Joint Pub 3-08 - HSDL

9 October 1996

Interagency CoordinationDuring Joint Operations

Vol I

Joint Pub 3-08

This, the first edition of Joint Pub3-08, “Interagency Coordination DuringJoint Operations,” represents a majormilestone in our efforts to improveinteragency coordination across the rangeof military operations.

Joint Pub 3-08 provides the principles andguidance for accomplishing interagencycoordination and discusses “real-world”examples of this important process. Itoutlines responsibilities and tasks for jointforce commanders and describes key USGovernment agencies and nongovernmentaland international organizations. Thefundamental concepts contained in thispublication provide joint doctrine for thecreative and visionary use of our Nation’s

military power, particularly in “military operations other than war.”

Joint force commanders frequently state that interagency coordination is oneof their biggest challenges. To that end, commanders must understand the principlesof Joint Pub 3-08 and bring them to bear during joint and multinational operations.Accordingly, please ensure the widest distribution of this and other jointpublications, and promote their use at every opportunity.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILIChairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This volume discusses the interagencyenvironment and describes joint doctrine tobest achieve coordination between thecombatant commands of the Department ofDefense and agencies of the US Government,nongovernmental and private voluntaryorganizations, and regional and internationalorganizations during unified actions and jointoperations. It provides potential methodologiesto synchronize successful interagencyoperations. Volume II describes the key USGovernment departments and agenciesand nongovernmental and internationalorganizations — their core competencies, basicorganizational structures, and relationship, orpotential relationship, with the Armed Forcesof the United States.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other joint forcecommanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrinefor joint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the ArmedForces in preparing their appropriate plans.It is not the intent of this publication to restrictthe authority of the JFC from organizing the

force and executing the mission in a mannerthe JFC deems most appropriate to ensureunity of effort in the accomplishment of theoverall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in thispublication apply to the commanders ofcombatant commands, subunified commands,joint task forces, and subordinate componentsof these commands. These principles andguidance also may apply when significantforces of one Service are attached to forces ofanother Service or when significant forces ofone Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGEVOLUME IEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..............................................................................................v

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION TO INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

• Understanding Interagency Operations....................................................................... I-1• Synchronizing Interagency Operations...................................................................... I-2• The Evolving Role of the Armed Forces of the United States

Within the Interagency Process.............................................................................. I-4• Systematic Integration of Procedures for Effective Cooperation................................ I-4• Interagency Operations at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels................ I-5• The Interagency Environment.................................................................................. I-5• Building Interagency Coordination......................................................................... I-11• Media Impact on Interagency Coordination............................................................ I-14

CHAPTER IIESTABLISHED INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

• Interagency Connectivity......................................................................................... II-1• Interagency Coordination at the National Level........................................................ II-1• National Security Council System (NSCS)............................................................... II-2• Forming a Joint Task Force (JTF)............................................................................. II-6• Interagency Coordination: Domestic Operations..................................................... II-7• Coordination With State and Local Authorities...................................................... II-11• Interagency Coordination: Foreign Operations...................................................... II-12• Interagency Structure in Foreign Countries........................................................... II-15• Command Relationships: “Supported,” “Supporting,” and “Associate”............... II-17• The Nongovernmental and Private Voluntary Organizations’

Connection to Joint Operations........................................................................... II-18• The Role of Regional and International Organizations............................................ II-20

CHAPTER IIIORGANIZING FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

• Organizing for Success........................................................................................... III-1• Organizing for Success at the Operational Level.................................................... III-1• Interagency Crisis Response at the Operational Level: Domestic Operations......... III-3• Interagency Crisis Response at the Operational Level: Foreign Operations............ III-6• Interagency Information Management................................................................... III-11• Interagency Training and Readiness...................................................................... III-13• Joint Task Force Mission Analysis........................................................................ III-13• Organizational Tools for the JTF........................................................................... III-15• Other JTF Interagency Considerations.................................................................. III-20

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• Humanitarian Operations Center......................................................................... III-24• Military Interface With NGOs and PVOs............................................................ III-25

FIGURE

I-1 Comparison of Agency Organizational Structures.......................................... I-6II-1 Participation in National Security Council System Activities......................... II-3II-2 Convening Interagency Working Groups....................................................... II-4II-3 Federal Emergency Management Agency Incident Command System......... II-10III-1 Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary

Organizations — Domestic Operations..................................................... III-4III-2 Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary

Organizations — Foreign Operations........................................................ III-7III-3 United States Agency for International Development / Office of

United States Foreign Disaster Assistance Disaster AssistanceResponse Team....................................................................................... III-12

III-4 Role of the Civil-Military Operations Center.............................................. III-17III-5 Model Civil-Military Operations Center..................................................... III-18

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms.................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions............................................................................... GL-4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

Interagency coordination forges the vital link between themilitary instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the USGovernment (USG) as well as nongovernmental agencies.The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demandsthat commanders and joint planners consider all elements ofnational power and recognize which agencies are best qualifiedto employ these elements toward the objective.

Increased involvement of military forces in civil activity athome and abroad is matched, in part, by an increase insituations — primarily overseas — in which civil agenciesface emerging post-Cold War factors and military threats notpreviously confronted. Many organizations are drawn closerto military forces because their missions may fail withoutmilitary support or protection.

The security challenges facing the nation today areincreasingly complex, requiring the skills and resources ofmany organizations. These include USG agencies, partnernations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), privatevoluntary organizations (PVOs), regional and internationalorganizations, and the agencies of the host country. Effortsmust be coordinated despite philosophical and operationaldifferences separating agencies.

Success in operations willdepend, to a large extent,on the ability to blend andengage all elements ofnational power effectively.

Obtaining coordinated andintegrated effort in aninteragency operation iscritical to success.

Outlines the Interagency Process and Participants

Explains the Evolving Role of the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates Within the Interagency Process

Describes Interagency Coordination

Explains the Role of the National Security Council System

Discusses Organizing for Interagency Operations at theOperational Level

Outlines Joint Task Force Roles and Responsibilities

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The Interagency Process and Participants

Interagency Coordination

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BASIC STEPS TO BUILDING AND MAINTAININGCOORDINATION

DEFINE THE PROBLEM IN CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUSTERMS AGREED TO BY ALL PARTICIPANTS

DEFINE THE OBJECTIVE

ESTABLISH A COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE

DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION / OPTIONS

CAPITALIZE ON EXPERIENCE

ESTABLISH RESPONSIBILITY

PLAN FOR THE TRANSITION OF KEYRESPONSIBILITIES, CAPABILITIES, AND FUNCTIONS

DIRECT ALL MEANS TOWARD UNITY OF EFFORT

Unity of effort is made more difficult by the agencies’ differentand sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques. To be successful, the interagency processshould bring together the interests of multiple agencies,departments, and organizations. This is even more complexthan the multidimensional nature of military combatoperations viewed in isolation. When the other instrumentsof national power — economic, political and/or diplomatic,and informational — are applied, the dimensions of the effortand the number and types of interactions expand significantly.

An atmosphere ofcooperation can ultimatelycontribute to unity ofeffort.

Coordinating the activitiesof the various governmentagencies is fundamental tothe efficient use of nationalresources.

The National SecurityCouncil System is theprincipal forum forconsideration of issues ofnational security requiringPresidential decisions.

The interagency process at the national level is groundedwithin the Constitution and established by law in the NationalSecurity Act of 1947 (NSA 47). The National SecurityCouncil (NSC) is a product of NSA 47.

The NSC advises and assists the President in integratingall aspects of national security policy — domestic, foreign,military, intelligence, and economic. Together with supportinginteragency working groups, high-level steering groups,executive committees, and task forces, the National SecurityCouncil System provides the foundation for interagencycoordination in the development and implementation of

Interagency Process at the National Level

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national security policy. The NSC staff is the President’spersonal and principal staff for national security issues. Ittracks and directs the development, execution, andimplementation of national security policies for the President.

Military operations inside the US and its territories, thoughlimited in many respects, may include military support tocivil authorities, which is Department of Defense (DOD)support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies that resultfrom natural or manmade causes, or military support tocivilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA). MSCLEAalso includes, but is not limited to military assistance to civildisturbances; Key Asset Protection Program; and interagencyassistance, to include training support to law enforcementagencies, support to counterdrug operations, support forcombatting terrorism, and improvised device response.

In all of these efforts, the military brings unique and veryuseful capabilities to the interagency forum that have valuein domestic support. However, the Constitution of the UnitedStates, laws, regulations, policies, and other legal issues allbear on the employment of the military in domestic operations.Considering the increased emphasis on domestic roles forthe Department of Defense, a balance must be definedduring the planning phase between the military capabilitiesand resources that can be applied to a situation and theconstraints of law.

Operations in foreign areas arise as a result of the UnitedStates' external relationships and how they bear on the nationalinterest. For the Department of Defense, in the politico-military domain, this involves bilateral and multilateralmilitary relationships, treaties involving DOD interests,technology transfer, armaments cooperation and control, andhumanitarian assistance and peace operations.

Within a theater, the geographic combatant commander isthe focal point for planning and implementation of regionalmilitary strategies that require interagency coordination.Coordination between the Department of Defense and otherUSG agencies may occur through a country team or within acombatant command. In some operations, a SpecialRepresentative of the President or Special Envoy of the UnitedNations Secretary-General may be involved. The USinteragency structure within foreign countries involves the

The Secretary of the Armyis the Department ofDefense Executive Agentfor provision of militarysupport to civil authoritiesand responds to theNational CommandAuthorities whencoordinating with theDirector of the FederalEmergency ManagementAgency.

The Department of Stateadvises and assists thePresident in foreign policyformulation and execution.

Interagency Coordination for Domestic Operations

Interagency Coordination for Foreign Operations

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Ambassador, country team system (which includes theDefense Attache Office and the Security AssistanceOrganization), the American Embassy public affairs officer,United States Information Service, and geographic combatantcommands.

The National Command Authorities establish supportedand supporting command relationships between combatantcommanders when deployment and execution orders areissued. The commanders of the geographic combatantcommands, supported by the functional combatant commandsor other geographic combatant commanders, provide forcesand resources to accomplish the mission. This commandrelationship among the combatant commanders lends itself tothe interagency process.

NGOs and PVOs do not operate within either the military orthe governmental hierarchy. Therefore, the relationshipbetween Armed Forces and NGOs and PVOs is neithersupported nor supporting, but rather an associate orpartnership relationship.

Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOsand PVOs are frequently on the scene before US forcesand are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They willmost likely remain long after military forces have departed.NGOs and PVOs are diverse, flexible, independent, andgrassroots-focused and are primary relief providers. NGOsand PVOs are involved in such diverse activities as education,technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, publicpolicy, and development programs. The sheer number oflives they affect and resources they provide enables the NGOand PVO community to wield a great deal of power withinthe interagency community.

Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectivelyto crisis, NGOs and PVOs can lessen the civil-militaryresources that a commander would otherwise have todevote to an operation. In the final analysis, activities andcapabilities of NGOs and PVOs must be factored into the

The Armed Forces performin both supported andsupporting roles with otheragencies.

Nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) andprivate voluntaryorganizations (PVOs) playan important role inproviding support to hostnations.

Mutually beneficialarrangements between theArmed Forces and NGOsand PVOs may be criticalto the success of thecampaign or operationplan.

Command Relationships

Nongovernmental Organizationsand Private Voluntary Organizations

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commander’s assessment of conditions and resources andintegrated into the selected course of action. Their extensiveinvolvement, local contacts, and experience in various nationsmake these organizations valuable sources of informationabout local and regional governments as well as civilianattitudes toward the operation.

Regional and international organizations have well-definedstructures, roles, and responsibilities and are usuallyequipped with the resources and expertise to participate incomplex interagency operations. Regional examples includethe North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization forAfrican Unity, the Organization of American States, theWestern European Union, and the Organization on Securityand Cooperation in Europe. International examples includethe United Nations and the International Red Cross and RedCrescent Movement.

Steps for combatant commands that support effectiveinteragency coordination and identify mutual objectivesinclude: (1) identify all agencies and organizations that areor should be involved in the operation; (2) establish aninteragency hierarchy and define the objectives of the responseeffort; (3) define courses of action for both theater militaryoperations and agency activities; (4) solicit from each agency,department, or organization a clear understanding of the rolethat each plays; (5) identify potential obstacles to the collectiveeffort arising from conflicting departmental or agencypriorities; (6) identify the resources of each participant inorder to reduce duplication and increase coherence in thecollective effort; (7) define the desired end state and exitcriteria; (8) maximize the mission’s assets to support thelonger term goals of the enterprise; and (9) establishinteragency assessment teams.

For interagency crisis response for operations within theUnited States and its territories (other than for acts ofterrorism), the Secretary of the Army is the Departmentof Defense Executive Agent for execution and managementof military support to civil authorities. The Secretary ofDefense retains the authority to approve the deployment ofcombatant command resources and to authorize DODinvolvement in operations that may include the use of lethalforce (e.g., civil disturbances). The Secretary of the Army

Regional and internationalorganizations possess areaor global influence.

Interagency forumsestablished early at theoperational level willenable close andconstructive dialoguebetween the engagedagencies.

Regional and International Organizations

Organizing for Interagency Operations at the Operational Level

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A combatant commandermay designate a joint taskforce to conduct themilitary portion ofinteragency operations.

executes and manages domestic operations through theDirector of Military Support and the supported geographiccombatant commander. When the Department of Defenseresponds to acts of terrorism, the Secretary of Defensepersonally oversees the operation. Early in crisis actionplanning for operations outside the continental United Statesand its territories, the geographic combatant commandercommunicates with the appropriate Ambassador(s) as partof crisis assessment. The Ambassador and country team areoften aware of factors and considerations that the geographiccombatant commander might apply to develop courses ofaction, and they are key to bringing together US nationalresources within the host country.

The unique aspects of the interagency process require thejoint task force (JTF) headquarters to be especially flexible,responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of not only theJTF’s components, but other agencies as well. Whendesignating a JTF, the combatant commander will select acommander of the joint task force, assign a joint operationsarea, specify a mission, provide planning guidance, and eitherallocate forces to the JTF from the Service and functionalcomponent forces assigned to the combatant command orrequest forces from supporting combatant commands. Incontrast to the established command structure of a combatantcommand or joint task force, NGOs and PVOs in theoperational area may not have a defined structure forcontrolling activities. Upon identifying organizational oroperational mismatches between organizations, the staff ofthe combatant command or JTF should designate points inthe NGO and PVO organizations at which liaison andcoordinating mechanisms are appropriate. These may includethe Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, theLogistics Operations Center, and a liaison section.

A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is thedeployment of a JTF assessment team to the projected jointoperations area. The assessment team may help clarify themission by actually deciding what needs to be accomplished,what type of force is required, the proper sequence fordeployment of the force, availability of state and local or in-country assets, and what ongoing operations are beingconducted by organizations other than military forces. TheJTF commander should consider the establishment of anexecutive steering group, civil-military operations center,and liaison teams. Other JTF interagency considerations

Joint Task Force Interagency Operations

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are intelligence support and control, logistic support, legalsupport, media affairs, and space support.

This publication discusses the interagency environment;describes joint doctrine to best achieve coordination betweenthe combatant commanders and agencies of the USG, NGOsand PVOs, and regional and international organizations duringunified actions and joint operations; and provides potentialmethodologies to conduct successful interagency operations.It also describes the key USG departments and agencies andnongovernmental and international organizations — their corecompetencies, basic organizational structures, andrelationship (or potential relationship) with the Armed Forcesof the United States.

CONCLUSION

Executive Summary

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CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION TO INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

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1. Understanding InteragencyOperations

The integration of political and militaryobjectives and the subsequent translationof these objectives into demonstrable actionhave always been essential to success at alllevels of operation. Clausewitz wrote: “Thepolitical objective is the goal, war is the meansof reaching it, and means can never beconsidered in isolation from their purpose.”The new, rapidly changing globalenvironment that is characterized by regionalinstability, the growth of pluralisticgovernments, and unconventional threats willrequire even greater interagency cooperation,with a fully functioning civil-militaryrelationship. Military operations must besynchronized with those of other agencies

of the US Government (USG) as well aswith foreign forces, nongovernmental andprivate voluntary organizations, andregional and international organizations.These actions must be mutually supportingand proceed in a logical sequence. In orderto successfully undertake interagencyoperations, the roles and relationships amongvarious Federal agencies, combatantcommands, state and local governments,country teams, and engaged organizationsmust be clearly understood. Whether militaryforces are involved in the detention ofmigrants in Guantanamo Bay, countering theflow of drugs from Latin America, stoppinga tyrannical invader in the Middle East,providing humanitarian assistance to a storm-ravaged populace, or making peace on theHorn of Africa, success will depend to a large

Unity of Effort Flows From the National Level

“When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forcesof the United States are only one component of a national-level effort involvingthe various instruments of national power. Instilling unity of effort at thenational level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a variety ofFederal departments and agencies. The President, assisted by the National SecurityCouncil, develops national security strategy, employing all elements ofnational power to secure national security objectives. In support of this, theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with other members ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, advises the President and Secretary of Defense(the National Command Authorities, or NCA) concerning the application ofmilitary power. Strategy involves understanding the desired policy goals fora projected operation; that is, what should be the desired state of affairswhen the conflict is terminated. The clear articulation of aims and objectivesand the resulting strategic focus is essential. This is the case not only forwar involving simultaneous major combat in multiple theaters, but also forthe more likely case of regional crises. In such cases, a single combatantcommand is normally supported, with others providing that support, and theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the NCA as coordinator of thewhole effort. Even here, use of American military power directly or indirectlyaffects the other combatant commands and Federal agencies. Unity of effort— directed and arranged at the national level — is critical.”

Joint Pub 1 Joint W arfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

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extent on the ability to blend and engage allelements of national power. Interagencycoordination1 forges the vital link between themilitary instrument of that power and theeconomic, political and/or diplomatic, andinformational entities of the USG as well asnongovernmental organizations. Successfulinteragency coordination enables theseagencies, departments, and organizations tomount a coherent and efficient collectiveoperation.

2. Synchronizing InteragencyOperations

The common thread throughout allmajor operations, whether in war or militaryoperations other than war (MOOTW), is thebroad range of agencies — many withindispensable practical competencies andmajor legal responsibilities — that interactwith the Armed Forces of the United States.Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines workheroically with various agencies every day.Military forces have long coordinated withthe headquarters or operating elements of theDepartments of State (DOS) andTransportation (DOT), the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA), and the adjutantsgeneral of the 50 states and four territories.Increasingly, though, participants includeother USG agencies,2 partner nations,nongovernmental organizations3 (NGOs) suchas Doctors Without Borders, private voluntaryorganizations4 (PVOs) like CARE, regionaland international organizations5 such as theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)and the United Nations (UN), and the agenciesof the host country. The intrinsic nature ofinteragency coordination demands thatcommanders and joint planners considerall elements of national power andrecognize which agencies are best qualifiedto employ these elements toward theobjective. This consideration is especiallynecessary because the security challengesfacing the United States today are growingin complexity, requiring the skills and

resources of many organizations. Becausethe solution to a problem seldom, if ever,resides within the capability of just oneagency, campaign or operation plans mustbe crafted to leverage the core competenciesof the myriad agencies, synchronizing theirefforts with military capabilities toward asingle objective. The National CommandAuthorities (NCA) decide to employ theArmed Forces of the United States becausethey have deemed it necessary to use militarymeans to meet national interests. The use ofthe military element of power as acomponent of the national security strategytakes the form of military objectives.These objectives need to be coordinatedwith associated diplomatic, economic, andinformational objectives. The militaryoften plays a supporting role to othernational agencies. Though the Departmentof Defense (DOD) may have little or nochoice regarding the agencies engaged in aparticular operation or control over theindividual agency agendas, understandinghow military coordination efforts interfacewith other organizations toward missionaccomplishment could provide the key tosuccess in joint operations and unifiedactions.

a. A Forum of Expertise. Eachorganization brings its own culture,philosophy, goals, practices, and skills tothe interagency table. This diversity is thestrength of the interagency process, providinga cross-section of expertise, skills, andabilities. In one coordinated forum, theprocess integrates many views, capabilities,and options.

b. Gathering the Right Resources. Thechallenge, not only to the Nation’s leadershipbut to commanders at all levels, is torecognize what resources may apply to aproblem and to bring them to theinteragency table. All efforts must becoordinated despite philosophical andoperational differences separating agencies.

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carry out most interagency coordinationfor the Department of Defense at thestrategic level. This coordination sets the stagefor directions to commanders at the operationaland tactical levels.

d. Focus of Theater Operations. Everyjoint force operation involves closecoordination with forces and agencies outsidethe chain of command. The guidance in JointPub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” forjoint force commanders (JFCs) is clear: “. . .ensure that joint operations are synchronizedin time, space, and purpose with the actionsof other military forces (multinationaloperations) and nonmilitary organizations(government agencies such as the US Agencyfor International Development (USAID),nongovernmental organizations such asreligious relief agencies, corporations,

An atmosphere of cooperation can ultimatelycontribute to unity of effort. Pursuit ofcoordination and cooperation in theinteragency process should be viewed as ameans, not an end of the process. Whilesome loss of organizational freedom of actionis often necessary to attain full cooperation,a zeal for consensus should not compromisethe authority, roles, or core competencies ofindividual agencies.

c. Strategic Direction. Coordinating theactivities of the various USG agencies isfundamental to the efficient use of nationalresources. The US National Security Strategydefines the interaction between the Departmentof Defense and other organizations in such criticaloperations as counterterrorism, counterdrug, andhumanitarian assistance. The Office of theSecretary of Defense and the Joint Staff

THE COMBATANT COMMANDER IN INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

Today, the combatant commands are operating in regions where somegovernments cannot control their cities, regions, and principal functions andinstitutions. As CINCs renew their regional strategies, an appreciation of thethreat must consider the consequences of instability. Countering this willrequire the effective combination of all the elements of national power if weare to overcome the tyranny of transnational threats and internal disorder.Interagency cooperation will be the foundation for any strategic vision ofpeacetime engagement. The problem of “who’s in charge?” still vexesinteragency efforts. In the past, the concept of a designated lead agency hasnot carried with it the operational authority to enjoin cooperation. So, then,how will interagency efforts be drawn together to achieve synergism?Exacerbating the problems surrounding issues of authority and resourcing isthe lack of an agreed interagency planning process that might synchronizeinteragency effort. The executive and legislative branches have not routinelyprovided interagency leadership with direct control over the resourcesnecessary for interagency operations. Decentralized operations in the fieldrequire cogent strategies and plans to inform the operator of agency objectives,concepts for operating, and available resources. Agencies will continue to beprone to talking past each other as they plan and program according to differentpriorities, schedules and operating areas. Yet, as long as the CINCs are theonly US Government officials with the wherewithal to pull together USinteragency actions on a regional basis, they will need to continue to providethe leadership - even while in a supporting role.

SOURCE: William W. Mendel and David G. BradfordInteragency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations

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international agencies such as theInternational Red Cross, and even the UnitedNations). Activities and operations with suchnonmilitary organizations can be complexand may require considerable effort by JFCsand their staffs. . . .”

3. The Evolving Role of theArmed Forces of the UnitedStates Within theInteragency Process

Increased involvement of military forcesin civil activity at home and abroad ismatched, in part, by an increase insituations — primarily overseas — inwhich civil agencies face emerging post-Cold War factors and military threats notpreviously confronted. With the breakdownof nation-states, there is greater need fordevelopmental, civil assistance, andhumanitarian relief organizations to alleviatehuman suffering. These organizations aredrawn closer to military forces by necessity,because their missions may fail withoutmilitary support or protection. Forexample, USAID frequently operates underhost-nation (HN) or regional militaryprotection in ways not experienced in the past,when violence was often suppressed by Cold

War stability and the National SecurityStrategy had not placed such emphasis onUSG agency operations overseas in supportof national objectives. Conversely, USmilitary forces routinely interact with otherUSG agencies and NGOs and PVOs to dealwith the expanding civil dimension ofmilitary operations. Thus, even wheremilitary-agency relations are long-standing,the circumstances of their implementationand of US operational effectiveness arechanging.

4. Systematic Integration ofProcedures for EffectiveCooperation

Obtaining coordinated and integratedeffort in an interagency operation shouldnot be equated to the command and controlof a military operation. The variousagencies’ different — and sometimesconflicting — goals, policies, procedures,and decision-making techniques make unityof effort a challenge. Some NGOs and PVOsmay, in fact, have policies that are purposelyantithetical to both the military andgovernment agencies. Additionally, there isno overarching interagency doctrine thatdelineates or dictates the relationships and

With the breakdown of nation-states, there is greater need fordevelopmental, civil assistance and humanitarian relief organizations toalleviate human suffering.

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procedures governing all agencies,departments, and organizations ininteragency operations. Nor is there anoverseeing organization to ensure that themyriad agencies, departments, andorganizations have the capability and thetools to work together. The interagencyprocess is often described as “more art thanscience,” while military operations tend todepend on structure and doctrine. However,some of the techniques, procedures, andsystems of military command and control(C2) can assist in obtaining unity of effort ifthey are adjusted to the dynamic world ofinteragency operations. Unity of effort canonly be achieved through close, continuousinteragency and interdepartmentalcoordination and cooperation, which arenecessary to overcome confusion overobjectives, inadequate structure orprocedures, and bureaucratic and personallimitations. In summary, action will followunderstanding.

5. Interagency Operations atthe Strategic, Operational,and Tactical Levels

Vertical and lateral integration of controlmechanisms is often confusing in theinteragency process. A principal difficultyof coordinating operations betweenagencies is determining counterpartsamong them. Organizational differencesexist between the military hierarchy and otherorganizations, particularly at the operationallevel where there is seldom a counterpartto the geographic combatant commander.Further, overall lead authority in foreignoperations is likely to be exercised not by thegeographic combatant commander, but by aUS Ambassador or other senior civilian, whowill provide policy and goals for all USGagencies and military organizations in theoperation. Decision making at the lowestlevels is frequently thwarted because fieldcoordinators may not be vested with theauthority to speak for their agencies,

departments, or organizations. Figure I-1depicts comparative organizational structuresusing the three “levels of war” as the model.

6. The InteragencyEnvironment

If the interagency process is to besuccessful, it should bring together theinterests of multiple agencies, departments,and organizations. This cohesion is evenmore complex than the multidimensionalnature of military combat operations viewedin isolation. When the other instruments ofnational power — economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational — areapplied, the dimensions of the effort and thenumber and types of interactions expandsignificantly. The essence of interagencycoordination is the interplay of multipleagencies with individual agendas. Thisprocess and the divergent agency culturestypically challenge the military ethos ofresults orientation. Nonetheless, byunderstanding the interagency environmentand culture, campaign and operation planscan be more adeptly crafted to synchronizethe efforts of the myriad agencies and focustheir core competencies synergisticallytoward the desired end state.

a. Understand the Nature of InteragencyBureaucracy. The basic precepts of theAmerican political system distribute powerto prevent any one branch from accumulatingoverwhelming influence over the politicalprocess. Certain powers are concentrated inthe executive branch during wartimeemergencies. Even then the tendency istoward diffusion, and concentrating thepowers of different agencies towardnational security objectives is difficult.

• Core Values. Each agency has corevalues that it will not compromise.These values form the foundation uponwhich all other functions of the agencygrow. In any interaction, all participants

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Join

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-08 Figure I-1. Comparison of Agency Organizational Structures

COMPARISON OF AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

ARMED FORCES OFTHE UNITED

STATES

EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENTS &

AGENCIESSTATE & LOCALGOVERNMENT

NORTH ATLANTICTREATY

ORGANIZATION(NATO)

UNITED NATIONS(UN)

NGOs ANDPVOs

STRATEGIC

Secretary of DefenseChairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffJoint Chiefs of StaffCombatant Commander (1)

National HeadquartersDepartment Secretaries

Governor NATO HeadquartersSupreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)

UN HeadquartersFunctional Headquarters (e.g., UN High Commissioner for Refugees)

NationalHeadquarters

OPERATIONAL

Combatant CommanderCommander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) (2)Defense Coordinating Officer/Defense Coordinating Element

Ambassador/Embassy (3)Liaisons (4)Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)Regional Office

State Adjutant General State Coordinating Officer (SCO)Office of Emergency Services (OES) Department/Agency

Major Subordinate Commands (e.g., Allied Forces Southern Europe)

Special Representative to the Secretary General(6)UN Command Korea, when activated, is the only UN organization at the operational level.

(Some organizations have regional offices)

TACTICAL

CJTF

ComponentsServiceFunctional

Ambassador/EmbassyField OfficeUS Agency for InternationalDevelopment/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance Disaster Assistance Response Team Liaison (5)Response Team

National GuardCounty CommissionerMayor/Manager

CountyCity (e.g., Police Department)

Principal Subordinate Commands (e.g., Allied Land Forces Southern Europe)Commander, Combined Joint Task Force

Task ElementTask Unit

Special Representative to the Secretary GeneralMilitary Force Commander

TeamsObservers

Field Office in Program Country

Relief Workers

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

The combatant commander, within the context of unified action, may function at both the strategic and operational levels in synchronizing the application of all instruments of national power in time, space,and purpose with the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs and PVOs, regional and international organizations, and corporations toward theater strategic objectives.The commander, joint task force (CJTF), within the context of unified action, functions at both the operational and tactical levels in synchronizing the application of all instruments of national power in time,space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs and PVOs, regional and international organizations, and corporations toward theater operational objectives.The Ambassador and Embassy (which includes the country team) function at both the operational and tactical levels by supporting joint operation planning conducted by a combatantcommander or CJTF.Liaisons at the operational level may include the Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) or Political Advisor (POLAD) assigned to the combatant commander by the Department of State, the CIAliaison officer, or any specifically assigned person. Other USG agencies do not have a similar counterpart to the combatant commander.USAID's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provides its rapidly deployable Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in response to international disasters. A DART providesspecialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of US Government response to disasters.The Special Representative to the UN Secretary General may function at both the operational and tactical levels.

I-7


must be constantly aware that eachagency will continuously cultivate andcreate external sources of support and willbe maneuvering to protect its core values.

• Insular Vision. Domestic politics areusually the single most importantdriver of the various USG agencies’agendas, which may or may not coincidewith international security issues. It isfortuitous, as in the Gulf War, when thereis some congruency, but that is notalways the case. On 16 April l990, theDeputies Committee of the NationalSecurity Council (NSC) met under theleadership of Robert Gates to reconsiderthe US policy toward Iraq. Because ofIraq’s recent actions, there was a proposalto stop the government-guaranteed riceand other grains sales andgovernment-backed Export-ImportBank credits. Some USG agenciesargued that the credit programs shouldgo forward because “all we would bedoing is hurting US rice producers andthe US firms looking for business.” TheDOS wanted to continue the creditsregardless of the intelligence reportsabout Iraq so as not to “tie theadministration’s hands.”

• Reduction of Uncertainty. Mostbureaucracies try to routinize their

operation and few are optimized forcrisis management. Crisis increasesuncertainty and the likelihood thatcompromises will have to be made. Withcompromise may come the fear thatpower, security, or prestige may besacrificed. Uncertainty allows for thecoexistence of varying views about thelikely outcomes of a given action; thesedifferences in viewpoint often lead toconflicting interests. An organizationwill struggle to reduce uncertainty andlessen the threat to its own stability.Information can reduce uncertainty andan organization’s power. Thusinformation is the coin of the realm ininteragency operations, as it providesthose who possess it a decidedadvantage in the decision-makingprocess.

• Individual Agendas. Private agendascan significantly affect interagencyconsensus. The goals of an institutionmay conflict with the private, usuallyshort-term, agendas of its members.Because personality plays such a largepart in interagency operations, personalagendas can be significant — often evencreating an informal hierarchy of thedepartment or agency. Allorganizations have some sort of formaland informal hierarchy, which results

THE VALUE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

General Jacob Devers, US Army commander of the 6th Army Group in WorldWar II, wrote that in coalition operations the personalities and the ambitionsof the senior commanders of each of the armed services of the Allied Powersunder his command were critical toward making the coalition work.

General Schwarzkopf and Saudi Arabia’s Lieutenant General Khaled were ableto forge the bonds of mutual respect and create an atmosphere that permeatedboth of their staffs and impacted on every action and every decision.

The Combined Civil Affairs Task Force, which assisted in the reconstructionof Kuwait after the Gulf War, was able to obtain interagency cooperation andestablish subordinate interagency support based largely on personalrelationships. Colonel Randall Elliot, USAR, who put the organization together,

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was also the senior analyst in the Near East Division of the DOS’s Bureau ofIntelligence and Research. He knew the US Ambassador-designate to Kuwait,Edward “Skip” Gnehm, and was able to recruit Major Andres Natsios, USAR,whose civilian job was Director of USAID’s Office of US Foreign DisasterAssistance. Major Natsios brought Mr. Fred Cuny from INTERTEC, acontractor specializing in disaster relief, into the task force. Thus, USAIDand its contractors were integrated into the operation based on these personalrelationships.

Personal relationships have dominated interagency operations from Landsdaleand Magsaysay in the Philippines, to Duarte and Pickering, Corr and Woernerin El Salvador. Successful interagency cooperation rests in no small part onthe ability of the Ambassador, the geographic combatant commander, theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the USGdepartments and agencies to personally work together.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources

in a specific distribution of power, income,and prestige among the members of theorganization. Informal structures arecreated to serve the personal needs of theorganization’s members and tend to modifythe organization’s overall behavior pattern.Informal structures inherent in everyorganization contribute significantly to itsability to perform formal functions. Thus,developing an understanding of anorganization and of the personalitiesinvolved in its informal structure canprovide insight to how the organizationperforms.

b. Gain Consensus Within the Departmentof Defense. Before attempting to gain consensusin the interagency arena, it must first beattained in the Department of Defense. Thevarious elements — Office of the Secretary ofDefense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff,Defense agencies and DOD field activities,Military Departments, and combatantcommands — should agree to the ends, ways,and means of an operation before trying tointegrate the military instrument of power withother agencies, departments, and organizations.The Department of Defense has a commonculture, common procedures, and a hierarchicalstructure, and the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates possess unique capabilities.

• Influence — This occurs both domesticallyand internationally, through military-to-military contacts and through the Reserveand National Guard.

• Resources — No other organization couldhave accomplished the massive logistic andengineer feats of Operation RESTOREHOPE.

• Responsiveness — Operations PROVIDECOMFORT, SEA ANGEL, RESTOREHOPE, and PROMOTE LIBERTY are allexamples of the demonstrated ability toorganize and project massive resourcesquickly to any spot on the globe.

• Command, Control, Communications,Computers, and Intelligence — Theability to command, control, communicate,and assimilate intelligence globally, bothon the ground and from space, isunparalleled.

• Organizing and Planning Processes —The ability to conduct crisis planning andorganize crisis response is unique.

• Training Support — The capability to trainlarge numbers of individuals quickly isunequaled.

I-9


• Strategic and Theater Lift — Only theArmed Forces of the United States havethe capability to rapidly projectoverwhelming military power anywhereon the globe in support of US nationalsecurity objectives.

(See also Figure A-C-4, Volume II.)

c. Develop an Understanding of OtherAgencies, Departments, and Organizations.

• Other Federal agencies can see the ends,ways, and means differently than doesthe Department of Defense. Eventhough the ends may be agreed to byall (as they are in the counterdrug war),the ways and the means may differfrom agency to agency. Distinctorganizational cultures can inhibitcooperation among agencies.Commonly an agency employs resourcesin ways that run counter to otheragencies’ cultures. What one agencyviews as “by the book,” another may seeas “slow and bureaucratic”; “fast andloose” to one is “flexible and responsive”to another. Interagency participantsshould understand that agencies areoften guided by their unique cultures(to include the Armed Forces of theUnited States) and that an appreciationof these cultural differences and of otheragencies’ priorities, procedures,capabilities, and terminology will paydividends during interagencycoordination and execution. Understandingthe significance that each organizationalculture plays in successful interagencycoordination can help effect workablecompromise and thus integrate all of theelements of national power.

• NGOs, PVOs, and some regional andinternational organizations present yetanother kind of challenge. Working withNGOs, PVOs, and regional and

international organizations requires ahigh degree of tolerance for ambiguity.None of these organizations willnormally accept taskings or directionfrom outside, and few coordinate theiractivities with others unless there is anorganizational need to do so. This factis particularly true when thecoordination may constrain normaloperating procedures or reduceflexibility. Because they are not partof the government, they may be hostiletoward it or unwilling to share itsvision or goals. These organizations mayembrace a set of principles that is at oddswith the thrust of military operations.However, their expertise may be essentialto the successful accomplishment of themission. Operation PROVIDECOMFORT provides an example ofgrowing cooperation between the ArmedForces of the United States and thehumanitarian relief community as theoperation unfolded.

• Each agency, department, andorganization has different access anda different perspective on theinternational scene. This difference canresult in a dysfunctional approach tosecurity issues. Determining the desiredend states in Panama, Kuwait, and theKurdish areas illustrated the inherentchallenge to achieving unity of effortwhen different organizations had distinctvisions. (Appendix J of this publication,“Humanitarian Assistance in ComplexEmergencies/The Mohonk Criteria,”contains criteria developed by the WorldConference on Religion and Peace foraddressing disasters. It may providecommanders with a better understandingof the philosophy of the internationalrelief community and thus furnishinsight into conducting militaryoperations in concert with theseorganizations.)

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d. Establish Unifying Goals. Reachingconsensus on a unifying goal is the mostimportant prerequisite for successfulinteragency operations. Consensus is frailand must be constantly nurtured, which ismuch more difficult if the goals are not clearor change over time. At the national level,this consensus is usually attained by the NSCstaff and often results in a PresidentialDecision Directive explaining the goals of anoperation and establishing interagencyresponsibilities. The objective is to ensurethat everyone has a stake in the outcome.

Some compromise that limits the freedomof individual agencies may be required togain consensus. The greater the number ofagencies and the more diversified the goals,the more difficult it is to reach consensus. Acrisis — such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait,the plight of the Kurds, the flooding ofBangladesh, or the tragedy of Oklahoma City— increases the likelihood that compromiseswill be made and consensus can be reached.Because a common unifying goal is soimportant, a great deal of time is spent onclarifying and restating the goals. GeneralDevers wrote that clarifying the directives ofhigher headquarters and dealing with thepolitical, economic, and military policies ofeach of the allied powers in World War IIwas a major task for the theater commander.

Because a common threat brings a coalitiontogether, the differences often revolve aroundways and means. Many of the techniquesthat have been developed in coalitionoperations can be used to facilitateinteragency operations.

e. Determine Mutual Needs andDevelop Interdependence. After developingan understanding of other agencies,determine the mutual needs between theDepartment of Defense and each of theother agencies. What things are important

both to the Department of Defense and toother organizations? The answer can helpdefine the common ground among agencies,departments, and organizations in pursuit ofmutual interests. All organizations will striveto maintain their interests, policies, and corevalues. These must be considered to ensuretotal interagency cooperation. Functionalinterdependence means that oneorganization relies upon another to attainthe objective. This interdependence is thestrongest and the most lasting potentialbond between agencies, departments, andorganizations. NGOs and PVOs mosteffectively conducted relief operations inSomalia with the security provided by the USArmed Forces. The US Armed Forces cannotconduct a long-range deployment without the

Successful interagency operations require a consensus on a unifying goal.

I-11


DOS securing overflight and en route basingagreements. Resource interdependence isbased on one organization providing certaincapabilities that another organization lacks.This support includes such resources asmanpower, logistics, training augmentation,communication, and money and establishesa framework for cooperation. Theseinterdependencies can develop over time andlead the way to true interagency cooperation.Ensuring that all organizations share theresponsibility for the job and receiveappropriate recognition strengthens thesebonds of interdependence. The purpose ofsuch recognition is to wed all of the engagedagencies to the process by validating andreinforcing their positive interagencyparticipation. (The following appendixes inthis publication describe the authority,responsibilities, organization, capabilities andcore competencies, and pertinent contactinformation for many of these agencies,departments, and organizations: AppendixA, “US Government Agencies,” AppendixB, “Nongovernmental and Private VoluntaryOrganizations,” Appendix C, “Regional andInternational Organizations,” Appendix D,“Agency Capabilities and Resources - QuickLook,” and Appendix H, “InteragencyTelephone and Facsimile Number Listing,”)

f. Consider Long-Term and Short-TermObjectives. Long- and short-termobjectives should be considered separately.

Participants should not lose sight ofestablishing a continuing relationship indeference to the issue at hand. At the strategiclevel of war, the combatant commander maywork with political committees or through theSecretary of Defense (in coordination withthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)who participates at NSC and ministerial-leveldiscussions, setting long-term policy goals.The combatant commander will also confrontshort-term operational objectives andcoordinate with the Ambassador and countryteam or a multinational and interagency staffor task force. Long- and short-termobjectives should have connectivity andthe combatant commander mustorganize the command to deal with eachsuccessfully.

7. Building InteragencyCoordination

Harnessing the power of disparateorganizations with competing priorities andprocedures is a daunting task. Joint Pub 3-0,“Doctrine for Joint Operations,” identifies therequirement for interagency coordination asa function of military operations in both warand MOOTW: “. . . combatant commandersand subordinate JFCs work with USAmbassadors, the DOS, and other agenciesto best integrate the military with thediplomatic, economic, and informationalinstruments of national power.”

BUILDING AN UNDERSTANDING IS NECESSARY

Not only do UN, international organizations, and nongovernmental and privatevoluntary organizations not understand the military organization, we likewisedo not understand them. They often have exaggerated impressions as to ourcapabilities, and little or no understanding of our limitations and restrictions.On the other hand, the US military personnel did not realize that thoseorganizations do not have a real chain of command as we are used to — wesimply never had any idea who to listen to . . . and they lacked one voice thatcould speak for all subordinates.

SOURCE: Operation SUPPORT HOPE After Action Review,Headquarters, USEUCOM

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While Chapter III of this publication details“organizing for successful interagencyoperations,” the following basic steps supportan orderly and systematic approach tobuilding and maintaining coordination.

a. Define the Problem in Clear andUnambiguous Terms That Are Agreed ToBy All. Differences in individualassumptions and organizational perspectivescan often cloud a clear understanding of theproblem. Representatives from each majorgroup of agencies, departments, andorganizations — to include field offices —should be involved in all levels of planningfrom the outset. These representatives areespecially important in order to achieve unityof effort during this problem definition phase.The early development of options forinteragency consideration is necessary.These options may be developed by creatingan interagency assessment team capable ofquick dispatch to the crisis area to work withthe combatant commander, Ambassador(s),or local and state authorities, to assess thesituation.

b. Define the Objective. Within thecontext of interagency operations,commanders and decision makers shouldseek clearly defined, decisive, andattainable objectives, end state, and exitcriteria . Successful interagency coordinationis essential to achieve these goals and thedevelopment of accurate and timelyassessments. Such definition allowsapplication of resources of the mostappropriate agencies. Not all agencies willnecessarily understand or agree to the needto clearly define the objective with the senseof urgency or specificity of militaryplanners. For example, the DOS may appearto resist defining the objective, since from itsperspective doing so might inhibit the give-and-take necessary to resolve the problemsthat are associated with many operations.From the DOS viewpoint, the objective mayemerge clearly only in the course of

negotiations and may not be established incomplete detail beforehand. This exampleis an illustration of the cultural differencesreferred to previously. Complications canarise because each agency has its ownperspective, capabilities, and culture. Thisdiversity is the strength and not theweakness of the interagency process.While there may be disagreement aboutsolutions, the differences provide a broadrange of options that can be applied.

c. Establish a Common Frame ofReference. The interagency environment iscomplicated by differences in keyterminology. The meaning of the terms “safezone” or “neutral” to a joint force commandermay have completely different connotationsto another agency head. The operationalimpact of this potential for misunderstandingis grave. The semantic differencescommonly experienced between Servicesgrows markedly in the interagency arena.To mitigate this problem, military plannersmust anticipate confusion and takemeasures to clarify and establish commonterms with clear and specific usage. A goodstart is to provide common access to Joint Pub1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary ofMilitary and Associated Terms.” Thisclarification is particularly important to theestablishment of military objectives. Differingoperating procedures, bureaucratic cultures,and language differences can create similarproblems during multinational operations.

d. Develop Courses of Action orOptions. These should address the problemand achieve the objectives. Militaryplanners should focus their efforts on themilitary enabling capabilities thatcontribute to national security policyobjective attainment and are part of theinteragency plan of action. Resource-sensitive problems require good options tolead to good solutions. Providing too few orclearly impractical options or recommendingthe “middle of the road” approach merely for

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the sake of achieving consensus is of littleservice to decision makers. The synergismof open debate within the interagencycommunity produces the best options.

e. Capitalize on Experience. Review theafter-action reports and lessons learned usingthe Joint Universal Lessons Learned Systemor the reports of such organizations as theCenter for Army Lessons Learned, the MarineCorps Lessons Learned System, Air ForceCenter for Lessons Learned, Coast GuardUniversal Lessons Learned System, US ArmyPeacekeeping Institute, and Center for NavalAnalyses to assess proposed courses of actionand to reduce the requirement to learn on thejob. Though usually less formal, agenciesoutside the Department of Defense frequentlyhave their own systems in place to capitalizeon operational experience. These should besought and used whenever possible.

f. Establish Responsibility. When allparticipants in the interagency processunderstand what needs to be done, agreeupon the means to accomplish it, andidentify who will do what through policy-operations coordination, a common senseof ownership and commitment towardresolution help achieve unity of effort. Theresources required for a mission must bepainstakingly identified, with specific andagreed upon responsibility assigned to theagencies that will provide them. To receiveproper reimbursement from other USGagencies for materiel support, carefulresponsibility and accounting proceduresshould be established. Cooperation andsynchronization are achieved wheninteragency coordination allows considerationof all positions. The military planner orcommander’s voice may be but one amongmany at the interagency table.

g. Plan for the Transition of KeyResponsibilities, Capabilities andFunctions. Prior to engagement of militaryforces, it is imperative to plan for the

transition of responsibility for specificactions or tasks from military tononmilitary entities. This planning mustbegin at the national level. When interagencytransition planning (including assignment ofspecific responsibilities and timelines foraccomplishment) does not occur, militaryinvolvement may be needlessly protracted.Recent positive examples illustrate this point;in Rwanda, the provision of potable water wascritical to saving thousands of lives. Whilethe US Armed Forces perhaps have thegreatest capacity to purify water, this servicecould not be provided indefinitely. Effectiveinteragency coordination enabled theidentification of other sources of reverseosmosis water purification units, associatedequipment, support funding, and mutuallyagreed-upon timelines and procedures fortransitioning from military support to NGOand PVO control. In Haiti the well-conceivedtransition planning, performed as part ofoverall interagency coordination, providedfor superb transition execution andmanagement. This transition enabled the USArmed Forces to hand over responsibility forkey tasks to other agencies, departments, andorganizations in a virtually seamless manner.As campaign and operation plans aredeveloped at the operational level, effectivetransition planning should also be aprimary consideration. Particularly duringMOOTW, commanders and militaryplanners at this level should anticipate theneed to “ratchet down” US military supportto lessen the impact on the local populace oftransitioning to other organizations.

h. Direct All Means Toward Unity ofEffort. Achieving unity of effort iscomplicated by the number of participants,distinctive agency cultures, lack of definitivecommand arrangements among the agencies,and often differing objectives. The principleof unity of effort pertains not only tomilitary operations but also to interagencycoordination. Unity will lead to success forthe mission, not a zero-sum equation among

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the agencies. Achieving this principle beginsby identifying agencies that have the requisitecapabilities to reach the common objectiveand by bringing their core competencies tothe interagency forum. Because theDepartment of Defense will often be in asupporting and not in the lead or supportedrole in this process, it may not be responsiblefor determining the mission or specifying theparticipating agencies. The NSC staffnormally designates the lead agency6 forsituations in which the Department ofDefense will participate, but lead agencyresponsibility can be situationally dependent,with the NSC staff setting the agenda.Among USG agencies, a charter enables theNSC to discharge responsibilities with theactive support of others assigned to theproblem. While not inviolate, the principleof lead agency is applied to a variety offunctions requiring interagencycoordination. Application of the principleis not limited to national-level coordination.It can be applied at the tactical level withcounterpart agencies such as governmentfield offices and local law enforcementagencies. It is important to determine detailsabout the agencies and organizations thathave an active role in the issue at hand toensure that those requiring informationreceive it and those that have informationprovide it.

8. Media Impact on InteragencyCoordination

The formulation and execution of anynational security policy must consider thepublic’s traditional values if the policy is tobe successful. As a result, the media can bea powerful force in shaping public attitudesand policy development. The media oftenhas a dramatic influence on the interagencyprocess — whether at the strategic decision-making level of the NSC or in the field asNGOs and PVOs vie for public attention andnecessary charitable contributions. Militaryplans that include interaction with otheragencies should anticipate the importancethat public affairs and media relations haveon the operation and in the interagencyprocess. As early as possible in the planningprocess, all participating agencies andorganizations need to establish and agree onprocedures for media access, issuing andverifying credentials, and briefing, escorting,and transporting of media members and theirequipment. Common communication pointsand public affairs themes should be developedprior to execution of the plan so thatorganizations are not perceived by the mediaas working at cross-purposes with oneanother. Responsibility for interaction withthe media should be established clearly sothat, to the extent possible, the media hearsfrom a single voice.

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1 Within the context of DOD involvement, interagency coordination occurs between elements of the Department ofDefense and engaged USG agencies, nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and regional andinternational organizations, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.

2 USG agencies and departments are those operating within the Federal Government’s executive branch. Theseinclude the NCA, Department of Defense, the various elements of the NSC System and NSC staff, DOS, Departmentof Justice (DOJ), DOT, Department of Energy (DOE), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the DrugEnforcement Administration (DEA), USAID, and many more.

3 "Nongovernmental organization" refers to a transnational, nonprofit organization of private citizens that maintainsa consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizationsmay be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest inhumanitarian assistance (development and relief). Nongovernmental organization is a term normally used by non-USorganizations. Also called NGO.

4 "Private voluntary organization" refers to a private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organization involved indevelopment and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally US-based. The term "private voluntaryorganization" is often used synonymously with nongovernmental organization. Also called PVO.

5 Regional and international organizations are those with regional or global influence.

6 A lead agency coordinates the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. Leadagencies are designated among USG agencies, normally by a Presidential Decision Directive, through the NSC or itsassociated forums, or based on traditional functional linkage (e.g., DOS for foreign policy matters). The lead agencychairs the NSC interagency working group (IWG) established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation.The lead agency also determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among other agencies, and is responsible for implementingdecisions.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIESTABLISHED INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

II-1

1. Interagency Connectivity

Response to the challenges facing theNation today most often requires a multi-agency, interdisciplinary approach thatbrings the many diverse skills andresources of the Federal Government andother public and private organizations tobear. While the requirement for coordinationbetween the agencies is not new, the need touse all capabilities is growing with thecomplexity and multidimensional nature ofthe new world order and with shrinkingmilitary resources. This cooperation is bestachieved through active interagencyinvolvement, building upon both thedifferences in agency cultures and the corecompetencies and successful experiencesthat each brings to the forum. What followsis a discussion of the foundation andbeginnings of the interagency process withinthe Federal Government, flowing downwardto the state and local governments andcombatant commands and outward to theNGOs, PVOs, and regional and internationalorganizations. A sampling of statutory,regulatory, or other conditions demonstratesorganizational connectivity betweenagencies, from the top down. While portionsof this chapter are described in other jointpublications, this material is brought togetherhere to provide a common frame of referencethat reflects all levels of interagencyinvolvement.

2. Interagency Coordination atthe National Level

The interagency process at the nationallevel is grounded within the Constitutionand established by law in the NationalSecurity Act of 1947 (NSA 47). TheNational Security Council is a product ofNSA 47.

a. NSA 47 codified and refined theinteragency process used during World WarII, modeled in part on Franklin D. Roosevelt’s1919 proposal for a “Joint Plan-MakingBody” to deal with the overlapping authoritiesof the Departments of State, War, and Navy.

b. Previous efforts had failed for lack of anational-level perspective, no staff forcontinuity, failure to properly understand theneed for interagency coordination, and theparochial interests of individual agencies.Evolving from the World War II experience(during which the Secretary of State was noteven invited to War Council meetings), aState-War-Navy Coordinating Committeewas formed in 1945.

c. From the earliest days of this Nation,the President was charged by the Constitutionwith the national security. The intent of NSA47 was to assist the President in executingthe authority to protect the United States.Most current USG interagency actions flowfrom these beginnings.

“What’s the relationship between a just-arrived military force and the NGOsand PVOs that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? Whatwe have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, ifthey are successful, you are successful. We need each other.”

General John M. ShalikashviliChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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d. Within the constitutional and statutorysystem, interagency actions at the nationallevel may be based more on personalities thanprocess and may consist more of persuasion,negotiation, and consensus building than ofstrict adherence to bureaucratic procedure.

3. National Security CouncilSystem (NSCS)

The functions, membership, andresponsibilities of the NSC are set forth inNSA 47 (as amended) and PresidentialDecision Directive (PDD) 2. They organizethe NSCS as the principal forum forconsideration of national security issuesrequiring Presidential decisions. The NSCadvises and assists the President inintegrating all aspects of national securitypolicy — domestic, foreign, military,intelligence, and economic (in conjunctionwith the National Economic Council).Together with supporting interagencyworking groups (some permanent and othersad hoc), high-level steering groups, executivecommittees, and task forces, the NSCSprovides the foundation for interagencycoordination in the development andimplementation of national security policy.The NSC is the only level of the ExecutiveBranch at which authoritative direction tothe various departments can be given.

a. NSC Membership. The members ofthe NSC are both prescribed by statute andidentified in PDD-2. The President chairsthe NSC. Other statutory members are theVice President, the Secretary of State(SECSTATE) and the Secretary of Defense.The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)regularly attends meetings as a Cabinet-levelofficer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff (CJCS) is a statutory advisor and alsoattends meetings of the NSC. The 20 January1993 PDD-2 added the Secretary of Treasury,the US Representative (with Ambassadorstatus) to the UN, the Assistant to thePresident for National Security Affairs (also

known as the National Security Advisor), theAssistant to the President for EconomicPolicy, and the Chief of Staff to the Presidentas permanent members. Heads of executivedepartments and agencies and other seniorofficials may be invited to attend meetings ofthe NSC on an ad hoc basis. For example,the Attorney General is invited whenmeetings pertain to the jurisdiction of theDOJ or when legal opinions may be necessaryregarding such matters as covert activities orinternational law.

b. NSC Organization. The NSC staff isthe President’s personal and principal stafffor national security issues. It tracks anddirects the development, execution, andimplementation of national security policiesfor the President. Depending on thePresident’s and the National SecurityAdvisor’s desires, the NSC staff does notimplement but may take either a central role,a coordinating role, or a monitoring role inpolicy and option development. The 20January 1993 PDD-2 identifies threeprimary interagency groups within theNSCS. Participation among USG agenciesin the NSCS and these subgroups are depictedin Figure II-1. The groups include thefollowing:

• The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) is the senior interagency forum fornational security policy issues.

• The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) is the senior sub-Cabinet (deputysecretary level) interagency forum. Itsparticipants mirror the groupsrepresented in the NSC/PC.

• The NSC Interagency WorkingGroups (NSC/IWGs) develop policy asissues work their way to the Presidentand, after the President’s decision,ensure proper implementation. TheIWG is an important tool for identifyingand assessing the diverse interests of

II-3

Established Interagency Relationships

executive departments and agencies andfor disseminating decisions, positions,and information to key participants. AnIWG can extend its capabilities byforming and dispatching assessmentteams to evaluate the situation. IWGsare formed in various ways. PDD-2establishes standing IWGs for specificpurposes as issues or crises arise and/orto develop long-term strategies.Normally tasked with the day-to-daycoordination of policy and issues,IWGs are sometimes augmented byexecutive committees, chaired by adirector from the NSC staff and similarlyrepresented by other agencies (to include

a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaryof Defense from the Office of theSecretary of Defense and a flag officer).Figure II-2 depicts the mechanism forconvening interagency workinggroups.

•• Top-down direction may come as aresult of a rapidly developing crisis.The President requests the NationalSecurity Advisor to convene the NSC.It reviews the situation, determines apreliminary course of action, and assignstasks for each executive agency. Details ofthe IWG’s role are identified at this time.

Figure II-1. Participation in National Security Council System Activities

PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL SECURITYCOUNCIL SYSTEM ACTIVITIES

PARTICIPANTS

OFFICE OF THESECRETARY OF

DEFENSE JOINT STAFFDEPARTMENT OF

STATEOTHER EXECUTIVE

BRANCH**

NSC

SYSTEM

NSC

SECRETARY OFDEFENSE

CHAIRMAN OF THEJOINT CHIEFS OFSTAFF

SECRETARY OFSTATE

PRESIDENT, VICEPRESIDENT, DIR OFCENTRALINTELLIGENCE,NATIONAL SECURITYADVISOR, US REPTO UN, SEC OFTREAS, ASST FORECONOMIC POLICY,CHIEF OF STAFF TOTHE PRESIDENT,ATTORNEY GENERAL,ET AL***

PRINCIPALSCOMMITTEE

SECRETARY OFDEFENSE

CHAIRMAN OF THEJOINT CHIEFS OFSTAFF

SECRETARY OFSTATE

NATIONAL SECURITYADVISOR, DCI, USREP TO UN, ASSTFOR ECONOMICPOLICY, ET AL***

DEPUTIESCOMMITTEE

UNDER SECRETARYFOR POLICY ORPRINCIPALDEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY FORPOLICY

VICE CHAIRMANOF THE JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF

UNDER ORASSISTANTSECSTATE FORPOLITICALAFFAIRS

DEPUTY NATIONALSECURITY ADVISOR,OTHER DEPUTIES

INTERAGENCYWORKING GROUP

ASST OR DEPUTYASST SECRETARY*

DIRECTOR/VICEDIRECTOR

DEPUTYASSISTANTSECSTATE

APPROPRIATEDEPUTY/UNDERSECRETARIES

WORKING GROUPSOFFICE OF THEASST SECRETARYACTION OFFICER

JOINT STAFFACTION OFFICER

DESK OFFICER US GOVERNMENTAGENCY ACTIONOFFICER

*

****

Office of the Secretary of Defense representatives at interagency working groups may beAssistant Secretaries, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries, Deputy AssistantSecretaries, Directors, or Task Force Directors/MembersA brief listing of other executive branch participantsInvited as appropriate

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•• Under more routine conditions,concerns focus on broader aspects ofnational policy and long-term strategyperspectives. Presidential ReviewDirectives (PRDs) outline specific agencyinterests, overall national policy objectives,and tasks for the appropriate componentsof the executive branch. IWGs integratethe various interests of the agencies intocoherent responses. This process isespecially likely in a new administration.

•• National security issues referred fromthe White House, executive departments

or agencies, or the NSCS to the NSCstaff may result in directives from theExecutive Secretary of the NSC toconvene an IWG. A directive willnormally identify (1) the nature of theissue; (2) the output of the IWG (e.g.,a study, recommendations, options);(3) all established national policies andemerging interests; (4) the level ofrepresentation desired from agencies;(5) a timetable; (6) an agency ordepartment to chair; and (7) a meetingplace and schedule.

CONVENING INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUPS

AGREE?

DIRECT

DEPARTMENT OF STATEDEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCEAGENCY COORDINATE

NORETURN

YESCONVENE

CRISISPOLICY ISSUESLONG-TERM STRATEGY

COORDINATE

DIRECTION & SUPERVISIONCOORDINATION

PRESIDENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF

INTERAGENCYWORKING

GROUP

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

Figure II-2. Convening Interagency Working Groups

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c. Determination of NSC Interest.Conditions that may trigger escalation to theNSC include the following:

• The potential for Presidential interest.

• Disagreement among agencies ordepartments that cannot otherwise beresolved.

• An issue exceeding the limits on theauthority of the collective groupaddressing the issue.

• An NSC staff request that the matter beaddressed within the NSCS.

d. The DOD Role in the NSCS

• Key DOD players in the NSCS comefrom within the Office of the Secretaryof Defense and the Joint Staff. TheMilitary Departments, which implementbut do not participate directly in nationalsecurity policy-making activities of theinteragency process, are representedprimarily by the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff.

• The NSCS is the channel for theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffto discharge substantial statutoryresponsibilities as the principalmilitary advisor to the President, theSecretary of Defense, and the NSC(and its members). At NSC meetingsthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffpresents personal views as well asdivergent views of the other members ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, if any, and thoseof the combatant commanders.

e. The Joint Staff Role in the NSCS

• The Joint Staff provides operationalinput and staff support through theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(or designee) for policy decisions made

by the Office of the Secretary ofDefense. It coordinates with thecombatant commanders and preparesappropriate directives, such as warning,alert, and execute orders, for Secretaryof Defense approval. This preparationincludes definition of command andinteragency relationships.

• Many military activities requireinteragency coordination, which theJoint Staff routinely accomplishes withthe Office of the Secretary of Defense,Department of State (with many involvedoffices and bureaus), Central IntelligenceAgency, NSC Staff, Department ofJustice, USAID, and others, dependingon the circumstances. There are timeswhen the combatant commander mayalso directly participate in accordancewith the Unified Command Plan(UCP). Within the Joint Staff, the officesof the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, Secretary of the Joint Staff,and the Operations (J-3), Logistics (J-4), and Plans and Policy (J-5)Directorates are focal points for NSC-related actions. The J-3 provides adviceon execution of military operations, theJ-4 assesses logistics implications ofcontemplated operations from itslogistics readiness center (LRC) to theinteragency forum, and the J-5 oftenserves to focus the Department ofDefense on a particular NSC matter forpolicy and planning purposes. Each ofthe Joint Staff directorates coordinateswith the Military Departments to solicitService input in the planning process.The Secretary of Defense may alsodesignate one of the Services as theexecutive agent for direction andcoordination of DOD activities insupport of specific mission areas.

f. The Combatant Commands' Role inthe NSCS. While the combatantcommanders function under the Secretary of

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Defense in accordance with the UCP, theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffrepresents the concerns of the combatantcommanders in the NSCS. These concernsare determined through directcommunications between the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatantcommanders and their respective staffs. Thecombatant commanders often directlycommunicate with the committees andgroups of the NSCS, just as the Joint Staffroutinely deals with intradepartmental issues.The formulation of military advice and therepresentation of joint force concerns will beaccomplished by members of the Joint Staffthrough coordination with the combatantcommand. Intradepartmental and policyinterests of the Department of Defense arerepresented by the appropriate members ofthe Office of the Secretary of Defense.

4. Forming a Joint Task Force(JTF)

Combatant commanders play a pivotal rolein the politics of military intervention. Whenit is necessary to engage the militaryinstrument of national power, a combatantcommander may designate a JTF toconduct the military operation. Thecombatant commander develops the missionstatement and concept of operations basedupon the direction of the NCA andcommunicated through the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff. Input from theDepartment of State, USAID’s Office of USForeign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), andothers, as well as the situation and the timemilitary forces will enter the joint operationsarea (JOA), may affect the mission statement.The combatant commander determines thenecessary military capabilities based uponmission analysis and tasks the components toidentify forces for specified capabilities.Components establish a force list (personnel,equipment, and supplies) and associatedmovement requirements to support theoperation. In coordination with the

commander, joint task force (CJTF), thecombatant commander will determine themilitary forces and other national meansrequired to accomplish the mission, allocateor request the military forces, and determinethe command relationships for the JTF.

a. JTF Attributes. The JTF conceptprovides for organizational flexibility, is taskorganized, reflects the mission’s requirementsand the unique and necessary capabilities ofthe Service and functional components, andprovides for the phased introduction of forcesand the rapid deployment of personnel andequipment. A JTF is normally designatedwhen the mission has a specific limitedobjective and does not require overallcentralized control of logistics. The missionassigned a JTF will require not only theexecution of responsibilities involving twoor more Military Departments but,increasingly, the support of all types ofagencies. Generally, a JTF is dissolved whenthe purpose for which it was created has beenachieved. The JTF organization resemblestraditional military organizations, with acommander, command element, and the forcesrequired to execute the mission. The primarypurpose of the JTF headquarters (HQ) iscommand, control, synchronization, andadministration of the JTF. The CJTF has atleast two responsibilities usually associatedwith those of combatant commanders: therequirement for unified action in the CJTF’sJOA and the necessity to interface with USGand HN agencies.

b. JTFs in the Interagency Process.During interagency operations, the JTFHQ must provide the basis for a unifiedeffort, centralized direction anddecentralized execution. The unique aspectsof the interagency process require the JTF HQto be especially flexible, responsive, andcognizant of the capabilities of not only theJTF’s components but those of other agencies,as well. The JTF HQ is the operationalfocal point for interagency coordination,

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“Disaster relief operations in supportof the state of Florida followingHurricane Andrew in August 1992included military personnel from allServices, active and reservecomponents, various nongovernmentalservice organizations (Red Cross,United Way and the Salvation Army),religious organizations of all types,state and local governments, otherFederal government organizations(including FEMA, Department ofTransportation and many others),contractors by the thousands, and tensof thousands of individual volunteerswho all worked together to help thecitizens of southern Florida begin onthe road to recovery.”

Major General Steven L. Arnold,USA

Operations Other Than W ar in aPower Projection Army: LessonsFrom Operation REST ORE HOPE

and Hurricane Andrew ReliefOperations, Strategic Studies

Institute, US Army War College,1994

c. The FRP applies to natural disasterssuch as earthquakes, forest fires, hurricanes,typhoons, tornadoes, floods, and volcaniceruptions; technological emergenciesinvolving radiological or hazardous materialreleases; and other Federal emergenciesidentified under the act.

d. Following a request for assistance fromthe Governor of the affected state or territoryand the determination that local ability torespond has been exceeded, the Presidentimplements the FRP by declaring adomestic disaster. With this Presidentialdeclaration, the resources of the FederalGovernment — through the interagencyprocess — can be focused on restoringnormalcy.

e. The FRP assigns responsibilities toexecutive departments and agencies ingrouped emergency support functions,

whereas the Joint Staff serves as the military’snational-level focal point. Accordingly, theCJTF may find it necessary to expand theJTF staff to accommodate the additionalrequirements. The flexibility associated withJTF organization makes it possible to put somekind of military and/or political structure orstaff into the JTF.

5. Interagency Coordination:Domestic1 Operations

a. Military operations inside the UnitedStates and its territories, though limited inmany respects, may include military supportto civil authorities (MSCA), which providesDOD support to civil authorities for domesticemergencies that result from natural ormanmade causes, or military support to civilianlaw enforcement agencies (MSCLEA).MSCLEA includes but is not limited to militaryassistance to civil disturbances, Key AssetProtection Program, and interagency assistance,to include training support to law enforcementagencies, support to counterdrug operations,support for combatting terrorism, andimprovised device response.

b. Crisis response to natural disastersand civil defense needs inside the UnitedStates are implemented through theFederal Response Plan (FRP). The RobertT. Stafford Disaster Relief and EmergencyAssistance Act (Disaster Relief Act of 1974,Public Law 93-288, as amended), is thestatutory authority for USG domestic disasterassistance. It gives the President the authorityto establish a program for disasterpreparedness and response which is delegatedto the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA). The act providesprocedures for declaring an emergency ormajor disaster, as well as the type andamount of Federal assistance available.Twenty-eight Federal departments andagencies support the operations of the FRPthrough execution of their assignedfunctional responsibilities.

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(ESFs) depending on the situation. Agenciesare designated as “primary” or “support,”based on their core competencies in 12 ESFsin the FRP. (See Annex J, Appendix A ofthis publication, “Federal EmergencyManagement Agency,” and its Figure A-J-2.)

f. DOD policy is set forth in DODDirective 3025.1, “Military Support toCivil Authorities (MSCA).” While theSecretary of Defense retains the authority toapprove the use of combatant commandresources for MSCA, the Secretary of theArmy is the Department of DefenseExecutive Agent for executing andmanaging MSCA and responds to the NCAwhen coordinating with the Director ofFEMA. Under the FRP, the Department ofDefense has the responsibility as “PrimaryAgency” for Public Works & Engineering(ESF #3). As a primary agency, theDepartment of Defense plans, coordinates,and manages the Federal response requiredby this function. The Department of Defensealso has specific responsibilities as a “SupportAgency” for all other ESFs. For additionalinformation see Joint Pub 3-07.7, “JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forDomestic Support Operations.”

g. The Secretary of Defense mustapprove the employment of combatantcommand resources for MSCA. TheSecretary of the Army may assign tasksdirectly to the combatant commanders, theMilitary Departments, DOD agencies, andthe Army Corps of Engineers. TheSecretary of the Army executes andmanages MSCA operations through theDirector of Military Support (DOMS).Navy and Air Force Deputies support DOMSto ensure optimum Service integration.Recent examples of DOMS leadershipinclude DOD support to relief activitiesassociated with Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew,and Iniki; the 1994 Los Angeles earthquake;and the 1994 Northwest fires.

h. The Secretary of Defense personallyoversees DOD responses to acts ofterr orism. Using the Joint Staff, theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assiststhe Secretary of Defense with operationalmanagement of such responses. DOMSassists the Secretary of Defense withmanaging the consequences of a terroristincident.

i. Federal assistance to a state or territoryis provided under the overall direction ofthe Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO),appointed by FEMA on behalf of thePresident after the President has declared a“disaster.” In coordination with the state,FEMA will send in the Emergency ResponseTeam (ERT) consisting of selected Federalagency representatives to assess damage,establish the disaster field office (DFO) andwork at the state emergency operations center.All taskings (known as “missionassignments”) must be approved byFEMA’s FCO in order for the Departmentof Defense to be reimbursed for itsincremental costs for the mission. When adomestic disaster occurs, FEMA’sCatastrophic Disaster Response Group(CDRG) and Emergency Support Team(EST) form at the Agency’s headquarters.The CDRG is the coordinating group thataddresses policy issues and supportrequirements from the FCO and ESFresponse elements in the field. The EST isan interagency group composed ofrepresentatives from the ten primary Federalagencies (including the Department ofDefense) and the FEMA staff to resolveissues.

j. Acting through the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff and DOMS (theDepartment of Defense representative on theCDRG), the Secretary of Defense approvesan execute order designating theCommander in Chief, US AtlanticCommand (USCINCACOM) (for disastersin the 48 continental states and Puerto Rico)

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or the Commander in Chief, US PacificCommand (USCINCPAC) (for disasters inAlaska, Hawaii, or the Pacific territories) asthe supported combatant commander andoperating agent. The execute order alsodelineates support relationships; directs theUS Army Corps of Engineers to begindisaster site support; and directs Commanderin Chief, US Transportation Command(USCINCTRANS) to begin unit orequipment movement as required by thesupported combatant commander. Actingthrough DOMS, the Secretary of the Armytasks and coordinates with the Services andother DOD elements (e.g., Defense LogisticsAgency), in accordance with supportrequirements identified by the Departmentof Health and Human Services (DHHS) orother primary agencies under the FederalResponse Plan and with the mission assignedby FEMA. USCINCACOM andUSCINCPAC are DOD principal planningagents. They have the responsibility toprovide joint planning and executiondirectives for peacetime assistance renderedby the Department of Defense within theirassigned areas of responsibility (AORs).

k. The supported combatantcommander designates a componentcommand as a headquarters to execute thedisaster relief operation. Thisheadquarters will appoint and deploy aDefense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and,based on the severity of the situation, mayalso deploy a joint task force. The DCO workswith the FCO to integrate JTF efforts insupport of the operation. The DCO serves asthe on-scene military point of contact for theFCO and principal representatives of otherUSG agencies participating in the reliefoperation. As a practical guide, the DCO andCJTF are not the same individual because theyhave different responsibilities and assets. Theseparation of these distinct functions allowsthe commander the flexibility to operate freelyin the disaster area, while the DCO focuseson task validation and coordinating DOD

response activities in the disaster field office.Within the continental United States(CONUS), USCINCACOM through itsArmy Component Forces Command or theContinental United States Army(CONUSA)2 can provide the JTF HQ. TheCONUSAs are Army regionally orientedcommands with regional boundaries. Theseheadquarters interact on a daily basis withstate and local authorities, the FEMA regions,and other Federal agencies on a variety ofissues that provide a foundation for rapid andsmooth transition to support operations duringperiods of disaster response. FEMA providessupporting combatant commanders withinterface to Federal agencies through RegionalInteragency Steering Committees forplanning, coordinating, and supportingMSCA efforts. FEMA has adopted theIncident Command System organizationalmodel (see Figure II-3) for the interagencyERT, which includes the functional elementsof operations, planning, logistics, and financeand/or administration.

l. In addition to crisis response roles incivil disasters, DOD assistance may berequested from other agencies as part of aFederal response to domesticenvironmental disasters. Normally, suchassistance will be provided based on requestsfrom the Environmental Protection Agency(EPA), the US Coast Guard (USCG), orDepartment of the Interior (DOI) as the leadagency. The Yellowstone forest fires of 1988and the Exxon Valdez oil spill of 1989 areexamples of disasters in which theDepartment of Defense and the Armed Forcesplayed a significant role. Other examplesinclude flooding and radiological andhazardous material accidents or incidents.

m. While the Department of Defenseresponse to domestic emergencies is normallycoordinated through DOMS, the militarymay also respond when aninterdepartmental memorandum ofagreement (MOA) is in effect. For example,

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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCYINCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

INCIDENTCOMMANDER

RESOURCESUNIT

SITUATIONUNIT

DOCUMENTATIONUNIT

DEMOBILIZATIONUNIT

TECHNICALSPECIALISTS

TIMEUNIT

PROCUREMENTUNIT

COMPENSATION /CLAIMSUNIT

COSTUNIT

COMMUNICATIONSUNIT

MEDICALUNIT

FOODUNIT

SINGLERESOURCES

TASKFORCES

STRIKETEAMS

AIRSUPPORTGROUP

AIRCOORDGROUP

SUPPLYUNIT

FACILITIESUNIT

GROUNDSUPPORTUNIT

SERVICEBRANCH

BRANCHES AIROPERATIONSBRANCH

DIVISIONSANDGROUPS

SUPPORTBRANCH

PLANNINGSECTION

CHIEF

OPERATIONSSECTION

CHIEF

LOGISTICSSECTION

CHIEF

ADMINISTRATION/FINANCE SECTION

CHIEF

INFORMATION OFFICERSAFETY OFFICERLIAISON OFFICER

the USCG (DOT) is assured of a rapidresponse from the US Navy in the deploymentof oil containment and recovery equipmentto the scene of an oil spill by aninterdepartmental MOA. This MOA setsforth procedures for deployment of equipmentand personnel, and for reimbursement ofoperational costs. Because of this MOA,negotiations at the headquarters level are notrequired. This mechanism enabled the rapiddeployment of Navy equipment to PrinceWilliam Sound in 1989 in response to the

Exxon Valdez incident and preceded themuch greater DOD assistance effortorchestrated by DOMS.

n. In all of these efforts, the military bringsunique and very useful capabilities to theinteragency forum that have value indomestic support. However, the Constitutionof the United States, laws, regulations,policies, and other legal issues all bear onthe employment of the military in domesticoperations. US law provides authority for

Figure II-3. Federal Emergency Management Agency Incident Command System

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and defines the conditions under whichmilitary forces can be employed, as well asthe legal constraints intended to preventmisuse of military force. Passive activitiesof military authorities that incidentally aidcivilian law enforcement agencies are notprohibited. However, with the exception ofmembers of the Coast Guard3 and membersof the National Guard in state service,military personnel are prohibited undereither the Posse Comitatus Act or DODpolicy from direct participation in theexecution of civil laws in the United Statesthat includes the following:

• Participating in the arrest, search andseizure, stop and frisk, or domesticinterdiction of vessels, aircraft, or vehicles.

• Conducting domestic surveillance orpursuit.

• Operating as informants, undercoveragents, or investigators in civilian legalcases or in any other civilian lawenforcement activity.

o. Operations within the United Statesare differentiated from other types ofmilitary operations. Military commandersmust seek a legal review of domesticoperation plans. They should scrutinizeeach request for aid to ensure that it conformswith statutory limits, especially in lawenforcement assistance to civil authorities.Moreover, the Secretary of Defense mustpersonally approve any request to assist lawenforcement agencies that will result in aplanned event with the potential forconfrontation with named individuals and/or groups or use of lethal force. Consideringthe increased emphasis on domestic roles forthe Department of Defense, a balance mustbe defined during the planning phase, withthe military capabilities and resources thatcan be applied to a situation on the one handand the constraints of law on the other.

p. Once a decision to employ militaryassets is made, the supported combatantcommander uses the different andcomplementary capabilities of each Serviceto accomplish the mission in disasterassistance. The JTF should be capable ofproviding any emergency assistance. Allclasses of supply and all types of services maybe required. The designation of a JTF willbe based on the capabilities required for theoptimum response to the disaster. Frequently,it will involve nontraditional or innovativeuses of military resources. The JTF will bespecifically configured for each mission. Indisaster situations, the JTF will becomposed of predominantly combatsupport and combat service support units.

6. Coordination With State andLocal Authorities

DOD interaction with state and localauthorities can take the very visible form ofMSCA or the more routine involvement ofcommanders of DOD installations with state,county, and municipal governments. Theseactivities include contingency planning withlocal governments and field offices of Federalagencies and community and social activities.

a. The Governor is supported in acontingency by the state or territorial Armyand Air National Guard under thecommand of the state or territory AdjutantGeneral. DOD support is generally providedin the form of assistance or augmentation ofskills and resources to a Federal agency fieldoffice or to a state or local agency havingresponsibility for a particular activity.

b. Each of the states and territories hasan office of emergency services (OES) oran equivalent responsible for preparednessplanning and assisting the Governor indirecting responses to emergencies. The OEScoordinates provision of state or territorialassistance to its local governments through

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immediate response by commanders will nottake precedence over their primary mission.Commanders should seek guidance throughthe chain of command regarding continuingassistance whenever DOD resources arecommitted under immediate responsecircumstances.

f. DOD coordination of activities betweeninstallations and the local community caninclude support for public fire and rescueservices, public works, police protection,social services, public health, and hospitals.Routine interagency coordination between theDepartment of Defense, Federal AviationAdministration (FAA) and the municipalitytakes place on a daily basis where a joint-usemilitary airfield supports commercial aviationserving the municipality. Examples includemilitary assistance to safety and traffic andsearch and rescue.

g. Interagency coordination with domesticPVOs such as the American Red Cross iscarried out between the Federal Government,the agencies, and the affected state or territory.

7. Interagency Coordination:Foreign Operations

a. Politico-Military Domain. TheDepartment of State advises and assists thePresident in foreign policy formulation andexecution. Day-to-day relationshipsbetween Federal agencies revolve about theNation’s external relationships and howthey bear on the national interest. For theDepartment of Defense (in the politico-military domain) this involves the following:

• Bilateral and multilateral militaryrelationships.

• Treaties involving DOD interests.

• Technology transfer.

• Armaments cooperation and control.

authority of the Governor or Adjutant Generalbut does not provide cross-border assistance.Additionally, the state will usually designate aState Coordinating Officer (SCO), with similarauthorities to the FCO, to coordinate andintegrate Federal and state activities.

c. Counterpart relationships to those ofDCO, FCO, and SCO are established at lowerechelons to facilitate coordination. Forexample, local DOD installation commandersmay work closely with local mayors andcommissioners to align capabilities andresources with needs.

d. Federal support to law enforcementagencies can be coordinated with the stateor territory Adjutant General, the OES,or principal law enforcement agency,depending on the nature and magnitudeof the operation. Coordination ofcounterdrug operations under Federal andstate oversight can be very low-key, withinteragency activities taking place withinspecific localities. Such an operation occurredalong the Saint Lawrence River in the 1980sto stop the illegal flow of drugs and cigarettes.The US Customs Service (USCS), USImmigration and Naturalization Service,Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), andstate and local police worked together, alongwith the Royal Canadian Mounted Police andother agencies of both governments. In adifferent sort of operation, support providedduring the Los Angeles riots required extensivecoordination at several echelons, from theAdjutant General to local law enforcementdepartments and DOD installations.

e. DOD support for local environmentaloperations can begin immediately withinthe authority delegated to installationcommanders. One such example is detectionof an oil spill in a harbor. If requested bylocal authorities, a commander of a DODinstallation having the appropriate resourcescan take immediate action, with coordinationof state and Federal activities to follow. This

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• Humanitarian assistance.

• Peace operations (including thoseconducted under the auspices of the UN).

b. Theater Orientation. Within a theater,the geographic combatant commander isthe focal point for planning andimplementation of theater and regionalmilitary strategies that require interagencycoordination. Coordination between theDepartment of Defense and other USGagencies may occur in a country team orwithin a combatant command. In someoperations, a Special Representative of thePresident or Special Envoy of the UNSecretary General may be involved. Thecombatant commander’s regional focus ismirrored at the Department of State in itsregional bureaus. Similarly, many other USGagencies are regionally organized (e.g.,USAID and United States InformationAgency [USIA]). Within individualcountries, the Ambassador and country teamare the initial focal point. (See Annex C[“DOD”] and Annex F ["Department ofState"] in Appendix A ["US GovernmentAgencies"] of this publication.)

“Interaction with the US Department ofState and the United Nations wascritical throughout the operation.Ambassador Oakley and I spokeregularly to coordinate the efforts of theDOS and our military operations in theARFOR sector. His support for ouroperation was superb and he played akey role in communicating with theleadership of the Somali clans. Wefollowed his lead in operations, just aswe fully supported the operations of theDOS.”

Major General Steven L. Arnold, USAOperations Other Than W ar in a

Power Projection Army: LessonsFrom Operation REST ORE HOPE andHurricane Andrew Relief Operations,Strategic Studies Institute, US Army

War College, 1994

c. Campaign Planning WithinInteragency Operations. The jointcampaign plan is based on the commander’sconcept, which presents a broad vision of therequired aim or end state and how operationswill be sequenced and synchronized toachieve objectives. Thus, a campaign planis an essential tool for laying out a clear,definable path linking the mission to thedesired end state. Such a plan enablescommanders to help political leaders visualizeoperational requirements for achievingobjectives. Given the systematic militaryapproach to problem solving, it is often thecombatant commander who formally orinformally functions as the lead organizer ofmany operations. How does the combatantcommander develop and execute acampaign plan in the interagency arena,in which his command authority is limited andthe military element of national power is oftenthe least dominant?

• Operational art lies at the heart of how acombatant commander producescampaign plans designed to meetstrategic objectives. The combatantcommander must consider foursignificant areas.

•• Ends. What conditions will achievethe theater strategic objectives?

•• Ways. What sequence of actions ismost likely to produce these conditions?

•• Means. How does the commanderapply resources to accomplish thissequence of actions?

•• Risk. What is the likely cost or riskto the joint force in performing thissequence of actions?

• To frame the campaign plan withininteragency operations, thecommander must address these four

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areas in the context of all of theelements of national power, to includepolitical and/or diplomatic, economic,informational, and military. Then,although choice may be limited, thecombatant commander must considerwhich agencies are best qualified to wieldthese elements of power. The campaignplan within interagency operationsshould integrate the elements ofnational power by synchronizing theefforts and optimizing the varied andextensive resources of many agenciesand organizations toward a singleobjective or end state.

d. Plan Development and Coordination.Combatant commanders frequently developcourses of action with recommendations andconsiderations originating in one or more USembassies. In this regard, the country teamcan be an invaluable resource, because eachembassy is required to develop andmaintain a current Emergency Action Plan(EAP). These EAPs, which can cover a widerange of anticipated contingencies and crises,can assist the combatant commanders inidentifying courses of action, options, andconstraints to military actions and supportactivities. More importantly, the EAPincorporates the inputs of thoserepresentatives with significant experience onthe ground. The staffs of geographiccombatant commands also consult withembassy country teams as well as with theOffice of the Secretary of Defense, the JointStaff, and key interagency offices tocoordinate military operations and supportactivities with those of other organizations.Initial concepts of military operations mayrequire revision based on feasibilityanalysis and consideration of relatedactivities by voluntary and privateorganizations, particularly with regard tologistics. For example, primitive seaport andairport facilities may limit the ability to movemassive amounts of supplies and constrainapplication of the collective effort. Such

information frequently originates within thecountry team that, in turn, may be in contactwith relief organizations in country. Thus,directly or indirectly, refinement of themilitary mission should be coordinated withother USG agencies, NGOs, and PVOs toidentify and minimize mutual interference.

• Mission planning conducted by thegeographic combatant commandershould be coordinated with theDepartment of State, through theOffice of the Secretary of Defense andthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, to facilitatedefinition and clarification of strategicaims, end state, and the means to achievethem. Commanders and plannersshould understand specific conditionsthat could produce mission failure, aswell as those that mark success.Commanders must ensure that unity ofeffort with other agencies contributes tostrategic aims and objectives.

• During campaign planning, thecommand should identify the targetaudiences to be reached. The JTFpublic affairs officer (PAO) mustcoordinate with civil affairs,psychological operations (PSYOP),intelligence community, and NGOs andPVOs to develop and package themes,mission, and end state. The desired endstate, essential tasks leading up to theend state, and exit criteria must beclearly expressed to the media in orderto gain and maintain public support.The various agencies involved incampaign planning do not necessarilysend the same messages and must notcontradict each other. Agencies andorganizations must determine andcoordinate the best methods tocommunicate these messages.

• Mission refinement can helpcommanders assist NGO and PVOactivities. The goal should not be to

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COUNTRY TEAM

The United States country team is “the senior, in-country, United Statescoordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United Statesdiplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each representedUnited States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the USdiplomatic mission.” (Joint Pub 1-02, “Department of Defense Directory ofMilitary and Associated Terms.”) It includes representatives of all USdepartments and agencies present in the country. The US Ambassador,synonymous with chief of mission, represents the President but takes policyguidance from the SECSTATE through regional bureaus. The Ambassador isresponsible for all US activities within the country to which the United Statesis accredited, and interprets US policies and strategy regarding the nation.The composition of the country team varies widely depending on specific USnational interests in the country, the desires of the chief of mission, thesituation within the country, and the number and level of presence of USagencies. Agencies represented on the country team can include US Agencyfor International Devopment; Department of Defense, through the DefenseAttache and Security Assistance Organization; US Information Agency,through the local US Information Service office; US Customs Service; PeaceCorps representatives; US Coast Guard; US Immigration and NaturalizationService; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigationthrough the Legal Attache; et al. The country team facilitates interagencyaction on recommendations from the field and implements effective executionof US programs and policies.


replace these activities. This mayinclude, for example, providing convoysecurity or transporting relief supplies.

(For a detailed description of these keyinteragency-intensive operations, see thefollowing appendices of this publication:Appendix E, “Counterdrug Operations —Interagency Coordination,” Appendix F,“Foreign Disaster Assistance — InteragencyCoordination,” and Appendix G,“Noncombatant Evacuation Operations —Interagency Coordination.” )

8. Interagency Structure inForeign Countries

The chief of mission (i.e., theAmbassador) has authority over allelements of the US Government in country,except forces assigned to a combatant

command.4 Other key USG organizationsin place within most nations include the USDefense Attache Office (USDAO) and theSecurity Assistance Organizations (SAO) —both part of the country team. In somecountries these two functions may beperformed by a single military office. It isimportant to understand the differencesbetween these agencies in theater interagencycoordination.

a. The Ambassador. As discussed, theAmbassador is the senior representative ofthe President in foreign nations and isresponsible for policy decisions and theactivities of USG employees in the country.The Ambassador integrates the programs andresources of all USG agencies represented onthe country team. As the chief of mission,the Ambassador has extraordinary authorityand a de facto coordinating mechanism that

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can be fine-tuned on the spot and tailored toeach crisis as it arises, based upon thesubstance of the problem with little need forwritten rules. Ambassadors must interactdaily with the Department of State’s strategic-level planners and decision makers.Additionally, the Ambassador functions atboth the operational and tactical levels,where recommendations and considerationsfor crisis action planning are provideddirectly to the geographic combatantcommander and commander of a joint taskforce. While forces in the field under ageographic combatant command are exemptfrom the Ambassador’s statutory authority,the Ambassador’s political role is importantto the success of military operations involvingArmed Forces.

b. The Country Team. The country teamsystem provides the foundation for rapidinteragency consultation and action onrecommendations from the field andeffective execution of US missions,programs, and policies. The country teamis often less than adequate for every need. Insome cases it may not exist (e.g., Cuba), itmay be inoperative due to damage orcasualties from natural or manmade disaster,or it may simply be weak or inadequatelytrained in crisis management. The relationshipwith military chains of command is frequentlyad hoc. This coordination is intended to betterachieve unity of effort.

• The country team concept encouragesagencies to coordinate their plans andoperations and keep one another and theAmbassador informed of their activities.

• Although the Ambassador is in charge,each agency head has directcommunication with and line of authorityfrom the parent organization. A memberof the country team who disagrees withthe direction of policy may appeal tosuperiors in Washington. Morefrequently, a member may receive home

agency instructions that conflict with theconsensus of the country team.Important issues must sometimes beresolved at the national level. Therelations of country team members totheir home agencies and to each otherrequire that proceedings be consensual.

c. US Defense Attache Office. Serviceattaches comprise the USDAO. The DefenseAttache (DATT) is normally the seniorService attache assigned to the embassy.While keeping the combatant commanderinformed of their activities, DATTs are ratedand funded by the Defense IntelligenceAgency. These attaches are valuable liaisons totheir HN counterparts. The attaches also servethe Ambassador and coordinate with, andrepresent, their respective Military Departmentson Service matters. The attaches assist theforeign internal defense (FID) program byexchanging information with the combatantcommander’s staff on HN military, social,economic, and political conditions.

d. Security Assistance Organization.The SAO is the most important FID-relatedmilitary activity under the supervision ofthe Ambassador. The SAO — which maybe comprised of a military assistance advisorygroup or liaison group, other military activity,or a single security assistance officer —reports to the US Ambassador but is rated bythe combatant commander and funded by theDefense Security Assistance Agency. TheSAO assists HN security forces by planningand administering military aspects of thesecurity assistance (SA) program. SA officesalso help the US country team communicateHN assistance needs to policy and budgetofficials within the US Government. Inaddition, the SAO provides oversight oftraining and assistance teams temporarilyassigned to the HN. The SAO is exceptedby law from giving direct trainingassistance. Instead, training is normallyprovided through special teams andorganizations assigned to limited tasks for

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specific periods (e.g., mobile training teams,technical assistance teams, quality assuranceteams).

e. United States Defense Representative(USDR). The USDR in foreign countries isan additional duty title assigned to a militaryofficer serving in a specifically designatedposition. The USDR is the in-country focalpoint for planning, coordinating, andexecuting support to US Government officialsfor in-country US defense issues and activitiesthat are not under the mission authorityexercised by parent DOD components. TheUSDR is also the in-country representativeof the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the geographiccombatant commander and is responsible(under the direction of the chief of mission)for providing coordination of administrativeand security matters to US Governmentofficials for all DOD noncombatantcommand elements in the foreign country inwhich the USDR is assigned.

f. American Embassy Public AffairsOfficer and United States InformationService. The public affairs officer is the thirdsenior officer at the embassy. Themes, messages,and press releases prepared by the JTF arenormally coordinated with the embassy publicaffairs officer or USIS press attache.

g. Geographic Combatant Commands.In order to effectively bring all elements ofnational power to theater and regionalstrategies as well as campaign and operationplans, combatant commanders areaugmented with representatives from otherUSG agencies.

• Frequently, geographic combatantcommands are assigned a ForeignPolicy Advisor (FPA) or PoliticalAdvisor (POLAD) by the Departmentof State. This person providesdiplomatic considerations and enablesinformal linkage with embassies in the

AOR and with the Department of State.The FPA and/or POLAD suppliesinformation regarding policy goals andobjectives of the Department of State thatare relevant to the geographic combatantcommander’s theater strategy.

• Other USG agencies may detail liaisonpersonnel to combatant commandstaffs to improve interagencycoordination. For example, representativesof the Director of Central Intelligencemay be assigned to staffs of geographiccombatant commands to facilitateintelligence support to militaryoperations, to assist in the coordinationof intelligence community activitieswithin the combatant commander’sAOR, to ensure that intelligence activitiesremain within policy and legalguidelines, and to anticipate futurerequirements for support.

9. Command Relationships:“Supported,” “Supporting,”and “Associate”

Today, the Armed Forces perform inboth supported and supporting roles withother agencies. During combat operationssuch as DESERT STORM or in humanitarianassistance operations such as PROVIDECOMFORT, the Department of Defense wasthe lead agency and was supported by otheragencies. When the Department of Defenseis tasked to provide military support to civilauthorities, its forces perform in a supportingrole. As previously discussed, commandersmay support the local head of another agency,such as an Ambassador, or may themselvesemploy the resources of other USG agenciesor even private firms. Whether supportedor supporting, close coordination is the keyto efficient and effective interagencyoperations.

a. The NCA establish supported and/orsupporting command relationships between

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combatant commanders when deploymentand execution orders are issued. This ensuresthat tasked combatant commanders receiveneeded support. The commanders of thegeographic combatant commands, supportedby the functional combatant commands suchas the US Transportation Command and USSpace Command, provide forces andresources to accomplish the mission. Thiscommand relationship among the combatantcommanders lends itself to the interagencyprocess. The supported combatantcommander controls and is accountable formilitary operations within a specified areaof responsibility. Supported commandersdefine the parameters, request the rightcapabilities, task supporting DODcomponents, coordinate with the appropriateFederal agencies, and develop a plan toachieve the common goal. As part of the teameffort, supporting commanders provide therequested capabilities to assist the supportedcommander to accomplish missions requiringadditional resources.

b. NGOs and PVOs do not operate withineither the military or the governmentalhierarchy. Therefore, the relationshipbetween the Armed Forces and NGOs andPVOs is neither supported nor supporting.An associate or partnership relationshipmay accurately describe that which existsbetween military forces and engaged NGOsand PVOs. If formed, the focal point whereUS military forces provide coordinatedsupport to NGOs and PVOs would be theCivil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).

“By melding the capabilities of themilitary and the NGOs and PVOs youhave developed a force multiplier.”

AmbassadorMadeleine K. Albright

The US Representative to theUnited Nations

10. The Nongovernmental andPrivate VoluntaryOrganizations’ Connectionto Joint Operations

Where long-term problems precede adeepening crisis, NGOs and PVOs arefrequently on scene before US forces and arewilling to operate in high-risk areas. Theywill most likely remain long after militaryforces have departed. NGOs and PVOs areindependent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary relief providers.

These organizations play an important rolein providing support to host nations. In fact,NGOs and PVOs provide assistance to over250 million people annually. Their worldwidecontributions total between $9 and $10 billioneach year — more than any single nation orinternational body (such as the UN). Becauseof their capability to respond quickly andeffectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commanderwould otherwise have to devote to anoperation. Though differences may existbetween military forces and civilian agencies,short-term objectives are frequently verysimilar . Discovering this common ground isessential to unity of effort. In the finalanalysis, activities and capabilities of NGOsand PVOs must be factored into thecommander’s assessment of conditions andresources and integrated into the selectedcourse of action.

a. The Role of NGOs and PVOs. NGOsand PVOs may range in size and experiencefrom those with multimillion dollar budgetsand decades of global experience indevelopmental and humanitarian relief tonewly created small organizations dedicatedto a particular emergency or disaster. Theprofessionalism, capability, equipment andother resources, and expertise vary greatlyfrom one NGO or PVO to another. NGOsand PVOs are involved in such diverseactivities as education, technical projects,

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relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy,and development programs. The connectivitybetween NGOs, PVOs and the Departmentof Defense is currently ad hoc, with no specificstatutory linkage. But while their focus remainsgrassroots and their connections informal,NGOs and PVOs are major players at theinteragency table. The sheer number of livesthey affect and resources they provide enablesthe NGO and PVO community to wield a greatdeal of power within the interagency community.In fact, individual organizations are often tappedby the UN and USG agencies to carry out specificrelief functions.

b. The Increasing Number of NGOs andPVOs. A JTF or multinational force mayencounter scores of NGOs and PVOs in aJOA. In Somalia alone, there were some 78private organizations contributing reliefsupport, and assisting the UN relief in theRwanda crisis were over 100 relieforganizations. Over 350 such agencies areregistered with USAID. InterAction, a US-based consortium of PVOs, has a membershipof over 150 private agencies that operate in180 countries. The International Council ofVoluntary Agencies (ICVA) also hasmembership numbering in the hundreds.

c. Military and Private OrganizationRelations. The extensive involvement, localcontacts, and experience gained in variousnations make private organizationsvaluable sources of information about localand regional governments and civilianattitudes toward the operation. While someorganizations will seek the protectionafforded by Armed Forces or the use ofmilitary aircraft to move relief supplies tooverseas destinations, others may avoid aclose affiliation with military forces,preferring autonomous operations. Theirrationale may be fear of compromising theirposition with the local populace or suspicionthat military forces intend to take control of,influence, or even prevent their operations.Combatant command staff planners should

consult these organizations, along with thehost country government (if sovereign), toidentify local issues and concerns that shouldbe reflected in the proposed public affairsguidance. Public affairs planning shouldalso include the identification of points ofcontact with NGOs and PVOs that willoperate in an affected area to arrangereferrals of news media queries regardingtheir operations to an authorizedspokesperson. Military spokespersonsshould comment on NGO and PVOoperations based on guidance provided by theOffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense(Public Affairs) (OASD[PA]), in cooperationwith the in-country headquarters of theorganization.

“For all our experience andcompassion, we in the relief anddevelopment business do not have thecapacity to deal with such large-scalecatastrophes without help. Help fromthe military is not something we shouldbegin to take for granted or rely uponin all cases. But there are extraordinarycircumstances that call for responses— manpower, equipment, expertise,transport and communication capacity— that only the military can deploy.”

Philip JohnstonPresident & CEO, CARE

“We must recognize that theDepartment of Defense contribution tointeragency operations is often morethat of enabler (versus decisive force,a function we are institutionally morecomfortable with). For example, inRwanda, the military served as anenabling force which allowed the NGOsand PVOs to execute their function ofhumanitarian relief. A key componentto our success in Rwanda was the factthat we consciously stayed in thebackground and withdrew our forcesas soon as the enabling function wascomplete.”

General George A. Joulwan, USACommander in Chief,

US European Command

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d. Military Support of NGOs and PVOs.The NCA may determine that it is in thenational interest to task US military forceswith missions that bring them into closecontact with (if not support of) NGOs andPVOs. In such circumstances, it is mutuallybeneficial to closely coordinate the activitiesof all participants. A climate of cooperationbetween NGOs, PVOs, and the militaryforces should be the goal. Taskings tosupport NGOs and PVOs are normally for ashort-term purpose due to extraordinaryevents. In most situations, logistics,communications, and security are thosecapabilities most needed by the NGOs andPVOs. It is, however, crucial to rememberthat in such missions the role of the ArmedForces should be to enable — not perform— NGO and PVO tasks. As later described,US military assistance has frequently provento be the critical difference that enabledsuccess of an operation. Militarycommanders and other decision makersshould also understand that mutually beneficialarrangements between the Armed Forces andNGOs and PVOs may be critical to the successof the campaign or operation plan.

(Many agencies that commanders mayencounter in an operational area are describedin Appendix B of this publication,“Nongovernmental and Private VoluntaryOrganizations.” Annex A of Appendix Bcontains “InterAction’s Geographic Index ofNGOs and PVOs.”)

11. The Role of Regional andInternational Organizations

Regional and international organizationspossess area or global influence. Regionalexamples include NATO, the Organizationfor African Unity, Organization of AmericanStates, Western European Union (WEU), andOrganization on Security and Cooperationin Europe. International examples includethe UN, its agencies, and the InternationalRed Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

These organizations have well-definedstructures, roles, and responsibilities andare usually equipped with the resourcesand expertise to participate in complexinteragency operations. The followingdescribes formal or informal ties between theUnited States and some of the largest of theseregional and international organizations.

a. The North Atlantic Tr eatyOrganization. The NATO experienceexemplifies the interagency process on aregional level. Its evolution has beenpropelled, often in the face of crisis, by thedemands for cooperation that characterize everyregional effort. The durability of NATO — theworld’s longest lasting alliance since theAthenians League of Delos was established in477 B.C. to repel the Persians — is testament toits success in interagency coordination.

• NATO was formed during the periodimmediately following World War IIwhen the Western European nations andtheir North American allies becameconcerned with the expansionist policiesof the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloccountries. Direct threats to thesovereignty of Norway, Greece, andTurkey; the 1948 coup inCzechoslovakia; and the illegal blockadeof Berlin prompted the Alliance for thecommon defense of Western Europe. By1982, sixteen nations were members ofthe Alliance: Belgium, France,Luxembourg, the Netherlands, theUnited Kingdom, the United States,Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy,Norway, Portugal, Greece, Turkey,Germany, and Spain.

• At the time of NATO’s establishment, theInter-American Treaty of ReciprocalAssistance of 1947 (Rio Pact)represented the US view of the proper,collective security relation betweennations: an armed attack against amember was considered an armed attack

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against all the members, butdetermination of the appropriateresponse was left to each country.Similarly, the North Atlantic Treatyallowed each country to take “suchaction as it deems necessary, includingthe use of armed force, to restore andmaintain the security of the NorthAtlantic Area.” The treaty wasimmediately supported by movement ofUS military supplies and troops toEurope in 1950 under NATO’s initial“Strategic Plan.” Consistent withinteragency practice, the plan called foreach country to undertake the tasks bestsuited to its location or capabilities. The

US role was chiefly to provide strategicbombing and naval support, with thecore of ground force from Europeannations. Today, NATO memberscontinue to share the burdens, risks, andresponsibilities as well as the benefits ofcollective security. They uphold theindividual rights of member nations andtheir obligations in accordance with theUnited Nations Charter. Nations shouldconsider the ramifications ofcommitments outside of the NATOtreaty but still retain the right toundertake unilateral operations.

• NATO orientation is evolving with thechanging global environment. Dangersto peace and threats to stability in theworld remain despite the end of the ColdWar. With the changes wrought by thedissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO’scurrent “New Strategy,” includingcombined joint task force concepts,confronts problems of burden-sharingand command in new areas and inunfamiliar roles. This is clearly evidentin NATO support to UN operations inthe former Yugoslavia. A NATOmaritime operation was initiated in theAdriatic in July 1992, in coordination andcooperation with operations undertaken by

WEU, to monitor compliance with UNSecurity Council resolutions imposingsanctions on Serbia and Montenegro. TheAlliance has been actively involved inplanning, preparation, and implementationof peace operations, such as protection forhumanitarian relief and support for UNmonitoring of heavy weapons. Therequirement for interagency coordinationon an international scale has been apparentas NATO becomes increasingly involvedwith NGOs, PVOs, and other regional andinternational organizations during the courseof ongoing peace operations.

Air component forces operating over the mountains of northernItaly in support of DENY FLIGHT.

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• Coordination of US efforts within NATObegins with the Presidentially appointedPermanent Representative, who has therank and status of AmbassadorExtraordinary and Chief of Mission (22USC 3901). As with any treaty, UScommitment to the implementation ofthe North Atlantic Treaty reflects thebalance between the power of thePresident to conduct foreign policy andCongress’s power of the purse. Congresshas authorized and regularly fundslogistic support for elements of theArmed Forces deployed to NATOoutside the United States and permitscross-servicing agreements in return forreciprocal support. Beyond day-to-dayoperations, training exercises, andlogistics authorized by statute,extraordinary employment of USmilitary force with NATO in bothwarfighting and military operationsother than war requires Presidentialaction and may be subject tocongressional review, including thoseemployments authorized and limited bythe War Powers Act.

b. The United Nations. Coordination withthe UN begins at the national level with theDepartment of State, through the USRepresentative to the UN. As stated earlier,the US Representative to the UN is amember of the NSC and participates in theformulation of policy matters relevant tothe UN and its activities. The USRepresentative is assisted at the US Missionto the UN by a military assistant whocoordinates appropriate military interestsprimarily with the UN Departments ofHumanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) andPeacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).

• The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, TheUnited Nations Participation Act of 1945,and Executive Order 10206 (Support ofPeaceful Settlements of Disputes) authorizevarious types of US military support to the

UN, either on a reimbursable ornonreimbursable basis.

• US military operations in support of theUN usually fall within Chapter VI(Pacific Settlement of Disputes) orChapter VII (Action with Respect toThreats to the Peace, Breaches of thePeace, and Acts of Aggression) of theUN Charter. (See Annex E, “UnitedNations,” of Appendix C, “Regional andInternational Organizations,” for detailsregarding the UN Charter and ChapterVI and VII of that charter.)

• The UN will normally conduct peaceoperations or humanitarian assistanceunder the provisions of a resolution ormandate from the Security Council orthe General Assembly. Mandates aredeveloped by politicians and diplomatstrying to reach compromise. Because ofthis, military commanders have oftenfound it difficult to translate thesemandates into workable mission orders.Commanders can use the interagencyprocess to feed back their concernsthrough the political apparatus of the UN.Though not always successful, clarity ofmission should always be sought fromthe Ambassador or UN ResidentCoordinator, as appropriate.

• The UN headquarters coordinatespeace operations and humanitarianassistance around the world. It does not,however, have a system for planningand executing these operations that iscomparable to that of the UnitedStates. The UN organizational structureconsists of the headquarters and theoperational field elements. Thus, thereis a strategic- and tactical-levelequivalent to the US Armed Forces, butno operational counterpart.

• At the headquarters, the Secretariatplans and directs missions. Either the

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UNDPKO or the UNDHA serves as theheadquarters component duringemergencies. Additional support bytemporary augmentation from the JointStaff and Service headquarters staffs maybe provided for specific requirements.UN special missions, such as the UNProtection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina,operate under the direction of the UNSecretary General (SYG).

• Field-level organization is often based onthe Resident Coordinator systemadministered by the UN DevelopmentProgram (UNDP) in conjunction with theUNDHA. The Resident Coordinatormobilizes and manages the local UNhumanitarian resources and providesdirection for the field relief effort.

• In serious emergencies, the UN SYGmay appoint a Special Representativewho reports to both the SYG directlyand advises UNDPKO and UNDHAat UN headquarters. The SpecialRepresentative may direct day-to-dayoperations, as was the case in the UNoperation in Cambodia.

• The CJTF deploying to a contingencysite may discover the need for a directchannel to either the Resident Coordinator,the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral, or both. The arrangementsbetween the JTF and UN forces shouldbe set forth in the appropriate executeorder. It is especially important that theCJTF understand the provisions of PDD-25, “Multilateral Peace Operations,”5 theUCP, and Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified ActionArmed Forces (UNAAF).”6

• UN-sponsored operations normallyemploy a force under a singlecommander. The force commander isappointed by the SYG with the consentof the UN Security Council and reportsdirectly to the SYG’s Special

Representative or to the SYG. In anymultinational operation, the UScommander will retain commandauthority over all assigned US forces.The US chain of command will flowfrom the NCA through the combatantcommander. With NCA authorization,the multinational force commander mayexercise operational control over USunits in specific operations authorized bythe UN Security Council.

c. International Red Cross and RedCrescent Movement. Three Red Crossorganizations make up the International RedCross and Red Crescent Movement: theInternational Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC), the International Federation ofRed Cross/Red Crescent Societies, and theindividual national Red Cross and RedCrescent organizations. The objective ofthe Movement is to coordinate an entire rangeof humanitarian activities. For example, the

Joint forces support uncoordinated peaceoperations under the command authority of theUS commander.

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forces to work together. The ICRC isdistinct from the rest of the Red CrossMovement in that it has a protectionmandate in addition to its reliefassistance work. It acts principally incases of civil conflict, ensuring legalprotection for the victims and acting asa neutral, independent humanitarianplayer in the most complex emergencysituations. At times the ICRC may getinvolved in strictly humanitarianoperations, but its mandate is to functionduring armed conflict.

• International Federation of Red Crossand Red Crescent Societies. Thisorganization consists of the National RedCross or Red Crescent Societies thatnormally operate within the borders oftheir own countries, whose mandate isto provide humanitarian relief duringdisasters. Red Cross and Red Crescentorganizations may provide assistance toother federation members through theirinternational alliance provisions.

d. Public Affairs Planning WithRegional and International Organizations.Public affairs planning should include theidentification of points of contact andauthorized spokespersons within eachregional or international organization whowill operate in an affected area to properlydirect referrals of news media queriesregarding operations. Planning for supportto UN missions will normally includecoordination with UN press office personnelthrough OASD(PA). Military spokespersonsshould comment on these organizations’operations based on the guidance of theOASD(PA), in cooperation with the in-country headquarters of the organizations.

(See Appendix C for a detailed discussionof these and other “Regional and InternationalOrganizations.”)

statutes of the Movement give the ICRCflexibility in situations not covered by theGeneva Conventions. It is critical to pointout that these groups are distinctly differentand have separate mandates and stafforganizations. However, common to theirhistory in civilian relief is their status as aneutral party. The rules of the GenevaConvention for assistance to and protectionof nonbelligerents set the base standard forinteragency connectivity with the Red Crossand Red Crescent Movement. Neutrality is avital aspect in the involvement of any RedCross or Red Crescent organization. Theprotection of this neutrality is a keyconsideration for joint military planners andoperators.

• International Committee of the RedCross. Founded in 1863, this neutralSwiss association with internationalinfluence applies the provisions ofinternational humanitarian law inarmed conflicts. It undertakes its tasksand derives its mandate from the GenevaConventions of 1949 and the twoadditional Protocols of 1977, which theICRC and advocates of humanitarian lawargue have gained universal applicationthrough the formative custom ofinternational law. Other nations thathave signed the Protocols considerthemselves bound to them. However,the United States has not ratified the1977 Protocols and does not alwaysrecognize ICRC actions that are basedon these Protocols, which presents amajor problem for the legal counsel inthe international arena because not allparticipants are similarly bound on verybasic matters of international law.Adherence or nonadherence can makea mismatch of potential partners inhumanitarian ventures. Variousmismatches in domestic laws can alsohave severe impact on the ability of

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1 For purposes of this publication, the term domestic refers to any state of the United States, the District of Columbia,Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the US Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, theFederated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, or the Republic of Palau.

2 The term CONUSA does not pertain to USPACOM AOR. However, functional responsibilities are carried out byother Army commands within the USPACOM AOR.

3 US Coast Guard personnel enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable Federal laws on and under thehigh seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (excerpt from 14 USC 2).

4 “Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country shall have full responsibility for thedirection, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country (except foremployees under the command of a United States area military commander)” (excerpt from 22 USC 3827[a]).

5 PDD-25 addresses multilateral peace operations and designates lead agencies for specific functions. It dividesresponsibilities for peace operations between the Department of State and the Department of Defense: Departmentof State to manage and pay for traditional peacekeeping missions in which there are no US combat units participating(e.g., Golan Heights, El Salvador, and Cambodia); and Department of Defense for peacekeeping missions inwhich US combat units are participating (e.g., Macedonia). Presidential Decision Directive 25, “The ClintonAdministration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” (The White House, May 1994), p. 12.

6 “For US forces participating in multilateral peace operations under UN auspices, the President retains and willnever relinquish command authority over US forces. On a case by case basis, the President will consider placingappropriate US forces under the operational control of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations

authorized by the Security Council.” Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIORGANIZING FOR SUCCESSFUL

INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

III-1

(Throughout this chapter, variousorganizational planning and operations toolsare referred to that are not currently formalizedin staffing or authorization. Because of this,and because titles and specific responsibilitiesmay vary by Service — or even by type ofoperation — these referrals representrecommendations only. In reviewing thesetools, the functions they perform and not thetitles assigned are the most importantconsideration.)

1. Organizing for Success

When either deliberate or crisis actionplanning is required, the degree to whichmilitary and civilian components can beintegrated and harmonized within aninteragency context will bear directly on theefficiency and success of the collective effort.To the extent feasible, joint planning shouldinclude all the participants from the outset.Appropriate decision-making structuresshould be established at headquarters and fieldlevels in order to resolve political,humanitarian, and military issues and tocoordinate operations. Establishment ofcoordination or liaison cells at each levelwill facilitate communication between

“In Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the US military and the UN and NGOcommunity in-theater literally ‘met on the dance floor.’ Given that a JTFcommander’s concern will be to ensure unity of effort (not command!), toobrief a time to establish relationships can exacerbate the tensions that existnaturally between and among so many disparate agencies with their owninternal agenda and outside sponsors. The commander, therefore, will findthat, short of insuring the protection of his force, his most pressing requirementwill be to meet his counterparts in the US government, UN, and NGOhierarchies and take whatever steps he thinks appropriate to insure thesmooth integration of military support . . .”

Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder,USA Commander,

JTF SUPPORT HOPE

participants. Previous chapters describedinteragency relationships, roles of the manymembers of the interagency arena, and theconditions under which the Department ofDefense interacts with other agencies,departments, and organizations. This chapterwill integrate these factors and suggestmeaningful tools for the commander toorganize for successful interagencycoordination — whether in domestic orforeign operations — and focus on theoperational level and below.

2. Organizing for Success at theOperational Level

Interagency forums established early atthe operational level will enable close andconstructive dialogue between the engagedagencies. In concert with the Office of theSecretary of Defense and the Joint Staff,combatant commands should supporteffective interagency coordination andidentify mutual objectives through thefollowing:

a. Identify all agencies, departments,and organizations that are or should beinvolved in the operation. This analysis

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needs to include identification of theparticipating NGOs and PVOs. In manycases, initial planning and coordination haveoccurred in Washington, D.C., so the JointStaff should ensure that the combatantcommander and the combatant command staffare made aware of all the agencies to beinvolved in the mission.

b. Establish an authoritative interagencyhierarchy, considering the lead agencyidentified at the national level, anddetermine the agency of primaryresponsibility. As previously identified, theremay be missions in which the Armed Forcesof the United States are in a supporting role.There may be resistance to the establishmentof such an interagency hierarchy, asinteragency players may view themselves as“one among equals” at all levels.Nonetheless, commanders should attemptto insert discipline, responsibility, and rigorinto the process in order to functioneffectively. In many cases, the militarycommander will discover that resistance anddisagreement are based upon a lack ofinformation or difference of perception,which can be corrected by ensuring constantcommunication between and with allconcerned parties. Regardless of thecommander’s efforts to foster coordinationand cooperation, critical issues may arise thatneed to be forwarded up through the chainof command for proper resolution.

c. Define the objectives of the responseeffort. (These should be broadly outlined intasking orders by the CJCS/JFC commander’sintent.)

d. Define courses of action for both theatermilitary operations and agency activitieswhile striving for operational compatibility.

e. Solicit from each agency, departmentor organization a clear definition of the rolethat each plays in the overall operation.The understanding of operating principles,

legal shortage of capabilities, points ofcontact, crisis management organization,Presidential direction (if applicable), andissues or tasks that cannot be undertaken maywell affect mission success. In manysituations, participating agencies,departments, and organizations may not haverepresentatives either in theater or collocatedwith the combatant command’s staff. In suchcases, it is advisable for the combatantcommander to request temporary assignmentof liaison officers from the participatingagencies, departments, and organizations tothe combatant command or JTF HQ.

f. Identify potential obstacles to thecollective effort arising from conflictingdepartmental or agency priorities. Earlyidentification of potential obstacles andconcurrence as to solutions by all participantsis the first step toward resolution. Historydemonstrates that obstacles are frequentlyidentified too late in the process and becomenearly insurmountable for the commander.Too often these obstacles are assumed to havebeen addressed by another agency,department, or organization. Onceidentified, if the obstacles cannot beresolved at the JFC’s level they mustimmediately be forwarded up the chain ofcommand for immediate resolution.

g. Identify the resources required for themission and determine which agencies,departments, or organizations arecommitted to provide these resources,reducing duplication and increasingcoherence in the collective effort. Thisidentification is a critical area in which thecommander and military planner can bringto bear detailed planning expertise in advisingthe interagency forum of both resourcerequirements and providers.

h. Define the desired end state and exitcriteria (e.g., transition from military tocivilian control, war to military operationsother than war).

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i. Maximize the mission’s assets tosupport the longer-term goals of theenterprise. The military’s contributionshould optimize the varied and extensiveresources available to complement andsupport the broader, long-range objectives ofthe international response to a crisis.

j. Establish interagency assessmentteams that can rapidly deploy to the area toevaluate the situation.

k. Implement crisis action planning.Crisis action planning by the combatantcommand staff for operations in which bothmilitary and civilian efforts are involved willnormally consider the following:

• Government officials and agencies of thenation or state.

• The Department of State and embassieswhen a foreign nation is involved.

• Officials of USG agencies associatedwith the US response.

• Makeup and organization of thecombatant command, the joint task force,supporting combatant commands, andService and functional componentcommands, as well as supportingDefense agencies.

• Multinational military forces and UNagencies, and other regional andinternational organizations when they areinvolved.

• Host-nation or local support available.

• NGOs and PVOs.

• Civil contract support.

3. Interagency Crisis Responseat the Operational Level:Domestic Operations

As discussed in Chapter II, “EstablishedInteragency Relationships,” while theSecretary of Defense reserves authority toemploy combatant command resources, theSecretary of the Army is the DODExecutive Agent for the execution andmanagement of military support to civilauthorities in domestic operations (otherthan DOD responses to acts of terrorism).The Secretary of the Army exercises hisresponsibilities through the Director ofMilitary Support. (See Figure III-1.) TheSecretary of Defense personally oversees andmanages DOD response to acts of terrorism.

a. The responsibility for determining thecommand and control relationship betweenthe DCO, FCO, and the CJTF rests withthe supported combatant commander. (SeeFigure III-1.) Normally, the DCO and CJTFare different individuals because of theirdissimilar responsibilities and assets.Separating the two distinct functions affordsthe commander flexibility to operate freelythroughout the disaster area, while the DCOfocuses on coordinating DOD responseactivities and validating tasks in the disasterfield office.

b. Organizational tools that may assistinteragency support of civil authoritiesinclude the following:

• Interagency Planning Cell (IPC). TheIPC is activated upon receipt of the CJCSwarning or alert order or at the directionof the combatant commander. The IPCis established to rapidly advise thesupported combatant commanderabout the resources of other agencies

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MODEL FOR COORDINATION BETWEENMILITARY AND NONMILITARY

ORGANIZATIONS - DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

PRESIDENT GOVERNORRequest for Assistance

Disaster/EmergencyDeclaration

OFFICEOF THE

SECRETARYOF DEFENSE

COMBATANT COMMAND STAFF

INTERAGENCYPLANNING

CELL

LIAISONSECTION

INTERAGENCYINFORMATION

BUREAU

OTHERAGENCIES

FEDERALEMERGENCY

MANAGEMENTAGENCY

AMERICANRED

CROSS

DIRECTOROF MILITARY

SUPPORT

COMBATANTCOMMANDER

STATEADJUTANTGENERAL

JOINT TASKFORCE

FEDERALCOORDINATING

OFFICER

STATECOORDINATING

OFFICER

MUNICIPALDEPARTMENTS

& OFFICES

AMERICANRED CROSS

STATE ANDCOUNTY

DEPARTMENTSAND AGENCIES

SECRETARY OFDEFENSE

SECRETARY OF THE ARMYEXECUTIVE AGENT

COMMANDER,JOINT TASK FORCE

PRIVATE VOLUNTARYORGANIZATIONS

COMMANDDIRECTION & SUPERVISIONCOORDINATION

STRATEGIC

OPERATIONAL

TACTICAL

JOINTSTAFF

CHAIRMAN OFTHE JOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFF

DEFENSECOORDINATING

OFFICER

CIVIL-MILITARYOPERATIONS

CENTER

Figure III-1. Model for Coordination Between Military and NonmilitaryOrganizations - Domestic Operations

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in the relief effort. An IPC will enablea coherent and efficient planning andcoordination effort through theparticipation of interagency subject-matter experts. Moreover, the burdenof coordination at the JTF level couldalso be lightened. Public affairscoordination with other Federal agencieswill normally be conducted by theOASD(PA). Consideration should also begiven to establishment of IPCs on the staffsof supporting combatant commanders,such as the US TransportationCommand (USTRANSCOM).

• Liaison Section. Upon receipt of theCJCS warning or alert order, or at thedirection of the combatant commander,the liaison section within thecombatant command staff is activated.Moreover, liaisons should be assignedto the USG lead agency, such as FEMA,to act as spokespersons for the combatantcommander at the USG agencyheadquarters and field teams, to clarifyoperational concepts and terminology,and to assist in the assessment of militaryrequirements. Exchange of liaisonsamong key agencies significantlyenhances unity of effort. For example,the intrinsic capabilities of military unitsto perform in nontraditional roles willnot be readily apparent to other agenciesbut are important in describing themilitary contribution to the Federalresponse. Conversely, agency liaisonsworking with the military force can assistthe force commander to maximizeagency core competencies andconcentrate the resources of engagedagencies. Service engineer units havesignificant capabilities. Military aircraftcan perform essential reconnaissancesearch and rescue and airlift. Navysurface combatants and auxiliariespossess important medical and industrialcapabilities. Coast Guard air and surface

units possess search and rescue,maritime law enforcement, andenvironmental protection capabilities.Nuclear submarines have poweredpublic electrical utilities followingdisasters, and naval vessels have providedtemporary billeting and feeding formigrants. These are examples of operationsthat are best described by a liaison attachedto the lead agency by the combatantcommander. Key capabilities that theliaison section in domestic operationsshould have include the following:

•• Interoperable communications withboth the combatant command and JTFstaffs.

•• Language or translation capabilitywhen working in a multilingual area.

•• Physical security.

•• Logistic support (including food,water, transportation, and other types ofsupport) coordinated by the Joint StaffJ-4 Logistics Readiness Center.

•• Security of classified material.

In short, the commander should plan toprovide the liaison section, as well as liaisonscontributed to the command, with allnecessary capabilities unless explicitagreement is arrived at prior to the operation.

• Interagency Information Bureau(IIB). Establish an IIB at each echelonof command to provide information tothe public. Emphasis should be placedon describing and promoting the Federaleffort at the same time that friction isinternalized for resolution.

(In addition to tools described above, mostof the mechanisms described below may alsobe applied to domestic interagency support.)

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4. Interagency Crisis Responseat the Operational Level:Foreign Operations

The geographic combatant commanderand combatant command staff should becontinuously engaged in interagencycoordination and establishing workingrelationships with interagency players longbefore crisis action planning is required. Inmany cases, the combatant commander’sorganization for crisis is well established andfunctioning far in advance of such anoccurrence, with preexisting and long-standing relationships formed among engagedagencies, departments, and organizations at

the national and theater levels. However,when crisis action planning becomesnecessary, the geographic combatantcommander (or POLAD) communicateswith the appropriate Ambassador(s) aspart of crisis assessment. The Ambassadorand country team are often aware of factorsand considerations that the geographiccombatant commander might apply todevelop courses of action, and they are keyto bringing together US national resourceswithin the host country. (See Figure III-2.)

a. Crisis Action Organization. Thecombatant command crisis actionorganization is activated upon receipt of theCJCS warning or alert order or at thedirection of the combatant commander.Activation of other temporary crisis actioncells to administer the unique requirementsof task force operations may be directedshortly thereafter. These cells support notonly functional requirements of the JTF suchas logistics, but also coordination of militaryand nonmilitary activities. Because thereare very few operational-level counterpartsto the combatant commander within otheragencies, establishment of a temporaryframework for interagency coordination

is appropriate and is a necessaryprecondition to effective coordinatedoperations. When designating a JTF, thecombatant commander will select a CJTF;assign a JOA; specify a mission; provideplanning guidance; and, in coordination withthe CJTF, either allocate forces to the JTF fromthe Service and functional component forcesassigned to the combatant command orrequest forces from supporting combatantcommands. In contrast to an establishedcombatant commander and CJTF command

The geographic combatant commander, having communicated with theAmbassador, ensures that appropriate crisis responses are made at theoperational level.

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MODEL FOR COORDINATION BETWEENMILITARY AND NONMILITARY

ORGANIZATIONS - FOREIGN OPERATIONS

PRESIDENT SECRETARY OF STATE

OFFICE OF THESECRETARY OF DEFENSE

US AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONALDEVELOPMENT / OFFICE OF US FOREIGN

DISASTER ASSISTANCE / DISASTERASSISTANCE RESPONSE TEAM

COUNTRYTEAM

LIAISONTEAMS

EXECUTIVESTEERING

GROUP

CIVIL-MILITARYOPERATIONS

CENTER

FOREIGNMILITARYFORCES

NATIONALINTELLIGENCE

SUPPORTTEAM

SPACEOPERATIONS

CELL

HUMANITARIANOPERATIONS

CENTER

COMBATANT COMMAND STAFF

HUMANITARIANASSISTANCE

SURVEYTEAM

HUMANITARIANASSISTANCE

COORDINATIONCENTER

LOGISTICSOPERATING

CENTER

LIAISONSECTION

OTHERAGENCIES

JOINTSTAFF

COMMANDDIRECTION & SUPERVISIONCOORDINATION

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

UN MILITARYFORCE

HEADQUARTERS

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ANDPRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AGENCIES

OTHER US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

HOST-NATION AGENCIES AND BUSINESSES

COMBATANTCOMMANDER

STRATEGIC

OPERATIONAL

TACTICAL

CHAIRMAN OF THEJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

AMBASSADOR

JOINTTASK

FORCE

COMMANDER,JOINT TASK

FORCE

Figure III-2. Model for Coordination Between Military and NonmilitaryOrganizations - Foreign Operations

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structure, NGOs and PVOs in the operationalarea may not have a defined structure forcontrolling activities. Further, many of theseorganizations may be present in theoperational area at the invitation and fundingof the host country. As such, they may bestructured to follow the conformity of host-nation regulations or restrictions which mayhinder military operations. Thus, the staff ofthe combatant command should anticipateorganizational and operational mismatches,primarily by designating points in theorganization at which liaisons andcoordinating mechanisms are appropriate.These may include the following:

• Humanitarian Assistance CoordinationCenter (HACC). In a humanitarianassistance (HA) operation, the combatantcommand’s crisis action organizationmay organize as a HACC. The HACC

assists with interagency coordinationand planning, providing the criticallink between the combatantcommander and other USG agencies,NGOs, PVOs, and international andregional organizations that mayparticipate in a HA operation at thestrategic level. Normally, the HACC isa temporary body that operates duringthe early planning and coordinationstages of the operation. Once a CMOCor Humanitarian Operations Center(HOC) has been established, the role ofthe HACC diminishes, and its functionsare accomplished through the normalorganization of the combatantcommand’s staff and crisis actionorganization. If a combatant commanderchooses to organize a HACC, liaisons fromother USG agencies (e.g., USAID/OFDAand US Public Health Service), US Army

CORDS — THE VIETNAM INTERAGENCY EXPERIENCE

The Vietnam conflict was often fraught with inefficiency among the myriadUSG agencies. Each of these agencies operated independently, without muchinteragency coordination, and each was satisfied that its individual interestswere being met. The consequence was a seemingly incoherent war effort. InMarch 1966, after it became clear that this would not work, President Johnsonappointed a Special Assistant who spoke with the authority of the Presidentto supervise Washington interagency efforts and to stimulate greater unity ofeffort.

Next, President Johnson decided to establish a single authority in Vietnam.Two previous organizations were combined — the USG agencies’ Office ofCivilian Operations and Military Assistance Command Vietnam's (MACV’s)Revolutionary Development Support — under the authority of a single civilianmanager, designated as Deputy to the Commanding General, MACV. Theunified civil-military program was designated Civil ian OperationsRevolutionary Development Support, or “CORDS.” Later, the term“revolutionary” was replaced by “rural.”

The next step was to integrate the rural programs of civilian agencies and themilitary at province level under a single Province Senior Advisor. Headingeach province team were top-quality US military or civilian leaders.

The integrated nature of the advisory team was evident in its composition.Below the Senior Advisor level, representatives of the US and Vietnamesemilitary and US civilian agencies filled billets according to core competencies.For example, US Army officers performed intelligence, security, PSYOP, and

III-9


civil affairs functions with the assistance of CIA representatives. Other keyprograms were directed and administered by both civilian and military officialsin the CORDS organization. The CORDS program brought unity to what hadbeen a disparate effort.

The key to the success of CORDS was decisiveness and top-level support,beginning with the President. While individual agencies had argued for thestatus quo, integrated actions were necessary. Strong leadership andrecognition of the need for interagency coordination brought the concept tofruition, and CORDS stands forth as one of the most positive lessons of theVietnam experience.

In a broad context, CORDS provides an excellent example of an effectivecampaign plan within an interagency context. The operational plannercountering or supporting an insurgent campaign must avoid thinking in termsof the customary time-space-mass continuum of the conventional theater orbattlefield. In the classic Maoist three-phase theory of guerrilla warfare(strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and strategic offense), military powerdoes not become truly important until the third and final phase. The insurgents’key tools during the early and mid-stages are informational, political andeconomic. The architects of the CORDS program largely recognized how theNorth Vietnamese strategy, called Dau Tranh, wielded these elements of power.By integrating the efforts of various US and South Vietnamese agencies, they“attacked” Dau Tranh along all four elements of North Vietnam’s national power.In essence, CORDS was the campaign designed to achieve the strategicobjective of defeating the Viet Cong insurgency. Unfortunately, it was simplyimplemented too late.


Corps of Engineers representatives, keyNGOs and PVOs, international andregional organizations, and host countryagencies may also be members of theHACC in large scale HA operations.

• Logistics Operations Center (LOC). ALOC functions as the single point ofcontact for coordinating the flow anddistribution of supplies into theoperating area, relieving the JTF of asmuch of this burden as possible. Otheractions that the LOC may performinclude the following:

•• Obtaining authority (from and/orthrough CINC, J-4, and/or J-5) tonegotiate for host-nation support (HNS)and on-site procurement through the JointStaff, Office of the Secretary of Defense,and the Department of State.

•• Determining a lead agency (UN,Service, or other agency) for contractingand support negotiation.

•• Serving, in concert with the LRC, asa logistics link to the Joint Staff, theServices, Defense Logistics Agency(DLA), USCINCTRANS, HNS, andother supporting commands and agenciesduring JTF operations.

• Liaison Section. As in domesticoperations, the liaison section in foreignoperations is crucial to interagencycoordination. Upon receipt of the CJCSwarning or alert order, or at the directionof the combatant commander, the liaisonsection is activated. A liaison sectionassists the combatant commander byproviding a single forum for thecoordination of military activities among

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multinational forces and engaged NGOsand PVOs, the local government andindigenous population, and regional andinternational organizations. As indomestic operations, military forces,engaged agencies, and in this case thehost nation should consider assigningliaisons to the combatant command staffin order to maximize information flowand interagency coordination. Keycapabilities required for the liaisonsection, described above in paragraph 3,“Interagency Crisis Response at theOperational Level: DomesticOperations,” are also necessary duringforeign operations.

b. NGO and PVO Relationships.Courses of action developed by thecombatant command staff should considerand incorporate interagency relationshipsthat the JTF has with other USG agencies,the UN (if engaged), regional andinternational organizations, and NGOsand PVOs. These considerations should beforwarded to the Joint Staff for negotiationby the Office of the Secretary of Defense withcounterparts at the headquarters level ofagencies and organizations. Workingthrough the Joint Staff, geographic combatantcommanders may arrange meetings beforedeployment with US Government agencies,UN, NATO (or appropriate regionalorganization), and NGO and PVO agencyheads in Washington, D.C., or New York tocoordinate activities, identify requirementsand capabilities, and establish interagencyrelationships for the operation. Thesemeetings can be set up through the Joint Staff,UN, or private agency consortiums such asInterAction. It would be useful to have theserelationships included in the execute orderto clarify this information for involvedmilitary forces. Commanders should ask forauthority to accomplish these tasks if it isnot specified in tasking orders from CJCS orJFC. Because authoritative coordination canbe realized at an agency’s strategic level

instead of hoping to attain similar results withtactical-level agency representatives incountry, these meetings can be extremelyproductive. This coordination is another toolused to maximize unity of effort.

c. Humanitarian Assistance SurveyTeam (HAST). Early on, an assessmentmust be made of what resources arerequired immediately to stabilize thehumanitarian crisis (e.g., “stop the dying”),the capability of the organizations alreadyoperating in the crisis area to meet thoseneeds, and the shortfall that the militaryforce must provide until the humanitarianrelief organizations can marshal theirresources. Without an early assessmentmodified periodically as the operationprogresses, requests for military assistancecannot be adequately evaluated, actualprogress is difficult to measure, andmeaningful disengagement criteria probablycannot be established. A HAST canaccomplish all of these functions.

• Prior to the deployment of the main body,the geographic combatant commandermay organize and deploy a HAST toimplement the following:

•• Facilitate multiagency inclusion inhumanitarian operations.

•• Acquire necessary information aboutthe operational area.

•• Plan for the operation.

•• Assess existing conditions, availableinfrastructure, and the capabilities andsize of the force required for the mission.

• To expedite assessments prior todeployment, the HAST should establishcontact with the US Embassy in theaffected country to help gain access tothe appropriate host-nation officials andother USG agency representatives. It is

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important to stress that the country teampossesses a wealth of information aboutthe host nation and can greatly facilitatethe mission of the HAST. The HASTshould include representatives from thecombatant command intelligence officer(J-2), J-3, J-4 (especially transportationand engineer infrastructure planners andcontracting and medical personnel), J-5, J-6, legal section, chaplain section,and civil affairs section. Based on priorcoordination and established associateor partnership working relationships, theHAST may also include key agencyNGO and PVO representatives. Onarrival in the country, the HAST shouldcomplete the following:

•• Establish liaison and coordinateassessment efforts with the US Embassy,host-nation and regional agencies, UNorganizations (such as the United NationsOffice of the High Commissioner forRefugees [UNHCR]), supportedcommanders or their representatives, andother national teams and relief agencies.

•• Define coordinating relationships andlines of authority among military,embassy, and USAID personnel withothers providing humanitarian assistanceand with officials of the nation beingassisted. This is an important preliminarystep needed to identify specific supportarrangements required for the collectivelogistic effort associated with delivery offood and medical supplies and forinterfaces for coordination with NGOs,PVOs, and regional and internationalorganizations.

•• Initiate liaison with the USAID/OFDA Disaster Assistance ResponseTeam (DART) (which provides rapidresponse field presence to internationaldisasters with specialists trained in avariety of disaster relief skills in orderto assist US country teams and USAID

missions with the management of USGovernment response to disasters) andUNDHA and UNDP, if deployed. TheDART and UN are equipped to calculatethe food, water, shelter, and healthservices required to implement thehumanitarian relief effort as well as thesources of these requirements.Integration of these calculations into theHAST assessment would reduce thepotential for duplication of effort andenhance calculations of logistics requiredto support the collective effort. In concertwith the country team, the DART candetermine the full range of servicesnecessary in cases of natural disaster.Figure III-3 depicts the organization ofthe DART.

5. Interagency InformationManagement

NGOs, PVOs, and regional andinternational organizations on scenepossess considerable information that maybe essential to the success of the militaryoperation. Relief workers have acomprehensive understanding of the needs ofthe population. Working closely withindigenous peoples, they understand localculture and practices. As a consequence, therelief community is an important source ofinformation regarding the following:

a. Historical perspective and insights intofactors contributing to the situation at hand.

b. Local cultural practices that will bearon the relationship of military forces to thepopulace.

c. Local political structure, political aimsof various parties, and the roles of key leaders.

d. Security situation.

e. Role and capabilities of the host-nationgovernment.

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UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONALDEVELOPMENT/OFFICE OF UNITED STATESFOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE DISASTER

ASSISTANCE RESPONSE TEAM

DISASTERASSISTANCE

RESPONSE TEAMTEAM LEADER

PRESS OFFICERSAFETY OFFICER

LIAISON OFFICER

SUPPLYOFFICER

TRANSPORTATIONOFFICER

COMMUNICATIONSOFFICER

AVIATIONOFFICER

MEDICALOFFICER

TECHNICAL/SCIENTIFICOPERATIONSSPECIALIST

SEARCH &RESCUETASKFORCELEADER

INFORMATIONOFFICER

FIELDASSESSMENTOFFICER

PROJECTOFFICER

TECHNICAL/SCIENTIFICSPECIALISTS

PROCUREMENTSPECIALIST

ADMINISTRATIVESUPPORT

LOGISTICSCOORDINATOR

ADMINISTRATOR/CONTRACTS

OFFICER

OPERATIONSCOORDINATOR

PLANNINGCOORDINATOR

Figure III-3. United States Agency for International Development/Office of United StatesForeign Disaster Assistance Disaster Assistance Response Team

THE INTERAGENCY BATTLEFIELD

The simulated conflict area was dotted with soldiers, civilians, andrepresentatives from the same nongovernmental organizations that we haveseen in Somalia and Bosnia. Representatives from the International Red Cross,Save the Children, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, aUSAID Disaster Assistance Relief Team, CARE, World Vision, mediarepresentatives, and others all went to Fort Polk, Louisiana. They were thereto work with us, to simulate their roles in these kinds of operations, and tolearn with us how we all can accomplish our missions as part of a team.

SOURCE: Observations from August 1994 Joint Readiness Training Centerrotation of 25th Infantry Division (Light) in which a variety of agenciesparticipated. General Gordon R. Sullivan and Andrew B. Twomey, The

Challenges of Peace, (Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Autumnedition, 1994)

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This kind of information is frequently notavailable through military channels.However, the manner in which informationis treated by military forces and thehumanitarian assistance community can besensitive. Handled properly, NGOs andPVOs will be active participants in theinteragency team seeking to resolve the crisis.Handled improperly, the relief community canbe alienated by a perception that, contrary toits philosophical ideals, it is considered nomore than an intelligence source by themilitary.

6. Interagency Training andReadiness

Rehearsal and synchronization exercisesbetween the combatant commands, JTF, otherelements of the Department of Defense, andseparate agencies provide an essential forumfor key events and policy issues to becoordinated and resolved. As such,combatant commanders should scheduleand participate in interagencycoordination training with otherdepartments and agencies of the USGovernment, international organizations,and the humanitarian assistancecommunity.

a. Training should focus on identifyingand assessing agency capabilities and corecompetencies, identifying proceduraldisconnects and attaining unity of effort.To sustain the readiness of the command torapidly respond to crises coherently, thetraining audience should include members ofthe HACC, LOC and liaison section describedabove, contingency JTF commands, and otheragency representatives. Combatant commandand JTF exercises should include nonmilitaryrepresentatives “playing” their normal roles,even in hypothetical combat situations.Training with NGOs and PVOs, the UN, andother USG agencies before deployment willgreatly enhance operational capabilitythrough solidifying the relationship between

civilian organizations and the military. Eachorganization should understand how towork with the other. As discussed, themilitary and nonmilitary agencies,departments, and organizations have totallydifferent cultures, but by simultaneouslyteaching about and training for one another’sorganizations, interoperability can besignificantly improved.

b. Increasingly, interagency coordinationtraining is occurring at combatant commands,senior-level colleges (such as the NationalDefense University), the Department ofState’s Foreign Service Institute, and on themock battlefields of the Joint ReadinessTraining Center.

(See Appendix D of this publication,“Agency Capabilities and Resources —Quick Look,” for a depiction of many of thevarious agencies discussed in this publication.It should be reviewed by the combatantcommand staff as a preliminary planning toolfor potential interagency relationships andcore competencies.)

7. Joint Task Force MissionAnalysis

a. Assessment Team. A valuable tool inthe mission analysis process is the deploymentof a JTF assessment team to the projectedJOA. The JTF assessment team is similarin composition to the HAST and, ifprovided early warning of pendingoperations, may be able to conductassessment in association with the HAST.If so, staffing requirements will be reduced.Recommended team members include CJTF,J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, key logistic staffpersonnel (including transportation andengineer planners and contractingpersonnel), medical personnel, legal officer,chaplain, civil affairs officer, a member ofthe USAID/OFDA DART scheduled to workwith the JTF if involved in foreign operations,and other staff members necessary to

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Clear goals and the personnel required to complete them are vital toprogress and good host-nation relations.

commence the interagency planning process.For foreign operations, special operationsforce personnel who possess uniquecultural, language, and technical skillsshould be requested through the combatantcommander. The assessment team may helpclarify the mission by actually deciding whatneeds to be accomplished, what type of forceis required to accomplish it, the propersequence for deployment of the force,availability of state and local or in-countryassets, and what ongoing operations are beingconducted by organizations other than militaryforces.

b. Coordinated Operations. Othertypes of operations (e.g., development orhumanitarian relief operations) may be inprogress prior to arrival of the JTF in theprojected joint operations area. The desiredend state, essential tasks, and exit criteria mustbe clearly expressed to the media in order togain and maintain public support. Asdiscussed, NGOs, PVOs, and other regionaland international organizations are oftenconducting operations well before the arrivalof military forces and will be there long afterthe US military departs. What is done by themilitary in the meantime has a distinctinfluence on long-term goals and the ability

to achieve them. It is important tocoordinate these operations and activitieswith the total plan. The ranking USmilitary commander may be the onlyofficial in the crisis area whose goals andresponsibilities include unifying the effortsof all agencies. In humanitarian assistanceoperations, a JTF’s mission cannotsuccessfully conclude until in-placeorganizations are operating effectively.Therefore, successful interaction betweenorganizations is imperative.

c. Priority Task. Identify the single mostimportant task that will stabilize thesituation (e.g., establish secure convoyroutes). Communicate this to the combatantcommander as well as the Ambassador. Toreach this bottom line determination, seek notonly military staff input but also that of keyagency representatives.

d. Regional Strategy. In furtheranalyzing the mission, consider the regionalstrategy for the projected joint operationsarea. The Department of State, UN, andother regional and internationalorganizations can provide this informationwith an appreciation for how the regionalstrategy affects the countries involved in

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projected operations. This information helpslegitimize the mission and assists inemphasizing end state and force requirements.

e. Political Considerations. When theJTF is deployed, the CJTF should quicklyestablish a relationship with the USAmbassador, the country team, and eitherthe US agency representatives in countryfor foreign operations or the FCO fordomestic disaster relief operations. If notinitiated at the national level in advance, theserelationships should be negotiated with theUS embassy upon arrival. If time and thesituation permit, it is important that the CJTFand key staff members meet with the NSCIWG in Washington, D.C., prior todeployment. During this visit it may also beuseful to meet with the regional and functionalelements of the Office of the Secretary ofDefense, Joint Staff representatives, theappropriate regional bureau at the Departmentof State, and embassies of the nationsinvolved. Establishing an effective workingrelationship with the Ambassador will helpin any foreign interagency endeavor. In casesof cross-border operations in which more thanone country is involved, each US mission mayhave a different perspective of the operation.Intelligence and information relationshipsbetween the CJTF, local and state authorities,the country team, and USG agencyrepresentatives must be established at theearliest stages of planning. Commandersshould recognize local and organizationalsensitivities to counterintelligence units andtheir operations. The CJTF should consultwith appropriate Ambassadors and countryteams to coordinate actions and determineareas of concern, ensuring that the combatantcommander and the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff are informed of all consultationsin order that the Joint Staff can properlycoordinate with the Department of State.

f. JTF Headquarters. The location of theJTF headquarters, whether afloat or ashore,is very important. Not only should it be

defensible, it should be positioned to workeasily with the political and private sector,the media, and other military elements ofan operation. It needs a sufficient powersupply and communication lines to supportoperations and should provide a locationfor a possible Special CompartmentedInformation Facility and a collateralstorage of intelligence information.Coordination at all levels is a requirement.Proximity to the American Embassy or USDiplomatic Mission may provide thepotential to enhance military operationalcapability.

8. Organizational Tools forthe JTF

Commanders should establish controlstructures that take account of and providecoherence to the activities of all elementsin the area. As well as military operations,this structure should include the political, civil,administrative, legal, and humanitarianactivities as well as media relations groupsthat may be involved. Commanders shouldultimately consider how their actions andthose of engaged organizations contributetoward the desired end state. Thisconsideration requires extensive liaison withall involved parties as well as reliablecommunications. Most useful in theinteragency process are platforms providingan opportunity for all sides to be heard.

a. Executive Steering Group (ESG).The ESG may be composed of theprincipals from the JTF, the embassy,NGO and PVO communities present in theJOA, and other organizations asappropriate. Lacking another similarforum, the ESG can provide high-level outletfor the exchange of information aboutoperational policies as well as for resolutionof difficulties arising among the variousorganizations. The ESG plays a policy roleand is charged with interpreting andcoordinating theater aspects of strategic

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combat support and combat service supportassets for CMO employment is one methodby which the commander can accomplish themission and meet the needs of the localpopulation. During Operation SUPPORTHOPE in Rwanda, the UN deployed anorganization called the On-Site OperationsCoordination Center, which had essentiallythe same functions as a CMOC and provideda clearinghouse for transmitting CMOCresponsibilities to the UN.

“The center (CMOC in Somalia) wasan effective, innovative mechanism notonly for operational coordination but tobridge the inevitable gaps betweenmilitary and civilian perceptions. Bydeveloping good personal relationshipsthe staffs were able to alleviate theconcerns and anxieties of the reliefcommunities.”

Ambassador Robert Oakley

• The CJTF may form a CMOC as theaction team to provide the following:

•• Carry out guidance and institute CJTFdecisions regarding civil-militaryoperations.

•• Perform liaison and coordinationbetween military capabilities and otheragencies, departments, and organizationsto meet the needs of the populace.

•• Provide a partnership forum formilitary and other engagedorganizations.

•• Receive, validate, and coordinaterequests for support from the NGOs,PVOs, and regional and internationalorganizations.

• It can be tailored to the specific tasksassociated with the collective national orinternational mission. In establishing theCMOC, the CJTF should build it from anucleus of organic operations, intelligence,

policy. A commander at any echelon mayestablish an ESG to serve as a conduitthrough which to provide information andpolicy guidance to engaged agencies. TheESG may be charged with formulating,coordinating, and promulgating local andtheater policies required for the explanation,clarification, and implementation of policiesdeveloped by the IWG. The ESG shouldeither be cochaired by the CJTF andAmbassador or assigned outright to eitherindividual, depending on the nature of theUS mission.

b. Civil-Military Operations Center.The ability of the JTF to work with allorganizations and groups is essential tomission accomplishment. A relationship mustbe developed between military forces, USGagencies, civilian authorities, involvedinternational and regional organizations,NGOs and PVOs, and the population.Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting placeof these elements. (See Figure III-4.)Although not a new concept, the CMOChas been effectively employed as a meansto coordinate civil and military operationsand plays an execution role (vice the policyrole of the ESG). The organization of theCMOC is theater- and mission-dependent —flexible in size and composition. During largescale HA operations, if a HOC is formed bythe host country or UN, the CMOC becomesthe focal point for coordination between themilitary and civilian agencies involved in theoperation. A commander at any echelon mayestablish a CMOC to facilitate coordinationwith other agencies, departments,organizations, and the host nation. In fact,more than one CMOC may be establishedin an AOR or JOA (such as occurred inRwanda), and each is task-organized basedon the mission. The transition from conflictto postconflict or during humanitarianassistance operations requires the supportedcommander to shift support priorities towardaccomplishment of the civil-militaryoperations (CMO) mission. Dedicating

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civil affairs, logistics, and communicationelements. (See Figure III-5.) The CJTFshould invite representatives of otheragencies that include the following:

•• Liaisons from Service and functionalcomponents, and supporting infrastructure,such as ports and airfields.

•• USAID/OFDA Disaster AssistanceRelief Team representatives.

•• DOS, country team, and other USGrepresentatives.

•• Military liaison personnel fromparticipating countries.

ROLE OF THE CIVIL-MILITARYOPERATIONS CENTER

CARE

SAVE THECHILDRENFEDERATION

INTERNATIONALRESCUECOMMITTEE

WORLD VISIONRELIEF ANDDEVELOPMENT

OTHERNONGOVERNMENTALORGANIZATIONS ANDPRIVATEVOLUNTARYORGANIZATIONS

UNITED NATIONSCHILDREN'SFUND

UNITED NATIONSWORLD FOODPROGRAMME

UNITED NATIONSHIGH COMMISSIONERFOR REFUGEES

OFFICE OF USFOREIGN DISASTERASSISTANCEDISASTERASSISTANCERESPONSE TEAM

COUNTRY TEAM

US GOVERNMENTAGENCIES

UNITEDNATIONS

MILITARY

CIVIL-MILITARY

OPERATIONSCENTER

LOCALGOVERNMENT

AND POPULATION

NONGOVERNMENTALORGANIZATIONS ANDPRIVATE VOLUNTARY

ORGANIZATIONS

Figure III-4. Role of the Civil-Military Operations Center

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•• Host country or local governmentagency representatives.

•• Representatives of regional andinternational organizations (e.g.,UNHCR and ICRC).

•• Representatives from NGOs andPVOs.

• Political representatives may provide theCJTF with avenues to satisfy operationalconsiderations and concerns, resulting inconsistency of military and politicalactions. Additionally, the CMOC forumappeals to NGOs and PVOs because itavoids guesswork by providing positivedirection for their efforts when and wheremost needed. Although US forces maybe latecomers compared to many reliefand international organizations, theybring considerable resources with them.It is incumbent on the military not todictate what will happen but tocoordinate a team approach to problemresolution. The CJTF cannot directinteragency cooperation among engagedagencies, but JTF resources andcapabilities such as protection, logistic

support, information, communication,and other services are frequently soughtby these agencies. The assistanceprovided often leads to their cooperation.

• A CMOC usually conducts dailymeetings to identify componentswithin the interagency forum capableof fulfilling needs. Validated requestsgo to the appropriate JTF or agencyrepresentative for action.

• CMOC tasks may include thefollowing:

•• Facilitate and coordinate activities of theJTF, other on-scene agencies, and higherechelons in the military chain of command.

•• Receive, validate, coordinate, andmonitor requests from humanitarianorganizations for routine and emergencymilitary support.

•• Coordinate response to requests formilitary support with Service components.

•• Coordinate requests to NGOs andPVOs for their support.

MODEL CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

DIRECTORCIVIL-MILITARY

OPERATIONS CENTER

DEPUTYDIRECTOR

OPERATIONSADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

PLANSCELL

OPERATIONSCELL

FUNCTIONALSPECIALTIES

CELL

LIAISONS:JOINT INFORMATION

BUREAU, COMPONENTS,COALITION, PORT, AIRFIELD

CIVILAFFAIRS

SUPPORT

Figure III-5. Model Civil-Military Operations Center

III-19


member of the CMOC, the PAO isresponsible for ensuring that memberagencies agree on message and pressreleases and for developing a groupconsensus in response to mediaqueries. Although each agency’smessage need not be identical, it isimperative that agencies not contradictone another.

“Instead of thinking about warfightingagencies like command and control,you create a political committee, a civil-military operations center — CMOC —to interface with volunteerorganizations. These become theheart of your operations, as opposedto a combat or fire support operationscenter.”

Lieutenant General A. C. Zinni,USMC

c. Liaison Teams. Commandersdesignate liaison officers (LNOs) as thefocal point for communication withexternal agencies and the host-nationgovernment. LNOs centralize direction andstaff cognizance over planning, coordination,and operations with external agencies orforces. Supported agencies, departments, andorganizations need a much clearerunderstanding of the military planningprocess. This is best accomplished by directliaison. LNOs normally are assigned to the

•• Coordinate with the DART deployedto the scene by USAID/OFDA.

•• Convene ad hoc mission planninggroups to address complex militarymissions that support NGO and PVOrequirements (examples include convoyescort and management and security ofrefugee camps and feeding centers).

•• Convene follow-on assessmentgroups.

•• Coordinate public affairs matters.

•• Provide situation reports regardingJTF operations, security, and otherinformation for participants in thecollective effort.

•• Chair port and airfield committeemeetings for space and access-relatedissues.

•• Facilitate creation and organization ofa logistics distribution system for food,water, and medical relief efforts.

•• Support, as required, civic actionteams.

• The JTF PAO should attend dailyCMOC meetings. As an active

CMOC IN PROVIDE COMFORT

Humanitarian relief organizations operating in southern Turkey and northernIraq coordinated their activities with those of the JTF through the CMOC. TheCMOC was co-located with the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) thatcoordinated the activities of the UN and other humanitarian relief organizations.The CMOC was coequal with the traditional J-staff sections. CMOC militaryofficers coordinated activities with both State Department officials and reliefworkers. The CMOC in Turkey demonstrated the efficiency and effectivenessof the concept. It provided a focal point for coordination of common civil-military needs and competing demands for services and infrastructure, ratherthan relying on random encounters between relief workers and staff officers.

SOURCE: Operations Other Than W ar, Vol. 1, Humanitarian Assistance,Center For Army Lessons Learned, December 1992

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office of the JTF’s chief of staff and workclosely with the operations officer to seek andresolve interagency problems. Their keyrole is to foster better understandingbetween participating forces, agencies, andthe local government. The purpose of theliaison teams is to establish authoritativerepresentation of the CJTF that can accuratelyinterpret the CJTF’s intentions and explainthe capabilities of the JTF. Conversely, theliaison team interprets for the JTF operationsofficer the intentions and capabilities of thenonmilitary organizations. Liaison teamsprovide input during development of coursesof action for future operations and work tomaximize current operations throughproactive interaction with the agencies,departments, and organizations to which theyare attached. Experience indicates thattransportation, language qualification,communications, and a single point of contactin the JTF headquarters are essential elementsto successful liaison. In support ofhumanitarian assistance missions, functionalskills and experience of liaisons should alignwith the need for medical and logisticsexpertise. Exchanging liaison teams andofficers has contributed greatly tocoordination in multinational militaryoperations. The same principle applies tocoordination of interagency operations.

• Especially consider a liaison statusbetween the JTF staff and the DARTin MOOTW. The DART is uniquelyqualified to address both sides of thecivil-military relationship.1 The DARTunderstands the NGO and PVO cultureand language, as well as militaryinvolvement in humanitarian assistance.A JTF-DART liaison relationship shouldbe sought during coordination betweenthe geographic combatant command staffand the Joint Staff.

• It is extremely important that LNOs arelanguage-qualified, are regionallyoriented, and have a solid knowledge of

the doctrine, capabilities, procedures, andculture of their organizations. Civil affairsor coalition support teams may be availableto serve as LNOs. The use of contractedinterpreters to augment LNO teams maybe another option, although in some casestheir loyalties may affect reliability.

• Liaison teams are formed when a 24-hourrepresentational capability is required.Teams are tailored to the specific situationand may require CJCS-controlledcommunications assets in somecircumstances.

• Individual liaison officers are assignedwhen 24-hour representation is notrequired and adequate communicationswith the JTF staff are available.

9. Other JTF InteragencyConsiderations

a. Intelligence Support and Control

• The combatant command’s staff shouldcoordinate for the deployment of aNational Intelligence Support Team(NIST) to help ensure JTF connectivitywith the theater joint intelligencecenter (JIC) and national intelligenceagencies. The interagency supportprovided by a NIST allows access toagency-unique information and analysis.It affords a link to national-level databases and information that can provideinformation beyond the organic resourcesof the JTF. NIST members are availableto the JTF and combatant commandheadquarters prior to deployment forteam building activities and predeploymentbriefings. Participating agencies retaincontrol of their members deployed withthe NIST, but the NIST operates underthe staff supervision of the JTF J-2.

• The JIC is the primary intelligenceorganization providing support to

III-21


joint operations in theater. It isresponsible for producing and providingthe intelligence required to support thejoint force commander and staff,components, task forces, and elementsand also coordinates support from otherintelligence organizations.

• The joint intelligence support element(JISE) is the CJTF’s primaryintelligence apparatus. It is establishedalong with the JTF itself. The JISE mayconstitute a new entity, or it may be littlemore than the combatant command’s JIC,or elements thereof, moving forward.

• Essential elements of information andintelligence must also be shared betweenand among all command elementssupporting the JTF and combatantcommand (to include USTRANSCOMelements providing strategic lift).

• JTF intelligence operations requireredundant communications capabilitiesto properly support various complexrequirements. Joint intelligence plannersfor JTF operations will normally preparea detailed intelligence architecture thatwill support all components during thecourse of each unique operation.Standard JTF intelligence operationsrequire Joint Worldwide IntegratedCommunications Systems (JWICS)capability in order to provide the jointtask force commander secure videoteleconferencing and data capability.JWICS also provides a secure data pathfor the Joint Deployable IntelligenceSupport System (JDISS). The JDISSsystem provides secure intelligence dataprocessing and image processing. EachService will also use its own joint-compatible Service-unique intelligencesystems to support its specific requirements.

• The JTF and combatant command staffsshould make every attempt to exploit

open source information in preparingand executing interagency operations.

• The JISE will face unique challengesin providing adequate and appropriatesupport to the CJTF. Traditionalsources of classified military informationwill have to be melded with unclassifiedinformation from open sources and localhuman intelligence (HUMINT). Thiseffort will be complicated by sensitivitiesof nonmilitary partners in interagencyactivities to the concept of militaryintelligence.

• Consideration must be given to controlof sensitive or classified militaryinformation in forums such as theCMOC that include representatives ofother USG agencies, NGOs, PVOs, andregional and international organizations.Procedures for control and disclosure ofclassified information practiced by theDepartment of Defense normally do notexist within other agencies. Thisomission may result in the inadvertentor intentional passage of sensitiveinformation to individuals not clearedfor access to such information.

• The combatant commander has theauthority and responsibility to control thedisclosure and release of classifiedmilitary information within the JOA inaccordance with MCM 176-92,“Delegation of Authority toCommanders of Unified Commands toDisclose Classified Military Informationto Foreign Governments andInternational Organizations.” In theabsence of sufficient guidance,command J-2s should share onlyinformation that is mission essential,affects lower-level operations, and isperishable. When required, authorityto downgrade classification or to sanitizeinformation should be provided to theappropriate operational echelon. Any US

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classified information released to a non-US force or organization must beproperly marked to indicate that it isreleasable.

• Most organizations cannot afford morethan a minimal level of securityprotection to classified information giventhem by the United States. Therefore, itis likely that the information they areprovided will be disclosed tounauthorized individuals.

• Joint task force operations may requiresignificant force protection support basedon the uniqueness of the operational areainto which the forces deploy. Anoperational force protection packagemay need to be deployed in advanceechelon forces to quickly develop the on-the-ground situation for the JTFcommander. Force protection teams canconsist of counterintelligence personnel,interrogators, interpreters, and otherspecially trained personnel as required.Force protection teams normally willhave mobile communications and mayuse the Theater Rapid ReactionIntelligence Package system tocommunicate critical data to the JTF.

b. Logistic Support. Logistic requirementsand resource availability coordination isvital to sustain the operation. The level ofthe logistic effort conducted by localgovernment or civilian agencies will have abearing on deployment and sustainment of theJTF. Moreover, the JTF may be asked toassume all or part of the burden of logisticsafter arrival.

• The supported combatant commander’sLRC provides the JTF with the link tothe Joint Staff, the Services, DLA,USTRANSCOM, and other supportingcommands and agencies. It is imperativethat supporting and/or supportedrelationships are officially established as

early as possible (for planning purposes)by use of CJCS tasking orders (planning,warning, alert, and execute orders).

• Contracting with US or local civilianagencies to augment military supportcapabilities with local supplies,services, and real estate requirementsbecomes a consideration for the JTF.Another contracting avenue is theLogistics Civil Augmentation Program(LOGCAP). It provides civiliancontractual assistance in peace to meetcrisis or wartime support requirementsworldwide. LOGCAP can provide amyriad of specialty contract servicessuch as well drilling, laundry, powergeneration, portable toilets, cranes,plumbing, construction, lighting, and portsupport.

• The JTF must establish movementpriorities between JTF requirementsand those of other USG agencies, thecountry team, coalition or UN forces,NGOs, and PVOs. The JointMovement Center is the primaryorganization for coordinatingmovements to support joint operationsin theater. Close communicationsshould be established with all elementsto ensure that their movementrequirements are fully understood by theJTF to enable effective planning andsecurity for materiel movement.

• Coordination is essential to full utilizationof NGO and PVO resources, whichdefrays military support for humanitarianoperations. In addition, it will help avoidsaturation of one sector at the expense ofanother and will strengthen unity ofeffort.

c. Meteorological and Oceanographic(METOC) Support. Environmental andgeophysical conditions cause natural disasters(typhoons, hurricanes, floods, droughts,

III-23


earthquakes, tidal waves) or adversely affectthe joint agency response to these disastersand to other operations. The JTF commandermust have access to accurate advanceknowledge of METOC conditions tosuccessfully conduct military operations.

• The combatant command seniorMETOC officer should coordinate fordeployment of METOC support toprovide accurate weather andoceanographic data to support theoperation. Component commandsprovide the METOC personnel andresources.

• The Joint METOC Forecast Unit (JMFU)is the primary organization providingforecasting support to joint operationsin theater. The JMFU is assisted byService METOC centers. The JMFU isresponsible for producing and providingthe METOC information required tosupport the joint force commander andstaff, components, task forces, andelements and coordinates support fromother METOC organizations.

• The JMFU and component METOCpersonnel perform observing andforecasting services, maintaining aconstant vigil for the impacts of adverseweather and oceanographic conditions onoperations.

• The JMFU and component METOCpersonnel have access to weather satelliteimagery and data, accurate forecastmodels of atmospheric and oceanographicconditions, and National Oceanographicand Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)capabilities and can exploit internationalweather and oceanographic data bases.

d. Legal Support. Legal advisors shouldpossess a comprehensive understanding of theregulations and laws applicable to militaryforces and other agencies, both governmental

and nongovernmental, domestic andinternational. The legal advisors must beactive participants in the interagencymechanisms to obtain the firsthandknowledge necessary to identify and resolvelegal issues confronting the commander.

• Legal advisors can help resolve some ofthe toughest interagency issues involvingthe following:

•• Domestic legal authority for DODparticipation and support.

•• International law.

•• Dislocated civilians.

•• Immunity and asylum.

•• Claims.

•• Investigations.

•• War crimes and related issues.

•• Arrests and detentions.

•• Intelligence law.

•• Budget and fiscal matters.

•• Contracting.

•• Environmental restrictions.

•• Limitations on employment of USmilitary forces.

• Rules of engagement (ROE) andrequests for changes to ROE can quicklyescalate to the Presidential level.Maximum coordination and understandingin country among USG agencies is crucialto a well-informed and timely decision atthe national level. In multinationaloperations, for such purposes aspeacekeeping operations or humanitarian

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assistance missions, a preplanned set ofROE becomes critical. The CJCS standingROE (CJCS Instruction 3121.01,“Standing Rules of Engagement for USForces,” 1 October 1994) serves as acoordination tool with US allies for thedevelopment of multinational ROE. ROEand revisions to ROE must becommunicated to NGOs, PVOs, andinternational and regional organizationswhen these rules affect their operations.

e. Media Affairs. In building anatmosphere of trust and cooperation with themedia, the United States must speak withone voice — both politically and militarily— and at the same time, see that partners’voices are heard. Media considerations forthe CJTF should include the following:

• Establish a Joint Information Bureau (JIB).

• Include a public affairs representativeduring all stages of the planning processfor the operation.

• Coordinate with combatant commander,the Department of Defense, theAmbassador, and the country team inJTF interaction with the media.

• Coordinate with the embassy through itsPAO and civil information officer, ifpresent, and host-nation Ministry ofInformation.

• Provide representatives of the NGOs andPVOs access to the media through theJIB’s facilities.

• Allow a representative from the JIB to bepresent at command meetings and briefingsand to attend the CMOC or similar civil-military organization meeting.

• Assemble the JTF public affairs section,to include a dedicated JIB representativefrom engaged agencies, if possible.

• Invite assignment of a spokespersonfrom the humanitarian relief communityto assist in media briefings when the JIBis created.

• Establish a civil information program,coordinated between a civil affairscommand, the joint psychologicaloperations task force (JPOTF), the USISofficer, the host country, and otherappropriate agencies.

f. Space Support. Support from spacewill be essential during joint operations andunified actions, especially wheninfrastructure in the JOA is damaged ornonexistent. Space systems can providereliable communications, weather data,terrain information, mapping support, andprecise navigation data. Such support comesfrom a variety of sources and must becoordinated between agencies for effectiveapplication. The CJTF should considerestablishing a space operations cell consistingof members from US Space Command’s JointSpace Support Team, the NIST, the DefenseMapping Agency, and the DefenseInformation Support Agency. This willassure the CJTF direct access to the majorresources necessary to provide multi-agencyspace support.

10. Humanitarian OperationsCenter

During large scale HA operations, aHOC may be created through coordinationwith other participants. The host nationshould provide the primary staff and directionfor the HOC when the operation is conductedwithin a sovereign nation. If that sovereignnation is unable to do so or is nonexistent,the UN (if engaged) should be considered todirect the HOC. The members of the HOCcoordinate the overall relief strategy;identify logistic requirements for NGOs,PVOs, and international and regionalorganizations; and identify and prioritize

III-25


HA needs and requests for military support.The HOC does not exercise command andcontrol. Rather, its purpose is to achieve unityof effort through coordination and effectiveconcentration of resources, implemented bythe individual organizations in accordancewith their own operational practices. It limitsor eliminates interference in executing themission and avoids working at cross-purposes.

a. Membership of the HOC, normallyunder the direction of the host country or UN,should include representatives of participatingorganizations who can speak authoritativelyabout their own policies, objectives, andpractices and who, ideally, can commit theiragencies, departments, and organizations tocourses of action and expenditure of resources.If the HA operation is a US unilateral effort, aUSAID/OFDA representative will most likelyserve as the director of the HOC. Otherrepresentatives should come from the NGOand PVO community, international andregional organizations, and the governmentof the affected nation, if appropriate.

b. An end state goal of the HOC shouldbe to create an environment in which the hostnation, UN, NGOs, and PVOs can assumefull responsibility for the security andoperations of the humanitarian relief efforts.

11. Military Interface WithNGOs and PVOs

a. Commanders must understand that NGOsand PVOs have valid missions and concernsand that these may complicate the mission ofUS forces. Such organizations may be supportedwhere feasible in compliance with militarymandates and objectives. The JTF staff shouldmeet with representatives of the humanitarianassistance community to define commonobjectives and courses of action that are mutuallysupportive without compromising the roles ofany of the participants.

b. Because of the important role playedby NGOs, PVOs, and regional andinternational organizations, they or theirinterests should be represented at everylevel of the chain of command. NGO andPVO field workers are normally experts intheir working environment. These workersare guided by operating principles of theirparent organizations, which typically requireindependence to do the job most effectively.

c. In providing assistance to endangeredpopulations in complex emergencies,2

humanitarian relief organizations mayview the use of military force to supporttheir efforts or to enforce UN mandates asa means of last resort. These organizationsview freedom of access as the ideal workingenvironment, in consonance with the basicprinciples of humanitarian assistance. Certainorganizations may insist on operating only onthis basis and without armed protection. Thecombatant command’s crisis action team,engaged in the preparation of plans fordeployment of the JTF into a humanitarianassistance operation, should expect toencounter responses from some humanitarianorganizations that are influenced by aprofound belief in these principles. Otherhumanitarian assistance organizations enjoya good, mutually supportive workingrelationship with governmental and militaryorganizations.

d. Commanders should consider theimplications of any military-initiatedhumanitarian assistance projects. Afrequent source of friction between militaryforces and these organizations is that programsinitiated by the military — often of highercaliber than the humanitarian relief agenciesprovide — are abruptly halted upon changeof mission. When this cessation occurswithout any transition to the level ofassistance provided by the NGOs and PVOsto the local populace, there are problems.

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Programs that are started should besustainable once the JTF redeploys.

e. Realistic expectations of militarysupport enable agencies to fully capitalizeon their interagency experiences. Withinthe bounds of security, these organizationsmust know the following:

• Capabilities and limitations of militaryforces.

• Services (e.g., shelter, food, transport,communications, security) that the forcewill or will not provide.

• Varying circumstances that precludeassistance.

• Types and scope of assistance that areappropriate and authorized by US law.

• Lessons learned at the conclusion ofinteragency operations.

f. As military conditions improve in thearea or the duration of the operationslengthens, agendas of engaged organizationsmay change, and mutual cooperationsometimes becomes more difficult to achieve.

g. Duplication of effort can be avoided andresources can be concentrated where mostneeded by using the organizational toolsdescribed above to coordinate military actionswith NGOs, PVOs and other organizationssuch as the UN.

1 From an interview with Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, 13 September 1994.

2 “Complex emergency” is a term used by the World Conference on Religion and Peace to describe a humanitariancrisis that may involve armed conflict and could be exacerbated by natural disasters. It is a situation in which theprevailing conditions threaten the lives of a portion of the affected population who, for a variety of reasons, areunable to obtain the minimum subsistence requirements and are dependent on external humanitarian assistancefor survival.

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AOR area of responsibility

C2 command and controlCARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE USA)CDRG Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (FEMA)CIA Central Intelligence Agency (USG)CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCJTF commander, joint task forceCMO civil-military operationsCMOC civil-military operations centerCONUS continental United StatesCONUSA Continental United States Army

DART Disaster Assistance Response Team (USAID/OFDA)DATT Defense AttacheDCI Director of Central IntelligenceDCO Defense Coordinating Officer (DOD)DEA Drug Enforcement AdministrationDFO Disaster Field Office (FEMA)DHHS Department of Health and Human ServicesDLA Defense Logistics AgencyDOD Department of DefenseDOE Department of EnergyDOI Department of the InteriorDOJ Department of JusticeDOMS Director of Military SupportDOS Department of StateDOT Department of Transportation

EAP Emergency Action PlanEPA Environmental Protection Agency (USG)ERT Emergency Response Team (FEMA)ESF emergency support function (FEMA)ESG Executive Steering GroupEST Emergency Support Team (FEMA)

FAA Federal Aviation AdministrationFBI Federal Bureau of InvestigationFCO Federal Coordinating Officer (USG)FEMA Federal Emergency Management AgencyFID foreign internal defenseFPA foreign policy advisorFRP Federal Response Plan (USG)

HACC humanitarian assistance coordination center

GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-08

HAST humanitarian assistance survey teamHN host nationHNS host-nation supportHOC humanitarian operations centerHQ headquartersHUMINT human intelligence

ICRC International Committee of the Red CrossICVA International Council of Voluntary AgenciesIIB interagency information bureauIPC interagency planning cellIWG Interagency Working Group (NSC)

J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staffJ-3 Operations Directorate of a joint staffJ-4 Logistics Directorate of a joint staffJ-5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of a joint staffJ-6 Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

Directorate of a joint staffJDISS Joint Deployable Intelligence Support SystemJFC joint force commanderJIB Joint Information BureauJIC Joint Intelligence CenterJISE joint intelligence support elementJMFU joint METOC forecast unitJOA joint operations areaJPOTF joint psychological operations task forceJTF joint task forceJWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications

LNO liaison officerLOC Logistics Operations CenterLOGCAP logistics civil augmentation program

METOC meteorology and oceanographyMOA memorandum of agreementMOOTW military operations other than warMSCA military support to civil authoritiesMSCLEA Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies

NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNCA National Command AuthoritiesNGO nongovernmental organizationNIST national intelligence support teamNOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric AdministrationNSA National Security AgencyNSA 47 National Security Act of 1947NSC National Security Council

GL-3

Glossary

NSC/DC National Security Council/Deputies CommitteeNSC/IWG National Security Council/Interagency Working GroupNSC/PC National Security Council/Principals CommitteeNSCS National Security Council System

OASD(PA) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)OES office of emergency servicesOFDA Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance

PAO public affairs officerPDD Presidential Decision DirectivePOLAD political advisorPRD Presidential Review DirectivePSYOP psychological operationsPVO private voluntary organization

ROE rules of engagementSA security assistanceSAO security assistance organizationSCO State Coordinating OfficerSECSTATE Secretary of StateSYG Secretary General (UN)

TREAS Department of the Treasury

UN United NationsUNAAF Unified Action Armed ForcesUNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian AffairsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNDPKO United Nations Department for Peacekeeping OperationsUNHCR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for RefugeesUSAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentUSCG United States Coast GuardUSCINCACOM Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic CommandUSCINCPAC Commander in Chief, United States Pacific CommandUSCINCTRANS Commander in Chief, United States Transportation CommandUSCS United States Customs Service (TREAS)USDAO United States Defense Attache OfficeUSDR United States Defense RepresentativeUSG United States GovernmentUSIA United States Information AgencyUSPACOM United States Pacific CommandUSTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

WEU Western European Union

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used toreduce the vulnerability of individuals andproperty to terrorist acts, to include limitedresponse and containment by local militaryforces. Also called AT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics,capabilities, or localities from which amilitary force derives its freedom of action,physical strength, or will to fight. (JointPub 1-02)

chain of command. The succession ofcommanding officers from a superior to asubordinate through which command isexercised. Also called command channel.(Joint Pub 1-02)

civil affairs. The activities of a commanderthat establish, maintain, influence, orexploit relations between military forcesand civil authorities, both governmentaland nongovernmental, and the civilianpopulace in a friendly, neutral, or hostilearea of operations in order to facilitatemilitary operations and consolidateoperational objectives. Civil affairs mayinclude performance by military forces ofactivities and functions normally theresponsibility of local government. Theseactivities may occur prior to, during, orsubsequent to other military actions. Theymay also occur, if directed, in the absenceof other military operations. (Joint Pub1-02)

civil-military operations. Group of plannedactivities in support of military operationsthat enhance the relationship between themilitary forces and civilian authorities andpopulation, and which promote thedevelopment of favorable emotions,attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly,or hostile groups. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil-military operations center. An ad hocorganization, normally established by thegeographic combatant commander orsubordinate joint force commander, toassist in the coordination of activitiesof engaged military forces, and otherUnited States Government agencies,nongovernmental organizations, privatevoluntary organizations, and regional andinternational organizations. There is noestablished structure, and its size andcomposition are situation dependent. Alsocalled CMOC. (Approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

coalition force. A force composed of militaryelements of nations that have formed atemporary alliance for some specificpurpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat service support. The essentialcapabilities, functions, activities, and tasksnecessary to sustain all elements ofoperating forces in theater at all levels ofwar. Within the national and theaterlogistic systems, it includes but is notlimited to that support rendered by serviceforces in ensuring the aspects of supply,maintenance, transportation, healthservices, and other services required byaviation and ground combat troops topermit those units to accomplish theirmissions in combat. Combat servicesupport encompasses those activities at alllevels of war that produce sustainment toall operating forces on the battlefield.(Joint Pub 1-02)

combat support. Fire support andoperational assistance provided to combatelements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command (commandauthority). Nontransferable commandauthority established by title 10 (“Armed

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-4GL-4 Joint Pub 3-08

Forces”), United States Code, section 164,exercised only by commanders of unifiedor specified combatant commands unlessotherwise directed by the President or theSecretary of Defense. Combatantcommand (command authority) cannot bedelegated and is the authority of acombatant commander to perform thosefunctions of command over assigned forcesinvolving organizing and employingcommands and forces, assigning tasks,designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction over all aspects ofmilitary operations, joint training, andlogistics necessary to accomplish themissions assigned to the command.Combatant command (commandauthority) should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.Normally this authority is exercisedthrough subordinate joint forcecommanders and Service and/or functionalcomponent commanders. Combatantcommand (command authority) providesfull authority to organize and employcommands and forces as the combatantcommander considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions.Operational control is inherent incombatant command (commandauthority). Also called COCOM. (JointPub 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander inchief of one of the unified or specifiedcombatant commands established by thePresident. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, includingantiterrorism (defensive measures taken toreduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) andcounterterrorism (offensive measures takento prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism),taken to oppose terrorism throughout theentire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combined. Between two or more forces oragencies of two or more allies. (When all

allies or services are not involved, theparticipating nations and services shall beidentified, e.g., Combined Navies.) (JointPub 1-02)

command, control, communications, andcomputer systems. Integrated systems ofdoctrine, procedures, organizationalstructures, personnel, equipment, facilities,and communications designed to supporta commander's exercise of command andcontrol across the range of militaryoperations. Also called C4 systems. (JointPub 1-02)

common user airlift service. The airliftservice provided on a common basis forall Department of Defense agencies and,as authorized, for other agencies of the USGovernment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Continental United States Army. Aregionally oriented command withgeographic boundaries under the commandof United States Army Forces Command.The Continental United States Army is anumbered Army and is the ForcesCommand agent for mobilization,deployment, and domestic emergencyplanning and execution. Also calledCONUSA. (This term and its definitionare applicable only in the context of thispub and cannot be referenced outside thispublication.)

counterdrug. Those active measures takento detect, monitor, and counter theproduction, trafficking, and use of illegaldrugs. Also called CD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gatheredand activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities,sabotage or assassinations conducted by oron behalf of foreign governments orelements thereof, foreign organizations, orforeign persons, or international terroristactivities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-5

Glossary

GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-08

counterterrorism. Offensive measures takento prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Country Team. The senior, in-country,United States coordinating and supervisingbody, headed by the Chief of the UnitedStates diplomatic mission, and composedof the senior member of each representedUnited States department or agency, asdesired by the Chief of the US diplomaticmission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

course of action. 1. A plan that wouldaccomplish, or is related to, theaccomplishment of a mission. (Joint Pub1-02)

developmental assistance. US Agency forInternational Development functionchartered under chapter one of the ForeignAssistance Act of 1961, primarily designedto promote economic growth and theequitable distribution of its benefits.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

Disaster Assistance Response Team.United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment’s (USAID) Office of UnitedStates Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)provides this rapidly deployable team inresponse to international disasters. ADisaster Assistance Response Teamprovides specialists, trained in a variety ofdisaster relief skills, to assist US embassiesand USAID missions with the managementof US Government response to disasters.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

displaced person. A civilian who isinvoluntarily outside the nationalboundaries of his or her country. See alsorefugee. (Joint Pub 1-02)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by whichthe military forces or elements thereof

guide their actions in support of nationalobjectives. It is authoritative but requiresjudgment in application. (Joint Pub 1-02)

end state. What the National CommandAuthorities want the situation to be whenoperations conclude — both militaryoperations, as well as those where themilitary is in support of other instrumentsof national power. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Federal Coordinating Officer. Appointedby the Director of the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency, on behalf of thePresident, to coordinate federal assistanceto a state affected by a disaster oremergency. The source and level of theFederal Coordinating Officer will likelydepend on the nature of the federal response.Also called FCO. (Approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

force protection. Security program designedto protect soldiers, civilian employees,family members, facilities, and equipment,in all locations and situations, accomplishedthrough planned and integrated applicationof combatting terrorism, physical security,operations security, personal protectiveservices, and supported by intelligence,counterintelligence, and other securityprograms. (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign assistance. Assistance ranging fromthe sale of military equipment to donationsof food and medical supplies to aidsurvivors of natural and man-madedisasters; United States assistance takesthree forms — development assistance,humanitarian assistance, and securityassistance. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

foreign disaster. An act of nature (such as aflood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake,volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an actof man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife,explosion, fire, or epidemic), which is or

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threatens to be of sufficient severity andmagnitude to warrant United States foreigndisaster relief to a foreign country, foreignpersons, or to an internationalorganization. (Approved for inclusion ofthe next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

foreign disaster relief. Prompt aid whichcan be used to alleviate the suffering offoreign disaster victims. Normally itincludes humanitarian services andtransportation; the provision of food,clothing, medicine, beds and bedding;temporary shelter and housing; thefurnishing of medical materiel, medicaland technical personnel; and makingrepairs to essential services. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02.)

foreign internal defense. Participation bycivilian and military agencies of agovernment in any of the action programstaken by another government to free andprotect its society from subversion,lawlessness, and insurgency. Also calledFID. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation. A nation that receives the forcesand/or supplies of allied nations and/orNATO organizations to be located on, tooperate in, or to transit through its territory.(Joint Pub 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or militaryassistance rendered by a nation to foreignforces within its territory during peacetime,crises or emergencies, or war, based onagreements mutually concluded betweennations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance.Assistance to the local populace providedby predominantly US forces in conjunctionwith military operations and exercises.This assistance is specifically authorizedby title 10, United States Code, section 401,and funded under separate authorities.

Assistance provided under these provisionsis limited to (1) medical, dental, andveterinary care provided in rural areas of acountry; (2) construction of rudimentarysurface transportation systems; (3) welldrilling and construction of basic sanitationfacilities; and (4) rudimentary constructionand repair of public facilities. Assistancemust fulfill unit training requirements thatincidentally create humanitarian benefit tothe local populace. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance. Programsconducted to relieve or reduce the resultsof natural or manmade disasters or otherendemic conditions such as human pain,disease, hunger, or privation that mightpresent a serious threat to life or that canresult in great damage to or loss of property.Humanitarian assistance provided by USforces is limited in scope and duration. Theassistance provided is designed tosupplement or complement the efforts ofthe host-nation civil authorities or agenciesthat may have the primary responsibilityfor providing humanitarian assistance.(Joint Pub 1-02)

information. Facts, data, or instructions inany medium or form. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting fromthe collection, processing, integration,analysis, evaluation, and interpretation ofavailable information concerning foreigncountries or areas. 2. Information andknowledge about an adversary obtainedthrough observation, investigation,analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub1-02)

interagency coordination. Within thecontext of Department of Defenseinvolvement, the coordination that occursbetween elements of the Department ofDefense and engaged US Governmentagencies, nongovernmental organizations,private voluntary organizations, and

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regional and international organizationsfor the purpose of accomplishing anobjective. (This term and its definitionmodifies the existing term and its definitionand is approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

internal defense and development. The fullrange of measures taken by a nation topromote its growth and protect itself fromsubversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Itfocuses on building viable institutions(political, economic, social, and military)that respond to the needs of society. Alsocalled IDAD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

international organization. Organizationswith global influence, such as the UnitedNations and the International Committeeof the Red Cross. (Approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint staff. 1. The staff of a commander of aunified or specified command, subordinateunified command, joint task force orsubordinate functional component (whena functional component command willemploy forces from more than one MilitaryDepartment), which includes membersfrom the several Services comprising theforce. These members should be assignedin such a manner as to ensure that thecommander understands the tactics,techniques, capabilities, needs, andlimitations of the component parts of theforce. Positions on the staff should bedivided so that Service representation andinfluence generally reflect the Servicecomposition of the force. 2. Joint Staff.The staff under the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff as provided for in theNational Security Act of 1947, as amendedby the Goldwater-Nichols Department ofDefense Reorganization Act of 1986. TheJoint Staff assists the Chairman and, subjectto the authority, direction, and control ofthe Chairman, the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairmanin carrying out their responsibilities. (JointPub 1-02)

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.The actions and methods which implementjoint doctrine and describe how forces willbe employed in joint operations. They willbe promulgated by the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination withthe combatant commands, Services, andJoint Staff. Also called JTTP. (Joint Pub1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that isconstituted and so designated by theSecretary of Defense, a combatantcommander, a subunified commander, oran existing joint task force commander.Also called JTF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

lead agency. Designated among USGovernment agencies to coordinate theinteragency oversight of the day-to-dayconduct of an ongoing operation. The leadagency is to chair the interagency workinggroup established to coordinate policyrelated to a particular operation. The leadagency determines the agenda, ensurescohesion among the agencies and isresponsible for implementing decisions.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

letter of assist. A contractual documentissued by the UN to a governmentauthorizing it to provide goods or servicesto a peacekeeping operation; the UN agreeseither to purchase the goods or services orauthorizes the government to supply themsubject to reimbursement by the UN.

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(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

liaison. That contact or intercommunicationmaintained between elements of militaryforces or other agencies to ensure mutualunderstanding and unity of purpose andaction. (This term and its definitionmodifies the existing term and its definitionand is approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

logistics. The science of planning andcarrying out the movement andmaintenance of forces. In its mostcomprehensive sense, those aspects ofmilitary operations which deal with: a.design and development, acquisition,storage, movement, distribution,maintenance, evacuation, and disposition ofmateriel; b. movement, evacuation, andhospitalization of personnel; c. acquisitionor construction, maintenance, operation, anddisposition of facilities; and d. acquisition orfurnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military civic action. The use ofpreponderantly indigenous military forceson projects useful to the local population atall levels in such fields as education,training, public works, agriculture,transportation, communications, health,sanitation, and others contributing toeconomic and social development, whichwould also serve to improve the standingof the military forces with the population.(US forces may at times advise or engagein military civic actions in overseas areas.)(Joint Pub 1-02)

Military Department. One of thedepartments within the Department ofDefense created by the National SecurityAct of 1947, as amended. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military operations other than war.Operations that encompass the use of

military capabilities across the range ofmilitary operations short of war. Thesemilitary actions can be applied tocomplement any combination of the otherinstruments of national power and occurbefore, during, and after war. Also calledMOOTW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military options. A range of military forceresponses that can be projected toaccomplish assigned tasks. Options includeone or a combination of the following:civic action, humanitarian assistance, civilaffairs, and other military activities todevelop positive relationships with othercountries; confidence building and othermeasures to reduce military tensions;military presence; activities to conveythreats to adversaries and truth projections;military deceptions and psychologicaloperations; quarantines, blockades, andharassment operations; raids; interventionoperations; armed conflict involving air,land, maritime, and strategic warfareoperations; support for law enforcementauthorities to counter international criminalactivities (terrorism, narcotics trafficking,slavery, and piracy); support for lawenforcement authorities to suppressdomestic rebellion; and support forinsurgencies, counterinsurgency, and civilwar in foreign countries. (This term andits definition modifies the existing term andits definition and is approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

multinational operations. A collective termto describe military actions conducted byforces of two or more nations, typicallyorganized within the structure of a coalitionor alliance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

nation assistance. Civil and/or militaryassistance rendered to a nation by foreignforces within that nation’s territory duringpeacetime, crises or emergencies, or war,based on agreements mutually concludedbetween nations. Nation assistance

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programs may include, but are not limitedto, security assistance, foreign internaldefense, other United States Code title 10(DOD) programs, and activities performedon a reimbursable basis by Federal agenciesor international organizations. (Joint Pub1-02)

National Command Authorities. ThePresident and the Secretary of Defense ortheir duly deputized alternates orsuccessors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operations.Operations conducted to relocate threatenednoncombatants from locations in a foreigncountry. These operations normally involveUnited States citizens whose lives are indanger, and may also include selectedforeign nationals. Also called NEO. (JointPub 1-02)

nongovernmenta l organizat ions.Transnational organizations of privatecitizens that maintain a consultative statuswith the Economic and Social Council ofthe United Nations. Nongovernmentalorganizations may be professionalassociations, foundations, multinationalbusinesses or simply groups with a commoninterest in humanitarian assistance activities(development and relief). “Nongovernmentalorganizations” is a term normally used bynon-US organizations. Also called NGO.(Joint Pub 1-02)

operational control. Transferable commandauthority that may be exercised bycommanders at any echelon at or belowthe level of combatant command.Operational control is inherent incombatant command (commandauthority). Operational control may bedelegated and is the authority to performthose functions of command oversubordinate forces involving organizingand employing commands and forces,

assigning tasks, designating objectives, andgiving authoritative direction necessary toaccomplish the mission. Operationalcontrol includes authoritative directionover all aspects of military operations andjoint training necessary to accomplishmissions assigned to the command.Operational control should be exercisedthrough the commanders of subordinateorganizations. Normally this authority isexercised through subordinate joint forcecommanders and Service and/or functionalcomponent commanders. Operationalcontrol normally provides full authority toorganize commands and forces and toemploy those forces as the commander inoperational control considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions.Operational control does not, in and ofitself, include authoritative direction forlogistics or matters of administration,discipline, internal organization, or unittraining. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peacekeeping. Military operationsundertaken with the consent of all majorparties to a dispute, designed to monitor andfacilitate implementation of an agreement(ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement)and support diplomatic efforts to reach along-term political settlement. (Joint Pub1-02)

peace operations. Encompassespeacekeeping operations and peaceenforcement operations conducted insupport of diplomatic efforts to establishand maintain peace. (Joint Pub 1-02)

preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actionstaken in advance of a predictable crisis toprevent or limit violence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

private voluntary organizations. Private,nonprofit humanitarian assistanceorganizations involved in development andrelief activities. Private voluntaryorganizations are normally United States-

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based. “Private voluntary organizations”is often used synonymously with the term“nongovernmental organizations.” Alsocalled PVO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations. Plannedoperations to convey selected informationand indicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives, objectivereasoning, and ultimately, the behavior offoreign governments, organizations,groups, and individuals. The purpose ofpsychological operations is to induce orreinforce foreign attitudes and behaviorfavorable to the originator’s objectives.Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

refugee. A civilian who, by reason of real orimagined danger, has left home to seeksafety elsewhere. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued bycompetent military authority that delineatethe circumstances and limitations underwhich United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with otherforces encountered. Also called ROE.(Joint Pub 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programsauthorized by the Foreign Assistance Actof 1961, as amended, and the Arms ExportControl Act of 1976, as amended, or otherrelated statutes by which the US providesdefense articles, military training, and otherdefense-related services by grant, loan, credit,or cash sales in furtherance of national policiesand objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations. Operations conductedby specially organized, trained, andequipped military and paramilitary forcesto achieve military, political, economic, orpsychological objectives by unconventionalmilitary means in hostile, denied, orpolitically sensitive areas. These operationsare conducted during peacetimecompetition, conflict, and war,

independently or in coordination withoperations of conventional, nonspecialoperations forces. Political-militaryconsiderations frequently shape specialoperations, requiring clandestine, covert,or low visibility techniques and oversightat the national level. Special operationsdiffer from conventional operations indegree of physical and political risk,operational techniques, mode ofemployment, independence from friendlysupport, and dependence on detailedoperational intelligence and indigenousassets. Also called SO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreementwhich defines the legal position of a visitingmilitary force deployed in the territory of afriendly state. Agreements delineating thestatus of visiting military forces may bebilateral or multilateral. Provisionspertaining to the status of visiting forcesmay be set forth in a separate agreement,or they may form a part of a morecomprehensive agreement. Theseprovisions describe how the authorities ofa visiting force may control members of thatforce and the amenability of the force or itsmembers to the local law or to the authorityof local officials. To the extent thatagreements delineate matters affecting therelations between a military force andcivilian authorities and population, theymay be considered as civil affairsagreements. Also called SOFA. (Joint Pub1-02)

strategy. The art and science of developingand using political, economic, psychological,and military forces as necessary duringpeace and war, to afford the maximumsupport to policies, in order to increase theprobabilities and favorable consequencesof victory and to lessen the chances ofdefeat. (Joint Pub 1-02)

supported commander. The commanderhaving primary responsibility for all

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aspects of a task assigned by the JointStrategic Capabilities Plan or other jointoperation planning authority. In thecontext of joint operation planning, thisterm refers to the commander who preparesoperation plans, campaign plans, oroperation orders in response to requirementsof the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.(Joint Pub 1-02)

supporting commander. A commander whoprovides augmentation forces or othersupport to a supported commander or whodevelops a supporting plan. Includes thedesignated combatant commands and

Defense agencies as appropriate. (JointPub 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broadcontinuing mission under a singlecommander and composed of significantassigned components of two or moreMilitary Departments, and which isestablished and so designated by thePresident, through the Secretary of Defensewith the advice and assistance of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Alsocalled unified combatant command. (JointPub 1-02)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCS receive the pub andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-08 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0

PERSONNELand

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT PUB 2-0

OPERATIONS

JOINT PUB 3-0

Joint Pub 3-08 - HSDL

Documents

Transcript of Joint Pub 3-08 - HSDL