Madaba than in other Governorates, and they become less commonwith increasing levels of education of the household head.

In addition, Jordanian households are families with many members. Morethan one-half of the households have six or more members.

Jordanian researchers believe that the nuclear families are ruled by family tiesand relations modelled on traditional household organisation (ESCWA 1995). Byway of an example, this can be seen in the fact that few families in Jordan actuallybreak up or split as a result of modernisation. Further, some Jordanian researchersbelieve that even if nuclear families form the majority of families, they are in factextended families not living in the same households any longer, but in the same area.In this manner, parents continue to influence their children’s lives, and neither malenor female children leave their home to live alone prior to marriage (ESCWA1992).We return to this issue below.

Table 8.1 Household types, in percent of all households

ylimaftuohtiwgnivilnosreP 0.7

nerdlihctuohtiwelpuoC 0.6

sraey41evobadlihctsegnuoyhtiwelpuoC 5.7

sselrosraey41dlihctsegnuoyhtiwelpuoC 8.75

sraey41evobadlihctsegnuoyhtiwelgniS 5.3

sselrosraey41dlihctsegnuoyhtiwelgniS 0.4

ylimafdednetxE 2.41

latoT 0.001

NdilavdethgiewnU 4585

264

CONTENTS

A Majority of the Households Are Settled Amidst Family andRelativesIn Jordan only 26 percent of the households are living in areas with no family orrelatives living nearby. In this context “nearby” was defined as in one’s hara (neigh-bourhood) or so near to it that one is able to walk to visit them. Seventy-four percentof the households have family and relatives within their closest neighbourhood. Wewill be concerned mostly with these spatially close networks.

The existence of a household network nearby varies somewhat across thegovernorates in Jordan. Amman has the highest number of families without such aclose network nearby (34 percent) while in Jarash and Ajloun only 13 percent ofthe households live without relatives nearby. Households in Irbid and in Zarqa and

Figure 8.1 Extended, nuclear and single person households by type of neighbourhood, do-main, and sex and age of household head; in percent of households in the category;unweighted valid N=5854

265

CONTENTS

Mafraq more often have family network nearby than those living in Amman or inthe South. There are no differences between refugees and non-refugees, but refu-gees living in the camps have relatives living nearby somewhat more often (80percent) than other areas (74 percent). There are no significant differences amongage groups or gender of the household head (females 72 and males 74 percent). Thisis shown in figure 8.2.

Rural and semi-urban residential households more often have family andrelatives living nearby than households in farm and nomad areas, while in urbanresidential areas the percentage of households with family nearby is close to theaverage. A factor that influences the households’ family network nearby is migra-tion. Not surprisingly, the households in which the head of household lived at thesame place five years prior to the interview more often (79 percent) had family living

Figure 8.2 Households having family and relatives nearby, by type of neighbourhood, domain,sex and age of household head, if head of household lived same place or elsewhere 5 yearsago. Bars represent difference from average of 74 percent. Unweighted valid N=5842

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CONTENTS

nearby than households where the household head had lived elsewhere. However,even in the latter case 52 percent had family living nearby.

Patrilineal Relatives Most Common, but Others Also Live NearbyWhat kinds of relatives live nearby each other? Are there any categories of kinsfolkthat Jordanians more often than others live together with within the same area?When they settle among kin, do they do so among certain kinds of relatives? Theseare complex questions to explore and answer.

In contrast to what is often the case when unilineal descent groups are com-mon, Jordanians (and other Arabs) use a kinship terminology denoting a specificrelative by a specific term1, and have very few terms referring to whole classes ofrelatives, such as siblings, cousins, uncles or aunts. Relatives for whom there is nospecific elementary term, are designated by a combination of the elementary termsin a way to describe the exact relation2 (Eickelman 1989:152). In the JLCS we choseto ask about specific relatives and if such relatives lived nearby.

As noted above, notions of closeness may be more a function of living inclose proximity than arising from a classification of relatives. It is commonly claimedthat there is a preference for living with patrilineal relatives, i.e. those able to tracea common descent through the fathers’ line. Nevertheless, closeness also dependson practice. Therefore, we cannot claim a priori that any relative, by virtue of beinga relative, is necessarily closer to the respondent and a better provider of supportthan other neighbours.

Jordanians practice marriage between first cousins. One result of the prac-tice is that the distinction between patrilateral and matrilateral relatives will even-tually be blurred making it difficult to establish if the respondent is living amidstone or the other kind of relatives.

The JLCS asked about which kinds of relatives were living nearby, by askingfor specific kinship terms in relation to the head of household and to the spouse,both on the father’s and on the mother’s side. The respondents were asked in addi-tion to provide the number of relatives of each category3. Figure 8.3 shows that it

1 Core terms are ab (father), umm (mother), ‘amm (father’s brother), ‘amma (father’s sister),khâl (mother’s brother), khâla (mother’s sister), akh (brother), ukht (sister), ibn (son), and bint(daughter). The principal terms used to designate affinal links are zawj (husband), zawja(wife), nasib (father-in-law), and the term nasibã can be used for in-laws in general.

2 Examples of such common combinations of basic terms are ibn ‘amm (father’s brother’s son),ibn ‘amma (father’s sister’s son), ibn khâl (mother’s brother’s son), ibn khâla (mother’s sister’sson), bint ‘amm (father’s brother’s daughter, bint ‘amma (father’s sister’s daughter), bint khâl(mother’s brother’s daughter) and bint khâla (mother’s sister’s daughter).

3 The answer categories were grouped into the following classes: 1-5 persons, 6-10 persons,more than 10 persons.

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CONTENTS

is common to have relatives both on the husband’s and on the wife’s side, althoughrelatives living nearby on the husband’s side are more common.

Almost one-half of households are located in neighbourhoods together withbrothers of the male head of household (46 percent). It is also common to have hissisters living nearby (34 percent). The grandparents from either side live nearby fewhouseholds (3 and 2 percent), while one out of three households have the parentsof the husband living nearby. Nineteen percent of the households have children ofeither sex living nearby, 14 percent have sons and 12 percent have daughters.

The high percentages of lineal relations, i.e. relatives belonging to the samedirect line of descent up or down (parents, grandparents, children etc), are in gen-eral not matched by collateral relations, i.e. where kinship links include a siblinglink. These are relatives like cousins, uncles and aunts. Of such collateral relations,the most common is to have cousins on the father’s side of the husband living nearby(27 percent), as well as uncles and aunts on the father’s side of the husband (22percent). All in all, it is less common to have relatives of the wife living nearby. Manycouples probably settle in the area where the husbands’ relatives live rather thanamong the relatives of the wife.

Lineal and Collateral Relatives Most Common Type of NetworkThe JLCS data reveal that more than one-half of households have lineal relatives ofthe husband including his siblings living nearby, while one-third have lineal relativesof the wife living within walking distance. Forty percent of the households havecollateral kin of the husband living nearby, and 26 percent have such kin of the wife.

Figure 8.3 Categories of relatives living nearby by sex of spouses, in percent of the house-holds having the category of relatives living nearby

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In figure 8.4 these categories of relatives are grouped. The figure shows that the mostcommon type of household network in the neighbourhood is that with both linealand collateral relatives living nearby (44 percent). In addition, 26 percent have onlylineal relatives living nearby. Only 4 percent of the households have only collateralrelatives living nearby.

The most comprehensive household networks, those comprised of both linealand collateral relatives, are most frequent in rural and semi-urban areas (60 percent),and in the governorates of Jarash and Ajloun (62 percent) and Irbid (59 percent).Households in which the head of household is younger than 35 years also more oftenhave more comprehensive household networks than those with older householdheads (54 percent as against 41 and 33). Female headed households less often havesuch comprehensive household networks (33 percent). This is shown in figure 8.5.

The lowest percentages of households with both lineal and collateral relativesliving nearby are found in farm areas (31 percent), among refugees and displacedpersons (36 percent), and in Amman (35 percent). The household network is alsoinfluenced by migration. Fewer of those having moved since 1990 (28 percent), haveboth lineal and collateral relatives living nearby, than those living in the same place(52 percent).

Household Networks Are Often ExtensiveMany households have at least some family and relatives living within the neigh-bourhood, but many also have several relatives living in their neighbourhood.

For each kind of relative the informant was asked to tell whether the house-hold head and the spouse of the head had 1 to 5, 6 to 10 or more than 10 relativesof the category. An index was constructed weighing each of these answers and add-ing them in order to provide a total indicator measuring the size of the network.The indicator was grouped into three groups of nearly identical sizes ranging from

Figure 8.4 Lineal and collateral relatives of both spouses living nearby, percentage of thehouseholds, n=6300

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CONTENTS

“no relatives nearby” and “some relatives living nearby” to “many relatives livingnearby”4. Figure 8.6 shows the distribution of this network size indicator.

Thirty-eight percent of the households can be considered to have extensiveor dense networks, that is, households which have more than 10 relatives of thehousehold head and the head’s spouse nearby. The distribution of such networksacross types of neighbourhood, governorates, sex and age of the head of householdand migration status, is very similar to the distribution of complex networks, i.e.the networks consisting of both lineal and collateral relatives (see figure 8.5).

If the traditional pattern of living in localities characterised by dense net-works made up of close kin with a preference for the father’s relatives still persists,

Figure 8.5 Type of network: Lineal and collateral relatives, in percent of the households inthe category. Bars represent difference from average of 44 percent. Unweighted N = 2817

4 The actual size limits for the two latter categories cannot be firmly established. But allhouseholds with definitely ten relatives or more living within walking distance were placedin the category “many relatives living nearby”.

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we would expect a high number of households to be surrounded by many personsof both lineal and collateral kin. This would best approximate the traditional notionof the village. Table 8.2 shows that 34 percent of the households actually are sur-rounded by this kind of networks.

The percentage of households having dense and comprehensive networkswithin their immediate neighbourhood varies across governorates, different typesof neighbourhoods, and according to the age and sex of the household head. Thereare significant differences between urban residential areas (29 percent) on the onehand, and rural and semi-urban areas (52 percent) on the other. Differences alsoexist between refugees and displaced (40 percent) and the population that is notrefugee (26 percent). The governorates Jarash and Ajloun, Irbid and those in thesouth, also have a high percentage of households with this kind of network. InAmman, on the other hand, fewer households are living as in the traditional vil-lage. Moving and increasing age of the household head, also lead to less village-likenetworks. This is shown in figure 8.7.

Figure 8.6: Size of local household networks. Percent of all households

Table 8.2 Types and size of household networks, percent of all households

krowtenfoeziS

krowtenfoepyT enoN emoS ynaM

sevitaleroN 62

ylnolaretalloC 3 1

ylnolaeniL 22 3

laretallocdnalaeniL 01 43

A Majority Is Satisfied With Their Household NetworkRespondents were asked about their satisfaction with a series of attributes of the placethey live, for example access to services, the space and cost of housing, the environ-ment, access to work, and so on. In this context, they were asked about their satis-faction with the distance to relatives and to friends also, and about their satisfactionwith neighbours.

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CONTENTS

In general, the Jordanian population is overwhelmingly satisfied with the distanceto friends and relatives. One percent of the households claim that distance to friendsand relatives is not important, and 95 percent find the distance to friends accepta-ble, satisfactory or very satisfactory. When it comes to the distance to relatives, 81percent of the households find it acceptable, satisfactory or very satisfactory. Closeto one-half of households reported the distance to relatives and friends to be verysatisfactory. This is shown in figure 8.8.

When asked about their satisfaction with the neighbours in general, 58 per-cent of the respondents claim they are very satisfied and 95 percent find the situa-tion acceptable or are satisfied. This may not come as a surprise, knowing that mostof the households are surrounded with kinsfolk.

Figure 8.7 The village household network: Many relatives and both lineal and collateralrelatives. Bars represent difference from average of 35 percent. Percent of households in cat-egory. Unweighted N=2203

272

CONTENTS

The level of satisfaction with the distance to relatives does not vary much betweenthe governorates, or according to type of neighbourhood. There is practically nodifference in the levels across age of the household head. The only exception is thatmore respondents reported being unsatisfied in farm areas, 31 percent comparedto the average of 18 percent. The most influential factors are the type and size ofthe household network, which again are influenced by migration during the last fiveyears, and whether children are living nearby. This is shown in figure 8.9.

While 90 percent are satisfied and only 10 percent are unsatisfied with thedistance to relatives among households with many relatives living within close dis-tance, 31 percent of those living without relatives nearby are unsatisfied. Of thosehaving both lineal and collateral relatives in the neighbourhood, 89 percent aresatisfied. Having only collateral relatives nearby is less satisfying, and 21 percent ofthese households are unsatisfied with the distance to relatives. Those who havemoved residence and lived elsewhere five years ago also are more often unsatisfied.Among households surrounded by both lineal and collateral relatives with manyrelatives in the neighborhood, only 3 percent reported that they are unsatisfied withthe distance to relatives.

In-MarriageArab marriage rules allow for consanguineous marriages among first cousins, andit has been claimed that there traditionally exists a preference for marrying the father’sbrother’s daughter (bin ‘amm) for men and hence the father’s brother’s son for women(ibn ‘amm). In the JLCS all women were asked about the relation to their most recenthusbands. Close to one-half of the marriages were contracted with a person that wasrelated through kinship to the woman before marriage. The results are shown intable 8.3.

Figure 8.8 Satisfaction with distance to relatives and friends. Percent of all households, n=6300

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CONTENTS

According to these results, 26 percent of marriages were contracted between firstcousins. The most popular of these marriages is the father’s brother’s son marriage(ibn ‘amm - bint ‘amm) as mentioned above (12.5 percent). It is worth mentioningthat nearly 4 percent of the marriages are between spouses that are related boththrough their mothers and through their fathers. Another 21 percent of the mar-riages are more distant in-marriages contracted within the hamulah. Altogether 47percent of the marriages took place within the hamulah, suggesting a significanttendency to hamulah endogamy, i.e. marriage within the hamulah.

Figure 8.9 Unsatisfied with the distance to relatives. Percent of the households in the cate-gory: Bars represent difference from average of 18 percent. Unweighted N=5919

Table 8.3 Relation to latest husband, in percent of all marriages

noss'rehtorbs'rehtoM )lahknbi( 3.2

noss'rehtorbs'rehtaF )mma'nbi( 5.21

noss'retsiss'rehtaf&noss'rehtorbrehtoM )amma'nbi&lahknbi( 7.2

noss'retsiss'rehtoM )alahknbi( 0.4

noss'retsiss'rehtaF )amma'nbi( 5.3

noss'rehtorbs'rehtaf&noss'retsiss'rehtoM )amma'nbi&alahknbi( 1.1

emaS halumah ediss'rehtaf, 3.61

emaS halumah ediss'rehtom, 6.4

noitaleroN 9.25

latoT 001

NdethgiewnU 2135

274

CONTENTS

The level of in-marriage is high, although not exceptionally so in the context of theMiddle East where rates of consanguineous marriage are generally high (Bittles1995). It agrees well with the pattern of residence among relatives in Jordan. If rel-atives live close together, the chances for marrying a relative increase. Throughgenerations, the practice of endogamy creates a dense web of kinship ties such thatpeople are related to each other in many ways and the family network grows.

The observed levels of in-marriage agree only to some extent with answersgiven to questions regarding the preferred marriage type. In this instance, 11 per-cent of respondents stated that the father’s brother’s son was the preferred spousefor a daughter, a figure very close to the observed level of 13 percent. Other formsof cousin marriages received scant support, and only an additional 1 percentpreferred cousin marriage of other types as their first choice in contrast to the 13percent actually having this form of marriage. Forty-nine percent stated that theydid not have any preference, and 35 percent wanted their daughter to marry out-side of the hamulah. It is not clear if the difference between observed and preferredmarriages is due to a recent shift in opinion, or if the complex choices involved infinding a spouse make the outcomes different than the preferences. There is a clearassociation between marriage preference and education, in that those having notattended school have a much higher preference for cousin marriage than those witheducation (table 8.4). This may, however, to some extent also reflect an age effect,in that those with little education are generally older than those with some moreeducation. However, in actual marriage practice, there is no clear-cut relationbetween the age of a woman and the relation to her spouse.

Since many marriages are between relatives, it would be expected that otherdimensions of closeness influence the choice of a future spouse. Overall, the JLCSshows that in 36 percent of the cases the spouses are from, or born in the same areain Jordan, while in 20 percent they come from different places. In 21 percent ofthe cases, the spouses come from different countries and in 24 percent they bothcome from a country other than Jordan. But as Jordan is a country hosting a large

Table 8.4 First marriage preference by education (percent)

noitacudE latoT

ecnereferPtoN

dednettarocisab

sselyradnoces rehgih

dethgiew-nUN

nisuoC 72 31 7 4 21 737

halumaH 6 5 2 3 5 162

edistuO halumah 81 43 24 04 53 1771

ecnereferpoN 84 74 84 35 94 3562

latoT 001 001 001 001 001 2245

275

CONTENTS

refugee population (44 percent of the population), these results mask an even higherpropensity for endogamy. This is shown in table 8.5.

One-half of spouses in the non-refugee population in Jordan are from thesame locality in Jordan, while 26 percent come from different places in Jordan. Alocality as defined in JLCS is most often a town or rural district (see appendix 1).Fifteen percent come from different countries, and 8 percent come from a samecountry outside Jordan. There are very few marriages between persons of refugeebackground and non-refugees, only approximately 10 percent of the marriages arebetween these two groups.

The refugees and the displaced tend to marry persons who are not onlyrefugees, but who have the same refugee background as themselves. Seventy-threepercent of 1948-refugees are married to persons that are themselves refugees from1948, and 17 percent are married to persons from other categories of refugees. Two-thirds of the 1967 displaced have married 1967 displaced, and another 20 percentof them have chosen a spouse who is either 1948 refugee or 1948 refugee anddisplaced. Seventy-seven percent of refugees and displaced have married within thesame category.

This pattern of selection of spouses implies that not only are the family net-works strengthened and continued through generations, but also broad social groupsare perpetuated over time. The same pattern based on a preference for social closenessin marriage has been observed for other refugee populations in the region (Tuastad1997, Pedersen 1997).

Table 8.5 Locality and endogamy by refugee status, percent

sutatseegufeR

8491eegufer

7691decalpsid

,eegufeRdecalpsid

azaGeegufer

toN,eeguferdecalpsid

latoT

niytilacolemaSnadroJ

42 9 5 61 05 63

niytilacoltnereffiDnadroJ

51 6 2 6 62 42

ton(yrtnuocemaS)nadroJ

23 45 07 84 8 02

seirtnuoctnereffiD 03 13 42 13 51 12

latoT 001 001 001 001 001 001

NdethgiewnU 409 815 242 15 2413 7584

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CONTENTS

Conclusion: The Strength of Family NetworksThere are four observations to make from this analysis. First, Jordanian householdslive in neighbourhoods surrounded by relatives. Less than one-third of householdshave no relatives living within the hara or within walking distance.

Second, the most common residential pattern is living with relatives on thefather’s side of the male head of household, but it is also common to have relativesof the wife living nearby. Third, the result of this is that a high percentage of house-holds are surrounded by both many kinds of relatives and by a high number ofrelatives. Their family networks continue to be complex and dense, as was theobserved pattern previously. Fourth, eight out of ten households are satisfied withthe distance to their relatives.

The survey results lend substantial support to the claim that the family holdsa strong position as a basic social unit. In spite of the movements and migrationsof people the country has experienced over the last decades, households manage tostructure their neighbourhoods or localities based on closeness or ‘asabiya. Relativeslive closely together in the same localities, and a high number of spouses chose theirpartners from among their relatives and the same social group.

Visiting Relatives: Expressing Closeness

The frequency of visits among relatives in Jordan is extremely high. Only 15 per-cent of the total population had not visited or had no visits from a relative duringthe two weeks prior to the interview. Twenty-five percent visited or were visited daily.It is worth noting that approximately one-third of the fieldwork was done duringRamadan5, and that the frequency of visits is expected to be particularly high dur-ing this month. During the month of Ramadan, 28 percent had visits, as against24 percent during the remaining part of the fieldwork. During the latter period ahigher percentage falling into the group with less frequent visits made up for thesomewhat lower number visiting daily. The overall impression of very high levelsof visiting remained unchanged. All in all, the results clearly demonstrate the closecontact among relatives.

Visits are more frequent between the respondents and relatives on theirfather’s side than between the respondents and other kinds of relatives. The level ofvisits is high all over Jordan, and seems to be nearly constant across age and sexdifferences. Factors influencing the visiting pattern most are the size and type of5 The fieldwork was carried out from 25 January to 18 April 1996. Revisits to cover house-holds where no contact was established during the main fieldwork continued until the endof April. Ramadan started on 20 January and lasted till 20 February.

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household network surrounding the family. The population in Amman has slightlyless frequent visits with family and relatives than the population in othergovernorates.

The JLCS gives a detailed account of which kinds of relatives are visited byor paid a visit to the respondent during the last two weeks. The answers show thatthe most frequent visits occur with relatives on the father’s side. Sixteen percent ofthe interviewees visited such relatives daily, and 71 percent had visited or had visitsfrom relatives on the father’s side at least once during the last two weeks. Visits withrelatives on the mother’s side are less frequent, as 43 percent had such visits duringthe two weeks preceding the interview, and visits with the relatives of the spouseare the least frequent. This is shown in figure 8.10.

There is only a very slight tendency for women to report more visits thanmen. While 23 percent of men report that they had or paid visits daily, 28 percentof the women did so. Seventeen percent of the male respondents and 13 percent ofthe female told that they had no visits over the last two weeks. The visiting patternis equal over the age groups, except for older persons, i.e. those over 60 years, whoreport 4 percentage points less visits than persons in other age groups.

Head of households and children are rather less involved in visiting than thespouses of the household heads, but the differences are small. While 15 percent ofthe heads of households and 16 percent of the children did not pay or have any visitduring the two last weeks, only 10 percent of the spouses of the household headshad no visits. Twenty-nine percent of the household heads, and 31 percent of theirspouses, have daily visits, while 20 percent of the children have the same frequencyof visits. Other household members and non-relatives living in the household havefewer visits (67 percent). This is shown in figure 8.11.

Figure 8.11 discloses that the factors influencing visiting patterns the most,are the type and size of the family network living nearby. Respondents from house-holds with both lineal and collateral relatives living in the neighbourhood and those

Figure 8.10 Visits with relatives during last two weeks, in percent of respondents (n=6300)

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with many relatives living nearby visit relatives more than others. There are also somedifferences across governorates, and the frequency of visits is higher in Irbid thanfor the other governorates.

When we consider the percentage of the population with daily visits over thetwo-weeks’ period, we see that frequent visitors are more numerous among headsof households and their spouses as opposed to the children and other members ofthe household. There are no differences across age groups. Amman has less frequentvisitors than the other reporting domains and the type and size of the householdnetwork in the neighbourhood seems to be an important factor influencing the visits.The more complex and bigger the group of relatives living nearby, the higher thepercentage of the population engaging in daily visiting. This is shown in figure 8.12.

The visiting pattern is relatively stable over types of neighbourhoods. Visitsoccur with somewhat higher frequency in refugee camps and in rural/semi-urbanresidential areas than in other kinds of neighbourhoods, but the differences are small.

Figure 8.11 Respondents with visits last two weeks, in percent, by sex, age group, position inthe household, types of relatives living nearby, size of household network nearby and report-ing domain. Bars show the difference from the overall level of 84 percent

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In farm areas, the percentage of persons having paid or received visits is lower thanfor other neighbourhoods. This is shown in figure 8.13.

Figure 8.12 Respondents with daily visits last two weeks, in percent, by sex, age group, posi-tion in the household, types of relatives living nearby, size of household network nearby andreporting domain. Bars show the difference from the average level of 25 percent

Figure 8.13 Visits among relatives by type of neighbourhood, in percent of the populationliving in each type of neighbourhood

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Use of Clan or Village Institutions

The diwan and the rabita are two types of clan or village institutions that have sim-ilar functions in Jordan. The diwan is a kind of a social club or a gathering placefor the clan or the hamulah or the ashira, where the members of the family groupgather on occasions. The diwan is primarily used for social gatherings, for weddingand engagement parties, and for gathering to express condolences. It can also beused for gatherings concerning family politics, for example solving disputes amongfamilies or raising social assistance for needy families. They are also used for religiousevents and to discuss political matters. The rabita has traditionally a clearer politi-cal role than the diwan, and was used by the clan leaders to exert their influenceand authority over the families and their members. In the JLCS no distinction wasmade between these two clan or village institutions.

As we find that the Jordanian population tends to continue or recreate villageliving patterns when it comes to organising the social space surrounding households,we would also expect that they utilise traditional institutions for organising majorsocial events. The survey results show that 34 percent of the respondents were mem-bers of hamulahs, ashiras or villages that had a rabita, a diwan or similar institutions.But only 13 percent of all respondents had attended gatherings in their rabita ordiwan during the last 12 months, or slightly more than a third of those who have arabita or diwan.

Who are the users of the diwans and rabitas? The results indicate that menand head of households more often than women and the spouses of household headsattend to gatherings in the clan institutions. Nineteen percent of the male respond-ents and 18 percent of the heads of household had attended any kind of gatheringin own rabita or diwan. Women also use the institutions, but less frequently, as 7percent of them had attended any kind of gathering during the last year. There areno differences across age groups, nor is there any noticeable difference related tosize and type of household network.

The attendance to meetings in own family's diwan and rabita is slightlyhigher in Zarqa and Mafraq (16 percent) and in Irbid (16 percent) than in othergovernorates (11-13 percent), and it is lowest in Jarash and Ajloun (7 percent). Wealso find lower attendance in farm (4 percent) as well as in rural and semi-urbanresidential areas (7 percent) and in refugee camps (10 percent). We find the highestfrequency of attendance in urban residential areas (14 percent).

If we look at the various types of gatherings and how the population is us-ing their diwans and rabitas as opposed to gatherings outside their own clan or villageinstitutions, we see that the clan institutions do not hold a very strong position asa convention place. For most of the types of occasions included in the survey, thepercentage of the population that attended gatherings held outside their own rabitas

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or diwans by far exceeded the ones that attended meetings in their own rabita ordiwan. This applies to ordinary gatherings, to marriages and engagements, to con-dolences and to religious events. By way of an example, 80 percent had participatedin at least one wedding or engagement during the last 12 months. But only twopercent had attended the wedding or engagement in their own diwan or rabita. Themajority, 72 percent, attended such gatherings outside their own clan institutions.Six percent had been in marriages and engagements both within and outside of theirclan institution.

Only when it comes to more rare occasions and more politicised mattersinvolving clan politics, like settlements of family disputes, political discussions andmobilisation of social assistance, do clan institutions hold a stronger position. Thisis shown in figure 8.14.

In spite of the noticeable presence of the clan institutions, they do not seemto hold a very strong position in organising the most common social gatherings forthe Jordanian population. This picture may underestimate, however, the real influ-ence of these institutions, as is indicated by the fact that they tend to be attendedby heads of household on occasions less of a social and more of a political nature.In addition, gatherings taking place outside own rabita or diwan, may take place inanother family's institution.

Figure 8.14 Attendance to gatherings in and outside of the diwan and rabita, by type of gath-ering. In percent of total population

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Help and Support Among Family, Friends andNeighbours

We would expect that the high frequency of living amidst many close relatives findsits corollary in a high level of sharing of resources and of exchanges of services andsupport within the group of relatives, as well as among other neighbours and friends.Comparing with the findings of very high levels of visiting among relatives, thefrequency of exchange of help and support is lower, although significant. Of all therespondents, 38 percent had given help of any kind to relatives, or to neighbours,friends or colleagues, while 26 percent had received help. The term “help” refers tothe provision of work or services during the two weeks prior to the interview, aswell as financial help and transfers in cash and in kind during the last year.

Givers, Takers and Exchangers: Most Help Their RelativesAll in all, it is more common to help family and relatives than friends, neighboursand colleagues. This is shown in figure 8.15.

Many of the respondents are involved in several kinds of support exchang-es. In table 8.6 an overview is provided for those who give and those who receivehelp of any kind. The table shows that 16 percent of the total population providedhelp only to family and relatives, and 8 percent provided only financial help or trans-fers in cash or kind to relatives, and another 5 percent did both. Five percent providedhelp only to friends, neighbors and colleagues, and 2 percent did this in additionto providing help to relatives. Only 1 percent engaged in all kinds of help to bothrelatives and to friends. The pattern is similar for the receivers. But they are fewerin number, and only 6 percent of them claim that they received help exclusively fromfamily and relatives.

Figure 8.15 Help given and received, by kind of help and status of other person. In percentof total population. N=6300

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If we group the givers and takers, 29 percent of the population consist of givers ofhelp to relatives only, while 4 percent direct their help to both relatives and friends,and 5 to friends only. Among the receivers, 17 percent obtain help only from rela-tives, while 3 percent are helped by relatives and friends, and 6 percent are helpedby friends only. In table 8.7 is shown how the respondents are both givers and takersand with whom they are interacting both “ways”. The table clearly shows the dom-inance of family and relatives in the pattern of exchange of support and help. Only4 percent interact exclusively with friends, neighbours or colleagues, and not withfamily and relatives. Thirty-nine percent interact exclusively with family and rela-tives, while 5 percent interact with both relatives and non-relatives.

Table 8.7 shows that those who interact with friends, neighbours and col-leagues – only, or in combination with family and relatives – are all both givers andtakers of help, or, what we could call “exchangers”. Those who are exclusively “giv-ers” of help, provide their support to family and relatives (21 percent of the totalpopulation). Nine percent are exclusively “receivers” of support, and they receivehelp from their family and relatives. If we add the 9 percent who are “exchangers”

Table 8.6 Help and transfers to relatives and friends, by givers and receivers. In percent ofthe total population. N=6300

neviG devieceR

plehoN 26 47

ylnosevitaler,pleH 61 6

ylnosevitaler,srefsnarT 8 8

sevitaler,srefsnartdnapleH 5 3

seugaelloc,srobhgien,sdneirfpleH 5 6

sdneirfdnasevitalerpleH 2 1

sdneirf-pleh,sevitaler-srefsnarT 1 1

sdneirf-pleh,sevitaler-srefsnart,pleH 1 0

latoT 001 001

Table 8.7 Givers and receivers of help, by categories of others. In percent of total popula-tion, N=6300

morfplehfosrevieceR

otplehfosreviG plehoNylnO

sevitalerdnasdneirF

sevitalersdneirfylnO latoT

plehoN 35 9 26

sevitalerylnO 12 9 92

sdneirfdnasevitaleR 2 2 4

sdneirfylnO 1 4 5

latoT 47 71 3 6 001

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of help between relatives, a total of 17 percent are both givers and receivers of helpand transfers.

The pattern described here seems to indicate that there are other principlesor norms guiding the helping patterns among non-relatives than those prevailingamong family members and relatives. Exchanges in non-family relations tend to bemore balanced than for the family relations, in the sense that if a person has pro-vided help over the last two weeks he or she has also received support, and vice versa.A more generalised patterns of reciprocity seems to prevail among family andrelatives. By this we mean that with the family, one may be expected to give even ifhelp is not reciprocated immediately, and family and relatives may extend supporteven if the recipient is not in a position to give back at the moment. Let us nowturn to the question of which kinds of help and transfers are most frequently in-volved in social network exchanges.

Kinds of Support: Household Activities and Transfers MostCommonIn the Jordan Living Conditions Survey the respondents were asked to state whichtypes of support they had given or received over the two weeks prior to the inter-view6, both concerning family and relatives and concerning friends, neighbours andcolleagues. The answer categories covered various activities related to household work(shopping, child care, preparation of food, housework) and productive activities(help in a family enterprise, work in the fields) as well as more occasional types ofsupport like assistance in relation to births, weddings, funerals and house buildingand maintenance.

There were few answers for each of the activities mentioned, which restrictsour analysis. The most frequent type of help was in relation to daily housework.While 24 percent of the respondents report that they have given help to family andrelatives outside of their own households over the last two weeks, 14 percent haveprovided help in housework activities and 5 percent had given help in the variousoccasional activities. Less than 3 percent of the total number of respondents hadgiven help in productive areas. Less than 1 percent had given help in a family en-terprise or had helped to work in the field or hakura. The same general pattern wasfound regarding reception of help from family and relatives, except that the totalnumber of respondents reporting to have received help of any kind was one-half

6 It was also asked about the kinship relation to the receivers or providers of support. As theanswers were few for each kind of support and the variations in kinship relations to providersand receivers were great, the results are not easy to interpret and they will not be analysedhere.

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that of the givers of help. Similar results were found concerning support amongfriends, neighbours and colleagues. The results are shown in table 8.8.

The respondents also were asked about the purpose of financial transfersgiven to or received from family and relatives over the last year, and about what thefinancial help was intended to cover. The defined answer categories covered specif-ic purposes like wedding arrangements and purchase of land, capital goods or farmequipment, as well as procurement of housing and payment of debts and for healthtreatment, education and pilgrimage. The defined alternatives gathered only fewanswers each, as the most frequent answers fell in the “other” category. This may

Table 8.8 Types of support given and received during the last two weeks, by categories ofothers. In percent of all respondents

:morfdeviecerrootnevigtroppuS sevitalerdnaylimaFsruobhgien,sdneirF

seugaellocdna

:troppusfosepyT 1 neviG devieceR neviG devieceR

seitivitcadlohesuoheromroenonipleH 6.31 2.7 1.9 0.5

gnippohsoD 9.3 6.1 9.2 0.1

eracdlihC 6.3 6.1 0.1 4.0

dooferaperP 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1

krowesuohrehtO 7.5 6.3 0.2 0.1

seiduts/krowloohcS * * 0.3 4.2

seitivitcaevitcudorperomroenonipleH 6.2 9.0 2.2 5.0

noitatropsnarT 3.1 8.0 5.1 4.0

esirpretneylimafnipleH 7.0 1.0 3.0 2.0

rosdleifnikroW arukah 7.0 1.0 4.0 2.0

seitivitcalanoisaccoeromroenonipleH 5.4 2.1 1.3 5.0

eraclatan-tsopnitsissA 0.1 5.0 5.0 2.0

gniddewgnignarranitsissA 3.1 1.0 0.1 1.0

larenufgnignarranitsissA 3.1 1.0 1.1 1.0

riaperrognidliubesuohnitsissA 9.0 4.0 6.0 1.0

plehlaicnaniF 2 6.41 5.21 2.3 8.0

plehrehtO 6.5 5.2 5.5 5.2

latoT 3 9.32 3.02 3.91 6.8

plehlaicnanifgnidulcxelatoT 8.32 1.11

NdilaVdethgiewnU 3055 3055 3055 3055

.sevitalerdnaylimafrofdedulcnitonsawyrogetacrewsnasihT*1 tsaeltagninoitnemegatnecrepehtevigslatotbuseht,dewollaerewsrewsnaelpitluM

.puorgehtnisrewsnaehtfoeno2 llacerehtdna,sevitalerdnaylimafrofnoitseuqetarapesanidesiarsawplehlaicnaniF

revoplehrednuyrogetacrewsnaenosaylnodesiarsawtielihw,raeytsalehtsawdoirep.seugaellocdnasrobhgien,sdneirfrofskeewowttsaleht

3 .sevitalerdnaylimafmorfdnaottroppuslaicnanifgnidulcnI

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Table 8.9 Reasons for financial help or transfers in cash or in kind given to or received fromrelatives during the last twelve months. In percent of all respondents

:plehlaicnanifrofnosaeR neviG devieceR

tnemegnarragniddewrofyaP 0.2 6.0

gnillewddliuB 6.0 2.0

gnillewdyuB 1.0 0.0

tbedayaP 6.0 7.0

lliblatipsohyaP 7.0 6.0

egamirgliprofyaP 1.0 1.0

noitacuderofyaP 6.0 9.0

dnalyuB 1.0 2.0

tnempiuqemrafrosdooglatipacyuB 1.0 2.0

plehrehtO 6.01 5.9

latoT 6.41 5.21

NdilaVdethgiewnU 3055 3055

indicate that it is more frequent to receive or to give transfers to cover generalexpenses than to pay for specific purposes or “projects”. This is shown in table 8.9.

The last kind of help and support that we will discuss here is the provisionof daily care for persons in need of such care. The JLCS shows that 1.3 percent ofall the randomly selected adults are in charge of the daily care for a family memberor a relative outside the household, while 3.3 percent are in charge of the daily carefor a family member inside the household. Such daily care is demanding in timeand efforts. Approximately 20 percent of these caretakers have had to reduce workor reduce the time spent on studies, or even in a few cases to quit work or studies,in order to meet the needs of the persons they are taking care of.

Helpers and Receivers: The Family Network as Source of socialSecurityLet us now explore if there are any significant patterns related to who is giving helpand support, and who is receiving help. First, there are few differences between thesix reporting domains, i.e. among the various Governorates. But there are somedifferences according to gender. Figure 8.16 shows that men are slightly more oftengivers and women are more often receivers. While 11 percent of the women receivedhelp during the last two weeks and transfers over the last year, only 6 percent of themen admitted they did so.

Older persons are more often receivers of help than persons in younger agegroups. A person over 60 years of age has a three times higher chance to be the

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Figure 8.16 Givers, exchangers and receivers of help, by sex. In percent, n=6299

Figure 8.17 Givers, exchangers and receivers of help, by age group. In percent, n=6300

receiver of help than a younger person, and one-half the chance of being a providerof help. This is shown in figure 8.17.

Education and income also influence whether a person is a giver or receiverof help. Education seems to positively influence the propensity to give help andsupport. The higher the level of achieved education, the more frequent is it to eitherbe an exchanger or a giver of help. With the exception of those who have notattended school, who are more often receivers of help than others, the percentageof receivers is stable over income groups. This is shown in figure 8.18.

Figure 8.19 shows the manner in which total household income influencesgiving and receiving help. While the percentage of givers increases with increasingincome, the percentage of receivers decreases. Respondents living in female headedhouseholds nearly twice as often are receivers compared to respondents living inhouseholds headed by men (15 and 8 percent respectively). Participation in thelabour force has a similar effect, as there are twice as high a percentage of receiversamong the respondents outside the workforce as among those in the workforce (11and 6 percent). Twenty-six percent of those in the labour force are givers.

When we look into the different kinds of help and support, we find thatexchanges of non-financial help among family and relatives are not much influencedby household income, nor are they much influenced by where the respondent livesin Jordan. Men less often claim that they are receivers of non-financial assistancethan women, and they give help somewhat less often than women.

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Figure 8.18 Receivers, exchangers and givers of help, by level of completed education. Inpercent, n=6300

Figure 8.19 Receivers, exchangers and givers of help, by income group. In percent, n=6300

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Men are more frequently providers of financial help and transfers than women.Economic help is more often received by respondents living in poor households andmore often given by respondents living in households with higher total income. Onthe one hand, only 5 percent of the respondents from households with a total year-ly income of less than 900 dinars and 11 percent of those having between 900 and1450 dinars supported relatives economically. On the other hand, more than 20percent of the respondents residing in households with a total yearly income of 3600dinars or more did so. In the lowest income groups, those with less than 900 dinarsand those with 900-1450 dinars, 20 and 17 percent of the interviewees receivedeconomic support from relatives. Among those with more than 3600 dinars in yearlyhousehold income, only 8 percent received economic support. There are no signif-icant differences across governorates.

In sum, we see that the provision of help between family and relatives, whichfor the most part consists of help in household activities, is less dependent on theeconomic situation of both giver and receiver, than is the case for financial help andtransfers. The overall direction of help, however, is from the able, young, econom-ic active, educated and relatively well off, towards the poorer, older, less educated,often women, and those outside the labour force. Exchange patterns seem to con-tribute to a safety net and serve as social security for those in need of it.

How important are these transfers, and to what extent are interfamily flowsfunctioning as a social security net? The Jordan Living Conditions Survey does notgive very good answers to these questions, as information about the size of economic

Figure 8.20 Financial help and transfers given and received during the last year, by incomegroups. In percent, n=6300

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flows is lacking. However, an indication can be obtained from the information aboutthe households’ sources of income and their importance. Fourteen percent of allhouseholds had remittances from relatives as one of the three most important sourcesof income. In comparison, the same percentage of households received retirementpensions or social security from the Government as one of the three most impor-tant sources of income. This is shown in figure 8.21.

It is interesting to note that very few households receiving retirement pen-sions or social security from the Government also have remittances from relativesas one of the three most important sources of income. Table 8.10 shows that lessthan 1 percent of all households have both kinds of income among their three mostimportant sources of income. This finding indicates that the remittances are directedtowards those households in need who lack public support for their subsistence, andthat family networks function as an additional source of support for a substantivepart of the population. This picture is somewhat altered if we look at the numberof individuals benefiting from the two kinds of support. The percentage of thepopulation supported through the public system is higher than the percentage having

Figure 8.21 Households receiving remittances from relatives and households receiving retire-ment pensions and/or social security from the Government, by importance as income source.In percent of all households, n=6300

Table 8.10 Households receiving remittances from relatives as one of the three most impor-tant sources of income by households receiving retirement pension or social security as oneof the three most important sources of income. In percent of all households

:emocnifoecruoSsevitalermorfsecnettimeR

tnemeriteR:emocnifoecruoSytiruceslaicosronoisnep

enoNtsoM

tnatropmitsomdnoceS

tnatropmidrihT

tnatropmilatoT

enoN 9.27 9.5 2.6 4.1 4.68

ecruostnatropmitsoM 1.6

8.0

2.6

tnatropmitsomdnoceS 6.4 0.5

tnatropmitsomdrihT 1.2 3.2

latoT 6.58 6.6 4.6 4.1 0.001

N 8926

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CONTENTS

remittances as an important source of income. Eleven percent of the population livein households having remittances from relatives as one of their three most impor-tant sources of income. Nineteen percent live in those households with retirementpensions or social security as one of the three most important sources of income.The family network still seems to fill an important role as a provider of social secu-rity in the Jordanian society.

292


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Hiam O. Kalimat and Åge A.Tiltnes

Chapter 9 Attitudes and Public Life

Summary

Dealing mainly with participation in public life and attitudes towards such partic-ipation, this chapter finds that there are substantial differences between Jordanianwomen and men. Approximately six in ten Jordanians above the age of twenty haveever voted in a municipal or national election, with only minor variation betweenthe sexes. However, when considering a second indicator of electoral politics, cam-paigning, we notice that men have been more active. While 15 percent of men havebeen involved in electoral campaigning, only 9 percent of women have. Six timesas many men as women (12 percent versus 2 percent) are members of at least onevoluntary organisation. Not surprisingly, Jordanian men are also more frequent usersof what we have called ‘guesthouses’ (rabitas, diwans and similar institutions) forpolitical purposes.

Turning from actual participation to attitudes towards such participation,we see that the gender difference persists. About double the number of men areopposed to female involvement in political and associational life compared to wom-en. Yet, our main conclusion is that there is a general ‘psychological’ barrier againstfemale public and political participation in Jordanian society. For example, one-thirdof the interviewed individuals above the age of fifteen are against having women inthe elected local councils, the National Assembly, or in the government.

This chapter also looks at the consumption of news through modern media.Three in four Jordanians were found to have obtained news from a newspaper, radioor TV station the day preceding the interview. TV is clearly the most popular sourceof information, followed by radio and newspapers. More men than women followthe news. The widest gender gap can be seen in newspaper consumption, due tohigher illiteracy rates among women. Nearly three in ten Jordanians supplement thementioned three Jordanian information sources with non-Jordanian TV news at leastonce a week. Twenty percent of the adult respondents watched non-Jordanian Arabchannels during the week before the interview; 15 percent watched Israeli news;while 2 percent followed news put on the air by Western TV stations.

CHAPTER 10 CHAPTER 8

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Introduction

This chapter deals with several aspects of public life. First, it sheds light on people’sinterest in societal and political issues by describing their level of news consump-tion through modern mass media such as newspapers, radio, and television. It thenturns from interest in public issues to public participation. Four indicators of par-ticipation in public life are included: voting, campaigning, organisational member-ship and the political use of ‘guesthouses’. Two indicators, voting and, belong tothe core of electoral politics. We asked about participation in both national and localelections. The third indicator of public engagement is voluntary membership invarious sorts of organisations, associations, and clubs. Clearly, all associations arenot involved in politics to the same extent. This becomes evident if we compare aneighbourhood-based group of women committed to social work with a nationalNGO supporting female candidates for parliamentary elections or an associationfor the protection of consumer rights.

Yet, whatever the degree of politicisation, it has been argued that associationalmembership is of considerable relevance to the discussion of political participation.Involvement in organisational life may enhance political awareness and skills, whichin turn lead to participation in formal politics (Almond and Verba 1989, Bibic 1994,Diamond 1994).

The fourth indicator of public participation is the use of what we have calleda traditional guesthouse (rabita, diwan, and similar institutions) belonging to a clan,tribe or village. These institutions play a central role in Jordanian society, includ-ing in the field of politics.

The third focus of the chapter is on women’s situation. More specifically wediscuss women’s opportunities to take part in public activities, Jordanians’ attitudestoward female participation in public and political arenas, and women’s freedomof movement. Finally, this chapter takes up people’s opinion about the spread oftechnology, literature, and system of governance from the industrialised countriesinto Jordan.

For some topics in this chapter, such as voting and campaigning, it wouldmake little sense to include other nationalities than the Jordanian. Hence, for thesake of clarity and simplicity only Jordanian nationals are included in our analysis.We study persons fifteen years of age or older. However, for analyses of elections,Jordanians below the age of twenty are excluded. In this manner only those whohad had the opportunity to take part in at least one election at the time of theinterview are covered by the analysis. Respondents are 4,991 randomly selectedindividuals (RSIs), 2,001 men and 2,990 women.

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News ConsumptionPeople obtain information about what is going on around them in society from avariety of sources. For the majority perhaps the most valuable information deals withlocal events and comes from informal channels in the private and local milieu. Ofequal importance to many, however, are news about broader issues, questions of amore general and principal character, and political decisions that affect people’s dailylives. Such information is first and foremost available through the modern massmedia. The Jordan Living Conditions Survey asked three questions to capture dataon this topic. First, it asked whether the respondent had read a newspaper the daypreceding the interview and if so, how many newspapers the respondent had read.Next, it asked if the person had received news through Jordanian as well as non-Jordanian radio or television the day before the interview. Finally, the survey que-ried if the respondent had watched the news on any Jordanian or non-JordanianTV the week prior to the interview.

Results show that 77 percent received news from at least one of the threeabove-mentioned types of mass media. We did a logistic regression analysis to findout which factors determine who actually use the media. The following variableswere included in our model: sex, age, level of education, level of income, labourforce participation, governorate of residence, Palestinian refugee status and urban-rural status. Only the first four variables mentioned turned out to be statisticallysignificant. These are included in figure 9.1. (See Chapter Appendix 9.1 for thedetailed results of the regression analysis.)

While 82 percent of men consumed news channelled through one of theseforms of media, only 72 percent of women did. Similarly, it is evident from figure9.1 that the highly educated are more interested in news from these sources thanare the less educated, and that there is a positive correlation between level of incomeand obtaining news from listening to radio, watching TV, or reading newspapers.Finally, people aged 30 to 44 years digest more news than both the younger andolder generations.

Of the three different kinds of mass media included in the survey, TV is clear-ly the most popular source. While only 25 percent had read a newspaper the daybefore the interview (or, if yesterday was a Friday or holiday, the day prior to that)and 33 percent had listened to news on the radio, 68 percent had followed the newson television. In general the patterns in figure 9.1 have their parallels when the samefour background characteristics are applied to the three types of mass media oneby one. Nevertheless, three points have been identified where the situation is slightlydifferent and therefore warrant comment.

First, as could be expected, young people listen to the news on radio less thanolder people. While only 28 percent among those 15-29 years of age received news

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from the radio the day preceding the interview, the percentage increases to 37 and41 respectively for the age groups 30-44 years and 45 years and more.

Second, the gender gap is much broader for newspaper consumption thanit is for watching TV. Only 15 percent of Jordanian women read at least onenewspaper daily against 38 percent of Jordanian men. However, 71 percent menand 65 percent women watch news on the TV. For radio listening the gender gap is12 percent in favour of men (38 against 26 percent). The difference between menand women in newspaper reading is, to a considerable extent, explained by illiteracy.While according to the JLCS about one-tenth of men are functionally illiterate, i.e.unable to read everyday materials, the figure for women is one out of four (see chap-ter 3).

Third, newspaper reading is highly affected by level of education, and moreso than listening to radio and watching TV. As can be seen from figure 9.2, not onlydoes a person’s level of education increase the reading of newspapers, it significant-ly affects the number of newspapers consumed per reader as well. The figure alsoindicates that newspaper consumption increases with level of income.

The section on news consumption concludes with a deeper look at the useof radio and TV as information sources. The overwhelming majority of Jordaniansrely on Jordanian radio and TV. Nearly one-third (32 percent) listened to news fromthe radio the day preceding the interview, while two-thirds (67 percent) watched

Figure 9.1 Persons 15 years and above who received news from any newspaper, radio, or TVthe day preceding the interview by various characteristics: sex, highest level of educationcompleted, yearly household income, and broad age groups

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news on TV. But a substantial number of people also follow the news on non-Jordanian TV stations. Nonetheless, for the most part these sources serve as sup-plements. Just one percent of the respondents used non-Jordanian TV or radio alone.A considerable number of Jordanians, 28 percent, follow news from other Arab,Israeli or Western TV at least once a week.

Figure 9.3 displays that about 20 percent of the adult respondents watchedArab channels other than the Jordanian during the week before the interview; that

Figure 9.2 Newspaper consumption. Number of newspapers read the day prior to the inter-view, by sex, highest level of education and yearly household income

Figure 9.3 Consumption of non-Jordanian radio and television news the day prior to the in-terview, by nationality of source. Note that some individuals use more than one source ofinformation. RSI 15 years or older

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15 percent watched Israeli news; while two percent followed news put on the air byWestern TV stations.

Public Participation

This section focuses on four different indicators of public involvement: (1) voting,(2) campaigning, (3) organisational membership, and (4) the use of a rabita or diwanor similar institutions. The first two, voting and campaigning, relate to the elector-al system. Let us therefore begin with briefly delineating that system. Jordan has abicameral legislature. The Parliament or National Assembly consists of a Senate of40 senators appointed by the King and a popularly elected House of Representa-tives of 80. Both chambers have a tenure of four years. Following the 1967 war, noelections were held until 1989. The electorate consists of Jordanian citizens abovethe age of 19 years, suspending however the right of the Armed Forces, PublicSecurity and Civil Defence personnel to vote as long as they are in service. Candi-dates for election are required to meet several conditions, among which are to be aJordanian citizen for at least ten years and to be at least 30 years of age. The elec-tion law also stipulates that a person may not combine membership in the Houseof Representatives with holding a public post. 1993 saw the first multiparty electionin nearly forty years. Yet, the majority of the candidates did not run under a partybanner. Tribal support is a decisive factor in Jordanian elections. In addition tonational elections, there have been polls at the local level. The last municipal elec-tions prior to the survey were held in 1995.

VotingDoes the Jordan Living Conditions Survey identify any population groups that votemore than others? Are there any socioeconomic characteristics that appear to ‘explain’variance in voting? We start with some factors which do not play an important rolein accounting for people’s voting. No effects are traced for level of education andincome. Likewise, whether a person lives in an urban or rural area does not haveany impact on the act of voting.

Gender does not seem to have much effect either, as 62 percent of Jordani-an women and 60 percent of Jordanian men above the age of twenty have voted inmunicipal or national elections at least once during their life. Yet, it is known thatthe female turnout in each individual Jordanian election is less than that of men,despite the fact that women constitute a higher percentage of the total electorate.To illustrate, official figures show that the female share of voters was 48.6 percent

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during both the 1995 municipal elections (Jordan Times, 15 July 1995) and the1997 parliamentary elections (Jordan Times, 13 September 1997). The femaledominance of the electorate is partly due to the age/sex structure of the population,and partly to the Election Law, which suspends the right to vote of the Armed Force,Public Security and Civil Defence, institutions that are mainly filled with men.

Figure 9.4 discloses some attributes that do affect balloting. First, more olderthan younger Jordanians have ever voted. Another conclusion would have been verysurprising, as one would expect some positive effect from the increased number ofopportunities to vote. Second, there is a considerable gap in voting betweenPalestinian refugees and the non-refugee part of the population. Whereas only 54percent of the refugees have been to the polls, 68 percent of the non-refugees haveever voted. An interesting point is that female voting behaviour explains most ofthe variation. Fifty-nine percent of the male refugees and 62 percent of the malenon-refugees have voted, while the figures for women are 50 percent and 72 percentrespectively.

Figure 9.4 Persons 20 years or more who have ever voted in local or national elections by agegroups, Palestinian refugee status, governorate, organisational membership and news con-sumption

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Third, a striking feature of figure 9.4 is the geographical variation found. Amman,Zarqa and Mafraq have voting participation rates about 20 percentage points belowthat of the other governorates. This regional variation is at least partly explained bythe lower participation rates among Palestinian refugees, since the majority of themreside in these cities. Fourth, we have identified a difference in voting between thosewho are and those who are not members of one or more organisations. The figuresare 73 percent and 61 percent respectively. Finally, people who actively seek newsthrough mass media are somewhat more politically active, at least judged by thisparticular indicator, than those who do not follow the news as much, and thereforeperhaps are less preoccupied with politics. While 63 percent of the Jordanians whofollow news through the media have ever voted, 57 percent of those who do notuse media as an information source have ever voted.

CampaigningConventional wisdom would have it that it takes much more political awarenessand dedication to engage in electoral campaigning than to vote. Therefore thenumber of people involved in such activities should be considerably less than thenumber of voters. The Jordan Living Conditions Survey data reveals that 12 per-cent of Jordanians (15 percent of men versus 9 percent of women) have ever activelypromoted or campaigned for a candidate during elections.

Two comments on this result seem in order. First, nearly one in eight Jorda-nians above the age of twenty has ever been involved in electoral campaigns. Ininterpreting this result we should keep in mind that the survey did not define elec-toral campaigning as it is understood in Western democracies. Contrary to what isusually the case in the West, men and women who actively promote a candidateunder informal circumstances would also define themselves as campaigners. Thismeans that although campaigning is a reliable indicator of political involvement,it is not, at least as it was used in this particular study, necessarily a very good indi-cator of participation in formal forums.

Second, the gap between the two sexes is not very wide. In fact, we wouldhave expected a far bigger difference between men and women’s participation sinceJordanian politics is traditionally understood as the prerogative of men. The resultis even more remarkable when we take into consideration women’s short experiencewith electoral politics. Women were enfranchised in 1974 but were not able toexecute this right until the by-elections held ten years later. The national electionof 1989 was their first real opportunity to engage in parliamentary life. Moreover,there have been very few female candidates to encourage women campaigners. Onlytwelve women ran for the parliamentary elections in 1989. Four years later thenumber of candidates was down to three.

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As is the case for voting, figure 9.5 shows that the proportion of people who haveever campaigned increases slightly with age. Contrary to what was the situation forvoting, there is a correlation between educational level and campaigning. While 16percent of Jordanians with higher education have actively campaigned for acandidate during elections, only 8 percent among those without any education havedone so.

In parallel to the result on voting, figure 9.5 reveals that the non-refugeepopulation has been much more actively involved in electoral campaigning thanthe Palestinian refugees. The likelihood of Palestinian refugees having ever cam-paigned is nearly one-half that of non-refugees. One important reason for thevariation between the two population groups is the relatively low number of Pales-tinian candidates in comparison to the number of candidates of East Bank or Trans-Jordanian origin. For instance, only an estimated 8 percent of the candidates wereidentified as Palestinians during the 1989 parliamentary elections (Robins 1990).This situation is partly explained by the Election Law that allocates a

Figure 9.5 Persons 20 years or more who have ever campaigned for a candidate in local ornational elections by sex, age groups, education, Palestinian refugee status, news consump-tion, organisational membership and voting

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disproportionately high number of seats to the electoral constituencies where EastBankers predominate and a lower number of seats to places like Amman, where themajority of Palestinians and Palestinian refugees are settled (Fathi 1994). The under-representation of Palestinians is also reflected in the 1993 elections, which resultedin 14 of 80, or 17.5 percent, elected Palestinian deputies (Wedeman 1994). Thisargument may also explain the difference in voting found between Palestinian ref-ugees and Jordanian non-refugees.

The survey gives mixed results on the question of whether Palestinian refu-gees living in camps are more politically active than refugees living outside of thecamps. It demonstrates that a total of 54 percent of refugees have ever voted and 8percent have ever campaigned. Yet, when the results are broken down according toplace of residence they disclose that while 62 percent of camp dwellers have voted,53 percent of the non-camp residents have voted. As for campaigning, non-camprefugees have been the more active group. Nine percent of Palestinian refugeesresiding outside refugee camps have ever promoted some candidate, while only 6percent of camp dwellers have done so.

Although Amman, and Zarqa and Mafraq have smaller proportions of peo-ple who have ever campaigned than the other governorates, the gap is not very wide.As for voting, household income does not have a significant impact on whetherindividuals involve themselves in electoral campaigning or not. What does have apositive effect on campaigning however, is news consumption (13 percent of con-sumers versus 8 percent of non-consumers), associational membership (29 percentof members versus 11 percent of non-members) and voting (18 percent of votersversus 2 percent of non-voters). Thus, the survey suggests that political interest, asmeasured by following news in the mass media, and more passive ways of publicand political participation, such as organisational membership and going to the polls,stimulate more active and participatory political activities, as measured by elector-al campaigning.

Membership in OrganisationsA 1996 national poll by Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, indicat-ed that 10 percent of the population participate in some kind of social organisa-tion (Jordan Times, 11 May 1996). The JLCS asked if the respondent was a mem-ber of any women, youth, social, sports, or cultural organisation or club. Data revealthat 7 percent of Jordanian citizens above the age of fifteen are members of suchvoluntary associations. Figure 9.6 shows various determinants for participation inassociational life. It indicates that 12 percent of men against only 2 percent of womenclaim to be member of at least one organisation, society or club. The figure furtherdiscloses regional differences. While 8 percent of the population in the southern

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governorates of Karak, Tafileh, Ma’an and Aqaba are affiliated with some formalorganisation, only 4 and 5 percent of the inhabitants of Jerash and Ajloun, and Zarqaand Mafraq are. Those who live in urban centres are more often members of asso-ciations and clubs than are people living in more sparsely populated areas. As forvoting and electoral campaigning, Palestinian refugee status plays a central role inaccounting for variation. The likelihood of being a member of a voluntary organ-isation is higher among non-refugees than among the Palestinian refugee population.

Contrary to what the survey shows for voting and campaigning, there is norelationship between age and the tendency to become involved in organisationalactivities. But education has a positive effect. As can be seen in figure 9.6, themembership level increases steadily with more education. While 2 percent are

Figure 9.6 Persons 15 years or more who are members of at least one organisation; by sex,urban rural status, governorate, Palestinian refugee status, highest level of education com-pleted, and yearly household income

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members in organisations among Jordanians with no education, 14 percent of Jor-danians with post-secondary education are members in organisations. Income is an-other factor which does not affect electoral participation but has a significant in-fluence on associational membership, is income. Only 3 percent from the lowestincome group are members against 10 percent from the highest income group. Thisis not surprising, since participation in formal organisations usually costs moneyas well as time.

To sum up, who you are, in terms of refugee status, education and income,and where you reside, have an impact on the tendency to participate in organisa-tional life.

Political Meetings in Guesthouses and ElsewhereIn the Jordan Living Conditions Survey, about one-third of Jordanians (35 percent)answer that their hamula or ashira, i.e. clan or tribe, or village have a rabita, diwanor similar institution. These are traditional guesthouses and meeting places whichrestrict membership to the social communities in which they belong, be it commu-nities based on kinship or geography. Some institutions are permanently located inbuildings owned by the societies, while other institutions rent one or more localesto carry out their activities. Many diwans and diwan-like institutions charge mem-bership fees. Therefore, the fact that the community of one in three Jordanians hasa guesthouse does not imply that one-third of all Jordanians are members or usersof such institutions or associations. According to our data, only 38 percent of therespondents who claim that their extended families or villages have a guesthouse,visited it during the 12 months preceding the interview. Guesthouses are used forseveral purposes such as social and religious events, social work, conflict resolution,political debates, election meetings and campaigns. The focus below is on theguesthouse as a meeting place for jaha delegations of notables and particularly asan arena for politics.

While the practice of having a guesthouse is quite widespread, it is by farmore prevalent in urban areas (39 percent) as compared to rural areas (21 percent).There are also differences across governorate boundaries, and this type of institu-tion is somewhat more common among the non-refugee part of the population thanamong Palestinian refugees (figure 9.7).

A jaha delegation is an important institution in Jordanian society. It can beused for various purposes, for example to make a formal request for a bride on behalfof an individual or to end inter-tribal disputes (Cunningham and Sarayrah 1993).The JLCS found that 10 percent of the adult respondents attended a meeting at arabita or diwan or some place else in order to resolve a conflict during the year beforethe interview. This usage is clearly the prerogative of men, as 15 percent men

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attended against only 5 percent women. A study by the Centre for Strategic Stud-ies at Jordan University found that 45 percent of 600 surveyed Jordanian men hadever participated in a jaha (Jordan Times, 11 May 1996).

Rabitas, diwans and similar institutions are important aspects of any discus-sion on political participation in Jordan. For instance, one Jordanian scholar writesthat the guesthouses (what he calls reception-houses) are the locus of electoral pol-itics (Haddad 1992). For comparison, diwans made up central arenas for the 1996election campaigns in the neighbouring West Bank and Gaza Strip also (Gilen 1996,Hovdenak 1996, Tuastad 1997). The JLCS shows that 10 percent of the interviewedindividuals above the age of fifteen attended at least one political meeting the twelvemonths before the interview either in his or her own guesthouse (2.4 percent) or,more commonly, in somebody else’s guesthouse or outside a guesthouse (7.6 per-cent). Roughly one in four who attended a political meeting did so in own diwanor rabita or similar institution. We must assume that some of the respondents vis-ited political meetings in other guesthouses as well. Hence, our results correspondwell to the political importance assigned to such institutions as diwans and rabitas.

Who attends political meetings? Our data produce no surprises. In general,analysis supports earlier results showing that men are more politically active thanwomen, that older people are more active than younger people, that increasingeducational levels increase political participation, and that the non-refugee part ofthe population is more politically active than the Palestinian refugee population

Figure 9.7 Respondent’s hamulah or ashira or village has a guesthouse; by urban-rural sta-tus, governorate and Palestinian refugee status

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(figure 9.8). In addition, those Jordanians who consume news through the mediaand are most active in organisational life and electoral politics also make mostpolitical use of this arena. Twenty-eight percent who have ever campaigned have useda guesthouse for political purposes as compared to 8 percent who have never cam-paigned. Among voters, 16 percent have participated in a political meeting at a diwanor rabita. Five percent of the Jordanians who have never been to the polls have visited

Figure 9.8 Persons 15 years or older who attended at least one political meeting during the12 months preceding the interview; by sex, age groups, highest level of education completed,Palestinian refugee status, news consumption, organisational membership, ever voted, andever campaigned

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a guesthouse to discuss political matters. In the same vein, among persons who formpart of associational life, 23 percent have been to a political guesthouse gatheringcompared to 10 percent among individuals who are not members of any voluntaryorganisation.

A brief comment to the gender differences in the political use of a diwan orrabita seems appropriate. But first, let us make it clear that men and women usual-ly participate in separate meetings. Approximately seven times as many men aswomen, whose extended family or village have a guesthouse, attended at least onepolitical gathering at the community guesthouse during the 12 months prior to theinterview, 14 percent against 2 percent. This gender gap is significant and in linewith the situation in other Arab countries. To illustrate, among Palestinians livingin the neighbouring West Bank and Gaza Strip the guesthouse still appears to bean institution primarily for men. Observers of the Palestinian 1996 Elections foundthat Palestinian women were excluded from campaign meetings held in such familyassociations (Gilen 1996, Hovdenak 1996). Likewise, a similar Kuwaiti institution,the semi-public diwaniyya, remains part of male political culture, controlled by rigidpatterns of gender segregation (Al-Mughni 1997).

The gender gap in the field of family politics is even wider than for generalpolitics, at least if one looks at participation in guesthouse meetings where the top-ic is resolution of inter-family or inter-tribal conflict. While 11 percent of Jordanianmen belonging to a community with a guesthouse had engaged in such a meeting,only 1 percent of women had done the same.

Women in Public Space

Attitudes Towards Female participationThis chapter has thus far shown that Jordanian men are somewhat more active inpolitics than women. Similarly, a significantly higher percentage of men incomparison with women take part in associational life. The situation is even lessbalanced considering high-ranking public and political positions. In fact, until quiterecently political space was nearly void of women. The first woman was elected toParliament’s 80-member Lower House in 1993. The same year the King appointedtwo female Senators to Parliament’s 40-member Upper House. There have been oneor two female ministers in each of the latest governments. In the local elections of1995 nine women succeeded in winning seats in municipal councils and one womanwas elected as mayor for the first time in Jordan’s history. 1996 saw a breakthroughin another important public field. For the first time in the Kingdom’s history awoman was appointed as a judge. As these examples clearly demonstrate, women

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are gradually obtaining more prominent public positions, although changes are com-ing at a slow pace.

The JLCS basically confirms the claim that there is a ‘psychological’ barrieragainst female public and political participation in Jordan. Hence, it is in agreementwith a 1993 national poll by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University ofJordan that found that nearly four in five of the 2,250 respondents believed thatmen were more capable of political work than women. When asked the hypothet-ical question of who they would prefer if a man and a woman with the same qual-ities and capabilities competed for elections in their district, 68.5 percent of thewomen said they would cast their vote for the man. The majority saw women’s mainrole at home. (Jordan Times, 28 September 1993).

According to the JLCS, about one-third of those interviewed are againstwomen serving in municipal councils (34 percent), the national assembly or in thegovernment (35 percent). Figure 9.9 shows that nearly double the number of men(46 and 47 percent) compared to women (24 and 25 percent) are against women

Figure 9.9 Individuals 15 years or older who are opposed to women doing the followingactivities: participate in voluntary social work, vote, be a member of a local council, be aminister or parliamentarian

Figure 9.10 Views on women’s public participation by age groups and sex. Individuals 15 yearsand above who state that they are against women being a minister or a parliamentarian,women as voters, and women participating in voluntary social work

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holding such positions. Furthermore, as many as 20 percent of the men do not wantwomen to vote. Only 9 percent of the women share this view. Many Jordanian menwould prefer not to see women active in organisational life. When asked if womenshould be allowed to take part in voluntary social activities, which is presumablyamong the least political of all organised activities, as many as 34 percent of menanswer that women should not be allowed to engage in these activities. Even 10percent of Jordanian women share this opinion.

People’s age seems to have a positive effect on political participation. Whatimpact does age have on people’s attitudes? Figure 9.10 reveals that age has theopposite effect on women and men. While older men are more positive to women’sentry into public roles than younger men, women above the age of 50 are moreconservative than younger women. The most noticeable result is without doubt the

Table 9.1 Views on women’s public participation according to the respondent’s religion andPalestinian refugee status, highest level of education, level of yearly household income,news consumption, whether the respondent has ever voted or campaigned, and wheth-er he or she is member of at least one association. Percent of respondents 15 years andabove who state that they are against women being a minister or a parliamentarian,women as voters, and women participating in voluntary social work. Percent

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sselro0541DJ:emocniwoL 32 71 43

0092-1541DJ:emocnielddiM 22 41 63

eromro1092DJ:emocnihgiH 71 21 33

noitacudeoN 42 91 53

loohcscisaB 32 41 73

loohcsyradnoceS 41 11 23

noitacuderehgiH 81 9 23

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dengiapmacrevE 61 8 62

detovreveN 22 91 93

detovrevE 02 9 13

aidemhguorhtswenoN 42 91 53

aidemhguorhtsweN 02 31 53

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degree of opposition among young men. Fifty-seven percent of men from 20 to 24years of age hope to never see female parliamentarians and ministers (again), while40 percent of the youngest men will not tolerate having women working for char-ities and the like.

The interviews demonstrate that there is a difference in opinion betweenPalestinian refugees and non-refugees. Refugees are systematically more scepticaltowards women playing public roles than non-refugees. Another noteworthy resultis the wide variation in attitudes towards women according to religion. For exam-ple, while 37 percent of Jordanian Muslims are against women in government orparliament, the figure for Jordan’s Christian community – less than 5 percent ofJordanian citizens - is only 10 percent (table 9.1).

The survey finds that both higher levels of education and increased incomehave positive effects on Jordanian’s attitudes to female involvement in associationallife and voting. The respondents’ acceptance of women as parliamentarians and min-isters, however, does not depend on these two factors (table 9.1).

Our analysis also suggests that those persons who are most active in publicand political life are most supportive of women joining associations and politics.Opposition to women’s participation systematically declines as one moves from thegroups of not politically interested, non-participants and non-members to those whofollow the news, participate in elections and promote candidates, and are membersof voluntary organisations (table 9.1).

Freedom of MovementIt is here hypothesised that the more women are free to move around at will andthe wider the range of activities they may do alone, the more liberalised and pro-gressive are the mindsets and internal values of their families. Philippe Fargues hasconvincingly argued that

“both girls’ enrollment at school and women’s work in cities are indicatorsthat females have a recognized place outside the world of kin. They alsosuggest an openness of men to non-patriarchal values: openness of the fatherin the former case, openness of the husband in the latter.” (Fargues 1995:184)

The idea being that such values are conducive to a more active public life, and todemocratic and participatory action. Before looking at the effect of women’s free-dom on public life, this section describes how unrestricted Jordanian women maymove around according to the JLCS, and presents a few factors that appear to explainthe presence of this freedom or the lack of it.

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Figure 9.11 Women who can go alone, with company, or can not go to certain places: studyabroad, visit relatives abroad, visit relatives outside of town, visit relatives in town, go to adoctor, go to the local market, and visit neighbours

The survey shows that the majority of Jordanian women above the age of 15 (83percent) can visit their neighbours without being accompanied. However, as thedistance from family and dwelling to the destination increases, the ability to movearound decreases for many women. Around six in ten adult women can travel alonewithin the borders of the town or village where they live, but less than one-half ofthat say that they can visit relatives alone outside their place of residence. Approx-imately 5 percent are not allowed to visit relatives outside of town and 30 percentstate that they can not visit relatives abroad, even when they travel withsomeone(figure 9.11).

Based on the items in figure 9.11, we have developed a ‘freedom of move-ment index’. By counting the number of ‘can go alone’ responses, the female Jor-danian population has been divided into five groups: Very free = 7 ‘can go alone’answers; Quite free = 5 such answers; Free = 3-4; Not so free = 1-2; and Can nevergo alone = 0 ‘can go alone’ answers. At one end of the scale, 27 percent are able tomove around very freely or quite freely, while at the other end, over 12 percent cannever go alone (figure 9.12).

Figure 9.12 confirms that women’s freedom of movement is closely relatedto public and political participation. For instance, women who are free to movearound alone are more likely to vote than women who are hindered by socialrestrictions. Among those who can never go alone only one-half as many womenhave ever voted as among those who can move around very freely or quite freely.

Our analysis, moreover, demonstrates that there is a relationship betweenwomen’s freedom of movement and their opinions about women’s participation inthe realms of voluntary organisation and politics. Those who are most free are clearlyless opposed to women’s involvement. For example, negative attitudes are

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Figure 9.13 Freedom of movement and women’s views on women’s public participation.Women 15 years and above who state that they are against women being a minister or aparliamentarian, women as voters, and women participating in voluntary social work

approximately three times more common among women who ‘can never go alone’than among women who are ‘very free’. This implies that women’s attitudes to aconsiderable degree mirror their own social positions and their families’ values (figure9.13).

Figure 9.12 Freedom of movement and public participation. Women 15 years or more whohave participated in certain activities by their freedom of movement: ever voted, ever campaigned,member of organisation, attended political meeting in a guesthouse last twelve months

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Attitudes Towards Western Influence

Many Jordanian citizens have for historical reasons spent a considerable part of theirlives abroad, and a substantial number of households have close relatives living insome non-Jordanian country (see chapter 2). Therefore, we can assume that theJordanian population has been exposed to substantial cultural, economic andpolitical influence from outside. Moreover, modern mass media has made non-Jor-danian and foreign ideas accessible to most people. For example, as mentioned earlier,nearly 30 percent of the Jordanian public watch news on a non-Jordanian TV channelat least once a week. Yet, for the most part, people are exposed to influence fromwithin the Arab world.

What do Jordanians above the age of 15 years think about influence fromthe developed countries, by most respondents probably interpreted to mean theWestern states, into Jordan? The JLCS finds 11 percent of the respondents to believethat more technology from the industrialised coiuntries should not be transferredto their home country, while 89 percent give strong or moderate support to its wideruse. It also reveals that about one in five are against translating non-Arabic (West-ern) books into Arabic and selling them in Jordan, and that one-half of the Jorda-nian population does not want the political systems of Arab countries to becomemore like the systems of the West (the developed countries) (figure 9.14.). This ishowever not to be interpreted as if Jordanians do not want to continue the path ofpolitical liberalisation started in 1989. According to a series of national surveys fromthe most recent years, Jordanians rate their democracy at the middle of the road andwant to keep up with reform politics. (Centre for Strategic Studies at the Universityof Jordan, referred in Jordan Times, 11 May 1996, 5-6 June 1997).

Figure 9.14 Opinions about influence from the developed countries. Individuals above theage of fifteen who supports, give conditional support or are against more widely use of tech-nology from the industrialised countries in Jordan, the sale of non-Arabic books translatedto Arabic in Jordan, and that Arab countries should become more like the developed countriesin their political systems

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rehgiH 8155,1 0251, 2561,401 1 0000, 8231, 8917,4

yradnoceS 8181,1 4521, 5418,88 1 0000, 4221, 3062,3

cisaB 8545, 1680, 3222,04 1 0000, 2180, 9527,1

)tsewol.sv(emocnidlohesuoH 3391,63 2 0000, 5470,

tsehgiH 4435, 5090, 0078,43 1 0000, 3570, 5607,1

muideM 0963, 9480, 7678,81 1 0000, 0450, 2644,1

ruobaledistuo.sv(ecrofruobalnI)ecrof

5321,- 5990, 2245,1 1 3412, 0000, 8388,

ruofeht.sv(etaronrevoG)setaronrevognrehtuos

5858,3 5 0075, 0000,

nammA 8201, 0421, 1786, 1 2704, 0000, 2801,1

qarfaM,aqraZ 9232, 4531, 6659,2 1 5580, 8210, 2262,1

abadaM,aqlaB 7450, 5641, 4931, 1 9807, 0000, 2650,1

dibrI 4031, 0131, 0199, 1 5913, 0000, 3931,1

nuoljA,hsareJ 1671, 5181, 5149, 1 9133, 0000, 6291,1

-non.sv(eegufernainitselaP)eegufer

7710,- 2770, 4250, 1 9818, 0000, 5289,

)larur.sv(nabrU 8600,- 6680, 2600, 1 1739, 0000, 2399,

tnatsnoC 3035, 4602, 5306,6 1 2010,

Appendix 9.1 Logistic Regression On MediaConsumption

Having received news through reading a newspaper, listening to radio or watchingTV the day preceding the interview


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Laurie Blome-Jacobsen, Sami Khoury and Siri Størmer

Chapter 10 Children and youth

Summary

Our findings show that the health conditions of Jordanian children, from the new-born to teenager, are generally good. Refugees do not appear to have worse childhealth conditions than non-refugees, and for a number of indicators, showed atendency towards better child health.

On the other hand, several categories of individuals were associated, to agreater or lesser degree depending on the indicator and age of the child, to poorerhealth outcomes. Low annual household income was consistently associated withpoor health indicators in infants and children, and lower educational achievementin youth. We found that the children of women with no education were associatedwith significantly poorer results on health indicators, particularly so for young chil-dren. One important exception to this relates to the duration of breast-feeding.Women with no education or only basic education had a significantly lower risk ofstopping breast-feeding than highly educated women. We found the mother’s edu-cation to be most influential in comparisons between children born to uneducatedmothers and children born to mothers with high levels of education, with differ-entials according to other levels of education inconsistent.

Considering living conditions indicators for children under 5 years of age,levels of prenatal care, assisted deliveries, infant and child mortality, and vaccina-tion coverage were better than those in most MENA and middle-income countries.We also found some problem areas impacting the health of young children whichinclude postnatal care (only 5 percent of Jordanian women received a postnatalhealth care check), malnutrition and short birth intervals.

Although still below rates reported for other MENA countries, some 14percent of Jordanian children under 5 years showed malnutrition in the form ofstunting.

Median birth intervals in Jordan have increased over the last 2 decades, butnot considerably - only 4 percent since 1990. Average birth intervals (30 months)are slightly over the minimum considered healthy by international health agencies.


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Considering youth aged 5 to 15 years, the mother’s education shows little effect onthe health of children. Income and household conditions including crowding,smoking in the home and sanitation facilities as they related to youth health, showedno association with the degree of illness in youth of this age group. Household in-come, however, was associated with how youth spend their leisure time - with youthfrom higher income families participating more in social, educational and sport-ing activities than lower income groups. Youth from low-income families were arealso more likely to drop out of school. The probability of dropping out of basicschool is almost two times higher among this group than among children from otherincome groups.

Introduction

This chapter will focus on the situation of children and youth, including mother’shealth care before birth up to youth at 15 years of age. It is organised in chapterscentering on issues concerning age groups from pregnancy and birth through child-hood to youth.

We start the chapter by discussing findings related to the position of new-born children, infants and small children less than five years of age. As the carereceived by the mother both prior to birth, during birth and after birth can oftendetermine the health and survival of the newborn child, we will begin with adescription of delivery assistance and postnatal care for Jordanian mothers. Second,infant and childhood mortality levels will be presented. Factors affecting infant andchild health and survival will then be discussed, including birth spacing, birthweights, breast-feeding practices and the nutritional status of children under 5 years.Finally, the type of care received by children under 5 and their play activities willbe described.

We then proceed to children and youth above 5 years of age. Here, we firstgive a presentation of their home situation and their health, before we turn tostudying their educational and leisure activities. While more detailed analysis ofeducation is found in chapter 4, we will give attention primarily to dropouts andreasons for not attending school.

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Prenatal Care

In Jordan most women receive prenatal care, meaning some type of health careduring pregnancy. Eighty-five percent of women ever pregnant visited a health centerduring their pregnancy. During the latest pregnancy, 79 percent of women receivedprenatal care by a doctor, 2 percent by a nurse and 4 percent by a midwife.

There are only small differences in the amount and type of prenatal careobtained by women in urban compared to rural areas. Figure 10.1 presents a fairlyequal distribution of prenatal care among women living in urban and rural areas.In total, 88 percent of urban women and 76 percent of rural women received prenatalcare during pregnancy. In both urban and rural areas the majority of women visit-ed a doctor for care (81 and 72 percent respectively), while the remaining visited anurse, midwife or other type of care-giver.

The use of prenatal care is dependent on the socioeconomic status of themother. Based on health care data covering the last pregnancy, 68 percent of wom-en from households with a total income of less than 1450 JD visited a doctor forprenatal care, while 86 percent of women from households with an income higherthan 2900 JD did so. In the lowest income group, 22 percent of the women didnot receive care, while 10 percent of women from households earning more than2900 JD per year had no prenatal health care.

Figure 10.1 Prenatal health care during last pregnancy by income

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When controlling for level of education, we find that prenatal health care utilizationrises with increasing education of the woman. Among women never having attendedschool 38 percent received no care, while only 4 percent of women with highereducation received no prenatal care. Among the latter, 91 percent visited a doctorand 5 percent visited other types of practitioners.

Women who received prenatal health care, on average had nearly seven vis-its, and the majority of them (around 65 percent) had between four and ten. Thispercentage is the same for urban and rural areas. Use of prenatal care services alsovaries little according to the educational level of the woman. However, while 12percent of women with low levels of education had more than ten visits, 17 percentof women with higher education had this many visits. Women with low educationlevels more often have few visits than those with higher education. This is shownin figure 10.3.

Jordanian women start prenatal health care early, and higher educated womenseem to have a higher level of concern regarding prenatal health than women withno or basic education, in the sense that they consult prenatal health care servicesearlier on in their pregnancies. During the first month of pregnancy more than 30percent of women had their first visit, and after three months nearly 70 percent hadinitiated their prenatal care program. The number of women starting their prena-tal health program early increases with household income, but there is no differencebetween women living in urban and rural areas. The level of the woman's educa-tion influences how early the prenatal care program is started. While 17 percent ofwomen who have not attended school began prenatal visits during the first monthof pregnancy, 45 percent of the women with higher education did the same.

Figure 10.2 Prenatal health care during last pregnancy by urban or rural status

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The JLCS data indicate that Jordan has good vaccination coverage against tetanusfor pregnant women. Among ever pregnant women, 36 percent reported that theywere vaccinated during pregnancy to avoid tetanus infection in the mother and childin conjunction with delivery. This percentage is the same for urban and rural areas.As tetanus vaccination is effective for about 10 years it is not necessary that womenbe immunized during every pregnancy.

Figure 10.3 Number of health visits during last pregnancy by mother’s education

Figure 10.4 Month of first visit by mother's education, latest pregnancy

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Delivery and Postnatal Care

Figure 10.6 describes the place of delivery for the most recent and second most recentbirths. Data on birth assistance was extracted for births during the five years pre-ceding the survey only, in order to better compare JLCS data with earlier studiesand depict the current situation.

Ninety-five percent of births in Jordan were assisted by a trained medical at-tendant. Most Jordanian women gave birth in either a public or private hospitalwhere the delivery was assisted by a doctor, nurse or midwife. In three out of fourdeliveries, public hospitals were chosen over private facilities for the most recentbirth. As the figure indicates, 13 percent of the respondents reported that their mostrecent child was born at home. Considering data complete for both delivery loca-tion and birth, slightly over one-half of home births were assisted by a medically

Figure 10.5 Tetanus injection during pregnancy by household yearly income

Figure 10.6 Delivery location for 2 most recent births (1991-96). n=8001

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trained birth attendant. A traditional birth attendant, relative, neighbour or friendassisted the remaining home deliveries (211 births out of a total of 4,450).

A comparison of JLCS data to an earlier, JPFHS survey shows that both thenumber of children born in health facilities and the number of assisted deliverieshave increased by some 10 percentage points since the 1990 survey. Four in fivechildren were delivered at a hospital and 87 percent of all deliveries occurred withmedically trained assistance during the 5 year period preceding the 1990 JPFHSsurvey. During the five years preceding the JLCS survey, nine in ten children weredelivered at a medical facility and 95 percent of all deliveries occurred with a trainedattendant.

Less Delivery Assistance Among Uneducated and Rural WomenFigure 10.7 describes the delivery location and birth assistance by backgroundcharacteristics. While there was little variation in the delivery location and type ofassistance across domains, home births with untrained assistance occurred mostfrequently in the Balqa and Madaba, and South domains where frequency ofuntrained delivery assistance was twice as high as that for all births (between 8-10percent). As could be expected, the mother’s education showed a negative relation-ship to the likelihood of untrained birth assistance. Among women with no formaleducation, nearly 20 percent of deliveries occurred at home with no medicalsupervision, while among the highest educated women nearly all deliveries took placein a hospital. Consistent with findings showing the generally better health carereceived by the refugee population, fewer refugees than non-refugees gave birth with-out medically trained assistance. This is true for the population with the head ofthe household being a gulf returnee as well. The women’s urban/rural status did showan influence on whether children were delivered with medical supervision. 60percent more of the births occurring at home without trained assistance were in ruralareas than in urban areas.

Women Satisfied With Care During Delivery, Except HighlyEducated MothersConsidering all latest births, the perception of care by women who gave birth inpublic or private medical facilities was generally positive. Approximately three-quar-ters of the women recommended no changes in the type of care they received orthe conditions of the facility. Among the remaining 25 percent of the deliveries, thewomen most often recommended that there be better hygiene at the place of delivery(13 percent) and better skilled personnel (8 percent). Other complaints includedlack of attendance, poor food and small rooms (5 percent each). Uneducated women

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were most pleased with their care (over 80 percent had no recommendations forchanges) while women who had completed higher education were the least pleasedwith their care (44 percent recommended one or more changes). This is likely tobe a reflection of demands for higher standards by educated women, not thatuneducated women were best treated.

Few Women Receive Postnatal CareThe majority of women reported that they had no postnatal health check subse-quent to the latest and second latest pregnancies. Postnatal care was given after only28 percent of the 2 most recent births. The most commonly cited reason for nohealth check was that there was “no need” (95 percent). Mothers reported hindrancesto care such as cost, travel distances, time, or husband’s disapproval being a prob-lem after less than 2 percent of the births. The mother’s education showed someassociation to the failure to obtain postnatal care. Women received no health checkafter 16 percent more of the births to women who had not attended school thanthe births to women with higher education. More women obtained postnatal care

Figure 10.7 Location of delivery and delivery assistance for 2 latest births by background var-iables (1991-96)

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with increasing levels of education through basic and secondary levels as well. Post-natal care was given to mothers slightly more often after early birth-order childrenthan after later pregnancies. For example, 30 percent of first birth-order children’smothers received postnatal care compared to 27 percent of the seventh- to ninth-order children’s mothers.

Birth Intervals

Allowing for a minimum of two years between births is important for the health ofinfants and children. Adequate birth spacing lowers infant mortality rates andgenerally improves infant and child health, in part by allowing for better breast-feed-ing practices. Promotion of the concept of birth spacing and encouraging a mini-mum two-year gap between births are among the activities of the Jordan Birth Spac-ing Project, begun in 1995, which works in conjunction with the Ministry of Healthin Jordan (Jordan Times, Dec. 19, 1996).

The JLCS found that Jordanian women had a mean birth interval of 30months – slightly over the minimum of two years for births during the five yearspreceding the survey. While over 50 percent of all births during this period occurredat least 2 years after the previous birth, one-quarter of the children were born lessthan 18 months after the previous birth. Figure 10.8 shows the cumulative percent-ages of birth intervals for two time periods: the ten years preceding the survey (1986-96) and the five years preceding the survey (1991-96) compared to that of all cases.JLCS data showed that birth intervals have lengthened somewhat over both the past10 and past 5 years, but not considerably.

Considering only the five years preceding the survey, the median numberof months between births was 4 percent higher in comparison with results from the1990 JPFH survey. According to JLCS results, longer birth intervals can be seenacross a variety of background characteristics. Birth intervals were higher for thefourth to sixth order children, those born to mothers age 30 and above and tomothers with higher education. While the JPFH survey showed that women withhigher education had shorter birth intervals than all those less educated, this trendhas shifted such that women with higher education show longer birth intervals thanwomen with only secondary education. This may indicate a change in the use ofcontraception in which women have increased contraception use as a method forcontrolling the interval between births rather than using contraception only whenthe women wishes to stop having children completely.

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Figure 10.9 Median birth intervals by background characteristics (1985-90 compared to 1991-96)

Source for 1985-90 data: Jordan Population and Family Health Survey (1990)

Figure 10.8 Cumulative percent of birth intervals for 10 and 5 years preceding survey comparedto all years. (1986-96) n=8726, (1991-96) n=4552, (all years) n=19351

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Short Spacings Most Common Among Young Women and Second -Third ChildrenBirth intervals by background characteristics are described in figure 10.10. Shortbirth intervals are closely associated to young mothers. According to JLCS data, 84percent of children born during the last five years to women aged 15 to 19 had abirth interval of less than 2 years. Moreover, over one-half of births to women lessthan 20 occurred within 17 months of the previous birth. Although, as mentionedabove, birth intervals for women with higher education as a group have lengthenedsince the 1990 survey, further education does not appear to have a strong influencein increasing birth spacing. Women with higher education had the highest perce-ntage of births less than 18 months after the previous birth (28 percent). This is 10percent more than women with no formal education, who had only 18 percent oftheir births with such short spacing during the same time period. Finally, short birthintervals were shown to be most common among the second and third children incomparison to other birth-order groups. One in three second and third-order chil-dren were born less than 18 months after the previous child — this birth order groupalso made up nearly 60 percent of all births occurring at an interval of 7 to 17months. Over 50 percent of all second and third-order children were born at aninterval of less than 24 months, compared to 38 percent for the fourth to sixth

Figure10.10 Birth intervals in months by background characteristics (1991-96). n=4552

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children, and 34 percent for the seventh to ninth-order children. The high percentageof short birth intervals among certain groups of women suggests that the postpartumamenorrhea affect is limited for these women, and due to the fact that Jordanianwomen tend to begin feeding their infants supplemental liquids fairly early afterbirth. Thus, less frequent and non-exclusive breast-feeding leads to a shorter post-partum infecundable period than could be expected given the duration of breast-feeding reported.

Infant and Child Mortality

The large drop in infant and under-5 mortality rates over the last several decadesin Jordan mirror general improvements in health outcomes that have been excep-tional in comparison to both other developing countries and the Middle East region.The JLCS data showed the rapid progress in lowering infant and under-5 mortali-ty through the 1970s continued into the early 1980s. However, indications of a slow-ing of this decline (and reversal for select subgroups for certain measures) are evidentby the early 1990s according to most infant and child mortality measures.

Infant and child mortality was measured by 5-year groups from 1980, and accordingto a number of measures, these included:• Neonatal mortality (the probability of death during the 1st month)• Post-neonatal mortality (the probability of death after the 1st month and before

the 1st birthday).• Infant mortality (the probability of death before the 1st birthday).• Child mortality (the probability of death between the 1st and 5th birthdays).• Under-5 mortality (the probability of death before the 5th birthday).

For the most recent period (1990-94), under-5 mortality was 32 deaths per 1,000births, child mortality was 4 deaths and infant mortality was 28 deaths per 1,000births. The infant mortality rate in Jordan is lower than average for other middle-income economies, which was measured as 39 deaths per 1,000 in 1995 (WorldBank 1997). The under-5 mortality rate in Jordan is also lower than that for theMENA region, which was measured at 70 deaths per 1,000 in 1993, and signifi-cantly lower than that for all developing countries, which was 102 deaths per 1,000births in 1993 (UNICEF 1995).

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Trends in Infant and Child Mortality by Five-Year PeriodsAll under-5 mortality rates have fallen since 1980, but not equally over time orconsistently across certain subgroups of the population. Figure 10.11 shows the trendin infant and child mortality rates for 3 five-year periods preceding the survey: 1980-84, 1985-89 and 1990-94. In general, large decreases in infant and under-5 mortalitymeasures between the 1980 to 1985 periods were followed by a slowing pace ofdecline between the 1985 and 1990 period, and for some groups, increases in infantand under-5 mortality levels. Groups which can be associated with higher mortalityrates for certain measures during the most recent 5-year period are noted in moredetail below.

Figure 10.11 Infant and child mortality by 5-year groups. n=5428

Improvements in Infant Mortality Rates Due Largely to FewerNeonatal DeathsThe percentage decreases between the 1980-84 and 1990-94 periods were greatestfor neonatal mortality and child mortality. From the 1980-84 period, neonatalmortality rates had fallen by 22 percent by the latest period. Child mortality rateshave also shown improvement over the past 15 years, with an over-all percentdecrease of 19 percent (from 4.8 deaths per 1,000 births in 1980-84 to 3.9 deathsin 1990-94). Improvements in neonatal mortality rates, however, were not

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accompanied by strong improvements in post-neonatal mortality. Post-neonatal ratesdecreased from 11.4 deaths per 1,000 births in the 1980 period to 10.9 deaths inthe 1990 period — a decrease of only 4 percent. This 4 percent drop includes a 7percent decrease between 1980 and 1985, and a 3 percent increase from 1985-89to 1990-94.

Considering the components of the total under-5 mortality as shown infigure 10.12, post-neonatal mortality has become a larger component of the under-5 mortality. While in 1980-85 under-5 mortality consisted of 58 percent neonatal,30 percent post-neonatal and 13 percent child mortality, in 1990-95 the percentageshare of post-neonatal increased to 34 percent.

Figure 10.12 Component measures of total under-5 mortality by 5-year groups. n=5428

Lower Neonatal and Higher Post-Neonatal Rates Reverse EarlierTrendA comparison of JLCS data to results from the 1990 JPFHS study shows a better-ing of neonatal and worsening of post-neonatal mortality trends. The 1990 JPFHSstudy pointed out a slackening of progress in lowering neonatal mortality rates. Aftersignificant improvements in mortality rates in the early 1970s, neonatal mortalityrates actually increased during the late 1970s, and decreased again only slightly inthe 1986-90 period. While the five-year calendar periods differ slightly between thetwo studies, JLCS data shows that there has been considerable improvement in thepace of decline in neonatal mortality levels since the 1990 study. On the other hand,

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data from the JLCS study shows that post-neonatal levels have slowed their declinecompared to results from 1971 - 1990 presented in the JPFHS study, where the paceof decline was between 21 - 35 percent over the three 5-year periods preceding thestudy.

The relative increase in the share of post-neonatal mortality compared toneonatal mortality, found in both the JLCS survey data and in comparing this datawith the JPFHS study, is unusual in circumstances of declining infant mortality rates.The usual pattern is for neonatal deaths to make up an increasing share of infantmortality for the reason that, in general, death within the first month of life is lessimpacted by socio-economic and health improvements. This finding indicates thatthere may be a data quality issue in which either post-neonatal mortality was under-reported during the earliest periods or that neonatal mortality was under-reportedin the more recent periods.

Higher Mortality Rates for Infants Born to Mothers Over Age 40,Particularly Post-Neonatal Mortality LevelsDifferentials in the infant and child mortality levels by certain demographic varia-bles are shown in table 10.1 on the following page for the 1990-94 period. Infantmortality rates (both neonatal and post-neonatal) were slightly higher for femalechildren than males. Women over the age of 39 at birth had twice the frequency oftheir children under 5 years dying. The highest components of under-5 mortalityfor older mothers were child mortality and post-neonatal mortality rates. Childmortality rates were more than four times higher for children born to women over40 than those born to women between 15 and 19 years of age, and post-neonatalrates were nearly three times higher. For example, following a large drop in post-neonatal rates between 1980 - 85, post-neonatal mortality levels had nearly dou-bled for women giving birth after the age of 39 during the 1990-94 period.

Young mothers, under the age of 20, can also be associated with higher infantand child mortality levels since the 1985-89 period, subsequent to large decreasesbetween the 1980 and 1985 periods.

Lower Mortality Rates Among Short-Spaced Births in the1990-94 PeriodBirth spacing predictably showed a negative relationship to mortality measures,particularly for post-neonatal mortality. Although this was less the case for birthsat a 4-year or greater interval – which is most likely due to the fact that in this birthinterval group, older women are over represented. Looking at changes in the infantand child mortality measures over time since 1980 by different birth intervals showed

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that gains in reducing mortality levels have been considerable for infants born atshort intervals (less than 18 months after the previous birth). However, for the mostpart under-5 mortality and infant mortality rates have either remained unchangedor been increasing since 1985 for higher birth intervals (greater than 3 years). Oneexception to this is a continued decline in neonatal mortality for birth intervals oftwo years or greater which has been coupled with a continued increase in post-neonatal mortality for the same group — showing an overall slight increase in theinfant mortality rate compared to the 1985-89 period.

First birth-order children showed higher neonatal mortality levels than allother birth orders with the exception of the seventh or greater-order children, butlower post-neonatal and child mortality rates. High birth-order children wereassociated with higher mortality according to all measures of infant and childmortality, but most evidently among post-neonatal deaths. Over time, however, highbirth-order infants and under-5 mortality rates dropped considerably between the

Table 10.1 Infant and child mortality by demographic characteristics (1990-94). n=5428

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(5Q0)

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91-51 4.81 8.9 1.82 6.1 7.92

92-02 7.61 6.01 3.72 8.3 1.13

93-03 71 6.9 6.62 4 6.03

+04 1.52 8.72 35 9.8 9.16

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71-7 3.21 6.21 9.42 8.3 7.82

32-81 8.91 6.91 4.93 2.8 6.74

53-42 1.21 7.5 8.71 3.3 1.12

74-63 7.81 4.5 1.42 3.1 4.52

+84 3.9 3.9 6.81 7.3 3.22

dlihCforedrOhtriB

1 4.02 7.4 1.52 5.2 6.72

3-2 41 3.01 3.42 3.3 6.72

6-4 6.31 1.11 7.42 6.3 3.82

+7 2.52 6.71 8.24 1.6 9.84

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1980 and 1985 periods, and remained stable or slightly increased during the 1990period.

Figure 10.13 on the following page describes the components of under-5mortality rates (neonatal, post-neonatal and child mortality) by select socio-econom-ic characteristics for the most recent period. Higher income households experiencedlower under-5 mortality as a total, and this difference was most marked for childmortality levels. While child mortality for low-income households was 6.3 deathsper 1000 births, middle income households had 1.1 deaths and high-income house-holds showed no child deaths per 1000 births. Post-neonatal rates also were lowerin the middle and high-income groups than the lowest income group. Interestingly,neonatal mortality rates were higher with increases in income.

Surprisingly, urban areas had higher under-5 mortality rates than rural are-as, which mostly consisted of the difference between urban and rural neonatal mor-tality rates. Across the different domains, the South showed considerably higherunder-5 mortality rates than the other domains, and the difference was mostly dueto higher neonatal mortality. Finally, the mother’s education showed a relationshipto under-5 mortality, particularly when comparing women not educated to all othereducation groups.

Birth WeightsThe JLCS collected birth weight data for the most recent and second most recentbirths. In 11 percent of the latest two births children had low birth weights (lessthan 2,500 grams). This measure is close to the average percent of low birth weightinfants for the Middle East and North Africa region, which was 10 percent in 1993,and considerably lower than that for all developing countries (19 percent) (UNICEF1995).

It should be noted that an unusually high number of infants were recordedas weighing exactly 2500 grams. In order to adjust for the likelihood that many ofthese birth weights were either slightly lower or higher than 2500, 50 percent weregrouped into the under 2500 grams category and 50 percent into the over 2500grams category.

The incidence of low-birth-weight infants was examined according to anumber of demographic and socio-economic variables. As shown in figure 10.14,the percentage of low-birth-weight infants was highest among young mothers (15-19 years), first order births and short birth intervals. The number of low-birth-weightinfants decreased with the mother’s age at birth, higher birth orders and intervals(with the exception of mothers over 40 years of age and birth orders higher than 10.)

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The mother’s education showed that women with basic education had the highestincidence of low-birth-weight infants followed by women with no education, highereducation and finally, secondary education. Household annual income appeared tohave a more direct relationship to birth weights. While 12 percent of the two latestinfants had low birth weights among low-income families, 7 percent of the infantswere low-birth-weight from high income households. Rural/urban status showedthe strongest relationship to birth weights among the socio-economic variables.Rural infants were twice as likely to have low birth weights (16 percent of the latest2 births) than urban infants (8 percent of the latest two births). This contrasts tofindings discussed above concerning infant mortality. One would expect that theincidence of low-birth-weight infants would follow infant mortality rates. Urbanareas had higher infant mortality rates than rural areas, but considerably fewer low-birth-weight infants.

Figure 10.13 Infant and child mortality by socio-economic characteristics (1990-94) n=5428

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No relationship was found between the mother’s receiving, or not receiving, prena-tal care and low birth weights in their infants — nearly the same percentage of infantshad low birth weights.

Figure 10.14 Percent of births with low birth weights by background variables, latest 2 births

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Breast-Feeding Practices

It is recommended by international health agencies that women exclusively breast-feed their infants for six months, and hold four months as the minimum length oftime recommended (WHO 1997) Breast-feeding is crucial for the health of bothinfant and mother in that it serves as the best way to provide for complete infantnutrition and protection against infection and disease, and improves women’s healthby increasing child spacing. An important component in enhancing breast-feedingpractices by women throughout their child’s infancy period is the role medicalfacilities play in initiating breast-feeding immediately after delivery and in educat-ing mothers in methods and importance. The JLCS survey gathered informationcovering the timing of first breast-feeding, the duration and reasons for stopping.

The results of the survey show that over 90 percent of the two most recentchildren were ever breast-fed. This percentage varied little across income, mother’seducation, urban/rural or domain categories. Within all of these categories, no fewerthan 90 percent of children were breast-fed for some duration.

Since 1990, Jordan has worked to implement the “Baby Friendly Initiative,”developed by UNICEF and WHO, in public hospitals to promote early, exclusiveand successful breast-feeding practices. In order to become a “Baby Friendly Hos-pital,” facilities should implement a number of steps. Encouraging mothers to beginbreast-feeding within the first hour after birth is one of the steps included in theprogram.

The JLCS survey gathered information regarding the timing of first breast-feeding. Twenty-seven percent of the two most recent infants were breast-fed with-in one hour of birth, and nearly three-quarters within the first day after birth. Amongthe 28 percent of infants who were not breast-fed within the first day after birth, adifference was evident according to the mother’s level of education. While higherfemale education is usually correlated with generally better health outcomes ininfants, in this case, more infants born to highly educated women were not breast-fed within the first day (33 percent) than infants born to women with no education(22 percent). In addition, the number of infants who were not breast-fed withinthe first day was highest in urban areas, and more specifically, in the Amman region,and those born in families with higher household incomes.

Data covering the two most recent births showed that 83 percent of theinfants were breast-fed for at least the minimum recommended length of fourmonths. Forty-one percent were breast-fed for a duration of between 4 months andone year, and 4 percent for greater than two years. However, these figures do notmeasure exclusive breast-feeding. As discussed in the demography chapter, breast-feeding children often begin receiving liquid food supplementation as early as thefirst month after birth.

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The education level of the mother again showed an inverse relationship to infantsbeing breast-fed. More infants born to uneducated mothers were breast-fed at leastfour months, and the duration was longer than all other education groups. Infantsborn to highly educated women were the least likely to be breast-fed the minimumrecommended duration, and those who were breast-fed for at least 4 months orgreater were done so for a shorter duration than infants born to women with lowereducation. For example, while 12 percent of infants born to uneducated womenwere breast-fed less than four months, 23 percent of infants born to women withhigher education were not breast-fed the minimum recommended duration. Firstbirth-order children were slightly less often breast-fed for at least four months andbreast-feeding stopped sooner than with other later order children. This could bedue to the mother’s lack of success at breast-feeding due to inexperience or knowl-edge deficit with the first child.

The association between the location of birth and duration of breast-feed-ing was examined to ascertain if infants born in hospitals were breast-fed more oftenor longer than those born at home. As mentioned above, hospitals can play animportant role in encouraging good breast-feeding practices. However, it was foundthat the relationship between these variables was opposite as what might be expected.Infants born at home were most often breast-fed at least 4 months --10 percent morethan infants born in government hospitals and 12 percent more than those born inprivate hospitals. Since low-income, uneducated women would be most likely togive birth at home, this finding, however, could also be expected, as these charac-teristics were associated with better breast-feeding practices above.

Figure 10.15 Duration of breast-feeding - 2 most recent births

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In order to examine more closely the relationship between these factors and theduration of breast-feeding, we employed a Cox regression analysis, or the Coxproportional hazard model. Here, the model assumes that the proportional hazardfor ceasing breast-feeding is proportional to the co-variates (explanatory variables)for the individuals. The results of this analysis show the level of risk for women stop-ping breast-feeding associated with each of the independent variables.

The variables used included location of delivery, mother’s education, urban/rural status, sex of the child and the mother’s participation in the labour force.Significant results were found in a number of categories. Women’s education at thelower levels showed the lowest risk of stopping breast-feeding related to the highereducated women. Women with basic education or less showed a 33 percent lowerrisk of stopping breast-feeding than highly educated women. A lower risk wasassociated with women who had secondary education also, but this result was notstatistically significant. Part of the affect of educational achievement, however, maybe including the affect of household income, which was not included in the analysis.Women with increasing levels of education also tend to have increasing householdincomes, and higher household income was associated with shorter duration ofbreast-feeding.

Urban women had a 9 percent higher risk of ceasing breast-feeding comparedto rural women, and women not participating in the labour force had a 13 percentlower risk of stopping breast-feeding than working women. In comparing the rela-tionship between breast-feeding duration and the sex of the child, we found that

Figure 10.16 Duration child breast-fed by mother’s education

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mothers of male infants had a 12 percent lower risk of ending breast-feeding thanmothers of female infants.

Finally, the relationship between location of delivery and duration of breast-feeding described above was substantiated with significant results. With womendelivering in a hospital as the reference group, women delivering at home withtrained assistance showed a 17 percent lower risk of stopping breast-feeding. Womendelivering at home without trained assistance also had a lower risk (12 percent), butthis was not statistically significant.

Infant and Childhood Nutrition

Childhood disease and death is commonly associated with underlying malnutrition,which often goes unrecognised in children. Poor nutrition status among infants andchildren often can be related to higher incidents of infection and longer durationof illnesses.

Three anthropometric indices were used to determine the prevalence ofmalnutrition among Jordanian children between the ages of 12 months and 5 years:height-for-age, weight-for-age, and weight-for-height. Anthropometric indices areevaluated by comparison to a reference population that tells how much well-nour-ished children should weigh and how tall they should be. The reference populationused was the standard WHO/CDC reference population. Children were classified(as conventionally is the case) as malnourished if their z-scores were below minustwo from the median of the reference population, and severely malnourished if theirz-scores were below minus three from the median. The height-for-age is an indica-tor of long-term malnutrition (stunting) because prolonged malnutrition leads toreduced growth. The weight-for-age is an indicator of general malnutrition. Theweight-for-height is an indicator of wasting: it measures how thin a child is in rela-tion to its height. In contrast to especially stunting, it shows acute malnutrition,i.e. short term drops in nutritional status.

Table 10.2 on the following page describes malnutrition levels for Jordanianchildren 12 to 59 months in addition to malnutrition by certain background char-acteristics. As can be seen by the table, there were considerable differences in theresults from the various anthropometric measures. 14 percent of the children showedstunting, with 5 percent of these children showing extreme malnutrition resultingin stunting. On the other hand, the number of children underweight or sufferingfrom wasting was considerably less. Only 5 percent of the children appeared to beunderweight and 2 percent suffering from wasting. The relatively lower incidenceof underweight (weight-for-age z-scores) and wasting (weight-for height) is likely

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to have been influenced by the reluctance parents showed to undress their childrenbefore weighing, leading to child weights being higher than reality.

Regarding all indices, the prevalence of malnutrition in Jordan is well belowthat for the MENA region as a whole, for which it has been reported that 13 per-cent of the children were underweight, 6 percent suffered wasting and 25 percentwere stunted (UNICEF 1995).

Few cases showed malnutrition in the form of underweight and wasting, andthese measures may by biased due to inaccurate recording of weights. Therefore,

Table 10.2 Malnourishment in children 12-59 months by background characteristics

-zegArofthgieHdepuorgserocs

-zegArofthgieWdepuorgserocs

thgiehrofthgieWdepuorgserocs-z

ylmertxE-uonlaM

dehsir

-uonlaMdehsir

ylmertxE-ruonlaM

dehsi

-uonlaMdehsir

ylmertxE-iruonlaM

dehs

-uonlaMdehsir

elaM 7.4 9.9 2.1 9.3 4.0 3.1

elameF 0.5 9.7 6.0 0.4 4.0 5.1

niamoD

nammA 4.4 7.7 7.0 4.4 7.0 5.1

qarfaM&aqraZ 0.6 9.9 9.0 6.3 2.0 0.1

abadaM&aqlaB 2.5 0.11 3.1 4.3 2.0 8.1

dibrI 7.3 9.6 5.0 7.3 0.0 4.1

nuoljA&hsaraJ 9.6 8.9 7.0 8.3 4.0 7.0

htuoS 8.4 9.21 2.2 1.5 8.0 7.1

puorgegA

sry2-.som21 8.4 7.7 7.0 9.3 6.0 5.1

.sry3 2.5 9.01 5.1 2.4 3.0 5.1

sry4 7.4 8.9 0.1 3.4 0.0 8.0

noitacudEdaeHHH

dednettatoN 8.7 8.31 0.1 0.7 2.0 6.0

sselrocisaB 5.4 3.9 8.0 7.3 4.0 0.1

yradnoceS 6.4 2.8 2.1 5.3 3.0 2.2

rehgiH 5.4 1.6 0.1 9.3 5.0 0.2

epyTdoohrobhgieN

laitnediseRnabrU 3.4 9.7 7.0 8.3 4.0 2.1

pmaCeegufeR 3.4 8.6 4.0 2.4 2.0 4.0

nabru-imes/laruRlaitnediseR

4.6 8.21 6.1 7.4 7.0 2.2

mraF 7.21 6.21 6.0 5.6 0.0 6.3

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analysis of malnutrition by background variables will be limited to the height forage measure (stunting), although percentages for the other measures are listed inthe table above. Figure 10.17 on the following page shows the percentage of chil-dren with poor nutritional status in the form of stunting according to these back-ground variables.

Incidences of stunting were higher among children over two years of age, andhighest among 3 year olds. Education and type of residence appeared to have a closeassociation to poor nutritional status in the form of stunting. Stunting showed anegative association with the education level of the household head — particularlyfor children born into households in which the household head had no educationcompared to all other educational levels. Over 50 percent more children born tohouseholds with an uneducated household head were stunted compared to childrenborn to households in which the head had basic education. In addition, there weresignificantly higher incidences of stunting in rural/semi-urban residential areas thanin urban residential areas. Refugee camps had the lowest levels of malnutritionamong young children.

Child ImmunisationVaccination information was collected for children under 5 years of age, withdetailed immunisation records obtained from vaccination/health cards or themother’s recall of the number of vaccinations for children for which no health cardwas presented. Over one-half of the respondents presented a vaccination card fortheir child, 35 percent responded that the child had a card but it was not shown,and 9 percent of the mothers responded that the child had no card. Of those whodid not show a vaccination card, but relied on mother’s recall of vaccinations, 82percent of the respondents said the child had been vaccinated, 10 percent respond-ed that the child had not been vaccinated and 5 percent did not know their child’simmunisation status.

Data concerning the type and timing of vaccinations for children under 5was collected only for children for whom an immunisation card was presented. Thisinformation will be examined according to immunisation schedules described bythe WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region (1995). As the countries within the regionfollow slightly different schedules, we compared the schedules described by WHOto JLCS data. Although, in practice, Jordan’s schedule may vary slightly from thison the number of doses and timing. The WHO Eastern Mediterranean Regionschedule is described in table 10.3 on the following page with the number of dosesand timing described as being practised in Jordan.

While a number of countries’ immunisation schedules include additionalDPT and Polio vaccinations, the primary series of DPT, Polio and Hepatitis is 3

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Figure 10.17 Stunting in children aged 12-59 months by background characteristics

Table 10.3 WHO immunisation schedule for Jordan (1995)

TPD oiloP selsaeM BsititapeH

shtnom81&4,3,2 sraey6/shtnom81&9,4,3,2 shtnom9 shtnom9&3,2

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doses and the primary series for measles is one or two doses. Using this as a mini-mum, 1, 1.5, 2 and 3-year old children’s immunisation records were examined toascertain how many had completed their immunisation schedules.

As figure 10.18 describes, over 80 percent of one-year-olds had completedtheir minimum DPT, Polio and Measles vaccinations: 84 percent, 86 percent and85 percent respectively. However, only 14 percent of one-year olds had completedHepatitis vaccinations. Over 90 percent of children at 18 months had completedtheir immunisations, with the exception, again, of hepatitis. Only 8 percent of 1.5-year-olds had received 3 doses of hepatitis, and the majority (84 percent) had notreceived a single hepatitis dose. By three years of age, nearly all children had beenfully vaccinated for DPT, Polio and Measles, but less than 15 percent had everreceived a single dose of hepatitis.

Figure 10.18 Completed vaccination among 1, 1.5, 2 and 3-year-olds

Note: “completed” vaccination includes 3 DPT, 3 Polio, 1-2 Measles & 3 Hepatitis

Immunisation rates for Jordanian children at 1 year of age are similar to other MENAcountries, which as a group had 83 percent DPT coverage, 83 percent Polio, and80 percent Measles coverage in 1993 (UNICEF, 1995).

Excluding Hepatitis immunisation, what incidence of incomplete vaccina-tion that exists in 1-year-olds appears to be due to the tendency for increasingly lesscoverage with each dosage. For example, considering the schedule of doses for DPT,the majority of 2-month old infants had received their first DPT dose (74 percent)while this coverage decreased to slightly over one-half of the 3 month-old infantsreceiving their second dose of DPT as scheduled, and another 34 percent receivingonly the first dose. Forty percent of 4 month-old infants had received their third

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dose of DPT as scheduled, 39 percent had received their second dose and 13 percenthad only received one dose. Thus, there was a tendency for vaccinations to be givenslightly later than the schedule describes for children during the first year, and forthe children to “catch-up” with vaccinations over the next two years.

Results from the JLCS also showed that there appears to be a few numberof cases of over-vaccinated children less than 5 years of age for DPT and Polio. Whilethe vaccination program for Jordan described by WHO includes 4 DPT and 5 Polio,there were 49 cases out of 1565 (3 percent) in which children 2-4 years had receivedmore than 4 DPT doses. Although some countries do include a fifth DPT dose,this is not usually given until the child is at least 6 years of age. In addition, 18children out of 1595 (1.1 percent) at 2-4 years old were given more than 5 Poliodoses. The sixth Polio dose also should not be given before the child reaches 6 years.

Illness in Infants and Young Children

The JLCS survey asked mothers if their children had been ill during the last twoweeks, and collected data regarding what type of illnesses the children had including:fever, cough or cold, diarrhoea, other illness and if the child had an accident of somekind. Figure 10.19 shows the distribution amongst these categories of illness forthose children under 5 years who had some kind of illness during the last two weeks.

Including all responses, slightly over one-half of the children had some typeof illness during the last two weeks. Coughs and colds were the most common illness,

Figure 10.19 Type of illness in children who had illness during the last two weeks (childrenunder 5 years)

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and inflicted some 25 percent of all children. Less than 5 percent had fevers andapproximately 2 - 8 percent had been inflicted with diarrhoea.

Illness in young children was analysed according to a number of backgroundfactors to determine if such variables as access to healthcare, household conditions,and socio-economic situation influenced the frequency of illness in children, or thetendency towards certain types of illness. Access to healthcare, measured by whetheror not the household had a health facility within walking distance, was predictedto influence illness in children in that children with regular, preventative care areless often ill, ill for shorter durations and with less severe illnesses. Household con-ditions could influence the incidence of illness in children through easier transmis-sion of virus and disease in conditions of poor sanitation and/or crowding.

No difference was found in the number of children ill during the last weekin households which had a health centre nearby compared to those that did not,nor was there a difference in the type of illnesses contracted.

We considered that poor household conditions might contribute to increasedrisk of infection in small children. However, crowded conditions, the number ofhousehold members and the existence of proper sanitation facilities showed littleinfluence on the level of children ill versus not ill. In fact, fewer children were ill inhouseholds with 3 or more persons per room than in household with less crowd-ing. The same held true with the number of household members.

Socio-economic level measured by the education of the household head andhousehold income also did not appear to coincide with the level of illness in children.However, considering only those children who reported as had been ill, more chil-dren amongst lower income households reported diarrhoea than in higher incomehouseholds. While 10 percent of those ill in low-income households had diarrhoea,8 percent had the same in medium income households, and 6 percent in high-income households. Fevers were also slightly higher in low-income households.

Finally, no difference in illness was shown for refugees, who had exactly thesame incidence of illness (40 percent) as non-refugees, nor were gulf returnee house-holds distinguishable as a group.

The results given above are all somewhat surprising, and one should nottotally discount the possibility of measurement errors here.

Treatment of Diarrhoea in Young ChildrenConsidering those children who were reported to have diarrhoea during the last twoweeks, it could be a concern that few children received ORS treatment - only 7percent - and 17 percent were given antibiotics. Antibiotics have been shown to beineffective against nearly all childhood diarrhoeas. The most common treatment

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was yoghurt, given in 24 percent of the cases. Herbal tea was given to 16 percentand regular tea given to 14 percent of the children with diarrhoea.

Caretaker of Young Children and Play Activities

The analysis shows that the pattern of child care for children under 5 years of agein Jordan is that few children are taken care of by an individual or day-care centreoutside the immediate family as a usual solution. The wide majority were properlysupervised during play, and television watching among these young children waslimited to a few hours per day on a regular basis. Few cases were found in whichJordanian children were left not cared for during the day, unsupervised outside orallowed to watch extensive amounts of television.

Almost all children under five years are taken care of by their mother dur-ing the day (96 percent). The next most common caretaker of under-5 children isthe grandmother (1.5 percent). Less than 1 percent of the children are reported ashaving no daytime caretaker.

Most of the children under five play inside or in the near vicinity of thehousehold. Forty-four percent of the children usually play in the house and 29percent play in the courtyard. Few young children play in the street or on the roof.

Children at this age in Jordan spend little of their playtime outside. Closeto one-half do so for less than one hour. Twenty-two percent of the children areoutside up to two hours and 15 percent are outside for play between two and fourhours. Interestingly, 9 percent of children less than five years are reported to playoutside most of the day. Most are supervised during play outside, with 86 percentbeing always supervised and 11 percent sometimes supervised. Three percent of thechildren were reported to have no supervision during play outside.

Ninenteen percent of the children were too young to watch TV. Most chil-dren watched television on a daily basis (45 percent), but they tended to watch forlimited durations. Forty-seven percent watched TV less than one hour the previ-ous evening and another 30 percent watched for one to two hours. Fifteen percentof children never watched TV, and 6 percent watched TV for more than 4 hoursthe previous evening.

The Family Environment for Children and Youth

In Jordan the children typically grow up in large households headed by men, andtogether with many siblings. Ninety-four percent of children of an age between 0

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and 15 years live in male headed households and 6 percent in female headed ones.Table 10.4 shows that only 9 percent of these children and youth live in householdswith 2-4 persons, while 62 percent live in households with 5-9 persons and 29percent in households with 10 or more people.

Table 10.4 Household size among the children 0-15 years of age

ezisdlohesuoH daehelameftoN daehelameF llA

)%(snosrep4-2 9 91 9

)%(snosrep9-5 55 16 26

)%(eromrosnosrep01 03 02 92

)n(latoT 65751 579 23761

Figure 10.20 Household size by household head and urban/rural

The household size tends to be larger in rural than in urban areas. In urban areas25 percent of the children and youth live in households that have 10 members ormore. Thirty-nine percent of the rural children and youth live in such large house-holds. Sixty-four percent in urban and 54 percent in rural areas live in householdswith 5-9 persons, while only 11 percent in urban and 7 percent in rural areas livein small households. Figure 10.20 shows the distribution of household size amongthe children 0-15 years of age by household head and urban or rural status.

A comparison of the JLCS data to results from the 1990 JPFHS study showsthat the large household size has been relatively stable. In studying household sizewe include only ‘usual’ members, which means that only persons who are membersof the household are included. Considering household size based on all households

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from the JLCS showed that 5 percent of the Jordanians live in single-person house-holds, 31 percent live in households with 2-4 persons, 50 percent with 5-9 personhouseholds and 14 percent in households of 10 persons or more. This is roughlythe same distribution as the JPFHS from 1990, although the mean size of usualmembers in households is lower in the JLCS results. The average of householdmembers from the JPFHS was 6.9 while the mean size of usual members in the JLCSwas 6.0. By studying the household size categories mentioned above, most house-holds are in the range of 5-9 persons, which covers the mean size of usual members.

Another important factor related to Jordanian children is that they grow upin stable family environments in which parents mostly live together, and, in addi-tion, among other family members and relatives.

General and Sleeping Crowding IndexIn order to study the housing situation for children and youth in more detail, wemay compute a General Crowding Index (GCI) and a Sleeping Crowding Index(SCI). The GCI is computed by dividing the number of persons in the householdby the number of rooms in the living quarters, and the SCI is computed by divid-ing the number of persons per household by the number of rooms used for sleeping.

Jordanian children aged 0-15 years of age mostly live in large families com-pared to the Western European countries. In addition, the Jordanians live in small-er-sized dwellings. The observations from the JLCS involve 5660 children 0-4 yearsof age, 5187 children 5-9 years of age and 5885 youths 10-15 years of age. Only 2percent of the children live in households with less than 1 person per room, 28percent have households of 1-2 persons per room, 35 percent live in households of2-3 persons per room and 35 percent live in households of 3 person per room or more.

The GCI shows that children live in slightly more crowded households inrural than in urban areas. In rural areas, 24 percent of the children live in householdswith 1-2 persons per room, 32 percent in households with 2-3 persons per room,and 42 percent in households with 3 persons or more per room. In urban areas, 29and 35 percent of the children live in households with 1-2 or 2-3 persons per room

Figure 10.21 The general crowding index (GCI) among children 0-15 years of age by age groups

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respectively, and another 34 percent in the crowded household of 3 persons or moreper room. This is shown in figure 10.22.

The differences in crowding are more important across income groups, asthe poorest households are the most crowded. Children from families with higherincome have more space in their dwellings. This is true even for larger households.

Figure 10.23 shows that in households earning less than 1450 JD annually85 percent of the children and youth live in dwellings with 2 or more persons perroom and only 15 percent are in houses with less than two persons per room. Infamilies with higher income, more than 2900 JD per year, 57 percent live in hous-es with more than 2 persons per room, 33 percent in dwellings with 1-2 personsper room, and a very few children in houses with less than 1 person per room.

Smoking inside the house is practiced in 67 percent of the households. Thebad effects of smoking on the health of children especially during the winter sea-son, is well documented. There is a high incidence of upper respiratory tract infec-tion among children exposed to passive smoking. In addition, youth exposed topassive smoking inside the house are more prone to take up smoking themselves.

However, data from the JLCS did not show this expected relationshipbetween smoking and acute illness in children. In the survey, there are 1158 casesof acute illness among the 11 069 responses. A chi-squared test has been computedfor testing independence of acute illness and smoke. The test did not lead to rejectionof the null hypothesis of no association between acute illness and smoking inside

Figure 10.23 The general crowding index (GCI) among children 0-15 years of age by house-hold yearly income

Figure 10.22 The general crowding index (GCI) among children 0-15 years of age by location

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the buildings. These results do not indicate higher risk of acute illness among chil-dren exposed to smoking.

Further, smoke and acute illness have been controlled by GCI to see if GCIinfluenced the distribution of smoking inside and illness. The distribution of smokeand illness controlled by GCI was fairly equal in the four combinations of smokinginside, no smoking inside, acute illness and no acute illness. These results do notallow for a claim that children living in households exposed to passive smoking havemore acute illness than children not exposed to smoking inside. There could be anumber of explanations for this. One possibility is that children generally reside indifferent rooms than smokers. Another explanation is that they tend to spend mostof their daytime hours outside the house.

Figure 10.25 The GCI by noise inside the building among children 0-15 years of age

Figure 10.24 The distribution of GCI by smoke inside houses and illness among children 0-15 years of age

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We have, however, analyzed the relationship between the crowding and exposureto noise. Twenty-six percent of the children live in households in which theindividual who reported told they were exposed to noise inside the building. Figure10.25 shows that there tends to be more noise in the crowded households, and wecan expect that this indicates an environment that adversely influences the children’sand the youngsters’ ability to do for instance schoolwork at home.

A similar analysis was conducted with the SCI for the same variables asdiscussed above. The SCI rate increases with the number of persons per sleepingroom. The SCI decreases with higher total household yearly income. In 88 percentof the households earning less than 1450 JD a year, three persons or more sleep inthe same room. In 68 percent of the households earning more than 2900 JD a year,the sleeping rooms are similarly crowded. By looking at SCI and chronic illness tosee whether smoke influenced the frequency of ill children, there were no essentialfindings. Further SCI has been controlled by noise to see if there were more responsesof “Noise from inside the building” when the SCI rate increases. The distributionsof persons per sleeping room were equal in both cases of noise or no noise from insidethe building.

Health Care for Children and Youth

The JLCS provides three variables concerning illness among children, i.e. observa-tions of chronic illness, incidence of acute illness, and information about whetherthe illness was serious enough to prevent the person from performing his or hernormal duties.

Approximately 3 percent of the children aged 5-15 years of age were reportedto have a chronic illness or disability, and roughly 10 percent of the children hadan acute illness during the two weeks preceding the interview. Few of these incidences

Figure 10.26 The GCI and acute illness of children 5-15 years of age

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of acute illness were serious enough to prevent the concerned person from perform-ing normal duties.

A more detailed study of the cases of acute illness revealed no relationshipbetween acute illness and educational level of the mother. Nor did we find anysignificant impact on acute illness of household the crowding as measured by theGCI.

Of other possible indicators that could influence children’s health, the following wereexamined:• Stability of main source of drinking water

• Exposure to car pollution

• Exposure to industry pollution

• Cleanliness in living area

The data did not show that exposure to harmful environment factors leads to anincrease in acute illness in children. Nevertheless, children are exposed to such poorenvironment factors to some extent. For example, while 38 percent live in house-holds that have almost never problems with drinking water, 44 percent live in house-holds that experience problems from time to time. Only 2 percent of the childrenlive in households that have daily problems with drinking water. Twenty-threepercent of the children live in families that claim exposure to car pollution and 5percent live in households exposed to pollution from industry. Two out of ten chil-dren are members of households residing in living areas characterised as not veryclean.

Leisure ActivitiesHow children spend their leisure time does not vary much according to where thechildren live in Jordan. The activities are more determined by the income of thehousehold. In the following, we distinguish between the younger children (5 to 9years old) and the older ones (10 to 15 years old) in order to depict differences inactivities across these two age groups.

There is no difference between the two groups regarding playing outsidewithout supervision. Approximately 20 percent of the children normally play out-side without supervision, 10 percent do this occasionally and 20 percent normallydo not play outside without supervision. These percentages are the same for urbanand rural areas.

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Almost 6 in 10 children participate in sports, 13 percent in music, roughly 25percent read books as well as newspapers and 20 percent prayed at a place of worshiplast week.

When we control for income of the household, we find that the participa-tion in the various activities slightly increases with higher yearly income of thehousehold. In the lowest income group half of the population participates in sportswhile 64 percent in the highest income group do so. Two in ten of the lowest income

Figure 10.27 Children's leisure activities by income group

group read books as well as newspapers while, three in ten of the highest incomegroup read books or newspapers. Participation in activities does not seem to bedependent on the mothers’ education.

In general, very few children are members of any organization. Only 3 percentof the respondents said they are members of an organization.

More than 90 percent of Jordanian children between 5 and 15 years of agewatch TV daily. Sixty percent of the children are watching TV for 2 hours or morea day, while 28 percent watch TV for 4 hours or more. 29 percent watch TV between1 and 2 hours. These percentages are the same for both age groups. Neither the

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education level of the mothers nor the income of the household significantlyinfluences the time spent in front of the TV each day.

Education and Dropouts

In Jordan children start schooling at the age of 6. In the age group 5-9 years, 85percent have ever attended school. Among children of 10 to 15 years of age, 99percent have ever attended. At the age of 15 virtually everyone has attended school.Although the rate of school attendance is high, some children drop out of school,and in the following we will focus on these.

In the JLCS all children of 6 to 18 years of age and not attending basic school,were asked about the reasons for not going to school. These reasons are given inthe table 10.5 below. The table gives 610 observations of dropouts out (of 12 437children), telling that 5 percent of the child population in schooling age has droppedout of basic school. Of the dropouts, 15 percent give economical reasons for notattending school, while 50 percent claim that they are not interested in school. 14percent point to repeated failures, and 10 percent are not allowed to go to school.

The reasons varied among boys and girls. The boys’ most common reasonwas that they were not interested in school (59 percent of the boys). Thirteen per-cent gave repeated failures as the main reason, and 16 percent of the boys had noschool available nearby. Among the girls, 40 percent answered that they are notinterested in school, 19 percent were not allowed to go to school, and 15 percentgave repeated failures as the reason.

When we check for the background of the children that are not attendingschool, we find that children from low-income households are over-representedamong the dropouts. Table 10.5 shows that 33 percent of dropout children comefrom households with income lower than JD 1450, while 20 percent of all children

Figure 10.28 Time spent in front of TV the day before interview. Children aged 5 years to 15

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Table 10.6 Reason for dropping out by household head education level. (Percent)

daehdlohesuohfonoitacudE

toNdednetta

rocisaBssel

yradnoceS rehgiH llA

egalagelwoleB 0 0 0 0 0

ytilibasiD 1 2 8 23 2

snosaerlacimonocE 51 51 8 32 51

noitargetnisidylimaF 1 3 1 0 2

loohcsnidetseretnitoN 65 74 07 22 05

eruliafdetaepeR 41 51 1 0 41

loohcstatnemtaertdaB 1 2 2 0 2

ybraenelbaliavatonloohcS 4 5 2 0 4

rekateraC/deirraM/dewollatoN 8 01 8 33 01

levartgnirudsmelborpytefaS 0 0 0 0 1

latoT 001 001 001 001 001

Table 10.5 Reason for dropping out by household income. (Percent)

emocniylraeydlohesuohlatoT

nahtsseL0541DJ

1541DJ0092ot

nahteroM0092

toNderewsna

llA

egalagelwoleB 0 0 0 0 0

ytilibasiD 1 3 2 1 2

snosaerlacimonocE 21 71 11 82 51

noitargetnisidylimaF 4 2 1 1 2

loohcsnidetesretnitoN 05 84 85 64 05

eruliafdetaepeR 31 51 51 8 41

loohcstatnemtaertdaB 3 1 1 2 2

ybraenelbaliavatonloohcS 7 4 0 01 4

rekateraC/deirraM/dewollatoN 01 01 11 3 01

levartgnirudsmelborpytefaS 0 0 1 0 1

latoT 001 001 001 001 001

6-18 years old live in households with income lower than JD 1450. The probabilityto drop out of basic school is almost two times higher among the children comingfrom households with the lowest income group compared to the children comingfrom the other income groups.

The data also show a clear relationship between the educational level of thehousehold head and the probability for not attending school (table 10.6). Almost

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all of the individuals that do not attend school have a household head that did notattend school himself, or has only basic education or less. Thirty-one percent of thedropouts have a household head who did not attended school and, in 65 percentof the cases, the household head has basic education or less. Together, these twogroups cover 96 percent of the observations. The end result is that nearly all drop-outs are children coming from households where the head of household either didnot attend school at all or finfished only basic school.


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Jon Pedersen

Chapter 11 Living Conditions in Jordan:a Holistic View

In the preceding chapters of this book we have dwelled on the various aspects ofliving conditions in Jordan. Living conditions have been seen from inside of vari-ous fields of study, such as health, population or economics. In this chapter thepurpose is rather a bird’s eye view of the wide field of living conditions: we want todraw the map of living conditions in Jordan.

Living Conditions in Jordan: A Summary

Some basic results from the previous chapters bear repetition, although the readercan turn to the chapter summaries and the Introduction for more extended over-views. A tabular overview of some basic social indicators is presented in table 11.1.

In chapter 2 on the demography of Jordan we showed that a fertility declineis currently underway in Jordan, and that mortality is quite low compared to othersocieties with similar fertility rates. Thus population growth has been very high, andeven though fertility is declining it will remain high for some time. However, a highbirth rate and low death rate are not the only reasons for rapid population change;migration and refugee flows have also been of central importance. This has bothincreased the total size of the population within the borders of Jordan, and has ledto a redistribution of the population within the country.

Because of the rapid population growth Jordan has experienced it is perhapssurprising that the discussion on housing and infrastructure (chapter 3) found thathousing conditions generally are quite satisfactory, with good access to infrastruc-ture such as electricity, water, roads and other public services. Crowding is never-theless a problem, in particular in the refugee camps and in some urban areas.

The chapter on education (chapter 4) documents the revolution in school-ing that Jordan has been through in recent years. Female education in particularhas increased tremendously, and there is now little difference in enrolment betweenboys and girls up to secondary school. For the most part Jordanians are satisfiedwith the performance of the schools.

APPENDIX 1CHAPTER 10

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CONTENTS

Table 11.1 Basic social indicators for Jordan as revealed by the JLCS

rotacidnI eulaV dnerT detcilffarebmuN*sdnasuohtni

)4991(etaRytilitreFlatoT 3.4 nwoD -

etarytilatromtnafnI 0001rep82 elbatS/nwoD -

oitarycnednepeD 3.77 nwoD -

g0052<thgiewhtriB %11 ? )shtrib(+51

suoiverpmorfshtnom42<gnicapshtiwshtriB %05 elbatS )shtrib(+07

lennosrepdeniartybdetsissatonshtriB %5 nwoD )shtrib(+7

shtnom4nahtsselrofrodeftsaerbtonnerdlihC %71 ?pu )nerdlihc(+32

owttnecertsomfo%,nevigtoneraclatantsoPshtrib

%27 ? )shtrib(+49

detnutsshtnom95-6nerdlihC %41 nwoD )nerdlihc(08

roopsahtlaehriehttroperohw+51degasnosreP %5 ? )snosrep(211

)moorrepsnosrep3=>(gnidworC 02 )sdlohesuoh(741

retawefasotsseccagnivahtonsdlohesuoH %2 nwoD )sdlohesuoh(51

htiwsmelborpyliadroylkeewhtiwsdlohesuoHretawgniknirdfoytilibats

%02 )sdlohesuoh(641

ybraenrotcodroytilicafhtlaehonhtiwsdlohesuoH %33 nwoD )sdlohesuoh(932

61egataloohcsnidellornetonsnosreP %01 nwoD )snosrep(11

evobadna51egaetaretillisnosreP %71 nwoD )snosrep(224

ecrofruobalniton+51deganemoW %58 nwoD )snosrep(2301

deyolpmenU %71 ? )snosrep(781

tcartnockrowlamroftuohtiwdeyolpmE %45 ? )snosrep(294

FLedistuosdaehdlohesuoH %52 ? )snosrep(771

cisabnahtsselrocisabsahdaehdlohesuoHnoitacude

%66 nwoD )snosrep(674

dlohesuohdedaehelamef% %11 ? )sdlohesuoh(77

yticirtceletuohtiwsdlohesuohfo% %3 nwoD )sdlohesuoh(32

DJ0541nahtsselemocnihtiwsdlohesuoh% %72 ? )sdlohesuoh(281

morfemocnininoitcudergnitropersdlohesuoh%5991ot4991

%22 )sdlohesuoh(261

gnivahreven+81deganoitalupopnainadroJfo%detov

%93 ? )snosrep(348

gniebton+81deganoitalupopnainadroJfo%noitasinagroyratnulovafosrebmem

%39 ? )snosrep(0102

ybraenylimaftuohtiwsdlohesuohfo% %62 ? )sdlohesuoh(091

* Assumes a base population of 4.314 million at end of February 1998. (DoS statistics estimatefor end of 1995 with population growth linearly extrapolated).

+ Numbers refer to yearly number of children born, which is roughly 137 thousand assuming1995 fertility rates

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As was the case for education, health services has seen a rapid expansion and around80 percent of the adults characterise their health as good or very good. Smokingappears as a substantial problem, particularly among men. Physical access to healthcare appears good. The public health care system is used in slightly more than halfof the consultations.

Several of the chapters show the importance of household income for vari-ous living conditions outcomes in Jordan. In the chapter on the household economywe point out that wage income is the dominant form of income, but the most suc-cessful way of making a living is to combine income sources. Transfers of variouskinds affect most households. Increased education is a key to improved householdincome.

The chapter on labour force participation and employment (7) documentsthe crucial importance of the public sector for employment in Jordan, but also findsthat overall the labour force participation in Jordan is very low. This is related tovery young age distribution of the country, but is also because few women are la-bour force members. Among the women who are members of the labour force, thereis more unemployment than for men; this is especially true for young educatedwomen. For men, health is an important determinant of labour force participation.An unusual feature of the Jordanian economy is that it is both a labour exporter(to the Gulf ) and importer (from Egypt and Syria). Women are mainly employedin education and health services, and among men, Palestinian refugees and displacedfrom 1967 are engaged in trade and private services while others are much morefrequently engaged in public services.

In chapter 8 on social networks the emphasis was to point out the impor-tance that social networks based on family and kinship have in Jordan. In particu-lar it is shown that people tend to live in neighbourhoods with close relatives, andthat the social network is an important part of people’s coping strategies.

Women and men differ when it comes to participation in public life (chap-ter 9) with men being the more active. Men are often negative towards femaleinvolvement in politics, and also female autonomy in general. Neither men norwomen are often members of voluntary organisations, but men (12 percent) moreso than women (2 percent). Participation in kinship and locality based organisa-tions is at higher levels.

Chapter 10 on children and youth found that in general Jordanian childrenand youth enjoy better living standards than do comparable countries in the region.However, several characteristics, such as poor household income and low educationof the mother were associated with poorer health outcomes, in particular for theyoungest children. Moreover postnatal care shows very low rates of use, althoughvaccination coverage is better than in comparable countries. Malnutrition, especially

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stunting, is a problem, but the JLCS did not find much extreme malnutrition inJordan.

In sum, the chapters paint a varied, but perhaps fairly rosy picture of Jordan,rosier perhaps than many would expect. To a large extent the colour of a picturedepends on the colour of the pictures with which it is compared. With its 1995 GNPper capita of 1510 USD (World Bank 1997) Jordan is a lower middle income coun-try in World Bank terms, with many of the characteristics of such countries: extensivecoverage of basic needs for the majority, but with large room for improvement. Itstill fares well compared to many such countries, especially when one considers itspoor natural resource base. For example, during the 1970s and early 1980s Jordan’simprovement in the fields of health was much better than in other Arab countries.

A characteristic of Jordan is also that it has been, and to some extent still is,a redistributive social formation. The government uses a large amount of its incomein subsidies, in the maintenance of a large public sector, and in education and health.It has, traditionally, used more of its income on health than similar countries. At7.9 percent of GDP spent on health (4.2 percent public expenditure) in 1995 (WorldBank 1997), Jordan places itself in the extreme high end among Middle IncomeCountries in its share of the GDP spent on health (see World Bank 1993 for com-parative data).

As a recent comparative paper makes clear (Deininger and Squire 1996),Jordan does not distinguish itself in any particular way as regards income inequal-ities. On one common measure of inequality, the income distribution, Jordan isquite similar to other Arab countries for which data exist, is slightly more inegali-tarian than Western European countries, and more egalitarian than African and LatinAmerican. To some extent that reflects the sorry state of the world more than Jor-danian realities. In Jordan, according to the World Bank (1997), the 20 percent ofhouseholds with the lowest expenditure account for 5.9 percent of total expendi-ture, while the 20 percent with the highest expenditure account for 50.1 percent.Nevertheless, although the structural adjustment and the social productivity pro-gram have reduced government involvement and are likely to reduce it further, thisless than extreme inequality is still a feature of Jordanian society.

Many contemporary reports on the social conditions in Jordan paint a dif-ferent picture. This is partly because they focus only on those on the bottom, beingbased on case studies that illuminate the conditions of the poor (e.g. Miles Doanand Bisharat 1990; Shami 1997; DeJong 1995, Jaber 1997). Such studies are veryvaluable, as they examine a significant part of the population, but they do leaveanother significant part of Jordanian society out of the picture.

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Infrastructure and Income

A key characteristic of Jordan is that while physical and social infrastructure aredistributed quite widely to the population, many Jordanians also experience anincome deficit. As described in chapter eight on household economy 27 percent ofthe households have incomes that fall below 1450 JD per year and in some ruralareas the percentage is around 40 (see table 11.3 below). One should note as dis-cussed more in depth in chapter 6 that it is likely that the income is underestimat-ed. As many as 11 percent of the households state that they cannot obtain 100JDto cover a sudden urgent need, and an additional 2 percent would need help fromfriends or relatives. A similar number considers themselves poor, in the sense thatthey did not agree to any statement that would place them as better off. Althoughit is difficult to say precisely because of very different ways of collecting data, itappears that the distribution of income now shows a larger clustering at the lowerend of the scale than it did in the household budget survey of 1992 (JordanDepartment of Statistics 1992). However, using the program POVCAL (Chen etal. n.d.) to smooth the observed grouped income reports into a continuous distri-bution reveals that the gini-coefficient (a measure of lack of equality in a distribu-tion) has not changed appreciably. Nevertheless, seventeen percent of the labour forcemembers are unemployed. Moreover, 19 percent of the households with childrenbelow age 5 have one or more children afflicted with malnutrition in one form oranother.1

Thus the JLCS found comparatively good access to basic services, housingand infrastructure existing alongside income shortfall and unemployment. Thereare at least three ways to interpret that juxtaposition. The first two possibilities centreon what many have termed the rentier character of the Jordanian economy (Brynen1992).

The first possibility is that the population enjoys its standard of living dueto the emphasis that the government has put on its own role in the Jordanianeconomy. The public sector is big, and the World Bank ventures that it broadlydefined may account for as much as two-thirds of the employees in Jordan (WorldBank 1994:105). Government investments in infrastructure and public utilities havebeen very important, both directly in the provision of services and indirectly throughemployment. Finally subsidies have traditionally been quite substantial. Thesubsidies on wheat, powdered milk, rice and sugar corresponded to 4.2 percent ofgovernment spending in 1992 or 1.6 percent of the GDP (World Bank 1994:34).While that high level has since been reduced substantially, it was still important whenthe JLCS data were collected. Thus, people may have been able to invest in housing,1 Malnutrition was measured as a deficit of height for age, weight for age, weight for heightor mid upper arm circumference.

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for example, due to comparatively small expenses on food. An indication that thismay be the case is that a large proportion (11 percent) of houses in Jordan are vacant(see chapter 3).

A second way of interpreting the findings is to point to the importance ofremittances in the Jordanian economy. Throughout the seventies the remittancesfrom workers abroad rose steadily, from 5 Million JD in 1971 (or 2.3 percent ofGNP) to 475 million in 1984 – a staggering 24 percent of GNP (Samha 1990:227).The late 1980s saw a reduction in remittances and a low point was reached in 1991when remittances made up 12 percent of the GNP. After 1991 remittances increasedagain, and accounted for about 19 percent of GNP in 1994 and increased furtherto 21 percent in 1996. In 1996 the remittances were JD 1,095 Million or roughlyJD 5502 Million in 1984 prices (Central Bank of Jordan 1998:5). Thus remittanc-es play a much larger role in the economy than subsidies do. The remittances allowmany Jordanian households to enjoy living standards that they would not other-wise have had, and 14 percent of the households consider remittances from rela-tives as one of their three most important sources of income.

A third possibility, which is not entirely contradictory to the preceding two,is that the level of infrastructure reflects the past economic history of Jordan whilethe shortfall in income is due to the more recent downturn. Jordan experienced verygood years during the 1970s, with a GDP real growth of 11.1 percent on averageduring the period 1973-79 (World Bank 1994:4). The growth slowed down duringthe 1980ies, and by 1985-89 the average growth was negative at –1.2 percent (WorldBank 1994:4). Unemployment rose from a level of 3.5 percent in 1980 to the present17 percent. The 1991 Gulf War led to a massive influx of returned workers to Jor-dan. That undoubtedly created heavy strains, both because of the scale of the re-turn and the concomitant need for creation of new jobs, and because of the reduc-tion in remittances it led to. Furthermore, it also led to an upsurge in housing andconstruction as the returned migrants brought with them much of their assets. Someobservers (e.g. Van Hear 1996) therefore consider that the return is partly respon-sible for the improvements in the economy of Jordan during the early 1990s.

However, the improved fortunes of Jordan have not been distributed equally.The boom in the eighties appears to have been followed by a diminishing of incomeinequality (Ali Shab’ban 1990). But, the recovery in the early nineties may appearto have had different results, and it is likely that the effects have had different impactson different categories of people. The JLCS found that one-quarter of the house-holds considered that their incomes had declined from 1994 to 1995, while anotherone-half reported that it had been stagnant. Similarly, among those that consideredthemselves as poor, 39 percent stated that the situation had developed during the 5

21984 equivalence calculated using the relation between the 1984 current prices GNP andconstant prices GNP as calculated in Central Bank of Jordan 1998.

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years preceding the survey. As was discussed in the household economy chapter, itis those with the least income who report that their income has diminished.

There are also other signs of strains. For example the returned migrants areoverall somewhat better off in material welfare than others, but they are more of-ten unemployed with a rate of 23 percent. This implies that at least some are basi-cally living off their savings, if they have not already used all of it

Another factor in this context is that although the government continuedto put emphasis on the development of public services after 1988, its degree ofsuccess has varied. As discussed in chapter 10 on children and youth the propor-tion of women that gave birth with a trained assistant (an important indicator ofwomen’s health) rose from 1990 to 1996. In contrast there has been little improve-ment in infant and child mortality recently. The survey findings resonate well withlongitudinal studies of disadvantaged groups in Amman (Bisharat and Tefik 1985,De Jong 1995) that also point to early improvements but worsening or stability ofthe situation after 1988.

Kuznets (1955) pointed out long ago that the relation between economicdevelopment and income inequality tends to show an inverted U-curve. At thebeginning of industrial development, income inequality is fairly small, it tends toincrease during development, and then diminishes in later stages. However, someanalysts (e.g. Nielsen 1994), point out that this simplistic model must be supple-mented by variables such as the spread of education, political democracy and laborforce shifts, particularly from agriculture to industrial work. If we translate this intothe Jordanian context, it would seem that Jordan to some extent has been able toavoid increased social differentiation, precisely because of some of the factors thatNielsen points to. Education has perhaps been of particular importance, with therapid spread of education and the quite high economic returns to education. Somedata suggests that urban differentiation is less than rural (Deininger and Squire1996). However, recent developments in the Jordanian economy indicate thatdifferentiation may be on the increase.

The discussion above suggests that the distribution of living conditions inJordan be of some significance. But to analyse this, we need to return to the frame-work for the study of living conditions.

How Are Living Conditions Structured?

The JLCS was designed with several theoretical assumptions in mind. One was thatit is fruitful to study the statistical patterns of living conditions as outcomes thathave been produced by actors in particular social situations, with particular resources

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CONTENTS

and constraints and with their own particular values. The outcomes that each actorexperiences feeds back on the resources, constraints and values each actor bring tobear on subsequent situations. For instance, using resources for investments ineducation creates a new situation for an actor, in which he or she can commandhigher pay than what would otherwise be possible.

The focus on actors, situations, resources, constraints and values providedmuch of the guidelines for the design of the survey. It is also the guiding principlefor the analysis. It leads us to ask whether it is possible to discover particular categoriesof actors that tend to be in similar situations, and if they face the same constraints.

The previous chapters have tentatively shown that several categories of actorsmay be distinguished within the Jordanian population with respect to living con-ditions. Some of these were categories that were expected to be meaningful at thevery outset, such as female headed households. Some were identified from empir-ical analysis of the survey data. Some categories that we had thought would bemeaningful across the board, such as refugee status, turned out not to be so in termsof socio-economic differentials.

It is important, however, to point out that the actors in the analysis may beboth individuals or households. Living conditions can also be seen from theperspective of several levels of aggregation, such as the household, community orregion or, indeed, the nation as a whole. So when we speak about “living condi-tions in Jordan”, it is necessary to be precise about who or what we are talking about.

As noted in the introduction to this book, a basic premise for the study ofliving conditions is that they are multi-faceted. Many factors combine to create thesituation of a household or an individual. Thus, there will be no single measure thatcan summarise all aspects of living conditions, although attempts are sometimesmade, such as the well-known UNDP “human development index” (UNDP 1997)or the World Bank’s practical emphasis on income as a single measure. The lack ofa single measure creates the analytical difficulty that a given household or individ-ual may score high on some measures, and low on others. This is precisely thesituation we pointed to above, in that comparatively good access to public services,housing and infrastructure may well be combined with low income, even thoughlow income households more often than high income have poor housing conditions.When living conditions factors combine in such a way, it becomes necessary to weighthe different aspects against each other if one wants to find an overall measure. Thatweighing is necessarily quite arbitrary: is crowding a worse problem than humiditywithin the house? However, what we can do, is to see how various aspects of livingconditions go together.

In general, we can identify three different ways living conditions may beordered. First, they may be sorted in heaps. In such a case good or bad things gotogether. For instance, if the education of a person is high, the person is also

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employed, has a high salary, lives in a good neighbourhood and sends the childrento a good school, it is a typical instance of positive heaping. In contrast, the resultsshown in chapter 5, that 8 percent of the households in the rural areas and 13 percentin urban has neither a health care facility nearby, nor a car, nor telephone are typi-cal examples of negative heaping. Here are three aspects that are not necessarily largeproblems by themselves, but by their conjunction limit accessibility to healthservices.

Second, living conditions factors may be compensatory. In such a case aperson who is badly off on one indicator may make up for it by the score on an-other. For example a person with a physical handicap may be compensated by goodaccess to health services. Another example is that of the Gulf returnees in Jordan,who have lower levels of employment than others, but still enjoy a comparativelyhigh standard of living due to the fact that they draw on resources they acquiredabroad.

Third, the factors that constitute living conditions may be simply lack order.In such cases, one cannot predict from knowledge of one factor what the levels forothers will be. This is usually more a theoretical possibility than a reality when itcomes to large living condition differentials, but is common when one considerssmall differences.

Two other aspects are important to the mapping of living conditions, namelythe strength of the differentials and the way in which people enter into particularconfigurations of living conditions. If the differences between groups are large, thenheaping, compensation and independence become much more important consid-erations than if the differentials are small. For example, we have seen in the educa-tion chapter that enrolment differentials between girls and boys exist in Jordan, butthey are small and probably not a case for concern except in higher education. Onthe other hand, unemployment rates for educated young women are extremely high,and the differentials to young educated men are large.

Another important consideration is how different parts of the populationare recruited into particular positions with respect to living conditions. In some casesspecific, easily identifiable categories of people find themselves in disadvantaged orvulnerable positions. The typical example in Jordan is that of women with depend-ants, heading their own household. In other cases the vulnerable household orindividual can only be identified through the fact that they score low on severalcriteria, but do not have any particular characteristic that easily can be put as a“heading” for their situation a priori. In this latter instance the analytical taskbecomes to find if there are common factors that characterise or may be seen asdetermining the position of these households or individuals.

In the rest of the chapter we will focus on some different ways of approach-ing the overall living conditions in Jordan. First, ordering of living conditions will

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be regarded from a geographical point of view, and we will explore how living con-ditions are structured in terms of the main reporting domains of the survey. Secondwe will try to establish how the different aspects of living conditions sort themselvesby different categories of individuals and households.

A Map of Jordan

Figure 11.1 shows a map of Jordan illustrating some of the key living conditionscharacteristics for individuals. Figure 11.2 shows a similar map for households.

Turning first to the map of individual characteristics, we have plotted thevariation in some key variables (total fertility rate, birth weight, infant mortality,malnutrition as measured by stunting, percentage aged 16-23 not in school, per-centage of women not in labour force and unemployment). Concerning regionaldisparities, the first conclusion to be drawn from the map is that Amman is better

Figure 11.1 Geographical distribution of key individual living condition characteristics inJordan. Each bar represent the percentage of the range of a variable for the governorates,i.e. 0 means lowest value in the distribution

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CONTENTS

off than the other regions. The South stands out in that it fares poorly on the healthrelated measures, but has relatively high female labour force participation and littleunemployment. This is probably related to the service sector and tourist industryin the area. However, the form of presentation overstates the differences to someextent, since what is shown is the percentage of the range of each variable. Thus whenAmman has a bar that is on 0 (on the baseline) for fertility, and Jerash and Ajlounhas one that is higher than the others, it means that Amman has the lowest fertilityrates, and Jerash and Ajloun the highest. Seen in another way, one of the strikingfindings is that the geographic differentials are quite small. Moreover, the variablespresented have been picked because they actually show some differences althoughthey are also variables that are central to the well-being of the population.

Nevertheless, a break down along the urban-rural dimension shows substan-tial variation hidden within each region (table 11.2). Rural health is worse thanurban, and in some cases, as revealed by the high figures for stunting in rural Balqaand Madaba the contrast is quite large. The urban-rural pattern of Jordan resem-bles other currently developing countries, but contrasts to the historical development

Figure 11.2 Geographical distribution of key household living condition characteristics inJordan. Bars represent percentage of range of variable

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CONTENTS

of the Western societies where rural health was better than in the cities during thefirst phases of development.

The second map is presented in figure 11.2. It shows regional disparities onthe household level. Here, the focus is on access to infrastructure, economic resourcesand characteristics of the household head. Again Amman comes out as better off,although the households of Amman more often than those in other areas report thatthey had less income in 1995 than in 1994, and the governorate also scores poorlyon water reliability and housing standards. The South also stands out as generallyfairly well off. The other regions present a more varied picture, and it is not clearhow one should assess their ranking. As was the case for individual characteristics,but to a lesser degree, the rural areas within each domain are somewhat worse offthan the urban. This is shown in table 11.3.

Table 11.2 Individual living condition components by Urban-Rural status

nammAdnaaqraZ

qarfaMdnaaqlaB

abadaMdibrI

dnahsaraJnuoljA

htuoS

U R U R U R U R U R U R

etaRytilitreFlatoT 4 4 5 6 5 5 5 4 5 6 4 5

thgiewhtriBwoL 7 31 9 41 9 12 8 61 11 81 51 02

detnutstnecreP 11 71 41 72 41 22 01 31 51 02 51 42

ton32-71degatnecrePloohcsnidellorne

36 85 27 87 16 96 36 36 66 17 76 76

ton+51degaselameftnecrePecrofruobalni

58 88 58 09 08 08 88 98 48 09 87 28

deyolpmenutnecreP 61 71 12 41 12 91 61 51 02 61 41 51

U nabrU R laruR

Table 11.3 Living condition characteristics of the household by geographical divisions.Percent

nammAdnaaqraZ

qarfaMdnaaqlaB

abadaMdibrI

dnahsaraJnuoljA

htuoS

U R U R U R U R U R U R

FLedistuosdaehdlohesuoH 72 12 42 12 62 02 72 72 62 72 81 72

rocisabsahdaehdlohesuoHnoitacudessel

95 96 07 08 66 18 86 27 27 08 36 28

dlohesuohdedaehelameF 01 01 21 6 11 7 21 41 31 11 01 11

repnosrep1>(gnidworC)moo

48 88 88 19 88 39 88 78 29 49 68 09

DJ0541nahtsselemocnI 32 14 72 13 13 74 52 62 03 72 71 23

emocnininoitcuderstropeR 62 32 82 51 32 12 51 9 41 41 02 81

ybraenytilicafhtlaehoN 52 84 52 84 24 65 73 04 06 36 83 54

smelborpyliadroylkeeWgniknirdfoecruosniamhtiw

retaw91 52 22 43 9 9 9 61 51 91 7 11

smelborp)4fotuo(4ro3esuohhtiw

92 72 23 02 92 42 62 82 72 32 81 81

U nabrU R laruR

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A Different Map of Jordan

The analysis of the survey data indicates that overall geographic differences are notparticularly important in Jordan, except to some extent the urban-rural dimension.To obtain a more varied understanding of who the disadvantaged or well off are inJordan, and what characterises them, other methods may be employed.

Correspondence analysis (Benzécri et al. 1973) is another approach to themapping of living conditions in Jordan. The basic idea behind this qualitativemultivariate descriptive statistical tool is that a complex table of categorical varia-bles may be reduced to a few dimensions, embodying the most important variabil-ity in the data. As such it is related to principal components analysis, but works forcategorical data. Parts of the output of a correspondence analysis may convenient-ly be shown in various cartesian plots. Interpretation of the plots focuses on therelative location of the data points in the space defined by the dimensions obtainedfrom the analysis. In one type of plot, the points represent the average dimensionalscore for each category of each variable. In that case, nearby locations of two cate-gories in the plot indicate that the two tend to occur together. The interpretation isrelative to the centre of the plot. Values that occur in the centre do not contributeto the differentiation. This is because the dimensional scores basically are measuresof deviation from the expected frequencies of each variable.

Correspondence analysis is well suited to the problem at hand, because itcan be used to show if living condition disadvantages are heaped or independentof each other. Independence is shown by values that cluster in the centre, whileheaping is shown by off-centre clustering.

Figure 11.3 is a correspondence plot in which we have attempted to illus-trate the basic socio-economic adaptations of the households in Jordan.3 The fourquadrants of the plot suggest four basic adaptations.4 In the upper right quadrantwe find the well off. High cost possessions (car) are found together with high in-come, income from property, high education, and ownership of land. In contrastdiagonally opposite are the poor, characterised by residence in refugee camps oragricultural areas, with low income, unemployed household head and inability tomeet a sudden outlay of JD 100. Households in the upper left quadrant are some-what better off: those are the households that subsist on remittances or transferincome. Let us call them the dependants. The head has little education, and is notmember of the labour force. In contrast the group diagonally down to the right are

3 Thanks are due to David Drury for some of the preliminary analysis.

4 For those unfamiliar with correspondence analysis we should add that there is a correspond-ence between the quadrants and the analytical interpretation is coincidental. The points donot need to distribute themselves over the four quadrants.

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CONTENTS

Figure 11.3 Category score correspondence plot of household socio economic adaptations inJordan. Variables either refer to the household as a whole or to characteristics of the house-hold head

the independent workers. They secure their livelihood, but not at a high level. Theyare employed, they have some education and they do not receive transfers.

The plot provides an illustration of the concepts of heaping, compensationand independence referred to above. The poor category in the lower left quadrantis a category for which poor conditions tend to aggregate. In contrast, their oppo-site on the diagonal is a typical example of positive heaping, while the dependenthouseholds at the upper left compensates for their poor education and low incomegeneration capability by the transfers and remittances they receive. And finally, theindependent workers in the lower right corner consist basically of a heaping ofmiddle characteristics. One should also note that there is considerable independ-ence or lack of association in the plot. This is partly indicated by the cluster of val-ues in the centre of the plot, but more importantly by the variables we have left outbecause they contribute little to the differentiation.

Not surprisingly, given the presentation of the maps above, the governorateswere not useful as variables. Most of the variation is captured by the ‘Type of area’characteristics in the plot, such as farm area, refugee camp, urban residential, andrural/ semi-urban residential. The rural – urban distinction that emerges from thegeographical analysis is also subsumed by the type of area. Another measure not

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shown in this plot is the dependency ratio (unproductive members divided by totalmembers in the household), Dependency ratios tend to be lower for the most well-off households than for others. This probably reflects the lower fertility of that cat-egory. In general, however, the dependency ratio does not distinguish much, andwe also did not find any large effect of household type. Female headed householdsare located together with the dependants. Refugee status did not differentiate (seealso Arneberg 1997 for a more thorough discussion of this point). Access to infra-structure and public services also did not contribute to the plot when it was tried.

Correspondence analysis can also be presented in another way, by plottinghow the individual households are distributed according to the dimensions identi-fied. This is shown in figure 11.4, which is a so-called hexagonal binning (Math-Soft 1997). The different hexagons are shaded according to how many householdsthat fall in their area, from light grey (few) to black (many). The space defined bythe axes is the same as that of the previous plot, even though each axis has a greater

Figure 11.4 Object score correspondence plot of household socio economic adaptations inJordan. Darker means higher densities of households

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range.5 This is because individual households may have more extreme values thanthe average for a variable. The centre of density is around the area of those we havetermed the independent workers, and towards the origin of the plot. The otherquadrants are less heavily represented, but there is a clustering in the poor quad-rant towards the origin. All in all it shows the importance of the lower two quad-rants, as opposed to the upper two, although there is also a substantial number ofcases in the well-off quadrant.

The results have bearing on the above discussion on the simultaneousoccurrence of income disparities and homogeneity in service access. The correspond-ence analysis supports the picture given in the introduction to this chapter, namelythat Jordan may be considered a society in which basic needs are generally fulfilled,but where some households face a considerable income shortage. The analysis alsosupports the factors that we have considered as explanations, i.e. the importance ofremittances and transfers as well as education. Moreover, the population is dividedinto categories, where the different explanatory factors have different weight.

Remittances and government transfers are most important for the depend-ants category in figure 11.3. Since this category of households is marked by suchcharacteristics as low education and being out of the labour force the transfers seemswell targeted. Being out of the labour force may, however, also be an effect of thetransfers, in the sense that transfers allow people to refrain from trying to get a job.In contrast, there is the category of the poor for which transfer and remittances donot play a role, in the sense that their lack of income due to unemployment is notcompensated. As noted, this category is partly made up of the refugee camp dwell-ers, those in poor agricultural areas, and probably also the squatters of the largetowns. Howver, it is difficult toidentify the latter in the survey, even if they as notedhave been the target of both research and policy interventions in Jordan.

Becoming Poor in Jordan

The discussion above raises the question of how one becomes poor or how povertyis reproduced in Jordan. But it also gives some indication of the answers. One suchindication is how the transitions between the different quadrants of our correspond-ence plots can be achieved. The perhaps most obvious transition is between the twoleft quadrants, i.e. between the poor and the dependants. Reduced or increased trans-fers and remittances will move people from one group to the other. Similarly, changes

5 The relation between dimensional score for the objects (here households) and the charac-teristics is subject to some debate. See Bacher 1995 for a discussion.

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in employment will move people between the lower quadrants. Increased educationincreases the chances of getting a job (as shown in chapter 7), but not so much forwomen who are often unemployed when well educated.

Figure 11.5 explores the question further by using “Ability to raise JD100should an unexpected need arise” as the dependent variable. The figure shows thebreakdown that emerges by using the exploratory data analysis technique CHAID(Magidson 1993). The analysis creates a so-called classification tree. It is based onletting a number of predictors form cross tabulations with the dependent variable,and at each stage finding the combination of cross-tabulations that best divide thepopulation into groups that are as different as possible on the dependent variable.

In the figure, the percentages are given for those that can muster JD100themselves. Thus, in the figure, education of the household head is the variable thatbest separates the respondent households in groups of different responses on theJD100-variable. It ranges from having JD100 among 74 percent of those with noeducation to 96 percent of those with higher. This is a finding that is entirely con-sistent with what we have stated so far, in the discussions about the effects ofeducation, and therefore not particularly surprising.

For those with higher education, the next branch is defined by the age ofthe household head in that older household heads are more often able to come upwith JD100. This is reflecting that as the household gets more established it accu-mulates resources. Among the established households, with heads aged 25 years andabove, those living in Amman are best off, as all can meet a sudden demand forJD100.

Among those with secondary education, it is having a property income thatincreases the ability to pay.

In contrast, for those with only basic education, it is the employment situ-ation that counts. The reason why the employment situation does not count for thosewith secondary and higher education is that in those groups nearly all householdheads are employed, and the employment variable cannot therefore distinguishwithin those groups. The unemployed are worst off among those with basic educa-tion, while those out of the labour force or temporarily absent are marginally worseoff than the full time employed. Those out of the labour force live better when theyhave property income, and within that group the dependency ratio of the house-hold is important. This result is fairly obvious – people who do not work live bet-ter when they have some income, and also if they do not have many to care for.

Like the above result, several of the results from the classification tree are quiteobvious. However, the point shown by the classification tree, is how different com-binations of variables result in different outcomes, and also the numericalimportance of the various combinations.

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As one can observe, another important benefit of analysis using classification treesis that it makes possible the use of different variables for different parts of the tree.This allows for the important ability to detect that there are different ways to afflu-ence or poverty, or that particular combinations of values have particular good orbad results. For example, it is among those with no education who live from trans-fer income (i.e. pensions, social security), do not own land and receive no remit-tances that the ability to pay JD100 is at its lowest. However, this is a fairly smallgroup at 98 households or 1.4 percent of the sample.

Figure 11.5 CHAID classification tree of “Ability to raise JD100”. Variables refer to householdcharacteristics or characteristics of household head

Labels for values where space does not permit complete text:* Main source of income:WP- Work or property income,T: Transfer and other types of income* Employment;Full: Full time employed,Part/NLF: Parttime employed or not member of labour force,TA-Un: Temporarily absent or unemployed* Governorate:A: Amman,I: Irbid,Z: Zarqa and Mafraq,B: Balqa and Madaba,S: South.

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Figure 11.6 Frequency of different residence five years ago by household income groups.Individual moves

6 Social differentiation within spatially compact groups cannot be tested by JLCS, but see forinstance Bisharat and Tewfik 1985.

It is striking, however, that the categories that distinguish themselves in the corre-spondence or classification analysis are not necessarily social groups in thesociological sense of making out corporate units. The squatters and refugee campdwellers may be so, in the sense that they sometimes act as groups, and are locatedgeographically close. But in this case one should not be blind to the fact that evenamong those groups there is considerable social differentiation.6 One should alsobear in mind that there might be quite strong selection effects at work. Poor peoplewill tend to move towards areas where the poor can afford to live, and many of thosewho succeed in becoming more affluent will move out. Therefore these areas arenot necessarily reproduced as pockets of poverty only by the people that live there,but also by the people that move to and from. Movements into refugee camps dooccur, for example, albeit less frequent than to other types of neighbourhoods. Eightpercent of the inhabitants of the refugee camps lived in another place in 1991. Incontrast, the average for all types of localities in Jordan is 14 percent. As seen infigure 11.6, migration appears more widespread among those with low incomes andthose with high incomes, than among those with middle incomes.

All in all there appears to be a significant element of individual or house-hold based social differentiation as opposed to social differentiation based on sta-ble social strata. This is not the least because of the importance of education inindividual success in Jordan. This is not to say that other, more group based socialdifferentiation is unimportant. Even when considering education there is a strong

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tendency that highly educated parents much more often than parents with loweducation have children who have higher education.

“Tradition” and “Modernity”

Since Jordan has experienced a tremendous economic development during the lastdecades, one might expect that there will also have been substantial changes in socialand cultural relations. That is true to some extent. To illustrate one may point tothe fact that female labour force participation is increasing, suggesting new rolesfor women in the economy and in the family. Or one may bring to bear the obser-vation that Jordan is currently undergoing a demographic transition resembling thatexperienced by European societies on their eve of modernity. Furthermore, as wehave seen Jordan has instituted a modern education system, in which almost allreceive basic education and many obtain advanced education. Jordan also is intenselysubject to influences from abroad through the large share of the inhabitants thatmove out and in of the country in search of work. Modern mass media is widelydistributed, and 82 percent of men and 72 percent of women had read a newspaperor received news on television or radio the day preceding their JLCS interview.Twenty-eight percent received news from wireless sources abroad (Arab, Israeli orWestern) as discussed in chapter 9.

Nevertheless, the JLCS data do not suggest that Jordan is developing into acopy of modernised Western societies. Although Jordan is becoming increasinglyglobalised, it is also taking its own specific path through modernity, as Clifford(1988:5) puts it in a discussion on tradition and modernisation. Clifford’s point isthat there is no necessary link between a modernised society and specific socialformations, in contrast to what is often posited by modernisation theorists and im-plicitly accepted by many of us. Moreover, as Wallerstein (1995) asserts, the cul-ture of developing countries should not be seen as a unitary something to be over-come in the process of modenisation, but rather as a mixture of different visions ofwhat a good life should be.

We show in chapter 9 that the political organisation of Jordan is influencedby what many would call “traditional” groups based on kinship and locality. Thatmay be interpreted as a survival from a former organisation of political life that isin the process of being destroyed. It may also be interpreted precisely as a specificpath that is currently being trod in Clifford’s terms. In chapter 8 we document therole of social networks in Jordanian society, pointing out that while many of thosenetworks are not now based in locality, they are virtual localities in Appadurai’s(1993) terms in the sense that they organise people as if they were sharing a village.

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Thus, dense networks are reproduced despite the distances often involved in urban-isation or migratory wage labour. A telling example of this is how Jordanian house-holds are able to mobilise remittances from their relatives abroad.

In the correspondence plot in figure 11.7 we present some aspects of theconfiguration of views and activities that might be seen as related to modernisation.In this case the correspondence solution is three-dimensional7 which makes itconsiderably more difficult to read, but the interpretation follows the lines outlinedabove.

The data are for the randomly selected individual. Several variables wereintroduced in the analysis: consumption of news, attitudes to aspects of Westernculture, smoking, labour force status, consumption of news, place of residence,history of labour migration, gender, voting behaviour and refugee status. Somevariables were left out of the final plot, as they did not contribute to the spread.This was the case for religion.

In figure 11.7, the range of attitudes on aspects of Western culture delineatethemselves clearly from lower left (accepts Western political system as a model) toupper right (does not want translation of non-Arab books and will not accept

Figure 11.7 Correspondence plot of cultural configurations in Jordan

7 The number of dimensions in a correspondence analysis is partly a matter of choice, partlya matter of how much of the variation that is represented by each dimension. In this casethe three first dimensions represent similar amounts of variation (“inertia”).

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8 The effect of inclusion would have been to make the bivariate association between West-ern news consumption and the other factors dominate in the plot and all other associationswould be hidden.

Western technology) on the other extreme. While this line in the correspondencespace may be interpreted as one of “modernisation” we are reluctant to do so. Onereason is, as mentioned above, that some variables that we would have expected togo together with this line, such as position on women’s autonomy, did not appearto have any association.

To some extent most of the other results are negative with respect to the fac-tor of Westernness, in that they show a lack of association with this factor. Thus,the age dimension appears quite unrelated to being oriented towards the West, andalso residence. Similarly, while Gulf returnees and refugees are clustered in the lowerright corner, they do not appear to have any particular characteristic as regards viewson the influence of the West.

The reason for including smoking habits in the analysis is that marketingfor tobacco in developing countries often has explicit references to modernity – themodern man is presented as a smoker. Smokers in Jordan are definitely male. Thatwas shown in the health chapter, and also is visible clearly in figure 11.7. Butsmoking appears not to be associated with views on the West, rather it is associatedwith the employed male with a history of labour migration.

Interestingly, consumption of the more widely used mass media does notinfluence views on westernisation much. There is a tendency that those who watchtelevision news from other Arab countries are more positive to western influences.However, the bivariate associations between watching Israeli TV and Western TVand the various measures of Western influence were quite strong. This was espe-cially the case for watching Western TV, where much higher percentages among thewatchers than among the non-watchers wanted to accept Western influence. How-ever, the number of watchers is very small and therefore the variables were not in-cluded in the correspondence analysis.8

The other measures of influence from abroad, that of having been on labourmigration or being a Gulf returnee were not associated with the westernisationvariables in the correspondence plot.

As noted, the main result of the above analysis is largely negative, but it maybe seen as a useful negative. The analysis finds no support for a contention that thereis a simple relation between position of women, Islam, and modernisation in aWestern direction as often posited – at least in the Western Press.

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The Future

Jordanian society is likely to change in the near future. One of the key factors inthat change is the development of the population, both in terms of numbers andin terms of human resources. As described in chapter 2, Jordan is currently goingthrough a demographic transition, in which fertility rates are dropping fast. A quitesubstantial mortality drop has preceded the fertility decline, leading to the rapidpopulation increase that Jordan has experienced.

The fertility decline is likely to continue for some time into the future, andthis will lead to changes in the structure of the population. While the Jordanianpopulation is now quite young, it will rapidly become older. Since many aspects ofliving conditions are tied to the individual’s life cycle from infant to elder – as amplydescribed in several of the chapters – it is of some interest to see how the popula-tion and its age distribution are likely to develop if current trends continue.

Figure 11.8 shows the age and sex structure of the Jordanian population in1995 and projections for 2000, 2005 and 2010. We made the projections using thecomponent-cohort method using the program FIVFIV (Shorter et al. 1995). We

Figure 11.8 Development of population structure of Jordan. 1995-2010. Dark shadingrepresents persons with primary education or more

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assumed that fertility will be reduced to replacement levels by year 2025 and thatmortality will slowly be reduced from the present level. No migration was stipulated.That is obviously an unrealistic assumption, but there is no factual basis for pre-dicting migration flows between Jordan and surrounding countries given the twistsof history after 1948. Such a projection entails an increase in population from about4.2 million in 1995, to 4.9 in year 2000, 5.6 in year 2005 and 6.2 in year 2010.However, the population projection is mainly illustrative. As noted in chapter 2 thepast performance of population projections in Jordan has been less than perfect andthere is no reason why this attempt should fare very much better. It is more thecharacteristics of the changes than their absolute sizes that are the focus here. Thatbeing said, several changes currently underway are noteworthy.

First, the population is ageing. By the year 2010 the effects of the fertilitydecline will be very noticeable, in that the youngest age groups will be smaller thanthe preceding ones and that the proportion of elderly will be somewhat larger. Thisis a classic example of what demographers call “ageing at the base” (i.e. of the pyr-amid) where the overall population distribution gets shifted up in age because offewer births than before. In contrast, increases in life expectancy, i.e. that peoplelive longer, generally are relatively unimportant in the ageing of the population. Theproportion of children below 15 years old will decline, and with it the child depend-ency ratio.

Second, the working-aged population will increase both in absolute andrelative terms (table 11.4). Thus Jordan’s characteristic of being a labour surpluseconomy is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Given that unemploymentis already high, Jordan faces acute challenges in providing enough jobs for its la-bour force. This is particularly so because the proportion of labour force partici-pants in the population is currently extremely low (see chapter 7). As the countrycontinues to modernise, labour force participation is expected to rise, mostly dueto higher rates among women. Female labour force participation correlates posi-tively with education of women, as shown in chapter 7. Increased female labour forceparticipation has been the trend so far, and is also the experience of most other Arabcountries.

Third, one of the most striking developments will be the growth of the pop-ulation’s stock of education. In the age groups now entering adulthood close to 100percent have primary education. Illiteracy rates will thus decline steadily, as younger

Table 11.4 Percentage of population in different age groups, 1995-2010

5991 0002 5002 0102

41-0 4.14 1.04 3.83 6.53

46-51 4.65 3.75 5.85 7.06

+56 2.2 7.2 2.3 7.3

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literates replace the old generations. Figure 11.8 also suggests how the educatedyoungsters in the future will fill the population pyramid from the bottom. One effectof this is that education, as a differential in the population, will change its signifi-cance. Today those without primary education are consistently worse off, and makeout a sizeable group. In the near future they will probably be even worse off becauseof the demands that modern societies put on human resources. But they will alsomake out a much smaller group. Similarly, in the population chapter it was point-ed out that while educated women were a tiny minority 20 years ago, with strik-ingly lower fertility than that of other women, the educated women of today arenot so different from their sisters with less education regarding fertility.

One consequence of the shift in population size and structure together withthe increase of qualifications will be that the structure of the labour market will haveto change in the direction of being able to use more educated labour. At the sametime the education system will have to change to supply the specific needs of a moreknowledge based economy. As noted in the chapter on education, this is alreadyrecognised as a problem. Part of the current high economic returns on educationin Jordan stems from the fact that the public sector has employed a large numberof the educated at comparatively advantageous terms, especially as regards jobsecurity, working hours and pensions.

Not all factors change because of population processes. As we have seen(chapter 2), there is little that distinguishes refugees from non-refugees in terms ofdemographic behaviour. Thus, the proportion of refugees in Jordan is likely toremain fairly constant, assuming, of course, that refugee flows to or from Jordando not again become an issue.

Conclusion

The question that has been posed most often to us during our work with the JordanLiving Conditions Survey is perhaps: How good or bad are the living conditionsin Jordan? This of course, is the question we have attempted to tackle, but it is alsoa question that has no simple answer. The UNDP’s Human Development Reportanswer of a human development index of 0.730, is perhaps not too illuminating,although it does have the benefit of ranking Jordan 84 among the 175 nations ofthe Earth (UNDP 1997:146-48).

Another answer is that we have attempted in this summary. Jordan is a soci-ety that has done surprisingly well considering its poor natural resource base andtroubled history. As we have seen, the basic needs of Jordanians have been satisfiedtoa large extent. The country has handled the huge population fluxes surprisingly well.

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But a large share of this needs satisfaction has been achieved either by governmenttransfers that exceed the long term capability of the government given the currenteconomic climate, or through remittances from relatives abroad. In a situation whereboth those sources are strained, a great many Jordanians suffer from income short-falls.


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Summary

As is common for large scale surveys, the JLCS used a two stage stratified proba-bility proportionate to size cluster design in which households were selected withapproximately equal probability within each stratum. On the national scale the sam-ple was not self weighting, because of the need to report from governorates of widelyvarying size. A randomly selected individual was chosen within each household inorder to answer questions where proxy respondents could not be expected to giveaccurate answers. The sample frame was derived from the 1994 Census and is con-sidered very accurate.

Non-response, both on the household, individual person and on the ques-tion level was generally very low. Some randomly selected individuals were not in-terviewed because it was impossible to find them at home. This mainly involvedworking males, and may constitute a slight bias. Also, some children that shouldhave been measured for anthropometry were not measured. In the figures present-ed in this report, non-response has been corrected for to some extent by adjustingthe weights.

A cluster sample such as that of the JLCS is in most cases less efficient thana simple random sample from the same population. It is also very much cheaper,and is the only practical way of carrying out such a survey on a national scale. Theefficiency costs of the design of JLCS are fairly typical for such surveys.

In general the JLCS data do not show any detectable biases or shortcomings.

Requirements of the Sampling Design

The sample of the JLCS was designed with several aims in mind. It should be of asufficient size to allow comparison of living conditions for several sub-groups (suchas women, children, female headed households, vulnerable groups). The sample also

Jon Pedersen

Appendix 1 The JLCS Sample


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allow separate reporting domains, such as major administrative divisions, and itshould be possible to estimate measures on the national level.

The sample should include enough refugees to allow analyses of their livingconditions, and there should be a sufficient number of refugee camp dwellers toallow analyses based on that group.

The requirement that the sample should allow reporting on the level ofadministrative divisions proved to be the most difficult. There are 12 governoratesin Jordan, but the population is very unequally distributed between them. The threesouthern governorates make up only about 9.5 percent of the population, and Am-man accounts for around 38 percent. In the experience of Fafo, a reporting domainin a living conditions survey should have a sample size of at least 1000 households,otherwise the domain easily becomes too small for detailed analyses when the do-main is further broken down by for instance age or gender.

Even when the three southern governorates are grouped together in a sepa-rate reporting domain, a total sample of about 10,500 would have been needed inorder to make a self-weighting sample, i.e. one where the relative importance of each

Figure A1.1 JLCS sample number of households compared to total number of households.The bars for the population represent the households in each domain as a proportion of thetotal population of households, while the bars for the sample represent the household sam-pled in each domain as proportion of the total number of households sampled.

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unit in the sample is the same. While desirable, this was not possible within thebudget. Also, a self-weighting sample would have resulted in about one third of thesample in Amman, or about 2000 households, which is more than is needed forindependent reporting of Amman. Because of this, it was decided to group gover-norates into six reporting domains, and to allocate the sample so that adequate re-porting domains were obtained. The benefit of this is that it became possible toreport by geographic divisions, the cost is that the precision of the sample on thenational level suffered somewhat. Of course, since the final estimates from the sampleare weighted, this does not affect the representativeness of the sample in any way.

Six geographic reporting domains were identified based on the governorates:Irbid; Jerash and Ajloun; Amman; Balqa and Madaba, Zarqa and Mafraq; and South.Their relative importance in the population and in the sample is shown in figureA1.1. Planned net sample size was 6000 households. All the domains had an ini-tial allocation of 900 households, except for Amman, which had 1500.

The JLCS defines households, household members and a single randomlyselected individual (RSI) in each household as respondents, or ultimate samplingunits. For some questions the respondent was the person whom the question per-tained to. For other questions a different household member answered, either onbehalf of another household member, or for the household as a whole. The overallarrangement of topics and respondents can be seen in table A1.1.

Table A1.1 Respondents in JLCS

otgniniatrepnoitseuQ ybderewsnA

,seitinema,erutcurtsarfni(dlohesuoH)ymonoce

esuopsnetfoyrev(nosrepelbisnopsertludA)daehelamfo

fonoitpecrep,evomotsnalpdlohesuoHtnemnorivne


cisab,noitacude,noitapicitrapecrofrobaLfohtlaeh,scitsiretcarahccihpargomed

srebmemdlohesuoh


nemowfoyrotsihevitcudorpeR noitseuqninamowehT

nerdlihcfoeracdnahtlaeHsesacwefanirodlihcehtforehtoM

.rekateracrehtona

ytilitrefelaM laudividnidetcelesylmodnaR

yrotsihevitpecartnoC laudividnidetcelesylmodnaR

sedutitta,efilcilbupninoitapicitraP laudividnidetcelesylmodnaR

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The Sampling FrameThe Department of Statistics carried out a population census in December 1994,and thus has a complete definition, mapping and listing of enumeration areas, hous-ing units and households in Jordan. This was used as the sample frame in the JLCS,and is also the national sample frame in Jordan.

The frame was organized as follows: The enumeration unit, the cluster, con-sisted of around 80 households, although clusters as large as 120 households exist-ed. Clusters were grouped into localities. A governorate then consisted of a numberof localities.

The sampling frame also included a number of other subdivisions (blocks,districts etc.). They were not needed because the clusters were directly listed withineach locality.

In the frame, the localities were divided into groups according to their sizewithin each governorate. Within a given size group, the localities were then orderedaccording to their geographic location, in a north-south order in order to provideimplicit satisfaction.

In practice, the frame has proved to be generally accurate, with the excep-tion of some nomadic communities. Field work was greatly facilitated by the factthat the census had been carried out a thirteen months before the survey, and themarkings that census staff had made on buildings to identify blocks and houses werestill visible.

Selection of the SampleThe design is a two stage stratified sample of dwelling units and the households thatlive in those dwelling units. The first stage is the selection of clusters (which are thenthe primary sampling units (PSUs), the second, the selection of households. WhenRandomly Selected Individuals (RSIs) were selected, the sample had a third stage.

First Stage Selection: Selection of PSUsEach governorate was treated as a separate stratum in the sample, and the clusters(PSUs) were selected from the list of all clusters in the governorate. No otherstratification was used, but the ordering of clusters in the frame provided someimplicit stratification, and in particular ensured that the sample was well spread outgeographically.

As is common in similar surveys, clusters were selected with probabilityproportional to their size (PPS) with the same number of households to be selectedin each cluster. As noted above, the reporting requirements made it difficult to obtain

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a self-weighting (epsem) design, but within each stratum the sample is approximatelyself-weighting.In selecting clusters the measure of size used was the number of households withineach cluster as provided by the preliminary 1994 Census data.

Second Stage Selection: Sampling Within Clusters (PSUs)In a cluster sample, the variance, and thereby the precision of the estimates, is affectedby the character of the clusters. If the units within each cluster are very much alike,then each unit selected after the first in a cluster does not contribute much newinformation to the sample. For example, when a cluster falls in a refugee camp, it isknown after the first interview that all the other interviews in the cluster will be withrefugees. Their refugee characteristic is then not “new” information when they areinterviewed, and thus does contribute much to the total sample size for thatcharacteristic. Therefore, when the clusters are expected to be homogenous, it isprudent to have a small number of interviews within each cluster, while larger takescan be appropriate if the clusters are heterogeneous. However, the reason for usinga cluster sample in the first place is cost considerations, and having very small sampletakes in each cluster becomes very expensive.

Given that the JLCS includes several key variables which may be expectedto be very homogeneously distributed within geographic areas (such as exposure tocrime, refugee status, and access to infrastructure to name a few) we expected fairlysubstantial design effects for these variables. Therefore, it was decided that thenumber of selected households within each cluster should be kept fairly small at10. That number was also convenient for the allocation of interviewer teams andcars.

In theory, the sample was of dwelling units rather than households. If twoor more households lived in a dwelling unit, all households within the unit wereselected. In practice this occurred rarely, and only 40 dwelling units had more thanone household.

In DoS sampling practice dwelling units are retained in the frame eventhough they are known at the time of selection to be non-existing, vacant or notused for residential purposes. As a result, slightly less than 20 percent of the dwell-ing units selected are not inhabited. It should be noted that this is not a vacancyrate, it is simply an artifact of the sampling method. However, to correct for thischaracteristic of the frame, oversampling at around 20 percent was used. This wascarried out as follows, as an integral part of the selection of the households.

Within a cluster the selection procedure was linear systematic sampling: thedwelling units were listed, and the sample was selected by taking households at fixed

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start between 1 and the interval was selected, and dwelling units were selected system-atically at regular steps defined by the calculated interval. The list used was a list ofdwelling units rather than households, even though the interval had been calculatedon the basis of the number of households. Since the number of dwelling units gen-erally was higher than the number of households, this resulted in an automaticoversampling of dwelling units which provided, on average, the desired number ofhouseholds within each cluster, and also kept the sample approximately self-weighting within each stratum.

Once a dwelling unit within a structure (usually a house) had been selected,the structure was relisted in order to determine the number of households current-ly living there. The intention had been to relist all of the selected clusters, but thiswas not carried out.

Third Stage Selection: Selection of Individuals From theHouseholdsFor some purposes the selection of individuals in the sample did not constitute aseparate stage of selection, because all qualifying household members were selectedfor interview. This was the case for women in the questions regarding their chil-dren, and for all household members in the case of the questions regarding forinstance labor force and education. However, to choose the randomly selected in-dividual there was a separate stage.

The randomly selected individuals were selected by the interviewer in thefield using a procedure described by Deming (1960:240-1). The method consistsof attaching to each questionnaire a table with a pre-determined (but random) se-lection of household members, made in such a way that it can be used regardless ofhousehold size. The interviewer lists the eligible household members on the tableaccording to a set of rules, and selects the person that the table tells her to select.Barring active cheating, the interviewer had no influence on what person was to beselected. The data do indicate a slight tendency for women (who were fairly easy tointerview) to be selected more often than men.

Selection ProbabilitiesThe computation of selection probabilities follows more or less the textbook caseof a two stage sample. Nevertheless, we would note one important modification.When clusters were selected with PPS a size estimate of households was used, while

intervals from the list. The first household was selected randomly. Thus, given that10 households were to be selected within each cluster, the sampling interval wasdetermined to be the number of households in the cluster divided by 10. A random

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the second stage selection used a size estimate of dwelling units. Also, as noted above,the selected clusters were partially relisted. Thus, there was one population estimateused for drawing the cluster, and another for drawing the households within thecluster. The formulas for selection probabilities are as follows, and the notation usedis given in table A1.2.

Equation 1

V

V

FV

FV P11

S ⋅= �

�

ms is determined by the constraint that there should be 10 households in each

cluster, i.e.:

Equation 2

PQ

V

V=��

Within each cluster a number of households are selected. The selection probabilityfor a household (or dwelling unit) within a cluster is then the following:

Table A1.2 Notation

lobmyS gninaeM

N tnuocnoitalupoP

n )noitacollaelpmasehtrepsa(tnuocelpmaS

M )sUSP(sretsulcforebmunnoitalupoP

m )sUSP(sretsulcforebmunelpmaS

p ytilibaborpnoitceleS

l )sgnillewdfo(tnuocdetsiletacidniottpircsrepuS

d sdlohesuohnahtrehtarstinugnillewdetacidniottpircsrepuS

s mutartsfoxednI

c retsulcfoxednI

h dlohesuohfoxednI

isr laudividnidetcelesylmodnarfoxednI

d dlohesuohehtnihtiwlaudividnifoxednI

388

CONTENTS

Equation 3

SQ

1F K

V F

G

V F

G O�

�

�

�

=

Note that at this stage the listed number of dwelling units should be used, ratherthan the first estimate from the census count. The overall inclusion probability fora dwelling unit in a stratum then becomes

Equation 4

OG

FVV

G

FVV

FVKFV

11

QP1S

�

�

��

��

⋅⋅⋅

=

(since S S SV F K V F F K� � � �= ⋅ )

Because of the mode of selection used (drawing from the list of dwelling units) thend

s,c (cluster take counted as dwelling units) is set to the overall sampling fraction

for the stratum, so that the selected number of dwelling units equals:

Equation 5

QQ 1

1 PV F

G V V F

G O

V F V

�

�

�

�

=⋅

⋅

In practice this means that except for rounding errors the sample of households willbe approximately self weighting within the stratum.

The selection probabilities for individuals in the case where all individualsof a specific category are selected in the household (e.g. all household members, allwomen) is equal to the selection probability for the household. Thus:

Equation 6

S SV F K G V F K� � � � �=However, the selection probabilities for the randomly selected individuals of thehousehold are different. In these cases a person who is a member of a householdwith few persons aged 18 years or more has a greater chance of being selected thana person who lives in a household with many such adults. Since the person is se-lected from the household by simple random sampling, the selection probability issimply (for the randomly selected adult):

389

CONTENTS

Equation 7

S1 P Q

1 1 1V F K UD

V FV

V F

G

V F K UD V F

G O

V

� �

� �

� � � �

�

� =⋅

⋅⋅

Sampling WeightsThe sampling weights used for estimation are of two types. The expansion weightscreate estimates equivalent to real numbers in the population, while the relativeweights retain the sample size and only adjust the relative contribution of each unitof analysis (household or individual). The expansion weights are calculated as theinverse of the sampling probability, while the relative weights are calculated as theexpansion weight divided by the mean of all the expansion weights.

Thus, the expansion sampling weight is:

Equation 8

:SL

L

=�

where i is an index of each individual analysis unit. The relative sampling weight isthen:

Equation 9

:S

:

Q

L

U L

L

H= ∑

The sampling weights were not used in the estimation of survey results, because allweights were adjusted for non-response as discussed below.

Response RatesThe response rate that is achieved during the field work of a survey is crucial forthe quality of the survey results. When response rates are low, one may justifiablysuspect biases in the results. Surveys in developing countries have often very lowresponse rates, often as low as 60 or 50 percent of the population sampled. In contrast

390

CONTENTS

surveys in developing countries have often very high response rates, often surpass-ing 90 percent.

In general one may distinguish between two types of non-response: unit non-response and item non-response. Unit non-response pertains to the non-responseof a whole unit, such as a household. In that case almost nothing is known aboutthat household. Item non-response pertains to the lack of information on a specificitem for a unit, for example that a person does not answer one question. We shalldeal with the two in turn.

Unit Non-Response: The HouseholdIn general the JLCS had a very high response rate and people cooperated willinglywith the interviewers. Nevertheless, for various reasons not all the planned inter-views were carried out. The results of the interviews or attempted interviews werestudied using a fairly detailed classification of non-response in the questionnaire,derived from Hidiroglou, Drew and Gray (1993). The response categories in theframework is given in Table A1.3.

Table A1.3 Non-response categories in JLCS

yrogetaC epytesnopseR

detelpmocweivretnI1 elbissopsiweivretnI

ehT(rosivrepusybdetrevnoclasufeR2tub,desuferyllaitinitnednopser

ehtybtisivaretfadetarepooc)rosivrepus

elbissopsiweivretnI

detelpmocyltraP3peekotkrowdleifgniruddesuylno-tnavelerrI

ssergorpfokcart

dleifehT(denimretedtonsutatS4afituodniftondluocmaetkrow

)sserddaehttagnivilsawdlohesuoh

elbissoprevodetubirtsidyllausu,raelctoNelbissoptondnaweivretni

ecnatsnirof(noitamrofnielbasuoN5,kcissawtnednopserehtesuaceb

)gnitarepoocyllaerton,lliyllatnemesnopser-non,elbissopsiweivretnI

stsixetondidtinugnillewD6 elbissopweivretnioN

tnacavsitinugnillewD7 elbissopweivretnioN

noitcurtsnocrednusitinugnillewD8 elbissopweivretnioN

elbigiletoN9 elbissopweivretnioN

,stsixedlohesuoheht(tcatnocoN01)emohtadnuofebtondluoctub

esnopser-non,elbissopsiweivretnI

lasufeR11 esnopser-non,elbissopsiweivretnI

391

CONTENTS

The framework is built around the fact that an interview can be missing for twomain reasons. First, it may be that the selected household did not belong to thesampling frame. This is the case when a dwelling unit does not exist in reality, isvacant, or the household is not eligible (foreign diplomats, for example). Second, aselected household, which actually exists and is eligible, may refuse or not be foundat home.

As can be seen from Table A1.4 the non-response due to refusals is insignif-icant. The non-response problems experienced by the survey are more due to sam-pling frame characteristics and field work operations than to the respondents’ will-ingness to answer. As noted, an aspect of the DoS sampling practice is thatnon-existing dwelling units are not removed from the sampling frame. Thus, thenon-existence rate is 1.4 percent, which is higher than one would normally expectfor a survey that was carried out soon after a census. Also, for sampling of house-holds the vacant dwelling units are not removed from the list before sampling, andover-sampling is used instead to ensure a sufficient number of households from aPSU. This leads to a Temporary Out of Scope rate that is very high. It is mainly aresult of the very high number of vacant dwelling units.

The vacant dwelling units and the fact that non existing dwelling units arekept in the frame do not lead to any biases in the sampling, although the variability

Table A1.4 Non-response rates in JLCS

metI rotacidnI sadetaluclaC

latoT 3157nwardstinugnillewd/sdlohesuohllA

elpmasehtni

devloseR 3237htiwstinuehtsunimlatoT

ni4edoc(sutatsetanimretedni)3elbaT

epocsnI 2746ton,gnitsixetonehtsunimdevloseR

stinutnacavroelbigile

etardevloseR 5.79 latoT/devloseR

etarepocsnI 4.88 devloseR/epocsnI

etarecnetsixe-noN 4.1 stinudevloser/stinutnetsixe-noN

etarepocsfotuoyraropmeT 2.01 devloser/)elbigiletoN+tnacaV(

etarnoisrevnoclasufeR 00.+slasufeR(/detrevnocslasufeR

)detrevnoc

etaresnopseR 5.19 epocsnI/sweivretnidetelpmoC

etarlasufeR 4. epocsnI/slasufeR

etartcatnocoN 4.7toN(/)tcatnocoN+denimretedtoN(

)epocsnI+denimreted

etaresnopser-noN 8.7oN+slasufeR+denimretedtoN(

nI+denimreteDtoN(/)tcatnoc)epocs

etaresnopser-nonlaudiseR 1. epocSnI/noitamrofnielbasuoN

392

CONTENTS

of the weights is increased slightly. More problematic is the fairly large count ofdwelling units with Not Determined status. That is mainly due to some clusters witha predominantly nomadic population being included in the sample frame. As thesurvey and the population census took place at different times of the year, thenomads had moved, and there was no one that could be asked about the selecteddwelling units. It is clear that the survey does not represent the nomadic part of thepopulation adequately. The intention was not to survey nomads, and the inclusionof some nomadic PSUs in the frame is mainly due to misclassification of thoseclusters.

The most problematic feature of the non-response is the comparatively highno contact rate. It is also the aspect of the response characteristics of the survey thatwas most improved during field work. Early field work monitoring showed that theno contact rate was unacceptably high. Supervision and revisit practices were thenimproved, and some clusters were revisited after interviewing had been completed.

Unit Non-Response: IndividualsOnce a household had been found the interviewer had to interview several personsin that household. All women aged between 15 and 54 years had to be interviewedin addition to a randomly selected person. For children less than five years old, datahad also to be collected from their parent or caretaker. Thus, there was in practicesome non-response here as well.

The overall pattern of non-response for these groups is given in the tablebelow. As can be seen, the only category with large non-response is that of childrenfor anthropometric measurements.

Table A1.5 Response rates for sub groups in the survey

puorG

forebmuNelbissop

stnednopser)dethgiewton(

%stnednopseR

on%tcatnoc lasufer%

nemowrofnemoWeriannoitseuq

0425 3.89 6.1 1.0

rof45-51nemowdeirraMcteyrotsihhtrib

5794 6.99 2.0 0

detcelesylmodnaRlaudividni

9195 0.39 9.6 1.0

rofnerdlihCcirtemoporhtna

stnemerusaem0674 7.87 9.9 01

393

CONTENTS

Item Non-ResponseIn general item non-response in JLCS is insignificant. There are seldom more than10 respondents to a question for which there is no answer recorded. There are a fewexceptions. Among the more important is the date of birth for some small children,anthropometric measurements of children, and also date of birth of some childrenthat are now dead.

Non-Response Adjustment

Despite generally high response rates, some non-response was present. In order toreduce possible biases resulting from this, non-response adjustments have been car-ried out, and all results presented in this report from have been calculated using thenon-response adjustments.

The method of correction for non-response is the so called “adjustment cellmethod”(see for example Lehtonen and Pahkinen 1995; Little and Rubin 1987).In this approach, households that are considered to be fairly similar are identifiedand a non-response rate is calculated for each group of households, called adjust-ment cells. These non-response rates are based on the number of households thatcould have responded, but for some reason did not. Vacant units, for example, areexcluded.

The inverse of the non-response rate is then used to adjust the weights (bothexpansion and relative) for each household. This results in a weighted sample sizethat is as it would have been if all households had responded. The effect is also toincrease the relative contribution to the estimates of units that are similar to thosemissing.

In the JLCS the adjustment cells used for households were localities, whichusually consisted of several of clusters. When a locality was too small, consisting ofless than 30 households, it was merged with a nearby one. This is because the sam-pling error on the non-response rate becomes excessive with adjustment cells thatare too small.

Using the notation in table A1.6, the correction factor for non-response tothe weights is given in Equation 10.

Table A1.6 Notation for non-response adjustment

lobmyS noitanalpxE

a )llectnemtsujdA(ytilacolfoxednI

hr sdlohesuohgnidnopseR

hf sdlohesuohgnidnopser-noN

394

CONTENTS

Equation 10

&K

K K

D

D

U

D

U

D

I

=

+

�

The number of possible interviews (i.e. the denominator in the non-response rate)is thus the sum of categories 1,2,5,10 and 11 in table A1.3. The number of non-respondent units is the sum of the categories 5, 10 and 11. The Status Not Deter-mined category may be distributed over the other categories, but this has not beendone for JLCS. Instead the category was ignored in the calculations, as most of thehouseholds in this category probably do not belong to the sample .

The weights for the randomly selected individuals were also adjusted for non-re-sponse. Here the adjustment cells were formed by labour force participation status,sex and governorate. The logic and mathematics of the adjustment are otherwisethe same as that described for the adjustment on the household level. The mainreason for applying the adjustment in this case was that there was a discernible ten-dency for men — and especially working men — to not be contacted for RSI in-terview.

Sampling and Non-Sampling Errors

All surveys produce estimates that contain some degree of error. So-called samplingerror results from the fact that the survey is based on a sample and not a census ofthe entire population. Non-sampling error is a general term that is used to describeany deviation or failure of measurement. Thus, when the interviewer records that ahousehold has refrigerator when it really does not have one, it is a non-samplingerror. The reason for the error may be that respondent did not understand the ques-tion, that the respondent lied, the interviewer recorded the answer wrongly or thatthe answer was incorrectly keyed in during data entry.

Non-Sampling ErrorsIt is relatively easy to understand non-sampling errors when the reasons pertain tothe various errors of recording. It is conceptually more difficult when the problemis with the dialogue between the respondent and interviewer, or when the concept

395

CONTENTS

covered by the question is complex and open to many interpretations. The conceptof an error presupposes a real or true value for the answer. In general the true answeris not known (as it would then be rather meaningless to carry out the survey to findout). Moreover, in many cases the true answer is not easy to define, as the onlyrealized instance of the answer is that generated by the survey. For example, the ques-tion of whether or not the respondent wants to allow translation of non Arabic booksinto Arabic was posed in the survey. It is probably the first time anyone in Jordanhas been confronted with that exact phrasing, although the discussion about trans-lation of western philosophy and thought has been current in Arab intellectual debatefor a long time. Thus, the survey generates a set of answers, for which the true valueis not easily defined.

Because of the many complications in the measurement and conceptualiza-tion of non-sampling errors, they are very difficult to quantify. Their discussionbelongs to the substantive analysis of the survey results. Sampling errors are moretractable, as their characteristics may be studied with the aid of statistical samplingtheory.

Sampling ErrorsSampling errors reflect the fact that the sample is a sub-set of the population stud-ied rather than the whole. They stem from the intrinsic variability of the character-istic being studied and the sampling design used in the study. It is important torealize that surveys with a complex sampling design such as the JLCS have samplingerrors that are different from those that would be obtained from a simple randomsample of the same size. In general, the use of stratification tends to decrease sam-pling errors, although the use of non-proportionate stratification such as in the JLCSincreases sampling errors for estimates relating to the whole of Jordan. Clusteringincreases sampling errors in most cases, and the use of weights also normally in-creases the degree of sampling error.

The combined effects on the sampling error of the various elements of thesampling design are conventionally measured by the so-called design effect. That isthe ratio of the variance actually obtained, and the variance that would have beenobtained in a simple random sample of the same size. If the design effect is 1.0 thesample is as efficient as a simple random sample, if it is less than 1.0 it is moreefficient, and if it is more than 1.0, it is less efficient. The design effect is not a sin-gle number that applies to the whole of the survey. Rather, each estimate has its owndesign effect, as the variance of an estimator depends on the particular samplingcharacteristics of that estimator. Because of that we have included in tables 7,8 and9 a number of estimates and their associated variances for the household, for indi-viduals and for the randomly selected individual.

396

CONTENTS

For each estimate we have included the estimate itself (i.e. the percentage that havea given characteristic), the standard error of the estimate, the design effect and theun-weighted and weighted number of observations (households or individuals asthe case may be).

The standard error of the estimate is the square root of the variance and mayeasily be interpreted, in that 1.96 times the standard error gives a 95 percent confi-dence interval for the estimate. For example, in table A1.8, the percentage of refu-gees (including displaced) is shown as 43.7 percent. One can be 95 percent sure thatthe true percentage of refugees in the population is 43.7 percent±(1.43 percent *1.96): that is between 40.8 and 46.6.

The design effect can be calculated in various ways. The one presented hereis the ratio of the actual variance, and the variance that would be obtained undersimple random sampling. It takes into account stratification, clustering, unequalweighting and over-sampling, which are the main design characteristics of the JLCSsample. The sampling errors were calculated using SUDAAN (Shah, Barnwell andBieler 1997).

As can be seen from the tables, the design effects are fairly normal for sur-veys of this type. Some variables stand out, though. These are mainly the variableswhere clustering of characteristics is especially strong, such as refugee status, typeof neighborhood or distance to services.

397

CONTENTS

Table A1.7 Sampling errors for selected household variables

rotacidnI tnecreP rorrEdradnatS tceffEngiseD snoitavresbOdethgieW

snoitavresbo

aeramraF

latoT 7.2 16.0 02.8 222 271

nammA 5.1 89.0 42.61 42 73

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 4.2 17.1 44.31 02 82

abadaMdnaaqlaB 9.21 61.3 48.4 511 47

dibrI 6.0 84.0 30.4 5 6

nuoljAdnahsaraJ 2.4 39.1 87.2 83 31

htuoS 1.2 49.0 64.2 02 31

pmaceegufeR

latoT 5.5 79.0 07.01 483 443

nammA 9.3 65.1 24.51 75 101


abadaMdnaaqlaB 0.21 91.3 42.5 111 96

dibrI 3.7 09.2 34.21 56 87


htuoS 0.0 00.0 . 0 0

daehelameF

latoT 5.01 64.0 23.1 826 166

nammA 8.9 18.0 87.1 041 252

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 7.01 70.1 13.1 69 321

abadaMdnaaqlaB 5.9 50.1 96.0 58 55

dibrI 1.21 01.1 51.1 701 031


htuoS 4.01 52.1 89.0 49 46

eegufer8491daehdlohesuoH

latoT 7.12 20.1 36.3 1501 0731

nammA 6.82 38.1 69.3 314 437

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 7.22 62.2 31.3 602 262

abadaMdnaaqlaB 3.91 86.2 05.2 471 211

dibrI 8.91 58.2 51.5 271 112


htuoS 3.6 22.1 44.1 25 93

decalpsiD7691daehdlohesuoH

latoT 3.31 27.0 86.2 016 638

nammA 1.81 14.1 12.3 852 564

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 0.12 09.1 63.2 981 242


dibrI 9.5 33.1 91.3 84 36


htuoS 5.1 34.0 07.0 21 9

398

CONTENTS


snoitavresbo

decalpsidneht,eegufeRdaehdlohesuoH

latoT 0.6 34.0 69.1 823 773

nammA 5.7 18.0 82.2 901 391



dibrI 0.2 95.0 08.1 61 12


htuoS 0.2 75.0 89.0 51 21

eeguferazaGdaehdlohesuoH

latoT 1.1 71.0 06.1 86 66

nammA 1.1 72.0 47.1 51 72



dibrI 2.0 61.0 01.1 2 2


htuoS 4.1 48.0 29.2 21 9

decalpsidroeegufertondaehdlohesuoH

latoT 0.85 23.1 22.4 2683 1563

nammA 7.44 42.2 09.4 846 8411

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 6.64 28.2 64.3 514 735

abadaMdnaaqlaB 4.56 26.3 51.3 985 873

dibrI 1.27 78.3 05.7 746 177


htuoS 7.88 11.2 95.2 508 845

loohcscisaB

latoT 1.77 22.1 00.5 8254 7584

nammA 6.47 24.2 74.7 7601 4191

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 0.78 80.2 31.4 287 2001

abadaMdnaaqlaB 6.37 66.3 67.3 276 624

dibrI 2.47 14.2 50.3 356 397


htuoS 4.18 18.2 40.3 537 305

loohcsyradnoceS

latoT 2.45 06.1 01.6 8203 4143

nammA 5.06 39.2 46.8 168 2551

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 9.65 85.3 66.5 115 556

abadaMdnaaqlaB 1.84 12.4 78.3 144 872

dibrI 2.74 65.3 11.5 514 505


htuoS 2.74 79.3 86.3 424 292

ybraenretnechtlaehyramirP

latoT 8.64 17.1 39.6 5562 1592

nammA 4.54 62.3 33.01 846 6611

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 6.15 87.3 81.6 264 595

abadaMdnaaqlaB 2.04 60.4 27.3 963 332

dibrI 7.25 45.3 40.5 954 465


htuoS 2.74 59.3 36.3 034 192

399

CONTENTS


snoitavresbo

ybraencinilcAWRNU

latoT 2.8 50.1 36.8 664 815

nammA 3.01 20.2 86.01 941 462



dibrI 5.7 90.2 33.6 66 18


htuoS 2.1 68.0 25.3 11 8

tbedon,denwosretrauqgniviL

latoT 7.84 29.0 20.2 7892 5603

nammA 9.34 35.1 03.2 436 8211

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 6.25 91.2 70.2 074 506

abadaMdnaaqlaB 4.35 23.2 81.1 284 903

dibrI 6.94 42.2 20.2 834 135


htuoS 3.15 02.3 73.2 364 613

snaolnoyap,denwosretrauqgniviL

latoT 2.31 56.0 61.2 938 438

nammA 6.11 52.1 86.3 461 792


abadaMdnaaqlaB 8.41 83.1 28.0 131 58

dibrI 5.12 77.1 68.1 491 032


htuoS 3.9 63.1 72.1 68 85

dehsinrufnu,detnersretrauqgniviL

latoT 2.72 89.0 78.2 9241 2171

nammA 9.33 98.1 58.3 784 078

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 3.92 60.2 12.2 362 733

abadaMdnaaqlaB 7.61 08.1 72.1 351 69

dibrI 3.71 49.1 56.2 941 581


htuoS 4.92 78.2 92.2 852 181

dehsinruf,detnersretrauqgniviL

latoT 9.0 71.0 98.1 35 95

nammA 2.1 92.0 37.1 71 03



dibrI 7.0 03.0 73.1 7 7


htuoS 5.1 10.1 78.3 41 9

)eerf(evitalerybdenwosretrauqgniviL

latoT 5.6 73.0 53.1 383 704

nammA 1.6 56.0 87.1 98 751



dibrI 1.8 79.0 82.1 17 68


htuoS 2.4 57.0 18.0 93 62

400

CONTENTS


snoitavresbo

)tnemyaptceridon(reyolpmeybdenwosretrauqgniviL

latoT 8.2 14.0 66.3 281 471

nammA 7.2 97.0 77.5 34 96



dibrI 0.1 34.0 29.1 9 01


htuoS 1.4 21.1 78.1 43 52

tnemyapon,deipuccosretrauqgniviL

latoT 7.0 21.0 82.1 73 24

nammA 5.0 12.0 30.2 8 41



dibrI 8.1 14.0 89.0 61 91


htuoS 0.0 00.0 . 0 0

tnemegnarraycnanetrehtOsretrauqgniviL

latoT 1.0 40.0 11.1 6 5

nammA 1.0 70.0 08.1 1 2

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 0.0 00.0 . 0 0


dibrI 0.0 00.0 . 0 0


htuoS 2.0 81.0 10.1 1 1

krowtenegawesottelioT

latoT 5.45 95.1 89.5 6762 7043

nammA 3.67 09.2 90.11 7801 1491

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 7.85 72.3 47.4 625 276

abadaMdnaaqlaB 6.64 14.4 42.4 824 962

dibrI 8.62 00.4 61.8 922 682


htuoS 6.03 09.3 90.4 452 581

knatcitpesottelioT

latoT 8.83 05.1 95.5 6562 7242

nammA 6.12 87.2 88.01 413 055

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 6.53 90.3 94.4 613 704

abadaMdnaaqlaB 1.73 28.3 93.3 723 412

dibrI 0.76 38.3 36.6 695 417


htuoS 5.35 06.3 79.2 984 423

enirtalyrdderevoC

latoT 8.4 24.0 72.2 493 303

nammA 7.1 15.0 88.3 42 24



dibrI 9.4 53.1 88.3 64 35


htuoS 3.11 18.1 78.1 101 86

401

CONTENTS


snoitavresbo

rehtOtelioT

latoT 8.1 53.0 00.4 641 311

nammA 4.0 02.0 35.2 5 9



dibrI 3.1 34.0 05.1 11 31


htuoS 6.4 02.2 52.6 53 82

ylralugeredisnignikomS

latoT 5.16 87.0 35.1 0163 5783

nammA 6.26 24.1 80.2 609 6061

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 7.26 36.1 32.1 265 227

abadaMdnaaqlaB 4.36 95.1 95.0 175 763

dibrI 3.85 20.2 96.1 515 326


htuoS 2.16 50.2 30.1 055 873

nadroJnidnalsnwO

latoT 9.41 16.0 47.1 2801 149

nammA 9.8 89.0 68.2 921 822


abadaMdnaaqlaB 2.81 08.1 91.1 361 501

dibrI 6.22 69.1 12.2 502 242


htuoS 1.72 65.1 17.0 342 761

yrtnuocrehtonidnalsnwO

latoT 5.4 23.0 24.1 222 182

nammA 9.5 26.0 76.1 48 051



dibrI 5.2 26.0 06.1 02 62


htuoS 4.1 14.0 37.0 31 8

yrtnuocrehtodnanadroJnihtobdnalsnwO

latoT 2.0 70.0 16.1 7 21

nammA 4.0 61.0 17.1 5 9


abadaMdnaaqlaB 0.0 .00.0 0 0

dibrI 0.0 .00.0 0 0

nuoljAdnahsaraJ 0.0 .00.0 0 0

htuoS 0.0 .00.0 0 0

dnalnwotonseoD

latoT 4.08 86.0 57.1 8064 6605

nammA 9.48 81.1 46.2 5221 9712

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 9.48 23.1 64.1 367 779

abadaMdnaaqlaB 0.77 47.1 39.0 696 644

dibrI 0.57 59.1 40.2 066 208


htuoS 6.17 56.1 87.0 046 244

402

CONTENTS


snoitavresbo

)detset(dnuoftlasdezidoI

latoT 2.77 28.0 42.2 4644 7584

nammA 8.67 65.1 72.3 2011 9691

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 8.67 29.1 32.2 096 488

abadaMdnaaqlaB 8.66 69.1 49.0 006 783

dibrI 8.88 12.1 94.1 587 949


htuoS 4.07 24.2 26.1 226 434

)detset(dnuoftlasdezidoitoN

latoT 2.02 97.0 62.2 8921 2721

nammA 4.02 94.1 03.3 992 425

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 7.91 98.1 44.2 671 722

abadaMdnaaqlaB 4.03 19.1 49.0 872 671

dibrI 6.9 21.1 54.1 58 301


htuoS 4.72 33.2 85.1 252 961

emohnitlasoN

latoT 4.1 71.0 22.1 48 58

nammA 3.1 03.0 17.1 81 23



dibrI 5.0 32.0 20.1 5 5


htuoS 4.1 73.0 75.0 31 9

enidoirofdetsettontlaS

latoT 3.1 02.0 48.1 96 18

nammA 5.1 73.0 41.2 32 04


abadaMdnaaqla 8.0 23.0 27.0 7 5

dibr 0.1 23.0 50.1 9 11


htuoS 8.0 92.0 36.0 7 5

VTsnwO

latoT 3.98 35.0 67.1 9025 4265

nammA 6.29 08.0 82.2 4331 7732

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 5.78 82.1 16.1 687 7001

abadaMdnaaqlaB 5.97 65.2 81.2 717 064

dibrI 3.98 90.1 42.1 297 559


htuoS 8.88 57.1 97.1 797 845

enohpeletsnwO

latoT 8.23 30.1 68.2 8271 4602

nammA 9.44 30.2 30.4 546 3511

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 5.12 39.1 83.2 391 842

abadaMdnaaqlaB 1.52 94.2 97.1 422 541

dibrI 8.22 99.1 72.2 102 442


htuoS 5.53 90.3 14.2 903 912

403

CONTENTS

Table A1.8 Sampling errors for selected variables pertaining to individuals


snoitavresbo

aeramraF

latoT 3.2 94.0 64.83 7211 848

nammA 1.1 76.0 47.85 001 061

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 8.1 53.1 39.66 68 021

abadaMdnaaqlaB 3.9 96.2 66.82 105 423

dibrI 9.0 17.0 65.43 94 16


htuoS 7.2 14.1 53.72 751 401

pmaceegufeR

latoT 1.6 80.1 92.27 2152 0722

nammA 7.4 18.1 93.201 983 886

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 2.6 18.2 15.78 233 814

abadaMdnaaqlaB 1.41 17.3 28.73 787 494

dibrI 0.7 38.2 62.77 673 454


htuoS 0.0 00.0 . 0 0

malsI

latoT 1.79 83.0 96.81 20643 57163

nammA 2.69 57.0 45.12 8297 51141

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 1.89 66.0 56.41 2515 2066

abadaMdnaaqlaB 3.69 52.1 34.41 8425 3633

dibrI 0.99 76.0 24.92 1435 3546


htuoS 6.69 61.1 76.41 3535 3763

naitsirhC

latoT 8.2 83.0 98.81 879 6401

nammA 7.3 57.0 59.12 203 245

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 9.1 66.0 56.41 301 131

abadaMdnaaqlaB 7.3 52.1 34.41 602 031

dibrI 0.1 76.0 24.92 25 36


htuoS 4.3 61.1 18.41 671 921

rehtO

latoT 1.0 20.0 38.1 31 12

nammA 1.0 40.0 69.1 11 02


abadaMdnaaqlaB 0.0 00.0 . 0 0

dibrI 0.0 00.0 . 0 0

nuoljAdnahsaraJ 0.0 00.0 . 0 0

htuoS 0.0 20.0 36.0 2 1

404

CONTENTS


snoitavresbo

eenruterfluG

latoT 9.5 44.0 03.21 8461 6912

nammA 3.8 78.0 18.31 886 4121

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 3.7 81.1 91.31 193 594

abadaMdnaaqlaB 9.3 07.0 92.4 212 731

dibrI 5.4 29.0 42.21 122 192


htuoS 7.0 92.0 33.4 93 62

eegufer8491

latoT 3.22 11.1 22.52 8646 0238

nammA 0.03 80.2 09.82 5742 2044

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 4.32 52.2 71.81 5421 5751

abadaMdnaaqlaB 6.22 99.2 41.71 0321 887

dibrI 2.91 39.2 23.43 9101 4521


htuoS 3.6 33.1 58.01 913 042

decalpsiD7691

latoT 5.31 47.0 35.61 1763 3105

nammA 4.91 05.1 32.02 7851 0582

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 1.12 18.1 17.21 0111 0241

abadaMdnaaqlaB 3.8 32.1 56.6 354 882

dibrI 1.5 12.1 16.81 362 533


htuoS 5.1 93.0 19.3 47 55

decalpsidneht,eegufeR

latoT 7.6 35.0 57.51 3112 1942

nammA 9.8 00.1 61.71 737 0131

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 6.8 03.1 29.31 454 975

abadaMdnaaqlaB 1.8 18.1 06.41 054 482

dibrI 4.2 59.0 84.32 89 851


htuoS 5.1 94.0 68.5 67 75

eeguferazaG

latoT 2.1 91.0 20.11 774 834

nammA 2.1 13.0 62.11 99 771



dibrI 1.0 50.0 85.1 5 6


htuoS 7.1 99.0 19.02 68 66

405

CONTENTS


snoitavresbo

eeguferazaGrodecalpsid,eegufeR

latoT 7.34 34.1 34.92 92721 26261

nammA 5.95 34.2 13.43 8984 9378

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 7.45 29.2 81.22 4982 3863

abadaMdnaaqlaB 5.93 11.4 65.32 6612 1831

dibrI 9.62 39.3 09.84 5831 3571


htuoS 0.11 71.2 15.71 555 914

loohcsdednettarevE

latoT 2.58 53.0 00.3 51262 60872

nammA 6.78 95.0 49.3 5046 21411

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 1.48 87.0 94.2 1973 0584

abadaMdnaaqlaB 2.08 03.1 21.3 9483 1742

dibrI 1.68 86.0 80.2 7604 4094


htuoS 1.18 62.1 82.3 8093 7862

ytilibasid,ssenllicinorhC

latoT 0.7 02.0 01.2 8132 6952

nammA 7.7 63.0 85.2 036 6211

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 6.7 05.0 03.2 593 905

abadaMdnaaqlaB 3.6 24.0 00.1 443 022

dibrI 6.6 64.0 71.2 443 724


htuoS 5.5 83.0 00.1 303 802

yevruserofebskeewowttsalssenllietucadaH

latoT 0.11 83.0 44.4 8603 5743

nammA 3.11 27.0 12.6 608 8241

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 3.31 98.0 26.3 475 837

abadaMdnaaqlaB 9.8 96.0 96.1 214 662

dibrI 6.11 68.0 87.3 225 836


htuoS 0.9 39.0 52.3 324 882

deyolpmeemitlluF

latoT 7.52 54.0 71.2 2115 5055

nammA 2.72 18.0 28.2 4531 3042

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 5.52 00.1 48.1 637 049

abadaMdnaaqlaB 1.72 32.1 25.1 478 855

dibrI 6.02 50.1 73.2 026 167


htuoS 8.92 82.1 45.1 988 716

deyolpmeemittraP

latoT 8.6 62.0 72.2 8141 5541

nammA 6.5 34.0 89.2 182 694

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 8.6 16.0 50.2 591 052

abadaMdnaaqlaB 9.5 35.0 10.1 981 121

dibrI 1.01 78.0 39.2 513 473


htuoS 9.5 05.0 19.0 871 121

406

CONTENTS


snoitavresbo

.tedtonemitdeyolpmE

latoT 5.2 61.0 81.2 365 245

nammA 3.2 03.0 93.3 411 302



dibrI 0.2 33.0 20.2 26 37


htuoS 7.3 54.0 51.1 411 67

krowmorftnesbayliraropmeT

latoT 6.1 21.0 59.1 313 143

nammA 6.1 42.0 70.3 08 041



dibrI 8.1 62.0 13.1 95 86


htuoS 5.1 72.0 49.0 24 13

deyolpmenU

latoT 5.7 42.0 66.1 2751 161

nammA 0.7 04.0 70.2 943 126

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 9.8 46.0 77.1 652 723

abadaMdnaaqlaB 6.9 26.0 88.0 903 791

dibrI 5.6 85.0 59.1 002 142


htuoS 1.7 45.0 78.0 912 641

elbabaliavassim,gnikeeS

latoT 0.0 00.0 . 0 0

nammA 0.0 00.0 . 0 0


abadaMdnaaqlaB 0.0 00.0 . 0 0

dibrI 0.0 00.0 . 0 0

nuoljAdnahsaraJ 0.0 00.0 . 0 0

htuoS 0.0 00.0 . 0 0

ecrofrobalnitoN

latoT 9.55 83.0 12.1 21211 87911

nammA 3.65 76.0 35.1 6972 2894

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 9.45 88.0 01.1 8751 2202

abadaMdnaaqlaB 8.25 60.1 98.0 2961 5801

dibrI 0.95 08.0 39.0 2081 5812


htuoS 1.25 52.1 52.1 2751 8701

407

CONTENTS

Table A1.9 Sampling errors for selected variables pertaing to the randomly selected individual


snoitavresbo

tfihsyadskroW

latoT 1.36 86.1 02.2 5621 8131

nammA 0.85 01.3 50.3 872 315

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 7.16 82.4 23.2 961 212

abadaMdnaaqlaB 1.76 31.3 19.0 742 751

dibrI 8.27 45.3 85.1 361 802


htuoS 1.66 51.3 20.1 342 371

sruohralugerrIskroW

latoT 3.51 91.1 00.2 242 023

nammA 7.91 52.2 84.2 68 571



dibrI 2.01 59.2 73.2 51 92


htuoS 2.7 94.1 67.0 82 91

tfihsgnitatoR

latoT 9.9 30.1 71.2 371 602

nammA 7.8 88.1 54.3 53 77



dibrI 8.21 18.2 67.1 92 73


htuoS 7.01 79.1 29.0 83 82

rehtO

latoT 7.11 11.1 81.2 891 542

nammA 5.31 60.2 08.2 36 911



dibrI 2.4 75.1 55.1 9 21


htuoS 0.61 75.2 21.1 05 24

sutatshtlaehlarenegdoogyreV

latoT 9.44 29.0 98.1 1732 8282

nammA 7.64 26.1 14.2 195 9121

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 5.63 53.2 23.2 382 704

abadaMdnaaqlaB 5.84 50.2 39.0 924 703

dibrI 4.34 61.2 96.1 913 244


htuoS 4.94 14.2 62.1 183 603

sutatshtlaehlarenegdooG

latoT 8.33 19.0 40.2 1881 9212

nammA 9.23 75.1 35.2 954 858

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 8.83 54.2 74.2 253 234

abadaMdnaaqlaB 9.82 99.1 60.1 142 381

dibrI 4.63 11.2 17.1 192 073


htuoS 2.03 53.2 24.1 962 781

408

CONTENTS


snoitavresbo

sutatshtlaehlarenegriaF

latoT 6.61 36.0 65.1 869 7401

nammA 0.71 01.1 79.1 332 244

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 1.81 36.1 37.1 561 202

abadaMdnaaqlaB 7.61 34.1 18.0 251 601

dibrI 0.51 64.1 84.1 431 351


htuoS 3.61 24.1 08.0 251 101

sutatshtlaehlarenegdaB

latoT 1.4 73.0 88.1 242 852

nammA 0.3 65.0 83.2 64 97



dibrI 1.5 80.1 31.2 93 25


htuoS 5.3 56.0 86.0 43 12

sutatshtlaehlarenegdabyreV

latoT 6.0 31.0 95.1 04 83

nammA 3.0 51.0 15.1 6 9



dibrI 2.0 11.0 07.0 2 2


htuoS 6.0 42.0 15.0 8 4

yliadsekomS

latoT 7.32 67.0 37.1 1921 6941

nammA 1.52 43.1 81.2 843 356

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 8.32 68.1 68.1 391 662

abadaMdnaaqlaB 7.82 39.1 10.1 242 281

dibrI 3.61 15.1 84.1 231 661


htuoS 3.72 41.2 52.1 812 961

yllanoisaccosekomS

latoT 5.3 73.0 81.2 291 222

nammA 0.3 05.0 49.1 64 97



dibrI 5.6 16.1 97.3 24 66


htuoS 6.1 74.0 57.0 41 01

revensekomS

latoT 7.27 18.0 48.1 9104 854

nammA 9.17 24.1 62.2 149 5781

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 8.27 39.1 28.1 826 118

abadaMdnaaqlaB 0.86 00.2 20.1 395 034

dibrI 1.77 01.2 32.2 116 587


htuoS 1.17 80.2 31.1 216 044

409

CONTENTS


snoitavresbo

acamrahpohcyspforesuralugeR

latoT 1.7 54.0 76.1 404 744

nammA 6.4 76.0 82.2 96 121

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 2.21 82.1 94.1 301 631


dibrI 4.9 13.1 08.1 17 59


htuoS 5.5 09.0 38.0 05 43

acamrahpohcyspforesuemitotemiT

latoT 2.41 96.0 31.2 738 298

nammA 7.01 22.1 35.3 641 082

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 0.61 55.1 57.1 141 871

abadaMdnaaqlaB 0.41 92.1 67.0 321 88

dibrI 8.12 10.2 01.2 391 222


htuoS 0.21 04.1 10.1 001 47

acamrahpohcyspfoesuoN

latoT 7.87 08.0 01.2 1624 1694

nammA 6.48 54.1 96.3 0211 7022

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 8.17 18.1 85.1 906 008

abadaMdnaaqlaB 8.97 73.1 46.0 196 505

dibrI 9.86 21.2 78.1 125 107


htuoS 5.28 85.1 49.0 496 115

shtnom21tsaldlihcdahtnednopserelaM

latoT 2.42 34.1 93.1 873 543

nammA 9.91 54.2 99.1 17 121



dibrI 2.13 64.4 44.1 15 65


htuoS 9.42 53.3 48.0 26 04

)selam(noitpecartnocforesutnerruC

latoT 7.24 31.2 87.1 654 074

nammA 7.64 49.3 85.2 821 022



dibrI 5.64 94.5 35.1 55 76


htuoS 0.04 68.4 80.1 97 05

detovsaH

latoT 2.64 09.0 87.1 7482 6092

nammA 8.83 65.1 53.2 335 1101

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 3.24 21.2 97.1 773 174

abadaMdnaaqlaB 9.45 12.2 90.1 294 743

dibrI 6.55 83.2 50.2 854 565


htuoS 6.65 01.2 79.0 905 053

410

CONTENTS


snoitavresbo

skoobcibarAnonfonoitalsnartstpeccA

latoT 7.75 98.0 75.1 9462 0123

nammA 0.26 44.1 08.1 427 9541

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 7.75 72.2 97.1 514 065

abadaMdnaaqlaB 1.95 43.2 90.1 344 723

dibrI 2.64 83.2 67.1 092 804


htuoS 3.95 83.2 90.1 514 613

skoobcibarAnonfonoitalsnartstpeccayllanoitidnoC

latoT 5.22 77.0 56.1 3801 0521

nammA 7.91 42.1 99.1 032 464

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 0.81 37.1 27.1 431 571

abadaMdnaaqlaB 9.81 17.1 29.0 331 501

dibrI 5.73 73.2 48.1 842 133


htuoS 2.91 30.2 32.1 741 201

noitalsnartskoobcibarAnonfonoitalsnartstpeccatonseoD

latoT 8.91 67.0 77.1 9301 0011

nammA 3.81 23.1 83.2 042 134

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 4.42 28.1 35.1 391 632

abadaMdnaaqlaB 9.12 08.1 19.0 961 121

dibrI 2.61 67.1 57.1 521 341


htuoS 5.12 31.2 52.1 951 411

emohehtedistuokrownacnemowtahtstroppuS

latoT 6.46 98.0 98.1 7563 6504

nammA 7.26 15.1 32.2 368 1361

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 9.95 51.2 78.1 325 766

abadaMdnaaqlaB 7.36 25.2 15.1 855 204

dibrI 1.96 02.2 10.2 345 307


htuoS 9.96 89.1 00.1 475 034

krowdnanemowottnereffidnI

latoT 4.6 94.0 71.2 923 004

nammA 3.7 59.0 40.3 99 091



dibrI 3.5 69.0 26.1 24 45


htuoS 9.4 37.0 26.0 74 03

emohehtedistuokrownemowtahttsniagA

latoT 1.92 58.0 49.1 2941 7281

nammA 0.03 64.1 92.2 963 087

qarfaMdnaaqraZ 7.23 71.2 90.2 162 463

abadaMdnaaqlaB 8.03 43.2 14.1 462 491

dibrI 6.52 01.2 50.2 891 062


htuoS 2.52 38.1 69.0 712 551


411

CONTENTS

Jon Pedersen and David Drury

Appendix 2 Some Notes on StatisticalMethods

Most of the results shown in this book are based on simple cross-tabulations of onevariable with another. Most non-technical readers should be able to follow the pres-entation without any particular problems. However, in some cases we have used morecomplex statistical techniques, and readers may want to consult the descriptionsbelow to refresh their memories if needed.

Mean and MedianThe mean is the arithmetic average — the total of all values divided by the numberof values. The median is the midpoint of the distribution; half of the cases havehigher values, and half are lower. For example, the mean of the numbers 2,3, and10 is 5; the median is 3.

Confidence Intervals and Probability Values.For the most part, the statistics in this report are estimates that describe somethingabout a population of people in Jordan. It could be the population as a whole, theurban population, the housing stock, children under 5 years, or some other group.But because the JLCS is a sample survey rather than a complete count, the estimateshave sampling error. While we can be sure that the results are representative onaverage, a given estimate will nearly always be slightly different from the true valuein the population because of the specific mix of respondents that was selected.Confidence intervals and probability values are ways of describing the degree ofuncertainty in the findings that is due to sampling error.

A confidence interval is a range of values that we construct around an esti-mate. It is usually written with a percentage, such as 90 per cent or 95 per cent, whichtells us how likely it is that the true population value will lie within that range. Forexample, the JLCS survey found that 73.7% of all households have relatives livingnearby. The 95 per cent confidence interval for that estimate is from 72% to 75.4%,which means that we can be 95 per cent sure that the true value in the populationlies within those limits. Another way of saying it is that if the sample is repeated

REFERNCESAPPENDIX 1

412

CONTENTS

100 times, 95 of those samples will yield estimates of 72% to 74.5% for the pro-portion of households with relatives living nearby, and 5 of the samples will giveresults outside of the limits.

A p-value (or probability value) is used in a slightly different situation, wherewe are examining the difference between two estimates, or between an estimate anda fixed value, such as 0 or 1. The p-value tells us the probability that our finding isa chance result of sampling rather than reflecting a real difference in the popula-tion. A low p-value means that there probably is a real difference.

For example, 72.3 per cent of urban households and 78.9 percent of ruralhouseholds have relatives living nearby according to the survey. Is this really a dif-ference? One way to find out is to apply a statistical test, in this case the Chi-square.Like most statistical tests, the Chi-square assumes that “nothing is happening” —in this case, that urban and rural areas have the same proportions of households withrelatives nearby. It calculates the amount of difference that might be expected purelydue to randomness in the sampling, and compares that to the amount of differencethat we actually observe. The test generates a p-value that tells us the probability ofgetting the observed result purely by chance if there actually were no differencebetween urban and rural areas.

It turns out that the probability for the two estimates to be “really” the sameis 0.007, or 7 times out of 1000. Most people would consider this value so small(so unlikely) that they would reject the idea that the difference is due to chance.However, “most people” is a fairly imprecise invocation of authority. How improb-able does the result have to be? In order to avoid making decisions on a case-by-case basis, we have adopted the rule that only probabilities of less than 0.05 (or 5times in 100) will be considered as indicating deviation from a chance result. Thatis also what the chapter authors mean when they refer to statistically significant find-ings. This is of course rather arbitrary, but in line with common practice.

In appendix 1 we present confidence intervals for the more widely-used sur-vey variables, as part of a discussion of some statistical issues that arise from the typeof sampling used in the JLCS. That is mainly to give an impression of the levels ofuncertainty associated with the results.

In general, however, we do not provide confidence intervals or p-values forthe estimates that we discuss in this book. In the main text we have adopted thepractice of not commenting on results that may easily be due to chance. That prac-tice also helps to focus attention on differences that are substantively relevant, whichis important for a survey with a large sample size like the JLCS. Neither from ageneral social science nor from a policy perspective are we interested in differencesthat are too small to have an effect on practical affairs.

413

CONTENTS

Correlation CoefficientsIf the values on two variables are related in a systematic way, we say that the twomeasures are correlated. If it is a positive correlation, high values on one variable areassociated with high values on another variable, and low values on one with low onthe other. A common example is height and weight. Correlations can also be in-verse or negative, when low values on one variable are associated with high valueson the other.

A correlation coefficient describes the extent to which two variables vary sys-tematically with another. The correlation coefficient most commonly used in thisreport is the so-called Pearson’s r. It takes on the value 0 when there is no correla-tion between two variables, +1 when there is perfect correlation and –1 when thereis a perfect inverse correlation. In the social sciences correlations in the range of 0.3to 0.6 (or similar negative values) are usually considered strong enough to commenton. Higher values are also worth noting but they do not occur very often, partlybecause of measurement problems. The correlation coefficient may be reported witha p-value (see above) which describes how often it could occur by chance. That p-value is then an example of a case where the estimate, i.e. the correlation coefficient,is compared to a fixed value, namely 0.

Indices and Reliability Measures: Cronbach’s AlphaSometimes a theoretical concept is difficult to measure directly, and the researcherresorts to indirect means of measurement. A common way to do that, which is usedin several places in this report, is to use additive indices. An additive index is a con-struct that is made by adding together the values on several variables that are thoughtto measure some part of the phenomenon we are interested in. For instance, oneway to capture the elusive concept of wealth is simply to count the durable goodsthat a household owns. This works well if the possession of such goods can be seenas additive — for example, if owning a video in addition to a television means thatthe household is slightly better off.

To be useful for an index the specific variables that are added together shouldbe correlated with each other and correlated with the index. Thus, in many coun-tries we find that a black and white television is not a good item to put on the listof household goods that goes in to a wealth index, because having a black and whitetelevision is inversely correlated with the other variables. Having a colour televisionmay correlate with having other goods, but if a household has a black and whitetelevision, it is unlikely to have very much else. It is a measure of poverty, not wealth.Another example of an additive index is that used in the health chapter, where re-

414

CONTENTS

ports of seven symptoms of psychological distress are combined to produce onemeasure of distress.

A common way to test the performance of an index is Cronbach’s Alpha. Thisstatistic basically measures how well an index adds together. We will not describehow it is computed here; suffice it to say that the conventional requirement is foran index to have an Alpha value of at least 0.7 (Nunally 1976).

Logistic RegressionLogistic regression is a statistical technique that explores how a set of explanatoryvariables affect the probability of something occurring. It is commonly used whenthe variable that we want to explain has only two values — basically ‘occurring’ and‘not occurring’. Some examples from this report are: whether or not a person is amember of the labour force, whether the person is unemployed, or whether he orshe has been sick in the 14 days preceding the interview. In logistic regression the‘yes’ value is usually termed an event (for example the event of falling sick or beingunemployed). The main aim of the analysis is to determine what factors influencethe probability of the event occurring.

The main benefit of the technique is that it allows us to isolate the effects ofseveral variables simultaneously. When a large number of variables is involved, thepresentation becomes much clearer than it would be if we used a complex series ofcross-tabulations.

The main result from a logistic regression analysis is a set of odds-ratios, whichappear in the column labelled Exp (B). The odds-ratios describe how the odds ofan event change with the values of different explanatory variables. The concept ofodds is a slight rephrasing of the concept of probability. Mathematically an odds isthe ratio of the probability of an event occurring to the probability of it not occur-ring. Another way of saying it is that, for example, there are 5 chances that some-thing will happen, against 1 chance that it will not. A connoisseur of horse racingmay believe that for one horse there is a 5 to 1 chance that the horse will win a race;for another horse he may believe there is a 4 to 1 chance that it will win. In logisticregression what is compared is the ratio of odds. Thus, to continue the horse racingexample, the odds ratio for the two horses is 5/4, or 1.2: the first horse is 1.2 timesmore likely to win than the other.

Thus, odds ratios compare odds to some other odds. In a typical examplefrom the JLCS, we report that the odds ratio of women voting is 0.8 relative to thatof men. This tells us that women are 0.8 times as likely to vote as men are, all othervariables held constant.

415

CONTENTS

When evaluating results from a logistic regression analysis it is very important tobe aware what the odds ratio that is presented is relative to. That is especially im-portant when the explanatory variable has several values. For example:

NOITACUDE )B(pxE

)1(ENON 5.0

)2(CISAB 8.0

)3(YRADNOCES 9.0

The education variable has four categories: no education, primary, secondary, andmore than secondary. The odds ratios for voting are 0.5 for no education, 0.8 forprimary and 0.9 for secondary education. The reference category is usually notshown, so in this case the odds ratios are relative to the group with more than sec-ondary education. The 0.5 ratio means that people with no education are half aslikely to vote as those with more than secondary education.

If the results are presented relative to the group with no education, differentcategories will be displayed and the odds ratios will be different, but the meaningis essentially the same: the 2.0 ratio means that people with more than secondaryeducation are twice as likely to vote as those with no education.

NOITACUDE )B(pxE

)2(CISAB 6.1

)3(YRADNOCES 8.1

)4(YRADNOCESNAHTEROM 0.2

However, odds ratios are not always calculated relative to one category, as they arein the above examples. They may be presented relative to the mean effect of thevariable, or in other ways. The author will usually provide some helpful interpreta-tion of the results in the chapter text.

A logistic regression analysis also provides a number of other statistics. Thepartial correlation coefficient (R) measures how strongly each explanatory variablecorrelates with the dependent when the correlation of other variables with the de-pendent is subtracted. It is thus a measure of the specific contribution that eachvariable makes to the model. The probability value (Sig.) shows the probability thatthe odds ratio is actually 1 or the regression coefficient is 0. If the value is high (morethan 0.05) it is likely that this explanatory variable has no influence on the event.The results also include regression coefficients and their standard errors, but theseare on a scale that are not easy to interpret.

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Event-History Analysis (Cox Regression)Event history analysis is another way of examining the factors associated with achange in a person’s situation. It is actually a collection of several related methods;in this book we use the so called Cox regression model to look at the determinantsof breast feeding. As in logistic regression, the variable that we want to explain hasonly two values — the event has happened, or it has not. Event history analysis alsoallows us to statistically isolate the effects of one variable by holding the effects ofother observed variables constant.

Unlike logistic regression, however, event history analysis always incorpo-rates an explicit time dimension. For each successive interval of time, the modelestimates the probability that a case will make a transition – like ceasing to breastfeed — given the fact that it has survived during pervious intervals. Part of this tran-sition probability is due to the simple passage of time, and part is due to specificfactors associated with the case: whether it is a boy or girl baby, from a rich or poorhousehold, and so on. An event-history approach avoids the problems that of lo-gistic regression encounters in dealing with certain kinds of transition, such as theso-called “censoring problem” . We carry out the interviews at specific times, andsome women are still breast feeding. We cannot go back later to find out when theystopped. Such a person for whom we know part of the duration, but not all, is saidto be “censored”.

In reporting results, we have mainly relied on the hazard ratios. The hazardratios tell if someone with a given characteristic has a greater or smaller chance ofexperiencing the transition (stopping breast feeding). They can be interpreted muchlike the odds-ratios in logistic regression. The comparison in this case is betweentwo hazard rates. For example, boys have a given probability (hazard) of stoppingbreast feeding at any given point in time, and girls may have a different probabili-ty. The ratio between the two hazards obtained for boys and girls is what is report-ed in Cox-regression as the hazard ratio.

An important assumption of Cox-regression is revealed by its generic name:proportional hazards regression. The technique assumes that the hazards ratio isconstant over time. For example, it is assumed that the probabilities of boys andgirls to stop breast feeding are proportional to each other for the whole period ofobservation.

REFERNCESAPPENDIX 1

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APPENDIX 2

Jordanian Society Living Conditions in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Documents

Transcript of Jordanian Society Living Conditions in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan