Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations

Joint Warfighting Center

16 June 1997

Joint Task Force Commander ’sHandbook for

Peace Operations

JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTERFENWICK ROAD BLDG 96

FORT MONROE VIRGINIA 23651-50000

16 June 1997

MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDER

This Handbook has undergone a major revision to reflect experiences gainedin recent peace operations and data provided in current joint doctrine. It stillis designed for senior commanders designated or about to be named as jointtask force commanders for peace operations. It is meant to be a resource toolfor the commander and senior staff, and is most useful when supplementedby the Peace Operations Database maintained as part of the Joint ElectronicLibrary. Though consistent with joint and Service doctrine, it is not a doctrinalpublication. Joint Publication 3-07.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Peacekeeping, ” contains joint doctrine for peace operations.

As we have witnessed over the past decade, there has been an ever increasingdemand for the Armed Forces of the United States to participate in variouspeace operations. From Somalia to Bosnia, US forces have been in the forefrontin providing military assistance where needed. Considering the instabilityand uncertainty in many countries throughout the world, it is paramountthat US forces remain ready for future peace operations. The “Joint TaskForce Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations” is one of many toolsthat potential joint task force commanders can use to become more familiarwith the many facets of peace operations. We are indebted to the experiencedjoint task force commanders, subject matter experts, and the many otherswho contributed so greatly to this Handbook. They identified the enduringpeace operations themes deemed to be invaluable to prospective joint taskforce commanders.

Corrections or suggestions for improvement of this Handbook are welcome.They should be sent to The Joint Warfighting Center, Building 96 FenwickRoad, Ft. Monroe, Virginia 23651-5000. The DSN telephone is 680-6550,commercial (757) 726-6550, and FAX extension -6552.

HAL M. HORNBURGMajor General, USAFCommander

from long-term, maturing crises, such as one inwhich a peacekeeping operation is needed.Conversely, the operation may seek to relieve ahumanitarian crisis, which can be a short noticerapid reaction effort. Finally, the commandersmay find themselves faced with a combinationof the two, creating a “complex contingency.”As a joint task force commander, you must graspthe nature of the operating environment in orderto successfully complete the mission.

b. Military Operations in the 1990’s

SITUATION:

“The refugee crisis in eastern Zaire threatened to reach disastrous proportionstoday, as one camp ballooned to 400,000 people and aid workers scrambled todeal with dwindling food and supplies for the 1.1 million refugees in the region.... The refugees are mainly members of the Hutu ethnic group who fled Rwandain the summer of 1994, fearing revenge killings by ethnic Tutsis, the principaltarget of a Hutu-led Rwandan government campaign of tribal slaughter. TheHutus fled into Zaire after a Tutsi rebel force crushed the Hutu military andmilitias who led the campaign of genocide. In recent days, the refugee populationin eastern Zaire has been rattled by fighting between Zairian Tutsis and thatcountry’s military. ... The fighting that has shaken the region continued to spreadtoday, as Zairian soldiers and Rwandan troops exchanged gunfire ... Earlier thisweek, the [Zairian] government declared a state of emergency in that region.”

Stephen BuckleyWashington Post

PREFACETHE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

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1. General

a. The United States conducts modernpeace operations to prevent, contain, orresolve regional conflicts that may pose threatsto national interests. The facts upon whichstrategic decisions and agreements withinvolved parties are based may greatly differfrom the realities the operational and tacticallevel commanders may find once they aredeployed. Additionally, the operations thesecommanders are tasked to perform may result

“My experience in Haiti reaffirmed my belief that combat trained soldiers, givena focused objective, time and resources to prepare, and led by adaptive andmentally agile leaders at all levels, will perform superbly as peacekeepers. Themission in Haiti clearly demonstrated that if the right conditions are created andsustained by the military component, and the military component is able tosynchronize its actions with the international, diplomatic, economic, informational,and humanitarian components—success is achievable. Our experience in Haitihas reinforced my belief that preparing for war must be the priority for any Army.The key is to understand the complexities of the peace operation environmentyou are facing and then adapt your warfighting skill to meet them.”

Lieutenant General J. W. Kinzer, USAForce Commander, United Nations Mission in Haiti

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JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operationsii

• As the 21st century approaches, thenature of conflict continues to changefrom that of interstate war to that ofintrastate conflicts. US militarytraditional training has taught leadersabout the impact that the mission, terrainand weather, troops and supportavailable, and time available have onoperations. Today, successful militaryoperations also include consideration ofother factors, as depicted below, and theirimpact on those operations.

•• Failed state environments (e.g.,Somalia and Rwanda).

•• Political considerations.

•• Nongovernmental organizations(NGO), private voluntary organizations(PVO), and international organizations(IO).

•• Media representatives.

•• Increasing amounts of urbanizedareas.

•• Civilians (resident within the jointoperations area (JOA), refugees,displaced persons) .

2. Complex Contingencies

a. A complex contingency occurswhenever one kind of a peace operation takesplace in conjunction with a humanitarianassistance operation. The most likely exampleof a complex contingency is one in which theUS force would provide security forhumanitarian assistance in addition toconducting a peace operation.

b. It is probable that the majority offuture peace operations will be part ofcomplex contingencies. Although thereminder of this Handbook will key on theterm “peace operations,” it is important that

you remember that your involvement in futurepeace operations may be better defined ascomplex contingencies. Figure 1 highlightssome of the characteristics of complexcontingencies.

c. Situation Assessment for ComplexContingencies. Assessing the situation is oneof the most critical steps you must accomplish.In assessing the situation, you should considerthe role each of the following factors plays:

• General Situation. Examine thefollowing:

•• General nature of the conflict,duration, and major participants.

•• Causes, issues at stake, and scope ofthe conflict.

•• Forces used and relative power.

•• Activities of outside actors bothfriendly and hostile and their interests inthe crisis.

• Political Situation. Understand thefollowing:

•• Nation’s internal political situation,nature of the host government, and keycenters of power.

•• Ruling party, opposition parties, andpoints of internal political conflict(wealth, territory, resources, power,ethnic identity, religion, or ideology).

•• Intensity of grievances, level ofpolitical mobilization and polarization,status of democratization, and degree ofethnic integration and accommodation.

•• Level of corruption and governmentresponsiveness to recent reforminitiatives. You also must understandwhich NGO, PVO, and IO

The Operating Environment

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representatives will be working with you.

• Military Situation . Know thefollowing:

•• Military, paramilitary, and militiafactions operating in the region.

•• Size of the force, equipment andcapabilities, degree of military disciplineand cohesion within each warringfaction.

•• Source and quantity of weaponssupplies, military balance, operationalmilitary objectives of the factions, if any.

•• Types of force employed, scope of theviolence, killing and destruction, anddegree of political control over themilitary.

• Public Security and Law and OrderSituation. Understand the following:

•• Types of police forces, scale of lawand order, degree of political control ofpolice forces.

•• Cultural aspects of the legal system.

•• Amount of corruption, nature andscope of police violence, nature ofcriminal activity, and quality of the legalsystem.

•• Nature of human rights practices andtreatment of citizens.

• Humanitarian Situation . Determinethe following:

•• Recent population movements,location and numbers of refugees andinternally displaced persons.

•• Requirements for water, food,sanitation, housing, medical services,heating supplies, or other humanitarianneeds.

Figure 1. Characteristics of Complex Contingencies

Increased use of asymmetrical means by belligerentsDominance of political objectivesPresence and involvement of nongovernmental, privatevoluntary, and international organizations; media; and othercivilians in the joint operations area--these groups will impacton operationsUsually takes place in a failed state

Numerous parties to the conflictUndisciplined factions (fail to respond to their ownleaders)Ineffective or short-lived cease firesAbsence of law and orderGross violations of human rightsRisk of local armed opposition to peace operations forcesCollapse of civil infrastructurePresence of many refugees and internally displacedpersonsPoorly defined operations area

CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPLEX CONTINGENCIES

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JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operationsiv

•• Threats of ethnic violence andgenocide.

•• Current and projected activities of theinternational relief community in theregion.

• Economic Situation. Be aware of thefollowing:

•• State of the economy, unemployment,distribution of wealth, types of naturalresources, principle agriculturalcommodities.

•• Level and nature of production andtrade, effect of sanctions (if appropriate).

•• Level of international investment,degree of graft and corruption inlicensing, and quality and effectivenessof government economic policy.

• Infrastructure . Examine the following:

•• Potential effects of climate and terrainon the operation.

•• Condition of the country’s availableinfrastructure such as airports, roads,communications, utilities, and the needfor additional assets or facilities.

• International Organizations. Know thefollowing:

•• What United Nations (UN) peacekeepingforces, relief operations, or otherorganizations are operating in the region.

•• Activities of private business interests inthe area.

• Host-Government Cooperation.Determine the level of cooperation by thehost-government with anticipatedoperations. Assess what it would take togain host nation (HN) cooperation.

• Regional Cooperation. Identify thefollowing:

•• Key regional actors, major powers,regional organizations, internationalactors, and other participants and theirinterests.

•• Regional alignments—assess theunity of purpose regarding the operationand be aware of the level of consensuswithin the UN Security Council.

3. Major Considerations of theOperating Environment

Because political factors often dominate anoperation, you should fully understand thefollow considerations:

a. Authorizing Body. What organizationdeveloped the instruments? What is therelationship between it and the United States?

b. Mandate, Accords, and/or SettlementInstrument . Does this contain any militaryrequirement that is unsuitable or unrealisticfor your joint task force’s (JTF) capabilities?Is it being used to assist in developing yourmission statement? What other impliedmissions (e.g., support for elections, supportto local police activities) are included?

c. Belligerent Representation. Were thebelligerent parties represented in thedevelopment of these instruments? What istheir level of consent to the process?

d. Expectations for Compliance. Doesconsent exist? Are the former belligerentparties willing to comply with the process?At all levels of the operation—strategic,operational, and tactical?

e. Rules of Engagement. Whatmodifications to CJCSI 3121.01, “StandingRules of Engagement for US Forces, withChange 1,” must be made to suit the needs of

The Operating Environment

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the instrument’s implementation? Are thereany unique training requirements needed tosupport these modifications?

f. Terms of Reference (TOR). If the JTFincludes other nations’ military forces, whatare the TOR for each force and the limits forusing it?

g. Use of Force. What have been theconsequences of the authorized use of force?

4. Summary

“Post-Cold War realities present a wide array of challenges to senior militaryleaders of the Armed Forces of the United States. These challenges rangefrom executing small-scale contingencies on one end of the spectrum topreparing for and fighting major regional campaigns at the other end. TheUS military has proven itself time and again ready to fight and win the Nation’swars. It must now continue this record of excellence in preparing for thenumerous challenges grouped under the category of peace operations.”

Mr. Len Hawley Deputy Assistant Secretary of DefenseFor Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance

a. This preface has attempted to describethe many types of variables that will defineand effect your operating environment. Yourthorough understanding of the operatingenvironment is key to the development of themission statement, concept of operations, andsubsequent tasks to the JTF’s components.This understanding also will play a major rolein the development of the exit strategy, a

Were nonlethal means been considered? Whatconsequences are foreseen with the use ofnonlethal force? Are there any special trainingrequirements?

h. Exit Strategy. Does an exit strategyexist? Is it being updated as necessary? Is itrealistic? What transition actions need tooccur?

critical part of your operation plan (OPLAN),operation order (OPORD), or campaign plan.

b. From what has been described, a JTFcould be established to perform a multitudeof tasks. Are you prepared to become thecommander of that JTF in what might be amultifaceted operation in an ever-changingenvironment?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................... xiii

CHAPTER IMISSION

• General..................................................................................................................... I-1• Mandates.................................................................................................................. I-3• Status-of-Forces Agreement...................................................................................... I-4• Terms of Reference................................................................................................... I-5• Mission Analysis....................................................................................................... I-6• Fundamentals...........................................................................................................I-12• End State..................................................................................................................I-13• Rules of Engagement...............................................................................................I-13• Mission Considerations for Multinational Forces.....................................................I-20• Additional Considerations........................................................................................I-22

CHAPTER IICIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

• Interagency Coordination..........................................................................................II-1• Nongovernmental Organizations, Private Voluntary Organizations,

United Nations Relief Agencies, and International Organizations..............................II-2• Civil-Military Operations Center...............................................................................II-7

CHAPTER IIIJOINT TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING

SECTION A. STAFF ORGANIZATION...........................................................III-1

• General...................................................................................................................III-1• Commander, Joint Task Force.................................................................................III-3• Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force.....................................................................III-7• Chief of Staff..........................................................................................................III-7• Commander, Joint Task Force’s Personal Staff Group.............................................III-8• Other Staff Requirement Considerations...............................................................III-13

SECTION B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES...........................................III-18

• General.................................................................................................................III-18• Civil Affairs ..........................................................................................................III-19• Psychological Operations......................................................................................III-22

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CHAPTER IVJOINT TASK FORCE COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

SECTION A. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS............ IV-1

• General ................................................................................................................... IV-1• Chain of Command ................................................................................................. IV-2• Interagency and Political Coordination................................................................... IV-6• Multinational Operations........................................................................................ IV-8• Communications .................................................................................................. IV-10• Additional Considerations.................................................................................... IV-12

SECTION B. NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION ........................................ IV-15

• General ................................................................................................................ IV-15• Procedures for Negotiation and Mediation ........................................................... IV-16• Negotiation and Mediation Training..................................................................... IV-19

SECTION C. JOINT COMMISSIONS ............................................................ IV-21

• General ................................................................................................................ IV-21• Objectives of Joint Commissions ......................................................................... IV-21• Key Concepts....................................................................................................... IV-23• Getting Started ...................................................................................................... IV-28• Leaving................................................................................................................ IV-28• General Joint Military Commission Meeting Tips ................................................ IV-29

SECTION D. RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE LOCAL POPULATION ........... IV-32

• General ................................................................................................................ IV-32• Additional Considerations.................................................................................... IV-33

CHAPTER VTRANSITION PLANNING

• General ................................................................................................................... V-1• Planning Considerations.......................................................................................... V-1

CHAPTER VILOGISTICS SUPPORT

• General .................................................................................................................. VI-1• Logistics Authority ................................................................................................ VI-2• Logistics Organization ........................................................................................... VI-3• Logistics Considerations ........................................................................................ VI-4• Transportation ........................................................................................................ VI-5• Logistics Planning.................................................................................................. VI-8• Multinational Logistics ........................................................................................ VI-12

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• UN Logistics........................................................................................................ VI-14• Contracting Support ............................................................................................. VI-15• Host-nation Support ............................................................................................. VI-18• Additional Considerations.................................................................................... VI-18• Logistics Boards, Offices, and Centers ................................................................. VI-20

CHAPTER VIIINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

• General ................................................................................................................. VII-1• Commander’s Direction ........................................................................................ VII-2• Operational Considerations ................................................................................... VII-3• Joint Task Force J-2 Organizations........................................................................ VII-4• Multinational Operations....................................................................................... VII-7

CHAPTER VIIIPUBLIC AFFAIRS AND MEDIA

• General ................................................................................................................ VIII-1• Public Affairs....................................................................................................... VIII-1• Procedures in Working with the Media................................................................. VIII-3

CHAPTER IXLEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES

• General .................................................................................................................. IX-1• International Agreements ....................................................................................... IX-2• Additional Legal Considerations ............................................................................ IX-2

CHAPTER XFORCE PROTECTION

• General ................................................................................................................... X-1• Force Protection Considerations.............................................................................. X-3• Risk Management ................................................................................................... X-5

CHAPTER XITRAINING REQUIREMENTS

• General .................................................................................................................. XI-1• Additional Considerations...................................................................................... XI-3

CHAPTER XIIREFUGEE, DISPLACED PERSON, OR MIGRANT CAMP OPERATIONS

• General ................................................................................................................. XII-1• Planning and Operations ....................................................................................... XII-1

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APPENDIXES

A Summary and Highlights of Presidential Decision Directive 25......................... A-1B Summary of UN Charter Chapters VI, VII, and VIII........................................... B-1C Chain of Command Structures............................................................................ C-1D Joint Task Force................................................................................................. D-1E References.......................................................................................................... E-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions.............................................................................. GL-5

FIGURE

1 Characteristics of Complex Contingencies....................................................... iiiEX-1 Types of UN Operations................................................................................. xvEX-2 The JTF Commander’s Stool......................................................................... xix

I-1 Extract from the Charter of the United Nations.............................................. I-2I-2 Major Elements of a Mandate........................................................................ I-4I-3 Questions Relative to Mission Success.......................................................... I-8I-4 Principles for Peace Operations................................................................... I-10I-5 Peace Operations Variables.......................................................................... I-12I-6 Basis of Rules of Engagement..................................................................... I-14I-7 Rules of Engagement Considerations.......................................................... I-17I-8 Sample Rules of Engagement Card.............................................................. I-18I-9 Rules of Engagement (ROE) Cell Responsibilities...................................... I-20I-10 Competing Dynamics.................................................................................. I-23

II-1 Sample Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center........................ II-10

III-1 Joint Task Force Daily Operations Cycle.................................................... III-8

IV-1 Command Relationships............................................................................. IV-3IV-2 Responsibilities of the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations............... IV-4IV-3 Situation Centre’s Tasks............................................................................. IV-5IV-4 Multinational Command and Control......................................................... IV-9IV-5 Integrated Strategy versus Divergent Objectives....................................... IV-14IV-6 Joint Military Commission (JMC) Meeting Tips....................................... IV-30

VI-1 Logistics Functional Areas......................................................................... VI-2VI-2 Principles of Logistics................................................................................ VI-9

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VI-3 Commodities for Disposal........................................................................ VI-11

VII-1 Categories of Human Culture.................................................................... VII-4VII-2 Host Country Information......................................................................... VII-5

VIII-1 Media Survival Guide.............................................................................. VIII-6

IX-1 Legal Issues................................................................................................ IX-5

C-1 United Nations Secretariat............................................................................ C-1C-2 United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations............................ C-2C-3 Sample Chain of Command for Multinational Force and Observers.............. C-3C-4 Generic Multinational Command Structure.................................................. C-4C-5 Notional United Nations Organizational Relationships................................. C-5

D-1 Joint Task Force Organizational Options..................................................... D-1D-2 Joint Task Force (JTF) Establishing Authority Responsibilities................... D-3

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Provides an overview of the many responsibilities and challenges facing acommander, joint task force embarking on a peace operation

Discusses mission considerations as they relate to peace operations

Explains the importance of civil-military relations

Discusses joint task force organization, staffing, and command responsibilities

Provides a synopsis of issues and questions concerning how the joint taskforce transitions to the United Nations, regional organizations, another militaryforce, or a civilian organization

Discusses logistics, intelligence, and legal support

Highlights the importance of force protection

Covers training considerations

Discusses refugee, displaced person, or migrant camp operations

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

“The world has grown smaller, in recent years ever more rapidly. It is hard todivorce our country from a number of conflicts to which years ago we wouldhave hardly paid any attention. While we cannot engage ourselves in allconflicts, we now have a choice. It is also true that if we move early indealing with these conflicts, and if we have an effective method for carryingout international peace enforcement, especially in a preventative way, wehave a new tool which can help in the early resolution of enormously difficult,potentially intractable situations that could well offset our national interestsand our future.”

Ambassador Thomas R. PickeringRemarks to a National Defense University Conference

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Chapter I—Mission

Each peace operation isunique—many will use theCharter of the UnitedNations as buttressingrationale.

The United States participation in peace operations may be aspart of a United Nations (UN)-sponsored activity, a regionalorganization, in cooperation with other countries, or a unilateraleffort. In any case, these operations have unique reasons forour participation and equally unique characteristics that definethem. UN-sponsored peace activities use the Charter of theUnited Nations as background for conducting peace operations.Although the Charter does not specifically cover peace

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KEY TERMS

Peace Operations: A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peaceenforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish andmaintain peace.

Peacekeeping: Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to adispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire,truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-termpolitical settlement.

Peace Enforcement: Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normallypursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions orsanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

Peace Building: Post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, thatstrengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid arelapse into conflict.

End State: What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be whenoperations conclude—both military operations, as well as those where the military is insupport of other instruments of national power.

United NationsDepartment of Peace-Keeping Operations.

Accurate and timelymission analysis isessential—considerleading the assessmentteam.

operations, it makes inferences regarding the legal basis toand for our participation in UN sponsored peace operations.Types of UN peace operations are shown in Figure EX-1.

To better direct and control UN peacekeeping operations, theDepartment of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) wasestablished. As the commander of a JTF, you will becoordinating with this department in the event you are involvedin a UN peacekeeping operation. Within the DPKO, a SituationCentre was formed to provide situation monitoring andexchange of information services between the UN HQ in NewYork and UN field missions worldwide. The Situation Centreis staffed 24 hours per day.

The assessment team can be the bridge between difficult-to-decipher mission orders and the actual implementation of apeace operation—but it will need senior leadership andperspective to be effective. The assessment team’s compositionand later retention on your staff will aid in the transition fromplanning to deployment and the actual commencement of youroperation.

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The critical variables of peace operations are the level ofconsent, the level of force, and the degree of impartiality. Thesevariables are not constant and may individually or collectivelyshift over the course of an operation. Success in peaceoperations often hinges on the ability to exercise situationaldominance with respect to the variables; failure is often theresult of losing control of one or more of them.

The end state may be a moving target, one that needscontinuous refinement throughout your operation. You mustwork toward a clearly understood, agreed upon, and measurablemission end state. You may have the opportunity to contributeto the development and wording of the end state during themission analysis phase.

The rules of engagement (ROE) are the means which the NCA,through the JCS and the combatant commander, provideguidance. Review the JCS Standing ROE (SROE) as a pointof departure. They are also the principal means for you toexpress “commander’s intent.” They must always emphasizethe right of self-defense.

TYPES OF UN OPERATIONS

"AUTHORIZED" -- Operations for whichthe UN sanctions military interventionwith the lead role assigned to a nation(e.g., DESERT STORM, Somalia).

"DIRECTED" -- Operations conducted underUN auspices with a military force underUN control (e.g., blue-helmeted force;Cyprus, Cambodia).

UN

Figure EX-1. Types of UN Operations

Peace operations areconducted in a dynamicenvironment.

I t is critical that you havea definable end state.

Rules of Engagement(ROE) provide theguidance and basis foraction—keep them clearand current.

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ROE may remain constant throughout your operation or morelikely they may need to be changed or refined. The JCS- issuedSROE contain the basics. They apply to all commandersthrough the chain of command and remain in effect untilspecifically modified or superseded. They may be modified bythe combatant commands and you may request supplementalmeasures as necessary. These SROE define the inherent rightof self-defense in terms of unit and national self-defense. Youmust advise the combatant commander when the ROE needadjustment.

You may command a force of widely varying capabilities. Youmust work to employ multinational forces where they cancontribute the most toward mission success. You also willneed to understand that they may have subtly different agendas,although completely rational for their purposes.

Be aware that political issues and decisions beyond yourauthority may have a major impact on your peace operation.Nongovernmental organizations (NGO), private voluntaryorganizations (PVO), and international organizations will beon scene, pursuing their own missions. The Office of ForeignDisaster Assistance (OFDA), United States Agency forInternational Development, probably will be represented in-country by a special Disaster Assistance Response Team(DART). In any case, OFDA (and its representative DART)is a professionally run organization that can help you. It is inthe best interest of your mission to integrate these organizationsor at a minimum be aware of their activities.

Become personallyinvolved in ROEdevelopment—ensure theyare adjusted in a timelymanner to fit yoursituation.

Integrate multinationalforces—balance strengthsand national agendas.

Recognize nontraditionalconsiderations—wherepossible integrate withother organizations andoperations.

Civil-military relations. Inpeace operations,interagency coordinationmay be your top priority.

Chapter II—Civil-Military Relations

This, in part, is due to the increased involvement of JTFs incivil activity both in the United States and abroad. This civilactivity requires the skills and resources of many organizations(e.g., United States Government agencies, NGO, PVO, andinternational and regional organizations).

By understanding the interagency process, you will be betterable to appreciate how the skills and resources of the abovecan assist in mission accomplishment. Civil-military relationscan create economic, political, and social stability as theyencourage the development of the affected nation’s materieland human resources.

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Nongovernmentalorganizations and privatevoluntary organizationsare a fact of life—the civil-military operationscenter(CMOC) has workedwell integrating andcapitalizing on differingexpertise and capabilities.

CMOC. You must be ableto work with allorganizations and groupsto accomplish yourmission. Conceptually, theCMOC is the meetingplace of these elements.

As a commander, joint taskforce, you have fullauthority to assignmissions, redirect efforts,and direct coordinationamong subordinatecommanders.

You may organize the jointtask force (JTF)headquarters as necessaryto carry out all duties andresponsibilities.

Most NGO and PVO have legitimate agendas but operatedifferently than the military. Learn what they are about; theyhave expertise and capabilities you may need. The civil-military operations center (CMOC) has proven extremely usefulin getting all participants to know each other, their roles andcapabilities.

The CMOC has been effectively employed as a means tocoordinate civil and military operations. Its structure isdependent on the mission and the requirements for civil-military operations in the affected country. As the commander,you are the driving influence behind this endeavor.

“Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you createa political committee, a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to interface withvolunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed toa combat or fire-support operations center.”

Lieutenant General A. C. Zinni, USMC Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force

Chapter III—Joint Task Force Organization and Staffing

The intent is to meet your needs while maintaining the tacticaland operational integrity of Service organizations. The mannerin which you organize the forces directly affects theresponsiveness and versatility of joint force operations. Youorganize forces to accomplish the mission based on your visionand concept of operations.

The options that may be used to form a joint task force (JTF)headquarters (HQ) are use of a standing JTF HQ, augment acore Service component HQ, or form an ad hoc HQ fromvarious contributors. The nucleus JTF staff normally is formedfrom an existing Service component HQ, usually not belowthe level of Army Corps, Marine Expeditionary Force, NumberedNavy Fleet, or Numbered Air Force. When fully formed, theJTF staff will be composed of appropriate members in key

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positions of responsibility from each Service or functionalcomponent or subordinate task force having significant forcesassigned to the command.

You will make the final decision on the composition of theJTF HQ, to include the establishment of boards, centers, cells,and bureaus.

The organizational structure of the force will depend on themission to be fulfilled, the capabilities and strength of thecomponent elements of the forces assigned and attached, andthe phasing of the contemplated operations.

You must identify the requirements for additional forces orpersonnel to higher HQ.

Your personal and special staff performs duties as prescribedand handles special matters over which you wish to exerciseclose control. This staff may include the political advisor,public affairs officer, legal officer, surgeon, inspector general,provost marshal, comptroller, chaplain, and others as directed.

Liaison personnel should be established between the JTF HQand higher commands, between the JTF HQ and componentand subordinate task force commands, between adjacent units,and between supporting, attached, and assigned forces and theJTF HQ.

You must determine what staff officer or staff section will haveoverall cognizance of all liaison personnel reporting to theJTF HQ.

Civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP)personnel and units are force multipliers and should becomean integral part of mission planning and execution. CA andPSYOP may become the centerpiece of your operation andbecome a much more critical part of your daily responsibilities.

As the commander, youmake recommendations onthe proper employment ofassigned and attachedforces and for theaccomplishment ofassigned missions.

Personal and special Staffof the Commander.

You must identify therequirement for liaisonpersonnel and requestthem at the earliestopportunity.

Special operations forcesare very valuable assets tothe JTF.

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Chapter IV—Joint Task Force Command Responsibilities

“One of the JTF Commander’s biggest challenges will be to determine just who arethe policy makers and power brokers.”

Brigadier General E. Bedard, USMCPresident, Marine Corps University

As a Commander, JTF (CJTF) you will be the key to success inmaintaining impartiality and building consensus among widelydiverse players. Encouraging and obtaining unity of effort atthe military, political, and cultural level will be a major challengefor you. Depending on the type of peace operation (UNmultinational, US-led multinational, or unilateral) you will haveto deal with differing command arrangements. In any case, it isimperative you understand how National Command Authoritiesdecisions flow and appreciate that the current political processwill be a major factor in your operations.

Your ability to effectively communicate with your own staff,involved multinational partners, other national andinternational players, and host nation (HN) representatives willbe one of the keys to success.

Chain of command.

Communications will notbe easy—plan on theworst.

It is critical that military/security, humanitarian/economic, and political/diplomatic activities areconstantly coordinated.Each of these three “legs”shown in Figure EX-2must remain steady.

Figure EX-2. The JTF Commander’s Stool

PO

LIT

ICA

L/ D

IPLO

MA

TIC

MIL

ITAR

Y/SE

CU

RIT

Y

HUMANITARIAN / ECO

NOM

IC

JTFPEACE OPERATIONS

THE JTF COMMANDER'S STOOL

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Executive Summary


Though not a primary duty, there will be times when, as thesenior military officer, you may be required to arrange, participateor lead negotiations and/or mediation. Your background inproblem identification and resolution will be useful in settlingwidely varying disputes. A whole range of topics, from barteringfor services to establishing relationships, may require yourinvolvement. Try to keep sight of the “big picture” from theUS viewpoint as well as that of the parties in conflict.Considering other alternatives, although not initially appealingto all parties, may be helpful.

Joint commissions have been a useful structure and process inthe implementation of the peace settlement. They are one aspectof a number of actions which fundamentally are about politicaldecisions that are carried out along political, military, andhumanitarian lines.

Your legal obligations in peace operations are much more limitedthan during armed conflict. You should determine in advancewhat those limits are and promulgate the rules in a conciseformat. Clear guidance on humanitarian and civil actionprojects, as well as medical treatment for local nationals, shouldbe issued early in the operation.

Negotiation and mediationmay be necessary to settledisputes.

Joint Commissions.

Responsibilities to thelocal population.

Transition planning isrequired to successfullyachieve the desired endstate.

Organization andauthority.

CHAPTER V—Transition

Mission analysis and operational planning should include thesignificant issues, major events, and work required for thetransition. Anticipating the desired end state and having anunderstanding of when you have reached it will assist transitionplanning.

CHAPTER VI—Logistics Support

The combatant commander may delegate directive authorityfor logistics to you within the joint operations area (JOA).This authority does not relieve the Service components of theirresponsibility for support or coordination. The combatantcommander’s Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) may proveespecially helpful in providing key logistics support andfunctions.

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Executive Summary

The J-4 will support you functionally but you set the tone forunity of effort through the entire operation. The J-4 willcoordinate requirements, funding, contracting, movementcontrol, apportionment and allocation, logistics discipline, andlogistics support for NGO and PVO.

Accurate, up-to-date information is vital to deployment andredeployment of the JTF. Logistics flow priorities should beestablished in the initial assessment stage and continuallyupdated as operations progress. United States TransportationCommand (USTRANSCOM) will provide the criticalcoordination of transportation assets.

Nominated by USTRANSCOM, the director mobility force(DIRMOBFOR) will deploy with functional experts to support,plan, monitor, and execute the air mobility mission. Onceestablished, the DIRMOBFOR serves as the designated agentfor all airlift issues in the area of responsibility or JOA.

Logistics for peace operations is complex and requires earlyinvolvement of your logistics staff in the overall planning toensure success. You should identify those logistics principlesthat have primacy in your operations. Environmental planningand disposal operations become important elements of yourlogistics plans. Logistics plans should be integrated withcomponent commands, as well as NGO, PVO, and outsideagencies involved in the operations in order to obtain acomplete logistics picture.

Some participating countries may be unable to do much morethan contribute manpower. In those cases, the United Statesoften becomes the chief supporter of those nations’ efforts.You must clarify guidance, funding, and support early todetermine if the desire and capability to support others ispresent. The UN’s intentions are good, but often they arewoefully late.

Contracting can be an effective force multiplier. The civilianaugmentation program can provide a myriad of services tosupport you mission. The development of a comprehensivecontracting support plan which outlines both procedures andpolicies should become part of your supporting logistics plans.

Using HN services and support to the maximum extent possiblecan lessen the number of military personnel required (a troopceiling may be a factor) and support subsequent efforts toreestablish national infrastructure.

Operations and logisticsare inseparable—neithercan be more importantthan the other.

Transportation is the“linchpin” of youroperation.

The Director of MobilityForces.

Logistics Planning.

Expect to be in the lead forproviding support to amultinational effort.

Contracting may berequired to providesupport during peaceoperations.

Maximize use of host-nation support andservices.

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Executive Summary


Logistics Boards, Offices,and Centers are your keysto timely logistics support.

There are no standardtemplates for structuringsupport to peaceoperations.

Human intelligence will becritical to your operation.

The media can help—youwill not be able to operateoutside their scrutiny.

Legal support is critical inpeace operations.

The establishment of logistics Boards, Offices, and Centersare critical to effective coordination of the JTF logistics effort.Establishment of each should be evaluated based on theprojected operations.

CHAPTER VII—Intelligence Responsibilities

In peace operations, intelligence systems must be tailored tosatisfy specific mission requirements. The JTF intelligenceresources should be flexibly structured to support potentiallychanging requirements.

Encourage your J-2 to cultivate widely diverse sources.Understanding the affected country and its people throughcultural and anthropological studies can provide you criticalinformation. Establishing ties with the local populace willpay off in terms of information about what the public knowsand thinks.

CHAPTER VIII—Public Affairs and Media

Get out front, fill the vacuum with useful information, and themedia will more than likely end up as an ally instead of anadversary. Your public affairs officer and the Joint InformationBureau will be force multipliers and should work closely withyou and the operations planning staff.

“CNN [coverage] had great implications. It allowed us to focus on what had to bedone by portraying the situations and conditions as they were.”

Lieutenant General R. Johnston, United States Marine CorpsCommander, Joint Task Force

Unified Task Force Somalia

Chapter IX—Legal Responsibilities

Your operational lawyer should be immediately available toadvise. A good legal advisor is a force multiplier and will assistin accomplishing your mission in a lawful manner. Your advisoris the best person to draft a general order to establish basic

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Executive Summary

policy for the JTF regarding permitted and prohibited actionswhile deployed.

Standing UN resolutions or other international directives canform the basis for legitimate US action—and they can be verysignificant to your mission analysis.

Legal advisors can help in many areas including refugees;displaced and detained civilians; advise to the PSYOP andCA cells; local culture, customs, and government; military andpolitical liaison; claims; investigations; and contingencycontracting. Like the public affairs officer, the legal advisorneeds to be an integral member of your staff. Your advisorcan provide guidance on the legal restraints on operators andthe rights to employ force.

Existing internationalagreements will impactyour mission.

Your legal personnel mustwork with psychologicaloperations and civil affairspersonnel to enhancemission success andresolve othernontraditional situations.

Force Protection—thehigher the level of securitythe less likely the JTF willsuffer a disaster.

It is important toremember that manyfactors influence forceprotection to includepolitical considerations.

Maximize training prior todeployment.

Rehearsals are absolutelyessential for success.

CHAPTER X—Force Protection

Every commander is responsible for force protection, regardlessof the type of operation or the perception of the threat. Themission analysis phase will help determine the type of forcesrequired to provide the necessary protection. Past experiencesin this area have provided ample “lessons learned.”

You may have little control of some of these factors.Conducting a thorough mission analysis should assist you indetermining the overall policy for force protection.

CHAPTER XI—Training Requirements

Our experience has proven over and over again that aconventional armed force, well-trained and highly disciplined,can be successful at peace operations. There will be somepeace operations training, such as staff exercises, negotiatingskills, live firing, and language proficiency, that is best done athome station. This training should include NGO and PVO.Specific requirements, functional training, or brush-up workmay be accomplished once in country.

As a minimum, the JTF staff must rehearse key events—evenif time is short. Likewise, rehearsals and careful wargamingshould precede operations in which units are working togetherfor the first time. Your intent and the concept of the operation

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Executive Summary


should receive special emphasis to avoid confusion that mightoccur because of differences in doctrine, terminology, orlanguage.

CHAPTER XII—Refugee, Displaced Person,or Migrant Camp Operations

United States participation in camp management operationsmay involve a variety of tasks that range from holding refugees,displaced persons, or migrants in camps to processing andarranging for their ultimate resettlement. This type of operationinvolves significant joint interagency coordination.

CONCLUSION

This Handbook will assist joint task force commanders inpreparing for peace operations. It is based on lessons learnedfrom previous peace operations and current joint doctrine. Itis not the intent of this Handbook to provide a detailed accountof every aspect of a peace operation but instead provide jointtask force commanders with an appreciation of how other jointtask force commanders and staffs accomplished their missions.

CHAPTER IMISSION

I-1

1. General

a. There is no standard peace operationsmission. Each peace operation is conductedin a unique setting with its own political,diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural,and military characteristics.

b. US military participation in peaceoperations may involve peacekeeping, peaceenforcement, or other military operations insupport of diplomatic actions to establish andmaintain peace. Humanitarian assistanceoperations (HAO) also may complementpeace operations.

c. Whatever the mission, US participationwill be based on the current national policyon peace operations. This policy can be foundin the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) PeaceOperations database under the title“Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25)—The Clinton Administration’s Policy onReforming Multilateral Peace Operations.”An unclassified summary and highlights ofPDD 25 are in Appendix A.

d. The United States may participate inpeace operations under the auspices of theUnited Nations, with regional organizations(e.g., the Organization of American States,North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),Organization of African Unity), unilaterally,or in cooperation with other countries.

• Regional organizations, with theexception of NATO, probably cannotcontribute much militarily.

• Where regional organizations providemore impact is perhaps in the areas ofdiplomacy and negotiation.

e. There are various legislative acts thatgovern US participation in peace operations.The two primary authorization documents are:

• The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, PartII, Chapters 2 and 6, as amended (22 USC2318, 2321j, and 2348a). This actauthorizes the President to furnishassistance to friendly countries and IOfor peace operations and other programsto further US national security issues.

• The United Nations Participation Act of1945, codified in 22 USC 287, andExecutive Order 10206 (Support ofPeaceful Settlements of Disputes)authorizes US military support to theUnited Nations.

f. As part of the United Nations, the UnitedStates may participate in operations that fallwithin Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement ofDisputes), Chapter VII (Action with Respectto Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,and Acts of Aggression), or Chapter VIII(Regional Arrangements) of the Charter of the

"... We learned that when you use land combat power in the peacekeepingor peace building role, you can’t achieve an end state of long-term peace—of stability and prosperity in the area. In general, a military element only canbring about an absence of war.”

Major General William L. Nash, USACommanding General of the 1st Armored Division

and Task Force Eagle, Bosnia-HerzegovinaFA Journal January-February 1997

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Chapter I


United Nations. Figure I-1 highlightsChapters VI, VII, and VIII operations. (Theterms peacekeeping and peace enforcementdo not appear in The Charter, but have beenused as indicated in Figure I-1.)

g. Appendix B provides furtherexplanation of Chapters VI, VII, and VIII ofthe UN Charter. Additionally, the JEL PeaceOperations database contains all articles ofChapters VI, VII, and VIII of the Charter.(The United States participation inImplementation Force (IFOR) was anexample of a Chapter VIII operation—NATO served as a regional organization incharge.)

h. In addition to Chapter VI and VIIoperations, some UN operations are referredto as “Chapter VI 1/2.” Such operations fallin a “gray area” between traditionalpeacekeeping and repulsing cross-border orintrastate aggression.

• The Charter of the United Nations doesnot expressly address those peaceoperations focused on internal politicalconflict (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina). Missions may include:

•• Weapons reduction activities.

Figure I-1. Extract from the Charter of the United Nations

Chapter VI: "Pacific Settlement of Disputes"(Peacekeeping)

Focuses on using negotiations, mediation, arbitration, and judicialmeans.Traditional peacekeeping operations.UN observer missions.

Chapter VII: "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches ofthe Peace, and Acts of Aggression"

(Peace Enforcement)Appropriate military operations to maintain and restore internationalpeace and security.Authorizes use of armed force provided by member states.Allows UN to force compliance on unwilling states.Has been expanded to include peace enforcement operations underwider interpretation of breaches of the peace.

Relates to the maintenance of international peace and security.Makes every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputesthrough regional arrangements or regional agencies.Takes enforcement action upon authorization of the Security Council.

Chapter VIII: "Regional Arrangements"

EXTRACT FROM THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

I-3

Mission

mission statements or orders through its chainof command.

b. Mandates are developed by politiciansand diplomats during the negotiation phaseof a peace operations mission. They are oftencollections of compromises developed toinfluence the negotiation process. Becauseof ambiguities, purposeful or otherwise, in theaccords finally signed, the commander whoreceives a mandate may find it difficult to putinto operational terms. (Often, there aremilitary advisors to politicians and diplomatswho may be able to influence the writing ofmandates.) The major elements of a mandateare shown in Figure I-2.

“In Cambodia, each faction quicklyrealized that it was possible to interpretthe Paris agreement in ways that suitedit best. The Khmer Rouge consistentlyjustified their refusal to cooperate onthe basis that UNTAC [UN TransitionalAuthority Force in Cambodia] was notfulfilling its promise of insuring thedeparture of ‘foreign forces’ fromCambodia. At issue was their differentinterpretation of the term foreignforces.”

Colonel K. Farris, USAUN Transitional Authority in

Cambodia

c. Normally, changes to mandates willrequire the consensus of all participatingcountries, subsequent to approval by theimplementing body (United Nations SecurityCouncil or regional organization).

d. Joint Pub 3-07.3, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for PeacekeepingOperations,” contains additional informationon mandates, to include a sample.

•• Providing security to localpopulations.

•• Rescuing failed states.

•• Providing security for the delivery ofhumanitarian assistance.

• Peace enforcement missions define newground for the United Nations.

• You, the commander, joint task force(CJTF), must be prepared to takeappropriate action to protect the mandate.

2. Mandates

“Every mandate should be sufficientlyclear that the Force Commanderunderstands what he is expected toaccomplish. But clarity alone is noguarantee of success. A morefundamental issue is feasibility: Canthe peace force reasonably beexpected to accomplish the taskscontained in the mandate? Some tasksmay yield to a more capable peaceforce than was originally planned.Others, especially some associatedwith transition operations, may beinherently so difficult that even a verycapable peace force will be frustrated.”

Soldiers For Peace CriticalOperational Issues

Bruce R. Pirnie andWilliam E. Simons

a. The mission is derived from a mandateor resolution issued by either the UnitedNations Security Council or throughinternational or regional treaties, accords,resolutions, or agreements. In the case of non-UN operations, the United States will issue

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Chapter I


3. Status-of-Forces Agreement(SOFA)

a. A SOFA or status of missions agreement(SOMA), (hereafter SOMA is includedwherever the term SOFA is used) proceedsfrom the mandate. However, peaceenforcement operations would not normallyinclude a SOFA, except with the host countryor countries from which operations are staged.With the advice of the concerned militarycommander, the diplomatic elementsnegotiate these agreements between the HN,sponsor, and contributors which establish thedetailed legal status of peace operations forces.SOFAs must balance two fundamental factors:the independence of the forces versus thegovernmental authorities of the hostgovernment, and freedom of movement.

However, as a minimum, SOFAs shouldinclude the following main points:

• International status of the force and itsmembers.

• Entry and departure permits, to and fromthe HN.

• The right to carry arms and the authorizedtype(s) of weapons.

• Freedom of movement in theperformance of service.

• Freedom to exercise religion of choice.

• Freedom of movement of individualmembers of the force in the HN.

Figure I-2. Major Elements of a Mandate

The scope of the pendingoperation.

Clear statements of the rights

and immunities of the peace

operations force under

jurisdiction of an

international agency.

Terms or conditions the host

nations or parties in the

conflict intend to impose on

the presence of the force

or mission.

Those countries which may

provide contingents.

Desired End State.

Mandates normally include-

I-5

Mission

• The use of airports, harbors, and roadnetworks in the HN.

• The right to operate a communicationssystem to include the Armed ForcesRadio and Television Service and securecommunications nets.

• Postal regulations.

• The flying of flags (e.g., United Nationsand national).

• Uniform regulations.

• Application of “The Convention of thePrivileges and Immunities of the UnitedNations.” These privileges andimmunities can be found in the “UnitedNations Guideline-Standing OperatingProcedures for Peace-KeepingOperations.” Refer to the JEL PeaceOperations database for this document.

• Matters of jurisdiction.

• Military police and security patrols.

• Tax and duty regulations.

b. All aspects of the SOFA or stationingagreement must have the appearance of totalimpartiality of the force.

“Key to this business [peacekeepingoperations] is absolute impartiality.Favoritism will get you in trouble if youshow the slightest hint of it.”

Colonel H. C. Ross, CanadianArmy, J-3 Operations,

Canadian National DefenseHeadquarters

c. Military and civilian personnel of thepeace operation’s force remain under thecriminal jurisdiction of their own nations. A

legal instrument should provide for thehanding over of members of the force fromthe host government to their respectivecontingents for disciplinary action.

d. In the event the host government isnonfunctional, the United States will retaintotal jurisdiction over its forces.

e. In a multinational peace operation,separate SOFAs may be required betweeneach participating troop contributing countryand the host country. The force headquarters(HQ) is not a legal entity subject tointernational law.

f. Joint Pub 3-07.3, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for PeacekeepingOperations,” and “The Operational LawHandbook,” contains a sample SOFA.

4. Terms of Reference

a. TOR are developed to governimplementation of the peace operationsbased on the mandate and the situation andmay be subject to approval by the parties tothe dispute in peacekeeping operations.

b. The UN Secretary General will usuallysend the TOR to the force commander of themission in either letter or message format.When the United States is a participant in apeace operation, the TOR are coordinated withthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, theDepartment of Defense, and the Departmentof State before final approval by the NationalCommand Authorities (NCA).

• The TOR describe the mission, commandrelationships, organization, logistics,accounting procedures, coordination andliaison, and responsibilities of themilitary units and personnel assigned ordetailed to the peace operations force.

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Chapter I


• Throughout the mission analysis, if amandate or parts of a mandate are unclear,you should take the necessary steps viahigher authority to have it explained orredefined.

• A means available to influence a rewriteof the mandate is to develop your ownmission statement and coordinate it withhigher authority prior to issuance of themandate. This also may provide you withthe opportunity to clarify force structurerequirements, end state(s), and“commander’s intent” with the supportedcombatant commander.

• It is important to remember thatpolitical issues often affect all aspectsof your military mission. It is notuncommon for political decisions to takeprecedence over military requirements.Normally, political issues are beyondyour scope of authority, but whenpossible you should try to influence themif they affect mission accomplishment.

For example, the size of a force maybe influenced more by politicaldecisions than militaryrequirements. The personnelstrength of a force preparing fordeployment to Somalia wasartificially capped at 10,200. Thiswas not based on mission analysis,but on political decisions.

b. Continuous mission analysis is vital tounderstand the mission and situation beforeentering the projected JOA. For instance, areyou to disarm civilians, establish lines ofcommunications, monitor the collection and

• The TOR are written by the UnitedNations or other sponsoringorganizations.

c. TOR are often far less precise than isdesirable from a military point of view forthe following reasons:

• They may be rendered innocuous orambiguous to obtain acceptance of themission by the HN and other nations.

• TOR may have been quickly preparedto hasten publishing the terms andactivating the mission.

• In a UN peacekeeping operation, theremay have to be a compromise to obtainacceptance by all parties.

d. Joint Pub 3-07.3, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for PeacekeepingOperations,” contains a sample TOR.

5. Mission Analysis

a. One of the most important tasks is toconduct a detailed mission analysis. Normalprocedures should be used by the staff inanalyzing the mission. An example is a staffplanning procedure that the Army and MarineCorps commonly use to help them in missionanalysis that looks at mission, enemy, terrainand weather, troops and support available,time available (METT-T). In peacekeepingoperations, the term “parties to the dispute”should be substituted for “enemy” in METT-T. Additionally, other planning factorswhich will have an impact on the analysisprocess include the cultural information andthe political situation of the projected JOA.

I-7

Mission

storage of heavy weapons, and/or performother unique tasks?

c. You also should be able to answer thefollowing questions.

• What is the mission going to achieve,how will the JTF achieve it, and whatresources are required?

• Can the JTF accomplish its mission inthe allotted time?

• What and how much of the affectednation’s infrastructure should berestored?

• Will the JTF projected actions solve thelong-term problem of the mission area?(This may be beyond your mission scopebut still should be considered in theanalysis process.)

• What are the requirements for UnitedStates Government (USG) interagencyand multinational coordination?

• What is the end state?

• What are the requirements for transitionand who is the transition force andcontrolling HQ?

d. You need to appreciate and be able toforecast the longer term impact on the HN(affected country) in contrast to the UnitedStates particular short-term, military solution.

• The mission must be periodicallyreviewed to avoid both directed and self-imposed mission creep.

• A thorough mission analysis will help indeterring mission creep and any adverseimpact on the actual mission.

• In most operations, it is difficult to determission creep because of the inherentdesire of US personnel to do more thanis required. This is especially true whenfaced with human suffering. However,it is important to remember that well-intended actions can be especiallydangerous in peace operations, wherethey can threaten impartiality as wellas undermine long-term programs. Inmany cases, inaction will be betterthan action.

e. Indicators of success related directly tothe desired end state need to be establishedand regularly reviewed—progress and success(victory) often are difficult to assess. Thiswill indicate the need for more detailedtransition planning. Questions impactingmission success are highlighted inFigure I-3—as the CJTF, you must realizethat political decisions may have asignificant bearing on the outcome of anumber of these questions and thus be outof your sphere of control.

f. You have to recognize when themission is not achievable—withoutrestructuring and/or commitment of additionalassets, further action may result in a waste ofresources.

g. As with any mission, commanders at alllevels must have a common understanding ofthe conditions that constitute success prior toinitiating operations. In peace operations,settlement, not victory, is the ultimate measureof success, though settlement is rarelyachievable through military efforts alone.Peace operations are conducted to reach aresolution by conciliation among the competingparties rather than termination by force.Principally, peace operations are designed tocreate or sustain the conditions in whichpolitical and diplomatic activities may proceed.

I-8

Chapter I


Figure I-3. Questions Relative to Mission Success

Is there a clearlydefinable

"end state"?

Can I control"mission creep"?

Are there alternatemeans to achieve

my objective?

Is there sufficient timeallotted to achieve

my objective?

What tolerance shouldI have for violence?

Do I have sufficientassets to

protect the force?

What is "one thing"I can do to stabilize

the situation?

What and how muchinfrastructure should

I restore?

What means areavailable to

accomplish the mission?

What is my exitstrategy?

What is myobjective?

How did I getwhere I am?

MISSION

SUCCESS

MISSION

SUCCESS

MISSION

SUCCESS

h. In peace operations, military actionmust complement diplomatic, economic,informational, and humanitarian efforts in the

pursuit of an overarching political objective.The concept of traditional military victory ordefeat is inappropriate in peace operations.

I-9

Mission

“Our experience in Haiti [United NationsMission in Haiti] reaffirmed the notionthat the military component of a peaceoperation must understand the political-military environment in which it willoperate. Within this dynamic andcomplex environment the force mustsynchronize its operations in a mannerthat will create and sustain theconditions necessary to enable thepolitical process to proceed withoutinterference.”

Success in PeacekeepingUnited Nations Mission in Haiti

The Military Perspective

i. It would be helpful during your analysisto identify the single most important task—the one thing that will stabilize the situation(e.g., establish secure convoy routes). Thiswill help focus the mission and assists inemphasizing end state(s) and forcerequirements.

j. Figure I-4 illustrates the principles ofmilitary operations other than war (MOOTW)which apply to the conduct of peaceoperations. These principles may benefit youduring the mission analysis and planningprocess.

k. A valuable tool in the mission analysisprocess is the early deployment of anassessment team to the projected JOA.

• The assessment team may help inclarifying the mission by actuallydeciding what needs to be accomplished,what type of force is required toaccomplish it, the proper sequence fordeployment of the force, availability ofin-country assets, and what ongoingoperations are being conducted byorganizations other than military forces.Depending on the type of peace operation(e.g., peacekeeping), some of the aboveinformation will be mandate directed.This should not deter you fromemphasizing your requirements to thesupported combatant commander.

• Composition of this assessment teamvaries. You should consider thefollowing individuals for teammembership. Among these teammembers should be personnel capable ofidentifying, determining, and assessinginfrastructure and transportationlimitations (sea, air, and landlines of communications). Additionally,personnel also are required to identify,determine, and assess environmentalconcerns (e.g., ground, water,and air pollution or environmentalcontamination for future remediation) inthe projected JOA.

•• Commander or designee•• Linguists or interpreters

“A thorough assessment of military resources needed to assist in the humanitarianrelief mission was made shortly after arrival in theater. This permitted the JTFcommander to establish priorities, develop success criteria, and rationalize the manyrequests for assistance that will be received daily from the UN and IO/NGOs/PVOs[international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntaryorganizations]. ... Without such an assessment made early-on (and then modifiedas the operation progresses), requests for military assistance cannot be adequatelyevaluated, ‘real’ progress is difficult to measure and meaningful disengagementcriteria probably cannot be established.”

Operation SUPPORT HOPEAfter-Action Report

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Chapter I


•• J-2•• J-3•• J-4 and key logistics planners—engineering personnel, transportationpersonnel, contracting personnel

PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Direct military operations towards aclearly defined decisive, and attainableobjective.

Seek unity of effort toward everyobjective.

Never permit the hostile factions toacquire an unexpected advantage.

Sustain the willing acceptance by thepeople of the right of the government togovern, or a group or agency to makeand carry out decisions.

Apply appropriate military capabilityprudently.

Prepare for measured, protractedapplication of military capability insupport of strategic aims.

- Defined by a Resolution/Mandate.- End state refinement is iterative.- Political considerations often

drive operations.- Concurrent actions required during

operations to achieve permanentpeace.

- Force protection.- Enhances legitimacy and impartiality.- Attains international credibility.- May extend to nongovernmental and

private voluntary organizations.- Freedom of action throughout the joint

operations area.

- Military may not have the lead.- Seek a coordination structure that

incorporates activities of all elements inthe area (nongovernmental, privatevoluntary, and internationalorganizations).

- Atmosphere of cooperation required.- Establish extensive liaison and

communications.

- Prepare for long protracted operations.- Information operations strategy key.- Gauge social and political progress

to measure success.- Balance attaining objectives quickly

with strategic aims and otherrestraints.

- Avoid inadvertent legitimization offactions.

- Use public affairs, civil affairs, andpsychological operations programs toenhance perceptions.

- Impartial treatment is critical.

- Disciplined application of force, tactics,and rules of engagement.

- Justified and carefully controlled.- Closely related to "Legitimacy."- Societal "face-saving" options

can diffuse a crisis.

- Use of mediation and negotiations.

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

SECURITY LEGITIMACY

PERSEVERANCE

RESTRAINT

Figure I-4. Principles for Peace Operations

•• J-6•• Medical planners—preventivemedicine personnel•• Legal personnel•• Chaplain ministry team

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Mission

The Commander for the United NationsTransitional Authority in Cambodia wasable to participate in the UN’s militarysurvey mission to that country. “Withthis experience he was able to helpshape the structure and composition ofthe military force before its deployment.In addition, his time in Cambodia gavehim a firsthand look at the terrain, thepeople, and the leaders of factions withwhom he would have to interact.”


Cambodia

• The members of the assessment teamshould be part of the JTF that willparticipate in the actual operation, whenpossible.

l. Development and refinement of rules ofengagement (ROE) are an important functionduring the mission analysis and assessment

•• Special operations forces (SOF)planners to include civil affairs (CA) andpsychological operations (PSYOP)personnel•• Office of United States ForeignDisaster Assistance (OFDA)/DisasterAssistance Response Team (DART)representatives*•• Public affairs (PA) personnel•• Political-military representative•• Embassy liaison officer•• UN representation, when appropriate

Note: * OFDA representatives may be inthe projected JOA prior to arrive of theassessment team. CA personnel shouldcoordinate with them to prevent a duplicationof effort during the assessment process.

• The assessment team can validate themission analysis process, reduceduplication of effort, and provide fora rational division of labor.

Peace operations forces arrive in-country via charter aircraft.

I-12

Chapter I


Force

Impartiality

Consent

ULTIMATESUCCESS

"Settlementnot

Victory"

PEACE OPERATIONS VARIABLES

Figure I-5. Peace Operations Variables

process. ROE are discussed subsequently inthis chapter.

m. Additionally, resource and fundingrequirements need to be addressed during theassessment process.

n. Because of the assessment and the totalmission analysis process, an end state(s)should be specified.

6. Fundamentals

a. Peace operations are conducted in adynamic environment, shaped by a numberof factors that strongly influence the mannerin which operations can be conducted.Successful commanders must grasp theimportance of these factors. Figure I-5

illustrates the critical variables of peaceoperations—the level of consent, the level offorce, and the degree of impartiality. Thedegree to which these three variables arepresent will play a major role in determiningthe nature of the operation and force tailoringmix. They are not constant and mayindividually or collectively shift over thecourse of an operation.

b. Commanders who are aware of thesevariables and the direction in which they tendto move may be more successful ininfluencing them and thereby controlling theoperational setting. In order to exercisecontrol, they must be able to influence thevariables and the pace and direction of change.Success in peace operations often hinges onthe ability to exercise situational dominancewith respect to the variables; failure is often

I-13

Mission

the result of losing control of one or more ofthem.

c. Assessments of the level of consent arepolitical-military in nature and possibly policydriven. Such assessments are factors indetermining force tailoring for operations.

7. End State

a. End state refinement is a continuousprocess.

b. An important step in the mission analysisprocess is to be sure that there is a clearlydefinable end state(s). From the end state,the transition (drawdown, handover), anddeparture data should be determined.

• Although an end state may be difficultto define in peace operations, you shouldstrive to refine the mission to ensure oneexists. As previously stated, beingprepared early to develop your ownmission statement and coordinating itwith higher authority may allow you theopportunity to clearly identify an endstate(s).

• The above process also may serve as theimpetus for all militaries, the UnitedNations, and other organizationsinvolved in the operation to agree on whatneeds to be accomplished or what isacceptable to reach an end state(s).Conditions required to reach an end statemust be made known.

•• An end state will not always beclearly defined or that what is definedmay be arbitrary or unrealistic.

•• Political decisions will have a greatimpact on an end state.

• Without a clearly defined missionstatement from you which includes the

end state, your component commandersand other multinational members cannotdevelop or define their implementing andsupporting tasks.

• You should develop criteria to definemission success. These criteria may bedefined by nontraditional tasks such aspeaceful resolution of conflict, vicetraditional criteria such as destruction ofthe enemy. This will require the JTF tolook beyond conventional warfightingcriteria to take into account, the uniquecharacteristics of the specific peaceoperation.

8. Rules of Engagement

“In all circumstances, ROE [rules ofengagement] must be tactically sound,fl e x i b l e , u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , a ndenforceable.”

Operational Law Handbook

a. “Operators” are responsible for thedevelopment of ROE.

b. Your legal advisor can help indeveloping ROE to ensure that they do notimproperly constrain your actions, but are stillconsistent with national command policy.

“US Foreign Policy may succeed or failon the basis of how well Rules ofEngagement are conceived,articulated, understood andimplemented.”

Naval Justice School

c. ROE are the directives issued bycompetent military authority which delineatethe circumstances and limitations under whichUS forces will initiate and/or continue combat

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engagement against belligerents encountered.In other words, ROE are the means by whichthe NCA and operational commanders directthe use of armed force in the context ofapplicable political and military policy anddomestic and international law. More simplyput, ROE are the rules that specify “when,where, against whom and how force can beused.” ROE are derived from the three areasdepicted in Figure I-6.

considerations during hostilities; and byprotecting from destruction infrastructurethat may prove logistically important ata later date.

•• ROE should be distinguished fromtactical control measures, threatconditions, and arming orders—armingorders are sometimes listed on the samecards as ROE, for easy reference.

•• ROE also should be distinguishedfrom other policies and directivesdeveloped by you, such as weaponsconfiscation rules.

• Political. In part, ROE are a reflectionof the political will of the government.Missions cannot be completedsuccessfully without the popular supportof the American people and their electedofficials. The development and trainingof ROE to multinational allies is aninherently political process which mayrequire coordination with the countryteam or other designated representativesof the Department of State.

• Legal. ROE are also a reflection ofinternational or domestic law or nationalpolicy.

f. ROE must contribute to morale andfighting spirit while supporting the political,military, and legal requirements of themission.

g. Nothing in the ROE can limit theinherent authority to use all necessarymeans available and take all appropriateaction in self-defense of an individualmember of the JTF, a unit of the JTF, orother JTF personnel.

• The elements of self-defense are:

•• Necessity—Imminent danger requiresresort to force when there is a hostile actor hostile intent.

Figure I-6. Basis of Rules of Engagement

LAW

ROE

POLICY OPERATIONS

BASIS OF RULESOF ENGAGEMENT

d. ROE may be used to control the use offorce in three main areas: force protection,mission accomplishment, or armed conflict.

e. ROE generally provide guidanceregarding the use of force by commanders andindividuals based on three types ofconsiderations:

• Military . Properly drafted ROE helpaccomplish the mission by ensuring theuse of force in such a way that it will beused in a manner consistent with theoverall military objective. They mustsupport both force protection and missionaccomplishment. ROE can assist thecommander by preventing theunintended start of hostilities prior toachieving a desired readiness posture; byestablishing economy of force

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Mission

“With respect to self-defense, ROEultimately come down to individualjudgment. For example, assume thatthere has been a series of bomb threatsin your area. A child runs toward aconvoy with a box. Althoughauthorized to fire (hostile intent?) it maybe prudent to hold fire. In Somalia, abeggar child was shot in this situationbut the rifleman was not chargedbecause he honestly felt threatened.Only with the proper training can theindividual rifleman have the confidenceto make these quick, stressfuldecisions.”

Colonel F. M. Lorenz, USMC Unified Task Force Somalia

•• Proportionality—Force must belimited in intensity, duration, andmagnitude to that reasonably required toensure the continued safety of US forces.

• ROE should be unambiguous and writtenso everybody will know that they willnot be prosecuted if they are acting inself-defense. (1) Conduct a promptinquiry (not necessarily a formalinvestigation) in all questionable casesof the use of deadly force—Your legaladvisor can help. (2) Promptly andaccurately record the facts. (3) Mediaattention can be expected. (4) Beprepared to begin more formalproceedings, but be aware that thismay have a chilling effect on theactions of members of the force whoare already in a stressful anddangerous situation. (Assistance frominvestigative agencies, for example, USArmy Criminal InvestigationCommand, Naval Criminal InvestigativeService, or Air Force Office of SpecialInvestigations is absolutely essential.)

h. ROE should be used to assist in courseof action (COA) development, wargaming,analysis, and selection process, but care must

be taken to ensure that the mission drives theROE and not vice-versa.

i. The development, distribution, training,and modification of ROE must be timely andresponsive to changing mission and threatparameters.

j. Additional information on ROE can beobtained from the JEL Peace Operationsdatabase under the title “Operational LawHandbook.”

k. Standing Rules of Engagement(SROE)

“These rules [Standing Rules ofEngagement] do not l imit acommander’s inherent authority andobligation to use all necessary meansavailable and to take all appropriateaction in self-defense of thecommander’s unit and other US forcesin the vicinity.”

CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules ofEngagement for US Forces, with

Change 1

• ROE are the primary means by whichthe NCA can, through the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatantcommanders, provide guidance to USforces in peacetime for handling the useof force during crises and in wartime tohelp control the level of hostilities. TheNCA have provided the SROE for USforces as stand alone guidance for USforces worldwide that are equallyapplicable to all the combatantcommands and can be easily and quicklyamended or clarified by mission-specificROE. See CJCSI 3121.01, “StandingRules of Engagement for US Forces, withChange 1,” for amplification of SROE.

• SROE apply in the absence of specificguidance from higher authority in theform of supplemental measures.

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• SROE also provide lists of numberedsupplemental measures that may beprovided by, or requested from, higherauthority to tailor ROE for a particularsituation.

• SROE do not apply to multinationalforces; civil disturbance operations;disaster relief operations; US CoastGuard units (and other units under theiroperational control (OPCON))conducting law enforcement operations;and, US forces in support of operationsnot under operational or tactical controlof a combatant commander orperforming missions under direct controlof the NCA, Military Departments, orother USG departments or agencies.

•• Combatant commanders also mayaugment the SROE in order to properlyrespond to the mission and threat in theirarea of responsibility.

•• You and your staff must understandthe military, political, and legal missionobjectives that necessitate ROE and beable to distill the SROE and anycombatant commander specific ROE intobaseline ROE for the unit commander,weapon system operator, and infantrysoldier to apply in the field.

• In developing ROE, it is critical that theplanners consider any Service-specificcore training in ROE that the combatforces may have received prior todeployment.

• Core training in the SROE, which atpresent is not uniform among theServices or even within the Services, hasproven an exceptional tool to familiarizethe “trigger-puller” with ROE and hasproven effective in streamlining swift

adjustments in ROE dictated by rapidlychanging circumstances.

• As Service doctrine develops on suchcore ROE training, the JTF will lessenconfusion and contribute to readiness andeffective use of force by accounting forthe language and training that Servicecomponents are using in core training andincorporating the same into the ROEplanning process as much as possible.Figure I-7 lists several key ROEconsiderations.

l. Development of Rules of Engagement

• Analyze the mission and the anticipatedthreat level. Are the applicable ROEadequate for the situation? If not, seekapproval of supplemental measures.

• Do the ROE protect the force?

• What is the higher HQ commander’sintent?

• ROE must be clear, concise, and at thesoldier (“trigger-puller”) level,unclassified. ROE cards should bedistributed. A sample ROE card isdepicted in Figure I-8.

• During peace operations most ROE are“conduct-based,” that is, your actions arebased on a situation or threat thatindicates a hostile act or intent. The threatmay be a variety of groups or individualsbut are not usually an “enemy” in the“warfighting” sense.

• Training all personnel on situations likelyto be encountered during the operationis critical in the understanding of ROE.Personnel should see what the threat orhostile intent looks like using SituationalTraining Exercises.

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Mission

“The ROE vignettes are a lot likefootball plays. We practice thevignettes but in the real game they letthe fans on the field.”

Soldier,10th Mountain Division

• ROE may remain constant throughoutyour operation. Changing the rules maycause confusion or send the wrong signalto the local population. However,changes in the threat situation or politicalsituation may dictate a formal change tothe ROE and require immediatedistribution.

• As the commander, you will recognizewhen new ROE are required, andpromptly make a request for a change tothe supported combatant commander.For example, if the presence ofantiaircraft weapons near your flight

routes becomes a serious threat to theforce, it may be necessary to seekpermission to act to deter, neutralize, orif necessary, destroy.

• ROE must be understood, remembered,applied, reinforced, and practiced.

• The aggressiveness that is important inwartime operations must be temperedwith restraint in the ambiguousenvironment of peace operations.

m. Promulgation of Rules ofEngagement

• Normally, ROE are distributed throughthe chain of command via an OPLAN,OPORD, or campaign plan. Inmultinational operations, it isimportant to develop ROE in aformat that can be promptlydistributed to other nations.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

International law.

Operational concerns

Commander's intent

Threat.

Tactical capabilities

Tactics and weapons systems organic to the joint task force.

Host-nation law and requirements.

US policy

(mission requirements).

(both commander, joint task force and higherheadquarters).

(of proposed force).

(considering United Nations resolutions and internationalagreements).

NOTE: May Not interfere with right and responsibility for self defense!!!

Figure I-7. Rules of Engagement Considerations

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JTF FOR SOMALIA RELIEF OPERATION

GROUND FORCESRULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your right to take appropriate action todefend yourself and your unit

A. You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack.B. Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a hostile act.C. When US forces are attacked by unarmed hostile elements, mobs and/or rioters, US

forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportionalto the threat.

D. You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your mission.E. Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense.

REMEMBER

1. The United States is not at war.2. Treat all persons with dignity and respect.3. Use minimum force to carry out mission.4. Always be prepared to act in self-defense.

• The “coalition forces support team”(CFST) discussed in Chapter III canassist in distributing current ROE andteaching it to multinational forces. It isimportant that all forces have the sameunderstanding of the ROE.

n. Rules of Engagement Cell

• To assist in the ROE process, theestablishment of a ROE Cell may bewarranted.

• JTF J-3 is responsible for thedevelopment of ROE in crisis actionplanning. ROE Cell provides a formalplanning structure through which theJ-3 can effectively perform thisresponsibility.

•• ROE planning process requires timelyand extensive intra-staff coordination andplanning.

•• The starting point for mission-specificROE is the SROE, which may bemodified with approved supplementalROE. (1) ROE are not static, however.They are tailored to the individualmission and threat environment and mustremain responsive to changes in either.(2) ROE planning process does not endwhen the OPLAN, OPORD, or campaignplan is approved. The ROE Cell shouldtrack and review the ROE and respondaccording to threat or mission changes.It also is the responsibility of the ROECell to ensure that core ROE trainingconcepts from the Service and functional

Figure I-8. Sample Rules of Engagement Card

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Mission

component forces are integrated into theROE development process and thatsubsequent training on the approvedmission-specific ROE build upon thatcore training base. (3) ROEdevelopment must begin early in theplanning process (before or during COAdevelopment). The ROE Cell ensuresearly and knowledgeable ROEdevelopment. Key participants in theROE Cell are: joint planning group(JPG) representative, J-2, J-3, J-5,and Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)representatives at a minimum

(participation may vary according to themission). Figure I-9 highlights some ofthe responsibilities of the ROE Cell.

9. Mission Considerations forMultinational Forces

a. As a JTF commander in peaceoperations, you probably will operate withmultinational forces. There are numerousunique considerations that should be evaluatedbefore you assign missions to these forces.Joint Pub 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for

Forces are routinely challenged to work within rules of engagement parameters.

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Figure I-9. Rules of Engagement (ROE) Cell Responsibilities

Wargames courses of action. ROE Cell predicts probable ROE impact onoperation planning--discusses political and military aspects of the missionstatement--forecasts probable ROE restrictions and allowances for use offorce.

Gathers threat indicators and decision points during course of actiondevelopment that will become the basis for drafting and requestingsupplemental ROE. Reacts to requests for supplemental ROE fromcomponents--generates supplemental ROE requests based on changingthreat or mission.

Drafts ROE and supplemental ROE--develops Appendix 6 (Rules ofEngagement) to Annex C (Operations) of the CJTF's operation plan, operationorder, or campaign plan.

Develops or reviews for uniformity and compliance with the ROE the tools fortraining in ROE--oversees dissemination and training of ROE.

Tracking boards for current ROE in force have proven effective.

ROE situation vignettes for use in training may prove beneficial.

Interprets the Standing Rules of Engagement and existing ROE for thecommander, joint task force, joint task force staff, and component commands.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)CELL RESPONSIBILITIES

Multinational Operations,” provides more in-depth discussion concerning multinationaloperations and planning.

b. Missions should be assigned that arecommensurate to each multinational force’spolitical commitment and military capability.The key to assigning missions to multinationalforces is a clear understanding of theircapabilities, political will, and their nationalinterests in the operation.

c. Command and control (C2) issues,language, force capabilities, cultural andhistorical backgrounds, religious beliefs,logistics, training, and political goals andobjectives all impact the coordination ofmultinational operations. Based on the above,it is difficult to “put together” a multinationaloperation.

d. Consequently, many things thatinfluence the performance of multinationalforces are out of your control. Nonetheless,you should devise a program or system toevaluate these forces before missionassignment. For example, a US commanderin Somalia conducted leaders’ reconnaissancewith all of his commanders, includingmultinational leaders. He was then able toevaluate their leadership, self-discipline,moral commitment, knowledge, capabilities(individual, unit, and equipment), prior tomission assignment.

• Additionally, you can determine what isan acceptable “degree of risk” forcommitment of each unit in amultinational force for specific missionsin the JOA.

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Mission

• Multinational forces may or may notarrive in the theater of operationssimultaneously with the JTF. This mayimpact on transition planning.

e. Other countries’ contingents may facepolitical constraints or operational constraintsdue to limited capabilities.

"One of the nations with a sizablecontingent in Cambodia had aparticularly low level of tolerance forcasualties, which directly affectedoperational planning.”


Cambodia

f. A means of alleviating some of theconcerns in working with multinational forceswould be to issue them “mission-orientedorders.”

• These type orders appear to provide thebest results and give a more positive senseof national pride.

•• Provide written orders—short, clear,simple.

•• Avoid using acronyms, slang, andobscure metaphors.

•• Use simple, repetitive wording—stressing understanding, not eloquence.

•• Use several means to confirmunderstanding of communications.

• Another recommendation would be toissue separate mission orders to eachmultinational force. This may not onlywork better but also support, to a greaterextent, each country’s nationalobjectives. From past experience, some

countries withdrew from offensiveoperations. To have forced thesecountries to participate in such operationswould not have been in their best interestnor would have supported the goals ofthe United Nations.

• In multinational operations, there shouldbe centralized planning and decentralizedexecution.

g. More simply stated, some countries aregood for peacekeeping operations, but not forpeace enforcement operations.

h. Strategic implications of all actions mustbe considered because of the nature of peaceoperations and competing multinationalinterests.

“The general in charge of a multi-battalion UN force once ordered asubordinate commander to seize anarea where snipers were hiding as theyfired at UN soldiers. The subordinatefeared the task would entail casualtiesbetween his own troops and get himinto hot water with his home-countrysuperiors, so he stalled for time. Thenhe contacted national-level authoritiesin his country ...to ask whether or nothe should obey his tactical orders fromthe United Nations.”

Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Baker, USAParameters, Spring 1994

i. The intent of this section was to highlightthe importance of using “common sense”when dealing with multinational forces.Regardless, if you communicate with themcollectively or singularly, the one factor thatmust remain constant is that these forcesare treated as legitimate partners with trustand confidence. Liaison personnel can domuch to enhance the relationship between theJTF and a multinational force.

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Nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations members and military representatives atmeeting to discuss humanitarian relief operations.

10. Additional Considerations

a. As previously stated, other types ofoperations (e.g., development or humanitarianrelief operations) may be in progress prior toarrival of the JTF in the JOA. NGO, PVO,and IO often are conducting activities wellbefore the arrival of military forces.Consideration should be given toacknowledging and coordinating some of theseactivities with your overall plan. Chapter II,“Civil-Military Relations,” provides additionalinformation on NGO and PVO.

“By 1993, there were more than 100such groups (nongovernmental andprivate voluntary organizations) inCambodia. Some had been there forten years; for much of that time theyconstituted the only foreign presencein the country.”

Colonel K. Farris, USAUN Transitional Authority

in Cambodia

b. In further analyzing the mission, youalso should consider the regional strategy forthe projected JOA.

• Regional strategy can be obtained fromthe supported combatant commander.

• The State Department also can providethis information with an appreciation forhow the regional strategy affects thecountries involved in projectedoperations.

c. In past peace operations, traditional rolesand functions of the military were expandedto support taskings. The goal should be toavoid expansion of traditional military rolesand functions through expanded interagencycoordination.

d. As the commander, you should beprepared to start the planning process andexert your influence in mission developmentto ensure what you are being told toaccomplish is feasible in the allotted time.

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Mission

Remember, the military normally cannotprovide a long-term solution for peaceoperations.

e. Figure I-10 highlights the manycompeting dynamics that may be associated

COMPETING DYNAMICS

DISARMAMENT

FAILEDECONOMY

ECONOMY 0FFORCE

JOBS

EMERGENCY RELIEF

POLITICAL RECONCILIATION

LACK OFJUDICIARY

MISSION EXPANSION

LOCALAGREEMENTS

COALITIONTURNOVER

COMPETINGAGENDAS

FORCEPROTECTION

NEIGHBORINGFORCES

SECURE ENVIRONMENT

POLICE FORCES NATIONALGOALS

CIVICACTION

CULTURALISM/ETHNICITY

WARLORDS/PARAMILITARY

Figure I-10. Competing Dynamics

with peace operations. As the CJTF, youmust recognize these dynamics but realizethat “the solution” may be well beyondyour control and capability.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IICIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

II-1

“The integration of political and military objectives and the subsequenttranslation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always beenessential to success at all levels of operations.”

Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations

• You should identify all agencies,departments, and organizations that areor should be involved in the operationand then determine how best tocoordinate with them. The supportedcombatant commander can assist in thisendeavor. Coordination may be achievedthrough (1) direct coordination byyourself or representative (e.g., deputy,commander, joint task force (DCJTF)),(2) coordination by a JTF staffdirectorate(s) or through an organizationsuch as a civil-military operations center(CMOC). In most instances, suchcoordination should be done at all levels.CMOC is discussed in more detailsubsequently in this chapter.

• When appropriate and withinoperational considerations, you shouldinvolve representatives from theinteragency organizations in JTF staffmeetings and briefings. This also shouldinclude participation in joint planningand training from the outset.

• Other ways to enhance interagencycoordination may be to:

•• Es tab l i sh an appropr ia tedecision-making structure to resolvepolitical, humanitarian, and militaryissues and to coordinate operations.

•• Situate coordination or liaison cells ateach level to facilitate communicationbetween participants.

1. Interagency Coordination

a. In peace operations, interagencycoordination may be your top priority.

• This, in part, is due to the increasedinvolvement of JTFs in civil activity bothin the United States and abroad. Thiscivil activity requires the skills andresources of many organizations (e.g.,USG agencies, partner nations, NGO,PVO, and international and regionalorganizations such as the United Nationsand NATO).

• By understanding the interagencyprocess, you will be better able toappreciate how the skills and resourcesof the above can assist in missionaccomplishment. Civil-militaryrelations can create economic,political, and social stability as theyencourage the development of theaffected nation’s materiel and humanresources.

•• Part of the educative process you andyour staff must understand is that eachorganization brings its own culture,philosophy, goals, practices, and skillsto the interagency table.

•• You must ensure an atmosphere ofcooperation exists so that both the skillsand resources of the JTF and interagencyorganizations can be more effectively andefficiently utilized. Unity of effort mustbe achieved.

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Chapter II


•• Establish a relationship with the USAmbassador, the country team, and, if aUN operation, the Special Representativeof the Secretary-General.

b. For further detail see Chapter IV, “JTFCommand Responsibilities,” of thisHandbook and Joint Pub 3-08, “InteragencyCoordination During Joint Operations,Volumes I and II.”

2. NongovernmentalOrganizations, PrivateVoluntary Organizations,United Nations ReliefAgencies, and InternationalOrganizations

“What’s the relationship between a just-arrived military force and the NGO andPVO that might have been working ina crisis-torn area all along? What wehave is a partnership. If you aresuccessful, they are successful; and,if they are successful, you aresuccessful. We need each other.”

General John M. Shalikashvili,USA, Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. Where long-term problems precede adeepening crisis, NGO, PVO, and others arefrequently on scene before US forces and arewilling to operate in high-risk areas. Theywill most likely remain long after militaryforces have departed. NGO and PVO areprimarily engaged in sustainabledevelopment programs; that is, they areworking long-term to improve the capacitiesof HN institutions to enhance health,education, economic development, and otherconditions in these countries. NGO and PVOalso may be providing relief or rehabilitationprograms targeted at the immediate crisis.

“In many instances, NGO are the endof the line—without them there is nohope.”

Barbara SmithInternational Rescue Committee

b. These organizations play an importantrole in providing support to the HN. In fact,NGO and PVO provide assistance to over 250million people annually. Their worldwidecontributions total between $9 and $10 billioneach year—more than any single nation orinternational body (such as the UnitedNations). Because of their capability torespond quickly and effectively to crises,they can lessen the civil-military resourcesthat a commander would otherwise haveto devote to an operation. Thoughdifferences may exist between military forcesand civilian agencies, short-term objectivesare frequently very similar. Discovering thiscommon ground is essential to unity of effort.In the final analysis, activities and capabilitiesof NGO and PVO must be factored into yourassessment of conditions and resources andintegrated into the selected COA.

• The Role of NGO and PVO. NGO andPVO may range in size and experiencefrom those with multimillion dollarbudgets and decades of global experiencein developmental and humanitarian reliefto newly created small organizationsdedicated to a particular emergency ordisaster.

•• The professionalism, capability,equipment and other resources, andexpertise vary greatly from oneorganization to another. NGO andPVO are involved in such diverseactivities as education, technical projects,relief activities, refugee assistance, publicpolicy, and development programs.Standards of conduct and standards of

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Civil-Military Relations

protocol are being developed by civilianorganizations to enhance theprofessionalism among NGO and PVO.(It is important to remember that someof these organizations do not respondpositively to the US military and havetheir own interests and agendas thatmay be in total contrast to that of themilitary.)

•• The connectivity between NGO,PVO and the Department of Defenseis currently ad hoc, with no specificstatutory linkage. But while their focusremains grassroots and their connectionsinformal, NGO and PVO are majorplayers at the interagency table. Thesheer number of lives they affect andresources they provide enables the NGOand PVO community to wield a great dealof power within the interagencycommunity. In fact, individualorganizations are often tapped by theUnited Nations and USG agencies tocarry out specific relief functions.

• United Nations Relief Agencies andInternational Organizations. Beloware brief descriptions of a number of theagencies and IO that JTFs havecoordinated with in past operations andones that you may coordinate with infuture operations.

•• United Nations Department ofHumanitarian Affairs (UNDHA).UNDHA is the focal point for disastermanagement in the UN system. Itmobilizes and coordinates internationaldisaster relief, promotes disastermitigation (through the provision ofadvisory services and technicalassistance), and promotes awareness,information exchange, and the transferof knowledge on disaster-related matters.It is responsible for maintaining contactwith disaster management entities and

emergency services worldwide and isable to mobilize specialized resources.The appointed UNDHA residentcoordinator has a crucial role in providingleadership to the UN team at countrylevel, and also coordinates locallyrepresented PVO and NGO as required.The resident coordinator convenes theUnited Nations Disaster ManagementTeam at the country level, seeking unityof effort among all the various PVO,NGO, and agencies. (1) UNDHA’smission is to coordinate and facilitateinternational relief assistance followingsudden disasters and similaremergencies. UNDHA is headquarteredat the UN office in Geneva (Palais desNations, CH-1211 Geneva 10,Switzerland). It also can be contacted atUN Headquarters in New York City. (2)The UNDHA staff in Geneva and NewYork is involved in policy planning andearly warning functions, emergencyoperational support and reliefcoordination, and disaster mitigation.The UN Under Secretary General ofHumanitarian Affairs also servesconcurrently as the UN EmergencyRelief Coordinator. While the mainresponsibility of the Under SecretaryGeneral of Humanitarian Affairs is tohead UNDHA, the main responsibilityof the UN Emergency Relief Coordinatoris to develop rapid response proceduresand teams to international humanitarianemergencies.

•• United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR hastwo closely related functions; to protectrefugees and to promote durablesolutions to their problems. UNHCRassists all refugees who have fled theircountries because of a well-founded fearof persecution for reasons of their race,religion, nationality, political opinion, ormembership in a particular social group

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and who cannot or do not want to return.UNHCR’s mission is to protect refugeesagainst physical harm, to protect theirbasic human rights, and to make sure thatthey are not forcibly returned to countrieswhere they could face imprisonment,torture, or death. The latter mission—UNHCR’s most important function,known as “international protection”—means that the organization strives toensure that no refugee is returnedinvoluntarily to a country where he orshe has reason to fear persecution.UNHCR is headquartered in Geneva(UNHCR Secretariat, Case Postale 2500,Ch-1211 Geneva 2 Depot, Switzerland).The UNHCR Branch Office for theUnited States is located in Washington,D.C. (1775 K Street, N.W., Suite 300,20006).

•• World Food Programme (WFP).The WFP is the food aid organization ofthe United Nations. The Programme’sassistance is targeted at the poorestsections of the population in low-income,food-deficit countries, particularlyvulnerable groups such as women andchildren. While WFP has beenincreasingly called upon to providedisaster relief assistance, it believes thatdevelopment projects have been andshould remain at the core of its work tohelp poor people become more self-reliant. WFP works on two fronts; asthe principal international channelproviding fast, efficient relief assistanceto victims of natural and manmadedisasters, and as a major supplier of foodaid to poor people in developingcountries aimed at building self-reliantfamilies and communities. In bothemergency operations and developmentprojects, WFP is responsible forassessing food aid needs, mobilizingcontributions from donors, transportingcommodities, and managing overalldistribution on a country-wide basis. But

final distribution to beneficiaries isundertaken either by governmentagencies or local and international NGOand PVO. WFP is headquartered inRome, Italy (Via Cristoforo Colombo,426, 00145 Rome, Italy).

•• United Nations Children’s Fund(UNICEF). The Fund is charged withgiving assistance, particularly todeveloping countries, in the developmentof permanent child health and welfareservices. UNICEF HQ is located in NewYork City (UNICEF House, 3 UN Plaza,NY, NY 10017).

•• International Committee of the RedCross (ICRC). The ICRC is a private,independent humanitarian institution, notmultinational organization, composedexclusively of Swiss nationals. Itsmission is to provide care to persons notdirectly participating in hostilities, suchas the sick, wounded, prisoners, or thosein distress, without discrimination. The1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977Protocols confer on the ICRC what manynations believe is the right to take action(e.g., to visit prisoners of war) and tomake proposals to states (e.g., to offer itsservices). Additionally, the InternationalRed Cross and Red Crescent Movement’sStatutes recognize that the ICRC has aright of humanitarian initiative insituations not covered by the GenevaConventions or their protocols. All ofthese “rights” constitute the permanentmandate conferred on the ICRC by muchof the international community. Thisspecific mandate distinguishes it fromother humanitarian organizations. TheICRC and advocates of humanitarian lawmay argue that the 1977 Protocols to theGeneva Conventions of 1949 havegained universal application through theformative custom of international law, theUnited States does not agree. The UnitedStates has not ratified the 1977 Protocols

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and may not always agree with norrecognize as authoritative ICRC actionsbased on the Protocols. Other nationsthat have acceded to these Protocols arebound to them. This leads to a majorproblem for the legal counsel in theinternational arena: not all participantsare similarly bound to international lawon very basic matters. There arenumerous conventions of wide but notuniversal application. Adherence or non-adherence can make a mismatch ofpotential partners in humanitarianventures. The ICRC is the guardian ofthe International Red Cross and RedCrescent Movement’s seven fundamentalprinciples: humanity, impartiality,neutrality, independence, voluntaryservice, unity, and universality.

• You may encounter scores of NGO andPVO in the JOA. In Somalia alone, therewere some 78 private organizationscontributing relief support, and assistingthe UN relief in the Rwanda crisis wereover 100 relief organizations. Over 350such agencies are registered with UnitedStates Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID). NGO and PVOmay belong to the organizations listedbelow.

•• InterAction is a membershiporganization of US based PVO who areinvolved in overseas disaster relief andresponse. Its membership includesapproximately 150 private agenciesoperating in 185 countries. Examples ofthese organizations are: Food for theHungry, Cooperative for Assistance andRelief Everywhere (CAREUSA) , andInternational Aid, Inc.

•• The International Council ofVoluntary Agencies also has membershipnumbering in the hundreds.

•• A more complete description of eachof these organizations is provided in theJEL Peace Operations database or inJoint Pub 3-08, “InteragencyCoordination During Joint OperationsVol II.”

• Military and Private OrganizationRelations. NGO and PVO concerns inthe military taking control of existingoperations are real. CA interaction withthese organizations before the onset ofoperations may allay this fear.

•• The extensive involvement, localcontacts, and experience gained invarious nations make privateorganizations valuable sources ofinformation about local and regionalgovernments and civilian attitudestoward the operation.

•• While some organizations will seekthe protection afforded by the JTF or theuse of military aircraft to move reliefsupplies to overseas destinations, othersmay avoid a close affiliation with militaryforces, preferring autonomousoperations. Their rationale may be fearof compromising their position with thelocal populace or suspicion that militaryforces intend to take control of, influence,or even prevent their operations.Combatant command staff plannersshould consult these organizations, alongwith the host-country government (ifsovereign), to identify local issues andconcerns that should be reflected in theproposed PA guidance.

•• PA planning also should include theidentification of points of contact withNGO and PVO that will operate in anaffected area to arrange referrals of newsmedia queries regarding their operationsto an authorized spokesperson. Military

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Chapter II


spokespersons should comment on NGOand PVO operations based on guidanceprovided by the Office of the AssistantSecretary of Defense (Public Affairs)(OASD[PA]), in cooperation with the in-country HQ of the organization.

• Military Support of NGO and PVO

“What the military, in turn, needs tolearn is that while some NGO stillregard it as the very embodiment ofevil, there are today an increasingnumber of professional, business-likeNGO who depart sharply from the ‘flakydo-gooder’ label with which the militaryhas too long tagged them. The risksof degrading the performance of themilitary, which rightfully prides itself onorganization and discipline, to a ‘leastcommon denominator’ level throughassociation with UN agencies andNGO is minimized when all the teammembers can project their strengthsand focus their resources ....”

Walter S. Clarke, US ArmyPeacekeeping Institute and

Arthur E. (Gene) Dewey,Congressional Hunger Center

•• NCA may determine that it is in thenational interest to task US militaryforces with missions that bring theminto close contact with (if not supportof) NGO, PVO, UN relieforganizations, or the ICRC. In suchcircumstances, it is mutually beneficialto closely coordinate the activities of allparticipants.

•• A climate of cooperation betweenNGO, PVO, and the military forces

should be the goal. Taskings to supportNGO and PVO are normally for a short-term purpose due to extraordinary events.(1) In most situations, logistics,communications, and security arethose capabilities most needed by theNGO and PVO. (2) It is, however,crucial to remember that in suchmissions the role of the JTF should beto enable—not perform—NGO andPVO tasks. US military assistance hasfrequently proven to be the criticaldifference that enabled mission success.

• You also should understand that mutuallybeneficial arrangements between the JTFand NGO, PVO, and other agencies maybe critical to the success of the operation.

c. Additional Considerations for theCJTF

• Conduct planning, preparation, andtraining with NGO, PVO, and otheragencies prior to deployment and at othertimes, as appropriate and withinoperational constraints.

• Develop, with the NGO, PVO, and otheragencies, a list of common concepts,goals, and procedures at the operationallevel that can be used throughout theentire operation. In addition, you needto know the location of theseorganizations and agencies in the JOA.This may include the location of theirwarehouses and storage areas.

• Work with other military and civilianofficials to become aware of theresponsibilities, capabilities, goals and

For Example: In Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the joint task force’s mainsupport was to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner forRefugees. In Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE, the jointtask force worked closely with the World Food Bank, the United NationsChildren’s Fund, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

II-7


objectives, and limitations of civilorganizations, NGO, PVO, and militaryelements involved in peace operations.Remember that NGO and PVO areimportant resources who can provideexcellent information on local customs,infrastructure, local governmentstructure, procurement and pay scales,and relief assessments.

• Reinforce a positive attitude with yourstaff and other military personnel towardthe capabilities of NGO, PVO, and otheragencies. However, a number of theseorganizations and agencies may workin direct conflict to what you are tryingto accomplish. They often have verydifferent cultures, ideals, and agendasin comparison to the military.

• Coordinate with Commander in Chief,United States Transportation Commandany policy which envisions the use ofstrategic air, or any other DefenseTransportation System lift assets. In pastoperations, transportation of non-DODpersonnel (e.g., NGO, PVO) aboard USmilitary aircraft has been an issue.

• Understand as conditions improve in theJOA and the duration of the operationlengthens, agendas change to includethose of NGO and PVO—mutualcooperation may be more difficult toachieve.

• Share lessons learned with appropriateorganizations.

• Realize programs that are started mustbe sustainable once the JTF redeploys.Organizations such as NGO and PVO canprovide sustainability; this assists in thelong-term peace operations solution.

d. One means of fostering a relationshipbetween the JTF and NGO and PVO is todevelop a formal working arrangement within

the JOA. The creation of a CMOC (which isdiscussed subsequently in this chapter) mayfacilitate in solidifying this relationship.

“NGO are the most critical source ofinformation ... The role of the NGOcommunity is of paramount importance.They must participate, they mustadvise, and they must do it in a mannerconducive to a comprehensive effort.”

The U.S. Military / NGORelationship in Humanitarian

InterventionsChris Seiple

3. Civil-Military OperationsCenter

“The center [civil-military operationscenter] was an effective innovativemechanism, not only for operationalcoordination, but to bridge theinevitable gaps between military andcivilian perceptions. By developinggood personal relationships, the staffswere able to alleviate the concernsand anxieties of the relief community.”

Ambassador R. OakleyPresident’s Special Envoy for

Somalia

a. You must be able to work with allorganizations and groups to accomplish yourmission. A relationship must be developedbetween military forces, USG agencies,civilian authorities, involved international andregional organizations, NGO and PVO, andthe population.

• Conceptually, the CMOC is the meetingplace of these elements. Although not anew concept, the CMOC has beeneffectively employed as a means tocoordinate civil and military operationsand plays an execution role. The

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Civil-military operations center members meeting to coordinate activities.

organization of the CMOC is theater- andmission-dependent—flexible in size andcomposition. A commander at anyechelon may establish a CMOC tofacilitate coordination with otheragencies, departments, organizations, andthe HN. In fact, more than one CMOCmay be established in a JOA (such asoccurred in Rwanda), and each is task-organized based on the mission.

• The transition from conflict topostconflict or during HAO requires thesupported commander to shift supportpriorities toward accomplishment of thecivil-military operations (CMO) mission.Dedicating combat support and combatservice support assets for CMOemployment is one method by which youcan accomplish the mission and meet theneeds of the local population.

• During Operation SUPPORT HOPE inRwanda, the United Nations deployedan organization called the On-SiteOperations Coordination Center, whichhad essentially the same functions as a

CMOC and provided a clearinghouse fortransmitting CMOC responsibilities tothe United Nations. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Civil-MilitaryCooperation concept (more commonlyreferred to as a CIMIC) was developedto perform basically the same functionsas a CMOC.

b. You may form a CMOC as the actionteam to provide the following:

• Carry out guidance and institute CJTFdecisions regarding CMO.

• Perform liaison and coordinationbetween military capabilities and otheragencies, departments, and organizationsto meet the needs of the populace.

• Provide a partnership forum for militaryand other engaged organizations.

• Receive, validate, and coordinaterequests for support from the NGO, PVO,and regional and internationalorganizations. It is important to

II-9


remember that these organizationsmay very well attend CMOC meetingsbut may not consider themselvesmembers of the CMOC. Many of theseorganizations consider the CMOC as avenue for interagency discussions but notas an interagency forum.

c. It can be tailored to the specific tasksassociated with the collective national orinternational mission. In establishing theCMOC, you should build it from a nucleus oforganic operations; information exchange;and CA, logistics, legal, and communicationelements. You should invite representativesof other agencies that include the following:

• Liaisons from Service and functionalcomponents, and suppor t inginfrastructure, such as ports and airfields.

• USAID/OFDA representatives.

• Department of State, country team, andother USG representatives.

• Military liaison personnel fromparticipating countries.

• Host country or local government agencyrepresentatives.

• Representatives of regional andinternational organizations (e.g., UnitedNations High Commissioner forRefugees and ICRC).

• Representatives from NGO and PVO.

• The composition of a notional CMOC isillustrated in Figure II-1. It is not theintent of this figure to emphasize theCMOC as the center of coordination forall interagency activities but rather toillustrate organizations that the JTF maycoordinate with and hold discussionswith concerning an ongoing operation.

d. Political representatives may provide youwith avenues to satisfy operationalconsiderations and concerns, resulting inconsistency of military and political actions.Additionally, the CMOC forum appeals toNGO and PVO because it avoids guessworkby providing these organizations a single-point of coordination with the military for theirneeds, ensuring that the unified efforts of theJTF and the relief community are focusedwhen and where they are most needed.Although US forces may be latecomerscompared to many relief and IO, they bringconsiderable resources with them.

• It is incumbent on the military not todictate what will happen but to coordinatea team approach to problem resolution.

• You cannot direct interagencycooperation among engaged agencies.However, working together at the CMOCon issues like security, logistics support,information sharing, communications,and other items, as well as the shared goalof improving conditions for HNnationals, can build a cooperative spiritamong all participants.

e. CMOC usually conducts daily meetingsto identify components within the interagencyforum capable of fulfilling needs. Validatedrequests go to the appropriate JTF or agencyrepresentative for action.

f. CMOC tasks may include the following:

• Facilitate and coordinate activities of theJTF, other on-scene agencies, and higherechelons in the military chain ofcommand.

• Receive, validate, coordinate, and monitorrequests from humanitarian organizationsfor routine and emergency militarysupport.

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Figure II-1. Sample Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center

• Coordinate response to requests formilitary support with Servicecomponents.

• Coordinate requests to NGO and PVOfor their support.

• Coordinate with the DART deployed tothe scene by OFDA.

• Convene ad hoc mission planning groupsto address complex military missions thatsupport NGO and PVO requirements(examples include convoy escort andmanagement and security of refugeecamps and feeding centers).

• Convene follow-on assessment groups.

“In Somalia, a daily meeting was held where the NGO were briefed on the currentsituation from all military participants. A review of ongoing humanitarian actionswas briefed by NGO and security requests for throughout the country were processedby the assisting units. In addition, the CMOC served as the venue for UN humanitarianprograms to operate from. Organizations such as Food and Agriculture, Education,and Water held coordination meetings at the CMOC and developed nationwide plansfor operations in-country.”

US Army Forces, Somalia, 10th Mountain Division (Light)

UNICEF

World FoodProgramme

Department ofPeacekeepingOperations

HighCommissionerfor Refugees

CMOC

UN

MILITARY

NGOandPVO

RedCross

USGAGENCIES

OFDA/DART

Country Team

CARE

Doctors of theWorld

Save theChildren

InternationalRescueCommittee

Other Relief &BenefitOrganizations

UNCMOCNGOPVOUSG

OFDADARTICRC

UNICEF

United NationsCivil-Military Operations CenterNongovernmental OrganizationsPrivate Voluntary OrganizationsUnited States Government

Office of Foreign Disaster AssistanceDisaster Assistance Response TeamInternational Committee of the RedCross

United Nations Childrens Fund

LEGEND

AmericanRedCrossICRCOther Red Cross Bodies

SAMPLE COMPOSITION OF A CIVIL-MILITARYOPERATIONS CENTER

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• Coordinate PA matters.

• Provide situation reports regarding JTFoperations, security, and otherinformation for participants in thecollective effort.

• Chair port and airfield committeemeetings for space and access-relatedissues.

• Facilitate creation and organization of alogistics distribution system for food,water, and medical relief efforts.

• Support, as required, civic action teams.

• Maintain a resource database to assist inthe efficient and effective use of militaryand non-military assets.

g. JTF public affairs office (PAO) shouldattend daily CMOC meetings. As an activemember of the CMOC, the PAO should strive

to obtain a group consensus on messages andpress releases. This will not be an easy task.However, the PAO still should attempt toprovide information that is noncontradictoryin nature.

h. Overall management of a CMOC maybe assigned to a multinational forcecommander or shared by a US and amultinational commander. In a US military-managed CMOC, the J-3 normally isresponsible for the management of, orparticipation in, the CMOC. CMOC may be asuborganization of the Joint Civil-MilitaryOperations Task Force (JCMOTF) and theCMOC may have suborganizations toaccommodate military or geographicrequirements. The director of the CMOCmust have unlimited access to you.

i. For further detail see Joint Pub 3-08,“Interagency Coordination During JointOperations,” and Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrinefor Joint Civil Affairs.”

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIJOINT TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING

III-1

SECTION A. STAFF ORGANIZATION

others who have been associated with peaceoperations.

c. As a CJTF, you may organize the JTFHQ as necessary to carry out all duties andresponsibilities. Your organization, in part,will be based on what option is used to formthe JTF HQ.

• There are several options that may beused to form a JTF HQ (e.g., use astanding JTF HQ, augment a core Servicecomponent HQ, form ad hoc fromvarious contributors). You may not havea great deal of input into what option isselected—JTF establishing authority isthe “key decisionmaker.”

“Nothing that I have ever been taught prepared me for the mental jump neededto go from being Chief of Operations in NATO Army Group to being Chief ofStaff of a UN operation, where I had to bring together the staff from tendifferent nations and staff the deployment in less than 3 weeks from theSecurity Council Resolution.”

Major General R. A. Cordy-Simpson, UKAR

1. General

a. This section addresses the broad aspectsof staff organization to include highlighting anumber of your responsibilities as the CJTF.Additionally, this section provides anoverview of some of the responsibilities ofyour DCJTF, chief of staff, and personal staffgroup. Another section of this chapterdiscusses SOF as they relate to stafforganization.

b. All possible staff organization optionsare not reflected in this section. It does,however, underscore options andrecommendations gleaned from interviewswith former CJTFs, JTF staff officers, and

A diverse expert staff is essential.

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• Normally, the nucleus JTF staff is formedfrom an existing Service component HQ,usually not below the level of Army Corps,Marine Expeditionary Force, NumberedNavy Fleet, or Numbered Air Force.

• Whatever option is used, a buildingprocess will be necessary. Additionally,this process must support the mission andprovide the best opportunity for success.In this regard, it may be necessary tochange the names of various JTFfunctions (based on sensitivities) whenworking with organizations such as theUnited Nations.

“... the transparent nature of UNoperations is not conducive to activitiesinvolving such things as psychologicaloperations, intelligence, and publicaffairs. To satisfy the polit icalsensitivities involved, UNMIH [UnitedNations Mission in Haiti] would, hence,employ Military Information SupportTeams (MIST) [vice psychologicaloperations], gather information viceintelligence, use force protectionteams, as opposed to counter-intelligence teams, and do publicinformation instead of public affairs.”



• When fully formed, the JTF staff shouldbe composed of appropriate members inkey positions of responsibility from eachService or functional component orsubordinate task force having significantforces assigned to the command.

• One former CJTF stated that “at least85% of the JTF staff should be in placeand trained before the CJTF assumescommand.”

• See Appendix D, “Joint Task Force,” ofthis Handbook for further informationconcerning a JTF.

d. The following additional factors shouldbe considered when creating a staff:

• It must be composed of Service membersthat comprise significant elements of thejoint force. Positions on the staff shouldbe divided so that Service representationand influence generally reflect theService composition of the force. Inmany situations, members frommultinational forces will comprise partof your staff.

• Filling key positions of responsibilitywith members from Service, functionalcomponents, and subordinate task forceswill be based in part on the mission andtype of operations to be conducted (e.g.,predominantly ground operations—J-3should be from the United States Armyor United States Marine Corps). Aspreviously mentioned, members frommultinational forces also may play aprominent role on your staff.

• Force composition as it applies tocapabilities, limitations, and requiredsupport.

• The importance of knowing, trusting ,and being able to rely on key players mayrequire you to handpick some membersof your staff (e.g., chief of staff or J-3).This is important because personalitiesoften play a significant role on a staff andyou must be able to quickly reach acomfort level with key staff members.

“Trust—defined as total confidence inthe integrity, ability, and good characterof another—is one of the most importantingredients in building strong teams.”

Joint Pub 1, Joint W arfare of theArmed Forces of the United States

e. When mission requirements exceed yourstaff’s capabilities (e.g., qualified personnel,

III-3

Joint Task Force Organization and Staffing

facilities, or equipment), you must requestassistance through the JTF establishingauthority.

• JTF establishing authority should makeprovisions to furnish the necessarypersonnel, facilities, and equipment.

•• Often an establishing authority has a“cell” of experts prepared to augment aJTF to provide assistance in the earlystages of organization and planning (e.g.,United States Pacific Command’s andUnited States Atlantic Command’s(USACOM) Deployable Joint TaskForce Augmentation Cells, or UnitedStates European Command’s Joint Core).

•• In most situations, this “cell” isprepared to provide as much assistanceas you desire.

• Staff officers who augment the JTFnucleus from combatant commands orthe Services should be trained as partof a joint training and exercise program(e.g., USACOM’s training program forJTFs).

• The Services and combatant commandsshould ensure qualified personnel arenominated to fill JTF augmentationbillets. These augmentees should possessthe following attributes:

•• Knowledge, confidence, forcefulness.

•• Preparedness to represent theirServices and units.

•• An understanding that they are the defacto Service “experts.”

•• Ability to work as part of a joint team(no Service parochialism).

f. A staff and facilities orientationprogram should be established to ensure

all individuals joining the JTF staffbecome thoroughly familiar with theirsurroundings (e.g., work and HQ areas,living areas, key personnel).

• This could be accomplished throughestablishment of a joint personnel receptioncenter (JPRC) under the JTF J-1.

• Another program that could beestablished in conjunction with the JPRCor by itself is the “buddy system”—anexperienced JTF staff member is assignedto a new staff member to assist in thefamiliarization process.

• During operations in Somalia, MarineForces Somalia and SOF elementsformed a CFST to process incomingmultinational forces. (1) JTF recognizedthe value of the CFST and used it toensure the proper disposition of allincoming multinational forces.(2) CFST provided such things asprearrival planning, briefings, initialbilleting, and deployment within country.(3) SOF used a similar support teamconcept (Coalition Support Team) inHaiti (United Nations Mission in Haiti)to provide liaison to national forcecontingents. (4) For future operations,it may be worth establishing similar typeorganizations.

• Whatever the program, it should improvethe efficiency of the staff and lead tobuilding the joint team.

2. Commander, Joint TaskForce

Some of your many responsibilities areoutlined below. These are provided as a guideand will have to be adapted to your missionand forces assigned.

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a. Making recommendations to theestablishing authority on the properemployment of assigned and attached forcesand for the accomplishment of suchoperational missions as may be assigned bythe establishing commander.

b. Exercising OPCON over assigned andnormally over attached forces. Whenmultinational forces comprise part of the JTF,you must determine how best to establishcommand relationships with these forces toensure mission success. You also mustdetermine when forces will be transferred toyour OPCON (e.g., upon arrival in the JOA).

c. Developing a detailed OPORD orcampaign plan within the Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System (JOPES)crisis action planning guidelines as directedby the establishing authority. You determineapplicability of existing OPLANs, operationplans in concept format, functional plans, andcampaign plans, if any, to maximize thebenefits of prior deliberate planning.

d. Providing your commander’s intent.Additionally, you should provide your initialcommander’s critical informationrequirements (CCIRs) to the JTF staff andcomponents. CCIRs are a comprehensive listof information requirements identified by thecommander as being critical in facilitatingtimely information management and thedecisionmaking process that affect successfulmission accomplishment.

e. Requesting supplemental ROE neededto accomplish the assigned mission. This mayinclude requesting release authority for riotcontrol agents—do not delay this request—it requires NCA approval in wartime andapproval of the supported combatantcommander in peacetime.

f. Establishing combat identificationmeasures.

“US and allied pilots are to be trainedto identify US ground vehicles inBosnia. US DoD officials say that pilotsflying fixed-wing aircraft are expectedto receive their first familiarizationtraining in combat identification (ID) ofthe US vehicles. A similar programmeis being developed to familiarizeground forces of other IFOR[Implementation Force] coalit ionmembers with US ground combat IDsystems.

Jane’ s Defence W eeklyBarbara Starr

g. Notifying the establishing authoritywhen prepared to assume responsibility forthe assigned JOA.

h. Ensuring that cross-Service support isprovided and the force operates as an effective,mutually supporting joint team. See ChapterVI, “Logistics Support,” for further detail.

i. Determining the requirement for andproviding guidance on the establishment ofthe necessary boards, offices, centers, andbureaus (e.g., Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB),Joint Movement Center (JMC), CMOC, ROECell) to enhance operational efficiency.

• You should require the JTF proponent ofa joint board, office, center, cell, or bureauto provide criteria and supportingrationale for establishing it (i.e., purposeand authority) and its proposedmembership.

• You make the final decision on theestablishment of any board, office,center, cell, or bureau—if it is notrequired do not establish it.

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j. Defining the area of operations withinthe JOA for land and naval componentcommanders and a joint special operationsarea (JSOA) for use by a joint force specialoperations component. Identify JTF primaryand alternate airfields as well as JTF-designated no-fly zones to the air componentcommander.

k. Using assigned and attached forces tobest perform the mission. The organizationalstructure of the force will depend on themission to be fulfilled, the capabilities andstrength of the component elements of theforces assigned and attached, and the phasingof the contemplated operation.

• Identifying the requirement for additionalforces or personnel to the JTFestablishing authority. Ensure accurateaccountability of the forces that arerequired and that are actually deployedto the JOA.

•• The establishing authority is essentialin the process of obtaining additionalforces, equipment, information, and otherassets or data for the JTF. See AppendixD, “Joint Task Force,” of this Handbookfor additional information concerning anestablishing authority.

•• Daily contact with the establishingauthority or representative is critical tostay abreast of and keep fully informedof the situation.

“Close contact (more than on a dailybasis) with the supported combatantcommand is a must.”

Rear Admiral M. D. Haskins, USNCommander, Joint Task Force 160

• The requirement for units and personnelthat are found mostly in the ReserveComponents (such as CA, PSYOP, and

historians) also should be consideredeven though they may not be readilyavailable for deployment or employment.

l. Providing guidance to subordinate forcesfor planning and conducting operations toinclude responsibilities with respect tosupporting forces as directed by the JTFestablishing authority .

m. Monitoring the operational situationand, as required, keeping the JTF establishingauthority informed.

n. Coordinating with other forces andagencies not assigned or attached, includingfriendly forces and governments, USGagencies, NGO, PVO, or IO as appropriate.This coordination should exist throughout allphases of an operation.

o. Establishing, if necessary, a coordinatingprocedure for specific functions or activities(e.g., procedures for rear area security and/orreception of forces) among assigned, attached,and supporting forces.

p. Establishing the succession ofcommand.

q. Assigning to subordinate commanders,as necessary, those tasks needed to accomplishthe plan.

r. Providing guidance to subordinate forcesfor the planning and execution ofredeployment operations.

s. Requesting, through the supportedcombatant commander, the necessarydiscipline and courts-martial authority toensure “good order and discipline” can bemaintained throughout the operation.

t. Ensuring that the JTF HQ is organizedto support the basic tenets of informationoperations (IO)—may be a sensitive subjectin some environments.

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• IO focuses on the vulnerabilities andopportunities presented by the increasingdependence by the United States andsome of our adversaries on informationand information systems. At the tacticaland operational levels, the target of IO isthe information-dependent process,whether human or automated. Theestablishment of an IO Cell may benecessary to manage these activities.

“Perhaps no single factor has as muchpotential as the information explosionfor changing the way in which militaryorganizations function, both duringpeace and in war.”

Lieutenant General E. J. Rokke, USAFPresident of the National

Defense University

• For further detail see CJCSI 3210.01,“Joint Information Warfare Policy,”(classified secret) and Joint Pub 3-13,“Joint Doctrine for InformationOperations.”

u. Coordinating with the supportedcombatant commander in establishing arotation policy.

• JTF J-1 should recommend a policyconcerning tour lengths to you.

• A rotation policy may be based on theJTF’s mission, length of operation,operational environment, andrequirement for “skilled” personnel.

• A standard tour length for all personnelmay seem more equitable and impactmore favorably on morale but may notbe supportable from an operationalaspect.

• Tour length probably will be governedby the JTF’s mission.

• Other factors that may influence tourlength:

•• Supported combatant commander’sguidance.

•• Tour length for Reserve Componentunits and personnel.

•• Tour length for personnel ontemporary additional duty or temporaryduty.

•• Service policy.

•• Rotation policies of other participatingnations.

v. Ensuring policies have been establishedcovering such subjects as personal and unitawards; postal operations; morale, welfare,and recreation requirements; casualtyreporting; and other areas as required.

w. Incorporating the appropriateresponsibilities to build a cohesive team thatmay include multinational forces, NGO, PVO,interagency representatives, and others. Thisis a must—it cannot be just “lip service.”

“Apart from the staff, what about thecontingents? How do you build thisteam? There are many nationalitiesinvolved; in UNPROFOR [UnitedNations Protection Force], I believe,thirty nationalities are represented inthe military, with probably thirty or fortyother nationalities represented amongthe police and civilians there. Differentlanguages, different religions, differentraces, different cultures, different levelsof experience — how does acommander bring all these peopletogether and get them to work as ateam? That is probably the biggestchallenge that faces anyone selectedto do the job.”

Major-General Clive Milner,Canadian Army (RET)

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3. Deputy Commander, JTF

a. Normally, the DCJTF is not from thesame Service as yourself. In multinationaloperations, the DCJTF in all likelihood willbe a non-US officer. DCJTF selection maybe based on the type of mission assigned and/or the number and type of forces comprisingthe JTF.

b. Usually is of equal rank or senior in rankto the component commanders.

c. Should possess a broad understandingof the type of operation to be conducted.

d. May be dual-hatted as the chief of staff,although not recommended for large scaleor multinational operations.

e. Responsibilities of the DCJTF mayinclude:

• Assuming command if the commanderbecomes a casualty or is otherwiseincapacitated or unavailable to exercisecommand.

• Serving as principal assistant to thecommander.

• Performing special duties as directed byyou (e.g., chairs various committees, hascognizance of liaison personnel reportingto the JTF HQ, interagencycoordination).

• Working with the components to keepyou updated.

• Refining the relationship with thecomponents to ensure the most efficientand effective command relationships.

• Tracking your CCIRs to ensurecompliance.

4. Chief of Staff

Chief of staff responsibilities may include :

a. Functioning as your principal staffofficer and advisor. In most cases, the chiefof staff will come from the same Service asyourself—probably from the same command.

b. Coordinating and directing the work ofthe staff divisions—supervises the preparationof staff estimates, OPLANs, OPORDs, orcampaign plans. Must ensure staffcoordination.

c. Ensuring staff training is conducted,when appropriate.

d. Establishing a scheme to develop a dailyschedule for the JTF staff that emphasizescoordination, logic, and your CCIRs. It isimportant for the staff to be on a daily schedulethat allows them to accomplish all tasks inthe most effective and efficient manner.

• This schedule should depict a step-by-stepapproach that leads to accomplishing thetasks. Daily events (briefings, meetings,shift changes) should support each otherand follow a consistent pattern.

• This daily schedule may be referredto as the “JTF Daily OperationsCycle.” Figure III-1 depicts, strictly forillustrative purposes, a “JTF DailyOperations Cycle.”

e. Representing you when authorized.

f. Ensuring your decisions and concepts areimplemented by directing and assigning staffresponsibilities when necessary—review staffactions.

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g. Formulating and announcing staffpolicies (e.g., message releasing authority;procedures for developing, tracking, andresolution of requests for information; andappointment of security manager).

h. Maintaining a master policy file andmonitoring standing operating procedures(SOP).

i. Ensuring required liaison isestablished. Liaison personnel reporting tothe JTF HQ may fall under the cognizance ofthe chief of staff.

5. Commander, Joint TaskForce’s Personal Staff Group

Your “personal staff group” (e.g., politicaladvisor (POLAD), PAO, legal officer,surgeon, inspector general (IG), provostmarshal (PM), comptroller, chaplain, andothers as directed) becomes the focus of apeace operation more so than perhaps inconventional combat operations. This groupneeds to be directly accessible to you; it mustnot work in isolation. Following is a synopsisof various staff sections within this group.

a. Political Advisor

JOINT TASK FORCE DAILY OPERATIONS CYCLE

0630

0730

0730

0800

0900

1000

1300

1700

1830

2000

SHIFT CHANGE

SYNCHRONIZATION MTG

SITUATION UPDATE

TO CJTF

PLANS UPDATE

TO CJTF

CJFT's CONF CALL

TO COMPONENTS

JPG

SYNCHRONIZATION MTG

DAILY STAFF BRIEF

SHIFT CHANGE

JPG

JOC

BRIEFING ROOM

BRIEFING ROOM

BRIEFING ROOM

BRIEFING ROOM

JPG

BRIEFING ROOM

BRIEFING ROOM

JOC

JPG

BATTLE STAFF/OTHERS AS REQUIRED

AS REQUIRED

CJTF, DCJTF, CofS, IG, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4,

J-5, J-6, CJTF's PERSONAL STAFF

COMPONENT LIAISON,

OTHERS AS REQUIRED


J-5, J-6, CJTF's PERSONAL STAFF,

COMPONENT LIAISON,

OTHERS AS REQUIRED

CJTF, COMPONENT COMMANDERS

JPG

DCJTF, J-2, J-3, JFACC, COMPONENT LIAISON,

OTHERS AS REQUIRED


J-5, J-6, CJTF's PERSONAL STAFF,

COMPONENT LIAISON,

OTHERS AS REQUIRED

BATTLE STAFF/OTHERS AS REQUIRED

JPG

TIME: EVENT: LOCATION: PARTICIPANTS:

JOC Joint Operations CenterCJTF Commander, Joint Task ForceDCJTF Deputy Commander, Joint Task ForceCofS Chief of StaffIG Inspector GeneralJPG Joint Planning GroupJ1 Manpower and Personnel Directorate

of a joint staff

J2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staffJ3 Operations Directorate of a joint staffJ4 Logistics Directorate of a joint staffJ5 Plans Directorate of a joint staffJ6 Command, Control, Communications, and

Computer Systems Directorate of a joint staffMTG Meeting

Figure III-1. Joint Task Force Daily Operations Cycle

III-9


• The first step for you is to immediatelyestablish a close and efficient relationshipwith your political advisor. Thisindividual will be a force multiplier forthe JTF if properly used by you. Thepolitical advisor will ensure the countryteam leader is informed of your plans andprovide you with valuable informationthat will impact on operations—thePOLAD provides diplomaticconsiderations and enables informallinkage with embassies in the JOA andwith the Department of State.

• The POLAD supplies informationregarding policy goals and objectives ofthe Department of State that are relevantto the operation.

• Chapter IV, “Joint Task Force CommandResponsibilities,” provides further detailconcerning interagency and politicalcoordination.

b. Public Affairs and Media. See ChapterVIII, “Public Affairs and Media,” of thisHandbook.

c. Legal. See Chapter IX, “Legal,” of thisHandbook.

d. Surgeon

“Preventive medicine, veterinary, andcombat stress detachments were themost valuable assets of the entireforce. While these assets wereconsidered essential to maintaining thehealth of the force, it is important to notethat UN accepts World HealthOrganization Standards for food, water,medicine and immunizations when USstandards may be more rigorous. Costdifferences resulting from adherence tothese stricter standards must beabsorbed by the nation concerned.”



• Plan to deploy medical personnel early,as they are critical to the success of theoperation.

• The surgeon is responsible forestablishing, monitoring, and evaluatingjoint force health service support (HSS).

“Many peace operations will beconducted in areas where there is littleor no medical infrastructure. US forceswill be at risk from accidents and a widevariety of endemic diseases requiringextensive planning for surgical support,aeromedical evacuation, andappropriate immunizations andpreventive measures based upon thedisease threat. Environmental hazardsfrom ground, water, and air pollutionalso pose a threat to deployed forces.Evaluation of these potential threatscan not be simply evaluated ...evaluation and development ofcountermeasures is an ongoingprocess requiring constant monitoringby medical professionals.”

Colonel David W. Foxworth, USAUS European Command Deputy

Command Surgeon

Responsibilities of the surgeon include:

•• Preparing the HSS plan. This planshould define the scope of medical careto be delivered in detail, determine therequisite number of medical personnelrequired to staff the JTF surgeon’s office,and the types of units and personnelrequired to support the operation. TheHSS plan also should include a medicalsurveillance program. This program isnecessary to follow disease trends, detectdisease outbreaks, develop public healthpolicy, and to allocate resources.

•• Establishing, in conjunction with thesupported combatant command andothers (e.g., the United Nations), a policyconcerning medical care eligibility and

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an appropriate reimbursement forservices.

Medical Care Eligibility: Followingan agreement between the [UnitedStates Atlantic Command] and theUnited Nations, the US [UnitedStates Support Group Haiti] medicalfacility would provide Level II andmedical care to all UN forces (toinclude UN civilians) in Haiti.

•• Advising you on HSS aspects of theoperation; intratheater rest, rotation, andreconstitution; preventive medicine;blood policy and distribution system;dental; veterinary medicinerequirements; and other medical factorsthat could affect operations.

•• Informing you on the status of HSSunits and assistance required by andprovided to the civilian populace and USnationals.

•• Reviewing ongoing health programsof NGO and other civilian agencies inthe JOA, advising CA forces onhumanitarian and civic assistanceactivities within the JOA.

•• Coordinating HSS provided to orreceived from multinational forces orother friendly nations. This includescoordinating with other staff sections(e.g., legal, PA, CA, J-3, and J-4) todetermine the policy and standardsconcerning who are eligible beneficiariesof medical care, both routine andemergency, and under what conditions.

•• Establishing and coordinating acomprehensive medical logistics systemfor Class VIII A (medical materiel) andB (blood and fluids).

•• Supervising the activities of the

necessary medical cells, boards, andcenters established at the JTF level. Forexample: (1) Joint Patient MovementRequirements Center (JPMRC) isunder the control of the JTF surgeon, tocoordinate and control patientmovement, in terms of identifying bedspace requirements, the movement ofpatients within and out of the JOA.JPMRC also generates JTF plans, andschedules, to execute JTF’s patientevacuation to medical treatment facilitiesin accordance with the supportedcombatant commander’s Theater PatientMovement Requirements Center.JPMRC is established in conjunctionwith the Global Patient MovementRequirements Center. (2) JTF JointBlood Program Office (JBPO) isactivated on order of the supportedcombatant command and is within theoffice of the JTF surgeon. JTF’s JBPOis task-organized to plan, coordinate, anddirect the handling, storage, anddistribution of blood within the JOA. (3)There is a corresponding patientmovement center (Theater PatientMovement Requirements Center) andJBPO located at the supported combatantcommand level to assist the JTF.

•• Developing a plan for patientevacuation in coordination with theaterand component surgeons and the UnitedStates Transportation Command/SG(USTRANSCOM).

•• Developing a mass casualty responseplan.

•• Coordinating medical intelligencesupport for HSS organizations.

•• Developing an extensive preventivemedicine program, to include pre- andpost surveillance programs. (1)Evaluating infectious disease risks. (2)Determining the requirements for anentomologist for vector control. (3) SOF

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medical personnel are excellent sourcesfor medical requirements and infectiousdisease risk evaluation.

“Vector borne diseases, diarrhealdiseases, and respiratory diseasescontinue to be a significant threat todeployed forces and have the potentialof compromising their mission.Constant vigilance is required by theline and the medical communitieswithin the Services to ensure routinequality preventive measures areimplemented at all stages of anexercise or operation. Immunizationsand chemoprophylaxis, personalprotective measures, medicalsurveillance, and prompt public healthresponses are major tools used by theline and preventive medicinecommunities to ensure that operationalforces maintain the optimal level ofhealth and fitness. Relaxing standardsor underestimating the value ofPreventive Medicine measures can bedisastrous to the timely and successfulaccomplishment of a mission.”

Operation SEA SIGNAL

•• Providing technical assistance andadvice to the CMOC.

•• Ensuring liaison is established witheach component surgeon.

•• Resolving the JTF medical equipmentand supply requirements, as medical itemsfrequently require long-lead times andspecial handling.

•• Preparing the HSS plan and ANNEXQ (Medical Services) of your OPLAN,OPORD, or campaign plan. The HSSplan should include a medicalsurveillance program. This program isnecessary to follow disease trends, detectdisease outbreaks, develop public healthpolicy, and to allocate resources.

• The surgeon staff should be joint and ofsufficient size to accomplish jointcoordination of HSS initiatives,standardization and interoperability, andreview of component medical plans andoperations.

• There are many aspects of HSS supportthat the surgeon will have to coordinatethrough the JTF J-4.

• See Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine for HealthService Support in Joint Operations,” formore detail concerning HSS.

e. Inspector General. The role of the IGis as important across the range of militaryoperations as it is in a garrison-typeenvironment. You should strive to have thisfunction as part of the JTF. The IG should beexperienced in joint operations and be of agrade (particular rank) that is commensuratewith the overall JTF organization.

• Basic IG functions are inspecting,assisting, investigating, and training theforce.

• IG responsibilities may include:

•• Checking and instilling discipline,ethics, and standards in the JTF.

•• Serving as your unbiased consultantfor evaluating management andleadership procedures and practices.

•• Improving the force (while protectingthe rights of individuals) through timely,complete and impartial inquiries,investigations, and inspections.

•• Conducting investigations andinquiries to determine the state ofreadiness, economy, efficiency,discipline, and morale of all JTF-leveland subordinate units.

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•• Providing reports and assessments onmatters relating to C2 and support ofassigned forces and joint operationalreadiness.

•• Interfacing with interagencyorganizations to assist in resolvingdifferences with the JTF.

f. Provost Marshal

• JTF PM is capable of developing andissuing policies, programs, and guidancefor the planning and conduct of militarypolice operations.

• Responsibilities of the PM may include:

•• Detainee and counterintelligence (CI)collection, processing, and reporting.

•• Force protection and physical securitypolicy. The PM, based on uniqueexperience and training, advises you ontechnical and procedural aspects ofphysical security and force protection.

•• Law enforcement policy and civilianpolice liaison. The PM provides you witha focal point on all matters of lawenforcement planning, policy, andreporting. In addition, the PM providesa liaison for you with local and othercivilian law enforcement authorities inthe JOA.

•• Military and security police planning.Based on your intent and operationalconcept, the PM can recommend waysin which military and security policecapabilities can best support the JTF’smission.

g. Comptroller

For success, it is essential that a policy bedeveloped for “funding” the peace operation.

This may be one of your most complex andtime-consuming tasks.

• Finance management support to the JTFincludes financial services and resourcemanagement functions.

• Responsibilities of the JTF comptrollermay include:

•• Serve as your principal financialmanagement advisor.

•• Represent you in identifying JTFresource and financial service needs tothe supported combatant commander,components, and others as required.

•• Establish JOA financial managementresponsibilities. Coordinate thedesignation of lead executive agents forspecific financial management functionsor special support requirements.

•• Provide estimates of resourcerequirements to the supported combatantcommander, component commands, andothers as required.

•• Establish positive controls overfunding authority received.

•• Coordinate with the JTF J-4 todevelop a system for prevention of fraud,waste, and abuse.

•• Coordinate with the JTF SJA officeon funding authority issues.

•• Handle reimbursement for services(e.g., medical services) provided tomultinational forces and others.

•• Prepare Appendix 3 Finance andDisbursing of ANNEX E (Personnel) ofyour OPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan.

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h. Chaplain

“Religion plays a pivotal role in the self-understanding of many young peopleand has a significant effect on thegoals, objectives, and structure ofsociety. In some cases, religious self-u n d e r s t a n d i n g m a y p l a y adeterminative or regulating role onpolicy, strategy, or tactics. It isimportant for the joint force commander(JFC) to have an understanding of thereligious groups and movements withinthe operational area and the potentialimpact that they may have on theaccomplishment of the assignedmission.”

Joint Pub 1-05, Religious MinistrySupport for Joint Operations

• Recommend deployment of chaplainministry teams as early as feasible.

• The JTF chaplain has responsibilitiesassociated with almost all facets of anoperation. For example the chaplain:

•• Advises you on religion, morals,ethics, and morale.

•• Performs ministry according to his orher respective faith group and Servicepractices and standards, expanding thespectrum of professional expectations tomeet the requirements.

•• Ensures that task force religioussupport personnel of all Services receiveprofessional assistance, program funding,and logistics and personnel throughappropriate JTF staff channels;establishes and coordinates a Task ForceReligious Ministry Support Plan that willprovide adequate chaplain coverage toall elements of the task force; andrecommends personnel replacement or

rotational policies to cognizant JTF staffagencies.

•• Assists humanitarian agencies and CAwith humanitarian and disaster-reliefprograms.

•• Ensures that detained persons receiveministry and care appropriate to theirneeds.

•• Prepares Appendix 6 (ChaplainActivities) to ANNEX E of yourOPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan.

• The chaplain also may be better attunedto the religious sensitivities in the JOAwhich in peace operations may be a majorfactor in reaching the desired end state.

• Additionally, the chaplain providesconfidentiality and privilegedcommunications in counseling for JTFpersonnel—imperative for stressmanagement, morale, and earlyidentification of critical personnelproblems.

• See Joint Pub 1-05, “Religious MinistrySupport for Joint Operations,” for furtherdetail.

6. Other Staff RequirementConsiderations

a. The successful commander integratesother functions (e.g., civilian organizations,political representatives, and military) into thestaff and planning process. The following areadditional staffing considerations.

• Linguists and Interpreters. They arecritical to mission success.

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Chapter III


“Linguists were essential to thesuccess of Operation UPHOLDDEMOCRACY.”

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACYJoint After Action Report

US Atlantic Command

•• You must identify the requirement forlinguists and interpreters as early aspossible because of the scarcity of theseassets and the long-lead time required todeploy them. (Historically, the timelyand complete sourcing of linguists andinterpreters has been a problem thatsignificantly impacted both personneltempo and JTF operations.)

•• Communications with the localpopulace and multinational forces can begreatly hindered without linguists orinterpreter support. The ability tocommunicate in English should not beconsidered a given.

•• These assets often are in the ReserveComponent and must be requested earlyto ensure availability and timeliness fordeployment and employment.

In past operations (e.g., OperationsDESERT STORM, RESTORE HOPE,and JOINT ENDEAVOR), the USmilitary used contracted interpretersto support operations. While this isacceptable for many requirements,some sensitive positions willinvariably require military linguistswith appropriate security clearances.In cases of less common languages,JTF components may requireparent Service or other Serviceaugmentation.

• JTF Liaison Personnel

“During [Operation] JUST CAUSE, I hadgood, competent liaison officers; not justto keep me informed of what theirrespective units were doing, but to alsoconvey to their units how the battle wasgoing. They are crucial to success, andyou have to pick your best people .They have to have the moxie to standup in front of a two or four star general,and brief him what their commander isthinking, their unit’s capabilities, andmake recommendations.”

Lieutenant General C. W. Stiner, USACommander,

Joint Task Force SouthOperation JUST CAUSE

•• You must identify the requirement forliaison personnel and request them at theearliest opportunity. Per this request, anyspecific qualifications and functions forthese personnel also should be noted. Therequirement may be for liaison cells viceindividuals because of the many requiredfunctions that must be covered on a 24-hour basis.

•• The JTF should establ ish afamiliarization program for all liaisonpersonnel—a JPRC could perform thisrequirement. You must determine whatstaff officer or staff section will haveoverall cognizance of all liaison personnelreporting to the JTF HQ for duty (e.g.,DCJTF, chief of staff, or J-3).

•• The maximum use of liaisonpersonnel will enhance interoperabilityand contribute significantly to missionsuccess.

•• Liaison personnel should beestablished between the JTF HQ and

III-15


higher commands, between adjacentunits, and between supporting, attached,and assigned forces, and otherappropriate host nation (HN) and IO, andthe JTF HQ. (1) Liaison personnel tothe JTF HQ perform their duties withinthe JTF staff division that is normallyresponsible for JTF functions related tothe liaison personnel’s assigned duties.(2) They are representatives of theircommanders and normally will attendbriefings and maintain close contact withthe JTF joint operations center. (3) Itwould be advantageous to the JTF duringsupport to UN operations that liaisonpersonnel be placed at the United NationsHQ in New York and the United Nationsoffice in Geneva, Switzerland.

LIAISON FUNCTIONS

Monitor, coordinate, advise, and assistthe command to which attached.

•• Liaison personnel must be thoroughlyfamiliar with the capabilities andlimitations of their parent units andServices. Without these qualificationsthey are of little value to the gaining HQ.

•• Component liaison personnel to theJTF HQ should be of sufficient rank(recommend grade of 0-6) to influencethe decisionmaking process. (1) Liaisonpersonnel may be authorized to answercertain routine CJTF queries on behalfof their commands. (2) In addition, youshould not formally task componentsthrough the component liaison personnelto the JTF HQ. Formal tasking ofcomponents should be accomplishedthrough normal C2 channels.

• Command Historian. All too often, keyevents, important decisions, and “how

to’s” of an operation are not recorded andthus not available for use as learning toolsfor future JTFs.

“The historian needs the sameimmediate, routine access to commandmeetings and sources as the legaladvisor, public affairs officer, politicaladvisor, and operations officer. Withoutdirectly observing discussions andactions, the historian only can producea general organizational overview.That record will neither permit adetailed analysis of lessons nor supportthe commander if his judgment is laterchallenged on specific decisions andoutcomes. And the commander canexpect his judgment to be challenged.”

Captain J. W. Williams, USNRImplementation Force Historian

•• To remedy this situation,consideration should be given toestablishing a small staff section to collecthistorical information covering the manyaspects of an operation from the initialplanning process to redeployment. Alessons learned cell may serve the samepurpose.

•• This section would be headed by acommand historian who could beresponsible for capturing and recordingJTF events for historical purposes,collecting lessons learned, ensuringturnover files are properly developed, andassisting in the development of SOP. (1)This process would include collectingand cataloguing photographs. (2)Additionally, the historian would ensurea daily record is kept on all importantevents. (3) To be credible—hence,useful to the commander—thehistorical record must be created at thetime of an event and must include thesources available at the time, as well as asynopsis of rationales for the course ofaction adopted.

•• Cognizance of this staff section will

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be as directed by you. (1) This staffsection probably would require someindependence to be effective. (2) It alsoshould not become entangled in thedecisionmaking process.

•• Other methods may be available torecord historical data but having a singlestaff section dedicated to accomplishingthis task would appear to be moreproductive and practical.

• Command Stenographer

•• The command stenographer allows forthe transcription of comments anddiscussions at your daily situation or staffbriefings.

•• The stenographer also can transcribediscussions at key decisionmakingsessions.

All three commanders of theImplementation Force [Bosnia]acquired such a stenographer andfound them extremely useful.

•• Transcripts should be reviewed,corrected, and validated by yourself ordesignee. Transcripts, combined with acopy of briefing slides and briefer notesor information papers, provide acommon, verified reference for you andthe staff. Ultimately these items shouldpass to the historian for the permanentrecord. These items may provide the onlyreliable record of decisionmaking.

• Contracting Officer

•• It is essential to have contractingpersonnel as part of your organization.

•• Contracting is essential in providingsupplies, services, and equipment thatcannot be deployed from home station.

•• For the JTF to successfully conductcontracting, highly trained contractingpersonnel are required.

•• See Chapter VI, “Logistics Support,”of this Handbook for more detail oncontracting.

• Joint Planning Group

•• The expeditionary nature of mostrecent and probably most future JTFoperations requires great flexibility inboth planning and execution of theseoperations. J-3 and J-5 personnel inparticular must work closely together toensure your intent is captured in planningand implemented in execution.

•• Formation of a JPG will facilitate theseefforts.

•• The decision on the organization andfunctions of the JPG should bedetermined by you at the onset oforganizing the JTF.

•• Furthermore, it must be made clearhow the JPG and staff sections (especiallythe J-3 and J-5) will interact duringplanning and once operations commence.

•• Suggested purposes for the JPG areto conduct crisis action planning, be thefocal point for OPORD or campaign plandevelopment, perform future planning,and accomplish other tasks asdirected. Another option available forfuture planning is to establish a “futureoperations cell” under the JTF J-3.

•• JPG is composed of representativesfrom appropriate JTF staff sections,components (Service and functional),and others as deemed necessary.

•• See Joint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint TaskForce Planning Guidance andProcedures,” for further detail.

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• Joint Visitors Bureau. The anticipatedinflux of visitors to a JOA may warrantthe establishment of a JTF JVB.

•• This bureau can assist in handlingall visitors but especially distinguishedv is i to rs—usua l l y a fu l l - t imeresponsibility.

“Visitors can also place demands onyour time. They all think they areimportant. Prime ministers, ministersof defence, chiefs of staff, chiefs ofpolice, diplomats, politicians, themedia, staff from UN Headquarters —they will visit a mission area in droves.All of them want to see the commander.It takes a lot of patience and a lot ofendurance, and your time and scheduleis very difficult to manage but,remember, you also have to be outthere with the troops from time to time.”

Major-General Clive Milner,Canadian Army (RET)

•• A senior officer should be the directorof the JVB. Reservists with a protocolbackground have been used in thisposition in past operations.

•• The JVB should be established as aseparate entity and not as part of the JointInformation Bureau (JIB) or PA office.It can work directly for you, DCJTF, orchief of staff.

•• It should be comprised ofrepresentatives from the components.

•• Possessing sufficient communicationsand transportation capability is vital tothe JVB.

•• Personnel assigned to the JVB mayrequire security training (e.g., executiveprotection, antiterrorism, patrolling,communications) and training in theproper handling of distinguished visitors.

• Automated Data ProcessingOperators

•• Your staff should include experiencedoperators for the Global Command andControl System (GCCS), and JOPES.

•• These individuals will be majorcontributors in assisting with deploymentand redeployment of forces andmanaging the time-phased force anddeployment data.

• Special Operations Forces. See SectionB, Special Operations Forces,” ChapterIII, “Joint Task Force Organization andStaffing,” of this Handbook.

• Civil-Military Relations . Chapter II,“Civil-Military Relations,” of thisHandbook discusses civil-militaryrelations.

• Intelligence. See Chapter VII,“Intelligence Support,” of thisHandbook.

• Multinational Members. US-led JTFsshould expect to participate as part of amultinational force in most future peaceoperations. In this instance multinationalmembers should be part of the JTF HQstaff.

•• This may allow you to gain insight intothe capabilities of their respective forcesearly in an operation and also benefit fromtheir expertise. A policy for releasingclassified information to multinationalstaff members will be required.

•• Multinational members should betreated with trust and respect—the USstaff members will follow your lead.

b. The military staff that remains narrowlyfocused may hinder success—any signs of“stovepipe” thinking should be eliminated.

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7. General

a. Special Operations Forces. SOF arevery valuable assets to a JTF. They possessunique capabilities and often are capable ofachieving success where more conventionalforces may falter. SOF are area oriented andusually have personnel experienced andconversant in the languages and cultures foundin the JOA. SOF units can assist you withliaison and Coalition Support Teams tofacilitate interoperability with multinationalforces. When the use of SOF is considered, itis very important to understand the capabilitiesof SOF and to properly apply thosecapabilities. For further details, see Joint Pubs3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,”3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations OperationalProcedures,” and 3-05.5, “Joint SpecialOperations Targeting and Mission PlanningProcedures.”

b. Joint Force Special OperationsComponent Commander (JFSOCC)

• You may designate a JFSOCC toaccomplish a specific mission or controlSOF in the JOA.

•• JFSOCC normally will be thecommander with the preponderance ofSOF and the requisite C2.

•• Normally, the JFSOCC is thecommander of a joint special operationstask force (JSOTF). (1) Usually, theJFSOCC exercises day-to-day C2 ofassigned or attached forces. (2) JFSOCCallocates forces against strategic or

operational tasks and in support of otherJTF component commanders based onguidance from the CJTF.

• You may define a JSOA for use by theJSOTF. The establishment of a JSOAmay delineate and facilitate simultaneousconventional and special operations inthe same general operational area.

c. Two capabilities of SOF that, at times,are overlooked are CA and PSYOP.

“The former supporting functions of civilaffairs and psychological operationswill become a centerpiece of peaceoperations and a much more criticalpart of your daily responsibilities.”

AnonymousOperation RESTORE HOPE

• The implementation of CA and PSYOPoperations is your responsibility.

• CA and PSYOP personnel and units areforce multipliers and should become anintegral part of mission planning. TheUnited States Special OperationsCommand includes all active and reservespecial operations, US Armypsychological operations, and civil affairsforces (except for Marine Corps ReserveCivil Affairs Groups) stationed in theUnited States. Active component CApersonnel are “generalists” who providea quick response CA capability to theJTF. They may require augmentation by

SECTION B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

“Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was a tremendous success, and JTF-Alpha’s Special Forces Teams were the only ones who could haveaccomplished the mission in the mountains.”

Center for Army Lessons Learned Number 92-6 Dec 92

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CA specialists from the ReserveComponent who may not be immediatelyavailable for deployment or employment.PSYOP capabilities within the activecomponent include both planning andexecution assets that are regionallyoriented and immediately deployable.

• You must determine where in the JTForganization these assets best fit—asfunctional components, under the J-3, orsome other structure. Both the CA andPSYOP supporting operations developedby the respective staff officers of the JTFare integrated into the operation order bythe J-3. Due to the political sensitivityof these areas, approval authority forthese operations normally remains withthe NCA or Office of the AssistantSecretary of Defense (SpecialOperations/Low Intensity Conflict)(OASD (SO/LIC)). However, theimplementation of these operationsremains with you.

• At the earliest opportunity, you mustidentify to the JTF establishing authoritythe requirement for CA and PSYOP unitsand staff augmentation.

•• These units often require ReserveComponent augmentation to be fullycapable. This should be taken intoconsideration when requesting theseassets because of the process and leadtime necessary to obtain them.

•• The legal limitations of reserve call-up must be explored. Joint Pub 4-05,“Joint Doctrine for MobilizationPlanning,” provides insight intoadditional methods of force expansion

(e.g., use of volunteers and PresidentialSelected Reserve Callup).

“I think all our conventional leaders andcommanders need to understand andwork more closely with SpecialOperations forces—Special ForcesOperational Detachments, Civil Affairs,and PSYOP teams. This marriagemust occur; we’ve got to force it. Wecannot succeed on the modernbattlefield without cooperation amongthese elements.”

Brigadier GeneralL. Magruder, III, USA

Commanding General,Joint Readiness Training Center

• CA, PSYOP, and PA actions candramatically affect the perceivedlegitimacy of peace operations. CAactions should reinforce (and bereinforced by) PSYOP themes andactions. PSYOP themes and actionsshould be coordinated with PAOinitiatives to avoid creating a dichotomy(real or perceived).

• It is particularly important to bringfunctional activities not normallyassociated with your staff to theirattention since most staffs areconcerned with “warfighting” vice“peace operations.”

8. Civil Affairs

a. CA encompasses the activities that youtake to establish and maintain relationsbetween your forces and the civil authoritiesand general population, resources, and

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institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areaswhere your forces are employed.

• You plan and conduct CA activities tofacilitate military operations and helpachieve political-military objectivesderived from US national securityinterests. In multinational operations,political-military objectives will bederived from some sort of compromisebetween participating nations.

• Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may entail interactionbetween US, multinational, andindigenous security forces, andgovernmental and nongovernmentalagencies as part of your mission.

• These activities may occur before,during, subsequent to, or in the absenceof other military actions.

b. Civil-Military Operations

• The term “civil-military operations” is abroad, generic term used to denote thedecisive and timely application ofmilitary capabilities to enhance therelationship between the military andcivilian populace in order to ensureaccomplishment of your mission. CMOrange from support to combat operationsto traditional nonmilitary roles assistingcountries in bringing about political,economic, and social stability.

• CMO are undertaken to encourage thedevelopment of a country’s material andhuman resources to assist in achievingUS and host-government political,economic, and psychological objectives.CMO involve liaison and coordinationamong US, multinational, andindigenous security forces, and amongUS forces and other government agenciesas well as NGO or PVO.

•• A variety of types of units, includingengineer, medical, intell igence,security, special forces, PSYOP, CA,communications, and transportationprovide capabilities, in varying degrees,to plan and conduct CMO and achievepolitical, economic, and psychologicalobjectives.

•• Dedicated CA forces, by virtue of theirarea and linguistic orientation, culturalawareness, experience in military-to-host-nation advisory and assistanceactivities, as well as in civil-orientedfunctions paralleling governmentalfunctions, are essential in CMO designedto secure support from the civilianpopulation, fulfill essential civilrequirements consistent with militarymissions, and create as positive an effectas possible on friends, allies, and HNcounterparts and governments.

• As a fundamental precept, CMO shouldbe closely coordinated with the CountryTeam and other USG agencies. Mostmilitary responses or efforts, especiallythose in MOOTW, require the military-civil partnership that successful CMOprovide. Successful CMO should usemilitary CA functional specialty skills butdo not necessarily require their use. Inall cases, actions by the Armed Forcesof the United States should support thehost or friendly country’s control overCMO programs and enhance popularperceptions of its stability and legitimacy.

• Joint Civil-Military Operations TaskForce. JCMOTF is normally a US jointforce organization, similar inorganization to a joint special operationstask force or JTF, flexible in size andcomposition depending on missioncircumstances. It may be developed tomeet a specific CMO contingencymission. You may organize JCMOTFs

III-21


to perform some or all of the followingCMO-relevant functions:

•• Provide C2 or direction of military HNadvisory, assessment, planning, and otherassistance activities by joint US forces.

•• Help establish US or multinational andmilitary-to-civil links for greaterunderstanding and efficiency ofcooperative assistance arrangements andpromote unity of effort.

•• Perform essential coordination orliaison with HN agencies, Country Team,UN agencies, other USG agencies, anddeployed US, multinational, and HNmilitary forces and supporting logisticsorganizations.

•• Assist in the planning and conduct ofcivil information programs to publicizepositive results and objectives of militaryassistance projects, to build civilacceptance and support of US operations,and to promote indigenous capabilitiescontributing to recovery and economic-social development.

•• Plan and conduct joint andmultinational CMO training exercises.

•• Allocate resources and sustain andcoordinate combat support or combatservice support elements, includingnecessary medical, transportation,military police, engineer, and associatedmaintenance and communicationscapabilities.

•• Advise and assist in strengthening orstabilizing civil infrastructures andservices and otherwise facilitatetransition to peacekeeping orconsolidation operations and associatedhand-off to other USG agency,international organization, or HNresponsibility.

•• Assess or identify HN civil support,relief, or funding requirements to thesupported combatant commander.

•• Advise you on policy; funding;multinational, foreign, or HNsensitivities; and their effect on theaterstrategy and/or campaign and operationalmissions.

c. CA Support to Military Operations

• Although the types of operations differacross the range of military operations,the basic CA objectives and CA-relevantfunctions of commanders, staffs, andsupporting CA elements and personnelremain the same.

• CA functional capabilities that span therange of military operations include, butare not limited to, any combination ofthe following:

•• Preparing CA assessments,estimates, agreements, and annexes inaccordance with JOPES—CA personnelare responsible for developing ANNEXG (Civil Affairs) of your OPLAN,OPORD, or campaign plan.

•• Assisting in the planning andcoordination of logistics activities. CAactivities plan for the followinglogistics activities: (1) Support formilitary forces from civilian resources toinclude such items as subsistence, water,billeting, cargo handling, transportation,limited spare parts, emergency medicalsupport, and both skilled and unskilledlabor. (2) Facilitate host-nation support(HNS) and contracting to US and/orfriendly forces in multinationaloperations following guidance andprocedures specified in the supportedcombatant commander’s OPLAN. (3)Support requirements and sourcing

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Chapter III


(estimated in OPLAN) for civilianpopulation and agencies. (4) Assist,supervise, or control self-supportingcivilian sector operations.

•• Assisting commanders, incoordination with the CJTF’s SJA, infulfilling lawful and humanitarianobligations to the civil or indigenouspopulation and ensuring CA activities areconsistent with international law,including the law of armed conflict, treatyobligations, and US law.

•• Minimizing local populationinterference with US military operationsby coordinating with civil agencies orauthorities to implement population andresource controls.

•• Supporting and coordinatingCMO , such as humanitarian assistanceand disaster relief, in concert with DODelements, other USG agencies, foreignor HN authorities, and NGO and PVOto reduce serious threat to health, life, andproperty and to project positive USinfluence in the JOA.

•• Assisting in the establishment andmaintenance of liaison or dialogue withindigenous personnel, agencies, and/orcivilian organizations to support nationaland regional information programs andother efforts that favorably portray USor multinational military operations.

d. For further detail see Joint Pub 3-57,“Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

9. Psychological Operations

a. PSYOP are operations planned toconvey selected information and indicators toforeign audiences to influence their emotions,motives, objective reasoning, and ultimatelythe behavior of foreign governments,

organizations, groups, and individuals. Thepurpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforceforeign attitudes and behavior favorable to theoriginator’s objectives. PSYOP are a vitalpart of the broad range of US political,military, economic, and informationalactivities. These all impact on peaceoperations.

b. The Under Secretary of Defense forPolicy or designee, the Assistant Secretaryof Defense (Special Operations/LowIntensity Conflict) reviews and approvesall PSYOP programs. The supportedcombatant commander’s PSYOP staff officeris the conduit for achieving this permissionand the PSYOP forces required to executePSYOP.

c. Ensure you have and exercise approvalauthority over PSYOP products, activities,and programs. Coordination between PAO,CA, political advisor, and PSYOP isimperative. While the PAO effort is focusedtowards the international and US media,PSYOP efforts are directed towards achievingyour objectives through communicating withthe local and regional audience.

d. PSYOP are employed by you tocommunicate with the local and targetaudiences. Some critical objectives of PSYOPmay include:

• Enhancing safety and security of theforce by: (1) Explaining the JTFmission and forestalling the developmentof false expectations. (2) Providing anonthreatening means for communicatingwith the local populace.

• Facilitating the conduct of operations byproviding you with the forum forproviding instructions to the localpopulace.

e. Joint Psychological Operations TaskForce (JPOTF)

III-23


• You may determine through the missionanalysis process that a JPOTF is requiredto coordinate PSYOP activities in theJOA.

• JPOTF is task organized in accordancewith requirements of the supportedcommanders and may include all or someof the following elements: loudspeakerteams, Product Development Center, C2element, and print, radio, and/ortelevision production and broadcastelements.

• JPOTF may provide the followingcapability.

•• Advise you on PSYOP.

•• Conduct PSYOP planning andexecution.

•• Analyze various COA.

•• Produce PSYOP products.

•• Coordinate with other subordinatetask forces and components to ensure themost efficient support is provided to you.

•• Conduct PSYOP disseminationoperations.

•• Evaluate the results of PSYOP.

•• Conduct liaison with HN agencies andother USG organizations.

•• Establish combat identificationstanding operating procedures and otherdirectives based on your guidance.

f. PSYOP personnel are responsible fordeveloping Appendix 4 PsychologicalOperations of ANNEX C (Operations) of yourOPLAN, OPORD, or campaign plan.

g. For further detail see Joint Pub 3-53,“Doctrine for Joint PsychologicalOperations.”

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVJOINT TASK FORCE COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

IV-1

1. General

a. You must establish unity of commandthroughout the JTF’s organizational structureand procedures. The success of the peaceoperation begins with you having the authorityto direct operations of all assigned or attachedmilitary forces.

• To accomplish your mission, you willhave to refocus your thinking from“warfighting” to peace operations,particularly for peacekeeping. Thisshould not be interpreted as de-emphasizing warfighting. It simplymeans that peace operations haveuncertainties that require a different view.

• The commander with vision and a totalunderstanding of the “big picture” ismore apt to be successful in peaceoperations than the commander who isnarrowly and solely focused onwarfighting. The major objective of apeace operation is a settlement, not avictory. All concerned parties mustrecognize there is more to gain frompeace than conflict. Achieving this goalexceeds the abilities of any military force;

hence, the need to understand the “bigpicture” and its political and economicfacets.

“One cannot succeed with peaceoperations if one allows subordinatecommanders and men in the field togive way to their natural inclinations,and act the way they are trained to actin war. With proper measures, goodcommanders can make the distinctionunderstood up and down the line, anddo so without losing the ability torespond fast and forcefully should therebe a situation which calls for it.”

Ambassador R. OakleyPresident’s Special Envoy

for Somalia

b. An important first step for you is toimmediately establish connectivity withhigher authority (e.g., the supportedcombatant commander, UN representative,regional organization representative).

• The earlier this connectivity isestablished, the more enhanced capabilitywill be available to you and the JTF staff.

“The tools that have been developed to help us fight our wars do not need tobe changed; they work and work well. The key is to train leaders at everylevel to be flexible, mentally agile, and able to adapt their learnings to theenvironment in which they find themselves. They must take the time tostudy and understand the military, political, economical, and socialenvironment. Additionally [in the event of a UN operation], they mustunderstand the unique nature of the UN and its system of operation andorganization.”

Major General J. W. Kinzer, USAForce Commander, United Nations Mission in Haiti

SECTION A. COMMAND, CONTROL, ANDCOMMUNICATIONS

IV-2

Chapter IV


•• Higher authority (e.g., thesupported combatant commander)holds the key to obtaining forces,equipment, information, and otherassets and data. Your personal dailycontact with this individual ororganization is critical.

•• This is especially important becauseyou must be prepared to accept theresponsibility for detailed planning andimmediate execution. An initial responseto the situation may be required in a veryshort period—US forces may be the onlyforce initially available for employment.Sound staff organization will help in theplanning and execution process.

•• Your planning should consider that forcerequirements normally are based on thecapability required to gain control of thesituation and effect the desired end state.

“Our military’s successes in Haitiand Bosnia came because theyestablished, through intimidation andthe threat of overwhelming force, asecure environment through theexercise of military power and militaryprowess ....”

For the RecordWashington Post

• The supported combatant commanderalso can help in limiting the number ofnonessential US military personnel(“strap-hangers”) in the projected JOA.You cannot afford to become a “touristbureau.”

2. Chain of Command

a. US Policy:

• The President retains and will neverrelinquish command authority over US

forces. The JTF will remain within theUS chain of command.

• On a case-by-case basis, the Presidentwill consider placing appropriate USforces under the operational control of acompetent foreign multinationalcommander.

“It i s s o m e t i m e s p r u d e n t o radvantageous (for reasons such asmaximizing military effectiveness andensuring unity of command) to place USforces under the operational control of aforeign commander to achieve specifiedmilitary objectives. In making thisdetermination, factors such as themission, the size of the proposed USforce, the risks involved, anticipatedduration, and rules of engagement willbe carefully considered.”

Presidential Decision Directive 25

• Any large scale participation of US forcesin a major peace enforcement missionthat is likely to involve combat shouldordinarily be conducted under USOPCON or through competent regionalorganizations such as NATO. FigureIV-1 delineates levels of commandrelationships for the JTF.

• Normally, your JTF chain of commandruns through the supported combatantcommander to the NCA. The Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting as theprincipal military advisor to thePresident, the National Security Council,and the Secretary of Defense also maybe involved in matters relating to the JTF.

b. UN Policy

• UN peacekeeping operations areestablished by the Security Council andfall under its authority. The Secretary-General is responsible to the SecurityCouncil for the organization, conduct,

IV-3

Joint Task Force Command Responsibilities

and direction of the operation, and he orshe alone reports to the Security Council.To better direct and control UNpeacekeeping operations, the Departmentof Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO)was established.

• The Special Representative of theSecretary-General usually will be thehead of mission in a UN conducted peaceoperation. This representative is theUN’s “power broker” as the USambassador is in a US run operation.

•• The JTF will be under the operationalcontrol of the UN force commander,however it will remain within the USchain of command.

•• As the CJTF, you may not be dual-hatted as the UN force commander. If

not, your authority and influence in a UNoperation will have to be tempered as amember of the UN team.

c. Department of Peace-KeepingOperations. The following is a synopsis ofthe responsibilities of the DPKO. You willbe coordinating with this department in theevent that you are involved in a UNpeacekeeping operation.

• DPKO is responsible for the planning,conduct and direction or all UN fieldoperations and as such serves as theoperational arm of the Secretary-Generalfor all UN field operations, in particular,the management and direction ofpeacekeeping operations. Figure IV-2highlights some of the responsibilities ofthe DPKO.

Figure IV-1. Command Relationships

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER

- Authorative direction for all military operationsand joint training.

- Organize and employ commands and forces- Establish plans/requirements for intelligence

activities.- Suspend from duty subordinate commanders.

When

is delegatedOPCON

When

is delegatedTACON

- Detailed andlocal directionand control ofmovement ormaneuvers toaccomplish themission.

When

relationshipsdelegated

SUPPORT- Aid, assist,

protect, orsustain anotherorganization.

WhenMULTINATIONAL

- US policy guidelines will normally apply.- Use of traditional arrangements may not

work because of varied national interests.- Include details in terms of reference.

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Chapter IV


• DPKO Situation Centre. T h eSituation Centre was formed in the DPKO,to provide situation monitoring andexchange of information services

between the UN HQ in New York andUN field missions worldwide. Themandate for this Centre has beendescribed as follows:

Figure IV-2. Responsibilities of the Department of Peace-KeepingOperations

Formulates policies and procedures, based on Security Councildecisions, for the establishment of new peacekeeping operations andthe effective functioning of ongoing operations.

Secures, through negotiations with Governments, military units andequipment as well as other military, police and civilian personnelrequired for peacekeeping operations.

Develops operational plans and methodologies for multidimensionaloperations to include election-monitoring.

Undertakes contingency planning for possible new peacekeepingoperations and related activities.

Proposes resource requirements for these operations to the Controllerfor preparation and submission of budgets to the legislative bodies forapproval.

Monitors and controls regular budget and extrabudgetary fundsrelated to peacekeeping activities.

Provides logistics and administrative support for field operations.

Maintains contacts with the parties to the conflicts and the membersof the Security Council concerning the effective implementation of theSecurity Council’s decisions.

Liaisons with Member States, United Nations agencies andnongovernmental organizations and coordinates with other entitiesconcerning their participation in peacekeeping operations and specialmissions.

Prepares the Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council andthe General Assembly on individual peacekeeping operations and onquestions of peacekeeping in general.

Provides substantive and secretariat services to the SpecialCommittee on peacekeeping operations and prepares trainingguidelines and principles for Member States.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OFPEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

IV-5


“The Situation Room [renamed Situation Centre] is intended to speed up,complement, and amplify the information flows generated in the field to facilitatetimely decisions by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations.Its role is to maintain communications links with all missions, to solicitinformation from the field as well as to process and analyze raw incominginformation.... Its staff, organized in teams to provide coverage around theclock, will screen incoming information, respond immediately to factualqueries, judge when to contact senior decision makers and to summarizeincoming information... (In the final stage) the Situation Room [Situation Centre]will also be in a position to provide daily briefings to senior managers, presentspontaneous briefings upon request, maintain constant situation displays andcontinuous event monitoring and display.... with reference to relevantinformation using maps, statistics and basic political, military and economicinformation as well as access to in-house and public data bases.”

SITUATION CENTRE'S TASKS

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

Provide a point of contact--24 hours per day.Maintain uninterrupted communications with all UNpeacekeeping missions and be able to communicate with allother UN-missions around the globe.Collate and disseminate timely raw information.Develop in coordination with UN HQ services. Enhancedcommunications, data processing and multiple visual displayfacilities.Prepare consolidated summaries.Develop an in-house capability to amplify and synthesize theinformation flow from the field.Monitor developing regional situations around the world, thatcould affect the general security and safety of UN personnel,using all available news media and UN informationchannels.Provide a Crisis-Centre in the event that a peacekeepingmission has to be implemented on a short notice, or a crisisoccurs in one of the established missions or elsewhere.

• Figure IV-3 depicts some of the tasks ofthe Situation Centre.

d. Additional Considerations:

• In multinational peace operations, thereprobably will be parallel chains ofcommand—national and military.

Figure IV-3. Situation Centre's Tasks

• National interests undoubtedly will havean impact on military decision-making.As discussed in other sections of thisbook, multinational operations areaffected by each participating country’spolitical agendas. The national interestsof Troop Contributing Nations regardingthe operation are usually described in the

IV-6

Chapter IV


terms of reference between the TroopContributing Nations and the UnitedNations.

• Development of a written document (e.g.,annex to OPLAN, OPORD, or campaignplan) outlining command relationships isessential.

• Figures in Appendix C of this Handbookdepict typical chain of commandstructures.

3. Interagency and PoliticalCoordination

a. The Chief of Mission (i.e., theAmbassador) has authority over all elementsof the USG in country, except certain elementsof the Armed Forces.

“Under the direction of the President,the chief of mission to a foreign countryshall have the full responsibility for thedirection, coordination, and supervisionof all government executive branchemployees in that country (except foremployees under the command of theUS area military commander.)”

22 USC 3827 (A)

b. The ambassador is the seniorrepresentative of the President in foreignnations and is responsible for policy decisionsand the activities of USG personnel in-country.The ambassador integrates the programs andresources of USG agencies represented onthe country team.

c. Combatant commanders andsubordinate JFCs work with US ambassadors,the Department of State, and other agenciesto best integrate the military with thediplomatic, economic, and informationalinstruments of national power.

d. For the Department of Defense, in thepolitical-military domain, this involves:

• Bilateral and multilateral militaryrelationships.

• Humanitarian and peace operations(including all UN operations).

• Treaties involving DOD interests.

• Armaments cooperation and control.

• Technology transfer.

e. You must establish an effectiverelationship with your political advisor.Acting together, you should assist the NCAin crafting policies that meet nationalobjectives and can be realistically executed.Additionally, you and the US Ambassadoracting as the country team leader shouldmaintain a close working relationship. Yourpolitical advisor acts as the principal contactwith the Ambassador.

f. You must coordinate political issues withthe Ambassador and the supported combatantcommander. This will ensure that issuesreceive due attention from the InteragencyWorking Group that advises the NCA. Thisgroup maintains a broad perspective on thecrisis without letting parochial viewsdominate decisions affecting JTF’s operations.

g. Recognize that any modern peaceoperation will be a complex contingency. Acomplex contingency occurs whenever apeace operation occurs in conjunction with ahumanitarian assistance operation. Themajority of modern peace operations will becomplex contingencies and you should planaccordingly.

h. Understand the difference between theUS Defense Attaché Office, the SecurityAssistance Organization, the Country Team,and the DART.

IV-7


KEY TERMS

US Defense Attaché Office (USDAO)— Service attaches comprise the USDAO. The DefenseAttaché (DATT) is normally the senior Service attach assigned to the embassy. While keepingthe combatant commander informed of their activities, DATTs are rated and funded by theDefense Intelligence Agency. These attaches are valuable liaisons to their host nation (HN)counterparts. The attaches also serve the Ambassador and coordinate with, and represent,their respective Military Departments on Service matters. The attaches assist the foreign internaldefense (FID) program by exchanging information with the combatant commander’s staff onHN military, social, economic, and political conditions.

Security Assistance Organization (SAO) —The SAO is the most important FID-related militaryactivity under the supervision of the Ambassador. The SAO — which may be comprised of amilitary assistance advisory group or liaison group, other military activity, or a single securityassistance officer — reports to the US Ambassador but is rated by the combatant commanderand funded by the Defense Security Assistance Agency. The SAO assists HN security forcesby planning and administering military aspects of the security assistance (SA) program. SAoffices also help the US country team communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budgetofficials within the US Government. In addition, the SAO provides oversight of training andassistance teams temporarily assigned to the HN. The SAO is excepted by law from givingdirect training assistance. Instead, training is normally provided through special teams andorganizations assigned to limited tasks for specific periods (e.g., mobile training teams, technicalassistance teams, quality assurance teams).

Country Team— The United States country team is “the senior, in-country, United Statescoordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission,and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency,as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission.” (Joint Pub 1-02, “Department of DefenseDirectory of Military and Associated Terms.”) It includes representatives of all US departmentsand agencies present in the country. The US Ambassador, synonymous with chief of mission,represents the President but takes policy guidance from the Secretary of State through regionalbureaus. The Ambassador is responsible for all US activities within the country to which theUnited States is accredited, and interprets US policies and strategy regarding the nation. Thecomposition of the country team varies widely depending on specific US national interests inthe country, the desires of the chief of mission, the situation within the country, and the numberand level of presence of US agencies. Agencies represented on the country team can includeUS Agency for International Development; Department of Defense, through the Defense Attachéand Security Assistance Organization; US Information Agency, through the local US InformationService office; US Customs Service; Peace Corps representatives; US Coast Guard; USImmigration and Naturalization Service; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau ofInvestigation through the Legal Attaché; et al. The country team facilitates interagency actionon recommendations from the field and implements effective execution of US programs andpolicies.

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)— United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment’s (USAID) Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) providesthis rapidly deployable team in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists,trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions withthe management of US Government response to disasters. DARTs coordinate their activitieswith the affected country; nongovernmental, private voluntary, and international organizations;United Nations; other assisting countries; and US military assets deployed to the disaster. Thestructure of a DART is dependent on the size, complexity, type, and location of the disaster,and the needs of USAID and/or the Embassy, and the affected country. The DART is organizedand supervised by a DART Team Leader selected by OFDA. The team leader receives adelegation of authority from and works directly for the OFDA Assistant Director for DisasterResponse or higher designee.

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Chapter IV


i. Try to include local government, if oneexists, in all support operations.

j. Working within the interagency andpolitical arena requires patience and awillingness to be the consummate team player.

4. Multinational Operations

a. To be successful in multinationaloperations, it is imperative that sound andeffective command relationships aredeveloped. The Office of the DeputyAssistant Secretary of Defense forPeacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistancecan assist combatant commanders in assessingother countries capabilities to participate inpeace operations. Figure IV-4 highlightsmultinational C2 variables.

b. As with the United States, most othernations are not willing to relinquish commandof their forces to other countries. Yourchallenge, as the JTF commander, will be toarrange the best possible working relationshipwith multinational forces. There is no “perfectsolution” to this situation.

c. In developing this relationship, it isimportant to remember that multinationaloperations do offer political legitimacy,especially in peace operations.

• Legitimacy builds and sustains thewilling acceptance by the internationalcommunity, the US public, and theindigenous populace of the right of thesponsoring authority to take action.

• Loss of acceptance by any one of theabove groups will limit or jeopardize theeffectiveness of operations.

d. An initial challenge for you will be tounderstand and work in an environment wheresome foreign nations harbor resentment

toward the United States because of aperceived attitude that the United States ispursuing a world dominance role.Additionally, some nations also may feel thatthe United States approach to operations is“if it ain’t done our way, it ain’t done right.”This attitude, if prevalent, can only disruptthe team building required in multinationaloperations.

e. An issue that may evolve concerns thetransfer of authority of multinational forcesto your control—nations may not agree onwhen the transfer should occur. The earlieryou gain control the more flexibility you willhave in conducting operations.

f. Consensus building is an extremelyimportant task. You are the key to aneffective team. Lieutenant General A. C.Zinni stated from his Somalia experiences: “Inmultinational operations the goal is to ensurecompatibility between coalition partners.”

g. The goal of compatibility is at thepolitical, military, and cultural levels. Youshould be able to address the followingquestions.

• What are the political motivations thatare responsible for each nation’sparticipation in the operation? Whatpotential conflicts may arise?

• Have you considered interoperability ofall the factors that make the missionpossible (e.g., command, control, andcommunications, logistics)?

• Are there cultural barriers that mayprevent a harmonious relationship?Have you considered a force structurethat minimizes friction between partners?

h. In multinational operations, unity ofeffort must be achieved.

IV-9


“Unity of effort in peace operationsmust stem from an understanding thatpolicy comes first. The military is aninstrument of national policy in thetruest Clauswitzian sense during peaceoperations.”

US Army Infantry SchoolWhite Paper

i. The principle of unity of command alsoapplies to MOOTW, but this principle maybe more difficult to attain.

• In peace operations, other governmentagencies often have the lead.

• You may report to a civilian chief andemploy resources of a civilian agency.

• Command arrangements often may beloosely defined and many times will notinvolve command authority as normallyunderstood.

• You should consider how your actionscontribute to initiatives that are alsodiplomatic, economic, and informationalin nature.

• Because peace operations often will beconducted at the small unit level, it isimportant all levels understand themilitary-civilian relationship to avoidunnecessary and counterproductivefriction.

MULTINATIONAL COMMANDAND CONTROL

UNITY OF EFFORT

LEVEL OF CONSENT

NATIONAL INTERESTS- ROLE- WILL- OBJECTIVES

Figure IV-4. Multinational Command and Control

IV-10

Chapter IV


In Somalia UNITAF operations were,in part, successful because “unity ofeffort was maintained because theUnited States set the agenda, andensured coalition partners agreed tothe mission’s objectives and wereprepared to follow the US Lead.”

Army-Air Force Center for LowIntensity Conflict

j. A simplified command structure at themission level is helpful in achieving unity ofeffort.

k. As discussed in Chapter I, “Mission,”multinational political and military objectiveswill probably have an impact on mostoperations. Each country will have its ownpolitical agenda and will follow it.

l. When working with multinational forces,it may be more productive to conduct separatediscussions with national commanders. Thisallows each commander the opportunity toexpress that nation’s views. Yourprofessional and personal relationship witheach country is very important and at timescan influence a reluctant country to providemore assistance.

m. Many countries are not staffed orequipped to offer a full spectrum of support.

• They may not possess:

•• A full array of combat support orcombat service support assets.

•• Maps of the projected JOA.

•• The capability to obtain or useintelligence and imagery data of the typecommonly used by US forces.

• This will require you to be even moredescriptive when providing informationto such multinational forces.

• These military forces probably will lookto the United States for equipment andsupplies. It is important to know whatagreements exist between the UnitedNations and these militaries before theirarrival in the projected JOA.

n. The United States can offer specialcapabilities (e.g., airlift; special operations;intelligence collection; command, control, andcommunications; security; logistics) whichcan offset other countries’ shortfalls andenhance overall operational capability.

o. There may be operational pauses basedon the ability of a multinational force to worktogether smoothly. The transition from oneevent to the next may not always occur asplanned.

p. You may have difficulty removing aparticular force or individual from amultinational force unless they are from yourown nation.

5. Communications

a. If you want to communicate, you mustbring the capability with you. This shouldinclude the capability to communicate usingvoice (secure and nonsecure), data, and videoteleconferencing (commonly referred to asVTC).

b. JTF cannot deploy, sustain itself, orredeploy without access to JOPES via GCCS.JTF must have a deployable GCCS capabilityand sufficiently trained operators forsustained operations. You also must havemultiple means of communicating to avoidthe possibility of a single point failure.

c. The ability to communicate with allmilitary forces, NGO, PVO, IO, UN agencies,HN agencies, religious organizations, andother organizations involved in the peaceoperation is essential.

IV-11


• The transition to follow-on units,commercial communications, or toagencies like the United Nations must beconsidered early in the operation.

• Noncompatability of communicationequipment among organizations andmultinational forces has been aproblem in previous peace operations.

• Be prepared to offer communicationsaccess through the CMOC to NGO andPVO. Such an offer will encourage themto work with you and the JTF.

d. Depending on the situation,communications with multinational forces,NGO, PVO, IO, OFDA, or DART should beestablished early in the operation.

e. Nonmilitary agencies may havecommunications networks established fortheir uses.

• These networks may include commercialleased circuits, commercial based satelliteservices (such as International MaritimeSatellite Organization) as well as highfrequency and very high frequencyradios.

• Civilian organizations and otheragencies may want to use militarycommunications assets once they areestablished. You may need to establish apolicy concerning this use.

f. You should address the need for securecommunications and requirements to controlcryptographic materials.

g. A policy for the release of classifiedcommunications information should beintroduced early in the operation. Recognizethat NGO and PVO will require some formof access to normally classified material inorder to accomplish their missions.Remember these organizations can be force

multipliers if they have enough informationaround which to structure their efforts.

h. The mission analysis and assessmentprocess provides the opportunity for your J-6to identify communications requirements andevaluate in-country capability. Consider thefollowing questions when conducting theassessment.

• What is the requirement for cellulartelephones, land mobile radios, or otherportable communications devices?

• Will commercial companies establishtelephone service for use by your forces?

• If you establish a JVB, what commercialcommunications capability is required?

• Who will be responsible for the fundingof additional communications equipmentor capability?

• Will you be expected to providecommunications capability to othermilitary forces, civilian organizations,US political agencies, news media?

• Have you planned for expansion?

• What is the policy on morale calls? Willyou be required to support morale calls?

i. Ad d i t i o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n sconsiderations:

• Spectrum management. Frequencymanagement must be identified andplanned. Ensure that you account forfrequencies already in use by NGO,PVO, UN agencies, HN agencies,religious organizations, and otherorganizations involved in the operation.

• Automated data processing softwarecompatibility is recommended tofacilitate transfer of files.

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Chapter IV


• Interoperability. A system should bedeveloped that satisfies communicationsrequirements from the NCA to the lowestinformation exchange requirement.

• If non-military groups like NGO, PVO,or IO have separate communicationsnetworks, but part of the JTF mission isto provide security for theseorganizations, it will be important toestablish procedures for how they makerequests for assistance duringemergencies.

• Redundancy. Multiple assets must beavailable and used during peaceoperations to ensure information flow.

j. See Joint Pub 6-0, “Doctrine forCommand, Control, Communications, andComputer (C4) Systems Support to JointOperations,” for further detail concerningcommunications.


a. The uncertainty of peace operations mayrequire you to be more proactive in dealingwith all levels of your command.

b. It is essential that “the troops” fullyunderstand the mission, goals, and objectivesof the operation.

“It is all about trust—up, down, and allaround.”

Major General C. F. Ernst, USACJTF Somalia

c. A set of instructions should be developedto cover those features of operations that lendthemselves to a definite or standardizedprocedure without loss of effectiveness—standing operating procedure. Theseinstructions should be easy to understand andbe “joint and/or multinational.”

d. There will be lots of rules to be workedout—normally, these will not be in your fieldof view. Nonetheless, you still should providea forum for deconfliction and resolution. Asthe commander, you must have a way tocommunicate with all the participants.

• This will require more than simplyproviding a platform to express ideas.

• The simple fact is that there will bepersonnel, to include commanders frommultinational forces, who do not have aworking understanding of the Englishlanguage.

•• Affirmative responses donot necessarily mean a totalunderstanding of your direction,guidance, or intent to comply.

•• In Somalia, models in the form of“sand tables” were used by somecommanders as an effective tool toovercome language deficiencies whendescribing operational requirements.Regardless of the mechanism used toenhance understanding, it still will takeextraordinary patience and detailedexplanations by you and your staff toenhance mission success.

• Terminology will be another problembetween multinational forces and otherorganizations (such as NGO and PVO).

“Differences in defining terminologyresults in differences in procedures.”

Captain Peter Feist, German NavyNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization

Joint Analysis Team

•• A lexicon of mutually agreedterminology should be developed toensure enhanced operability andmaximum understanding by all peace

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operations militaries, NGO, PVO,religious organizations, and others. JointPub 1-02, “Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and AssociatedTerms,” and the glossary in thisHandbook can help provide a commonbasis for understanding.

“The units participating in PeaceSupport Operations could have easiergoing if all were using the ‘Peace-keeping’ words in the same way.Today, different defense forces areusing the very same expression withdifferent meanings. If we are going tocreate a real Joint and Combined forcefor Peace Support Operations, we needto solve the terminology problem.”

LtCol Alf Gorsjo, Swedish ArmySwedish Armed Forces

International Centre

•• Widest distribution of mutuallyagreeable terminology is essential.

•• Maximum use of liaison officersalso will enhance interoperability andunity of effort. (1) At the earliestopportunity, identify the requirement forliaison personnel, linguists, and foreignarea specialists to the supportedcombatant commander. (2) SOF withcross-cultural and language skillsworking with multinational forcescan prove to be a valuable asset. Donot leave “home” without them—they are that important. (3) Inmultinational operations, incompatiblecommunications equipment makes itimperative that liaison personnel areused. It is essential that liaison personnelhave equipment compatible with the JTF.(4) Saturating multinational forces withintelligent and articulate liaisonpersonnel will greatly enhance unity ofeffort. (5) JTF liaison officers stationed

at the United Nations mission HQ canbe a valuable source for information andplanning assistance. (6) Multinationalliaison officers assigned to the JTF oftenare senior military officers who canprovide better coordination because theyspeak with authority and understand theirindividual countries’ interests.Integrating multinational liaisonpersonnel into the JTF staff is totallydependent on your desires. Securityconsiderations may inhibit this process.

“Military success in coalition warfaredepends on the ability of Americancommanders to harmon ize thecapabilities, doctrines, and logistics offorces from various cultures.”

Captain T. J. Pudas, USNJFQ Forum W inter 93-94

e. The location of the JTF HQ is veryimportant. You must be able to protect it—be prepared to fight to defend it.

f. You should be in a position to easily workwith both the political and military sides ofthe operation. Coordination at all levels is arequirement, and being close to the UnitedStates Diplomatic Mission may provide thepotential to enhance military operationalcapability.

g. You need to know all policies that havebeen established by Department of State andDepartment of Defense prior to deployment.

h. Your efforts to coordinate the manyaspects of peace operations will be based uponyour ability to work within the framework thatis established by the integrated military,political, and humanitarian strategy. This willhave to be balanced with the many divergentobjectives presented from these same threespheres of influence (see Figure IV-5).

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VS.

HUMANITARIAN

POLITICAL MILITARY

HUMANITARIAN

OBJECTIVES

MILITARY POLITICAL

INTEGRATED STRATEGY VERSUSDIVERGENT OBJECTIVES

Figure IV-5. Integrated Strategy versus Divergent Objectives

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7. General

a. Although not one of your primary duties,you will probably find yourself in the role ofa negotiator, mediator, or even arbitrator atsome point during operations. Each rolerequires different attributes, but there aremany common ones and this section focuseson those common attributes and techniques.Experience has shown that leaders at all levelsconduct negotiations in a peace operation. Forexample, you may be negotiating for rightsof passage; mediating between hostilefactions; or bartering for use of facilities,buildings, roads, and services. As you thinkabout the process of negotiation, guide youranalysis with the following concepts:

b. Negotiations do not exist in a vacuum.It is important to understand the broader issuesof conflict and their changing nature.

• In peace operations, it is essential tomaintain dialogue with all parties,groups, and organizations—including ofcourse the government if one exists, butalso the opposition or various factions ormilitias.

• It also is important not to allow any oneincident to destroy dialogue (even if forceis applied)—creating an atmosphere ofhostility will not lead to a resolution.

c. Negotiation is an exercise in persuasion.It is a way to advance your interests by jointlydecided action. You need the cooperation of

the other parties; consider them partners insolving the problems you face.

d. Think carefully about the full range ofyour interests and prepare thoroughly for thefull range of interests of the other parties.What are the underlying interests behind aparticular position that a party has taken on aparticular issue? People negotiate for differentreasons such as:

• tasks (e.g., the lease of a compound);

• relationships (e.g., to get to know theother party and find out more informationabout who that person is);

• status (e.g., legitimacy as a participant inthe eyes of others).

e. Think carefully about your alternativesto negotiating an agreement. How will yoube most persuasive in educating others to seea negotiated settlement as being in their bestinterests?

f. Be attuned to cultural differences.Actions can have different connotations. Theuse of language can be different; yes maymean no. How people reason and whatconstitutes facts and what principles apply areshaped by culture. Nonverbal behavior suchas the symbolic rituals or protocols of thearrangement for a meeting also is important.

g. Negotiations will be conducted atseveral levels: negotiations among US

SECTION B. NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION

“Be forthright and honest; believe in your cause. Know the nature of manand his culture; and count on the instinct of man to recognize the truth.”

Brigadier General M. Hamilton, USADeputy Director, J-5 USPACOM

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agencies and departments; between themultinational partners; between the JTF andUN agencies; between the JTF and localleaders. This complex web of negotiationsrequires the following to build consensus: tact,diplomacy, honesty, open mindedness,patience, fairness, effective communications,cross-cultural sensitivity, and careful planning.

“There are no panaceas or cookbookanswers to negotiations and mediationand the broader context of conflictmanagement and resolution. Theprocess is complex and what works inone situation may not be applicable inthe next operation.”

US Army Peacekeeping Institute

8. Procedures for Negotiationand Mediation

a. Successful negotiations should bebased on the following steps:

• Establish communications. The firststep is to establish an effective means ofcommunicating with the political and/orfaction leader(s). Do not assume thatcertain leaders or elements are opposedto your efforts without carefulinvestigation. Insist on fact findingbefore forming any opinions.

• Carefully develop a strategic plan anddiagram the results of your analysis.Useful questions to answer in thisanalysis are:

•• What are the main issues as you seethem?

•• Who are the relevant parties? Firstorder? Second? Third?

•• What are these parties’ publicly statedpositions? Privately stated positions?

•• What are the underlying interestsbehind these positions?

•• What are the bottom-line needs ofeach party?

•• What are their concerns? Fears? Towhat degree does historical baggageaffect them?

• There will be a negotiation on theconduct of negotiations. This processmust be addressed in your initial planningsessions.

• Set clear goals and objectives. Knowwhat you are trying to accomplish as wellas the limits of your authority. Thinkcarefully about how you want toapproach the issues. Settle the easyissues first. Settle issue by issue in someorder. Look to create linkages or toseparate nonrelated issues. For example,security issues might be separated fromlogistics issues. Consider having detailsworked out at later sessions with the rightpeople. Understand these sessions willalso be negotiations.

• Work with the parties to identifycommon ground on which to buildmeaningful dialogue. Expect to spendconsiderable time determining the exactproblem(s). At this stage, be problem-oriented rather than solution-oriented.

•• If a party perceives more benefits froman alternative to negotiations than to anyoutcome negotiations could produce, donot expect that party to negotiate toachieve an agreement. You need toeducate and persuade them thatnegotiations will in fact produce the mostbenefits.

•• Focus on underlying interests.Differences in the relative value ofinterests, forecasts of future events,

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aversion to risk, and time preferencesmay offer opportunities to developoptions for mutual gain.

•• Learn from the parties. Seek waysthrough partnering with them to findpossible alternatives beyond their presentthinking.

•• When necessary, assume the role ofconvener, facilitator, or mediator. Bepatient.

• Composition of negotiating forum anddecisionmaking mechanisms. In somecases a committee or council can beformed with appropriate representationfrom the various interested parties. It iscritical to identify the right participantsin advance. For example, will it includeambassador and JTF commander-level,mid-level, or working-level personnel?

•• In deciding what constitutes theappropriate construct for a meeting,consider the culture. For example, whatrole do women play in the society? Howis status defined in the culture?

•• Composition of the committee orcouncil also may include legal advisors,political representatives (e.g., Departmentof State, UN agencies, or others), militaryrepresentatives (J-3, J-4, J-5), and othercivilian representatives from the JTF orNGO and PVO.

•• Members should possess the statusand ability to deal with the leadershiprepresenting all involved parties.

•• For those members seen as part of theJTF, it is important that they understandthe issues and speak with one voice. Thiswill require a prior negotiation withinyour own delegation. They mustunderstand policy and direction fromyour higher authority.

•• Negotiations are time-consuming andcan be frustrating. Be attentive towhether you have the people negotiatingwho can effectively recommend that anagreement reached be ratified by theirsuperiors. Are all the decisionmakerswho will determine whether or not theagreement reached is implementedrepresented in the committee or council?

•• You need to develop a supportiveclimate for the decisionmakers tocomplete an agreement. In that vein, itis useful to talk to those who are notdecisionmakers but from whom thedecisionmakers will need support. In thisway, they may assist you in helping theirdecisionmakers reach agreement.

•• In zones of severe conflict and statecollapse, it is frequently difficult todetermine the legitimate communityleaders with whom any lasting agreementmust be made.

•• Ensure your negotiators understandthe scope and latitude of their authority.Their requirement to get your priorapproval will empower them in their roleas negotiator and/or mediator.

• Establish the venue. What is the mannerin which meetings can be called? Can aneutral ground be found that is acceptableto all sides? Should US representativesgo to the factional leader’s location, orwill this improperly affect thenegotiations? What about the detailssuch as the seating arrangements orspecific settings traditionally used in theculture?

•• Selection of a negotiating venueshould also be based on security for allinvolved parties, accessibility,availability of communications facilities,and comfort.

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•• Ensure that information arising fromor relevant to the negotiations is sharedwith all parties. The timing of this sharingmay vary depending on thecircumstances.

•• Sharing of information notwithstanding, all information generatedfrom the negotiations may be held inconfidence until officially released.That decision will depend on the natureof the talks. For example, if publicitymay help create support and empowerthe negotiators to agree, release ofinformation may be constructive.Flexibility is needed here rather than ahard and fast rule.

• Cultural Considerations:

•• There are organizational cultureswithin the various agencies anddepartments of the USG that shape thecontext of negotiations. Equallyimportant are national culturaldifferences.

•• It is imperative that experiencedinterpreters be part of your negotiatingteam. What is critical is theirunderstanding of the cultural context ofterms used. You need more than literaltranslators.

•• Negotiation is only one means ofresolving conflict. It is worthwhile toconsider indigenous conflict resolutiontechniques in selecting your approach.Adapting your techniques with indigenousones may improve the prospects for asettlement. (1) There are differences instyles of reasoning, manner in which anindividual negotiates, who carriesauthority, and behavior in such dimensionsas protocol and time. (2) For example,in our culture it is accepted that one mayoffer concessions early in a negotiation

to reach an agreement. That approachmay not have the same connotation inother cultures. Moreover, the concept ofcompromise, which has a positiveconnotation for Americans, may have anegative one in other cultures. (3) Wherewe as Americans are direct problemsolvers with a give-and-take approach,other cultures are indirect, mostconcerned with the long-termrelationship, historical context, andprinciples. Issues of symbolism, status,and face may be importantconsiderations. (4) For example,answers may not be direct and you willhave to look for indirect formulations andnonverbal gestures to understand whatthe other party is telling you. In turn,this means you need to be careful withyour wording and gestures so thatunintended meanings are not sent. Theother party may not say no directly to aproposal but that is what is meant. (5)In Kismayo, Somalia, a meeting of thevarious clans and subclans to seekpolitical reconciliation in 1993 was in atraditional setting under a tree withpebbles scattered underneath instead ofthe American custom of a meeting at atable.

•• If you cannot reach agreement, keepthe dialogue going. At a minimum, seekagreement on when the parties will meetagain. Look for something to keep themomentum alive. Go back to earlierdiscussions on common ground. Seekto keep trust alive in the process.

•• Within your own team, considerselecting one person who understandsconflict dynamics and cross-culturalissues to look at the process of thenegotiations and advise you. Thisindividual can watch for body languageand other indicators of how the processis working. In turn, he or she may be

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able to coach the JTF negotiators in moreeffective techniques.

• Implementation:

•• At the conclusion of negotiations, areport should be prepared to ensure allaccomplishments, agreements, anddisagreements are recorded for future use.

•• Consider giving one person the taskof reporting and presenting to allparticipants what has taken place. Thiscan build trust in the process if it isviewed as an honest effort to understandeach side’s position.

9. Negotiation and MediationTraining

“There are many times when platoonleaders and platoon sergeantsat roadblocks, and company andbattalion commanders working incordon and search operations, mustnegotiate and communicate withpotential belligerents. Leaders need toknow that they may be placed in aposition that requires them to mediateor negotiate on the battlefield.”

Brigadier GeneralL. Magruder, III, USACG, Joint Readiness

Training Center

LTG Arnold and Mohamed Said Hersi negotiating in Dhoobley for the disarmament of Hersi’sforces and peaceful coexistence.

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a. Negotiation and mediation training isessential for military officers in peaceoperations. They need a conceptualfoundation of conflict management andresolution and conceptual skills to help themin analyzing and selecting approaches to dealwith the conflicts. Too many officers havehad to develop this skill through on-the-jobtraining. Such training in a predeploymenttraining program is the preferredapproach. Moreover, once deployed youmay not have the means or time to providea suitable training program.

b. Ideally, education in how to think aboutnegotiations should be a part of theprofessional development of leaders in anorganization that may participate in peaceoperations long before any alert for a possibledeployment.

• Basic concepts need to be introduced andthen applied in a series of exercises in acourse of three to five days.

• Selected leaders who would benefit fromsuch training include staff officers downto battalion level and companycommanders.

• Sources of such courses include thefollowing:

•• The United States ArmyPeacekeeping Institute at CarlisleBarracks, PA has a 3 and 4 day exportablenegotiations course.

•• The Foreign Service Institute atArlington, VA offers a one week

Negotiation Art and Skills course severaltimes a year.

• Other institutions that are sources ofexpertise in negotiation and conflictresolution and offer training in a varietyof formats are listed below. The UnitedStates Army Peacekeeping Institute canprovide points of contact for theseinstitutions.

•• The United States Institute of Peace,Washington, DC. This institute isfederally funded and is one of theforemost institutions for its expertise andpractical work with governmental andnongovernmental organizations.

•• The American ArbitrationAssociation, Washington, DC. Extensivepractical experience as negotiators andmediators and trainers for governmentalagencies and IO.

•• John F. Kennedy School ofGovernment, Harvard University,Cambridge, MA. One week courseoffered once a year entitled “StrategicPublic-Sector Negotiation.”

•• Harvard Law School, Cambridge,MA. Various courses and workshopsavailable to non-lawyers.

•• Conflict Management Group,Cambridge, MA. Nonprofit organizationthat tailors programs for organizationsand has extensive internationalexperience.

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10. General

a. Joint commissions, bodies of individualsrepresenting the peace operations force,various factions, and institutions involved inthe conflict or its resolution, have been usedin peace operations in Cambodia,Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, El Salvador,Namibia, and Bosnia. Historically,commissions were used in other operationssuch as the withdrawal of the NationalistChinese troops from Burma in 1953-54.

b. In a broad sense, peace operations seekto create the opportunity for the parties toresolve a conflict. More recent peaceoperations have sought to implement a peacesettlement. The terms of that settlementshould provide mechanisms to help initiateand sustain the peace process; well-craftedpeace settlements will be a guideline towarda deeper resolution of the conflict.

c. Joint commissions have been a usefulstructure and process in the implementation ofthe peace settlement. They are one aspect of anumber of actions which fundamentally areabout political decisions that are carried outalong political, military, and humanitarian lines.

d. Dependent on the terms in the peaceagreement that establish the joint

commissions, and the tasks given to the forcein the peace operation, the integration ofefforts by the task force may take place in thestaff section overseeing the joint commissionprocess. In contrast to the normal situation,the integration effort is not located in theoperations section but rather thesynchronization of efforts is orchestratedthrough the joint commission system.

11. Objectives of JointCommissions

a. Joint commissions serve three mainfunctions:

• Translate political agreements intoactions on the ground.

• Act as a dispute resolution mechanism.

• NAssist in peace building.

b. Translate political agreements intoactions on the ground.

• There will be gaps in the peace settlementdocument (e.g., treaty) that are notsufficiently covered—often deliberatelyin order to gain agreement—that thepolitical and military mission will have

SECTION C. JOINT COMMISSIONS

“Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the NATO-led Peace Enforcement missionin Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H), exposed US and Coalition commanders tothe concept of Joint Military Commissions (JMCs). Peace operations requiresubstantial interaction between military commanders and belligerent militaryor political leaders to resolve conflicts or to secure cooperation. During[Operation] JOINT ENDEAVOR, the multinational divisions (US, French, andBritish) found the JMC process to be the key control and liaison mechanismfor compelling compliance with treaty talks.”

Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter 96-8

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to resolve with the parties in order toimplement the treaty.

•• This is a double-edged sword: it mayallow for the gaps to be filled in at thenext level of decisionmaking when themomentum and other aspects of closingthe deal on the treaty so dictate.

•• On the other hand, it means that thenegotiation that must take place at thecommission level needs to have thepolitical and military mission memberswell conversant with the context of thecompromise forged at the peace treatylevel.

• In other cases, there will be questions ofinterpretations that the treaty does notanswer which the commission mustanswer for implementation.

In Mozambique, they [commissions]had to negotiate what was meant bythe term “offensive military action.”

In Bosnia, factions often hadinterpretations of the treatythat seemed reasonable andplausible, but were incorrect.IFOR [ Imp lementa t ion Force]commanders worked with thefactions at the joint militarycommissions to develop a jointinterpretation of how to execute aclause in the treaty.

• Lack of resources, unpredictable events,and terrain considerations are allproblems that may arise when translating

agreements into action. These will needto be solved at the commission level.

In Cambodia, they [commissions]spent four hours defining theterm “troops” and “forces” inrelationship to the presence ofVietnamese troops; even afterwardsit remained a difficult area.

In El Salvador, the treaty called for aseparation of forces. Questions thathad to be addressed included wherewould the encampments be, howwould the soldiers be fed, theirhealth and sanitation needsprovided for, as well as their safety.

c. Act as a dispute resolution mechanism.

• Joint commissions are a way for theparties to resolve disputes which comeup over the course of time.

• Concerns can be raised in thecommissions and may well cut across thestrictly military aspects of the agreement,often involving a separation of forces:

•• Facilitating delivery of humanitarianassistance;

•• Movement of displaced persons;

•• Violations by civilians in the zone ofseparation;

•• Human rights allegations (someonetries to detain a person as a human rightsoffender).

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1s t A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n ( I F O R[Implementation Force]) indicatedthat the joint military commissionshould not be used for purely civilmatters, and any decision to use thatforum for nonmilitary issues neededto be carefully coordinated withpolitical authorities at the highestlevel. Lack of alternate institutionsmight require nonmilitary issues tobe raised through the joint militarycommission channels, but theyshould be properly referred to G-5and joint civil commission channelsfor action.

• Each peace operation is unique and theseguidelines will need to be evaluated bythe task force as to their applicability toits operation. What is certain is that therewill be issues raised that must be resolvedin the military commissions that are notpurely military issues.

d. Assist in peace building.

• Often overlooked in the initial planningis the contributions joint commissions—including joint military commissions—can make as a vehicle to assist in thereconciliation of the parties so they canbuild a sustainable peace.

• Peace building includes efforts to identifyand support structures which will tendto consolidate peace and advance a senseof confidence and well-being amongpeople.

•• It may include disarming, restorationof order, custody and possible destructionof weapons, repatriating refugees,advisory and training support for securitypersonnel, advancing efforts to protecthuman rights, reforming or strengtheninggovernmental institutions, and promotingformal and informal processes of politicalparticipation.

•• Frame your thinking about jointcommissions to include how this processof working together can be used to buildother mechanisms or institutions thatpromote a sustainable peace. This isreally “political” peace building thatneeds to precede other actions.

•• As an illustration, there areramifications of a task that you might begiven, e.g., disarming individuals. Therifle or weapon may have psychological,economic, and perhaps other values thathave to be considered which may not bepurely military.

•• The other aspect of peace building isto understand that subsequent agreementsyou reach in implementing the treaty willgive rise to other disputes and questions.All the more reason to build in processesin those agreements that provide for howdisputes will be handled.

12. Key Concepts

a. Commissions System

• It is important to institutionalize whateverdegree of reconciliation the partiesachieve in the peace negotiation into thepeace treaty because it will be neededlater when tensions rise in its execution.

•• The commission system needs to beincluded in the treaty; it is very hard tonegotiate such a mechanism afterward.

•• Secondly, it gives you the basis foryour authority.

•• It is important that the political andmilitary leadership of the mission areprivy to the processes of the peace treatynegotiations so they understand thecontext in which agreement was reachedon the provisions.

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• There needs to be a system ofcommissions in place that cutshorizontally and vertically across thethree dimensions of political, military,and humanitarian.

•• The system will need to be tailored toyour particular situation but needs toextend to the local level.

•• Whether there is one overarchingcommission and then working groups forfunctional areas or several commissionsis not central but there is a need forseveral forums that address the threebroad dimensions.

b. Coordination is critical for the missionacross these commissions and down to thelocal level.

In UNITAF [Unified Task Force(Somalia)], Lieutenant General Zinni’sexperience noted that some itemscould be handled in a “technical way”by referring them to a security ormilitary committee (or commission)that would have been difficult toresolve if referred to the politicalcommittee. For example, soldiersfired on must respond if repeatedlytaken under fire; we as military menunderstand that any nation’scommanders must address this.

The integration of the political,military, and humanitarian aspectsof these operations are so criticalthat as the Force Commander,Lieutenant General Zinni felt that hecouldn’t have enough smartcolonels in his hip pocket to sendas liaison to the other committeesand to use to form working groupsas needed to address issues thatdevelop as roadblocks orstalemates. Lieutenant GeneralKinzer, Force Commander forUNMIH [United Nations Mission inHaiti], stressed the same point in thecontext of his mission.

• Consistency of coordination, procedures,and approaches within all levels ofcommissions is a major task. Equallyimportant is the political, military, andhumanitarian coordination that needs totake place horizontally at each level andfrom top to bottom.

• All who have worked with jointcommissions stress the importance oftrying to resolve as much as possible atthe lowest level.

• Anticipate that you will need toprovide everything to get the systemworking.

•• You must ensure that logistics cannotbe used as an excuse by a party not toattend meetings.

•• You need to determine where partiesmay need assistance in executingagreements reached, e.g., can theycommunicate in a timely fashion withtheir subordinate units?

•• Traffic flow, security, and provisionsfor the media are examples of the detailsthat need to be rehearsed.

•• Office space for each party at thecommission meeting area is useful fortheir own consultations, private meetingswith mission leaders, follow-up efforts,and as waiting areas before the start ofmeetings.

c. Your role in the commission: convener,third party, and negotiator.

• The most effective joint commissions areones where the agreement establishingthe commission places the individual incharge of the overall mission as aparticipant vice observer and the chairof the commission.

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• Each operation is unique and what roleyou play will vary. In some instances,you are not negotiating with the otherparties because what is required to bedone is clear and specific. Even in thoseinstances, you may combine aspects ofthe various roles described below toachieve your objectives.

• As the chair you are fulfilling the roleof:

•• Convener in that you will initiate andseek to persuade the parties to moveforward in implementing the agreement.In that sense, you have leverage initiallyand the wherewithal to start the process.

In IFOR [Implementation Force inBosnia], the 1st Armored Divisionjudged t ha t I FOR ’s i nhe ren tcapability to compel compliancewas key to obtaining the partiesvoluntary compliance. At the sametime, 1st Armored Division pointedout the two-edged sword of usingforce to compel compliance. On theone hand, its use risks losing thelocal consent for the mission’soperations. On the other hand,noncompliance risks the credibilityand authority of the mission forceas a guarantor of the peaceagreement. (See section below ongraduated response to noncompliance.)

•• Third party—from facilitator tomediator—to help shape the agenda, tohelp the parties see where each othersneeds and interests are, and whereappropriate offer proposals to move theprocess forward.

•• Negotiator—you have specificinterests you are seeking to advance interms of the peace agreement or treaty.

•• Adviser and an arbitrator (at times).

• By combining these roles in a complexway you advance your interests whileadvancing the other parties interests atthe same time in some manner ofbalancing so all see value in the process.

•• In this balancing, you are seeking toaccomplish the following: (1) Fill thevacuum of trust between the parties bythe trust they place in you. (2) Shift thistrust to the negotiation process that isinherent in the joint commission system.(3) Transfer this trust in the process totrust between the parties.

•• Have an individual who can monitorthe process so he or she can assess whereyou are in terms of where you are tryingto go in a strategic sense as well asobserving how the day-to-day process isworking. It is easy to get caught up inthe day-to-day challenges that you losesight of where you are in the strategicsense of where you are trying to go.

•• You will have initial authority andleverage from your position. Over timeyou build trust with the parties by youractions. Additionally, your personalvalue to other parties can be an asset forleverage, if used sparingly.

d. Advancing interests through jointdecisions.

• Thorough understanding of each partiesinterests—what they care about—in thebroadest sense is key to maximizing yourrole.

•• Focus on what is behind the positionthe parties are taking on an issue and whythey are taking that stance.

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•• Interests are both tangible (territory)and intangible (status, legitimacy, honor).

IFOR [Implementation Force inBosnia] used area experts and jointcommission officers, as liaisonofficers with the various factions.They built special relationships withthem and were a valuable source ofinformation for the commander inunderstanding the intent and actionsof the factions; they were also in aposition to better explain IFOR’sdesires and intent to the factions.

• Picking the right people with the rightpersonalities is key to success.Individuals must not take thingspersonally. Frustration with missionpersonnel often is frustration with theintractable problems with which theparties are dealing.

• Preparation for each meeting can not beoveremphasized.

“[Implementation Force Bosnia]. TheJMC [joint military commission] was socritical to our mission that we preparedfor each meeting as if it were a battle,wargaming all the possibilities.”

Colonel Gregory Fontenot, USACommander of 1st Brigade

Combat Team, 1st Armored Divisionand Task Force Eagle, Bosnia-

HerzegovinaFA Journal, January-February 1997

•• Rehearsals are mandatory to ensureall details have been considered andaddressed.

•• The level of formality may varydepending on the level of the jointcommission meeting.

•• Informal meetings and other meetingsaway from the table of the formal meetingare as important as the formal meetings.

A US commander of a brigade combatteam in IFOR [Implementation Forcein Bosnia] stated that for every formaljoint military commission meeting hehad probably conducted five informalone-on-one meetings.

On occasion, when tensions betweenIFOR and a party became elevated, anIFOR commander would take a moreinformal stance with the party’scommander. An informal meeting atlunch was used in an attempt to relaxtensions rather than respondinginitially by applying more pressureformally at the meeting.

e. Understand the cultural context.

• Understanding how the parties solveproblems is important so that yoursuggestions are appropriate. In Somaliaduring the negotiations for the accordreached in Kismayo in 1993,compensation for the dead was handledby a public acceptance of apology for un-Somalia like behavior.

• Understand how each side validatesdecisions it makes. It may take time toratify and sell to their communities thatto which they are agreeing. If needed,providing assets to do that as well as thetime for that to happen helps ensure thoseagreements will be implemented.

f. The process is dynamic and expect tolearn while doing.

• Patience is a virtue you must have.

• Understanding the other parties fears,needs, and expectations is critical;understanding does not mean agreement.

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• Your success in this role is seen in theparties’ perceptions of you as impartial,credible, and trustworthy: That is builtlittle by little in small ways.

• Over time a series of negotiatedagreements can provide the frameworkfor the resolution of the conflict.

• But relationships with individuals is whatimplements those agreements. For thatto happen there must be trust as you areasking them to do things that they wouldnot ordinarily do.

g. Develop the capacity to make innovativeproposals.

• At different times, you will need todevelop the capacity to make innovativeproposals. You want the parties todevelop this capacity so your role maybe more meaningful in helping them tosee how they can accomplish this.

• You do this by preparation that willinvolve discussions in private channels,off the record, away from the table offormal meetings.

• Move carefully here so that you are surebefore you put forward a proposal as itwill have legitimacy and it affects theother parties’ perceptions of you.

• You want a concrete action to be agreedto by all parties with a deadline. Offeringdirectives or deciding for them is notwhat you are seeking to accomplish.

• Impasses may develop where issues mustbe referred up the structure, over to thepolitical side, and the mission may needto contact other influential actors to assistin resolving the stalemate. The peoplepresented to you as the leaders may not

in fact be the key community leaders;they may simply be the ones withweapons.

h. Graduated response to noncompliance.

• Graduated responses to noncomplianceneed to have been thought throughbeforehand, developed, and agreed uponat the senior political and military levels.

• These responses must be applied in aconsistent way across all contingents inthe task force and mission andcoordinated with all.

• Examples of graduated responsesinclude:

•• Obtain name, rank, position ofrefusing authority; relay to higherheadquarters.

•• Elevate negotiation to next level.

•• Call in mediator.

•• Shows of force with helicopters and/or demonstrations of combat capability,e.g., arriving at informal meetings withtank platoons as escorts.

• The use of force should be at the end of along list of other actions. Its use needsto be coordinated with the top politicaland military leaders in the mission.

• Your actions should not be a surprise tothe other party.

•• Inform them ahead of action and usethe commission system to do that.

•• Do not say things you do not mean orhave the authority to execute withoutapproval.

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Chapter IV


• Once you decide that you must use force,resolve is key. Immediately afterwardsuse the commission system to deal withthe situation.

In Somalia, a clan was told thatthe task force would occupy acompound in 6 hours; immediatelyafter the forceful occupation, thetask force called the securitycommittee into session and the taskforce commander addressed thegravity of the action and how toproceed from this point.

• Remember the unintended consequenceson the civilian population who are at theexecution end of their own politicians andmilitary.

13. Getting Started

a. Act quickly once the agreement is signedto establish contact to the local level.

• You need to build on the momentumcreated by the agreement signing quickly.It gives you great leverage and authorityand AGREEMENT which can wane overtime as circumstances change.

• Preparation is key and at the beginningyou have the leverage to convene theparties and may well be the only one thatalso has the assets.

b. Prepare simple rules on commissionfunctions.

• Start slowly and build as you learn,giving yourself needed flexibility so thatyou deliver what you promise.

• Inclusive agenda setting should be a goalas it promotes joint problem solving andbuilds trust and confidence.

14. Leaving

a. Your success is tied to the parties’success in learning to work together.

• They may be reluctant participants.

• Your challenge is to get each side to seethat the solution to advancing its interestslies in gaining the agreement of the otherside(s)—it is a JOINT problem.

b. The process is very much a process ofpersuasion.

• You are a party with interests, influence,and power who must strike a balancebetween roles of facilitator, mediator,negotiator, and convener.

• This must be made to work across theentire JOA in a coordinated fashion inall three dimensions—political, military,and humanitarian—with all the host ofagencies and groups also present.

“Regardless of whether you areenforcing peace or not, this committee(joint commissions) must work byconsent and consensus. The partiesmust take ownership in fixing problemor resolving/preventing conflict.”

Lieutenant General A. Zinni, USMC25 October 1995

IV-29


15. General Joint MilitaryCommission Meeting Tips

Figure IV-6 provides “tips” for conductingjoint military commission meetings based onspecific situations encountered by IFOR

(Implementation Force) in Bosnia during1995-1996. These “tips” (extracted from theCenter for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter96-8) should be viewed in conjunction withmaterial previously discussed.

Colonel Henry W. Stratman, Chief for the Joint Military Commission for Task Force Eaglemeets a Muslim Military Leader, Brigadier General Mahmucjin as he arrives in the 1-4

Cavalry area at CQ347027 to attend a Joint Military Commission meeting.

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Figure IV-6. Joint Military Commission (JMC) Meeting Tips

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Avoid actions which might be perceived as favoring one party.Train in depth. All JMC officers or staff designated to supportJMC efforts need to be trained and knowledgeable of overallJMC operations, policies, and plans.Always have the appropriate subject matter experts at meetings."Stove-pipe" JMC information (up and down the chain ofcommand JMCs).Speak with one voice--especially with regard to high priorityissues (such as force protection and freedom of movement).Do not leave translation of documents to other parties.When using interpreters and translators, rehearsals are critical.

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Know the desired outcome of every meeting.Prepare for each meeting as though you were preparing forbattle.Prioritize your interests on all issues; learn interests of otherparties.Coordinate the agenda informally; avoid surprises. Havetranslators and meeting presenters read through preparedscripts, and rehearse audio-visual/multimedia presentations.Identify easy issues for agreement.Anticipate how to deal with surprise issues.Anticipate how to handle deal-breakers.Anticipate how to defuse tension.

! Be cautious about giving any guarantees.!

JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION (JMC)MEETING TIPS

GENERAL

BEFORE A MEETING

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Figure IV-6. Joint Military Commission (JMC) Meeting Tips (Cont.)

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Make small talk before the meeting starts.First order of business at the JMC is to present the agenda--provide copies of key, referenced documents, and set andmaintain control of the meeting.Identify easy issues for agreement at every meeting--set thestage.Do not focus on what is said. Find out why it is said--get pastpositions to identify interests.Remember that what is said at the negotiating table is hard toretract--be deliberate.Always use a competent, attentive recorder.Always use a process observer; use the same one every time.Joint press releases are serious business--watch for traps; draftearly.Know when to take a break and interject small talk to break risingtension. Keep in mind that small talk can be dangerous; choosetopics carefully.Do not minimize someone's interest.Be culturally correct and smart.Know when to end a meeting.Restate the agreed issues, expectations, and remaining points ofcontention which require resolution.The last order of business should be the agreement on when tohold the next meeting.

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All parties speak as one voice to the press (joint press release).Provide major items (maps, mine detection equipment) to partiesin full view of the press; show the media that words are coupledwith deeds.Hot-wash [critique] each meeting and share results up and downthe JMC chain.Prepare meeting notes or after-action report. Send follow-upletters or documents that address concerns addressed at theJMC.Closely guide and monitor staff working groups.Begin preparation for the next meeting.

JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION (JMC)MEETING TIPS

DURING A MEETING

AFTER A MEETING

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SECTION D. RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE LOCALPOPULATION

16. General

a. In peace operations, you will be facedwith difficult decisions in terms of yourresponsibilities to the local population. Forexample, what are the limits of yourresponsibility to keep order, maintain essentialservices, and protect the local populace fromacts of violence?

“It’s like going into a domestic disputebetween husband and wife; when youintervene, they turn on you, when youleave they pick up where they left off—fighting each other.”

Corporal A. Martin, USMCFleet Antiterrorism Security Team

American Embassy Mogadishu

b. In peace operations, to the forces legalobligation to the local populace is much morelimited than during armed conflict, and isgenerally tied to the mission, local conditions,and force capability to provide a secureenvironment within the area you control.

c. You should determine in advance whatthose limits are, and promulgate “good order”rules in a clear and concise format. ROEshould provide some guidance here as well,such as the rules of deadly force to protectthird parties and local citizens.

During the first five months ofOperation RESTORE HOPE inSomalia, the JTF commander madeit clear that the responsibility topolice the local population onlyextended to areas within his control.For example, when a rape wasoccurring within sight of a guardpost, US forces came to the aid ofthe victim and apprehended theassailant. When a local nationalkilled a British relief worker in anoutlying town and fled into theinterior of the country, the crime wasinvestigated by the United States asa possible violation of internationallaw. In this case, the investigationwas referred to internationalauthority.

In Haiti during the first few days ofthe 1994 occupation, US troops werecriticized in the press for failing tocome to the aid of pro-democracydemonstrators who were beingattacked by local police. Thisillustrates the challenge faced bycommanders in protecting the localpopulation.

• Detention of local nationals and otherlawbreakers is a sensitive issue. This isespecially true when there is no local lawenforcement capability, or the lawenforcement and judicial systems have

IV-33


been compromised by the politicalsituation.

• You will have to be prepared to detainlocal nationals in accordance withinternational standards. All detentionswill be scrutinized by international andlocal groups.


a. During peace operations, questions alsomay arise about humanitarian and civic actionprojects, as well as medical treatment for localnationals. Clear guidance on these subjectsshould be issued by you early in the operation.This may help to prevent mission creep andprojects that might violate US law andregulation, or projects disruptive to ongoing

NGO and PVO or other developmentprograms, even though these projects mightbe driven by good intentions. For example,subordinate commanders often may want todo things that help the local population, suchas building an orphanage or conductingmedical projects. Clear written guidanceearly in the operation and coordinationwith NGO, PVO, and other civilianagencies working in the area will avoidproblems later.

b. There are a myriad of legalrequirements, including who pays for servicessuch as real estate and private property usedby your force.

c. You have a responsibility to providemedical treatment to civilians that your forcemay injure in the area of operations.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VTRANSITION PLANNING

V-1

b. Transition planning is an integral partof operational planning and mission analysis.It must extend throughout the planningprocess and into operations and redeployment.This planning must be as detailed as any otheroperational mission.

• Transition planning can be accomplishedby a number of organizations within theJTF, such as the JPG, future operationscell, CMOC, J-3 Plans, or J-5. This willdepend on how you organize the JTF.

• A “transition plan” should bedeveloped as an initial step in thetransition process. When possible, thisplan should be “unclassified.”

• To commence plan development,identification of the following factors isimportant.

•• Issues and key JTF events (past,present, and future).

•• Work required to accomplish thetransition.

•• Military force or other organizationtaking over control of the operation.

• Most, if not all, of your staff sections canprovide valuable input to the transitionplan. Do not deny input from a staffsection solely based on its work being“routine.” Nothing is “purely routine”

1. General

a. Transferring control of an operation tothe United Nations, regional organizations,another military force, or civilianorganizations requires detailed planning andexecution.

b. Your mission analysis, an identifiableend state, and the political policy will all playan important role in the transition process.

c. Transferring control of an operation issituationally dependent and each one willpossess unique characteristics andrequirements. Nevertheless, this section willprovide general guidelines andrecommendations for the transition process.

2. Planning Considerations

a. As you near the redeployment stagefor your forces, it is of utmost importancethat your number one priority remain forceprotection.

“That phase (redeployment) of theoperation can be the most hazardousin force protection because the tacticalfocus tends to shift towardsredeployment and away from task forcesecurity.”

TRADOC Pamphlet525-100-6

“... Transitions may involve the transfer of certain responsibilities to nonmilitarycivil agencies. NGO and PVO may be responsible for the ultimate successof the peace operation, perhaps with significant US support, to include militaryforces. Transitions in peace operations may have no clear division betweencombat and peacetime activities, they may lack definable timetables fortransferring responsibilities, and be conducted in a fluid, increasingly politicalenvironment.”

FM 100-23, Peace Operations

V-2

Chapter V


when dealing with the United Nations,multinational military forces, or civilianorganizations.

•• Staff sections should highlight in thetransition plan how they are organizedand how they function. Checklists shouldbe developed to facilitate the transition.

•• Additionally, the staff sections shouldprovide a recommendation on how theincoming staff should be organized.

•• Turnover files should be developed byyour staff sections. These often areforgotten in the haste to redeploy.

• Planning should link the departure ofyour force with the anticipated arrival ofthe force or organization taking charge.

• Use of US military acronyms in the planshould be avoided.

c. Knowledge of the incoming force ororganization is paramount.

• Dealing with the United Nations can bevery frustrating because of itsbureaucratic way of doing business.

• As previously mentioned, funding can bea major obstacle, especially whenworking with the United Nations.

• Another concern in working with theUnited Nations is to ensure a sufficientnumber of UN staff and officers aredeployed for the transition process. Thesupported combatant commander canassist you in this endeavor.

• It is recommended that you collocate theincoming HQ with the JTF’s HQ. Thismay enhance your ability to trulyincorporate the “new staff” with the old.

d. The following questions may have animpact on transition.

• Who will determine when the transitionbegins or is complete?

• Who will fund the transition?

• What is the JTF policy for transition andredeployment?

• What issues exist before the transitionand what potential issues will exist forthe transition force or organization oncethe transition is complete? Have thesebeen provided to the incoming transitionforce or organization?

• Has the JTF’s end state beenaccomplished? If not, will this have abearing on the incoming transition forceor organization?

• If there is a new mission, how can theJTF assist the incoming transition forceor organization in preparing for it?

• What US forces, equipment, or supplieswill remain behind?

• Is there a disposal plan in existence? Ifnot, what arrangements have been madeto facilitate disposal of commoditiesoutlined in Chapter VI, “LogisticsSupport,” of this Handbook.

• What will be the command relationshipfor US forces during the transition andfor those US forces remaining behind?

• Who will support US forces remainingbehind?

• What will be the communicationsrequirement for US forces remainingbehind?

V-3

Transition Planning

• Will the United States be expected toprovide communication capability to theincoming transition force ororganization?

• Can information be shared with theincoming transition force ororganization?

• Will there be new ROE established forthe transition?

• Will ongoing operations (e.g., engineerprojects) be discontinued or interrupted?

• Will the incoming force or organizationuse the same HQ facility as the JTF?

• What agreements have been developedwith NGO, PVO, IO, HN, or others that

may impact the incoming transition forceor organization?

• Has a list of points of contact beendeveloped for the incoming transitionforce or organization?

• What will be the requirement for liaisonpersonnel?

• Will sufficient security be available toprovide force protection? Who willprovide it?

• How will the turnover be accomplished?

• Who will handle PA for the transition?

V-4

Chapter V


Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VILOGISTICS SUPPORT

VI-1

1. General

a. Logistics in peace operations are just asimportant as they are in war.

b. The US military has unique logisticscapabilities that are relevant to peace andhumanitarian operations. These include therapid capability to plan, deploy, employ andredeploy; a robust C2 capability; a sustainedlogistics capability, and security throughoutoperations. US military capabilitiesfrequently requested are strategic and tacticalairlift, infrastructure (e.g., port, airfield, road)security, water purification, groundtransportation of personnel, equipment andsupplies, arrival and departure airfield controlgroups, port and railhead operations groups,civil-military liaison cells, and limitedinfrastructure repair.

c. Logistics is particularly susceptible to“mission creep,” especially in peace orhumanitarian operations. Evolutions both onthe ground and in the political context of thecrisis could lead to unexpected changes in therole and hence requirements of military forces.

d. Plan for mission termination.

• Analyze what logistics infrastructure,materiel, capabilities, and equipment willremain in-country for use by follow-onforces or organizations.

• What is required for redeployment offorces, materiel, and equipment.

e. While peace operations can be eitherunder UN or NATO auspices, unilateral, or incooperation with other countries, they are

normally joint and multinational. Therefore,you may be required to participate in UN,NATO, or multinational logisticsorganizations.

f. Joint logistics should use existingindividual Service policies and procedureswhenever possible. If this is not possible dueto inefficiencies or impracticalities, youshould identify the differences to thesupported combatant commander forresolution.

g. Logistics will have to support bothmilitary and nonmilitary humanitarianoperations. Coordination with IO, NGO, andPVO will facilitate support to humanitarianoperations. Establishment of a civil-militarycoordination element (e.g., CMOC) isessential to planning and execution.

“For all our experience and compassion,we in the relief and developmentbusiness do not have the capacity todeal with such large-scale catastropheswithout help. Help from the military isnot something we should begin to takefor granted or rely upon in all cases. Butthere are extraordinary circumstancesthat call for responses—manpower,equipment, expertise, transport andcommunication capacity—that only themilitary can deploy.”

Philip JohnsonPresident & Chief Executive

Officer, CARE

h. Prioritization between conducting andsupporting military operations and providingsupport to other government and

“Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plansof strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings thetroops to this point.”

Jomini,Pr’ecis de l’ Art de la Guerre. 1838

VI-2

Chapter VI


nongovernmental agencies could become anissue.

2. Logistics Authority

a. Combatant commanders exercisedirective authority for logistics, and maydelegate this authority to the JTF for acommon support capability within the JOA.It is critical that the JTF J-4 determinewhat, if any, logistics directive authority fora common support capability thesupported combatant commander hasdelegated to the JTF and if the scope of theauthority meets the JTF requirements.

b. The combatant commander’s directiveauthority does not negate the individualService’s responsibility for logistics supportor discourage coordination by consultationand agreement, nor is it meant to disrupteffective procedures or efficient use offacilities or organizations.

c. Each Service is responsible for thelogistics support of its own forces, exceptwhen logistics support is otherwise providedfor by agreement with national agencies,

multinational partners, or by assignments tocommon, joint, or cross-servicing. Thesupported combatant command maydetermine that common servicing would bebeneficial within the theater or designatedarea. In addition, the applicability of StandardNATO Agreements, Foreign Military Sales,agreements under the NATO Mutual SupportAct, other bilateral and multinationalagreements, and international programs varyfrom nation to nation, and the distinctionbetween programs is often unclear.Determinations must often be made on acase-by-case basis.

d. Authority over logistics undermultinational and UN operations isdifferent and situationally dependent.Areas which must be clarified include funding,cross-servicing, and mutual supportagreements.

e. Implementation and execution oflogistics functions (Figure VI-1) remain theresponsibility of the Services and thesupported combatant commander’s Servicecomponents.

* OTHER SERVICES. Theseinclude other essential servicesand functions for a force, suchas laundry, waste disposal services,administrative services, exchangeservices, postal, graves registration,and pay services.

LOGISTICS FUNCTIONAL AREAS

TRANSPORTATION MAINTENANCE

GENERALENGINEERING

SUPPLYSYSTEMS

HEALTHSERVICES

OTHERSERVICES *

Individual Services define logistics functional areas differently. Theabove functional areas from Joint Pub 4-0 are used for standardization

Figure VI-1. Logistics Functional Areas

VI-3

Logistics Support

3. Logistics Organization

a. JTF J-4 organization should betailored to respond to the anticipatedoperation. To accomplish this, it shouldinclude specialists from the various logisticsfunctional areas: health services, supplysystems, transportation, general engineering,maintenance, and miscellaneous services, plusexperts in logistics plans and operations.

b. Logistics responsibilities follow single-Service command channels; therefore, it isrecommended that the JTF J-4 staff haverepresentatives or liaison personnel from eachService involved in the JTF. Since SOF relyon conventional Service counterparts forsupport, it also is recommended that thespecial operations components haverepresentatives involved as well.Representatives should possess the necessarylogistics expertise to interface within theirService channels.

c. It is recommended that you establish alogistics readiness center (LRC) to providethe following logistics control andcoordination functions:

• Monitor current and evolving JTFlogistics capabilities.

• Coordinate logistics support andmaintain total assets visibility.

• Prioritization of logistics resources.

• Advise you on supportability of proposedoperations or COA.

• Determine logistics sustainmentrequirements for planning and execution.

• Coordinate with the supported combatantcommander’s LRC and act as the JTFagent and advocate for logistics support.

• Provide a central point for logistics-related boards, offices, and centers.

d. The supported combatant commander’sLRC can assist the JTF by providing the linkwith the Joint Staff, the Services, DefenseLogistics Agency (DLA), USTRANSCOM,and other supporting commands and agencies.This LRC:

• Manages the combatant commander’sdirective authority over logistics andprovides the coordination required toresolve logistics issues and problems.

• Acts as the JTF agent for requestingadditional resources, deconflictingdemands on common use resources(when demand exceeds capabilities), andcoordinating logistics with othermultinational forces at the Departmentof State and Joint Chiefs of Staff levels.

e. Past peace operations have shown thefollowing staff billets require personnelexperienced in joint and multinationaloperations and should be part of your J-4organization:

• Postal personnel to coordinatetransportation of bulk mail.

• Supply and contracting officer(s) (withappropriate warrants).

• Explosive ordnance disposal personnel(for mines and other unexplodedordnance).

• Transportation officer(s).

• Customs official(s).

• Engineer(s) or facility manager(s).

• Bulk liquid specialists—water andpetroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL).

VI-4

Chapter VI


f. It is critical that you establish effectivelogistics coordination and communicationslinks with multinational forces. Logisticscoordination and communications links withHN, IO, NGO, and PVO should be establishedthrough or in coordination with the CMOC.

g. Liaison representatives and interpretersand linguists on your J-4 staff will be essentialin dealing with the HN, multinational forces,IO, NGO, PVO, and the civilian populace.

h. JTF J-4 should consider assigning oneofficer for preparation of the daily logisticsstatus report (LOGSTAT) for the supportedcombatant commander. This single point ofcontact builds confidence and becomes theJTF expert for logistics status and issues. Thishas proven to be a significant advantage inpast peace operations.

i. The capabilities of the NGO and PVOlogistics organizations should be incorporatedinto the LOGSTAT. LOGSTAT shouldclearly identify what critical shortfalls existand/or are anticipated, what actions are beingtaken to resolve the shortfalls, and if anyassistance is required by Service components,DOD organizations, or any other organization.

4. Logistics Considerations

a. Logistics is a factor in determiningobjectives. Logistics almost always willaffect a theater campaign and exert varyingconstraints on JTF operations.

b. Coordinate logistics planning withoperational planning. Operations andlogistics are inseparable. J-4 must coordinateclosely with current operations, futureoperations, and future plans to be effective.

c. Forward Impetus. A system ofcontinuous replenishment that requires eitherautomatic (push) or requisitioning (pull)

capability. JTF requirements should bereviewed periodically and refined if required.Service component commanders can helpdetermine the best method of continuousreplenishment. A system to capture costassociated with providing support tomultinational forces must be established andthe legal authority for the provision of supportidentified.

d. Balance of forces. You should considernot only US combat and combat supportforces, but also multinational requirements.Regardless of any prior agreements, othernations tend to look to the United States forsupport; therefore, your US support forcesmay have to be larger than initially planned.JTF J-4 should pass JTF logistics requirementsto the Service components, who then can bestdetermine logistics force structure.

e. Unity of effort . Unity of effort isessential to coordinate logistics operations inboth joint and multinational environments,requiring coordination not only betweenServices, but also among governmentaldepartments and agencies, IO, NGO, PVO,and multinational forces.

f. Apportionment and allocation.Apportionment is distribution for planning oflimited resources, whereas allocation isdistribution of limited resources amongcompeting requirements. Failure to maintaina system of apportionment and allocation cancause inflation of priorities, ultimatebreakdown of the priority system, and loss ofcontrol over the logistics system.

“You tell me your requirements, and I’llmatch them with capability.”

Lieutenant GeneralD. SCHROEDER, USA

Commander, Joint Task Force,Operation SUPPORT HOPE

VI-5

Logistics Support

g. Logistics discipline. True economy ofsupply requires the careful planning andbuildup of levels to provide those resourcesrequired. Excess stock or unwise use ofpriorities decreases flexibility and drainstransportation, facilities, and logisticsresources from other operational priorities.

h. Reserve Component ForceRequirements. Identification of yourrequirements for reserve units and personnelaugmentation is essential as it may determinehow fast an operation can proceed and the leadtimes for obtaining support. Once identified,reserve requirements should be made knownto the supported combatant commander.

5. Transportation

a. Transportation by air, land, and sea, isthe “linchpin” of your operation, your J-4 mustunderstand the roles and functions of allmobility assets used in deployment,sustainment, and redeployment of the JTF.

“Victory is the beautiful, bright-coloredflower. Transportation is the stemwithout which it could never haveblossomed”

Winston ChurchillThe River W ar, vii, 1899

b. Accurate, up-to-date transportationinformation is vital to effective operations.You need the capability to monitor and trackmovement of forces, equipment, and suppliescoming into and within JOA. Inadequateoversight of movement reduces efficiencyand could cause bottlenecks.

c. Coordination of movement throughJOPES via GCCS is critical to deploying andsupporting JTF forces.

d. Prioritize your transportation ; ifsurface delivery is possible, use it. Do nottry to ship everything immediately by air.Provide, through the supported combatantcommander, your requirements and prioritiesto the USTRANSCOM and allow the DefenseTransportation System to effectively movethose requirements.

e. Logistics flow priorities should beestablished in the initial assessment andcontinually updated as operations progress.Materiel arriving before off-load equipmentis on hand or personnel deploying well inadvance of their equipment can cause majorproblems.

• Integration of the strategic and theaterflow and movement requirements iscrucial to prevent congestion attransportation nodes (especially atseaports and airports).

• Establishment of an in-theater hubmaximizes cargo throughput andimproves theater distribution.

f. USTRANSCOM can provide vitalmovement data to the JTF theatermovement control system. This data isimportant as it not only provides informationfor the direct delivery or for transloadingpassengers and cargo, but it also can be usedto deconflict strategic movements with othertheater movements. USTRANSCOM:

• Provides strategic air, land, and seatransportation and terminal services inpeace and war.

• Procures commercial transportationservices and activates (with Secretary ofDefense approval) the Civil Reserve AirFleet, Ready Reserve Force, and theapplicable sealift program (VoluntaryIntermodal Sealift Agreement or SealiftReadiness Program).

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Chapter VI


• Provides representatives to yourassessment team to help evaluateseaports, airports, and inlandtransportation system requirements. Inaddition, representatives fromUSTRANSCOM (possibly through itstransportation component commands(TCCs)) normally are available toprovide continued support at airports,seaports, and transportation andmovement control centers.

• Nominates (mission dependent) adirector of mobility forces(DIRMOBFOR) to act as the single pointof contact for air mobility expertise andfor resolving strategic and theater airmobility issues. This focus will ensure aseamless air mobility system ofUSTRANSCOM assets and theaterassets. DIRMOBFOR will be discussedin more detail subsequently in thischapter.

• Monitors movement data and maintainsthe JOPES database.

• Assists in coordination of movement andaccess to JOPES via GCCS.

g. There are many transportationconsiderations that affect logistics planningin theater movement operations. To include:

• Assigned airlift and sealift characteristics,capabilities, and allocations. Keep inmind the requirements to support bothmilitary and civilian airlift and sealift.

• Airfields and seaports, to include theircapabilities and limitations, and airlandfacilities available in the departure andobjective areas. Engineer effort andequipment requirements for newconstruction or necessary improvementsto existing facilities.

• Anticipated HNS and measures toobtain local labor, transportation, andmateriel resources.

• Access to (including basing, transit, andoverflight rights) operational areas and

USTRANSCOM schedules military and commercial transportation to move forces, equipment,and supply/resupply.

VI-7

Logistics Support

current SOFA within operational areas.Supporting combatant commanders cancoordinate the political and diplomaticefforts to arrange for support, country anddiplomatic clearances, and overflightrights, basing, access, and other forms ofsupport with affected countries for forcesthat are in transit from one locality toanother.

• Control of airfields and seaports is criticalto success of the operation. Expect othernations’ military forces as well as NGOand regular civilian traffic to competewith slot times and vessel berthing.Establish a well coordinated movementcontrol center to manage movements intoand out of the air- and seaports ofdebarkation.

• In-transit visibility (ITV) is necessary toensure smooth flow of supplies andsustainment. Plan to establish ITVprocedures and ITV nodes at all ports ofembarkation, transit points, and ports ofdebarkation. Lack of ITV will cause lossof confidence in the supply system andlead to unnecessary reordering, furtherclogging the supply lines.

h. Director of Mobility Forces

• Normally a senior officer who is familiarwith the area of responsibility or JOA andpossesses an extensive background inairlift operations.

• When established, the DIRMOBFORserves as the designated agent for allairlift issues in the area of responsibilityor JOA, and for other duties as directed.

• The D I R M O B F O R e x e r c i s e scoordinating authority between the airliftcoordination cell, the air mobilityelement (AME), the Tanker AirliftControl Center, the JMC, and the air

operations center in order to expedite theresolution of airlift problems.

• DIRMOBFOR may be sourced from thetheater’s organizations or nominated byUSTRANSCOM or USACOM.

• The CJTF may request DIRMOBFORsupport through the supported combatantcommander. The DIRMOBFOR maydeploy with an AME.

•• AME brings all the necessaryfunctional experts to support, plan,monitor, and execute the theater airmobility mission (air refueling and airlift).

•• AME functions include: missionplanning, C2, aerial port, intelligence,weather, logistics support, aircraftmaintenance, and combat camera. Ifnecessary, an AME can deploy withcompletely self-contained air mobileshelters that are used for work centers inremote areas.

• Joint Pub 3-17, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for TheaterAirlift Operations”; Joint Pub 4-01.1,“Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Airlift Support to JointOperations”; and Joint Pub 4-01.3, “JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forMovement Control”; contain informationon the DIRMOBFOR.

i. Additional information on airlift supportoperations can be found in Joint Pub 4-0,“Doctrine for Logistic Support of JointOperations”; Joint Pub 4-01.1, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for AirliftSupport to Joint Operations”; Joint Pub4-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Movement Control”; and JointPub 3-17, “ Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Theater Airlift Operations.”

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Chapter VI


6. Logistics Planning

a. Logistics for peace operations iscomplex due to the interdependence ofService components, DLA and other agencies,HN, and multinational forces.

“Forget logistics and you lose.”

General F.M. Franks, Jr., USA (RET)

b. Early involvement of your logistics staffis critical to the success of the operation andensures that sustainment requirements arebalanced with capabilities. The JTFassessment team logistics representatives’responsibilities include:

• Reviewing lessons learned databases forunique requirements, planning factors,and potential problem areas.

• Establishing liaison with HN, IO, NGO,and PVO to obtain the most up-to-dateinformation concerning the crisis from alogistics perspective.

• Working with transportation specialistsfrom USTRANSCOM and the TCCs toevaluate airports, seaports, and inlandtransportation systems’ capabilities andrequirements. These specialists candetermine personnel augmentationrequirements and equipment for missionsupport. Additionally, early receipt ofbasing rights and diplomatic clearancesis critical to mobility success.

• Assessing HN capabilities to providesupport services, facilities, storage(particularly airport and seaport), andmateriel.

• Assessing in-theater capabilities andresources of the United Nations, IO,NGO, and PVO.

• Determining the capabilities of existinginfrastructure. Engineers or facilitymanagers can provide criticalinformation on the availability of existingpermanent and semipermanent facilities(e.g., water treatment plants, powerstations, reservoirs, bulk and retail fuelstorage).

•• Environmental planning is essentialto ensure that all appropriateenvironmental reviews have beencompleted in accordance withapplicable US and HN agreements,environmental laws, policies, andregulations.

•• Coordination with legal and otherappropriate staff officers (i.e., medicalofficer) to assist in documentation ofcurrent environmental conditions, suchas water and soil contamination,epidemiological surveys, disease riskassessments, and compliance with legalrequirements, including any SOFAagreement or other internationalagreements that may effect; identifyingand recording information associatedwith environmental contamination forfuture remediation.

• Planning for the acquisition of realproperty and lease costs. A primaryconcern is the determination of whatfacilities and land are needed and whetherthey exist in the JOA. Priorities forproperty acquisition should beestablished taking into account when theproperty is needed.

c. Application of the principles of logistics,as shown in Figure VI-2, is essential toestablishing effective support.

d. Logistics plans should be integrated withcomponent commands and otherorganizations and agencies, as well as HN andmultinational forces, to ensure success.

VI-9

Logistics Support

e. The JTF logistics plans need to bespecific and address the tailored requirementsof the local population being supported toensure relief supplies are applicable (correctsizes, types). For example, the JTF at NavalBase Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, receivedclothing from the World Relief Agency whichcould not be used (i.e., wrong sizes ofwomen’s clothing, flip flops which melted onthe hot pavement).

f. Early determination of the supportrequired to aid the civilian populace will assistin developing a supporting plan.

“The JTF commander should evaluatehis ability to use local nationals. Wherehe can do so without giving theappearance of partiality, he gains anumber of advantages: (1) he wins thehearts and minds of the people, (2) hebegins to restore the localinfrastructure, (3) he gains a source ofinformation through use of indigenousemployees, (4) he reduces his forcesupport requirements, and (5) heavoids leaving a void caused by thedeparture of the peace operationsforce.”

Major General H. SMITH, USACommanding General, 21st

TAACOM

PRINCIPLES OF LOGISTICS

Used by experienced logisticians, not as a checklist, but as a guide foranalytical thinking and prudent planning. Not all principles exert equalinfluence; one or two may dominate in any given situation and may changeas the operation progresses. The key is to identify those principles thathave high priority in specific situations.

RESP

ONS

IVEN

ESS

FLEX

IBIL

ITY

SIM

PLIC

ITY

ECO

NOM

Y

ATTA

INAB

ILIT

Y

SUST

AINA

BILI

TY

SURV

IVAB

ILIT

Y

LOGISTICSSUPPORT PLAN

Figure VI-2. Principles of Logistics

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g. The United Nations, IO, NGO, PVO,and others, in an effort to help by shippingrelief supplies, will likely cause transportation“choke points” en route to and within theater.A J-4 linkage with the CMOC may assist inproviding a solution to this type ofcircumstance.

h. Logistics planners should identifyrequirements and pass them to the Servicecomponents for sourcing. Working with theService components, your J-4 can determinewhether the JTF support should be providedfrom the military (Services), civilian sources,HN, UN, or other nations.

i. Your planners must determine the JTFresupply requirements and makerecommendations to the Services on the bestresupply method (e.g., the “push” or “pull”)and the type of servicing (e.g., cross, common,joint) recommended.

j. Disposal operations. Disposal is animportant link in the overall logistics chain,

however, in virtually all plans it is notaddressed.

• Inadequate understanding of disposal’srole causes:

•• Conflicts with public and internationallaw.

•• Confusion over roles andrequirements.

•• Increased costs.

•• Inefficient operations.

• Planning for disposal must take placefrom the onset of operations and continuethroughout redeployment. Disposaloperations may become the “long pole”in the tent during redeployment—costbecomes paramount.

• Figure VI-3 depicts various commoditiesthat require disposal.

As part of the initiative in Haiti to reduce the level of violence in the Haitiansociety, the United States offered to purchase private weapons from theHaitians. The results were wildly enthusiastic and more than 15,000 weaponswere ultimately collected—enough to fill a 40 foot MILVAN. The Army thenattempted to turn over the weapons to the Defense Reutilization MarketingOffice (DRMO). The DRMO stated that it does not accept custody oraccountability for weapons. After much discussion of the options available tothem, the Force commander opted to ship the container full of weapons to theUnited States, where they ended up at Letterkenny Army depot. The Armydepot learned that in order to properly demilitarize the weapons, they werelooking at a bill for more than $600,000. At this point, they asked for the DefenseLogistics Agency’s (DLA) help in finding an alternative method to costeffectively get rid of these weapons. DLA was able to offer the option ofgranting a waiver to use a local steel mill to melt down the weapons providedthat proper oversight and surveillance was available. The waiver was granted,surveillance was performed, the steel mill got to keep the metal, and the UStaxpayers saved more than $585,000.

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Logistics Support

COMMODITIES FOR DISPOSAL

Usable Property and Scrap.

Munitions List and Strategic List Items.

Captured and/or Confiscated Weapons.

Hazardous Materiel and Hazardous Waste.

Rations and Food.

Ammunition, Explosives, and Dangerous Articles.

Radioactive Materiel.

Infectious and Non-Infectious Medical Waste.

Classified Items.

Drugs, Biologicals, and Controlled Substances.

Figure VI-3. Commodities for Disposal

k. See Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for JointOperations”; Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine forLogistic Support of Joint Operations”; andJoint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force PlanningGuidance and Procedures”; and CJCSM

3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning andExecution System Volume II: PlanningFormats and Guidance,” for additionalplanning guidance and areas to consider whendeveloping the logistics plan.

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7. Multinational Logistics

a. It is to your advantage to attain as muchcontrol over logistics as possible throughdiplomacy, knowledge of multinationalforces’ doctrine, and good relations withmilitary commanders and civilian leaders.

b. It is essential that logistics be handledon a multinational basis, within the limitationsof interoperability. The J-4 should establisha planning group to define the extent ofinteroperability that may exist between USforces and multinational forces.

• It is recommend that the JTF J-4 establisha Multinational Deployment Agency(MDA) to deconflict the movement ofother deploying forces into the JOA.

• The MDA would be an expansion of yourJMC and would be responsible forcreating a combined multinational time-phased force and deployment list thatwould deconflict initial movement plansand the actual deployment.

c. Some nations will not relinquishdirective authority over their logistics forces,assets, and systems. The creation of a singletheater logistics command provides economyof assets and system efficiency. Even ifmultinational participants insist uponmaintaining a national logistics structure,assigning a lead for logistics responsibilityprecludes duplication of effort.

d. Funding authority to supportmultinational forces should be identified asearly as possible. Once funding authority isdetermined, procedures should be developedto ensure there will be no adverse impact onoperations.

e. Consensus on multinational logisticsissues and requirements should be formedearly. As the CJTF, you may not be able to

direct or demand action—normally youcan only request it. Some of the majorsupport issues that must be resolved by themultinational force commander include:

• Mutual logistics support must be inaccordance with existing legalauthorities. The Foreign Assistance Act,the Arms Export Act, acquisition cross-Service agreement (ACSA) Authority,and the Federal Property andAdministrative Service Act all have abearing on the degree of support theUnited States can provide to or receivefrom other nations.

• Identification of common supplies andservices that might be provided by onenation or a multinational organization.

• If, when, and how transfer of authorityover national logistics assets (to includeauthority for cross-leveling nationalsupplies) will be provided to themultinational force commander (anational decision between participatingnations).

• ACSA procedures to account for andreimburse nations for services andsupplies exchanged between nations.

• Establishment of responsibility, andrelease procedures, for national assets.

• Development of the means to maintainnational asset accountability (from thenational sustaining base to the front lineunits).

• Ensuring compatibility ofcommunications networks to includeautomated data processing interfacesbetween national logistics organizationsof the multinational force and nationalsupport systems.

VI-13

Logistics Support

• Prioritization, allocation, and use ofcommon infrastructure capabilities (e.g.,ports, airfields, roads) to support militaryoperations.

f. Avoid potential problems by earlyidentification of differences among thenations’ and Services’ logistics doctrine,stockage levels, interoperability, andaccountability.

g. JTF J-4 staff should be aware of culturaldifferences (language, values, religiousbeliefs, economic infrastructure, nutritionalstandards, and social outlooks) which mayhave an impact on logistics support tomultinational forces.

h. Sustainment of forces is each nation’sresponsibility; however, varying degrees ofmutual logistics support can and should bedeveloped for economy of effort. Some nationsdo not have deployable logistics capabilitiesand become totally dependent on the UnitedStates or the United Nations for support.

• The JTF should be prepared tosupport US forces, as well as forcesfrom other nations and/or civilianorganizations involved in theoperation.

•• This support may include sustainment,airlift, and development of logisticsstructure.

•• For airlift support, close liaison withthe theater airlift C2 structure canassist in coordinating approval, andfacilitating such airlift once approved.Consider including a USTRANSCOMor Air Mobility Command liaisonrepresentative on the JTF staff.

• When support is required, ensure fundinglines are clearly identified.

i. You must plan for sustainment—it willnot take care of itself. You may be in-theaterfor a long period of time, and unusual needsor requirements may occur (for example, theshipment of Christmas trees to Somalia andThanksgiving turkeys to Haiti).

j. Develop a list of current agreements withother participating nations that provide forlogistics support. In some cases, members ofthe JTF will negotiate agreements governinglogistics support with representatives of othernations of the United Nations. Negotiationsmust be initiated only after authorization bythe Department of State in accordance withDepartment of State Circular 175.

k. The use of civilian contractors andvarious HNS agencies often increases thelogistics capability of the multinational force.Non-uniformed support agencies may beintegrated into the logistics structure of themultinational force to ensure their mosteffective employment and use. Commandersshould be prepared to assume all essentiallogistics related responsibilities in the eventthis support is terminated. As the CJTF, youshould implement a system of internal controlmeasures to ensure that the logistics civilianaugmentation program (LOGCAP)contractors are used effectively and when onlynecessary in a manner which ensures thatservices provided are reasonably priced. TheCMOC may be useful in coordinating withHN infrastructure.

l. Your J-4 should establish quality controlsand monitor compliance for all multinational-provided services and supplies such as POL,water, and food.

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8. UN Logistics

“Successful participation in future UNoperations requires US commandersand logisticians understand the uniqueUN logistics and budgetary proceduresand the difference between USlogistical support standards and UNallowance. In-survey, out-survey andrequirements for requisition of goodsand services are all unique within theUN contracting and requisition process.Further, US commanders must beaware of the requirements of US lawsand regulations prior to transfer of goodand services to any United Nationorganizations.”

SUCCESS IN PEACEKEEPINGUNITED NATIONS

MISSION IN HAITI:THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

a. The UN logistics system relies onmember states to be self-sufficient at theunit level for a given length of time,normally 60 to 120 days. This period allowsthe UN to organize a logistics structure,acquire real estate and facilities, and establishcontracts and local Memorandums ofUnderstanding which will provide logisticssupport for the forces involved in peaceoperations.

b. A UN survey/assessment team willevaluate the operation requirements anddevelop planning data for sustainment. Whenparticipating in UN missions, you should senda US logistics representative with the UNmission survey team, if possible. The JTFshould coordinate with UN forces to improvethe unity of effort and reduce potential conflicts.

c. Once established, the UN logisticssupport structure normally will provide ameasure of continuing support through asystem of Lead Nations, civilian contractualarrangements, a UN Force Logistics SupportGroup (FLSG), or a combination of the above.

• The Lead Nation concept. A LeadNation is a nation assigned to provide theUN support to other nations under areimbursable agreement. Medium sizedmissions may be centered on oneprincipal member state’s contingent. Insuch cases, the member state wouldassume responsibility for providing anagreed upon list of logistics support toother nations and would maintainresupply links to its home base. Otherelements of the force would rely on theprincipal member state for the bulk oftheir administrative and logistics needs.There still will be a requirement forcontingents to have nationalrepresentation within the lead state’slogistics organization—nationalinterests may be at stake.

• Force Logistics Support Concept. Inthe case of all but the smallest missions,support depends on the UN finding amember state, or states, to accept theresponsibility of forming the structure ofthe FLSG—the US Army agreed to formthe FLSG in Somalia. The FLSG willincorporate logistics units from the otherparticipating nations referred to by theUnited Nations as National SupportElements. A member state accepting theFLSG role will be responsible, incoordination with the Chief LogisticsOfficer at the Force HQ, for theestablishment of local contractualarrangement in support of the force.Despite the formation of an FLSG, therealways will be a requirement formember states to be self-sufficient forunique national elements of resupply,particularly repair parts, clothing, food,and major end items replacement.

• Civilian Contractor . As the missionprogresses, the UN will attempt toeconomize the logistics support throughthe use of civilian contractors. Thegeneral aim will be to achieve the most

VI-15

Logistics Support

economical logistics organization thatwill both meet the demands of the forceand release military manpower forredeployment. The overall process willbe coordinated by the force HQ and willbe a unique solution for each mission.

•• UN contracting, which the UnitedStates considers part of logistics, does notfall under the logistics division but ratherpurchasing and transport servicesdivision. While this structure may appearto work in UN HQ, there are times whenthe procurement officer will not supportrequests from the UN ChiefAdministrative Officer (CAO) or forcecommander for a variety of reasons.

•• The procurement process within theUnited Nations is very bureaucratic andslow in providing items. Procurementby UN agencies is very decentralized—each agency virtually does their own, andoften with different procedures. TheUnited Nations is gradually movingtowards standardization of itsprocurement. The UN DevelopmentProgram’s Interagency ProcurementServices Office (IAPSO) is slated tobecome the UN standard for a commonprocurement system. IAPSO isdeveloping a compendium of genericspecifications for commonly used itemsin all types of operations.

d. The CAO does not work directly forthe Force Commander, but reports to theSpecial Representative of the SecretaryGeneral. The CAO is the power behindthe scenes as the civilian logisticsinfrastructure reports to the CAO toinclude the budget officer. Therefore,logistics problems will not be resolvedunless the CAO is involved in the process.

e. The UN normally coordinates suchlogistics areas as bulk supplies (water, fuel,and rations of common user items, i.e., UN

clothing, domestic consumables, batteries,some vehicle spares) and services (wastedisposal, laundry, and bath).

f. For UN operations, you shoulddetermine what standards are to be followedin regard to support.

• US standards tend to exceed UNstandards, (e.g., consumption rates, spacerequirements, and safety levels). USmilitary equipment and systemssophistication may be different than thestandards of support the UN has agreedto provide or is willing to fund.

• UN standards must be clearly understoodin regard to level and quality of supportprovided and funded. Logistics supportthat is significantly more extensivethan what is outlined in the UNagreement may not be reimbursable.

• The JTF must be prepared to bring itsown support in the areas where the UN-provided support is deficient.

g. Detailed logistics procedures for UNmissions can be obtained from the “FieldAdministration and Logistics Division(FALD), Department of Peace-KeepingOperations (DPKO),” United Nations.

9. Contracting Support

“Contracting is critical—in BOSNIA/HERZEGOVINA setting up a fuelpipeline is a good example ofcontracting and using the localcitizenry—stevedores to unload ships,truck drivers, and other locals to build,clean, wash, cook, etc.”

Major General H. SMITH, USA Commanding General,

21st TAACOM

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a. Providing support may requirecontracting interaction with foreigngovernments, commercial entities, NGO, andPVO. Contracting can be an effective forcemultiplier of combat service support fordeployed forces. When properly used,contracting is another essential tool forsupporting your mission. Contracting canbridge gaps that may occur before sufficientorganic support units can deploy or beforescheduled LOGCAP or HNS resources canprovide support. Contracting also is valuablewhere no HNS agreements exist, or whereHNS agreements do not provide for thesupplies or services required. Closecoordination with CA, finance andaccounting activities, and legal support alsois essential.

b. LOGCAP can provide a myriad ofservices such as: well drilling, laundry, powergeneration, portalets, cranes, and port support.

• Requests for LOGCAP support shouldbe made to the supported combatantcommander.

• LOGCAP can be an expensive programand funding guidance is required.

“From October 1992 to March 1994, theArmy paid Brown and Root $77 millionfor food, fuel, water, transportation, andbasic infrastructure support foroperations in Somalia.”

Margo MacFarland Defense Reporter for Inside the Pentagon

• The LOGCAP program can be used totransition from military to civilian-controlled operations. In addition, it canbe used to manage limited logisticsresources—hire contractors instead ofcallup of military reservists.

c. Contracting Support Plan. It isrecommended that you develop a contractingsupport plan to:

• Outline the procedures and policies forimplementation of contracting support inthe JOA, assuring full utilization of HNSand LOGCAP resources.

• Ensure contracting solutions receiveconsideration during logistics planningand become part of OPLAN, OPORD,or campaign plan.

During IFOR (ImplementationForce Bosnia) commanders weresometimes unaware of the costramifications of their decisions. Forexample, the decision to acceleratethe camp construction schedulerequired the contractor to flyplywood from the United States intothe area of operations becausesufficient stores were not availablein Europe, which increased costs.For example, the contractor reportedthat the cost of 3/4-inch sheet ofplywood, 4 x 8 feet, purchased in theUnited States was $14.06. Flyingthat sheet of plywood to the area ofoperations from the United Statesincreased the cost to $85.98 persheet, and shipping by boatincreased the cost to $27.31 persheet.

• Identify your subordinate commandsrequirements that may be met by HNS,LOGCAP, or contracting support.

• Develop an area database containing allavailable data concerning local resources.The database may include area studies,locally developed logistics support data,a complete listing of existing LOGCAPand HNS agreements available in theJOA, and recommendations from StateDepartment Foreign Service personnel.

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Logistics Support

Information also may come from theUnited Nations humanitarian agencies,IO, NGO, and PVO already operating inthe area. One immediate source ofinformation on current global complexemergencies is the UNDHA’s ReliefInternet site (http://www.reliefweb.int/)which contains maps and current fieldreports from IO, NGO, and PVO.

• Address security and quality controlaspects of contracting, to includeinspection of goods received to ensureagainst sabotage, poisoning, or otherterrorist-style actions.

d. Contracting Office(s). You may wantto establish joint contracting office(s), staffedby personnel, to include linguists andinterpreters when required, from all theServices and multinational forces operatingin the JOA. Joint contracting offices would:

• Include some or all of the warrantedcontracting officers in the JOA. If more

than one contracting office is required,contracting officers may have to beassigned to other smaller joint contractingoffices to provide support on an areabasis.

• Provide coordination and cooperationamong Services that maintain parallelcontracting organizations within theJOA. Preclude Interservice andmultinational competition for localsupplies or services, and obtain themost advantageous prices throughconsolidation of requirements to moreeffectively utilize scarce personnelresources.

• Establish coordination and cooperationwith CA, finance and accountingactivities, and legal support.

• Provide contracting representatives toyour logistics organizational structurei.e., LRC.

Contracting for local labor can reduce demands for military resources and improve relationshipswith the populace.

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e. It is critical, upon mission terminationor redeployment, that the JTF ensures allrecords or files are closed out andsubmitted to the appropriate authoritiesfor disposition.

10. Host-nation Support

a. Countries without a governmentinfrastructure may only be able to providelimited logistics assistance.

b. Within the J-4, you should centralize thecoordination of HN functions, i.e., requirementidentification, procurement. This will help toidentify the complete JTF logistics effort.

Keep in mind that local procurementefforts, while they may bringbeneficial impacts to the hostnation, may also undermine otherimportant goals. In the highlysensitive environment of peaceoperations, local suppliers may haveimportant political connections andan otherwise innocent procurementdecision may be interpreted to havepolitical meaning in the host nation.Or, procurement may bid up localprices, with deleterious impact onlocal groups or nongovernmentaland private voluntary organizations.In worst cases, local suppliers eagerto do business with US militaryunits, have dropped long-standingservices to civilian organizations,causing disruption and controversy.

c. CA personnel assigned to the JTF aretrained to identify and coordinate HN supportresources and can provide valuable assistanceto the J-4 staff.

d. To negotiate for HN support, authoritymust be obtained through the Joint Staff,Office of the Secretary of Defense, andDepartment of State.

• HN agreements should include theauthority for you to coordinate directlywith the HN for support, acquisition,and use of facilities and real estate.

• Develop a list of current HN agreements.Your assessment team should determinewhat types of support and supplies canbe provided by the HN and how they canreduce your logistics foot print.

• JTF legal advisor should be involved inthe development process for HNagreements.

e. Procedures and agreements should bedeveloped for local contracting, currencyexchange rates, local hire (wage scale), andcustoms regulations.

f. During the assessment process, JTF J-4should evaluate current HN contractualarrangements among the organizations present(United Nations, IO, NGO, PVO) andevaluate their effectiveness. As required,determine the best lead agency (e.g., UnitedNations, Service, or other agency) forcontracting and negotiating for support.

g. During the assessment process, JTF J-4should determine and evaluate HNtransportation, facilities, equipment, and othercapabilities.

h. Coordinate distribution of humanitarianaid with the United Nations, IO, HN, NGO,and PVO present.


a. Identify additional funding requirementsfor renting facilities to support operations. Inaddition, develop a system for propertyaccountability.

b. Identify special clothing and equipmentrequirements that may require a long-lead time

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Logistics Support

to obtain, i.e., nonmilitary supplies, riotcontrol gear.

c. Obtain funding codes from the supportedcombatant commander or Service componentcommanders and then determine whatmethods and documentation are required torecord all expenditures.

d. Establish procedures for providingsupport (transportation, housing, messing) todiplomats and distinguished visitors. Ifestablished, the JVB (as mentioned in ChapterIII, “Joint Task Force Organization andStaffing,” of this Handbook ) can assist insatisfying this requirement.

e. Develop a system for prevention offraud, waste, and abuse. J-4 needs tocontinually assess all logistics requests,requirements, and actions to ensure they passa “sanity check” and are valid with respect tothe peace operation and authority given to theJTF.

f. Provide adequate security for logisticsassets. Your combat service support unitsshould be prepared to provide their own local(base) security.

g. Consider establishing a common“exchange” for the JTF. A well-stocked

exchange will not only provide personnelsupport items, but will also serve as a moralebooster.

h. Establish a system with the JTF J-2 togather information from logistics sources suchas truck drivers and engineers.

“In BOSNIA/HERZEGOVINA, some ofour best information came to be calledtransportation intelligence. Driversoften had the best information on theroad conditions, attitude of the localpopulations, locations of checkpoints,and our ability to get through.”

Lieutenant ColonelR. ROBINSON, USA

HQ AFCENT

i. Plan for seaport, airport, and railheadfacilities having to be shared by NGO, PVO,UN or NATO personnel, multinational forces,and civilian contractors.

j. Develop mortuary plans to includeprocedures and policies for US forces, localcivilians, and multinational forces. Theseplans need to be coordinated with Departmentof State.

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k. Determine the best method for providingpotable water: (1) land-based reverse osmosiswater purification units (ROWPUs), (2)ROWPU barges, or (3) bottled water. Eachhas its own advantages and drawbacks.Bottled water may have an addedadvantage of enhancing troop morale. Itis essential that the JTF has an effective watersupport plan, to include inputs from engineers,medical personnel, and other staff officers—Water is critical.

12. Logistics Boards, Offices,and Centers

a. While not all of the following jointorganizations may be required, your J-4should evaluate the need for each based onthe projected operations.

b. The following theater-levelorganizations may be established by thesupported combatant commander to assistthe JTF in coordinating logistics efforts:

• Joint Transportation Board establishespriorities and allocates common-userstransportation resources.

• Joint Petroleum Office (JPO)coordinates POL planning and execution,as well as the supply of common bulkpetroleum products. Normally, thesupported combatant commander’s JPOprovides wholesale bulk petroleummanagement.

• Joint Civil-Military EngineeringBoard (JCMEB), a temporary board,establishes policies, procedures,priorities, and overall direction for civil-military construction and engineeringrequirements.

• Joint Facilities Utilization Board(JFUB) evaluates and reconciles requestsfor real estate, facilities, interservicesupport, and construction in compliancewith the JCMEB. JFUB actions will beguided by the provisions of Joint Pub4-04, “Joint Doctrine for CivilEngineering Support.”

• CINC Logistic Procurement SupportBoard (CLPSB) coordinates contractingoperations with US Embassies and HNfor acquisition of supplies and services,

Providing water is often a priority task in restoring basic human needs.

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Logistics Support

eliminating duplication by arranging forsingle-Service contracting.

• Joint Materiel Priorities andAllocation Board modifies andrecommends priorities for allocation ofmateriel assets for both United States andmultinational forces.

c. The following may be established bythe CJTF to coordinate logistics efforts:

• Joint Movement Center implements thetaskings and priorities for movement.Additionally, the JTF’s JMC coordinatesthe employment of all transportationassets, including multinational and HNwithin the JOA.

• Subarea Petroleum Office, whentactical operations warrant extensivemanagement of wholesale bulk POL intheater, is established by the JPO tocoordinate, plan and execute commonbulk petroleum products for the JTF.

• Joint Mortuary Affairs Office,routinely assigned to the Army

Feeding the local population, in coordination with civilian organizations working in the jointoperations area, may be part of your mission.

component commander as executiveagent, plans and executes all mortuaryaffairs programs and provides guidanceto facilitate mortuary programs andmaintain data.

• JTF Contracting Office(s), workingwith the CLPSB, are established (withwarranted contracting officers) tocoordinate contracting requirements forand assisting in the acquisition of localfacilities, supplies, services, and support.The contracting office coordinatescontracting support requirements amongServices to preclude Interservicecompetition for supplies or services inorder to obtain effective utilization andadvantageous prices throughconsolidation of JTF requirements.

d. A complete description of the functionsfor each of the logistics boards, offices, andcenters can be found in the JEL underAppendix B to Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine forLogistic Support of Joint Operations.”

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIIINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

VII-1

Interpreters are an essential part of information gathering.

“If you don’t understand the cultures you are involved in; who makes decisionsin these societies; how their infrastructure is designed; the uniqueness intheir values and in their taboos—you aren’t going to be successful.”

George Wilson-Commentary inAir Force T imes

1. General

a. As a CJTF, you must recognize that inmultifaceted and multinational operationssensitivities will exist when discussingintelligence. This may even extend to usingthe term “intelligence.” For example: Inpeace operations, the term “information” maybe used instead of the term “intelligence,” “all-source intelligence gathering” is commonlyreferred to as “information gathering,” or thetitle “intelligence officer” may have to bechanged to “information officer.” Thesesensitivities do not negate the JTF’sresponsibility in developing a comprehensiveintelligence plan that utilizes all availableassets and programs.

b. The primary source of intelligence inpeace operations is normally human sources.

• Interpreters are an integral part of thiscollection system.

• In peace operations, low-level sourceoperations, elicitations, debriefs ofindigenous personnel, screeningoperations, and patrolling are the primaryinformation gathering techniques.

• Assessing the economic and health needs,military capability, and political intent ofthose receiving assistance shouldincrease the efficiency and capability ofyour force.

VII-2

Chapter VII


• The best sources of information may beCA and PSYOP personnel, militarypatrols in local villages, militaryengineers, truck drivers, UN militaryobservers, and others that have directcontact with the population. Approachesto NGO, PVO, and other civilianorganizations for information should becharacterized by openness andtransparency, including a clear statementof the purposes for which informationwill be used, so as to avoid underminingcooperative efforts with such agencies.

• SOF also can provide in-depthknowledge and information of theprojected JOA.

c. Consider requesting intelligenceproducts available from PSYOP analysts—“Special PSYOP Studies and SpecialAssessments.” These can be tailored toaddress specific requirements relating to thelocal population and ramifications of JTFactions. Request these products through thesupported combatant commander’s staffPSYOP officer.

d. Communications and an understandingof the local infrastructure can lead tosuccessful situational awareness.

e. See Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine forIntelligence Support to Operations,” Joint Pub2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to MilitaryOperations,” and Joint Pub 2-01.2, “JointDoctrine and Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Counterintelligence Supportto Operations,” for further detail concerningintelligence support to a JTF.

2. Commander’s Direction

a. Use all sources to gather information(intelligence).

b. Provide your J-2 with a clear assessmentof the mission, your intended objectives, andprioritized intelligence requirements.

c. Establish a collection system and ameans to evaluate information gathered “onthe street.”

d. Emphasize to all personnel theimportance of always being informationconscious.

e. Provide basic guidelines for all personnelto improve their information gatheringcapability.

• During peace operations, free exchangeof information between military forcesof different nations may not exist. Thiscauses nations to conduct regionalanalysis independently which may notsupport your overall plan.

• Changes in the behavior of the localpopulace may suggest a significantchange is required in your operationalstrategy.

For example, “In a crisis [OperationSEA ANGEL] such as the aftermath of[Cyclone] Marian, food is not asimportant as clean water and shelter.Consequently, the food-bridge to thetime when regular staples can bedistributed is the high protein powerbar. When these protein bars beganto show up on the black market as wellas being used as a means to barter,CARE recognized that the first stageof the crisis was over. If the peoplecould physically afford not to eat thebar and thus trade it, they were nolonger in a life-threatening situation. Itis measures of effectiveness like thisone that signaled the end of Phase Oneand the transition to Phase Two.”

The U.S. Military / NGORelationship in Humanitarian

InterventionsChris Seiple

VII-3

Intelligence Support

is unavailable, other theater or tacticalcommunications may be used to satisfyintelligence exchange requirements.

c. Because peace operations scenariosoften eliminate the maneuver, posture, and fireoptions, you must consciously undergo anintellectual adaptation to a new and complexenvironment. In addition, the nature andintensity of a potential threat in a peaceoperation can change suddenly anddramatically. Therefore, the JTF intelligenceresources should be flexibly structured tosupport potentially changing requirementsaggressively and proactively.

d. The intelligence effort must be unified.The integration of intelligence representativesand liaison personnel at each organizationallevel will result in complete access tointelligence capabilities to support missionresponsibilities without regard to organizationor command configurations.

e. Sharing and mutual support are essentialto integrating all resources and capabilitiesinto a unified system that will best fulfill theprioritized intelligence needs for jointoperations.

f. If you have extensive contact with theindigenous population, cultural informationis of critical importance in gauging thepotential reactions of the local population tothe activities of the peace operation.Knowledge of such factors as shown in FigureVII-1 (Ernst Cassirer’s Six Categories ofHuman Culture) is vital in avoidingmisunderstandings and improving theeffectiveness of operations.

g. Biographic information and leadershipanalysis are integral to understanding thenature and proclivities of adversaries orpotential adversaries, their method ofoperation, and how they interact with theirenvironment.

• Every item of operational informationhas potential importance in peaceoperations. (An obvious statement butone that may not be clear to all militarypersonnel.)

• Classification may present a problem inreleasing information, but keeping asmuch unclassified as feasible willimprove interoperability and trust amongmultinational partners.

• Do not forget the media in this endeavor.If you keep the media informed, they maybecome more willing to exchangeinformation with your staff.

3. Operational Considerations

a. There are no standard templates forstructuring intelligence support to peaceoperations. Use the same approach for theseoperations as you would for wartimeoperations. Intelligence organizationalresources, methodologies, and productsshould be established, flexible, exercisedregularly, and applicable in any type ofmilitary option or scenario.

b. In peace operations, intelligence systemssupport must be tailored to satisfy specificmission requirements. The Joint DeployableIntelligence Support System (JDISS) providesa common platform which, combined with theJoint Worldwide IntelligenceCommunications System (JWICS)communications, can provide automatedintelligence support to the JTF. Other DODIntelligence Information System standardworkstations also may be employed to providean equivalent or specialized capability.Regardless of workstation platform, JWICSprovides sensitive compartmentedinformation connectivity to access worldwideintelligence centers, databases, imageryproducts, and personnel. In the event, JWICS

VII-4

Chapter VII


and systems by foreign intelligence services.CI also determines the ability and willingnessof HN forces to protect DOD resources andpersonnel.

l. You should, through your J-2, prioritizecomponent intelligence requirements tomanage the flow of intelligence andinformation more effectively and efficientlyto meet time-sensitive requirements.

4. Joint Task Force J-2Organizations

a. JTF Joint Intelligence SupportElement (JISE)

• The JISE, through the J-2, is the focusfor intelligence support to jointoperations in the JOA and is responsiblefor providing the JTF with completeintelligence.

• A tailored subset of the theater jointintelligence center (JIC), the JISEprovides intelligence support to JTFoperational forces and performs commonintelligence functions. The JISE is theprincipal J-2 organization supportingjoint operations.

• By design, the JISE is scalable and canexpand to meet the needs of the JTF, andit is tailored to fit the operatingenvironment based on identified CJTFrequirements.

• JISE is composed of analytical expertsand analysis teams that provide servicesand products required by the CJTF, JTFstaff, and components. These all-discipline and all-warfare specialtyanalysis teams should be focused onsubstantive operational intelligenceproblems. Analysis teams should takeinto account pertinent information fromall sources; a JISE’s capability for joint

h. Nonmilitary information factors such asthose shown in Figure VII-2 become criticalelements when evaluating potential problemareas that can impact the success of peaceoperations.

i. In many peace operations, yourknowledge of the ethnic and religious factionsand fissures in the JOA, along with thehistorical background of the hostilitiesunderlying the deployment, will be vital incomplying with the mandate, preventingunintentional mission creep, and ultimatelyachieving the objectives of the operation.

j. It is imperative to consider what must bedone, as well as what must not be done, totrigger an undesired or hostile action.

k. Recognize CI (UN operations mayinhibit collection of CI information) as asource of information. CI developsinformation on the threat posed to plans,strategies, resources, programs, operations,

RELIGION

MYTH

ART

LANGUAGE

SCIENCE

HISTORY

CATEGORIESOF HUMAN NATURE

Figure VII-1. Categories of Human Culture

VII-5


and all-source analysis is the key tooperational intelligence that is timely,relevant, and complete.

• JISE should support “upward” to thesupported combatant commander’s JIC,CJTF, and the JTF staff and shouldsupport “downward” to components,units, and elements assigned to or insupport of the JTF.

• Analytical efforts of the JISE should havean operational focus, with responsibilityfor helping the CJTF better understandhow the adversary thinks, e.g., how an

adversary will conceptualize thesituation, what options an adversary willconsider, and how an adversary will reactto the JTF actions.

• When the CJTF is engaged in planningoperations, the JISE assists by:

•• Identifying and nominating attainablemilitary objectives.

•• Identifying and nominating deceptionobjectives that will help attain militaryobjectives.

Figure VII-2. Host Country Information

GOVERNMENT FACTIONS,

MOTIVATIONS, AND

OBJECTIVES

SECURITYESTIMATES

JUDICIARY

EFFECTIVENESS

HUMANCULTURAL

INFORMATION

STATUS AND

EFFECTIVENESS OF

HOST GOVERNMENT

LOCAL

INFRASTRUCTURE

POLICECAPABILITIES

AND LOYALTIES

HOST COUNTRYINFORMATIONIS REQUIRED

HOST COUNTRY INFORMATION

VII-6

Chapter VII


• When the CJTF and subordinatecommanders are engaged in conductingoperations, the JISE assists by:

•• Orchestrating, in conjunction with J-3 watch teams and collection managers,all forms of reconnaissance andsurveillance which are necessary forunderstanding the situation, identifyingobjectives, providing warning to forces,and assessing the effects of operations.

•• In addition, the JISE also may be usedto manage intelligence resources andefforts and to coordinate application ofsenior, subordinate, and supportingcommands’ intelligence activities.

b. Joint Force J-2 Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Staff Element (J-2X)

• A JTF J-2X also may be activated. Thisconcept is designed to integrate humanintelligence (HUMINT) and CI bycombining the Human IntelligenceOperations Cell (HOC) with the TaskForce Counterintelligence CoordinatingAuthority (TFCICA), both of whomcomprise the J-2X.

•• A TFCICA coordinatesCounterintelligence Force ProtectionSource Operations; maintains tacticalsource registry; maintains liaisoncoordination; and conducts CI collectionmanagement support functions.

•• A HOC coordinates operations,sources administration, and requirementswith the Country Team; establishesliaison and tasks HUMINT collectionelements against identified prioritydocument and foreign materialacquisition requirements; and guidesHUMINT operations toward eliminationof intelligence gaps.

• The J-2X

•• Controls and coordinates allHUMINT and CI collection activities andkeeps the JTF J-2 informed on all humanintelligence and CI activities in the JOA.

•• Deconflicts source operational interestto minimize duplication of effort.

•• Ensures proper resource applicationto provide a coordinated and integratedHUMINT collection and reporting effortfor the JTF.

c. National Intelligence Support Team(NIST)

“The Haiti JTFs were all supported byNational Intelligence Support Teams(NISTs) drawn from the DefenseIntell igence Agency, CentralIntelligence Agency, and NationalSecurity Agency. NISTs can berequested by joint force commandersfrom CJCS and—on approval of theSecretary of Defense—tailored to meetoperational requirements based onarrangements between theater J-2sand the Defense Intelligence Agencyand J-2, Joint Staff.”

Joint Force QuarterlySpring 1995

• A NIST provides a mission-tailorednational intelligence “reach-back”capability to fulfill the stated intelligencerequirements of the supported JTF.

•• Normally, it is composed of theDefense Intelligence Agency, CentralIntelligence Agency, National SecurityAgency, and other intelligence resources,as required.

•• At a minimum, the personneldeployed in a NIST provide access toagency unique information andsupporting analysis. A basic NIST issupported by JDISS.

VII-7


• It is requested by the JTF, through thesupported combatant commander, and istailored to meet operational requirementsbased on arrangements between thesupported combatant commander’s J-2and the Joint Staff J-2.

5. Multinational Operations

a. There are close analogies between jointand multinational doctrines that result fromsimilar needs. One example is to establish aseamless cooperative force and unity of effort.

q. Concepts applicable when establishinginformation (intelligence) support tomultinational peace operations include:

• Adjust for national differences. Youshould be flexible enough to facilitaterequired adjustments to national conceptsfor intelligence support to make themultinational action effective. Forexample, a single director of intelligenceshould be designated in-theater withintelligence and information beingexchanged.

• Strive for unity of effort to achieve acommon mission. The mission shouldbe viewed from a national as well asmultinational perspective and a threat toone element of the force by a commonadversary should be considered a threatto all members.

• Determine and plan intelligence. Whenpossible, multinational intelligencerequirements should be agreed upon,planned, and exercised in advance of theoperation.

• Seek full exchange of information.

• Plan complementary intelligenceoperations. Strengths can be enhancedand weaknesses overcome whenmultinational intelligence resources andcapabilities are applied against the entireoperation.

• Establish a multinational intelligencecenter. This center should includerepresentatives from all participatingnations. (There will still be a requirementfor a US-only intelligence center.)

• Exchange liaisons. This exchange willeliminate potential problems betweencultures, languages, doctrines, andoperational intelligence requirements.The requirement for linguists andinterpreters is further accentuated by thefollowing quote.

“[Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR].Multinational lines of communication.Complicated lines of communicationintensify any confusion that exists,which is further exasperated by the lackof a common language. ... Not only didwe have to establish guidelines forpassing information, but we also had tolearn to gather and assimilateintelligence from three very differentinternational organizations: Italians,French and British. Eventually, webecame an integral part of the Italians’intelligence collection plan. The Italiansgave us access to their assessments ofthe current situation, including forceprotection issues. Translators were notavailable; occasionally, an allied soldierspoke some English, but in mostinstances neither party couldcommunicate effectively.”

Captain John H. Campbell, KSARNG161st Field Artillery(Target Acquisition)

FA Journal, January-February 1997

VII-8

Chapter VII


Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIIIPUBLIC AFFAIRS AND MEDIA

VIII-1

1. General

a. Dissemination of information to theworld’s public is now, more than ever before,a media event. Cameras are rolling and storiesare filed before forces even “hit the beach.”

b. The relationship you and your PA staffdevelop with the media will be critical to theoperation as you seek to have your storyaccurately told. The media may be of moreimportance to the military in MOOTW(e.g., peace operations) than war.

c. The media can be an ally and anadditional source of information—how muchof an ally may depend on you.

2. Public Affairs

a. Upon arrival in country, you must beprepared for a tidal wave of media attention—

“From their inception, contingency operations are high visibility. TheAmerican/world publics, families of Service members, the news media, andthe government have an insatiable demand for information that must bemade readily and immediately available.”

Joint Universal Lessons LearnedNo. 70344-88264 (06186)

your media policy must be developed beforedeployment.

b. You need to rehearse what you are goingto say to the media prior to your arrival in theJOA (obtain guidance from higher HQ on the“story” to be provided the media—substanceand strategy). A predeployment mediarelations “refresher” will enhance your abilityto address varied interests and agendas of theinternational media.

c. To help in handling the media andproviding maximum coverage of all importantevents, the JTF should deploy with PAassets as part of the command group.

• It would be better to initially deployadditional personnel and equipment andscale back rather than lose initial controlof the media impact on operations.

“From the beginning of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, media representatives were inthe mountains reporting on the plight of displaced Kurds. We decided from the outsetthat President Bush’s objectives for this humanitarian relief operation could be met bestby ensuring full access for the media. Therefore, we placed members of the media onour helicopters, in our C-130 aircraft, on our convoys, in our relocation camps, and withour ground forces, including SOF units. Interestingly enough, even though we madeseveral mistakes that were observed by the media, those mistakes never made it to thenightly news. Apparently, our evident commitment to relieving human suffering and ouropenness to coverage of all aspects of the operation persuaded the media to providewell-balanced, objective coverage of our endeavors and to place in proper perspectivethose mistakes we did make.”

General J. P. McCarthy, USAF Deputy Commander in Chief

US European Command

VIII-2

Chapter VIII


• Peace operations are normally more opento the public and therefore moreinformation is expected to be released.

d. PAO should be viewed as a forcemultiplier, be part of the planning process, andestablish goals based on your guidance.

e. PAO and PSYOP staffs shouldcoordinate efforts.

• PSYOP can use PA announcements andreleases. However, PA cannot employPSYOP.

• News media coverage of PSYOPactivities can benefit the JTF.

f. Joint Information Bureau

• Establish a JIB.

• JIB should facilitate and control PAcoverage within the JOA.

• It may help in improving disseminationof information to internal and externalaudiences.

• JIB provides a central location for newsand media access and support.

• A representative from the JIB should bepresent at your meetings and briefings.Additionally, a representative also shouldattend the CMOC or similar CMOmeetings.

g. Internal information is important to yourpersonnel and their families at home.Depending on the scope and duration of theoperation, establishment of Armed ForcesRadio and Television Service may be a wayto provide news and communicate withmembers of the JTF.

• Ensure your PAO is getting the goodword on your activities back to the“homefront.” Positive feedback is a

Navy SEALs coming ashore in Somalia—surrounded by a horde of media.

Syg

ma

Pho

to b

y P

atri

ck R

ober

t

VIII-3

Public Affairs and Media

must—remember, at times, Americanvalues may be at odds with the operation.

• The morale of the Service member oftenis influenced by what the spouse andother family members report they haveseen or heard on television and radio.

h. Make as much of the operationunclassified as possible; this may enhance theflow of information.

i. Encourage the PAO to become familiarwith the local media, both organizationallyand individually, to establish a workingrelationship in which two-waycommunication can occur for the benefit ofthe media, the public (internal and externalaudiences) and the JTF.

3. Procedures in Working withthe Media

a. Some rules and procedures for dealingwith the media are as follows:

• These rules should be promulgated to allparticipating military personnel as wellas the media.

• A coordinated media policy must beestablished. A system to providecredentials for the media may have to beestablished—this allows for some controlover who attends JTF briefings.

• In working with the media, be honest,accurate, and prepared to providesupport when possible (e.g.,transportation, meals, billeting,emergency medical treatment, liaisonpersonnel).

• In dealing with the media, the UnitedStates must speak with one voice, bothpolitically and militarily. Coordinate with

the combatant commander, Departmentof Defense, and State Department(country team).

• The media should see the identifiable endstate and progress in moving toward it.

• Aggressively counter inaccurateinformation with subject matter experts.

“CNN is everywhere, and where CNNgoes, all the other media outlets swiftlyfollow. Censorship today is virtuallyimpossible, with backpack satellite-broadcast systems and telephones thatallow reporters to file their copy fromanywhere in the world. That accessgives the news an immediacy thatdrives the political process in ways thatcan be very unhealthy, particularlywhen so many of the decisions makershave no experience of the world aboutwhich they are making decisions of lifeand death.”

James AdamsWashington Bureau Chief

London Sunday T imes

b. The media will want to talk to the fieldcommanders and their troops.

• Generally, this is a good idea.

• Avoid “dog and pony” shows. Mostexperienced media will immediately spotthem.

• It is better to let the media talk to thetroops. (They will anyway.) Guidance tothe troops should be:

•• You are free to talk to the media.

•• Everything you say is “on the record”and “for attribution”—meaning what yousay will be quoted by your name.

VIII-4

Chapter VIII


•• Do not discuss classified or sensitiveinformation. Do not comment on policy.

•• Be honest. If you do not know theanswer, say so. Do not speculate and staywithin your area of expertise.

•• Listen to the questions. If you areunsure of a query, ask the reporter toclarify it.

•• Treat equally and respect theirdeadlines.

•• Respect HN sensitivities and speakslowly.

•• Keep your answers brief and to thepoint.

•• Always maintain eye contact withinterviewer.

•• Avoid military or technical jargon.

•• Relax. Be yourself. Be friendly.

c. Facilitate media coverage of a highlysuccessful NGO or PVO operations. Suchoperations often are good yardsticks tomeasure success or failure with the media.

d. It is important not to put the media in aposition of appearing as your agent.

e. The media normally will go to greatlengths to remain impartial; however, someindividuals may have their own agendas andbiases.

f. Expect a wide range of competenciesamong the media.

• Most are very professional, courageous,highly ethical, and as dedicated to theirprofession as you are to yours.

• They often have no military background;however, they will usually work to gatherthe facts and present an accurate story.

• Treat them with the respect you expectand never underrate their capability togather information.

• They can be tenacious and may havesources of information not available to you.

“In general, there is a bell curve; thegood journalists are willing to share thesame hardships as the military. Lesscapable journalists are more oftenfound filing their stories from five starhotels.”

Colonel F. Peck, USMC Public Affairs Office,Headquarters Marine Corps

g. Most of the professional newsorganizations come prepared (either with thenecessary logistics support or money to buyit). As a rule, if you invite the media to comewith you, either be prepared to provide themwith transportation or include their vehiclesin your entourage.

h. If the media chooses to accompany themilitary, they will be under your protectionand rules. If they choose to leave, they are ontheir own.

i. More accurate and positive reportingwill be made by the media if they are familiarwith your mission.

j. Be aware that countries other than theUnited States will be interested and followingyour operation. The media dispatched tocover your activities will have an internationalmakeup and will report from a widely diverseperspective. In fact, some journalists may bepolitically aligned with organizations with an

VIII-5

Public Affairs and Media

opposing or unsympathetic view of yourposition.

k. Your command has an important storyto tell. Your force’s activities are “news” toboth international and national audiences. Youare the most believable spokesperson torepresent the force. Preparation and practiceon your part will result in newsworthy,informative articles and programs that maybe read and seen by millions of readers andviewers.

l. News travels fast and rumors travel faster.Be aggressive and proactive in your mediaand PA activities. Facilitating coverage ofyour activities is a media control measure.Market your good works to the media.

• A lack of communication capability andcultural differences in Third Worldcountries may require you tocommunicate face-to-face with thesecountries’ representatives.

• Regular briefings keep informationflowing to and from the media.

m. Remember as the situation changes, themedia also may change its focus—the “mainreporters” may leave and be replaced by “areaspecialists.”

n. In the past peace operations, CJTFs heldone-on-one discussions with mediarepresentatives to better articulate JTFactivities and operations. These should beconducted in addition to regularly scheduledpress conferences.

o. A “media survival guide” is shown inFigure VIII-1.

p. An excellent source to obtain additionalinformation on dealing with the media is anappendix to the “Operational LawHandbook.” Refer to the JEL Peace Operationsdatabase for this reference.

q. Joint Pub 3-61, “Doctrine for PublicAffairs in Joint Operations,” also providesfurther detail.

VIII-6

Chapter VIII


MEDIA SURVIVAL GUIDE

“Generally, it is in the institution’s best interest to deal honestly and ina timely manner with the media. If you do not play, you surrender toyour critics who will be eagerly at hand.

Understand the media’s obsession with speed, and through dailycontact, keep working to win the battle of the first media perception.

Leaders must learn to take time to articulate their positions to themedia. They must use short, simple language that the media will useand the public will understand.

Use the media to inform the public proactively, not just to react tocritics.

Understand that the news is almost always skewed toward the sideof those willing to talk to the media, and against those who say “Nocomment.”

Remember that CNN will correct the television record, while othernetworks rarely will do that because of time constraints.

Realize that there are reporters who do want to be accurate andhave balanced stories. Too often editors or television producers getin the way and interject the political or budget spin on an otherwisepositive story about our people. Getting reporters out to the fleet,field, or factory floor is a beginning.

Play the media game. Understand there are times for a low profile,but more often, a media opportunity to tell your story should not belost because of fear. We need to tell people, through the media, whatwe are about.

Do not be thin-skinned. We will not win every media engagement,but we must continue to communicate to our people and to the public.”

Rear Admiral Brent Baker, USN (RET)

Figure VIII-1. Media Survival Guide

CHAPTER IXLEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES

IX-1

“Joint legal staffs are needed in joint operations. Each Service should have atleast one senior staff judge advocate (SJA) at the [joint task force] JTFheadquarters.”

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACYJoint After Action Report (JAAR)

US Atlantic Command

1. General

a. Legal support is critical in peaceoperations. This support should include legalassistance attorneys to handle a wide array oflegal assistance issues for members of the JTF.

b. Peace operations involve a myriad ofstatutory, regulatory, and policyconsiderations, both foreign and domestic, inaddition to the normal constraints associatedwith deployments and operations. Your legaladvisor (SJA) is usually in the best positionto access these sources. Legal advisor andSJA will be used synonymously throughoutthis chapter.

c. Peace operations may requiresubordinate commanders to become involvedwith local governments and/or conductnegotiations among competing factions. Youwill need a legal advisor of sufficient rank(recommend grade of 0-6) to influence thedecisionmaking process.

d. Your “operational lawyer” should beimmediately available to advise, not only onthe legal restraints upon operators, but on therights to employ force.

e. Legal Responsibilities

• Legal services provided to you and yourstaff include operational law (includingLaw of Armed Conflict, ROE, Law ofthe Sea, Airspace Law, SOFA, andgeneral international law), military

justice, claims, legal assistance, andadministrative law (includingenvironmental law, contracts, and fiscallaw).

• Many of the subject areas overlap oneanother, requiring knowledgeable andeffective planning by the SJA.

•• SJA drafts Appendix 4 (Legal) toAnnex E (Personnel) of your OPLAN,OPORD, or campaign plan; develops alegal services support plan; drafts generaland restrictive orders; provides adviceand assistance in the development,interpretation, and modification of ROE;and oversees execution of the legalservices support plan at the JTF andcomponent level (component judgeadvocates are primarily responsible forthe execution of the legal services supportplan, except as it concerns JTF staffmembers).

•• The entire OPLAN, OPORD, orcampaign plan should be reviewed forlegal sufficiency. In the role ofoperational and international law advisor,the SJA will be responsible for providingadvice to the various staff sections andboards as requested on the entire rangeof operational and politico-militaryissues. SJA or representative is a memberof the ROE Planning Cell—critical areaof legal support is providing advice andcounsel on the development andpromulgation of ROE.

IX-2

Chapter IX


• Legal advisors also can help with a widerange of issues to include weaponsconfiscation policy; reviewing existingOPLANs, OPORDs, and campaignplans; developing policy guidance lettersfor you; and developing negotiationstrategy, as necessary.

•• Even if provided for by a SOFA orother international agreement,negotiation with local governments maybe necessary concerning a variety ofissues, including procurement matters,property seizure for military purposes,and scope of foreign criminal jurisdiction.

•• Legal advisors can advise andrepresent you on all these issues, as wellas ensure all adverse actions are properlyadministered.

f. Your legal advisor should be a vital partof the planning team before deployment.Besides reviewing OPLANs, OPORDs, andcampaign plans for legal sufficiency andidentifying legal issues, the legal advisor candraft a General Order to establish basicpolicy for the JTF regarding prohibited andpermitted actions while deployed. In addition,your legal advisor can provide details of theUniform Code of Military Justiceconsiderations for the JTF.

g. A good legal advisor is a forcemultiplier, and will assist you inaccomplishing your mission in a lawfulmanner.

2. International Agreements

a. Your legal advisor should be veryfamiliar with “international agreements” thatmight affect your mission.

b. The supported combatant commander’slegal advisor often can provide your legaladvisor a description and analysis ofapplicable laws.

c. There are usually UN Resolutions orother international directives which can formthe basis for US action. These may becomeimportant in your mission analysis.

• International agreements may cover suchissues as HN support, diplomatic statusand foreign criminal jurisdiction, use ofdeadly force, environmental matters, andmedical treatment of civilians.

The contractor was not included inthe status-of-forces agreement withthe Hungarian government. Theresult was the contractor paid about$18 million in value added tax tothe Hungarian government, whichwas subsequently billed to theUS Government as a contract cost.The Army is working to recoupthese taxes from the Hungariangovernment.

• Chapter I, “Mission,” of this Handbookdiscusses one type of theseagreements—SOFA.

3. Additional LegalConsiderations

a. Immediately request release authority forriot control agents—NCA approval requiredin wartime; supported combatant approvalrequired in peacetime. If you anticipate arequirement for riot control agents do notdelay the request to the supported combatantcommander.

b. Your legal advisor can assist in manyareas including refugees; displaced anddetained civilians; PSYOP and CA, localculture, customs, and government; military andpolitical liaison; claims; investigations;environmental regulations, both United Statesand HN; and contingency contracting.

IX-3

Legal Responsibilities

• The SJA also can provide advice on suchmatters as the legality of landing fees,interpretation of transit agreements, andthe requirement for participationagreements (e.g., in BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, NATO requiredparticipating countries to conclude aparticipation agreement with NATO tobind each country to NATO’s way ofdoing things).

• Another area that may require SJAattention is tax preparation assistance,when appropriate. The SJA shoulddevelop a tax preparation assistanceprogram for US members of the JTF.

c. A comprehensive understanding ofregulations and laws applicable to bothmilitary forces and other agencies, bothgovernmental and nongovernmental, isessential to promoting unity of effort andachieving success.

d. In multinational operations, coalitionpartners and the HN should be integrated intothe planning process to ensure all legalrequirements are identified. Your legal advisorshould help establish liaison with multinationaland HN legal officials early in the operation.

e. Be prepared to liaise and coordinate withthe local police force. This is an importantelement in retaining law and order. Be awarethat US law places limitations on permissiblesupport.

f. Be prepared to liaise and coordinate withlocal authorities and court officials whoadminister the judicial system to handlethieves and trespassers.

g. Invariably, the International Committeeof the Red Cross or other internationalorganizations will monitor your actions. Yourlegal advisor should be their single point ofcontact.

Forces must avoid unnecessary apprehension and detention of the local populace.

IX-4

Chapter IX


h. Two areas of sensitivity usually will arisein all peace operations.

• Detention of local nationals or others whoattack or otherwise disrupt the JTF or itspersonnel is a delicate issue. You mustbe sensitive to apprehension and turnoverprocedures. This is important especiallywhere there are distinct culturaldifferences in the JOA.

• Claims. In all likelihood, your force willinjure people or damage property,incidental to your operations. Your legaladvisor must implement a claims systemto pay for these incidents to assist in goodcommunity relations.

i. You will encounter fiscal restraintsinvolving activities that are not directly relatedto your mission. They are often technical andstatutory in nature. They may arise in logisticsassistance to NGO, PVO, multinationalforces, or others.

j. Your legal advisor can be a majorcontributor in solving many issues if used tofull advantage.

k. In summary, Figure IX-1 highlightslegal issues that may impact on JTFoperations.

IX-5

Legal Responsibilities

Figure IX-1. Legal Issues

Joint Military JusticeUniformity versus EfficiencyCourts-martial Asset SharingDivergent Command Philosophies

ClaimsForeign ClaimsSingle-Service Claims Authority

Legal AssistanceAsset Utilization and Interoperability

Environmental LawApplicability of US Law AbroadEnvironmental Treaties and Agreements

Fiscal Law/ContractsFiscal statutes and Appropriations Acts

International LawTreatiesConventions and Protocols (Hague/Geneva)Customary International Law (Law of Armed Conflict)National Policy Issues (Asylum and Refuge)Execution Orders (Riot Control Agents)

Operational Law IssuesOverflight of National AirspaceFreedom of NavigationBasing Rights (intermediate staging bases and forwardoperations bases)Displaced PersonsHumanitarian AssistanceStatus-of-Forces Agreement/Status of MissionAgreements

Rules of Engagement (ROE)An Operations (J-3) ResponsibilityLegal Advisor may be the most experienced and educatedin ROE Development

LEGAL ISSUES

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER XFORCE PROTECTION

X-1

1. General

a. Force protection must be a top priorityduring the “life” of a JTF. It commences fromthe time units are alerted to move theirequipment to the sea and aerial ports ofembarkation, to redeployment, and everythingin between. It is your responsibility and all

“In a multinational environment such as this one [Operation JOINTENDEAVOR], this subject [force protection] can be somewhat controversialas armies’ philosophies of military operations are different. The fact is, theAmerican Army focuses on force protection as a dynamic incumbent of militaryoperations. ... Commanders must take care of the sons and daughtersentrusted to them to accomplish the nation’s military missions. Force protectionmultiplies combat power, ensures you have the soldiers to get the job doneright. ... Force protection makes us more proficient and credible as awarfighting force. ... Force protection is more than sweat and sand bags; it’saggressive acts to keep the peace.”

Major General William L. Nash, USACommanding General, 1st Armored Division

and Task Force Eagle, Bosnia-HerzegovinaFA Journal, January-February 1997

Flowers adorn the remains of the Marine barracks in Beirut.

other commanders within the JTF. The intentshould be to accomplish the mission with theleast loss of personnel, equipment, andsupplies. In the event of a terrorist attack, it isimperative that qualified personnel areavailable to provide accurate casualtyreporting to the respective Service casualtyoffices. In this regard, the importance of

"The tragedy of the Marinebarracks bombing in Lebanoncannot be lost on leaders."Special Warfare, April 1994

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having 100% accurate personnelaccountability cannot be overemphasized.

b. It is important to remember thatmany factors influence force protection toinclude political considerations.

c. Conducting the mission analysis processshould assist in determining the policy forforce protection. Additionally, it shouldidentify the type of forces and equipmentrequired to support this policy.

d. In some peace operations, banditry andterrorism may play a major role in disruptingthe JTF’s security efforts. A plan must bedeveloped to counter this threat—US forcesoften are targets of violent acts.

e. You should not allow the philosophy of“unarmed peacekeepers” to minimize yourresponsibility for force protection.

f. Combat service support units (e.g.,logistics commands) normally provide theirown local (base) security.

g. NGO, PVO, the media, and others alsomay request some form of protection.

h. The protection afforded to theseorganizations and groups may serve toenhance your credibility with them andprovide you with a “window of opportunity”to further advance a cooperative and workableenvironment.

i. The higher the level of focus for forceprotection procedures, the less likely thechance of disaster.

j. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for JointOperations,” and Joint Pub 3-07.3, “JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forPeacekeeping Operations,” provide moredetail on force protection.

“Force protection for US forces will always be a significant issue in any militaryoperation, and be an especially high priority in peace operations missions. In OJE[Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR], US force protection took on a higher degree ofimportance than we have seen in other military operations. In fact, force protectionwas a formal part of the OPLAN [operation plan] mission statement and permeatedall aspects of mission execution. Furthermore, many participants [Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I conference participants] agreed that US forceprotection measures seemed to be politically motivated and clearly not based ona realistic threat assessment.”

Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I Conference Report

Force Protection

Security program designedto protect soldiers, civilianemployees, family members,facilities, and equipment, inall locations and situations.

Accomplished throughplanned and integratedapplication of combattingterrorism, physical security,operations security, personalprotective services, andsupported by intelligence,counterintelligence, andother security programs.

!

!

KEY TERM

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Force Protection

2. Force ProtectionConsiderations

“My initial concern for the taskforce deploying to Operation ABLESENTRY was force protection. SomeUN military commanders don’tunderstand our preoccupation with thisissue because they are not faced withthe same threat as US forces. Theydon’t understand that because we arethe American Army, we are an isolatedtarget of opportunity.”

Major General W. H. Yates, USACommander, Berlin Brigade

The below force protection considerationsare provided as a guide. They will have to beadapted to the JTF’s peace operations missionand situation.

a. ROE. ROE provide a means toinfluence force protection.

b. Protection from potential threats. Inpeace operations, you must be able to

establish a mechanism to identify potentialthreats to the JTF. These threats may notalways be transparent.

In Haiti (United Nations Mission inHaiti), force protection teams wereformed to identify potential threatsto the force.

c. Health, Welfare, Morale, andMaintenance. You must keep personnelhealthy and maintain high morale. Thisprotection includes guarding equipment andsupplies from loss or damage. You also mustensure systems are in place for adequatemedical care, quick return of minor casualtiesto duty, and preventive medicine. Joint Pub4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Supportin Joint Operations,” discusses health supportfor joint operations.

d. Safety

• You make safety an integral part of all jointtraining and operations. Sustained, high-tempo operations put personnel at risk.

Khobar Towers, another example of a terrorist attack against United States military forces.

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• Command interest, discipline, andtraining lessen those risks.

• Safety in training, planning, andoperations is crucial to successfuloperations and the preservation ofmilitary power.

•• You may reduce the chance of mishapby conducting risk assessments,assigning a safety officer and staff,conducting a safety program, and seekingadvice from local personnel. The safetyprogram should begin with trainingconducted before deployment and becontinuous.

•• Training will include factors that couldhave an effect on safety, such as theenvironment, terrain, road conditions andlocal driving habits, access or possessionof live ammunition, unlocated oruncleared mine fields, and specialequipment such as tanks and othersystems that present special hazards.

•• Safety also is important during offduty and recreational activities. Ifpossible, the safety officer and staffshould coordinate with local authoritiesconcerning environmental and healthconcerns.

e. Prevention of Fratricide. You makeevery effort to reduce the potential forfratricide—the unintentional killing orwounding of friendly personnel by friendlyfire. As the CJTF, you must be aware of thosesituations that increase the risk of fratricideand institute appropriate preventativemeasures. The primary mechanisms forlimiting fratricide are command emphasis,disciplined operations, close coordinationamong component commands, rehearsals,and enhanced situational awareness.

• You should establish anti-fratricidemeasures in your SOPs and otherdirectives.

• In multinational operations, it also isessential to coordinate these measureswith multinational forces to ensure theirunderstanding and concurrence.

f. Technology. Every means of forceprotection must be examined. Technology canassist in providing lethal and nonlethalcapability (e.g., sensors, securecommunications network, unmanned aerialvehicles, personnel dyemarkers, spongegrenades, rubber bullets) to the JTF.

g. Nonlethal Force

• The use of nonlethal weapons is a rapidlydeveloping area for military operations.The term is really a misnomer becauseany object, even a tent peg, can be lethalin certain circumstances.

• Nonlethal technologies are designed tofill the gap between verbal warnings anddeadly force when dealing with unarmedhostile elements. These situations arelikely to be encountered in peaceoperations, and the CJTF needs to havethe maximum tools at the JTF’s disposalto reduce the threat to the JTF, and toavoid raising the level of conflictunnecessarily.

• The CJTF must determine early in theplanning stage what nonlethaltechnology is available, how the force istrained to use it, and how the ROEauthorize its employment.

h. Individual Awar eness. All JTFcommanders, “from top to bottom,” must stressto the “troops” and others (e.g., mediapersonnel, other government agencies’personnel, and civilian organizations) thesignificance of security and the importanceof individual awareness (be aware of what isgoing on around them).

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Force Protection

3. Risk Management (RM)

a. Uncertainty and risk are a fundamentalpart of all military operations. A time-testedtenet of success of the joint operations of theUnited States is taking bold, decisive action,and a willingness to accept the associatedrisk. Risk is the probability and severity ofloss linked to various hazards. Carefullydetermining the risks, analyzing andcontrolling as many hazards as possible, andexecuting a supervised plan that accounts forthese hazards contributes to the success ofthe application of military force. RM is theprocess by which decision makers reduce oroffset risk. The RM process provides leadersa systematic mechanism to identify andchoose the optimum COA for any givensituation. RM must become a fully integratedelement of planning and executing anoperation. The RM process is applicable toall levels of military operations — strategic,operational, and tactical. Commanders areresponsible for the routine application of RMin the planning and execution of militaryoperations.

b. Risk Management Process

• Identify Hazards. Consider all aspectsof current and future situations,environment, and known historicalproblem areas.

• Assess Hazards. Assess hazards todetermine risks. Assess the impact ofeach hazard in terms of potential loss andcost, based on probability and severity.

• Develop Controls and Make RiskDecisions. Develop control measuresthat eliminate the hazard or reduce its risk.As control measures are developed, risksare reevaluated until all risks are reducedto an acceptable level.

• Implement Controls. Put controls inplace that eliminate the hazards or reducetheir risks.

• Supervise and Evaluate. Enforcestandards and controls. Evaluate theeffectiveness of controls and adjust and/or update as necessary.

Demonstration of nonlethal capability available to joint task forces

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER XITRAINING REQUIREMENTS

XI-1

“A well-trained and disciplined military unit is the best foundation upon whichto build a peacekeeping force.”

Lieutenant General T. Montgomery, USASenior Military Representative to NATO

“Peace operations commanders and staff planners—even in companies andbattalions—may find their efforts require a level of political knowledge andsophistication formerly associated only with soldier-statesman at the highest level.”

Center for Army Lessons Learned May 1996

1. General

a. Training needs to be a continuingprocess for both personnel and units. It shouldbe accomplished with as many of themultinational forces and nonmilitaryorganizations associated with the operationas possible.

“It [training] should not be regulated tosimply preparing forces prior todeployment. It is a continuous ongoingprocess which constantly seeks torefresh and hone skil ls. ... Aconstructive ongoing cycle of in-theatre[in the joint operations area] training willprevent boredom, raise morale,develop unit cohesion and maintainoperational effectiveness. Training in-theatre [in the joint operations area]also may serve to maintain visibility anddemonstrate resolve without beingunnecessarily provocative.”

Wider Peacekeeping

b. You should establish a training programbased on your assessment of the mission andprojected JOA.

c. Training for peace operations may notbe entirely different from training forwarfighting except that the uniqueness of

peace operations requires warrior training tobe expanded and enhanced.

d. Predeployment training can beaccomplished, even in a time-sensitiveoperation, as long as it is based on anticipatedoperations to be conducted. The followingare potential training areas.

• Individual military skills.

• Individual and collective preventivemedicine procedures and practice.

• First aid—Individual and “buddy.”

• Terrorism awareness and prevention.

• Unit training (rehearsals should bemandatory)—based on projectedoperations.

• Staff training to include training withmultinational forces and nonmilitaryorganizations (when applicable)—youmay be faced with working with a diverseset of militaries and organizations. Themore multinational forces andnonmilitary organizations participate inyour training the more you will learn howthey think and operate and the morebroad-minded your staff will become—team building.

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• Customs, culture, religious practices,political situation, geography, economic,and historical background of the situationand population of the projected JOA.

• Adversary capabilities—as appropriate.

• How to effectively communicate to thepublic through the news media.

• Negotiation and mediation.

• Language training—key phrases.

• Situational awareness.

•• Mine and booby trap awareness.

•• Recognition of weapons and weaponssystems.

• ROE (to include both CJCSI 3121.01,“Standing Rules of Engagement for USForces,” and any supplemental measuresapproved for the theater or operation).

• Law of war (law of armed conflict).

• Crowd control—use of and employmentof riot control agents.

e. Embarked forces aboard Navy ships alsocan accomplish some training (e.g., individualskills, classes on ROE, working with themedia, and cultural aspects of the JOA). Anattempt should be made to bring these forcesashore for appropriate training.

f. Training may be accomplished once theJTF arrives in the JOA, but it probably willdepend on the situation and be based onspecific requirements and functions—forceprotection requirements also may impact onareas available for training. If the situationpermits, allow nonmilitary organizations toparticipate in your training—NGO and PVOhave much to offer and require your attention.

• Exercises may be conducted to rehearsethe OPORD or new missions.

Training conducted aboard a Navy ship.

XI-3

Training Requirements

• Training in the JOA also may advertiseyour capabilities which may serve as adeterrent.

• Some exercises and training (e.g., livefiring) will require HN approval—situationally dependent.

g. Success of the operation, in part, willdepend on the training the JTF receives priorto and during the operation.


All it takes is one Service member, actingimproperly, to “poison the well.” Training

and emphasis on proper personal conductmay prevent this.

a. Continue emphasizing ROE to ensureall understand it—to include when and howto use force.

b. Emphasize that all military personnel,but especially junior officers, staffnoncommissioned officers, andnoncommissioned officers, receiveinstruction in the “understanding” of peaceoperations. Inappropriate individualstatements and actions may offend forcesfrom other nations, HN, or NGO and PVO,and create negative perceptions of the UnitedStates or the JTF. Individuals should not

For example, “at Battamburg, a freak wind came up. The UN team suddenly heardsmall arms fire breaking out at the far end of town. The UN started to call for anextraction, when some of the folks looked outside and saw in fact that the Cambodianswere just firing up in the air to ‘stop the wind.’ That’s a normal Cambodian practice.When it is windy, when a storm approaches, they shoot in the air and the wind stops,hopefully.”

Major G. Steuber, USA, UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia

In-country training programs must support multinational forces.

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assume that derogatory statements made inEnglish will not be understood by others. Thesame is true for gestures and slang terms.

“There is no doubt in my mind, that thesuccess of a peace-keeping operationdepends more than anything else on thevigilance and mental alertness of themost junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader, for it is on theirreaction and immediate response thatthe success of the operation rests.”

Brigadier M. Harbottle, UN ForcesCyprus

c. Ensure JTF staff augmentees participatein training events. Additional training forthese individuals should evolve through thecombatant commanders’ exercise and training

program. Normally, these augmentees bringextensive expertise to your staff.

d. Review the supported combatantcommander’s Joint Mission Essential TaskList for guidance on military force capabilityas it relates to training requirements.

e. Provide training to all units or individualswhom you plan to lend equipment.

f. Evaluate training opportunities offeredby other Services and nations. For example:7th Army Training Command in Germany, theUnited Nations Training Advisory Team inthe United Kingdom, and the Swedish ArmedForces International Centre. These all haveextensive experience in training units andindividuals for peace operations.

CHAPTER XIIREFUGEE, DISPLACED PERSON, OR MIGRANT

CAMP OPERATIONS

XII-1

In Operations PROVIDE COMFORT andSEA SIGNAL, the United States wasinvolved in camp management operations.This section of the Handbook discussesvarious aspects of these operations withoutexpounding on topics (e.g., PA, ROE,linguists, force protection) that are discussedelsewhere in the Handbook, and focusesspecifically on situations where the JTF istasked with camp management. In manypeace operations involving HAO, JTFpersonnel may encounter camps for refugeesmanaged by organizations such as the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees orcamps for conflict-displaced groups managedby the United Nations or NGO. In this lattersituation, previous guidance on civil-militaryrelations and other guidance in the Handbookwould apply.

1. General

a. Humanitarian Assistance Operations

• HAO, often, complement peaceoperations.

• These types of operations vary accordingto the events that caused them.

b. US participation may involve a varietyof tasks that range from holding refugees,displaced persons, or migrants in camps toprocessing and arranging for their ultimateresettlement.

c. As with peace operations, you mustunderstand the scope of the legal authority forthe operation: Is it governed by US statutes,Presidential Directives and Executive Orders,treaty obligations, or other internationalagreements? Existing internationalagreements may constrain US forces;agreements negotiated during the course ofthe operation could provide additionalflexibility for expanded operations inneighboring countries. Likewise, agreementsalso may define the legal rights andresponsibilities of US forces in dealing withrefugees, displaced persons, or migrants, aswell as host-country officials.

2. Planning and Operations

a. Mission Analysis

• Continued mission analysis is vital toachieving the mission.

• Over time, the nature of the mission

“The United States armed forces are becoming increasingly involved inhumanitarian assistance operations around the world. Operations such asthose involving Cuban and Haitian migrants, Kurdish and Rwandan refugees,and internal disaster relief are likely to continue as a result of other wars,natural disaster, and political or economic turmoil. We have adapted well tothese challenges by forming joint task forces (JTFs) and using our commandand control systems, logistics, and rapid deployment capabilities in innovativeways. We must build from these experiences as we prepare for futurechallenges.”

General J. J. Sheehan, USMCCommander in Chief

United States Atlantic Command

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likely will change. For example, in theearly stages of the operation the emphasiswill be on emergency measures to house,feed, and provide necessary medical carefor these people. As this is completed,the JTF may initiate efforts to improvethe quality of life for them and preparefor the end of the operation.

• Cultural awareness provides a frameworkfor rendering assistance to, as well asresolving problems with, the refugees,displaced persons, or migrants.

•• An analysis of the region and peopleshould be reviewed prior to deploymentto understand the operationalenvironment.

•• This should include information oncustoms and habits: gender or familyrelations, food, taboos, religiousrequirements, as well as information onthe refugee’s, displaced person’s, ormigrant’s country, the site of the mission,and data on any previous relatedoperations.

b. Basic Policy

• Basic policy issues affecting the JTF maybe addressed by an Interagency WorkingGroup in Washington that is organizedfor the specific operation. This groupprobably will consist of representativesfrom the National Security Council staff,the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretaryof Defense, Department of State, and, inmany instances, the Coast Guard, and theDepartment of Justice. Policy issues mayinclude housing, food, medical services,mail, donations of goods and services,camp programs, religious requirements,immigration policy, and transportation ofrefugees or migrants to the United States(if appropriate).

• Visits to the area by policymakers whohave a direct impact on the missionshould be encouraged as well as visitsby the supported combatant commanderand staff and all the agencies involved inthe daily execution of the mission.

• A JTF formed specifically to conductmigrant camp operations on a US facility,such as JTF 160 at Naval BaseGuantanamo Bay, Cuba will likely beorganized differently from a JTF in aforeign country with a broad mission,only part of which is assisting in theestablishment and operation of camps forrefugees and displaced persons.

c. Civil-Military Relations

• As in peace operations, the role of otherUS agencies and their potentialinvolvement and impact on theseoperations must be understood by theJTF.

• The goal is to gain consensus on majorpolicy decisions and encourage a teamapproach between the military andgovernmental and nongovernmentalorganizations.

•• It is likely that there will be participationof IO, NGO, and PVO in most of theseoperations.

•• The challenge will be to integratethese organizations into the JTFoperations. Different organizationalstructures and agendas of theseorganizations will complicate this task.

d. Camp Operations

• Policies should be developed regardinginteraction between JTF troops and campoccupants. Specifically consider what

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Refugee, Displaced Person, or Migrant Camp Operations

types of commercial transactions andcharitable acts are to be permitted.

• The effective operation of camps requiresa well-developed organization, detailedoperating procedures, and personnelsensitized to dealing with refugees,displaced persons, and migrants.

• These people will be provided with food,clothing, and shelter in the camps thatwill be their home for an indeterminatetime. You must set the tone for theoperation and ensure that JTF personnelunderstand that these individuals arehuman beings and not just numbers.

•• These people must be treated withdignity and respect.

•• It also is important to remember thatthese people are not military personnel;as such, they are not used to being givenorders. Random searches, for instance,only should be carried out for securitypurposes.

• Each camp operation is likely to bedifferent, but you should try to involverefugees, displaced persons, and migrantsin the operation of the camp. Developing

self-governing bodies can be a primefactor in the peaceful and efficientoperation of the camps. JTF personnelshould identify potential refugee,displaced person, and migrant leadershipas soon as possible and support thoseleaders who are willing to work towardmission accomplishment. Employmentof refugees, displaced persons, ormigrants within the camp also should beconsidered. Specific conditions of theoperation will determine whetherpayment of cash for these services isfeasible or advisable.

• Organized recreational activities can easeboredom and restlessness. Daily camplife offers very little opportunity forproductive activity. Organized programssuch as physical training and sports canenhance the US relationship with thesepeople as well as improve their moraleand quality of life. When people areafforded the opportunity for physicalactivity during their idle hours, they aremore manageable and less likely toprotest their conditions or causeproblems.

• The following four principles maycontribute to mission accomplishment:

“Tomorrow [16 April 1997] marks the beginning of the end of Joint Task ForceOperation PACIFIC HAVEN when the last of 6600 Kurdish evacuees brought toGuam for political asylum depart the island—heading for new lives on the U.S.mainland. This 218-day humanitarian effort was established Sept. 16, 1996, to serveas the instrument of care for the evacuees. While on the island, the Kurds wereprovided shelter, food, clothing, medical care, and assimilation classes to help themadjust to a new way of life in the United States. This was a joint effort by about 1600individuals, including military members from all services and U.S. interagencyprofessionals from around the globe. ... ‘The cooperation between U.S. military,federal and local government, and non-government organizations and the communityensured the mission’s success,’ said Maj. Gen. John Dallager, Joint task Forcecommander. ‘Our success will undoubtedly be a role model for future humanitarianefforts.’”

News Release Reference Number: No. 177-97Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

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•• Accountability . There must be anaccurate accounting of all refugees,displaced persons, or migrants at alltimes. An automated, networked system,such as the Deployable Mass PopulationIdentification and Tracking System(commonly referred to as DMPITS), inconjunction with an identification cardwith a permanent number, issued andcontrolled at the JTF level, is needed toensure positive, real-time accountabilityfor the population.

•• Control . Positive control of the camppopulation is the key to successfulcamp security and operations. Thedissemination of information is animportant means of population control.Use refugee, displaced person, or migrantleadership to disseminate informationwithin the camps. This should becoordinated through an organizationsuch as a military information supportteam (PSYOP activities). It is imperativethat the population be given a messageof hope for their future.

•• Security. Provisions for campsecurity and the enforcement of law,order, and discipline within the camps areessential. This is a delicate area since,with very few exceptions, these peopleare not criminals nor are theyprisoners of war and should not betreated as if they are part of eithergroup. It will be necessary to developconsistent and fair standards fordisciplinary segregation and detention ofpeople. Military legal officers and insome cases Justice Department personnelshould develop these. A well trainedsecurity force with clear ROE protectboth the civilians and JTF personnel. Insome instances, it may be necessary toprovide separate housing for families,single women, or other groups for whichthere may be special security concerns.

•• Communications. Effect ivecommunications can convey importantmessages that help form opinions andattitudes that contribute to good campmorale. This includes keeping thepopulation informed of their status andUS intentions toward them.Communications also convey yourinterest in their well being. Campnewspaper, radio, and face-to-facemeetings are very effective means todispel rumors and communicateimportant information.

e. Medical. Infectious diseases pose oneof the greatest threats to JTF personnel andcamp populations. Proper sanitation andpreventive medicine early in the operation cancontribute to mission success. Foodpreparation, potable water, sewage and refusesanitation, and animal control are critical tomaintaining public health and preventingepidemic diseases.

f. Logistics. Joint logistics planning andcoordination are essential to successful campsupport. The logistics structure devised toconduct operations in these camps may varyfrom what would be considered “normaloperations.” JTF 160 (Operation SEASIGNAL) used a Joint Logistics SupportCommand to provide support for both JTFpersonnel and the migrant population.

• Food Service. The quality and reliabilityof food service can be a major factor inmaintaining tranquillity in the camps. Aneffective food services operation requiresthe participation of the JTF staff (medical,food service, and CA). The lack ofconsistent food service and quality offood served can be a source of significantdiscontent. Migrants should be used asmuch as possible in food servicesoperations.

XII-5

Refugee, Displaced Person, or Migrant Camp Operations

“In a migrant camp environment, mealstake on an elevated importance. Foodservice personnel at Guantanamo[Operation SEA SIGNAL] determinedthe cultural and nutritional needs of themigrant population and providedmenus tailored to the specific cultureof the migrants. Camp leaders wereconsulted to identify any foodprohibitions or preferences beforefeeding plans were established.”

Migrant Camp Operations:The Guantanamo Experience

• Camp Construction. The design andconstruction of the camp will be asignificant part of missionaccomplishment. The camp will becomethe equivalent of a small town with allthe infrastructure required to support theneeds of the population. Early on, youshould decide construction standards forthe camps as this will dictate personneland equipment requirements.

•• Planning for the camps should includea site survey.

•• A primary consideration should be theanticipated length of the operation andthe requirements to meet the initial surgeof migrants. If the operation continuesfor an extended period, it may benecessary to transition from temporaryfacilities to semipermanent construction.

•• Maintenance of the civilian and JTFcamps is critical. Separate engineeringunits should be tasked with campmaintenance.

•• Camp construction will have tosupport various groups of people—families, single women, single men,detention centers.

•• Another important consideration isplanning for the eventual termination of

the operation. Retrograde planningshould be included even as camps arebeing constructed.

• Contracting. Consideration should begiven to using contractor support. Useof contractors to fulfill such requirementsas food service support, public workssupport, supply support, and/or linguistsservices may be possible early in theoperation. Contract support should notbe assumed to be available during theinitial phase of an operation. Its best usewould be to meet long-termrequirements.

g. Funding. Every effort should bemade during the planning stages todetermine funding responsibilities andsources. The interagency group inWashington, D.C. will determine which non-DOD funds sources also may be available.The supported combatant commander mayprovide funds to the JTF for specific purposes,but these funds usually are very limited.

• If possible, you should obtain authorityfor the JTF to control its own budget.Future operations likely will be subjectto austere funding and will not operateeffectively without direct funding controland visibility.

• JTF and Service components shouldcarefully track and record costsconnected with the operation. This willallow the Department of Defense torecoup costs through later supplementalappropriat ions as appropriate.Additionally, a high priority should beplaced on property accountability due tofrequent turnover of temporarypersonnel.

h. Legal. The rights of migrantsattempting to enter the United States areseverely limited. The United StatesImmigration and Nationality Act (INA) does

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not have extraterritorial effect; therefore,migrants do not have the same rights in anoffshore safe haven as they would in theUnited States. In each safe haven situation,the Department of Justice will determine theextent to which the INA is applicable. Eventhough migrants do not have the same rightsas US citizens, JTF personnel must not actarbitrarily and capriciously toward them.

• An early determination should be soughtto identify the legal status of the migrants(e.g., whether grounds exist for a refugeedetermination) and their ultimatedisposition (which may includeresettlement in a third country).

• This determination will impact upon themission’s end state and ultimateconclusion of the operation.

• The issue of the legal basis of theoperation is very important, not onlyfrom a fiscal law standpoint but also froman international law perspective.

i. For more detail see “USACOM’s TTPfor Migrant Camp Operations,” andUSACOM’s Handbook titled “Migrant CampOperations: The Guantanamo Experience.”

APPENDIX ASUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISION

DIRECTIVE 25

A-1

The current administration’s policy on reforming multilateral peaceoperations can be located in the JEL database for peace operations underthe title “Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25).” This directiveaddresses six major issues of reform and improvement. The executivesummary of PDD 25 follows.

1. Policy Directive

“1. Making disciplined and coherent choicesabout which peace operations to support—both when we vote in the security council forUN peace operations and when we participatein such operations with US troops.

• To achieve this goal, the policy directivesets forth three increasingly rigorous standardsof review for US support for or participationin peace operations, with the most stringentapplying to US participation in missions thatmay involve combat. The policy directiveaffirms that peacekeeping can be a useful toolfor advancing US national security interestsin some circumstances, but both US and UNinvolvement in peacekeeping must beselective and more effective.

2. Reducing US costs for UN peaceoperations, both the percentage our nationpays for each operation and the cost of theoperations themselves.

• To achieve this goal, the policy directiveorders that we work to reduce ourpeacekeeping assessment percentage from thecurrent 31.7% to 25% by January 1, 1996,and proposes a number of specific steps toreduce the cost of UN peace operations.

3. Defining clearly our policy regarding thecommand and control of American militaryforces in UN peace operations.

• The policy directive underscores the factthat the President will never relinquishcommand of US forces. However, asCommander in Chief, the President has theauthority to place US forces under theoperational control of a foreign commanderwhen doing so serves American securityinterests, just as American leaders have donenumerous times since the Revolutionary War,including in Operation DESERT STORM.

• The greater the anticipated US military role,the less like it will be that the United Stateswill agree to have a UN commander exerciseoverall operational control over US forces.Any large scale participation of US forces ina major peace enforcement operation that islikely to involve combat should ordinarily beconducted under US command andoperational control or through competentregional organizations such as NATO or adhoc coalitions.

4. Reforming and improving the UN’scapability to manage peace operations.

• The policy recommends 11 steps tostrengthen UN management of peaceoperations and directs US support forstrengthening the UN’s planning, logistics,information, and command and controlcapabilities.

5. Improving the way the US Governmentmanages and funds peace operations.

A-2

Appendix A


• The policy directive creates a new sharedresponsibility approach to managing andfunding UN peace operations within theUnited States Government. Under thisapproach, the department of defense will takelead management and funding responsibilityfor those UN operations that involve UScombat units and those that are likely toinvolve combat, whether or not US troops areinvolved. This approach will ensure thatmilitary expertise is brought to bear on thoseoperations that have a significant militarycomponent.

• The State Department will retain leadmanagement and funding responsibility fortraditional peacekeeping operations that donot involve US combat units. In all cases, theState Department remains responsible for theconduct of diplomacy and instructions toembassies and our UN mission in New York.

6. Creating better forms of cooperationbetween the Executive, the Congress and theAmerican public on peace operations.

• The policy directive sets out seven proposalsfor increasing and regularizing the flow ofinformation and consultation between theexecutive branch and congress; the Presidentbelieves US support for and participation inUN peace operations can only succeed overthe long term with bipartisan support ofcongress and the American people.”

2. Role of Peace Operations inForeign Policy

• The current administration defines the roleof the United States in peace operations inthe following summary. (Extracted from theadministration’s policy on reformingmultilateral peace operations, May 1994.)

• Voting for peace operations:

•• US military involvement in peaceoperations must support diplomatic effortsto allow combatants the opportunity toresolve their differences and failed societiesto commence the rebuilding process. Peaceoperations should not be open-endedcommitments but instead linked to concretepolitical solutions; otherwise, they normallyshould not be undertaken. To the greatestextent possible, each UN peace operationshould have a specified time frame tied tointermediate or final objectives, anintegrated political and military strategywell-coordinated with humanitarianassistance efforts, specified troop levels, anda firm budget estimate.

•• The UN has been the most frequentsponsor of peacekeeping operations. Theadministration will consider the factorsbelow when deciding whether to vote for aproposed new UN peace operation (ChapterVI or Chapter VII) or to support aregionally-sponsored peace operation.

••• UN involvement advances USinterests, and there is an internationalcommunity of interest for dealing with theproblem on a multilateral basis.

••• There is a threat to or breach ofinternational peace and security, often ofa regional character, defined as one or acombination or the following:

•••• international aggression, or;

•••• urgent humanitarian disastercoupled with violence;

•••• sudden interruption of establisheddemocracy or gross violation of humanrights coupled with violence, or threatof violence.

••• There are clear objectives and anunderstanding of where the mission fits

A-3

Summary and Highlights of Presidential Decision Directive 25

on the spectrum between traditionalpeacekeeping and peace enforcement.

••• For traditional (Chapter VI)peacekeeping operations, a cease-fireshould be in place and the consent of theparties obtained before the force isdeployed.

••• For peace enforcement (Chapter VII)operations, the threat to international peaceand security is considered significant.

••• The means to accomplish the missionare available, including the forces,financing and a mandate appropriate to themission.

••• The political, economic andhumanitarian consequences of inaction bythe international community have beenweighed and are considered unacceptable.

••• The operation’s anticipated durationis tied to clear objectives and realisticcriteria for ending the operation.

• These factors are an aid in decision-making;they do not by themselves constitute aprescriptive device. Decisions have been andwill be based on the cumulative weight of thefactors, with no single factor necessarily beingan absolute determinant.

• In addition, using the factors above, the USwill continue to scrutinize closely all existingpeace operations when they come up forregular renewal by the Security Council toassess the value of continuing them. Inappropriate cases, the US will seek voluntarycontributions by beneficiary nations orenhanced host nation support to reduce orcover, at least partially, the costs of certainUN operations. The US will also considervoting against renewal of certain long-standing peace operations that are failing tomeet established objectives in order to free

military and financial resources for morepressing UN missions.

• Participating in UN and other peaceoperations:

•• The administration will continue toapply even stricter standards when itassesses whether to recommend to thePresident that US personnel participate ina given peace operation. In addition to thefactors listed above, we will consider thefollowing factors:

••• Participation advances US interestsand both the unique and general risks toAmerican personnel have been weighedand are considered acceptable;

••• Personnel, funds and other resourcesare available;

••• US participation is necessary foroperation’s success;

••• The role of US forces is tied to clearobjectives and an endpoint for USparticipation can be identified;

••• Domestic and congressional supportexists or can be marshalled;

••• Command and control arrangementsare acceptable.

•• Additional, even more rigorous factorswill be applied when there is the possibilityof significant US participation in ChapterVII operations that are likely to involvecombat:

••• There exists a determination to commitsufficient forces to achieve clearly definedobjectives;

••• There exists a plan to achieve thoseobjectives decisively;

A-4

Appendix A


••• There exists a commitment to reassessand adjust, as necessary, the size,composition, and disposition of our forcesto achieve our objectives.

• Any recommendation to the President willbe based on the cumulative weight of theabove factors, with no single factor necessarilybeing an absolute determinant.

• The role of regional organizations:

•• In some cases, the appropriate way toperform peace operations will be to involveregional organizations. The United Stateswill continue to emphasize the UN as theprimary international body with theauthority to conduct peacekeeping

operations. At the same time, the UnitedStates will support efforts to improveregional organizations’ peacekeepingcapabilities.

•• When regional organizations orgroupings seek to conduct peacekeepingwith UNSC endorsement, US support willbe conditioned on adherence to theprinciples of the UN Charter and meetingestablished UNSC criteria, includingneutrality, consent of the conflicting parties,formal UNSC oversight and finite, renewalmandates.

• Refer to the JEL Peace Operations databasefor other portions of PDD 25.

APPENDIX BSUMMARY OF UN CHARTERCHAPTERS VI, VII, and VIII

“The first of the purposes of the United Nations listed in its Charter is to maintaininternational peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measuresfor the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression ofacts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peacefulmeans, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to abreach of the peace.”

The Blue Helmets

United Nations Headquarters in New York City.

• The UN Security Council is vested withthe primary responsibility for themaintenance of international peace and

security. Chapters VI, VII, and VIII ofthe Charter are the vehicles used toachieve this purpose. Below is a brief

B-1

B-2

Appendix B


summary of these chapters. Consult theJEL Peace Operations database to viewthe Articles of Chapters VI, VII, and VIII.

• Chapter VI—PACIFIC SETTLEMENTOF DISPUTES. This chapter providesthat international disputes likely toendanger the maintenance ofinternational peace and security can bebrought to the attention of the UNSecurity Council or the GeneralAssembly. The Security Council isexpressly mandated to call on the partiesto settle their disputes by peaceful means,to recommend appropriate procedures ormethods of adjustment and, in addition,to propose actual terms of a settlement.The action of the Security Council in thiscontext is limited to makingrecommendations; essentially, thepeaceful settlement of internationaldisputes must be achieved by the partiesthemselves, acting on a voluntary basisto carry out the decisions of the SecurityCouncil in accordance with the Charter.

• Chapter VII—ACTION WITHRESPECT TO THREATS TO THEPEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE,AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION. If theSecurity Council determines that a threatto the peace, breach of the peace or actof aggression exists, the Security Councilmay employ the broad powers given itin Chapter VII of the Charter. In orderto prevent an aggravation to the situation,the Security Council may call upon theparties concerned to comply with such

provisional measures as it deemsnecessary or desirable. Next, it maydecide, under Article 42, such action byair, sea, and land forces as may benecessary to maintain or restoreinternational peace and security. For thispurpose, all members of the UN agree tomake available to the Security Council,on its call and in accordance with specialagreements, the necessary armed forces,assistance and facilities. Plans for the useof armed force are to be made by theSecurity Council with the assistance of amilitary staff committee.

• Chapter VIII—Regional Arrangements—Chapter VIII of the UN Charter allowsfor the creation of “regionalorganizations” or agencies to deal withsuch matters relating to the maintenanceof international peace and security as areappropriate for regional actions (seeArticle 52). Regional organizations arerequired to encourage peaceful settlementof international disputes, and mustprohibit the aggressive use or threat offorce in international relations.Additionally, Article 53 of the UNCharter requires that enforcement actionmay be carried out by a regionalorganization only if sanctioned by the UNSecurity Council and that suchenforcement actions must always beconsistent with the principles of theCharter. Finally, the Security Councilmay use regional organizations forenforcement actions under its ownauthority.

UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIATDepartment Level

SECRETARY GENERAL

SeniorPoliticalAdviser

Inspectionsand

Investigation

SeniorPoliticalAdviser

ExecutiveOffice

PoliticalAffairs

HumanitarianAffairs

Peace-KeepingOperations

Development,Supportand Management

Support

Legal Affairs

Economic andSocial Information

and Policy Analysis

PublicInformation

Administrationand

Management

Policy Developmentand Sustainable

Development

Figure C-1. United Nations Secretariat

AP

PE

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IX C

CH

AIN

OF

CO

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AN

D S

TR

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TU

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C-1

Appendix C

JTF

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Under Secretary General

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

Military Adviser

Situation Centre

Assistant Secretary General

Planning

Finance ManagementMission PlanningService

Demining Unit

Training Unit

Civilian Police

Lessons LearnedUnit

Personnel Management

Logistics &Communications

FieldAdministration

& Logistics

Europe& LatinAmerica

Asia &Middle East

Africa

Assistant Secretary General

Policy andAnalysis

Executive Officer

Figure C-2. United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations

Chain of Command Structures

C-3

ForceHeadquarters

FijianBattalion

1ST SupportBattalion USA

USBattalion

ColombianBattalion

THE FORCE

Civilian ObserverUnitUSA

Fixed WingAviation Unit

France

Coastal PatrolUnitItaly

Training andAdvisory TeamNew Zealand

Transport andEngineering Unit

Uruguay

Support ContractorHolmes and Narver

Service, Inc.

Headquarters UnitUnited Kingdom

CanadianContingent

Force Signals UnitForce Military Police Unit

The Netherlands

Office of theDirector General

General Consul Policy, Planning,and Operations

Logistics, Facilities,and Contracts

Personneland Publications Administration

Politicaland Press

Affairs

Comptroller

MFO HEADQUARTERS - ROME,ITALY

SAMPLE CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR MULTINATIONALFORCE AND OBSERVERS

Note: US Forces performing peacekeeping operations under the direction of multinationalpeacekeeping organizations will be assigned to a combatant commander unless otherwisedirected by the NCA.

Figure C-3. Sample Chain of Command for Multinational Force and Observers

Appendix C

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CombatantCommander

PoliticalLeader

USNationalForce

NationalForce

NationalForce

GENERIC MULTINATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

ForceCommander

NationalGovernment

NationalGovernment

COMMANDOperational ControlADVISORY

LEGEND

Figure C-4. Generic Multinational Command Structure

Chain of C

omm

and Structures

C-5

NOTIONAL UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVETO THE SECRETARY

GENERAL (SRSG)

HUMANRIGHTS

DIVISION

CIVILIANPOLICE

COMMISSIONER

UN FORCECOMMANDER

CHIEFADMINISTRATIVEOFFICER (CAO)

ELECTORALDIVISION

HUMANITARIANAFFAIRS

COORDINATOR

NATIONALCONTINGENTS

UN FORCEHEADQUARTERS

INFORMATIONDIVISION

Figure C-5. Notional United Nations Organizational Relationships

Appendix C

JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace OperationsC-6

Intentionally Blank

D-1

1. General

a. A JTF is a joint force that is constitutedand so designated by a JTF establishingauthority. JTF establishing authority may bethe Secretary of Defense or the commander ofa combatant command, subordinate unifiedcommand, or an existing JTF. In mostsituations, the JTF establishing authority willbe a combatant commander. Figure D-1illustrates JTF organizational options.

b. A JTF is established on a geographicalarea or functional basis when the mission

has a specific limited objective and does notrequire overall centralized control of logistics.

• The mission assigned should requireexecution of responsibilities involvinga joint force on a significant scale andclose integration of effort, or shouldrequire coordination of local defense ofa subordinate area.

• Execution of responsibilities mayinvolve air, land, sea, space, and specialoperations in any combination executedunilaterally or in cooperation withfriendly nations.

JOINT TASK FORCECOMMANDER

* Optional

Note: A naval force consisting of Navyand Marine Corps forces does notby itself constitute a joint task force.

ATTACHMENTS *

SERVICECOMPONENTS/

FORCES

FUNCTIONALCOMPONENTS *

JOINT TASKFORCES *

(AREA OR FUNCTIONAL)

JOINT TASK FORCEORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS

“The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team.”

General John M. Shalikashvili, USAChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

APPENDIX DJOINT TASK FORCE

Figure D-1. Joint Task Force Organizational Options

D-2

Appendix D


c. A JTF is dissolved by the properauthority when the purpose for which it wascreated has been achieved or when it is nolonger required.

2. Establishing Authority

a. The authority establishing a JTFdesignates the commander and assigns the

mission and forces. Figure D-2 depicts otherresponsibilities of the establishing authority.

b. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action ArmedForces (UNAAF),” Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrinefor Joint Operations,” and Joint Pub 5-00.2,“Joint Task Force Planning Guidance andProcedures,” provide policy, doctrine, andguidance for organizing joint forces.

D-3

Joint Task Force

Figure D-2. Joint Task Force (JTF) Establishing Authority Responsibilities

JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) ESTABLISHINGAUTHORITY RESPONSIBILITIES

Exercising command and control of the JTF.

Determining, in coordination with commander, joint task

force (CJTF), the military forces and other national meansrequired to accomplish the mission.

Allocating or requesting forces required.

Defining the joint operations area (JOA) in terms of geography and/ortime. (Note: The JOA should be assigned through the appropriatecombatant commander and activated at the date and time specified).

Ensuring the development and approval of rules of engagementtailored to the situation.

Monitoring the operational situation and keeping superiors informedthrough periodic reports.

Providing guidance (e.g., planning guidelines with a recognizable endstate, situation, concepts, tasks, execution orders, administration,logistics, media releases, and organizational requirements).

Promulgating changes in plans and modifying mission and forces asnecessary.

Ensuring administrative and logistics support.

Recommending to higher authority which organizations should beresponsible for funding various aspects of the JTF.

Establishing or assisting in establishing liaison with US embassies andforeign governments involved in the operation.

Determining supporting force requirements.

Preparing a directive that indicates the purpose, in terms of desiredeffect, and the scope of action required. The directive establishes thesupport relationships with amplifying instructions (e.g., strength to beallocated to the supporting mission; time, place, and duration of thesupporting effort; priority of the supporting mission; and authority for thecessation of support).

Approving CJTF plans.

D-4

Appendix D


Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX EREFERENCES

E-1

The development of the “Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations,”is based upon the following primary references:

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions

a. CJCSI 3110.14, “Supplementary Instruction to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY96; Military Operations Other Than War.”

b. CJCSI 3121.01 W/CH1, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.” (SECRET)

c. CJCSI 3210.01, “Joint Information Warfare Policy.” (SECRET)

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual

a. CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume IIPlanning Formats and Guidance.”

3. Joint Publications

a. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

b. Joint Pub 1-0, “Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations.”

c. Joint Pub 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and AssociatedTerms.”

d. Joint Pub 1-05, “Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations.”

e. Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations.”

f. Joint Pub 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.”

g. Joint Pub 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures forCounterintelligence Support to Operations.”

h. Joint Pub 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

i. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

j. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”

k. Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations Operational procedures.”

l. Joint Pub 3-05.5, “Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission PlanningProcedures.”

m. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

E-2

Appendix E


n. Joint Pub 3-07.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for PeacekeepingOperations.”

o. Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Volumes I andII.”

p. Joint Pub 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Warfare.”

q. Joint Pub 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.”

r. Joint Pub 3-17, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater AirliftOperations.”

s. Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”

t. Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

u. Joint Pub 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations. ”

v. Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”

w. Joint Pub 4-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support toJoint Operations.”

x. Joint Pub 4-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.”

y. Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.”

z. Joint Pub 4-05, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning.”

aa. Joint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

bb. Joint Pub 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer(C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.”

4. Other Publications

a. The Judge Advocate General’s School United States Army, “Operational LawHandbook.”

b. US Atlantic Command’s, “Migrant Camp Operations: The GuantanamoExperience.”

c. “US Atlantic Command Tactics, Techniques, & Procedures (TTP) for Migrant CampOperations.”

d. FM 100-23, “Peace Operations.”

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

ACSA aquisition cross-Service agreementAFCENT Allied Forces Central EuropeAME air mobile element

B-H Bosnia-Herzegovina

C2 command and controlCA civil affairsCAO chief administrative officerCARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CAREUSA)CCIR commander’s critical information requirementsCFST coalition forces support teamCI counterintelligenceCIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation conceptCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff InstructionCJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ManualCJTF commander, joint task forceCLPSB CINC Logistic Procurement Support BoardCMO civil-military operationsCMOC civil-military operations centerCNN Cable News NetworkCOA course of actionCont. continuedC of S chief of staff

DART disaster assistance response teamDATT Defense AttachéDCJTF deputy commander, joint task forceDIRMOBFOR director of mobility forceDLA Defense Logistics AgencyDMPITS Deployable Mass Population Identification and Tracking SystemDOD Department of DefenseDPKO Department of Peace-Keeping OperationsDRMO Defense Reutilization Marketing Office

FALD Field Administration and Logistics DivisionFID foreign internal defenseFLSG Force Logistics Support GroupFM field manual

G-5 civil affairs, military governmentGCCS Global Command and Control System

GL-2

Glossary


HAO humanitarian assistance operationsHN host nationHNS host-nation supportHOC Human Intelligence Operations CellHSS health service supportHQ headquartersHUMINT human intelligence

IAPSO Interagency Procurement Services OfficeICRC International Committee of the Red CrossID identificationIFOR Implementation Force (Bosnia)IG inspector generalINA Immigration and Naturalization ActIO international organizations, information operationsITV in-transit visibility

J-1 Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a joint staffJ-2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staffJ-2X Joint Force J-2 Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Staff

ElementJ-3 Operations Directorate of a joint staffJ-4 Logistics Directorate of a joint staffJ-5 Plans Directorate of a joint staffJ-6 Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

Directorate of a joint staffJBPO Joint Blood Program OfficeJCMEB Joint Civil-Military Engineering BoardJCMOTF Joint Civil-Military Operations Task ForceJDISS Joint Deployable Intelligence Support SystemJEL Joint Electronic LibraryJFC joint force commanderJFSOCC joint force special operations component commanderJFUB Joint Facilities Utilization BoardJIB Joint Information BureauJIC joint intelligence centerJISE joint intelligence support elementJMC joint movement center, joint military commissionJOA joint operations areaJOC joint operations centerJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJPG joint planning groupJPMRC Joint Patient Movement Requirement CenterJPO Joint Petroleum OfficeJPOTF joint psychological operations task forceJPRC joint personnel reception centerJSOA joint special operations areaJSOTF joint special operations task force

GL-3

Glossary

JTF joint task forceJVB joint visitors bureauJWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications SystemKSARNG Kansas Army National Guard

LOGCAP logistics civilian augmentation programLOGSTAT logistics status reportLRC logistics readiness center

MDA Multinational Deployment AgencyMETT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support

available, time availableMILVAN military van (container)MIST military information support teamMOOTW military operations other than warMTG meeting

NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNCA National Command AuthoritiesNGO nongovernmental organizationsNIST national intelligence support teamNo. number

OASD (PA) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)OASD (SO/LIC) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special

Operations/Low Intensity Conflict)OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster AssistanceOJE Operation JOINT ENDEAVOROPCON operational controlOPLAN operation planOPORD operation order

PA public affairsPAO public affairs office, public affairs officerPDD Presidential Decision DirectivePM provost marshalPOL petroleum, oils, and lubricantsPOLAD political advisorPSYOP psychological operationsPUB publicationPVO private voluntary organizations

RCA riot control agentsRET retiredRM risk managementROE rules of engagementROWPU reverse osmosis water purification unit

GL-4

Glossary


SA security assistanceSAO security assistance organizationSECSTATE Secretary of StateSJA Staff Judge AdvocateSOF special operations forcesSOFA status-of-forces agreementSOMA status of missions agreementSOP standing operating proceduresSROE standing rules of engagementSRSG Special Representative to the Secretary General

TAACOM Theater Army Area CommandTCC transportation component commandTFCICA Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating AuthorityTOR terms of referenceTRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

UKAR United Kingdom ArmyUN United NationsUNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian AffairsUNHCR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for RefugeesUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNITAF Unified Task Force (Somalia)UNMIH United Nations Mission in HaitiUNPROFOR United Nations Protection ForceUNSC United Nations Security CouncilUNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in CambodiaUS United StatesUSA United States ArmyUSACOM United States Atlantic CommandUSAF United States Air ForceUSAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentUSC United States CodeUSDAO United States Defense Attaché OfficeUSG United States GovernmentUSMC United States Marine CorpsUSN United States NavyUSNR United States Navy ReserveUSPACOM United States Pacific CommandUSTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

VTC video teleconferencing

WFP World Food Programme (UN)

GL-5

Glossary

antiterrorism —Defensive measures used toreduce the vulnerability of individuals andproperty to terrorist acts, to include limitedresponse and containment by local militaryforces. Also called AT . (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil affairs—The activities of a commanderthat establish, maintain, influence, or exploitrelations between military forces and civilauthorities, both governmental andnongovernmental, and the civilian populacein a friendly, neutral, or hostile area ofoperations in order to facilitate militaryoperations and consolidate operationalobjectives. Civil affairs may includeperformance by military forces of activitiesand functions normally the responsibilityof local government. These activities mayoccur prior to, during, or subsequent to othermilitary actions. They may also occur, ifdirected, in the absence of other militaryoperations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil affairs agreement—An agreementwhich governs the relationship betweenallied armed forces located in a friendlycountry and the civil authorities and peopleof that country. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil-military operations —Group of plannedactivities in support of military operationsthat enhance the relationship between themilitary forces and civilian authorities andpopulation and which promote thedevelopment of favorable emotions,attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly,or hostile groups. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil-military operations center—An ad hocorganization, normally established by thegeographic combatant commander orsubordinate joint force commander, to assistin the coordination of activities of engagedmilitary forces, and other United States

Government agencies, nongovernmentalorganizations, private voluntaryorganizations, and regional andinternational organizations. There is noestablished structure, and its size andcomposition are situation dependent. Alsocalled CMOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coalition force—A force composed ofmilitary elements of nations that haveformed a temporary alliance for somespecific purpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatting terrorism—Actions, includingantiterrorism (defensive measures taken toreduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) andcounterterrorism (offensive measures takento prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism),taken to oppose terrorism throughout theentire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence—Information gatheredand activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities,sabotage, or assassinations conducted by oron behalf of foreign governments orelements thereof, foreign organizations, orforeign persons, or international terroristactivities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterterrorism—Offensive measurestaken to prevent, deter, and respond toterrorism. Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Country Team—The senior, in-country,United States coordinating and supervisingbody, headed by the Chief of the UnitedStates diplomatic mission, and composedof the senior member of each representedUnited States department or agency asdesired by the chief of the US diplomaticmission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-6

Glossary

JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace OperationsGL-6

director of mobility forces—Normally asenior officer who is familiar with the areaof responsibility or joint operations area andpossesses an extensive background in airliftoperations. When established, the directorof mobility forces serves as the designatedagent for all airlift issues in the area ofresponsibility or joint operations area, andfor other duties as directed. The director ofmobility forces exercises coordinatingauthority between the airlift coordinationcell, the air mobility element, the TankerAirlift Control Center, the joint movementcenter, and the air operations center in orderto expedite the resolution of airliftproblems. The director of mobility forcesmay be sourced from the theater’sorganizations, United States TransportationCommand, or United States AtlanticCommand. Also called DIRMOBFOR.(Joint Pub 1-02)

displaced person—A civilian who isinvoluntarily outside the nationalboundaries of his or her country. (Joint Pub1-02)

end state—What the National CommandAuthorities want the situation to be whenoperations conclude—both militaryoperations, as well as those where themilitary is in support of other instrumentsof national power. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force protection—Security programdesigned to protect soldiers, civilianemployees, family members, facilities, andequipment in all locations and situations,accomplished through planned andintegrated application of combattingterrorism, physical security, operationssecurity, personal protective services, andsupported by intelligence,counterintelligence, and other securityprograms. (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign internal defense—Participation bycivilian and military agencies of agovernment in any of the action programstaken by another government to free andprotect its society from subversion,lawlessness, and insurgency. Also calledFID. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation—A nation which receives theforces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, tooperate in, or to transit through its territory.(Joint Pub 1-02)

host-nation support—Civil and/or militaryassistance rendered by a nation to foreignforces within its territory during peacetime,crises or emergencies, or war based onagreements mutually concluded betweennations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

human intelligence—A category ofintelligence derived from informationcollected and provided by human sources.Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance—Programsconducted to relieve or reduce the resultsof natural or manmade disasters or otherendemic conditions such as human pain,disease, hunger, or privation that mightpresent a serious threat to life or that canresult in great damage to or loss of property.Humanitarian assistance provided by USforces is limited in scope and duration. Theassistance provided is designed tosupplement or complement the efforts ofthe host nation civil authorities or agenciesthat may have the primary responsibility forproviding humanitarian assistance. (JointPub 1-02)

INTERACTION —An association of 154US-based private humanitarianorganizations working in 180 countries.

GL-7

Glossary

The central focus of its work is to alleviatehuman suffering and to promote sustainabledevelopment. (InterAction)

international organizations—Organizationswith global influence, such as the UnitedNations and the International Committeeof the Red Cross. See alsonongovernmental organizations; privatevoluntary organizations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

law of war—That part of international lawthat regulates the conduct of armedhostilities. Also called the law of armedconflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistic assessment—An evaluation of: a.The logistic support required to supportparticular military operations in a theaterof operations, country, or area. b. Theactual and/or potential logistics supportavailable for the conduct of militaryoperations either within the theater, country,or area, or located elsewhere. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistics—The science of planning andcarrying out the movement andmaintenance of forces. In its mostcomprehensive sense, those aspects ofmilitary operations which deal with: a.design and development, acquisition,storage, movement, distribution,maintenance, evacuation, and dispositionof materiel; b. movement, evacuation, andhospitalization of personnel; c. acquisitionor construction, maintenance, operation,and disposition of facilities; and d.acquisition or furnishing of services. (JointPub 1-02)

military operations other than war—Operations that encompass the use ofmilitary capabilities across the range ofmilitary operations short of war. Thesemilitary actions can be applied to

complement any combination of the otherinstruments of national power and occurbefore, during, and after war. Also calledMOOTW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mission creep—Occurs when armed forcestake on broader missions than initiallyplanned. (JFQ Forum, winter 1993-94,Dixon, p. 28)

multinational operations—A collectiveterm to describe military actions conductedby forces of two or more nations, typicallyorganized within the structure of a coalitionor alliance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities—ThePresident and the Secretary of Defense ortheir duly deputized alternates orsuccessors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub1-02)

national intelligence support team—Anationally sourced team composed ofintelligence and communications expertsfrom either Defense Intelligence Agency,Central Intelligence Agency, NationalSecurity Agency, or any combination ofthese agencies. Also called NIST. (JointPub 1-02)

nongovernmental organizations—Transnational organizations of privatecitizens that maintain a consultative statuswith the Economic and Social Council ofthe United Nations. Nongovernmentalorganizations may be professionalassociations, foundations, multinationalbusinesses, or simply groups with acommon interest in humanitarian assistanceactivities (development and relief).“Nongovernmental organizations” is a termnormally used by non-United Statesorganizations. Also called NGO. (JointPub 1-02)

GL-8

Glossary


peace building—Post-conflict actions,predominately diplomatic and economic,that strengthen and rebuild governmentalinfrastructure and institutions in order toavoid a relapse into conflict. See also peaceenforcement; peacekeeping; peacemaking;peace operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peace enforcement—Application of militaryforce, or the threat of its use, normallypursuant to international authorization, tocompel compliance with resolutions orsanctions designed to maintain or restorepeace and order. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peacekeeping—Military operationsundertaken with the consent of all majorparties to a dispute, designed to monitor andfacilitate implementation of an agreement(ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement)and support diplomatic efforts to reach along-term political settlement. (Joint Pub1-02)

peace operations—A broad term thatencompasses peacekeeping operations andpeace enforcement operations conducted insupport of diplomatic efforts to establishand maintain peace. (Joint Pub 1-02)

private voluntary organizations—Private,nonprofit humanitarian assistanceorganizations involved in development andrelief activities. Private voluntaryorganizations are normally United States-based. “Private voluntary organization” isoften used synonymously with the term“nongovernmental organizations.” Alsocalled PVO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations—Plannedoperations to convey selected informationand indicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives, objective

reasoning, and ultimately the behavior offoreign governments, organizations,groups, and individuals. The purpose ofpsychological operations is to induce orreinforce foreign attitudes and behaviorfavorable to the originator’s objectives.Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rules of engagement—Directives issued bycompetent military authority whichdelineate the circumstances and limitationsunder which United States forces willinitiate and/or continue combat engagementwith other forces encountered. Also calledROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement—An agreementwhich defines the legal position of a visitingmilitary force deployed in the territory of afriendly state. Agreements delineating thestatus of visiting military forces may bebilateral or multilateral. Provisionspertaining to the status of visiting forcesmay be set forth in a separate agreement,or they may form a part of a morecomprehensive agreement. Theseprovisions describe how the authorities ofa visiting force may control members of thatforce and the amenability of the force or itsmembers to the local law or to the authorityof local officials. To the extent thatagreements delineate matters affecting therelations between a military force andcivilian authorities and population, theymay be considered as civil affairsagreements. Also called SOFA. (Joint Pub1-02)

terrorism—The calculated use of violenceor threat of violence to inculcate fear;intended to coerce or to intimidategovernments or societies in the pursuit ofgoals that are generally political, religious,or ideological. (Joint Pub 1-02)

• To provide greater access to the mostcurrent joint publications, and otherappropriate databases and to expeditestaffing, the JEL was created. The JEL,depicted above, provides the jointcommunity on-line access via the WorldWide Web. It contains all unclassifiedapproved joint doctrine, key Servicepublications, selected research papersand documents, and all approved

terminology. Action officers, planners,researchers, and operators everywherecan access this vital information throughtheir desktop computers using theInternet (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine).

• Most of the databases on the JEL on-linesystem are periodically loaded onto CD-ROM for worldwide distribution. APeace Operations CD-ROM is enclosed.

JOINT ELECTRONIC LIBRARY

The Joint Electronic Library Concept

The Joint Electronic Library

MILITARY LIBRARY

The Joint Electronic Library

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This current revision of the original Handbook would not have been possible without theguidance and advice of a great many individuals. The Joint Warfighting Center is veryappreciative of those experts who gave of their time, thought, and encouragement. While itis impossible to list everyone who gave so generously to make this work possible, specialthanks is offered to the following for their wisdom and support of the original Handbook:Ambassador Robert Oakley (RET); GEN Henry Shelton, USA; LTG Steven Arnold, USA;LtGen Robert Johnston, USMC (RET); LTG Thomas Montgomery, USA; Lt Gen EdwinTenoso, USAF; LtGen C. E. Wilhelm, USMC; LtGen Anthony Zinni, USMC; LtGen JamesJones, USMC; Maj Gen Lee Downer, USAF; MG Carl Ernst, USA; Maj Gen John Handy,USAF; Maj Gen Mike Short, USAF; MG Hugh Smith, USA; RADM Fred Lewis, USN;BGen “Buck” Bedard, USMC; BG Morris Boyd, USA; Brig Gen “Fess” Ingersoll, USAF;Brig Gen “Buck” Marr, USAF; RADM Dave Ruble, USN (SC); Col Gary Anderson, USMC;Col Gary Collenborne, USMC; COL Karl Farris, USA (RET); COL Ralph Feneis, USA;CAPT Ted Ferriter, USN; COL Craig D. Hackett, USA; CAPT Brad Hayes, USN (RET);Chaplain (COL) Herman Keizer, USA; Col F. M. Lorenz, USMC; Col Vic Mitchell, USA(RET); Col Fred Peck, USMC; COL Steve Riley, USA; COL John Smith, USA; COL TomWallace, USA; Col Dennis Long, USMC; Col Paul O’Toole, USMC; LTC Ron Bertha, USA;Lt Col Ann Story, USAF (RET); MAJ Mike Jaska, USA (RET); Maj Dennis Scanlon, USMC;and Mr. Rich Rinaldo, TRADOC. Additionally, a word of special gratitude to our allies whohelped freely and expertly: Col Cameron Ross, and the J3 operations staff at National DefenceHeadquarters, Canadian Forces; Col Charles Rogers, UKAR Liaison to TRADOC; GroupCaptain Alan Hotchkiss, RAF (RET) and LtCol Frank Freeman, RM, Joint Warfare Staff;and Col Richard Cousens, Col Alistair Duncan, and LtCol Jim Baxter, British Army StaffCollege.

In addition, the following were instrumental in the revision of the Handbook which has madeit a better tool for the JTF commander and staff: Mr. Len Hawley, Acting Deputy AssistantSecretary of Defense Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance Policy; LTG Joseph Kinzer,USA; Lt Gen John Sams, Jr., USAF; MG Donald Campbell, USAR; Ms. Julia Taft, DirectorInterAction; COL Jonathan Bailey MBE British Army; Professor James McCallum, ArmyWar College; LTC Paul Hughes, USA; LTC John Otte, USA; LTC Phil Wilkinson, BritishArmy; LTC Alf Gorsjo, Swedish Armed Forces International Centre; Mr. Thomas Frey,USAID; and Mr. Par Eriksson, Sweden’s National Defense Research Establishment.


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