Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations - BITS€œJoint Doctrine for Multinational...

5 April 2000

Joint Doctrinefor Multinational

Operations

Joint Publication 3-16

Throughout our nation’s history, our Armed Forces haveparticipated in alliances and coalitions in support of freedom in allparts of the world. From the birth of this great nation and our ownstruggle for freedom to the epic battles of two world wars in thetwentieth century and the ensuing Cold War, the strength of ourpartnership has always exceeded the sum of its parts. Our liberty,and the liberty of so many people in other democracies, is owed to theselfless dedication of our comrades who had the vision to set commongoals and the will and capability to fight together to achieve greatness.

“Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations” will help to guideyou through the challenging and sometimes complex nature ofoperating as a part of a multinational force. It takes us beyond thehardware of force interoperability and types of operations to thesoftware of command relationships, considerations for the planningand execution of multinational operations, and divergent culturesworking together toward a common end.

While we will always prepare to operate unilaterally if necessary,we must also be prepared to operate in multinational alliances andcoalitions when practical. This doctrine will assist you in the latterendeavor.

HENRY H. SHELTONChairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides guidance andprinciples for the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates when they operate as part of amultinational force. This publicationdescribes multinational operations that theUnited States may participate in as a part ofan alliance, coalition, or other ad hocarrangement. It describes joint organizationalstructures essential to coordinate land,maritime, air, space, and special operationsin a multinational environment. It addressesoperational considerations that thecommander and staff should contemplateduring the planning and execution ofmultinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrine forjoint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems most

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States.For doctrine and procedures not ratified bythe United States, commanders shouldevaluate and follow the multinationalcommand’s doctrine and procedures, whereapplicable.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IFUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

• Multinational Operations Defined ............................................................................. I-1• Strategic Context ....................................................................................................... I-1• Types of Multinational Operations ............................................................................ I-3• Peacetime Engagement ............................................................................................. I-8• Tenets of Multinational Cooperation ......................................................................... I-9• Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability .............................................. I-10

CHAPTER IICOMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

• National Security Structure ...................................................................................... II-1• Command and Control of US Forces in Multinational Operations ............................ II-3• Multinational Force Commander .............................................................................. II-6• Overview of Multinational Command Structures ..................................................... II-7• Alliance Command Structures .................................................................................. II-8• Coalition Command Structures .............................................................................. II-10• Control of Multinational Operations ....................................................................... II-11• Civil-Military Coordination ................................................................................... II-14

CHAPTER IIICONSIDERATIONS DURING THE PLANNING AND EXECUTIONOF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

• Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks ............................................................ III-1• Political and Military Considerations ..................................................................... III-1• Intelligence and Information .................................................................................. III-3• Logistics and Host-Nation Support ......................................................................... III-6• Language, Culture, and Sovereignty ...................................................................... III-13• Health Service Support ......................................................................................... III-14• Termination and Transition ................................................................................... III-15• Communications ................................................................................................... III-16• Force Protection .................................................................................................... III-16• International Law and the Law of War .................................................................. III-17• The Law of the Sea ............................................................................................... III-18• Rules of Engagement ............................................................................................ III-19• Doctrine, Training, and Resources ....................................................................... III-19• Media .................................................................................................................. III-20

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• Religious Ministry Support .................................................................................. III-21• Meteorology and Oceanography .......................................................................... III-21• Environmental Considerations ............................................................................ III-21

CHAPTER IVOPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

SECTION A. GENERAL-UNIFIED ACTION ........................................................ IV-1• General .................................................................................................................. IV-1

SECTION B. LAND OPERATIONS ........................................................................ IV-1• General .................................................................................................................. IV-1

SECTION C. MARITIME OPERATIONS ............................................................... IV-5• General .................................................................................................................. IV-5

SECTION D. AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS ..................................................... IV-7• Air Operations ....................................................................................................... IV-7• Space Operations ................................................................................................. IV-10

SECTION E. SPECIAL OPERATIONS ................................................................. IV-11• General ................................................................................................................ IV-11

SECTION F. GENERAL ........................................................................................ IV-13• Information Operations ........................................................................................ IV-13• Search and Rescue ............................................................................................... IV-13

APPENDIX

A Commander’s Checklist for Multinational Operations ....................................... A-1B A Representative List of US Participation in Multinational Operations .............. B-1C References ......................................................................................................... C-1D Administrative Instructions ............................................................................... D-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-4

FIGURE

II-1 The National Security Structure ..................................................................... II-2II-2 Key Players in the Department of State ......................................................... II-3II-3 Notional Multinational Command Structure .................................................. II-8II-4 Alliance Integrated Command Structure ........................................................ II-9II-5 Lead Nation Command Structure ................................................................ II-10II-6 Coalition Parallel Command Structure (With Coordination Center) ............. II-11II-7 Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM ........... II-12

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III-1 Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations ................................ III-2III-2 The Intelligence Cycle ................................................................................ III-3IV-1 Capabilities of Land Forces ......................................................................... IV-2IV-2 Characteristics of Maritime Forces ............................................................. IV-6IV-3 Key Aspects of Air Operations .................................................................... IV-8IV-4 US Special Operations Command Capabilities ......................................... IV-11

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Describes the Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

Reviews Multinational Command Relationships

Discusses the Considerations During the Planning andExecution of Multinational Operations

Covers Operational Considerations

Multinational operationsis a collective term todescribe military actionsconducted by forces oftwo or more nations.

Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

The United States has often shared common securityinterests and participated in operations with other nations.Typically, multinational operations are performed withinthe structure of a coalition or alliance. A coalition is an adhoc arrangement between two or more nations for commonaction. An alliance is the result of formal agreementsbetween two or more nations for broad, long-term objectiveswhich further the common interests of the members.Normally each alliance or coalition develops its ownprotocols and contingency plans to guide multinationalaction. Multinational operations may include combat andare conducted both during war and military operations otherthan war (MOOTW). War is the extreme case forconducting multinational operations; the goal is to achievethe multinational objectives as quickly as possible and withas little cost as possible. MOOTW focus on deterring war,resolving conflict, promoting peace and stability, andsupporting civil authorities. Peacetime engagementactivities are intended to shape the security environment inpeacetime. These activities demonstrate US commitment,lend credibility to its alliances, enhance regional stability,and provide a crisis response capability while promotingUS influence and access. During multinational operations,respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, and patience mustbe practiced during all activities to ensure unity of effort.Steps to achieve rationalization, standardization, andinteroperability will significantly enhance the probabilityof success in multinational operations. When providingalliance or coalition leadership, the geographic combatant

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Several key individualsand organizationsdetermine the level of USmilitary involvement inmultinational operations.

One of the mostimportant tasks whenplanning multinationaloperations is to conduct adetailed mission analysis.

commander ensures that unified action integrates US jointoperations, in conjunction with multinational, interagency,and international organizations, into a strategic unity ofeffort to achieve the strategic end state.

The National Security Council is the principal forum toconsider national security issues that require presidentialdecisions. Its membership includes the President, the VicePresident, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary ofDefense. The National Command Authorities (NCA)consist of the President and the Secretary of Defense andmay employ military power and personnel to respond tosituations affecting US interests. The Secretary of State isthe President’s principal foreign policy advisor and theDepartment of State administers US Embassies abroad andsupports the Secretary of State in pursuing US foreign policygoals. The President retains command authority over USforces, yet sometimes it is prudent to place appropriate USforces under the operational control of a foreign commanderto achieve specified military objectives. Foreign operationalcontrol, tactical control, and support relationships may allbe advantageous to multinational operations. Each coalitionor alliance will create the structure that will best meet theneeds, political realities, constraints, and objectives of theparticipating nations. Alliance command relationships oftenreflect either an integrated command structure or a leadnation command structure. Coalition commandrelationships often are a parallel command structure, a leadnation command structure, or a combination of the two.

A mission analysis for a multinational operation shouldinclude assessments of the respective capabilities, politicalwill, and national interests of each of the nationalcontingents. This analysis should result in a missionstatement for the multinational force as a whole and arestated mission for the US contingent of the force. Oncethe tasks necessary to achieve the objectives have beenapproved, the multinational force commander (MNFC)assigns specific tasks to the contingent most capable ofcompleting those tasks. Every phase of the intelligencecycle, including planning and direction, collection,processing and exploitation, analysis and production,dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback,

Command Relationships

Considerations During the Planning and Execution ofMultinational Operations

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Executive Summary

is substantively adjusted to support multinationaloperations. Effective logistic support in a multinationaloperation will pose particular problems for the MNFC andwill require detailed planning and flexible execution, takinginto account the logistic capabilities, demands, andlimitations of each national contingent. During thecommander’s assessment, the overall objectives also needto include criteria for termination and transition,communications, force protection, international lawconsiderations, rules of engagement, doctrine, education andtraining, media relations, health service support, religiousministry support, meteorology, and oceanography as wellas many cultural and linguistic needs.

Land operations occur across the range of militaryoperations, during war and MOOTW. Land forces possessthe capability to hold or occupy land areas. Capabilities toland forces include operational mobility, interoperability,sustainability, and versatility. Maritime operations covera range of military activities undertaken, in peacetime or inwar, to exercise sea control or project power ashore. Thequalities that characterize maritime forces include readiness,flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility. Air operationsgain and maintain control of the air and exploit its use toachieve the MNFC’s objectives. Unity of effort is necessaryfor effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning isessential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of allavailable forces. Decentralized execution is essential togenerate the tempo of operations required and to cope withthe uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat. Spaceoperations include force enhancement, space control, spacesupport including spacelift and on-orbit operations, andforce application. Special operations forces enable thecommander to develop and exercise unconventional militaryoptions in multinational operations independently or insupport of other components. They are trained to provideliaison to multinational maneuver units, taking advantageof their language capabilities, cultural awareness, andexperience in working and training with foreign militaryand paramilitary forces. Information operations (IO) arethose actions taken to affect adversary information andinformation systems while defending one’s own informationand information systems. Additionally, informationassurance (IA) is an element of IO that is concerned withthe protection and defense of information and informationsystems by ensuring their availability, integrity,

Operationalconsiderations includeland, maritime, air andspace, special operations,information operations,and search and rescueoperations.

Operational Considerations

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authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. Thisincludes providing for the restoration of informationsystems by incorporating protection, detection, and reactioncapabilities. Both IO and IA must be factored into everyoperation conducted by any task force. The Joint Staffcoordinates US positions on all IO matters discussedbilaterally or in multinational organizations to encourageinteroperability and compatibility in fulfilling commonrequirements. Search and rescue (SAR) operations arethose efforts undertaken to find and recover downed and/or missing personnel. Normally each nation and/orcomponent is responsible for conducting its own SARmissions.

Multinational operations include alliances or coalitionsbetween two or more nations in order to best achieve theircommon interests. The NCA will retain ultimate commandauthority over US military forces and personnel, but oftenwill employ the aid of foreign command and additionalsupport relationships in order to achieve specified militaryobjectives. Detailed mission analysis and organizedobjectives help provide a successful multinational operationthrough the coordinated employment of forces.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IFUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

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1. Multinational OperationsDefined

“Multinational operations” is a collectiveterm to describe military actions conductedby forces of two or more nations. Suchoperations are usually undertaken within thestructure of a coalition or alliance, althoughother possible arrangements includesupervision by an international organization(such as the United Nations (UN) orOrganization for Security and Cooperation inEurope). A coalition is an ad hoc arrangementbetween two or more nations for commonaction. An alliance is the result of formalagreements (i.e., treaties) between two or morenations for broad, long-term objectives whichfurther the common interests of the members.Coalitions are formed by different nationswith different objectives than long standingalliances, usually for a single occasion or forlonger cooperation in a narrow sector ofcommon interest. Although the descriptionof “multinational” will always apply to such

“Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world isinvolved and the freedom of its people.”

Woodrow Wilson(1856-1924)

forces and commanders, they can also bedescribed as “allied,” “alliance,” “bilateral,”“combined,” “multilateral,” or “coalition,” asappropriate.

Sovereignty issues will be one of the mostdifficult issues for the multinational forcecommander (MNFC) to deal with, both inregard to forces contributed by nations andby host country nations. Often, the MNFCwill be required to accomplish the missionthrough coordination, communication, andconsensus in addition to traditional commandconcepts. Political sensitivities must beacknowledged and often the MNFC (andsubordinates) must depend on their diplomaticas well as warrior skills.

2. Strategic Context

a. General

• The United States has often sharedcommon or mutually-compatible

Flags of participants in Operation COOPERATIVE OSPREY 1996.

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security interests and participated inoperations with other nations.Contemporary threats to collectivesecurity objectives have become moreambiguous and regionally focused sincethe end of the Cold War. Combatantcommanders may confront a variety offactors that challenge the stability ofcountries and regions within their areasof responsibility (AORs). Resultantinstabilities can cause increased levels ofactivity outside commonly acceptedstandards of law, order, and fairness, inthe form of employing intimidation, drugtrafficking, terrorism, insurgencies,regional conflicts, proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, civil wars,and information systems exploitation ordisruption. It is difficult to predict whenor where such threats may emerge.

• Where commonality or compatibilityof interest exists, nations may enterinto political, economic, and militarypartnerships. These partnerships occurin both regional and worldwide patternsas nations seek opportunities to promotetheir mutual national interests; ensuremutual security against real andperceived threats; and conduct foreignhumanitarian assistance (FHA) and peace

operations (PO). Cultural, psychological,economic, technological, informational,and political factors as well astransnational dangers all impact onmultinational operations. Manyoperation plans (OPLANs) to deter orcounter threats are prepared within thecontext of a treaty or alliance framework.Sometimes they are developed in a lessstructured coalition framework, based ontemporary agreements or arrangements.Much of the information and guidanceprovided for unified action and jointoperations are applicable to multinationaloperations. However, differences inallied laws, doctrine, organization,weapons, equipment, terminology,culture, politics, religion, and languagemust be taken into account. Normallyeach alliance or coalition develops itsown protocols and contingency plans toguide multinational action.

• The United States employs a nationalsecurity strategy committed to protectingits own national security interests andachieving strategic objectives bydirecting all the elements of nationalpower (diplomatic, economic,information, military) toward thestrategic end state. The National Security

F-16 participating in Bright Star exercise in Egypt.

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Strategy states that, while US forcesretain unilateral capability, wheneverpossible they will seek to operatealongside alliance or coalition forces,integrating their capabilities andcapitalizing on their strengths, to promoteregional stability throughout the world.Therefore, US commanders shouldexpect to conduct operations as part of amultinational force (MNF). US forcesmay participate in these multinationalefforts across a range of military and civiloperations in concert with a variety ofUS governmental agencies, militaryforces of other nations, local authorities,and international and nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs).

b. The Military Commander’s Role

• In responding to crises, US militarycommanders must understand thatmilitary operations are one part of anoverall strategy to focus all elementsof national power. Though the militaryapplication of power may not in itselfachieve US strategic objectives, failureto apply that power properly couldpreclude attaining those objectives.

• When assessing the theater strategicenvironment, combatant commandersshould consider international securityagreements, formal and informalcommand relationships with allies orcoalition partners, collective securitystrategies, global and regional stability,and regional interrelationships. UnitedNations Security Council resolutionsmay also provide the basis for use ofmilitary force.

• In multinational operations, planners andparticipants should be sensitive to thedemands of consensus-driven decisionmaking.

3. Types of MultinationalOperations

Multinational operations may beconducted during periods of both war andmilitary operations other than war(MOOTW). Each multinational operationis unique, and key considerations involved inplanning and conducting multinationaloperations vary with the internationalsituation, perspectives, motives, and valuesof the organization’s members.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili inspects amap of the Bosnian area during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

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a. War. When diplomatic, economic, andinformational means are unable orinappropriate to achieve objectives, thealliance or coalition may decide to conductlarge-scale, sustained combat operations,thereby placing the alliance or coalition in awartime state. In such cases, the goal is towin as quickly and with as few casualties aspossible, achieve alliance or coalitionobjectives, and conclude hostilities on termsfavorable to all multinational partners. Warmay be of a limited or general nature. Limitedwar is armed conflict short of general war, aswas conducted during Operation JUSTCAUSE in December 1989. General war,such as World Wars I and II, involves armedconflict among major powers in which thetotal resources of the belligerents areemployed and survival is at stake. In eitherinstance decisive force is applied to fight andwin.

• MNFCs may employ air, land, sea, space,and special operations forces in a widevariety of operations to attack theenemy’s physical capabilities, morale,and will to fight. When required toemploy force, MNFCs can seekcombinations of forces and actions toachieve concentration in variousdimensions, all culminating in applyingmaximum combat capability at thedecisive time and place. This isaccomplished by arranging symmetricaland asymmetrical actions to takeadvantage of friendly strengths andenemy vulnerabilities and to preservefreedom of action for future operations.Engagements with the enemy may besymmetrical (if the US force and theenemy force are similar), or asymmetricif forces are dissimilar. MNFCs areuniquely situated to seize opportunitiesfor asymmetrical action and must beespecially alert to exploit the tremendouspotential combat power of such actions.National contributions of air, land, sea,space, and special operations forces can

not be viewed in isolation. Each may becritical to the success, and may havecertain unique capabilities that cannotbe duplicated by other resources. Thecontributions of these forces will varyover time with the nature of the threatand other strategic, operational, andtactical circumstances. Synergy isachieved by synchronizing thecontributions of alliance or coalitionpartners in multinational operations toenable MNFCs to project focusedcapabilities that present no seams orvulnerabilities to an enemy forexploitation.

• Multinational force operations will becharacterized by the following.

•• Simultaneity and Depth. The intentof simultaneity and depth is to bringforce to bear on the opponent’s entirestructure in a near simultaneousmanner. The goal is to overwhelm andcripple enemy capabilities and enemywill to resist. “Simultaneity” refers tothe simultaneous application ofcapability against the full array of enemycapabilities and sources of strength.Simultaneity also refers to the concurrentconduct of operations at the tactical,operational, and strategic levels. Becauseof the inherent interrelationshipsbetween the various levels of war,MNFCs cannot be concerned only withevents at their respective echelon. To beeffective, MNFCs should not allow anenemy sanctuary or respite. This isaccomplished by conducting operationsacross the full breadth and depth of theoperational area, thereby overwhelmingthe enemy throughout the battle areafrom multiple dimensions.

•• Anticipation. Anticipation is key toeffective planning. MNFCs shouldremain alert for the unexpected and foropportunities to exploit the situation.

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MNFCs should consider what mighthappen and look for the signs that maybring the possible event to pass. Surprisecan be avoided by monitoring operationsas they unfold and signaling to their staffand subordinate units the actions they areto take to stay in control of events asmuch as possible. MNFCs should realizethe impact of operations and prepare fortheir results, such as the surrender of largenumbers of opposing forces. Situationalawareness is a prerequisite forcommanders and planners in order tobe able to anticipate opportunities andchallenges. Intelligence preparation ofthe battlespace (IPB) can assist MNFCsin defining likely or potential enemycourses of action (COAs), as well as theindicators that suggest the enemy hasembarked on a specific COA.Anticipation is not without risk. MNFCsand planners that tend to lean inanticipation of what they expect toencounter are more susceptible tooperational military deception efforts byan opponent. Therefore, commandersand planners should carefully considerthe information upon which decisions arebeing based.

•• Balance. Balance is the maintenanceof the force, its capabilities, and itsoperations in such a manner as tocontribute to freedom of action andresponsiveness. Balance refers to theappropriate mix of forces and capabilitieswithin the MNF as well as the nature andtiming of operations conducted. MNFCsstrive to maintain friendly force balancewhile aggressively seeking to disrupt anenemy’s balance by striking withpowerful blows from unexpecteddirections or dimensions and pressing thefight.

•• Leverage. Achieving leverage entailsgaining, maintaining, and exploitingadvantages in combat power across all

dimensions among the forces availableto MNFCs. Force interaction withrespect to friendly force relationships canbe generally characterized as supported(the receiver of a given effort) orsupporting (the provider of such aneffort). A principal MNFC responsibilityis to assess continuously whether forcerelationships enhance to the fullest extentpossible the provision of fightingassistance from and to each element ofthe MNF. Support relationships afford aneffective means to weigh (and ensureunity of effort for) various operations.MNFCs can gain decisive advantage overthe enemy through leverage, which canbe achieved in a variety of ways.Asymmetrical actions that pit MNFstrengths against enemy weaknesses andmaneuver in time and space can providedecisive advantage. Synergy from theconcentration and integration of jointforce actions also provides joint forcecommanders (JFCs) with decisiveadvantage. Leverage allows MNFCs toimpose their will on the enemy, increasethe enemy’s dilemma, and maintain theinitiative.

•• Timing and Tempo. Multinationalforces should conduct operations at atempo and point in time that best exploitsfriendly capabilities and inhibits theenemy. With proper timing, MNFCs candominate the action, remainunpredictable, and operate beyond theenemy’s ability to react. MNFCs mayvary the tempo of operations duringselected phases of a campaign. They mayelect to reduce the pace of operations orconduct high-tempo operations designedspecifically to exceed enemy capabilities.“Timing” refers to the effects achievedas well as to the application of force.

b. Military Operations Other ThanWar. MOOTW are operations thatencompass the use of military capabilities

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across the range of military operations shortof war. These military actions can be appliedto complement any combination of the otherinstruments of national power and occurbefore, during, and after war. MOOTW focuson deterring war, resolving conflict, andpromoting peace. MOOTW may involveelements of both combat and noncombatoperations in peace, crisis, and war situations.MOOTW involving combat (such as somepeace enforcement operations) may havemany of the same characteristics as war,including active combat operations andemployment of most combat capabilities. Thefollowing list of MOOTW categories thatmay be conducted in a multinational settingare presented in alphabetical order.Multinational participation in any MOOTWcategory will present unique and regionallyspecific challenges which will requireconsideration of the tenets of multinationalcooperation to be discussed later in thischapter.

See JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for MilitaryOperations Other Than War,” or otherappropriate publications in the JP 3-07 seriesfor further detail.

• Combating Terrorism. Combatingterrorism involves actions taken tooppose terrorism from wherever thethreat exists. It includes antiterrorism(defensive measures taken to reducevulnerability to terrorist acts) andcounterterrorism (offensive measurestaken to prevent, deter, and respond toterrorism).

• Department of Defense (DOD)Support to Counterdrug (CD)Operations. DOD support to thenational drug control strategy includessupport to US law enforcement agencies(federal, state, and local) and cooperativeforeign governments by providingintelligence analysts and logistic supportpersonnel; support to detection andmonitoring of the movement of air andsea traffic; support to interdiction;internal drug prevention and treatmentprograms; training of foreign CDorganizations in tactics, techniques, andprocedures (TTP) that can be applied totheir CD operations; and research anddevelopment.

Special operations forces enhances multinational force capabilities throughinteraction with host nations during peacetime engagement operations.

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• Enforcement of Sanctions andMaritime Intercept Operations. Theseare operations which employ coercivemeasures to interdict the movement ofcertain types of designated items into orout of a nation or specified area.

• Enforcing Exclusion Zones. Anexclusion zone is established by asanctioning body to prohibit specifiedactivities in a specific geographic area.Exclusion zones can be established in theair (no-fly zones), at sea (maritime), oron land (zones of separation or inter-entity boundary lines). The measures areusually imposed by the UN or otherinternational bodies.

• Ensuring Freedom of Navigation andOverflight. These operations areconducted to demonstrate US orinternational rights to navigate sea or airroutes.

• Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.FHA operations relieve or reduce theresults of natural or manmade disastersor other endemic conditions such ashuman pain, disease, hunger, or privationthat might present a serious threat to lifeor than can result in great damage to or

loss of property in regions outside theUnited States. FHA provided by USforces is limited in scope and durationand is intended to supplement orcomplement efforts of host nation (HN)civil authorities or agencies with theprimary responsibility for providingassistance. US civil affairs (CA) forcesare trained to assist the commander incoordinating with NGOs, privatevoluntary organizations (PVOs),international organizations, and localcivilian agencies through the civil-military operations center (CMOC) insituations involving FHA which mayalso be in coordination with UN reliefefforts.

• Nation Assistance and Support toCounterinsurgency. Nation assistanceis civil or military assistance (other thanFHA) rendered to a nation by US forceswithin that nation’s territory duringpeace, crisis, emergency, or war, basedon agreements concluded between theUnited States and that nation. The goalis to promote long-term regionalstability. Nation assistance programsoften include, but are not limited tosecurity assistance; foreign internaldefense (FID); and humanitarian and

Canadian and Hungarian troops train in an urban environment.

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civic assistance (HCA). Unlike FHA,HCA is support provided in conjunctionwith military operations and exercises,and must fulfill unit trainingrequirements that incidentally createhumanitarian benefit to the localpopulace.

• Noncombatant Evacuation Operations(NEOs). These operations normallyrelocate threatened noncombatants froma foreign country. Although conductedto evacuate US citizens, NEOs may alsoinclude selective evacuation, contingenton space availability, of citizens from theHN as well as citizens from othercountries.

• Peace Operations. PO are operationsconducted in support of diplomaticefforts to establish and maintain peace;they include peace enforcementoperations and peacekeeping operations.PO are conducted in conjunction with thevarious diplomatic activities necessary tosecure a negotiated truce and resolve theconflict. Additional types of MOOTW(e.g., FHA and NEO) may complementpeace operations. PO are tailored to eachsituation and may be conducted insupport of diplomatic activities before,during, and after conflict. US CA forcesand security assistance officers (SAOs)provide a significant capability to thecommander in the planning and conductof PO. These forces can provide theliaison between the military force and thelocal populace, local government, andNGOs, PVOs, and internationalorganizations.

• Protection of Shipping. Whennecessary, US forces provide protectionof US flagged vessels, US citizens(whether embarked in US or foreignvessels), and their property againstunlawful violence on and overinternational waters. With the consent

of the flag state, and the approval of theNational Command Authorities (NCA),this protection may be extended toforeign flag vessels under internationallaw.

• Show of Force Operations. Theseoperations, designed to demonstrate USresolve, involve increased visibility ofUS deployed forces in an attempt todefuse a specific situation that, if allowedto continue, may be detrimental to USinterests or national objectives. A showof force can involve a wide range ofmilitary forces including joint USmilitary or MNFs.

• Arms Control. Arms control, thoughnot a military operation, is a means toreduce the risk of war by limiting orreducing the threat from potentialadversaries (e.g., through a cap on,reduction or elimination of particularweapons) and through confidencebuilding measures rather than relyingsolely on military responses toperceived or anticipated changes in themilitary threat. It may manifest itselfthrough several conventions (i.e.,treaties, agreements, or unilateralaction). Arms control complementsmilitary preparedness to enhance nationaland regional security. Combatantcommanders and their staffs must beaware of applicable arms controlconventions and those negotiations inprogress that affect their AOR.

4. Peacetime Engagement

Peacetime engagement is defined as allmilitary activities involving other nationsintended to shape the security environmentin peacetime. These activities demonstrateUS commitment, lend credibility to itsalliances, enhance regional stability, andprovide a crisis response capability whilepromoting US influence and access. In

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addition to forces stationed overseas andafloat, peacetime engagement activitiesinclude periodic and rotational deployments,access and storage agreements, multinationalexercises, port visits, freedom of navigationexercises, foreign military training, foreigncommunity support, and military-to-militarycontacts including SAOs and militaryassistance advisory groups. Given theirlocation and knowledge of the region,peacetime engagement forces could be thefirst which the combatant commandercommits to multinational operations. Spaceforces enhance peacetime engagement byproviding a continuous worldwide presencethat allows monitoring and quick reaction atall levels throughout the range of militaryoperations.

5. Tenets of MultinationalCooperation

After World War II, General Dwight D.Eisenhower said that “mutual confidence”is the “one basic thing that will make alliedcommands work.” This mutual confidencestems from several intangibleconsiderations which must guide theactions of every participant. While thetenets discussed below cannot guaranteesuccess, ignoring them may lead to missionfailure due to a lack of unity of effort.

a. Respect. In assigning missions toMNFs, the commander must consider that

national honor and prestige may be asimportant to a contributing MNF as combatcapability. All partners must be included inthe planning process, and their opinions mustbe sought in mission assignment.Understanding, consideration, and acceptanceof partner ideas often lead to solidification ofthe partnership. This includes respect for eachpartner’s culture, religion, customs, history,and values. Seemingly junior officers incommand of small contingents are the seniorrepresentatives of their government within theMNFs and, as such, should be treated withspecial consideration beyond their US-equivalent rank. Without genuine respect ofothers, rapport and mutual confidence cannotexist.

b. Rapport. US commanders and staffsshould establish rapport with theircounterparts from partner countries, as wellas the MNFC (who may or may not be fromthe United States). This is a personal, directrelationship that only they can develop. Theresult of good rapport between leaders willbe successful teamwork by their staffs andsubordinate commanders and overall unity ofeffort. It is essential that each member of theMNF understand their partners’ nationalviews and work to minimize friction withinthe MNF.

c. Knowledge of Partners. UScommanders and their staffs should knoweach member of the MNF. Much time and

MULTINATIONAL ENDEAVORS

There is a good probability that any military operations undertaken by theUnited States of America will have multinational aspects, so extensive is thenetwork of alliances, friendships, and mutual interests established by ournation around the world. Here again the role of the combatant commanders inconducting the broad sweep of unified operations within their theaters is crucialand requires acute political sensitivity (the supporting joint and componentcommanders within combatant commands also play key roles in this regard).

SOURCE: JP 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forcesof the United States”

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effort is expended in learning about the enemyand a similar effort is required to understandthe doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals,culture, religion, customs, history, and valuesof each partner.

d. Patience. Effective partnerships taketime and attention to develop. Diligentpursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficialrelationship with multinational partnersrequires untiring, even-handed patience.This is easier to accomplish within alliancesbut is equally necessary regarding prospectivecoalition partners.

6. Rationalization,Standardization, andInteroperability

In t e r n a t i o n a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,standardization, and interoperability (RSI)with allies, coalition partners, and otherfriendly nations is important for achieving:the closest practical cooperation amongtheir military forces; the most efficientuse of research, development, procurement,support, and production resources; and themost effective multinational warfightingcapability. International military RSI appliesto both materiel and non-materiel matters.

Additional guidance on RSI may be found inChairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffInstruction (CJCSI) 2700.01, “InternationalMilitary Rationalization, Standardization,and Interoperability Between the UnitedStates and Its Allies and Other FriendlyNations.”

a. Rationalization. This is any action thatincreases the effectiveness of allied and/orcoalition forces through more efficient oreffective use of defense resources committedto the alliance and/or coalition.Rationalization includes consolidation,reassignment of national priorities to higheralliance needs, standardization, specialization,mutual support or improved interoperability,and greater cooperation. Rationalizationapplies to both weapons and materielresources and non-weapons military matters.

b. Standardization. Unity of effort isgreatly enhanced through standardization.The basic purpose of standardizationprograms is to achieve the closest practicalcooperation among MNFs through theefficient use of resources and the reductionof operational, logistic, technical, andprocedural obstacles in multinationalmilitary operations.

A US Marine assists a Slovakian soldier with camouflage makeup.

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• Standardization is a four-level processbeginning with efforts for compatibility,continuing with interoperability andinterchangeability measures, andculminating with commonality (seeglossary definitions). The Department ofDefense is actively involved in severalinternational standardization programs,including the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization’s (NATO’s) manystandardization forums, the five-nation(United States, Australia, Canada,United Kingdom, and New Zealand)Air Standardization CoordinatingCommittee, and the American, British,C a n a d i a n , A u s t r a l i a n A r m i e sStandardization Program (ABCA). TheUnited States also participates in theCombined Communications-ElectronicsBoard and Australian, Canadian, NewZealand, United Kingdom, UnitedStates Naval command, control, andcommunications (C3) organizations toa c h i e v e s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n a n dinteroperability in command, control,communications, computers, andintelligence (C4I).

• Alliances provide a forum to worktowards standardization of nationalequipment, doctrine, and TTP.

Standardization is not an end in itself,but it does provide a framework thatplanners utilize as much as possible inall multinational operations. Coalitions,however, are by definition created for asingle purpose and usually (but notalways) for a finite length of time and,as such, are ad hoc arrangements. Theydo not provide military planners withthe same political resolve, commonalityof aim, or degree of organizationalmaturity as alliances.

• Alliances usually have developed adegree of standardization with regard toadministrative, logistic, and operationalprocedures. The mechanisms for thisstandardization are internationalstandardization agreements (ISAs). ISAscan be materiel or non-materiel in nature.Non-materiel related ISAs should alreadybe incorporated into US joint and Servicedoctrine and TTP. The five paragraphoperations order is one commonexample. Materiel ISAs are implementedinto the equipment design, development,or adaptation processes to facilitatestandardization. In NATO, ISAs areknown as standardization agreements(STANAGs) and are instruments thatmust be used to establish commonality

Equipment waits to be loaded at a Bosnian airport.

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in procedures and equipment. Thequadripartite standing agreements(QSTAGs) agreed to within the ABCAare another type of ISA. The existenceof these ISAs does not mean that theywill be automatically used during analliance’s multinational operation. Theiruse should be clearly specified in theOPLAN. In addition, these ISAs cannotbe used as vehicles for obligating financialresources or transferring resources.

See the discussion on use of acquisitioncross-Service agreements (ACSAs) inChapter III, “Considerations During thePlanning and Execution ofMultinational Operations.”

• Standardization agreements like theSTANAGs and QSTAGs provide abaseline for cooperation within acoalition. In many parts of the world,these multilateral and other bilateralagreements for standardization betweenpotential coalition members may be inplace prior to the formation of thecoalition. However, participants may notbe immediately familiar with suchagreements. The MNFC mustdisseminate ISAs among the MNF or relyon existing standing operatingprocedures (SOP) and clearly written,uncomplicated orders. MNFCs shouldidentify where they can best standardizethe force and achieve interoperabilitywithin the force; in communications,logistics, or administration, for example.This is more difficult to accomplish incoalition operations since participantshave not normally been associatedtogether prior to the particularcontingency. The limitations applywhen non-alliance members participatein an alliance operation. However, ISAsshould be used where possible tostandardize procedures and processes.

c. Interoperability. Historically, theproblems of interoperability have been solved— when they have been solved at all —primarily through trial and error duringactual conduct of operations over an extendedperiod of time. Interoperability is an essentialRSI requirement for multinationaloperations. Nations cannot operate effectivelytogether unless their forces are interoperable.The most important areas for interoperabilityinclude language, communications, doctrine,and exchanges of information.

• Factors which enhance achievinginteroperability start with adherence tothe tenets of multinational operations inparagraph 5. Additional factors includeplanning for interoperability; thepersonalities of the commander and staff;visits to assess allied capabilities; acommand atmosphere permittingpositive criticism; liaison teams;multinational training exercises; and aconstant effort to eliminate sources ofconfusion and misunderstanding. Theestablishment of standards for assessingthe logistic capability of expectedparticipants in a multinational operationshould be the first step in achievinglogistic interoperabil i ty amongparticipants. Such standards shouldalready be established for alliancemembers.

• Factors that inhibit achievinginteroperability include restricted accessto national proprietary defenseinformation infrastructure systems forC4I; time available; any refusal tocooperate with partners; the degree ofdifferences in military organization,security, language, doctrine, andequipment; level of experience; andconflicting personalities.

CHAPTER IICOMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

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1. National Security Structure

Several key individuals andorganizations determine the level of USmilitary involvement in multinationaloperations. The National Security Council(NSC) is the principal forum to considernational security issues that requirepresidential decisions. Its membershipincludes four statutory members: thePresident, the Vice President, the Secretaryof State, and the Secretary of Defense. TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and theDirector of Central Intelligence serve asstatutory advisors (see Figure II-1).

a. National Command Authorities. TheNCA consist of the President and theSecretary of Defense, or their duly deputizedalternates or successors. The NCA mayemploy military power to respond to situationsaffecting vital US interests. The Secretary hasstatutory authority, direction, and control overthe Military Departments. By law, only theNCA has the authority to direct both themovement of personnel and the initiation ofmilitary action.

b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffis the principal military advisor to thePresident and statutory advisor to the NSC.The Chairman may seek advice from, andconsult with, the other members of the JointChiefs of Staff. The Chairman may also seekadvice from the Joint Staff and the combatantcommanders. When directed by the President,the Chairman facilitates actions within the

“Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States ithas been as a member of — most often to lead — coalition operations.”

General Robert W. RisCassi, USA"Principles for Coalition Warfare," Joint Force Quarterly

Summer 1993

chain of command by transmittingcommunications to the commanders of thecombatant commands from the NCA;however, the Chairman does not exercisecommand over any of the combatant forces.

c. Combatant Commander. Thecombatant commander is a commander inchief (CINC) of one of the unified orspecified combatant commands establishedby the President. Combatant commandersexercise combatant command (commandauthority) (COCOM) over assigned forces.This broad authority allows the combatantcommanders to perform a variety of functions,including organizing and employingcommands and forces; assigning tasks anddesignating objectives; and directing militaryoperations, joint training, and logistics asnecessary to accomplish assigned missions.COCOM is exercised only by the combatantcommander, and cannot be delegated.

d. Department of State. TheDepartment of State (DOS) is organized toprovide foreign policy advice to thePresident, nation-to-nation representationthroughout the world, US interagencycoordination in the various nations withwhom the United States has relations, andworldwide information services. Keyplayers within the DOS are shown in FigureII-2 and include the following.

• Secretary of State. The Secretary ofState is the principal foreign policyadvisor to the President and is responsiblefor the overall direction, coordination,

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and supervision of US foreign relationsand for the interagency activities of theUS Government (USG) both outside theUnited States and with US missions tointernational organizations.

• Ambassador or Chief of Mission. TheAmbassador, or Chief of Mission(COM), is the senior US official, militaryor civilian, at the embassy. Theambassador usually has overall direction,coordination, and supervision of USGactivities and personnel in a host country.This authority does not extend topersonnel in other missions or those

assigned to either an international agencyor to a combatant commander. A crisismay arise in a nation or an area in whichthe United States has no diplomaticmission. In such a situation, the Presidentmay send a representative withinstructions that vary from the standardauthorities and responsibilities of a COM.

• Diplomatic Missions. The USdiplomatic mission to an HN includes therepresentatives of all in-country USGdepartments and agencies. US missionsto multinational organizations andalliances such as the Organization of

Figure II-1. The National Security Structure

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

Command/DirectionCoordination

DiplomaticMissions

Chairman ofJoint Chiefs of

Staff

Director ofCentral

Intelligence

CommanderUnified Command

(CINC)

CommanderSubunifiedCommand

CommanderComponentCommand

CommanderJoint Task

Force

President

Secretary ofDefense

VicePresident

Secretaryof State

National Security Council

National CommandAuthorities

NSCStatutory Advisors

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American States (OAS), NATO, and theUN include representatives of USGdepartments and agencies routinelyengaged in activities with thoseorganizations.

• Political Advisor. The political advisor(POLAD) uses knowledge of USalliance, coalition, and regional mattersto assist the commander in translatingpolitical objectives into military strategy.Each geographic combatant commanderis assigned a foreign service officerby the Department of State to act as thePOLAD. By exception, the DOS mayassign a POLAD to component orsubordinate command levels. Those notassigned a foreign service officer maybe assigned a civil service POLAD. ThePOLAD coordinates with, and ensurescooperation between, the primarypolitical and military personnel (eitherUS or MNF as appropriate).

• Country Team. The Country Team is acouncil of the senior officers representingeach USG agency or activity operatingin a host country. It is the informal titleof the in-country interagency

coordination among the key members ofthe US diplomatic mission. The CountryTeam works together under theAmbassador’s COM direction to identifytheir problems and pool their skills andresources to best serve US nationalinterests. The Country Team has no legalstanding or formal structure; it is,essentially, what the COM makes it. Itis made up of the COM, the deputy COM,senior foreign service councilorsassigned to the embassy, and seniorrepresentatives of USG agenciesassigned to the country. If there is a SAO,its chief is also a member. Whenappropriate, the geographic CINC andUS military area commander may sendrepresentatives to the Country Teammeetings, or may choose to work throughthe United States Defense Representativeto coordinate CINC related issues. TheCINC also coordinates directly with theCOM on policy and strategy issues.Through the Country Team, the COMensures that all USG activities in thecountry are coordinated and in harmonywith each other.

• Other Political Representatives. Thereare other political representatives thatmilitary commanders will have to dealwith, cooperate with, or support. Thesepolitical representatives include specialenvoys, ambassadors-at-large, or UNhigh commissioners.

2. Command and Control ofUS Forces in MultinationalOperations

The President retains commandauthority over US forces. This includes theauthority and responsibility for effectivelyusing available resources and for planningemployment, organizing, directing,coordinating, controlling, and protectingmilitary forces for the accomplishment ofassigned missions. It is sometimes prudent

KEY PLAYERS IN THEDEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State

Political Representatives

Diplomatic MissionsDiplomatic Missions

Political Representatives

Political AdvisorPolitical Advisor

Country TeamCountry Team

AmbassadorAmbassador

Secretary of State

Figure II-2. Key Players in the Department of State

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or advantageous (for reasons such asmaximizing military effectiveness andensuring unity of effort) to place appropriateUS forces under the operational control(OPCON) of a foreign commander to achievespecified military objectives. In making thedetermination to place US forces under theOPCON of non-US commanders, thePresident carefully considers such factors asthe mission, size of the proposed US force,risks involved, anticipated duration, and rulesof engagement (ROE). Additional commandand control (C2) considerations include thefollowing.

a. Operational Control. OPCON is atype of command authority. Within the UScommand structure, OPCON is transferablecommand authority that may be exercised bycommanders at any echelon at or below thelevel of combatant command. On a case bycase basis, the President may place US forcesparticipating in multilateral PO under UNauspices under the OPCON of a competentUN commander for specific UN operationsauthorized by the Security Council. ThePresident retains and will never relinquishcommand authority over US forces. Thegreater the US military role, the less likely itwill be that the United States will agree tohave a UN commander exercise overall

OPCON over US forces. Any large scaleparticipation of US forces in a major peaceenforcement mission that is likely to involvecombat should ordinarily be conducted underUS command and OPCON or throughcompetent regional organizations such asNATO or ad hoc coalitions.

OPCON for UN multilateral PO is givenfor a specific time frame or mission andincludes the authority to assign tasks to USforces already deployed by the President andto US units led by US officers. Within thelimits of OPCON, a foreign UN commandercannot change the mission or deploy USforces outside the AOR agreed to by thePresident. Nor may the foreign UNcommander separate units, divide theirsupplies, administer discipline, promoteanyone, or change their internal organization.

b. Foreign OPCON. The MNFC must beaware that many different interpretations ofOPCON and tactical control (TACON) existamong alliance and coalition partners andmust ensure complete understanding of theterms early in the planning of the operation.The fundamental elements of US commandapply when US forces are placed under theOPCON of a foreign commander. UScommanders will maintain the capability to

Swedish units patrol near Sarajevo.

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report separately to higher US militaryauthorities in addition to foreign commanders.For matters perceived as illegal under US orinternational law, or outside the mandate ofthe mission to which the United States hasagreed, US commanders will first attemptresolution with the appropriate foreigncommanders. If issues remain unresolved, theUS commanders will refer the matters tohigher US authorities. Concerns relating tolegality, mission mandate, and prudence mustbe addressed early in the planning process.These same considerations apply to foreignforces placed under the OPCON of USMNFCs. Nations do not relinquish theirnational interests by participating inmultinational operations. US commandersmust be prepared to deal with these issues asthey arise during an operation. This is one ofthe major distinguishing characteristics ofoperating in the multinational environment.In multinational operations, consensusthrough compromise is often essential tosuccess. The United States will continue towork with MNFs to streamline C2 proceduresand maximize effective coordination. Thegreater the US military role, the less likely itwill be that the President will agree to have aforeign commander exercise overall OPCONover US forces. Any large scale participation

of US forces will likely be conducted underUS command, or through competent regionalsecurity organizations such as NATO.

c. Tactical Control. TACON is anotherform of command authority exercised duringmultinational operations. It provides for thedetailed (and usually local) direction andcontrol of movements or maneuvers necessaryto accomplish the missions or tasks assigned.The commander of the parent unit continuesto exercise OPCON (when so authorized) andadministrative control over that unit unlessotherwise specified in the establishingdirective.

d. Support. Supporting relationships willbe established among participating forces inmultinational operations. The establishingauthority is responsible for ensuring that boththe supported and supporting commanderunderstand the degree of authority that thesupported commander is granted, theresponsibilities of the supporting commander,and the opportunities for establishing mutualsupport arrangements among participatingforces. US force commanders must beapprised of the opportunities, limitations, and/or conditions under which logistic supportmay be provided to forces of other nations.

Large scale participation of US forces will likely be conducted under UScommand, or through competent regional security organizations.

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e. Coordinating Authority. In manycases, coordinating authority may be the onlyacceptable means of accomplishing amultinational mission. Coordinating authorityis a consultation relationship betweencommanders, not an authority by which C2may be exercised. It is more applicable toplanning and similar activities than tooperations. Use of coordinating authorityrequires agreement among participants, as thecommander exercising coordinating authoritydoes not have the authority to resolve disputes.For this reason, its use during operationsshould be limited. Since NGOs and PVOsare not within the chain of command,coordination is the only mechanism availablefor working with those agencies.

f. Chain of Command. The chain ofcommand from the President to the lowestUS commander in the field remainsinviolate. There is no intention for theconditions specified earlier in this paragraphto subvert command links. While unity ofcommand is certainly an important criterionin any command structure, the emphasis maychange in operations when coordination andconsensus building become the key elementsand the means to achieve unity of effort.

g. Termination and Self Protection.The President has the right to terminateUS participation in multinationaloperations at any time. Additionally, USforces are authorized and obligated to takeall necessary actions for self protectionwhile participating in multinationaloperations.

3. Multinational ForceCommander

“MNFC” is a general term applied to acommander who exercises commandauthority over a military force composedof elements from two or more nations. Theextent of the MNFC’s command authorityis determined by the participating nations.This authority could range in degree fromcommand, to directing supportrelationships, to being the coordinatingauthority between the various nations, asdiscussed in paragraph 2 above. Suchauthority, however, is seldom absolute.MNFCs unify the efforts of the MNFtoward common objectives. Gainingconsensus is an important aspect ofdecision making in multinationaloperations.

Multinational flight of aircraft participating in Operation DENY FLIGHT.

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4. Overview of MultinationalCommand Structures

No single command structure best fits theneeds of all alliances and coalitions. Eachcoalition or alliance will create the structurethat will best meet the needs, politicalrealities, constraints, and objectives ofthe participating nations. Politicalconsiderations heavily influence the ultimateshape of the command structure. However,participating nations should strive to achieveunity of command for the operation to themaximum extent possible, with missions,tasks, responsibilities, and authorities clearlydefined and understood by all participants.While command relationships are well definedin US doctrine, they are not necessarily partof the doctrinal lexicon of nations with whichthe United States may operate in an allianceor coalition.

a. Alliances. In alliances, national politicalobjectives are addressed and generallysubsumed within MNF objectives at thealliance treaty level. Generally, alliancecommand structures have been carefullydeveloped over extended periods of time andhave a high degree of stability and consensus.Doctrine, standardization, and politicalconsensus characterize alliances. However,these command structures may be modifiedor tailored for particular operations, especiallywhen alliance operations may include non-alliance members. However, use of alliancesfor purposes other than those for which theirintegrated structures were designed, or inoperations for which they have not had thelead time necessary to develop integratedplans and structures, may result in behaviorthat more closely approximates that of acoalition.

b. Coalitions. Within a coalition formedto meet a specific crisis, the political views ofthe participants may have much greaterinfluence over the ultimate commandrelationships. National pride and prestige of

member nations can limit options fororganization of the coalition command, asmany nations prefer to not subordinate theirforces to those of other nations. Coalitionmissions and objectives tend to evolve overtime. Likewise, force capabilities may varyover time. This variation will, in turn, affectthe overall command capability to react to achanging mission. Political objectives andlimitations will also change over time, furthercomplicating the task of the MNFC. Thecommander should be attuned to thesechanges and make adjustments to thecommand structure and training program tomitigate negative impacts where possible.

c. Organizational Structure. As in thecase of unified action and joint operations,basic organizational options are area orfunctional orientation and single-Service orjoint organization, to which are added nationalor multinational formations. Regardless ofhow the MNF is organized operationally, eachnation furnishing forces normally establishesa national component to ensure effectiveadministration of its forces. Its functions aresimilar to a Service component command atthe unified command level in a US jointorganization. (The US military structure toconduct multinational operations is normallythe joint task force.) The logistic supportelement of this component is referred to asthe National Support Element. The nationalcomponent provides a means to administerand support the national forces, coordinatecommunication to the parent nation, tendernational military views and recommendationsdirectly to the multinational commander, andfacilitate the assignment and reassignment ofnational forces to subordinate operationalmultinational organizations. As in the caseof a joint headquarters (HQ), a multinationalHQ should reflect the general composition ofthe MNFs as a whole. The national elementwill be the vehicle for execution of Title 10,US Code (USC) responsibilities for US forces.(See Figure II-3 for a notional multinationalcommand structure.)

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See JP 4-08, “Joint Doctrine for LogisticSupport of Multinational Operations.”

5. Alliance CommandStructures

Alliances typically have establishedcommand structures, support systems, andstandardized procedures. In allianceoperations, such structures should be used tothe maximum practical extent. Alliancecommand and force structures oftenmirror the degree of alliance memberparticipation. Subordinate commands are

often led by senior military officers frommember nations. Effective operations withinan alliance require that the senior politicaland military authorities be in agreement onthe type of command relationships that willgovern the operations of the forces.

See Appendix A, “Commander’s Checklist forMultinational Operations,” for a discussion ofother alliance command terminology. It mayhelp the MNFC and the national leaders identifyand agree on a command relationship definitionthat satisfies unity of effort while protecting theirnational autonomy.

NOTIONAL MULTINATIONAL COMMANDSTRUCTURE

NATIONAL COMMAND

COMMAND AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDERBY PARTICIPATING NATIONS

* EXAMPLES INCLUDE UN, ALLIANCES, TREATIES, OR COALITION AGREEMENT

US NATIONALFORCE

NATIONALFORCE

NATIONALFORCE

MULTINATIONALFORCE

COMMANDER

LEGITIMIZINGAUTHORITY*

NATIONALGOVERNMENT

UNITED STATESNATIONALCOMMAND

AUTHORITIES

NATIONALGOVERNMENT

COMBATANTCOMMANDERS

Figure II-3. Notional Multinational Command Structure

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Notwithstanding peacetime commandrelationships within an alliance, it should berecognized that because of the politicalsensitivities of an actual multinationaloperation, a considerable “learning curve” willbe experienced regarding commandrelationships and operating procedures.Alliance command relationships oftenreflect either an integrated commandstructure or a lead nation commandstructure.

a. Integrated Command Structure. Analliance organized under an integratedcommand structure provides unity of effortin a multinational setting (see Figure II-4). Agood example of this command structure isfound in NATO where a strategic commanderis designated from a member nation, but thestrategic command staff and the commandersand staffs of subordinate commands are ofmultinational makeup. The key ingredientsin an integrated alliance command are that asingle commander be designated, that the staffbe composed of representatives from all

member nations, and that subordinatecommands and staffs be integrated into thelowest echelon necessary to accomplish themission.

b. Lead Nation Command Structure

• This structure exists in an alliance whenall member nations place their forcesunder the control of one nation (seeFigure II-5). A current example in NATOis the Allied Command Europe RapidReaction Corps, the makeup of whoseHQ staff and subordinate commandsdepends largely on the lead nation. Thecommand can be distinguished by adominant lead nation command and staffarrangement with subordinate elementsretaining strict national integrity.

• It is also possible for a lead nationcommand in an alliance to becharacterized by an integrated staff andmultinational subordinate forces.Integrating the staff allows the

Figure II-4. Alliance Integrated Command Structure

ALLIANCE INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE

ALLIANCECOMMANDER

INTEGRATEDSTAFF

MULTINATIONALFORCES

MULTINATIONALFORCES

MULTINATIONALFORCES

ALLIANCEINTEGRATEDCOMPONENT



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commander to draw upon the expertiseof alliance partners in areas where thelead nation may have less experience.

• Rotational command, a variation of leadnation command, allows eachparticipating nation to be the lead nationin turn. To be effective, command tourlengths should be adjusted so that othernations may have the opportunity to bethe lead nation. However, commandtours should not be so short to beoperationally meaningless. Examplesinclude the NATO Standing Naval ForcesAtlantic and Mediterranean, which have12 month command tours that rotatebetween the participants.

6. Coalition CommandStructures

Many coalitions are formed in rapidresponse to unforeseen crises which usuallyoccur outside the area or scope of an allianceor when the response requires more than analliance to handle it. The command

relationships usually evolve as a coalitiondevelops. Coalitions are most oftencharacterized by one of three basicstructures: parallel, lead nation, or acombination of the two. In coalitionoperations, member nations may desire toretain even more control of their own nationalforces than is generally associated withalliance operations.

a. Parallel Command Structures. Undera parallel command, no single forcecommander is designated (see Figure II-6).The coalition leadership must develop a meansfor coordination among the participants toattain unity of effort. This can beaccomplished through the use of coordinationcenters (See paragraph 7b). Nonetheless,because of the absence of a single commander,the use of a parallel command structure shouldbe avoided if at all possible.

b. Lead Nation Command Structure.Another common command structure in acoalition is the lead nation command (seeFigure II-5). A coalition of this makeup sees

Figure II-5. Lead Nation Command Structure

LEAD NATION COMMAND STRUCTURE

LEAD NATIONHEADQUARTERS

NATIONALFORCES

US FORCES NATIONALFORCES

NATIONALFORCES

COMMANDER

US FORCESCOMMANDER

NATIONALFORCES

COMMANDER

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all coalition members subordinating theirforces to a single partner. However, nationsare generally reluctant to grant extensivecontrol over their forces to one lead nation.Coalition counterparts are also sensitive toactions that might be construed as preferentialto the lead nation’s interests. One means ofensuring that the HQ is representative of theentire coalition is to augment the HQ staff withrepresentatives from the participatingcoalition members, such as designateddeputies or assistant commanders, planners,and logisticians. This provides the coalitioncommander with representative leadership, aready source of expertise on the capabilitiesof the respective coalition members, andfacilitates the planning process.

c. Combination. Lead nation and parallelcommand structures can exist simultaneouslywithin a coalition. This combination occurswhen two or more nations serve as controllingelements for a mix of international forces, suchas the command arrangement employed bythe Gulf War coalition (see Figure II-7).

7. Control of MultinationalOperations

There are two key structural enhancementsthat should improve the control of MNFs: aliaison network and coordination centers.

a. Liaison. The need for effective liaisonis vital in any MNF. Differences in doctrine,organization, equipment, training, andnational law demand a robust liaison structureto facilitate operations. Not only is the use ofliaison an invaluable confidence-building toolbetween the MNFC and lower levels ofdifferent nationalities, but it is also asignificant source of information for theMNFC. During multinational operations,joint forces establish liaison early withforces of each nation, fostering a betterunderstanding of mission and tactics,facilitating transfer of vital information,enhancing mutual trust, and developing anincreased level of teamwork. Earlyestablishment reduces the fog and frictioncaused by incompatible communications

Figure II-6. Coalition Parallel Command Structure (With Coordination Center)

COALITION PARALLEL COMMAND STRUCTURE(WITH COORDINATION CENTER)

COALITIONHEADQUARTERS

WEST

COALITIONHEADQUARTERS

EAST

FORCES FROMCOALITION NATIONS

#4, #5, & #6

FORCES FROMCOALITION NATIONS

#1, #2, & #3

COORDINATIONCENTER

COORDINATIONCOMMAND OR CONTROL

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systems, doctrine, and operatingprocedures.

• Liaison is often accomplished throughthe use of liaison teams. These teamsmust be knowledgeable about thestructure, capabilities, weapons systems,logistics, C4I systems, and planningmethods that are employed within their

commands. Liaison requirements for USforces participating in multinationaloperations are usually greater thananticipated or normally staffed.Personnel liaison requirements must beidentified early during the planningprocess and staffed accordingly. Teammembers should be language qualifiedor provided interpreter support.

Figure II-7. Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM

COALITION COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOROPERATION DESERT STORM

NATIONAL LDRSOF UNITEDKINGDOM

NATIONAL COMMANDAUTHORITIES OFUNITED STATES

NATIONAL LDRSOF FRANCE

NATIONAL LDRSOF ARAB/ISLAMIC

NATIONS

JOINT FORCEGROUND

COMMANDER(SAUDI)

JOINT FORCEAIR

COMMANDER(SAUDI)

NATIONAL OPERATIONALCOMMAND

TACTICAL CONTROL

COORDINATION

BRITISHFORCE COMMANDER

UNITED STATESFORCE COMMANDER

(CINCCENT)

JOINT FORCE/THEATEROF OPS COMMANDER

(SAUDI)FRENCH FORCECOMMANDER

GROUNDCOMMANDER

GROUNDCOMMANDER

AIRCOMMANDER

AIRCOMMANDER

AIR FORCECOMMANDER

(CENTAF)(JFACC)

ARMYCOMMANDER

(ARCENT)

MARINECOMMANDER(MARCENT)

NAVYCOMMANDER

(NAVCENT)

SPECIAL OPERATIONFORCES COMMANDER

(SOCCENT)

F2C2

KEY (terms used during DESERT STORM)

ARCENTCENTAFCINCCENTF2C2JFACCMARCENTNAVCENTSOCCENT

US Army Forces, US Central CommandUS Central Command Air ForcesCommander in Chief, US Central Commandfriendly forces coordinating counciljoint force air component commanderUS Marine Component, US Central CommandUS Navy Forces, US Central CommandSpecial Operations Component, US Central Command

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Understanding language and culture arekey factors to successful liaisonoperations. However, professionalknowledge and functional expertise arefar more important and influential.

• Once liaison is established, liaison teamsbecome the direct representatives of theirrespective commanders. Their useenhances understanding of any situationthat may have been distorted by the filtersof other national agencies and levels.

• Special operations forces (SOF) haveproven particularly effective inintegrating MNFs. Their languagecapabilities, cultural awareness, andexperience in working and training withother countries’ militaries allows themto improve coordination, minimizemisunderstanding, and save lives duringMNF operations. SOF can also providethe MNFC with accurate assessments ofMNF readiness, training, and otherfactors.

b. Coordination Centers. Another meansof controlling an MNF is the use of a friendlyforces coordination center. US commandersshould routinely advocate creation of such acenter in the early stages of any coalitioneffort, especially one that is operating undera parallel command structure. It is a provenmeans of enhancing stability and interactionwithin the coalition as capabilities developwithin the operating area. Not only can acoordination center be used for C2 purposes,but variations can be used to organize andcontrol a variety of functional areas, includinglogistics and civil-military operations (CMO).

• Initially, a coordination center can be thefocal point for support issues such asforce sustainment, alert and warning,host-nation support (HNS), movementcontrol, and training. However, as acoalition matures, the role of the

coordination center can be expanded toinclude command activities.

• When a coordination center is activated,member nations provide a staff elementto the center that is comprised of actionofficers who are familiar with supportactivities such as those listed above.Coalition nations should be encouragedto augment this staff with linguists andrequisite communications capabilities tomaintain contact with their parent HQ.

Apart from the central coalitioncoordination center mentioned above, anumber of functional coordination centersmay be established within an overallcombined logistics coordination or supportcommand for either an alliance or coalitionoperation. Activities centrally coordinated

Multinational operations may require interactionwith a variety of agencies, both military andnonmilitary.

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or controlled by such centers would includemovement control, centralized contracting,theater-level logistic support operations,overall medical support, and infrastructureengineering. Key to the success of suchcenters is the early establishment and staffingwith functionally skilled personnel to exerciseappropriate control of designated activities.

8. Civil-MilitaryCoordination

In many operating environments, the MNFinteracts with a variety of entities requiringunified actions by the geographic combatantcommander, including nonmilitarygovernmental agencies (like US Agency forInternational Development), NGOs (such asreligious relief agencies), corporations, PVOs(such as the American Red Cross), andinternational organizations (such as the UN).These groups play an important role inproviding support to HNs. Thoughdifferences may exist between military forcesand civilian agencies, short-term objectivesare frequently very similar.

a. Relationships. The MNFC’srelationship with these organizations will varydepending on the nature of the contingencyand the particular type of organizationinvolved.

• Relationships with other governmentalagencies (US and those of other nations)and supranational agencies (UN andalliance structures) will be marked by adegree of formality that may duplicateor at least resemble a supported and/orsupporting command relationship. Inwar, nonmilitary objectives will usuallybe subordinated to military ones and anyinteragency structures should supportmilitary action. During MOOTW,nonmilitary objectives can either besuperior, equal to, or subordinate to themilitary objectives. It is imperative thatany interagency structure relationships

be clearly defined with respect to militarysupport before commencement ofoperations other than war. Otheragencies may be lead agent foroperations other than war, with militaryforces providing support. In some cases,the lead agency is prescribed by law orregulation, or by agreement betweenallied and coalition forces and theagencies involved. (US NCA shouldprovide clear guidance regarding therelationships between US militarycommanders and US governmentalagencies.)

• In order to achieve the greatest unity ofeffort, activities and capabilities of NGOsand PVOs must be factored into thecommander’s assessment of conditionsand resources, and integrated into theselected concept of operations. Inaddition, the OPLAN should provideguidance to the MNFC regardingrelationships with and support to NGOs,PVOs, and international organizationsoperating within the operational area.Because many of these organizations donot operate within the military orgovernmental hierarchy, the relationshipbetween an MNFC and PVOs and NGOsis neither supported nor supporting. Anassociate or partnership may moreaccurately describe the relationship thatexists between them. In some cases,NGOs and PVOs may providemanagement and direction. Typically,this relationship would occur duringMOOTW. Operations of NGOs andPVOs will vary based upon the nature ofthe MOOTW (i.e., they may be muchmore heavily involved in FHAoperations than peace enforcement).Communicating clearly, recognizingeach other’s limitations, and buildingconsensus and cooperation are criticalstepping stones to achieving a unifiedeffort. A transition plan is essential whenrelieving, replacing, or relinquishing to

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PVOs, NGOs, and internationalorganizations. This must begin as earlyas possible in the planning cycle for suchoperations. During war, the relationshipwith most NGOs and PVOs will besubordinated to the military tasks at hand.

b. Coordination Centers. MNFCs canachieve significant positive results inaccomplishing their missions and shapingbetter conditions by finding positive ways tointeract with these organizations. One meansof enhancing the working relationshipbetween NGOs and PVOs when there is nocommand relationship is through theirintegration with existing coordination centers,as described in paragraph 7b. While theMNFC cannot always exert commandinfluence over these entities, it is possible tooperate through a process of communication,consensus, cooperation, and coordination.The CMOC can be useful in deconflicting andcoordinating operations among these groups.

See JP 3-57, “Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.”

c. Agreements. The interagencyenvironment does not preclude establishingformal agreements between the military andcivilian government agencies. Suchagreements can take the form of memoranda

of understanding or terms of reference. Whenappropriate, heads of agencies and militarycommanders negotiate and co-sign plans.Congress has tightly restricted the delegationof authority to negotiate and sign agreementswith foreign nations, forces or agencies. Also,there are regulatory and statutory fiscalconstraints involving agreements between theArmed Forces of the United States and otherUS governmental and nongovernmentalagencies. A Judge Advocate should beconsulted before negotiating or entering intoany agreements outside the Department ofDefense. (Normally, the DOS will take thelead in US negotiations with supranational andother nations’ agencies.) The greatest successwill be achieved if these negotiations areconcluded prior to the commencement of anoperation.

JP 3-08, “Interagency Coordination DuringJoint Operations,” provides more detail oninteragency coordination and on agenciesexpected to be involved.

Presidential Decision Directive 56,“Interagency Management of ComplexContingency Operations,” signed 20 May,1997, provides additional guidance forinteragency planning, coordinating andexecuting MOOTW, both at the USG policylevel and the operational and/or field level.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIICONSIDERATIONS DURING THE PLANNING ANDEXECUTION OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

III-1

1. Mission Analysis andAssignment of Tasks

The conditions that could generate amultinational operation are varied and mayresult from manmade causes, such as armedaggression by one nation against another, ornatural disasters. Likewise, the sources forthe strategic guidance in responding to suchemergencies are numerous and may comefrom such organizations as the UN, NATO,other existing alliances or coalitions, or anindividual nation. Regardless of the sourceof that strategic guidance, a detailed missionanalysis must be accomplished and is oneof the most important tasks in planningmultinational operations. This analysisshould result in a mission statement andcampaign plan for the MNF as a whole anda restated mission for the US element ofthe force. Before assigning tasks to variouselements of the MNF, a commander, with theassistance of the staff, should conduct anestimate of the situation. This will allow theMNFC to analyze, in an organized manner,the many factors that will affect theaccomplishment of the assigned mission(s).This analysis should include the respectivecapabilities, political will, and nationalinterests of the MNF components. As part ofthe mission analysis, force requirementsshould be identified; standards forparticipation published (e.g., training levelcompetence and logistics, includingdeployment, sustainment, and redeploymentcapabilities); and funding requests,certification procedures, and forcecommitments solicited from alliance or likely

“Neither policies nor machines will determine the history of tomorrow. Manis the measure of all things... This, then, is the ultimate battlefield: the heartsand minds of men.”

Hanson W. Baldwin

coalition participants. Additionally, expectedinteragency contributions and involvement ofeach nation should be addressed. This is acritical step as each nation determines whatits contribution to the operation will be.National force commitments, even in anestablished alliance, are not automatic. Basedupon these national contributions, and afterdetermining the tasks necessary to achieve theobjectives that support missionaccomplishment, the MNFC should assign aspecific task to the element of the MNF mostcapable of completing that task. If there areseveral elements that can complete the task,the MNFC should consider assigning that taskin a manner that ensures that all elements canmake meaningful contributions to the desiredend state.

2. Political and MilitaryConsiderations

a. Capabilities. As shown in FigureIII-1, military capabilities of nations differbased on national interests, objectives,arms control limitations, doctrine,organization, training, leaderdevelopment, equipment, history, defensebudget, and domestic politics. The MNFCmust be aware of the differences in thepolitical constraints and capabilities of theforces of various nations, and consider thesedifferences when assigning missions andconducting operations. The MNFCcommander may be required to spendconsiderable time working political issues.The commander’s role as diplomat shouldnot be underestimated. Commanders will

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routinely work directly with politicalauthorities in the region. Even within theirown command, political limitations andconstraints on the employment of the forceswill greatly influence daily operations.

b. Integration. The basic challenge inmultinational operations is the effectiveintegration and employment of all assetsprovided toward the achievement of acommon objective. This goal may beachieved through unity of effort despitedisparate (and occasionally incompatible)capabilities, ROE, equipment, and procedures.To reduce disparities among participatingforces, minimum capability standards shouldbe established and a certification processdeveloped. Identified shortcomings shouldbe satisfied by either bilateral or multilateralsupport agreements (formal or informal) prior

to the deployment of forces to the operationalarea. This process relies heavily upondetailed coordination between prospectiveforces and the MNFC. The degree ofinvolvement of each participant is likelyto be a purely political decision, and thecommander must be cognizant of nationalmandates placed on individual units. Itmay be necessary to employ the forceaccording to national and politicalconsiderations.

c. Employment. The national interest ofcountries varies in most contingencies andresults in differing degrees of commitment byalliance and coalition members. Those mostcommitted will authorize the full range ofemployment. Other countries may limit theircountry’s forces to defensive or combatservice support roles.

Figure III-1. Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations

NATIONAL INTERESTS

ARMS CONTROL LIMITATIONS

DOCTRINE

ORGANIZATION

OBJECTIVES

TRAINING

HISTORY

LEADER DEVELOPMENT

DEFENSE BUDGET

EQUIPMENT

DOMESTIC POLITICS

FACTORS AFFECTING THE MILITARYCAPABILITIES OF NATIONS

NATIONAL INTERESTS

OBJECTIVES

ARMS CONTROL LIMITATIONS

DOCTRINE

ORGANIZATION

TRAINING

HISTORY

LEADER DEVELOPMENT

DEFENSE BUDGET

EQUIPMENT

DOMESTIC POLITICS

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Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations

3. Intelligence and Information

Every phase of the intelligence cycle —planning and direction, collection,processing and exploitation, analysis andproduction, dissemination and integration,and evaluation and feedback — issubstantively affected in multinationaloperations (see Figure III-2). In addition,the type of operations, be they war orMOOTW, imposes further uniqueconsiderations that significantly alter standardjoint intelligence operations. Consequently,each coalition or alliance must develop its ownintelligence procedures, utilizing availableassets, that are tailored to the mission. In everycase, however, the procedures developed mustbe responsive to the MNFC’s requirements,and the delivered intelligence products timelyand accurate. The release of classifiedinformation to MNFs is governed by national

disclosure policy (NDP). Detailed guidancemust be provided to the senior US commanderby the chain of command in accordance withNational Security Decision Memorandum(NSDM) 119, “Disclosure of ClassifiedUnited States Military Information to ForeignGovernments and InternationalOrganizations” and NDP-1, “National Policyand Procedures for the Disclosure ofClassified Military Information to ForeignGovernments and InternationalOrganizations.” Detailed written guidancemay be supplemented with limited delegationof disclosure authority where appropriate(e.g., combined force protection purposes).However, the senior US officer needs tobecome personally concerned with the issuesof intelligence sharing and releasing ofinformation early in the process in order toensure that the commander’s requirementshave been clearly stated and understood; that

Figure III-2. The Intelligence Cycle

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

PLANNINGAND

DIRECTION

DISSEMINATIONAND

INTEGRATION

COLLECTION

PROCESSINGAND

EXPLOITATION

ANALYSISAND

PRODUCTION

MISSION

EVALUATION

AN

DEFE DBACK

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the guidance issued is supportive of thoserequirements; and that the procedures to befollowed are supportable by the MNFC.

a. Planning. When planning or directingintelligence operations, centralized controlis desired but frequently unattainable. Aswith overall command relationships, butespecially in intelligence, a hybridorganization evolves that usually has somenational assets (and the intelligence gatheredby them) placed at the coalition’s disposal,while others are retained under the directcontrol of individual nations. Due to thecovert and clandestine nature of manyintelligence gathering operations, nations arereluctant to share all of their sources andmethods of obtaining intelligence. It is veryunlikely that nations will make many of theirintelligence resources directly available fortasking by a coalition. Many nations mayadopt the technique of having a nationalintelligence cell at the MNF HQ throughwhich tasking and/or support will flow to and/or from the nation and the MNF HQ. Thebasis of a collection strategy is formed byweaving the intelligence requirements withavailable assets, superimposed upon thecoalition’s intelligence estimate of the existinggeographical, political, social, cultural,

economic, and military factors in anoperational area, and the likely threat coursesof action. Each nation’s ability to gather andprocess intelligence, through human ortechnical means, varies widely. The MNF’scollection manager(s) must account for thisand task resources accordingly. The managermust approach this task with an “all-sourceintelligence” mentality, gathering informationthat answers intelligence requirements froma variety of sources and fusing it,strengthening the reliability of the overallconclusions in the process. The process ofgathering information, processinginformation, and ultimately disseminating itto a wide spectrum of users is predicated oneffective communications, both vertical andlateral. The usefulness of intelligenceinformation to the MNFC is directlyproportional to its timeliness and accuracy,especially in targeting and maneuver.

b. Communications and ProcessingArchitectures. Due to the perishable natureof pertinent, releasable intelligence, it isimperative that a system be devised for andby the MNF members that is capable oftransmitting the most important intelligencerapidly to units. Frequently this system relieson the distribution of standardized equipment

Multinational operations provide unique challenges in developing intelligenceprocedures among the participating nations.

III-5


by one country’s forces to ensurecommonality. The system must also be firmlyrooted in a network of coalition liaison officersat major intelligence production orcommunication centers, to provide redundantintelligence communications channels to theirparent nation, and to determine and obtainintelligence uniquely suited for that nation’smission in time to exploit it.

c. Coordination. Within alliances, it iscommon for intelligence procedures,practices, and standardized agreements to beestablished and tested prior to actual use.Coalitions, however, are frequently ad hocorganizations, created and disbandedrelatively quickly. It is therefore imperativeto compensate for the lack of standardizationthrough coordination. As mentioned above,communications architectures are essentialelements to coordinate. Additional areasrequiring extensive coordination include thefriendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum,use of space and/or space assets, geographicallocation of intelligence collection assets, andtargets of intelligence collection. Intelligenceprocessing centers should be multinational incharacter, serving the MNFC but alsorecognizing intelligence that has value insupport of national missions. However,

establishment of these multinationalprocessing centers, particularly in the case ofad hoc coalitions, will require extensivepersonal involvement and support from theMNFC and the corresponding nation in orderto make this a functioning reality. Again, theMNFC’s priority intelligence requirementsshould serve as the milestones to fully focusthe intelligence effort. The answers can onlybe gained through effective coordination atall levels.

See JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Supportto Joint Operations,” for further details.

d. MOOTW. Operations conducted in aMOOTW environment demand far greaterattention from the military analyst to thepolitical, social, economic, and culturaldynamics that exist within an AOR and/orjoint operations area (JOA) than doesconventional war. Such operations expandIPB well past geographical and forcecapability considerations. In a MOOTWenvironment, the centers of gravity frequentlyare not conventional military forces or terrain.Sources describing these non-traditionaldynamics are plentiful. Within an operationalarea, the local media, diplomatic missionpersonnel (including attachés), NGOs, PVOs,

Close coordination is essential when alliances are formed to ensure thesmooth flow of information between nations.

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and international organizations can providesignificant detail which is unobtainableelsewhere. Traditional reconnaissanceelements such as SOF are useful as well.However, special consideration must be givento the intelligence role that combat supportsoldiers have during operations in a MOOTWenvironment. Given that the operational areais non-traditional (i.e., non-linear), medicalpersonnel, transportation personnel,contracting personnel, CA personnel,psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel,and soldiers performing missions involvingextensive contact with the local populationwill provide a much better source forinformation than in conventional operations.These personnel will operate in the HNenvironment routinely and will be able todiscern change within it.

See JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for MilitaryOperations Other Than War,” for furtherdetails.

e. Other Considerations. It is importantto consider the ramifications of labelinginformation about an AOR and/or JOA asintelligence, especially when interacting withnonmilitary organizations. In many cultures,the perception of intelligence connotesinformation gathered on a nation’s citizenryto exploit it. Further, attempts to exchangeinformation with many NGOs and PVOswould likely be stifled as they strive tomaintain political neutrality throughout theworld and would not associate in anyperceived intelligence gathering attempts.Therefore, unclassified facts and/or datashould be referred to as information in orderto facilitate its exchange throughout the AORand/or JOA for the purpose of fosteringmutual interests in resolving or deterringconflict or providing support.

f. Geospatial Information & Services(GI&S). Multinational operations requireinteroperable GI&S data, applications, and

data exchange capabilities. Wheneverpossible, participants should agree to workon a standard datum and ensure that allproducts utilize that datum. A multinationalGI&S plan must coordinate all products foruse by member forces, to include accessapproval procedures, blending their assetsinto a cohesive production program.

See JP 2-03, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Geospatial Information andServices Support to Joint Operations,” forfurther details.

4. Logistics and Host-NationSupport

Effective logistic support is fundamentalto operational success; the MNFC must beable to logistically influence the conduct ofoperations. Multinational operations increasethe complexity of executing logistics andreduce the degree of flexibility normally foundin a national logistic support system.Although each nation is responsible forlogistic support of its national forces, theexecution of multinational logistics must bea collective responsibility of the nationscomprising the MNF. This collectiveresponsibility is critical and cannot beoverstressed. Multinational logistics shouldbe flexible, responsive, predictive, and shouldprovide timely sustainment throughout theentire MNF. The multinational logistic planshould incorporate the logistic requirementsand capabilities of the MNF to ensuresustained and synchronized execution. Theintent is to provide the MNFC with the timelyintroduction and proper mix of support unitsand resources into the operational area.Achievement of this goal requiresconsiderable cooperation and continuouscoordination among (and between) allelements of the logistic support andoperational elements. This must begin duringthe initial planning phase and continuethrough the operation’s termination.

III-7


a. Responsibility. The responsibility forproviding logistic support to nationalcomponent forces ultimately resides withtheir nations, unless previously agreed to inaccordance with alliance implementingarrangements (IAs) or coalition ISAs. Varyingdegrees of mutual logistic support exist inmultinational operations and must be plannedto complement partners’ capabilities andminimize weaknesses. To require each nationin an MNF to perform all logistic functionsseparately would be inefficient, expensive,and hinder the MNFC’s ability to influenceoperations logistically. The synergy requiredfor successful multinational logistics iscentralized control and coordination ofcommon services and common funding forlogistic services where appropriate (e.g.,transportation, billeting) to reduce overallcosts.

See JP 4-08, “Joint Doctrine for LogisticSupport of Multinational Operations.”

b. Differences. Among the participatingnations, there will be differences in logisticsdoctrine, organizational capabilities, SOPs (toinclude reporting formats), terminology anddefinitions, methods for computingrequirements, organizational policies, and

automated data processing (ADP) supportsystems. These differences must beunderstood by all, harmonized whererealistically possible, and accounted forduring OPLAN formulation. IAs and ISAsshould be clearly specified in OPLANs toensure their use by multinational formations.Multinational logistics planning must occursimultaneously and concurrently withoperation planning. Such plans should bedeveloped in consonance with prospectiveparticipating nations to achieve logisticefficiencies. The challenge of planning is insimultaneously supporting an ongoingoperation while developing the supportorganization, bilateral and multilateralagreements and associated C2 mechanisms toachieve unity of effort. To the extent thatconcurrent planning occurs, many of thesechallenges may be avoided or minimized.

c. Authority. MNFCs may have directivelogistic authority if coordinated in plandevelopment or when consent is provided byparticipating national commands. Requestswill be made to national commanders toassume organizational missions in support ofMNFs. In some cases, the MNFC mayexercise control over the various nationallogistic units. In other cases, the MNFC may

Unloading an Air Force C-5 Galaxy in Haiti.

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have only coordinating authority. The degreeof authority will depend upon existingagreements and ad hoc arrangementsnegotiated with participating nations and/oras identified in the campaign plan and/orOPLAN. The MNFC may delegate tocomponent commanders (land, maritime, air)only the level of coordinating authoritygranted by the individual nations. The MNFCmay establish a logistic coordination or controlcenter headed by a senior logistic coordinator tocontrol or coordinate common or theater-levellogistic support within the operational area.Some of the major support issues that must beresolved by the MNFC include the following.

• Ensuring that the mutual logistic supportfor US forces is in accordance withexisting legal authorities. The ForeignAssistance Act, the Arms Export ControlAct, ACSA authority, the FederalProperty and Administrative ServicesAct of 1949 (as amended), the FlyAmerica Act, and the Cargo PreferenceActs all have a bearing on the degree ofsupport that the United States can provideto or receive from other nations. Inaddition, specific legislative language

contained in DOD authorization orappropriation acts may limit US abilityto receive and/or provide logistic supportfrom and/or to allies.

• Identification of common supplies andservices that might be provided by onenation or a multinational organization.

• Establishing if, when, and how an MNFCwill be provided authority over nationallogistic assets (to include authority forredistribution of national supplies underemergency conditions). This requires anational decision by participatingnations.

• Availability and use of common and/orup-front funding for establishing cost-effective contracts, establishingmultinational headquarters, and generaland/or common support.

• Development of policies and proceduresto account and reimburse for logisticservices and supplies exchanged betweenthe United States and other nations underthe ACSA authority.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC — 1965

“The intervention [in the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965], was not a missionof conquest, but rather an effort to safeguard the lives of US and other nationalsand to restore order in the country without taking sides in the dispute... Inaddition to providing security of US property and evacuating Americancitizens... [the] US military forces conducted urban warfareoperations...participated in civil affairs and psychological warfare programs,supported diplomatic efforts to achieve a political settlement, and providedtroops for the Inter-American Peace Force...The establishment of the IAPF wasa historic first. [It] demonstrated that multinational forces can work togethereffectively...It also reaffirmed the requirement for joint doctrine..., [howeverseveral] problems were encountered...the lack of adequate strategiccommunications... Pertinent intelligence and availability of maps... [lack of]joint public affairs organization representing the Department of Defense, theState Department and other... agencies.”

SOURCE: James B. Motley

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• Establishment of responsibility andrelease procedures for national assets.

• Development of the means to maintainnational asset accountability (from thenational sustaining base to the front lineunits).

• E n s u r i n g c o m p a t i b i l i t y a n dinteroperability of communicationsnetworks to include ADP interfacesbetween national logistic organizationsof the MNF and national support systems,and how to integrate informationclassification requirements.

• Prioritization, C2, allocation, and use ofcommon infrastructure capabilities (e.g.,ports, airfields, roads) to support militaryand civil operations.

• Identification and distribution of thoseISAs (STANAGs, QSTAGSs) that canfacilitate the provision of multinationallogistic support.

d. Civilians and Contractors. The useof civilian contractors and HNS agencies oftenincreases the logistic capability of the MNF.Non-uniformed support agencies may beintegrated into the logistic structure of theMNF to ensure their most effectiveemployment and use. Commanders shouldbe prepared to assume all essential logistic-related responsibilities in the event thissupport is curtailed or terminated. TheCMOC, as well as logistic coordinationcenters, may be useful in coordinating withHN infrastructure. Consideration should begiven to the centralization of HNS expertise(legal, financial, acquisition, medical, andadministrative) to ensure that the force’s totalrequirements are known and to preventcompetition between partners. Allocation ofthis support is based on command prioritieswhich best support the operational objectives.Additionally, nations must agree on whether

an MNF commander will have the authorityto conclude HNS arrangements or whetherprior national approval is required.

e. Planning. Often little planning timeis available prior to a multinationaloperation. However, to the extent thatplanning time is available, logistic supportplanning should be conducted concurrentlywith operational planning. Since suchplanning is critical, it will be frequentlynecessary to share partial or incompleteplanning data (or data not fully approved) withprospective partners. Staffs should evaluatethe level of standardization andinteroperability among participatingnations and, where situations permit, cometo agreement on which nations will beresponsible for providing logistic supportfunctions for the MNF, the taskorganization of the logistic units to supportthe MNF, and the procedures and methodsfor how the support will be provided. Atthe MNF HQ, the focus should be onmeasuring the requirements of executing thecampaign plan, providing advance estimatesof these requirements to national units, andensuring that proper controls are in place todeconflict and permit movement andprocessing. Frequently, planning HQ,especially logistic planning HQ, are staffedwith personnel temporarily assigned. Tofacilitate early planning, personnel must beidentified and made available in a timelymanner. There are three generally acceptedmethods of executing cooperative logistics inan MNF. These can be used singularly or incombination. Regardless of the mutualsupport method(s) used, it is imperative thatnational decisions and commitments to leador participate in such arrangements beprovided early during the planning cycle.Assuming a lead nation or role specializationnation status does not grant the US forces anyadditional legal authority to provide supportto coalition partners on a non-reimbursablebasis.

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• In the lead nation concept, a nationaccepts responsibility to provide one ormore logistic functions within a specifiedgeographic area in support of the MNF.

• In a role specialization agreement, anation accepts responsibility to providea particular class of supply or service forall or most of the MNF.

• Using pooled assets and resources, twoor more nations form an integratedlogistic support structure to providesupply or support functions to the MNF.

The role specialist nation (RSN) missionin NATO can be implemented for a NATOoperation that includes member and non-member nations. Specific planningconsiderations should address the US militaryrole as the RSN for a specific logisticcommodity and the on-demand support levelavailable when another nation provides aspecified commodity as the RSN. During theplanning process, components and defenseagencies should prepare, develop, anddisseminate specific policies and proceduresfor potential RSN applications in NATO andother multinational operations. USparticipation as an RSN often is constrainedby legal authorities. This factor must beconsidered early in the planning process sothat any required agreements or arrangementscan be put in place prior to the operation.

f. Available HNS Infrastructure.Analysis of the physical infrastructure in theHN is critical to understanding forcesustainability. MNF logistic planners shouldevaluate what facilities and services (such asgovernment, law enforcement, sanitation,power, fuel, and medical support) exist asviable support for local consumption andsupport of coalition forces. First, assess theability of the HN to receive US and/or MNFpersonnel and equipment (e.g., ports andairfields). Second, determine the capabilityof transportation systems to move forces once

they arrive in theater. Third, evaluateavailability of logistic support. The impactof obtaining HNS upon the host country’snational economy must also be considered,along with possible environmental impactsupon HNs. These must be recognized andaddressed during the planning process. Inaddition, specific technical agreements inmany areas (e.g., environmental clean-up,levying of customs duties and taxes,hazardous material and/or waste storage,transit and disposal) must be developed toaugment status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs)that may have been concluded with HNs.

g. Acquisition and Cross-ServicingAgreements Authority. Normally, USGacquisitions must be accomplished by meansof a Federal Acquisition Regulation contract.Transfers of defense goods and services toforeign nations must generally be donethrough a foreign military sales (FMS) case.Often, in coalition operations, these methodsmay prove to be cumbersome, timeconsuming, and inefficient. Under ACSAauthority (10 USC 2341 and following) theSecretary of Defense can enter intoagreements for the acquisition of or cross-servicing of logistic support, supplies, andservices on a reimbursable, replacement-in-kind, or exchange for equal value basis. Theseagreements can be with eligible nations andinternational organizations of which theUnited States is a member. The ACSA is abroad overall agreement which is generallysupplemented by an IA. The IA containspoints of contact and specific details of thetransaction and payment procedures and underwhich orders for logistic support supplies andservices are placed. Neither party is obligateduntil the order is accepted.

• Logistic support, supplies, and servicesis defined as food, billeting,transportation (including airlift),petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing,communications services, medicalservices, ammunition, base operations

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support (and construction incident tobase operations support), storageservices, use of facilities, trainingservices, spare parts and components,repair and maintenance services,calibration services, and port services.

• Items that may not be acquired ortransferred under the ACSA authorityinclude weapons systems, major enditems of equipment (except for temporaryuse of general purpose vehicles and otheritems of military equipment notdesignated as significant militaryequipment on the United StatesMunitions List promulgated pursuant to22 USC 2778(a)(1), guided missiles,naval mines and torpedoes, nuclearammunition, cartridge and aircrewescape propulsion system components,chaff and chaff dispensers, guidance kitsfor bombs and other ammunition, andchemical ammunition (other than riotcontrol agents (RCA)).

h. Arms Export Control Act (AECA)Title 22 US Code. The AECA FMSagreement negotiated between the UnitedStates and an allied and/or coalition countryor organization is the preferred agreement

for operations other than short-term emergentemergency operations. The primaryinstruments are: the letter of request from thecountry or organization requesting logisticsupport; and the letter of offer and letter ofacceptance (LOA) from the United States.Within this agreement, the basic orderingagreement (BOA) may be included toestablish an account for ordering a wide rangeof undefined materiel requirements, unknownat the signing of the LOA. A BOA isparticularly useful for food, fuel, medical,ammunition, unscheduled repairs, and repairparts. Using this agreement, the full range oflogistic support from routine throughemergency requirements may be provided,including weapon systems and major enditems if necessary. The LOA provides aformal contractual agreement and includes theuse of established logistic systems in the FMScommunity. Many of the countries interfacedirectly with US logistic systems. US logisticsystems, procedures, and methods of financialaccounting are institutionalized anddocumented by DOD 5105.38-M, “SecurityAssistance Management Manual,” to supporteligible country’s armed forces today. For thepurposes of training and standardization theemergency operation’s systems should be thesame as those used for the routine peacetime

An Acquisition and Cross-Servicing agreement would provide for the logisticrequirements needed to support multinational operations.

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operations. Many countries are alreadytrained and use the familiar FMS process.

• The two basic elements are a signedLOA and funded accounts to support thecountry’s requirements. The full rangeof materiel, supplies and services,including weapon systems and major enditems, may be provided under the AECA.

• Benefits of the AECA and/or FMSsystem include the following.

•• Use of standard logistic systems.

•• Complete financial accountability.

•• Control of materiel in accordance withthe country and/or organization’sassigned force activity designator and thepriority assigned individual requests.

•• Handling of “non-standard” itemrequisitions. Existing FMS logisticsystems are set up to support theserequirements.

•• May prevent an excessive drawdownon US forces’ logistic support and/or unitorganic supplies and equipment.

•• Transportation of materiel to theoperational area, particularlyammunition, may be provided utilizingthe country’s assets and handling system,thereby reducing the transportationrequirements on the DefenseTransportation System during a crisissituation.

i. Contingency Contracting. Contractingis another essential tool of the logistician insupport of the mission, and a significantenhancement to the reception, staging, onwardmovement, and integration of combat forcesinto the operational area. Contingencycontracting is the process of contracting forlocally available supplies, services, and

construction in immediate support ofdeployed units, either at staging locations,interim support bases, or forward operatinglocations. Properly used, contracting is aneffective force multiplier for deployed forcesduring a contingency. It can serve to reducedependence on the continental United States-based logistic system. Contracting can affectforce structure and personnel ceilingrequirements, allow more nations toparticipate, save funds, and enhanceinfrastructure recovery. Satisfyingrequirements for supplies and services by localcontracting can improve response time andreduce logistic footprints. Contracting canaugment the existing logistic supportcapability, providing an additional source forcritically required supplies and services.

However, as indicated for HNS, thecontractor resources available in theater areto be prioritized by the MNFC or thedesignated logistic coordinator. In doing so,consideration must be given to the impact oflocal contracting upon the HN’s economy andinfrastructure. These economic effects mayinfluence attainment of the eventual end statewithin the operational area and timing ofwithdrawal. External contractors may beused; however, their operation in theater mustbe addressed in a SOFA or other internationalagreement, where applicable, for such issuesas taxes, cross border fees, and landing fees.

• Contingency contracting will not replaceHNS or the existing supply systemswhere these systems are available oroperational. However, deploymentsmost likely to require employment ofcontingency contracting are thoseoccurring in areas of the world wherethere are few, if any, HNS agreements.

• Most recent deployments of US forceshave been joint operations supportingcontingencies in remote areas of theworld. The trend of world eventssuggests that such operations will

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become more probable in the future.Whether for FHA, disaster relief,peacekeeping, NEO, war, or othercontingencies, such operations mayrequire the creation of joint contractingelements, staffed by personnel from allServices operating in the theater.Services will coordinate and cooperatein development of contingencycontracting procedures to enhance theability of contracting to be an effectiveforce multiplier. Joint contractingelements will also preclude inter-Servicecompetition for local supplies andservices and more effectively use scarcepersonnel resources during acontingency.

• Contingency contracting warrants specialtreatment because of the complex natureof the acquisition process and the needto support operational forces. Thisnecessitates that the combatantcommanders formulate comprehensiveimplementation plans that will supportthis essential element of the logisticchain. This will ensure that proper legalmethods are employed in theprocurement of supplies and services andthat military forces receive the required

logistic resources to perform theirmission.

5. Language, Culture, andSovereignty

a. Language. Differing languageswithin an MNF can present a realchallenge to unity of effort. US forcescannot assume that the predominantlanguage will automatically be English, andspecifying an official language for the MNFcan be a sensitive issue. Language contentis conveyed by word choice, mannerisms, andother means, and information loss,miscommunications, and misunderstandingscan have a negative effect on operations. Thetime required to receive information, processit, develop operational plans from it, translatethe plans, and distribute them tomultinational partners can adversely impactthe speed and tempo of operations. Plannersmay lessen these difficulties by earlyidentification of translator support and theuse of multilingual liaison personnel.Contractor support for interpreters andtranslators should be addressed during theplanning phase. HN resources may be veryimportant and may serve an especiallyimportant role if available during the initial

An Estonian soldier mans a checkpoint during a multinational exercise.

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stages of the deployment. In addition, theimportance of staffing HQ with qualifiedliaison personnel cannot be minimized. Thiswill usually place additional demands uponUS commanders for liaison personnel, butthey are critical to the success of anymultinational mission.

b. Culture. Each partner inmultinational operations possesses aunique cultural identity — the result oflanguage, values, religious systems, andeconomic and social outlooks. Evenseemingly minor differences, such asdietary restrictions, can have great impact.Commanders should strive to accommodatereligious holidays, prayer calls, and otherunique cultural traditions important to alliesand coalition members, consistent with thesituation.

c. Linguists and Area Experts. To assistwith cultural and language challenges, theJFC employs linguists and area experts,often available within and through theService components or from other USagencies. In some instances, members ofService forces may be especially familiar withthe operational area, its cultures, andlanguages as a result of previous assignmentsor heritage. The use of such abilities shouldbe maximized to facilitate understanding andcommunications. Appropriate securitymeasures should be taken to ensure thatcontracted linguists or area experts recruitedto assist the commander are not able tojeopardize the operation through espionageor subversion.

d. Sovereignty Issues. Sovereignty issueswill be most difficult for the MNFC to dealwith, both in regard to forces contributed bynations and by host country nations. Often,the MNFC will be required to accomplishth e mission through coordinat ion,communication, and consensus, in additionto traditional command concepts. Politicalsensitivities must be acknowledged and often

the MNFC (and subordinates) must act as“diplomats” as well as “warriors.” MNFCsshould address all sovereignty issues to ensurethat operations are not adversely affected.MNFCs should seek advice on sovereigntyissues from the DOS, Country Teams, and theAmbassador of the HN. Examples include:collecting and sharing information, basing,overflight rights, aerial ports of debarkation,seaports of debarkation, location and access,railheads, border crossings, and operations inthe territorial sea. The commander may createstructures such as committees to addresssovereignty issues. These committees maybe chaired by military or nonmilitaryrepresentatives of the HN to facilitatecooperation and build trust. Theseorganizations could facilitate operations byreducing sensitivities and misunderstandingsand removing impediments. However, suchissues will be formally resolved with HNsthrough the development of appropriatetechnical agreements to augment existing orrecently developed SOFAs. In many casesSAOs, NGOs, PVOs, and internationalorganizations resident in the HN will havedetailed knowledge and could establish goodwill in these areas which may be called uponto assist in the conduct of operations orestablishing a congenial relationship in theHN.

6. Health Service Support

Multinational delivery of health servicespresents numerous challenges. How healthservices are delivered in the field may be afactor in a particular nation’s decision toparticipate. Differences in medical standards,customs, and training require carefulcoordination and planning. Exchange ofblood and blood products between nations isa sensitive issue and must be coordinated asearly as possible. Blood audit trails must beestablished for each nation providing bloodduring an operation. Effective C2 of medicaloperations is critical to mission success. AnMNF surgeon may be appointed for each

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participating command and task force. Amedical coordination center staffed withrepresentatives from participating nationsshould be established. Such a center willfacilitate coordination of health servicesupport (HSS) initiatives, regionalization,standardization and interoperability, review ofplans, and integration with overall operation.This coordination center will coordinate theevacuation of casualties to non-nationalmedical facilities. Often, casualties from onenation will use the medical facilities of anothernation. Casualty evacuation and use of non-national medical facilities must be closelycoordinated. The MNFCs need to assessMNF HSS requirements and capabilities bothquantitatively and qualitatively, and provideguidance to enhance the effectiveness of HSSthrough shared use of assets. The senior UScommander should be apprised of legallimitations concerning the use of non-USmedical treatment facilities and supplies,especially blood, by US forces. Thecommander should also be apprised oflimitations of providing medical care orsupplies to non-US forces as well as the legalrequirement to treat wounded enemy prisonersof war. Mutual medical support must be inaccordance with existing legal authorities inthe same manner as logistic and HNS.

Coordination for any lead nation, rolespecialization, or ACSA authority must beaddressed during the multinational planningprocess. Theater medical evacuation requirescareful planning and an ACSA.

7. Termination and Transition

Mission analysis, an identifiable end state,and the political policy will all play animportant role in the transition process.Transferring control of an operation issituationally dependent and each one willpossess different characteristics andrequirements. The commander determines theobjectives that will achieve the desired endstate. Objectives and conditions must beclearly defined, measurable, and attainable.In the absence of other termination criteria,nations may select an arbitrary date forwithdrawal of their forces. Transferringcontrol of an operation from or to the UN,regional organizations, another military force,or civilian organizations requires detailedplanning and execution. This is even moreimportant during mission start-up. Planningfor such transfers should occur as part ofoperation planning. Disposal of equipment,a task that may become a political issue, mustbe carefully planned.

Health services for multinational operations could pose many challenges forthe multinational force commander.

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NOTE: Environmental issues must beaddressed during initial planning.

8. Communications

Communications are fundamental tosuccessful multinational operations.Planning considerations include frequencymanagement, equipment compatibility,procedural compatibility, cryptographicand information security, identificationfriend or foe, and data-link protocols.MNFCs should anticipate that some forcesfrom MNF member nations will have directand near immediate communicationscapability from the operational area to theirrespective national political leaderships. Thiscapability can facilitate coordination of issues,but it can also be a source of frustration asleaderships external to the operational areamay be issuing guidance directly to theirdeployed national forces. Manycommunications issues can be resolvedthrough equipment exchange and liaisonteams. Communications requirements varywith the mission, size, composition,geography, and location of the MNF.Interoperability is often constrained by theleast technologically proficient participant.Effective communications support must beestablished which allows control over diverse,widely dispersed air, maritime, ground, andspace elements. Access to both military andcommercial satellites should be an earlyplanning requirement to support widelydispersed elements. The MNFC shouldaddress the need for integratedcommunications among all participatingforces early in the planning phase of theoperation. MNF planning and technicalcommunications systems control centersshould be established as soon as possible tocoordinate all communications andinformation operations. Liaison officer(LNO) teams should be sent to other MNFHQs to facilitate integration of operations.These LNO teams should deploy withsufficient communications equipment to

conduct operations with their respective HQs.Consideration should also be given to possibledegradation of communications due to theextended distances over which the MNF mustoperate and the effects of enemy exploitationof the electro-magnetic spectrum. Planningfor communications support must also includeprovisions which allow execution of requiredcommunications under adverse conditions.Additionally, US law requires priorinternational and implementing agreementsdefining quid pro quo payments for allied useof the Defense Information Systems Networkand military satellite communications assets.

9. Force Protection

a. Force protection are actions taken toprevent or mitigate hostile actions againstDOD resources (to include family members),facilities, and critical information. Thesemeasures, both offensive and defensive,conserve the force’s fighting potential so thatit can be applied at the decisive time andplace. Force protection does not includeactions to defeat the enemy or protect againstaccidents, weather, and disease. Forceprotection planning considerations duringmultinational operations are similar to US-only operations. There are, however, certainfacets about force protection in amultinational environment that must beconsidered.

See JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,”for planning force protection.

b. Commanders must understand thatother nations do not necessarily execute forceprotection in the same way as the US Military.Some nation’s armed forces may or may notbe willing or able to assume more risk thanUS forces. The Unified Command Plandesignates all force protection responsibilitiesto the geographic combatant commander forall service members within their AOR. UScommanders, whether under US control orunder a command relationship to a

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multinational or coalition force, mustcontinuously assess threats andvulnerabilities while implementingappropriate force protection countermeasuresin accordance with published combatantcommander directives.

c. Special consideration must be given topersonnel who must interact with localpopulations, such as civil affairs, PSYOP, andlocal contract liaison. Separate assessmentsshould be conducted to determine theappropriate protection requirement in orderto facilitate the accomplishment of their tasks.

d. Throughout multinational operations,risk management should be used to reduceor offset risk by systematically identifying,assessing, and controlling risk. The riskmanagement process helps commandersmake decisions that weigh risk againstmission accomplishment.

e. Another significant problem facing themultinational force is the potential forfratricide. Unfamiliar procedures, lack of acommon language, and differing operationalterms of reference can increase this risk.Multinational force support or liaison teamscan greatly assist in assessing and reducingthe fratricide risk to the multinational forceby recommending operational coordinationmeasures or technological solutions.

f. Finally, commanders must understandthat US forces, as part of a multinationalforce, can potentially be a greater target.Because of the US policy of engagement, theUS military often assumes the leadership rolein multinational operations. As a result ofUS global leadership, adversaries may viewattacks against American Service membersas a higher payoff target. As such,commanders must continue securityprograms to protect Service members,civilian employees, family members,facilities, information, and equipment in alllocations and situations.

10. International Law and theLaw of War

US forces will comply with applicable USand international law during the conduct ofall military operations. US forces will applythe law of war during all armed conflicts,however such conflicts are characterized, andwith the principles and spirit of the law ofwar during all operations. US commanderswill ensure that the DOD Law of War Programis implemented in accordance with DOD andService directives, and that adequateprocedures are in place to ensure that allviolations of the law of war are promptlyreported and thoroughly investigated inaccordance with those directives. Legaladvisors should be immediately available atall appropriate levels of command and duringall stages of operation planning and executionto provide advice concerning law of warcompliance.

a. Treatment of Combatants.Combatants are those persons who have theright under international law to participatedirectly in armed conflict and include allmembers of the regularly organized armedforces of a party to the conflict (except medicalpersonnel, chaplains, civil defense personnel,and members of the armed forces who haveacquired civil defense status). Irregular forceswho are under responsible command, carrytheir arms openly, distinguish themselvesclearly from the civilian population, andconduct their operations in accordance withthe laws and customs of war, are alsoconsidered combatants. Although combatantsare lawful targets, the right of US forces toinjure combatants is limited by the law of war.

b. Treatment of Prisoners of War(POWs). Combatants that have surrenderedor otherwise fallen into enemy hands areentitled to POW status and are protected bythe Third Geneva Convention of 1949.Generally, they must be treated humanely andprotected against violence, intimidation,

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insult, and public curiosity. Should a questionarise regarding a captive’s entitlement to POWstatus, that individual should be accordedPOW treatment until a competent tribunaldetermines the status to which that individualis properly entitled.

c. Treatment of Noncombatants.Noncombatants are those individuals who donot form a part of the armed forces and whootherwise refrain from the commission ofhostile acts. Noncombatants also includethose members of the armed forces who enjoyspecial protected status, such as medicalpersonnel and chaplains, or who have beenrendered incapable of combat by wounds,sickness, shipwreck, or capture. The law ofwar prohibits making noncombatant personsthe object of intentional attack and requiresthat they be safeguarded against injury notincidental to military operations directedagainst military objectives. Noncombatantswho take a direct part in hostilities by takingup arms or otherwise trying to kill, injure,capture, or impede the missionaccomplishment of US and/or MNFpersonnel or destroy US and/or MNF propertylose their immunity and may be attacked.

d. Treatment of Other Detainees. Forreasons of force protection or mission

accomplishment, US forces may detainpersonnel during multinational operationswhen the United States is not a party to anarmed conflict. Although not POWs, suchdetainees will be accorded the minimumprotections thereof and shall be treatedhumanely under all circumstances untilreleased or turned over to appropriate HN orinternational authorities.

11. The Law of the Sea

All waters seaward of the territorial sea(contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones,and high seas) are international waters inwhich the high seas freedoms of navigationand overflight are preserved to theinternational community. The high seasinclude all parts of the ocean seaward of theexclusive economic zone. The high seas areopen to all States, and no State may validlypurport to subject any part of the high seas toits sovereignty. Nations may haveinterpretations of some aspects of the law ofthe sea which differ subtly or materially fromthose of other partners, particularly as theymay relate to rights of innocent passage,transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanespassage, or recognition or nonrecognition ofcertain excessive maritime claims of thirdstates. The maritime component commander

Under international law, the high seas are open to all States, and high seasfreedoms of navigation and overflight apply to all waters seaward of the territorialsea.

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(MCC) must be cognizant of nationaldifferences in interpretation and the impactthat may have on operations. Commanders ofnational forces have a particular responsibilityto apprise the MCC of any nationalinterpretations that may be pertinent. Legalsupport is critical for multinational operations,particularly when involved in an HN, includingits territorial waters and airspace. Participatingnations should provide commanders with accessto legal advice throughout the operation to ensurethat there is a comprehensive understanding ofany national differences governing operationsat sea or differences in national positions withrespect to the maritime claims of nations in atheater of operations.

12. Rules of Engagement

Obtaining concurrence for ROE fromnational authorities is a time consumingprocess and should be addressed early in theplanning process. An area of particularconcern in multinational ROE is clarifyingto what extent RCAs are authorized for use.Even though the participants may have similarpolitical mandates, ROE may differ amongthe nations represented. In many cases,commanders of deployed member forces maylack the authority to speak on behalf of their

nation in the ROE development process.Complete consensus or standardization ofROE should be sought, but may not beachievable. The commander needs toreconcile differences as much as possible todevelop and implement simple ROE that canbe tailored by member forces to their nationalpolicies. In some cases, MNFCs can use thedifferences in national policies to theiradvantage. US forces assigned OPCON toan MNF will follow the ROE of the MNFunless otherwise directed by the NCA. USforces will be assigned and remain OPCONto a foreign MNFC only if the combatantcommander and higher authority determinethat the ROE for that MNF are consistentwith US policy guidance on individual andunit self-defense as contained in the standingrules of engagement (SROE) (CJCSI 3121.01CH1, “Standing Rules of Engagement for USForces”). SROE serve as the default ROEand are applicable at all times duringmultinational operations unless supersededby approved supplemental ROE.

13. Doctrine, Training, andResources

Some nations possess doctrine and trainingprograms with a full treatment of strategic,

MNFCs seek to improve the contributions of member nation forces throughtraining assistance and sharing resources, such as the loan of equipment.

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operational, and tactical issues. Other nationshave doctrine and training programs thatsupport military forces much smaller than USforces. Some nations prepare for highlymobile, mechanized operations, while othersconcern themselves with insurgency or otherforms of warfare. US joint doctrine stressesrapid, agile operations emphasizing ingenuity,creativity, and improvisation within theguidelines provided by the overallcommander’s intent. Some nations’ forcesmay be unfamiliar with this approach and beuncertain about its implementation in themultinational operation.

a. Doctrine. US multinational doctrineendeavors to be compatible with both US jointdoctrine and MNF capabilities. Due todifferent levels of training, equipment, andtechnologies, commanders must carefullyconsider which units are best suited forparticular missions. One example of this isthe Multinational Maritime Operationsmanual which has been created as a doctrinalguide for coalition operations.

b. Training and Resources. When thesituation permits, MNFCs seek opportunitiesto improve the contributions of member nationforces through training assistance and sharingresources consistent with agreements betweenalliance and coalition members, such as theloan of equipment (e.g., radios, vehicles, orweapons). Multinational exercises are keycomponents of training and doctrinerefinement. Types of exercises includecommand post exercises and field trainingexercises. Simulation can complement mostexercises. Distributed simulation is a meansto enhance training between remotelyseparated forces. Loans of equipment andsharing of logistic resources are either coveredunder the Arms Export Control Act or theNATO Mutual Support Act, and require anegotiated ACSA (see DOD Directive(DODD) 2010.9, “Mutual Logistic SupportBetween the United States and GovernmentEligible Countries and NATO Subsidiary

Bodies,” Draft) or foreign military sale.Multinational exercises should include robustlogistics play in order to exercise multinationallogistic support mechanisms and identifypossible constraints in providing or receivinglogistic support with forces from other nations.

14. Media

Today’s technological environmentprovides the media with greater access tomilitary operations. Commanders shouldconsider media impact during planning andexecution of multinational operations.Planning should facilitate the interactionbetween the military and the national andinternational press organizations. Each nationhas its own viewpoint on media freedom andaccess, and the MNFC should consider thisduring planning. Respect for the viewpointsof other nations must be demonstrated evenif they are contrary to that of the United States.Simplicity should be the driving factor inplanning for media support in a multinationalenvironment. Commanders should plan forregular media access. Ground rules need tobe established which are clear and maintainappropriate operations security. Mediaconsiderations will be channeled through amedia coordination center at the MNFC level,staffed by representatives from participatingnations. The MNFC’s media coordinationcenter will work on an integrated basis withrepresentative international organizationsoperating within the operational area. Mediaoperations must be coordinated both withinthe US forces chain of command and throughMNF channels. Predeployment mediatraining for military and civilian personnel(media included) is essential. Ensure earlyand continuous coordination between publicaffairs, CA, and PSYOP so that their messagesare not contradictory and damaging to thecredibility of the MNFC. Include publicaffairs and public information officers in theplanning process. Develop a policy forreleasing information on incidents, especiallycasualty reports. Policy should distinguish

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between situations where the victims are fromone nation or from several nations.

See JP 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs inJoint Operations,” for additional details.

15. Religious Ministry Support

Religious cultural differences of bothparticipating nations and HNs must beidentified and addressed during the planningstages to be properly recognized duringexecution. Religious considerations mayseriously impact multinational operations.The primary responsibility for religiousministry support in multinational operationsremains with the national componentcommanders. The MNFC may assign themost senior national component chaplain tothe MNFC staff if this position is not alreadystaffed. This will help ensure comprehensiveministry cooperation and respect for anyreligious sensitivities of the HN and thenational components.

16. Meteorology andOceanography

The effective understanding of meteorologyand oceanography and the application of thatknowledge to mission execution couldcontribute significantly to the success of amultinational operation. The state of theweather and oceans can be a force multiplieror force detractor. Successful commandersuse the environment to their advantage. Inmultinational operations, early planning iscritical. Differences in language, techniques,data formats, and communications must beovercome prior to any operation. To ensurethat meteorological and oceanographic(METOC) forces of all participating nationsoperate together, the MNFC may designate asenior METOC officer to coordinate METOCsupport. This officer will ensure that allMETOC forces operate from a coordinatedplanning forecast, and that all METOCrequirements are met.

17. EnvironmentalConsiderations

a. Environmental considerations may bean important factor in any joint multinationaloperation. These considerations include thefollowing.

• Air pollution from ships, vehicles,aircraft, and construction machinery.

• Cleanup of base camps and otheroccupied areas to an appropriate level.

• Protection of endangered species andmarine mammals in the operationalarea.

• Environmental safety and health.

• Hazardous material management.

• Hazardous waste disposal.

• Medical and infectious wastesmanagement and disposal.

• Natural and cultural resourcesprotection.

• Noise abatement, including noise fromaircraft operations.

• Pesticide management.

• Resource and energy conservationthrough pollution prevention practices.

• Solid waste management and disposal.

• Oil and hazardous substance spillsprevention and controls.

• Water pollution from sewage, foodservice, and other operations.

b. To the extent practicable and consistentwith mission accomplishment, commanders

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should take these environmental factors intoaccount during planning, execution, andconclusion of a multinational operation.Commanders should also clearly identifyguidance that may be different from thenormal practices of any of the membernations and obtain agreement fromparticipating nations. Besides agreeing oncommon goals and objectives for theoperation, commanders of participatingmultinational forces should reach some

understanding on environmental protectionmeasures during the operation. Failure toaccompl i sh th i s may resu l t i nm i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s , d e c r e a s e dinteroperability, and a failure to develop andimplement a successful environmental annexfor the operation.

For a further discussion of environmentalconsiderations refer to JP 4-04, “JointDoctrine for Civil Engineering Support.”

CHAPTER IVOPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

IV-1

SECTION A.GENERAL-UNIFIED ACTION

1. General

When providing alliance or coalitionleadership, the geographic combatantcommander should ensure that jointoperations are synchronized in time, space,and purpose with the actions of the respectiveallies, to include land, maritime, air, specialoperations, information operations (IO),search and rescue, and space supportoperations. These operations, in conjunctionwith interagency, nongovernmental, privatevoluntary, or UN operations, must all beintegrated to achieve a strategic unity of effortand the strategic end state.

SECTION B. LANDOPERATIONS

2. General

Land operations occur across the rangeof military operations, during war andMOOTW. The operational aim of landforces during wartime, as an integralportion of a joint force, is to conductmilitary operations in support of theMNFC objectives. During MOOTW, theoperational aim is to achieve the MNF endstate constituting success.

a. Capabilities of Land Forces (seeFigure IV-1).

“Organizations created to fight the last war better are not going to win thenext.”

LTG James M. Gavin, USA(1908-1990)

• Operational Mobility. MNFCs canattain the degree of operational mobilitynecessary through the proper use ofmaneuver. At the operational level,maneuver is a means by which MNFCsset the terms of military operations bytime and location, decline militaryoperations, or exploit existing situations.The principal purpose of maneuver is togain positional advantage relative toenemy centers of gravity. There aremultiple ways to attain positionaladvantage. Maintaining dimensionalsuperiority, thereby facilitating freedomof action, is one example. Concentrationof forces at decisive points to achievesurprise, psychological shock, andphysical momentum can be key to theMNFC’s campaign or major operation.The MNFC must consider thecontribution of MNFs in attainingpositional advantage. At all levels of war,successful maneuver requires not onlyfire and movement but also agility andversatility of thought, plans, operations,and organizations. Seamless integrationof MNFs, capabilities, and systemsenhances the MNFC’s ability to exploitpositional advantage, maintain the degreeof operational mobility desired, andprovide an inherent level of forceprotection.

• Interoperability. Failure to ensureinteroperability presents a clear threatthat all MNF participants recognize.There are material and non-materialsolutions to interoperability challenges.

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Standardization enhancesinteroperability, but time and resourceswill probably preclude completestandardization. Achieving operationseffectiveness in multinational landformations is an integral part of effectivemultinational operations.

For further information, see CJCSI2700.01, “International MilitaryRationalization, Standardization, andInteroperability Between the UnitedStates and Its Allies and Other FriendlyNations.”

• Sustainability. Land forces logisticsupport includes, but is not limited to,manpower, medical, maintenance,supplies, storage facilities, andtransportation, with emphasis ontechnology and common sourcing. Theextent of in-theater logistic infrastructure,including medical support andcorresponding capabilities, will relate to

the force levels employed and the typeof operation and will be subject to thelimitations of geography, distances, andtransportation. Sustainability activitiescompete for many of the sametransportation assets as those needed forthe movement of land forces. Logisticsupport can be centralized ordecentralized. Centralized support isusually more cost effective, but can beinflexible and unresponsive.Decentralized support is often lessefficient, but is generally moreadaptive to the requirements of localcommanders. The MNFC makes adetermination on how to organize logisticsupport based on the situation.

• Versatility. Versatility is the ability ofunits to meet diverse missionrequirements. The MNFC must beinvolved in the initial tailoring of theforce to meet mission requirements byrationalizing prospective force

Figure IV-1. Capabilities of Land Forces

CAPABILITIES OF LAND FORCES

LAND

OPERATIONALMOBILITY INTEROPERABILITY

SUSTAINABILITYVERSATILITY

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contributions during the planning phase.Versatility implies a capacity to bemultifunctional, to operate across therange of military operations, and toperform at the tactical, operational, andstrategic levels as required by the MNFC.Trained leaders with versatile andmaneuverable air and surface forces willenable the MNF to operate effectivelyduring war and MOOTW.

b. Land Component Commander (LCC)

• To most effectively exploit thecapabilities of multinational land forces,the MNFC normally designates anoverall LCC. The LCC must shift focus,tailor forces, and move from one role ormission to another rapidly and efficiently.In the absence of an LCC, the MNFCmust plan, direct, and control landoperations. Due to the complexity andfluidity of land operations, designationof an LCC may provide the MNFCgreater flexibility to conductmultinational operations.

c. Geographical Relationships

• The MNFC provides guidance to majors u b o r d i n a t e c o m m a n d e r s a n dcomponent commanders using campaignplans, OPLANs, and operation orders.The MNFC assigns or attaches forces tosubordinate commands, to the extentagreed to by the participating nations.Subordinate commanders plan andexecute supporting operations. Thisensures that activities are synchronizedboth internally and with other elementsof the MNF.

• Area of Operations. MNFCs maydefine an AO for land forces. The landAO will normally have forward, lateral,and rear boundaries. They do nottypically encompass the entireoperational area of the MNF, but are largeenough for the LCC to accomplishassigned missions and protect the landforces. The size, shape, and positioningof the LCC’s AO will be established bythe MNFC based on the concept of

OPERATIONAL MOBILITY

The most serious consequence of the offensive (Western Front, 21 March 1918),from the German point of view, had been the institution of an allied unifiedcommand. Thus, despite its initial brilliant tactical success, the offensive wasa strategic failure. There were three main reasons for this: (1) Lack of logisticmobility. Once a breakthrough had been made, the Germans found themselvesadvancing across land devastated by 4 years of war, particularly by their own“scorched earth” measures at the time of the withdrawal to the HindenburgLine. They did not have the means of keeping up a flow of ammunition, food,and other supplies to their troops advancing through a veritable quagmire.(2) Lack of Strategic Mobility. The same problem prevented them from fullyexploiting the gap with fast-moving mobile forces, or even from providingadequate reinforcements and replacements to the breakthrough troops. (3)Lack of mobile tactical fire support. Once the breakthrough was made, thefront-line infantry quickly outran their artillery, which was unable to advancein any significant numbers through the roadless morass. Thus when the Britishwere finally able to move reserves into the gap, the Germans lacked sufficientfirepower to maintain the momentum of their drive or to deal adequately withthe British fighter planes strafing them.

SOURCE: R. Ernest Dupuy

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operations and the LCC’s requirement tomaneuver and protect the forces.

d. Supported and SupportingRelationships

• In order to most effectively synchronizeoperations, the MNFC will establishsupported and supporting relationshipsamong forces. During such relationships,the supported commander must clearlyarticulate the vision of operations to thosesupporting commanders that apply forceswithin the supported commander’sboundaries. Supported commandersshould provide supporting commandersas much latitude as possible in theplanning and execution of theiroperations.

• The LCC is the supported commanderwithin the AO designated by the MNFC.Within this designated AO, the LCCsynchronizes maneuver, fires, andinterdiction. To facilitate thissynchronization, the LCC has theauthority to designate the target priority,effects, and timing of fires within the AO.Within the MNF operational area, allmissions must contribute to the

accomplishment of the overall objective.Synchronization of efforts within the landAO with operational area-wideoperations is of particular importance. Tofacilitate synchronization, the MNFCestablishes priorities that will be executedthroughout the operational area,including within the LCC’s AO. Incoordination with the LCC, thosecommanders designated by the MNFCto execute operational area-widefunctions have the latitude to plan andexecute these MNFC prioritizedoperations and attack targets within theLCC AO.

e. Synchronizing MNF Land Operations

• The LCC synchronizes jointmultinational fires within the AO to assistland, maritime, air, amphibious, andspecial operations forces to move,maneuver, and control territory,populations, and key waters. These firesinclude both lethal and nonlethal effects.Successful joint multinational fires areenhanced by the establishment ofcommon doctrine and procedures,seamless communications, systeminteroperability, and liaison.

The LCC is responsible for the synchronization of operations within the AO.

IV-5


• Maneuver and interdiction are twokey components of MNF operations.Synchronizing maneuver andinterdiction within the AO providesone of the most dynamic conceptsavailable to the LCC. Interdiction andmaneuver are not separate operationsagainst a common enemy, but rathercomplementary operations designed toachieve campaign objectives. Potentialresponses to synchronized maneuver andinterdiction can create an agonizingdilemma for the enemy. If the enemyattempts to counter the maneuver, enemyforces can be exposed to unacceptablelosses from interdiction. If the enemyemploys measures to reduce suchinterdiction losses, enemy forces may notbe able to counter the maneuver. Thesynergy achieved by integrating andsynchronizing interdiction and maneuverassists land commanders in optimizingleverage at the operational level.

• The LCC is directly concerned with thoseenemy forces and capabilities that can affectnear-term operations (current operationsand those required to facilitate futureoperations). Accordingly, that part ofinterdiction with a near-term effect on landmaneuver supports that maneuver to enablethe LCC to achieve the MNFCs objectives.

SECTION C. MARITIMEOPERATIONS

3. General

Multinational maritime operations covera range of military activities exercising seacontrol or projecting power ashore.Maritime forces are primarily Navy andMarine or naval infantry; however, they mayalso include maritime-focused air elements,expeditionary forces, or other governmentagencies charged with sovereignty, security,or constabulary functions at sea.

a. Characteristics of Maritime Forces.As shown in Figure IV-2, the qualities thatcharacterize maritime forces as politicaland/or military instruments in support ofgovernment policies are readiness,flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility.Maritime forces may be used to reassure orassist allies and friends in times of distress,deter and respond to aggression, and influenceunstable situations.

• Readiness. One of the strengths ofmaritime forces lies in their immediateavailability to respond to contingencies.As a matter of course, by maintainingproficiency in the capabilities necessaryto resolve major conflicts, maritimeforces can provide a wide range ofservices in support of peacetimeoperations.

• Flexibility. Maritime forces have beenemployed in the resolution of manyinternational crises since the end of WorldWar II. The flexibility of maritime forcespermits political leaders and commandersto shift focus and reconfigure and realignforces to handle a variety ofcontingencies by providing a wide rangeof weapons systems, military options,and logistic or administrative skills. Intasks ranging from forcible entry and airinterdiction operations to NEOs, disasterrelief, show of force, maritimeinterdiction, and FHA, maritime forcescan control the seas and providediplomatic leverage in peace or time ofcrisis. The strategic and tactical C3capabilities of maritime forces providefor a controllable force to complementdiplomatic efforts. In all cases, maritimeforces provide both a perception and apotential for action ashore.

• Self-Sustainment. Although the degreeof self-sustainment achievable by anallied force will be determined by thenature of the operation and the types of

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units committed by the participants,maritime forces are capable of operatingin forward areas at the end of long supplylines without significant land-basedsupply structure. With the provision ofreplenishment-at-sea and on-stationreplacement of personnel and ships,maritime operations may be continuedindefinitely. To support the sustainabilityof maritime forces, it may be necessaryto establish multinational forward and/or advanced logistic sites. A forcelogistic coordinator should be designatedfor the afloat maritime forces who willcoordinate with the ashore multinationallogistic coordinator.

• Mobility. Maritime forces, with theirstrategic and tactical mobility, have theability to monitor a situation passively,remain on station for a sustained period,respond to a crisis rapidly, and deployin combat with authority. Mobilityenables maritime forces to respond from

over-the-horizon, becoming selectivelyvisible and threatening to adversaries asneeded. If diplomatic, political, oreconomic measures succeed, maritimeforces can be quickly withdrawn withoutfurther action ashore. Maritime forcescan also respond to indications ofpending crises by relocating rapidlyeither from one end of the theater toanother or from one theater to another,usually independent of fixed logistics.In combat, the ability to positionmaritime forces provides commanderswith a tactical and operationaladvantage. In addition to being able toproject power, maritime forces have beenuseful in supporting FHA and NEOs bymeeting basic water, food, and medicalsupport during such operations.

b. Waterspace Management. Waterspacemanagement is complex even under idealcircumstances in which all participants arefully conversant with common operating

Figure IV-2. Characteristics of Maritime Forces

CHARACTERISTICS OF MARITIME FORCES

MARITIME

MOBILITY READINESS

FLEXIBILITYSELF-

SUSTAINABILIT

IV-7


doctrine and procedures. In multinationaloperations, designation of an MCC maygreatly assist the MNFC in coordinating andeffectively exploiting multinational maritimeforces. Additionally, without a formalizedprocess for preventing mutual interferenceamong undersea, surface, and air activities,the MNFC (or the MCC) will have to exerciseprecise judgment in assigning tasks tosubmarine forces. Geographic isolation maybe the only practicable method of avoidingfratricide. The commander must get earlyagreement among the participating nationsduring the planning phase that there will be asingle submarine operating authority; this willnormally be provided by the nation with themost experience and best facilities forperforming this service.

c. Expeditionary Operations. Oftenconducted in connection with maritime

operations, Marine expeditionary operationsprovide the MNFC with an importantcapability. Land, sea, and air forces canconduct expeditionary operations, but MarineCorps forces are typically the mostaccomplished practitioners of expeditionaryoperations. Flexible and responsive, MarineCorps forces can make a valuable contributionto any MNF. Specially trained and equippedfor multipurpose combined armsexpeditionary operations, Marines combinethe capabilities of land, sea, and air forces.Marines are most effective when organizedto operate in combined arms teams as a Marineair-ground task force. Marine operationaleffectiveness is significantly diminished ifMarine combined arms forces are dividedamong land and air component commanders.

SECTION D. AIR AND SPACEOPERATIONS

4. Air Operations

The purpose of multinational airoperations is to gain and maintain controland exploit the use of the air to achieve theMNFC’s objectives. Multinational airoperations range from complex, wartimeair operations to FHA. Air forces providethe MNFC with the capability to achievestrategic, operational, and tactical effectssimultaneously throughout the full depth andbreadth of the battlespace. In order to achieveunity of air effort, C2 is normally exercisedfrom the highest practicable level by adesignated air commander. Centralizedcontrol of air forces optimizes the use ofairpower and maximizes the probability ofachieving established MNFC objectives(see Figure IV-3).

a. Characteristics of Air Forces

• Flexibility and Versatility. Air forcescan operate free from obstacles andbarriers. In addition, many air elements

The mobility of maritime forces is less constrainedby geographic boundaries than air and groundforces.

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can be adapted to more than one mission,which provides to the MNFC a wide rangeof flexibility and versatility needed tosuccessfully accomplish the assigned tasks.

• Inherently Strategic. The capability ofair power to strike at the heart of theadversary enables MNFCs to accomplishmultinational and theater strategic-levelobjectives. Airpower is suitable forstrategic, diplomatic, and humanitarianpurposes.

• Suitable for Simultaneous Operations.Airpower can be employed across therange of military operations tosimultaneously conduct symmetric andasymmetric operations and attack abroad spectrum of targets.

• Persistent. While the intention of mostmodern air operations is to attainobjectives through swift, simultaneousand decisive action, there may be

occasions in which goals may not beattained quickly. Air operations allowair assets to visit and revisit targets overextended periods of time.

b. Air Component Commander (ACC).To most effectively exploit the capabilities ofmultinational air power, the MNFC normallydesignates an overall ACC. When an ACC isnot designated, the MNFC may plan, direct,and control air operations. The ACC isresponsible for planning, coordinating,allocating, tasking, and controlling airmissions to meet the MNFC’s objectives. Inmultinational operations, the authority andcommand relationships of the ACC areestablished by the MNFC. If designated, theACC typically exercises OPCON overassigned and attached forces and TACONover other military capabilities and forcesmade available for tasking, with the exceptionof strategic air mobility forces, which willremain under the OPCON of Commander inChief, United States Transportation

KEY ASPECTS OF AIR OPERATIONS

AIR

CENTRALIZED

CONTROLAIR DEFENSE

AIRSPACE

CONTROL

UNITY OF

EFFORT

Figure IV-3. Key Aspects of Air Operations

IV-9


Command. In some instances, the MNFCmay decide that direct support is a moreappropriate command authority for certaincapabilities and/or forces.

c. Air Operations Planning. An integralpart of the MNFC’s planning efforts is theconcept of air operations. The ACC isresponsible for air operations planning, anddevelops the concept for air operations thatdescribes how the multinational assets madeavailable are envisioned to be employed insupport of the MNFC’s overall objectives.Since the purpose of developing this conceptis to achieve unity of effort in air operations,the staff assigned the responsibility to developthe plan should include appropriaterepresentation from all nations and Servicesproviding resources to the plan. This ensuresadequate consideration and understanding ofmultinational weapon systems and forcecapabilities. Air planning should also includethe use of logistic air assets and airfields. Thisis especially important for the coordinationof tactical air operations with logisticoperations, especially the air movement ofsupplies, their unloading, and rapid clearancefrom aerial ports. In the event that noestablished multinational guidance isavailable, planning considerations for

multinational air operations should resemblethose for joint air operations.

See JP 3-56.1, “Command and Control forJoint Air Operations,” for details on the airplanning process.

d. Airspace Control. The primarypurpose of airspace control is to promote safe,effective use of airspace with minimal restraintimposed on the users. Internationalagreements, enemy and friendly forcestructures, deployments and resupplyoperations, commanders’ concepts andoperations, and operating environments suchas foreign continents, the high seas, andamphibious objective areas will necessitatedifferent specific arrangements for airspacecontrol.

• Responsibility. The responsibility forairspace control rests with the MNFC,who normally designates an airspacecontrol authority (ACA) to coordinate theairspace control activities formultinational operations. The broadresponsibilities of the ACA includecoordinating and integrating the use ofthe airspace control area. Subject to theauthority and approval of the MNFC,

Multinational air operations range from complex to routine.

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the ACA develops broad policies andprocedures for airspace control and forthe coordination required amongnations’ forces. The ACA establishesan airspace control system that isresponsive to the needs of the MNFC,integrates the MNF airspace controlsystem with that of the HN, andcoordinates and deconflicts userrequirements. Centralized direction bythe ACA does not imply assumption ofOPCON over any assets. Matters onwhich the ACA is unable to obtainagreement shall be referred to the MNFCfor resolution. If the ACC is not assignedduties of the ACA, then the ACA andstaff would normally be collocated withthe ACC staff. The responsibilities ofACA and ACC are interrelated andshould normally be assigned to oneindividual.

• Requirements. The system used forairspace control must integrate allairspace users and be flexible andresponsive to the changing requirementsof the component commanders. Thissystem enhances the MNFC’s ability toemploy forces. It is central to the conceptof air operations and it should promoteoperational effectiveness while reducingthe risk of fratricide.

e. Air Defense. The successful conductof air defense operations requires theintegrated operation of availablemultinational air defense systems. Airdefense operations must be coordinated withother operations, both on and over land andsea. The MNFC may designate an area airdefense commander (AADC) to ensure anintegrated defensive effort by MNFs. Theresponsibilities of the ACC, AADC, and ACAare interrelated and are normally assigned toone individual, but they may be assigned totwo or more individuals when the situationdictates. Based on the situation, if the MNFCdecides not to assign the ACC, AADC, or

ACA as on individual, then closecoordination between all three positions isessential.

5. Space Operations

Space forces provide a means to exploitand, if required, control space to assist in thesuccessful execution of multinationaloperations. Space systems offer globalcoverage and the potential for real time andnear real time support to military operations.As a point of contact for military spaceoperations, United States Space Command(USSPACECOM) enables commands to haveaccess to space capabilities and systems.USSPACECOM can deploy space supportteams to assist in providing the necessaryspace-related capabilities.

a. Space Control Operations. Spacecontrol operations are conducted to gain andmaintain space superiority. They ensure thatfriendly forces can use the space environmentwhile denying its use to the enemy. Toaccomplish this, space forces must surveyspace, protect US ability to use space, preventadversaries from interfering with that use, andnegate the ability for adversaries to exploittheir space forces.

b. Force Enhancement Operations.Force enhancement operations consist of thoseoperations conducted from space with theobjective of enabling or supporting terrestrialforces. Navigation, communications,reconnaissance, surveillance, ballistic missilewarning, and environmental sensing helpreduce uncertainty and friction at all threelevels of war.

c. Space Support Operations. Spacesupport operations are carried out by terrestrialelements of military space forces to sustain,surge, and reconstitute elements of a militaryspace system or capability. These activitiesdeploy, sustain, or augment on-orbitspacecraft, direct missions, and support other

IV-11


government or civil organizations. Spacesupport involves spacelift and satelliteoperations.

d. Space Support to MNF. Allied orcoalition forces will have many of the samerequirements for space support as do USforces. Sharing of intelligence products iscontrolled according to intelligenceguidelines. Multi-spectral imagery productsare normally unclassified and will be of greatbenefit to other MNFs. Weather data is alsoreadily available to share, as is globalpositioning system navigation support. Ofspecial importance is providing warning anddefense against attack from theater ballisticmissiles. USSPACECOM is responsible forassisting in development of missile warningarchitectures and providing this informationto MNFs in a process called “shared earlywarning.”

SECTION E. SPECIALOPERATIONS

6. General

All considerations associated with theconduct of unilateral special operations areapplicable to multinational operations. SOFprovides the MNF with a range of specializedmilitary responses that lessen politicalliability or risk of escalation (Figure IV-4).The establishment of a combined joint specialoperations task force offers the MNFC a C2element for US or combined SOF.

a. SOF can provide specific assistance inthe area of assessment, liaison, and trainingof non-US military forces operating with theUS force. SOF may deploy teams ahead ofthe multinational operations to evaluatecapability of non-US units and identifytraining necessary to integrate them into theoverall plan. This capability is enhanced byroutine interaction of SOF with non-USmilitary units as a regular function, such as

the FID mission. SOF are trained to provideliaison to multinational surface and air unitstaking advantage of their language andcultural capabilities. SOF can provide trainingto overcome existing shortfalls identifiedduring the assessment.

See JP 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint SpecialOperations,” for details.

b. Psychological Operations Support.PSYOP should be incorporated into allmultinational operations. The MNFC mustensure that all PSYOP activities, regardlessof national origin, are coordinated. PSYOPmust begin early, preferably beforedeployment, to prepare a population for thearrival of MNFs and develop communicationchannels that can be used from day one of theoperation. PSYOP provides the commanderwith a controlled mechanism to communicatewith all elements of a population: civilians,military, or belligerent factions. PSYOPcommunicates policy, provides information,and can persuade groups to cooperate with

Figure IV-4. US Special OperationsCommand Capabilities

US SPECIAL OPERATIONSCOMMAND CAPABILITIES

Direct Action

Special Reconnaissance

Foreign Internal Defense

Unconventional Warfare

Combatting Terrorism

Psychological Operations

Civil Affairs

Counterproliferation ofWeapons of Mass Destruction

Information Operations

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MNFs. A detailed analysis of a country’sculture, political climate, and militaryorganization can help the MNFC to effectivelyapply PSYOP to communicate policy, provideinformation, and persuade groups to cooperatewith friendly forces. US PSYOP willnormally be approved in US channelsregardless of the composition of the MNFchain of command.

See JP 3-53, “Doctrine for JointPsychological Operations,” for furtherinformation.

c. Civil Affairs Support. CA provides abridge between the US military and the HNmilitary and civilian authorities in support ofmilitary objectives of the operation. CA unitscan provide support to non-US units inmultinational operations. Plannerscoordinating CA support must factor in thefact that the majority of CA units are in theReserve Component. The interface betweenthe force commander (multinational or US),local authorities and civilian populace in theoperational area is called CMO. CMO is ageneric term used to denote the decisive andtimely application of military capabilities to

enhance the relationship between the militaryand civilian populace in order to ensureaccomplishment of the commander’s mission.As with so many other areas, CMO must becoordinated to accomplish the MNFC’smission. The activities of multinational CAresources should be prioritized through theMNF’s CMO plan to maximize the benefit ofthese resources. CMO encompasses anyimpact of the civilian populace on militaryoperations. Commanders should establish thisliaison with civil authorities, local populace,NGOs, and PVOs. This will assist thecommander in transitioning responsibility, ifdirected, to these organizations upon missioncompletion. One means by which thecommander can accomplish this interface isthrough a CMOC. CA personnel can provideCMO support by helping to staff the CMOCand conduct liaison with the local populace.CA personnel are routinely trained in skillsthat make them an optimal choice to form thecore of a CMOC team into which functionalspecialties are integrated.

See JP 3-57, “Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations,” for furtherinformation.

SOF may conduct multinational operations independent of or in support ofother components.

IV-13


SECTION F. GENERAL

7. Information Operations

The Joint Staff will coordinate US positionson all IO matters discussed bilaterally or inmultinational organizations to encourageinteroperability and compatibility in fulfillingcommon requirements. Direct discussionsregarding multinational operations in aspecific theater are the responsibility of thegeographic combatant commander.

a. The Multinational IO Cell

• When the JFC is also the MNFC, the jointforce staff should be augmented byplanners and subject matter experts fromthe MNF. All MNF members should berepresented in the IO cell in positions tocontribute, when possible, to each of theelements of IO. IO planners should seekto accommodate the requirements of theMNF with the goal of using all theavailable IO resources. Directrepresentation ensures that multinationalIO assets are efficiently used and that themultinational IO plan is coordinated withall other aspects of the multinationaloperation.

See JP 3-13, “Joint Doctrine forInformation Operations.”

• In the case where the JFC is not theMNFC, it may be necessary for the JFCto brief the MNFC and staff on theadvantages of IO as a part of militarystrategy to achieve MNF goals. The JFCshould propose organizing amultinational IO cell. If this is notacceptable to the MNFC, the JFC shouldassume responsibility for using IO as apart of military strategy within the jointforce to support MNF objectives.

b. Multinational IO Planning. PlanningIO to support multinational operations is

more difficult because of complex securityissues, differences in the level of trainingof involved forces, interoperability ofequipment, and language barriers.

• How to plan multinational IO is theprerogative of the MNFC. The size,composition, and mission of the MNF,as well as diplomatic considerations, mayinfluence how multinational IO isplanned. Coordination at the IO cell levelwith detailed planning at the individualelement level would give multinationalIO planning the most consistency withUS IO planning procedures.

• The multinational IO plan should directlyand demonstrably support the objectivesof the MNFC. This is particularlyimportant when joint force planners areattempting to acquaint a non-US MNFCwith the advantages of IO as a part ofmilitary strategy.

c. Multinational Information Assurance.The appropriate US geographic combatantcommander should issue clearly statedguidelines for the release of classified USinformation to the MNF, based on existingpolicy directives and any applicable approvedexceptions to national disclosure policy.These guidelines should be issued to USparticipants only and should be specificenough to allow implementation down to thetactical level. The subordinate JFC mayundertake planning and execution ofindependent IO in support of multinationalobjectives.

See CJCSI 6510.01A, “DefensiveInformation Operations Implementation.”

8. Search and Rescue

The MNFC must make a carefulassessment of each member’s search andrescue (SAR) capability and procedures.Normally each nation and/or component is

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responsible for conducting its own SARmissions. However, not all participants maypossess this capability, so the MNFC mayhave to establish an organization andprocedures to provide this service to allparticipants. The commander should develop

Each multinational partner brings unique SAR capabilities.

and organize a comprehensive SARorganization. A good model for this type oforganization is the joint search and rescue center.

See JP 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint CombatSearch and Rescue (CSAR).”

APPENDIX ACOMMANDER’S CHECKLIST FOR MULTINATIONAL

OPERATIONS

A-1

Multinational operations as described in this publication cover a wide spectrum of subjects.The checklist provided below offers the MNFC a planning tool for multinational operations.

_____ Has the mission been analyzed for clear and attainable objectives?

_____ How does the mission statement accomplish the desired end state?

_____ How do the objectives help to ensure the desired end state?

_____ Have these objectives been translated into missions for subordinate commanders?

_____ Has the source of mission tasking been identified?

_____ If the source is not the political authority sponsoring the multinational operation, hasclarification and support from the national military chain of command been requested?

_____ Has a risk assessment been accomplished as appropriate?

_____ What process should one follow to consider and approve changes to the originalmission statement?

_____ Have all US forces received the proper predeployment training?

_____ What type of predeployment training have MNFs received?

_____ Have standards regarding operational and/or logistic capabilities been established forcertifying units to participate in the operation? Have nations with deficiencies indicatedmethod of resolution?

_____ Has adequacy in terms of mission accomplishment been assessed?

_____ Have the implications of national and regional culture on contemplated multinationaloperations been assessed?

_____ Have appropriate orientation briefings from the State Department and NGOs and/orPVOs been requested?

_____ Have ROE been agreed upon?

_____ By military commanders?

_____ By policy makers?

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_____ Do the ROE of the multinational force permit the same degree of individual self-defense and unit self-defense as the US SROE?

_____ Have the personnel for the multinational staff been chosen to reflect the requiredfunctional skills, training level, language skill and avoidance of historic animosities?

_____ Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution?

_____ Have lead nations been designated where appropriate?

_____ Have strategic mobility assets been allocated?

_____ Are multinational legal representatives available to provide counsel on internationallaw and/or legal agreements?

_____ What are the alternative courses of action to be followed by the multinational forcewhen a national military element withdraws from the force (i.e., actions followingdecomposition of the force)?

_____ Do transition plans exist to move from standing start to MOOTW and/or to war orwar to MOOTW?

_____ What are the courses of action to be executed if the sponsoring organization orderswithdrawal of multinational forces in advance of end state achievement?

_____ Has the deployment time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) been completedand validated?

_____ Have the non-US forces relying on US strategic mobility for deployment and/orredeployment been included in the TPFDD?

_____ Has the deployment plan deconflicted NGO and/or PVO as well as contractortransportation requirements in order to avoid competition for limited transportationinfrastructure?

_____ Has status-of-forces been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations? Whohas been designated to negotiate technical agreements to implement SOFAs?

_____ Are forces, C4I capabilities, and logistic support robust enough to respond to increasedlevels of operational intensity?

_____ Do the resources allocated to the force protection component of the mission balancewith the potential political ramifications of failure to protect the force?

_____ Have the cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics of the operational areabeen fused with the traditional study of geographic and military considerations toform an intelligence estimate that identifies threat centers of gravity, as well as high

A-3

Commander’s Checklist for Multinational Operations

value and high payoff targets? Does the plan consider these issues in a way thatfacilitates operations and end state?

_____ Have determined efforts been made to pool information with applicable NGOs andPVOs, to increase efficiency of operations through coordination and eliminateredundancy in operations?

_____ Are chemical weapon threats known and are troops and medical facilities prepared tocope with their possible use?

_____ To what extent are RCAs authorized for use?

_____ Review plan for duplication of effort in supporting the operation.

_____ Is there an initiating directive which clearly articulates the command arrangements?

_____ Has the MNFC done a mission analysis to determine the most appropriate commandauthorities required from contributing nations’ political authorities to ensure thatthe directed mission can be accomplished? Should the necessary command authoritiesnot be forthcoming, the MNFC should explore the following:

_____ Feasibility of achieving unity of command and associated conditions?

_____ Feasibility of achieving unity of effort and associated conditions?

_____ Feasibility of achieving coherent federated operations wherein national forcesremain under national OPCON and TACON?

_____ Assistance required from the NCA in negotiating unity of command or effortat the strategic level?

_____ Multinational command channels for the execution of military operationsand national channels for reporting status and requesting support?

_____ Have supported and supporting command relationships been established or referredto higher authority for resolution of inadequacies?

_____ Have command relationships regarding control of forces been defined?

_____ Have liaison arrangements associated with C2 of the forces been assessed?

_____ Do liaison elements on the command staff possess requisite authorities and have a fullunderstanding of both national interest and multinational objectives?

_____ Have deficiencies with coalition commanders been negotiated for resolution?

_____ Do liaison elements have appropriate linguistic, communications, logistic, and officesupport capabilities in place?

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JP 3-16

_____ Has the command structure been designed to minimize layers to a more horizontalorganization?

_____ Have 24 hour command centers been provided for if required?

_____ Have C2 arrangements been made to include the US Ambassador, the Country Team,and nonmilitary government officials in coordinating functions?

_____ Have US as well as multinational legal constraints been considered in planning forC2?

_____ Is there a means and a plan to provide all forces with a common tactical picture?

_____ Have the multinational partners with a lesser C2 capability been provided appropriateliaison personnel and interpreters (if necessary), operators, and maintainers to enableinteraction with the commander and other multinational members?

_____ Have arrangements been made for intra- and inter-staff communication among samenation staff members?

_____ Has coordination been accomplished with multinational members regardingcommunication equipment capability?

_____ Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment?

_____ Has the terrain and environment been considered while planning for the C4I network?

_____ Have common data bases been provided for?

_____ Has the nation most capable of providing an integrated, interoperable C4I networkbeen selected to serve as network manager for the multinational C4I infrastructure?

_____ Have agreements on cryptographic, communications and/or ADP security issues, andother planning factors been reached among all multinational components? Arecompatible materials available?

_____ Have arrangements been made and/or established to allow contract multinationalforeign nation employees to work on C2 staffs without exposure to ADP and classifiedinformation used in daily operations?

_____ Have the nations agreed to work on a standard datum and produce all products to thatdatum?

_____ Has a multinational GI&S plan been produced and disseminated which designates allGI&S products for use?

_____ Have special, adequate, and supportable intelligence sharing and foreign disclosureprocedures been established?

A-5


_____ Have the intelligence requirements been clearly stated to focus the collection effort?

_____ Has theater foreign disclosure authority been identified?

_____ Has the adversary’s use of space assets been analyzed and have requests for denyingmilitarily useful space information to the adversary been considered?

_____ Has the C4I system been established with the capability to rapidly disseminate, to allparticipants, time-sensitive information and/or intelligence for use in targeting or rapidreaction?

_____ Have efforts been made to place sufficient intelligence collection resources under thecontrol of (or at least immediately responsive to) the MNFC?

_____ Have efforts been made to assign intelligence gathering tasks in accordance with theMNFC’s intelligence requirements and according to the capability of the multinationalequipment under MNF control?

_____ Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlefield information intomultinational centralized processing and exploitation centers?

_____ Has a policy and a plan for the control, release, and dissemination of sensitiveinformation been promulgated?

_____ Has the rapid dissemination of targeting materials been provided for?

_____ Does the United States have an ACSA with coalition nations?

_____ Does principal logistics civil augmentation program structure have an overall officerin charge or main point of contact for C2 of contract personnel?

_____ Do other US legal authorities permit the provision of logistic support to coalitionnations?

_____ Has the MNFC’s authority to redistribute logistic assets and services been definedand agreed to?

_____ Have reimbursement or replacement-in-kind procedures been developed and agreedto?

_____ Have contractor procedures been established to allow US participation in contractsled by non-US personnel and used by US personnel?

_____ Have logistic reporting procedures been established and promulgated throughout theforce?

_____ Are there existing standardization agreements that could facilitate mutual support?

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JP 3-16

_____ Can the HN provide support and, if so, have negotiations to secure support either beenestablished or completed?

_____ Are the mission economic and infrastructure repair plans known and being compliedwith by all nations, Services, and units?

_____ Is there a means in place which authorizes exchange of mutual logistic support ofgoods and services between the United States and MNF allies and accounts for theamounts received?

_____ Has a logistic determination been made, (i.e., what countries will provide what pieceof the logistics system, health services to include aeromedical evacuation and healthservice logistics)?

_____ Has HNS been evaluated in the deployed location(s) to determine the logisticrequirements?

_____ Has the probable cost of the multinational operations been determined and are theremechanisms in place to track the cost?

_____ Have logisticians assessed the feasibility and/or supportability and risks of the mission?

_____ Have coordinating centers been established for movements, medical, contracting,infrastructure engineering, and logistic operations?

_____ Is a transitional plan available to facilitate deployment and operational assumption ofin-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agencyor alliance?

_____ Has funding been identified to support operations and/or to provide reimbursement ofexpenditures from existing budgets?

_____ Will common funding be available to support multinational common costs andexpenditures?

_____ Has it been determined if or to what extent operational-related expenses will bereimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding by theparticipating nations?

_____ Is the MNFC aware of existing agreements among participating nations in the form ofbilateral or multilateral arrangements, funding, and training?

_____ Are medical facilities identified to support the operation? Are evacuation plans, bothintra- and intertheater, in place?

_____ Are graves registration and mortuary procedures in place to service multinationalcasualties, to include recognition of cultural differences in dealing with casualties?

A-7


_____ Has a PSYOP program(s) been developed to support the operation?

_____ Have PSYOP assets been requested?

_____ Have procedures been established for coordination and approval of PSYOP objectives,themes, programs, and products?

_____ Have population and resource control measures and the subordinate commander’sauthority to impose them been included in the MNF plan?

_____ Are there adequate CA personnel on hand to assist planners?

_____ Are there special operations personnel available to develop and execute unconventionalmilitary options for the commander?

_____ Has a public affairs plan been promulgated that:

_____ Provides a contingency statement to use in response to media queries beforeinitial public release of information concerning the MNF and its mission?

_____ States who (from which nation and when, or all nations simultaneously)makes the initial public release concerning the MNF and its mission?

_____ States agreed-upon procedures for the subsequent release of informationconcerning the MNF and its national components?

_____ Is predeployment media training complete?

_____ Is the relationship between the inevitable media coverage of tactical operations andfuture strategic decisions understood by all commanders?

_____ Have requirements for combat camera support, including communicating to MNFsthe need for operational documentation, been arranged?

_____ Has an operation historian been designated and staff authorized?

_____ Is a mechanism in place for the collection, assessment, and reporting of lessons learned?

_____ End state identifies the conditions under which the multinational military operationcan be terminated. Are the conditions tangible in military terms? Are they containedin the mission statement?

_____ Has the end state and exit strategy been articulated as part of the commander’s visionfor subordinates for translation into unit objectives and sustainment of unit missionorientation? What is the exit strategy? How do US forces get out? What constitutesmission success?

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JP 3-16

_____ What is the coalition end state criteria?

_____ What are the national end state criteria of each coalition partner?

_____ Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?

_____ What are the redeployment and/or withdrawal plans for multinational forces? Is thedeparture of forces to be accomplished under tactical conditions?

_____ What are the environmental standards to be met by withdrawal in humanitarian orother peaceful operations?

_____ What US forces, equipment, and supplies will remain behind? Has disposal of USequipment supplies been properly planned?

_____ What are the C2 and command arrangements for departure?

_____ Who will support US forces that remain behind?

_____ Have the C2 systems support required for the diminishing MNF presence beenidentified?

APPENDIX BA REPRESENTATIVE LIST OF US PARTICIPATION IN

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

B-1

1900. International Relief Force in China,Boxer Rebellion. Eight nation force, led bya British general and later a German, included2,000 US soldiers and Marines. Loosecoordination of operations was achievedthrough meetings of a Council of Generals.

1918. Allied Armies in France, World WarI. Some 2,000,000 Americans servedalongside French and British armies under theoverall coordination of a French Officer, theCommander in Chief of the Allied Armies inFrance, Marshal Ferdinand Foch. A precedentwas set that US soldiers should remain in largeunits under US command. The French andBritish originally argued that US soldiersshould be placed in allied units as individualand small-unit replacements as soon as theyarrived in theater, a concept successfullyvetoed by the senior US commander, GeneralJohn J. Pershing.

1918. Allied Intervention in Russia,Vicinity of Murmansk in the Far North.Three US battalions joined British, Canadian,Italian, Finnish, and Serbian units undercommand of a British general at the end ofWorld War I and the Bolshevik Revolution.Contemporaneous US military activities inSiberia and the Far East were not formallyintegrated with allies, due to disagreement onpolitical goals.

1942. Allied Operations in World War II.Due to the combined nature of alliedoperations against Axis powers, US and UKcommands and staffs were often inter-layered.US units were subordinated to Britishcommanders a number of times, for example,in Italy, Normandy, Arnhem, and in the China-Burma-India Theater. This experience madethe US military a proponent of coalitionwarfare and a world leader in its practice.

1948. United Nations Truce SupervisionOrganization in Palestine. The longest-livedUN peace observing mission, continuingtoday. The United States has contributedvarious numbers of military observers andsupport personnel through time, with an earlypeak strength of 327—137 officers of allServices and 190 enlisted men. Some 17nations have participated at various times andsuccessive commanders have come fromSweden, the United States, Belgium,Denmark, Canada, Norway, Finland, Ireland,and Ghana. Many precedents, agreements,and laws have derived from this experience.

1949. United Nations Military ObserverGroup in India and Pakistan. One of 14nations participating, the United Statescontributed up to 28 military observers andan air crew until 1954. The group was headedsuccessively by generals from Belgium,Canada, and Australia.

1950. Allied Operations During theKorean War. As part of the United NationsCommand (UNC), US forces played animportant role in repelling the attack on theRepublic of Korea (ROK). Because no peacetreaty ever ended that war, the UNC still standstoday. A US general commands the UNC andits sister organization, the Combined ForcesCommand, Korea (CFC). The groundcomponent command of the UNC and CFC,commanded by a South Korean general,consists during armistice of one US divisionand 23 ROK divisions. All told, there areapproximately 37,000 US Service membersin South Korea helping to maintain thearmistice.

1962. United Nations Security Force forthe UN Temporary Executive Authority inWest New Guinea. A US Air Force task

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Appendix B

JP 3-16

force of 115 men and 10 aircraft provided in-country support for operations commandedby a Pakistani general.

1965. Inter-American Peace Force in theDominican Republic. First peacekeepingforce of the OAS. After the initial USintervention, six Latin American nations sentsmall forces to join some 21,500 US troops— soon reduced to 12,000 — in an MNFcommanded by a general from Brazil.

1982. Multinational Force in Beirut. About1,200 US troops joined contingents fromFrance, Italy, and the United Kingdom toobserve the withdrawal of PalestinianLiberation Organization, Syrian, and Israeliforces from Beirut, Lebanon. No centralcommand structure was established, althoughcoordination was effected through a Liaisonand Coordination Committee. Two separateterrorist attacks killed 241 US Marines,sailors, and soldiers at the US Headquartersand 58 French soldiers at the FrenchHeadquarters on 23 October 1983, and theMNF withdrew in March 1984.

1982. Multinational Force and Observersin the Sinai. A ten nation, independent forceempowered by Egypt and Israel to supervisetruce provisions in the Sinai Peninsula. TheUnited States provides support troops and aninfantry battalion rotated every 6 months;Congress limits participation to 1,200personnel. The military commander is aNorwegian general, and the Director Generalis an American operating from Rome.

1990 to Present. Maritime InterceptionOperations. Fourteen nations continue toenforce a UN embargo of Iraq in the northernArabian Gulf, preventing the import andexport of banned items.

1991. DESERT STORM Coalition in thePersian Gulf War. Over 23 nations joinedto eject forces of Iraq from Kuwait. US, UK,and French forces were under the CINC, US

Central Command, while Arab forces wereunder the Saudi commander of the joint forcestheater of operations; the two entities werelinked in the Coalition Coordination,Communication and Integration Center.Within that structure, a US brigade from the82d Airborne Division was placed underOPCON of the French 6th Light ArmoredDivision.

1992 to Present. Operation SOUTHERNWATCH. Multinational operations to enforcethe UN No-fly Zone over southern Iraq inorder to protect Shia enclaves.

1991-1996. Operation PROVIDECOMFORT. Establishment of a combinedtask force at the conclusion of the Gulf Warto enforce the no-fly zone in Northern Iraqand to support coalition humanitarian reliefoperations for the Kurds and other displacedIraqi civilians.

1992. United Nations Protection Force inFormer Yugoslavia. 21 nations combinedin an effort to provide humanitarian reliefand attempt to create an environment for peacein Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1993. United Nations Operation in Somalia(UNOSOM) after US HumanitarianIntervention of December 1992 —UNOSOM II. Some 9,000 US militarypersonnel participated as part of amultinational UN force of at least 28,000peace operations troops. The overall UNcommander was a Turkish general, assistedby a US deputy.

1994. Multinational Force and UnitedNations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). TheAmerican-led MNF, a coalition of (eventually)37 countries, entered the country of Haiti on19 September 1994 in order to restore thelegitimate and democratically electedgovernment of Haiti. The MNF transferredresponsibility for operations in Haiti toUNMIH on 31 March 1995.

B-3

A Representative List of US Participation in Multinational Operations

1995. NATO Implementation andStabilization Force. NATO led,multinational effort conducted to stabilize UNbrokered peacekeeping effort by introducingforces of participating nations within theterritory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1999. NATO Operation ALLIEDFORCE. An offensive military operationled by NATO with multinationalinvolvement, undertaken in order to preventan outbreak of humanitarian crises in Kosovo.

B-4

Appendix B

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX CREFERENCES

C-1

The development of JP 3-16 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Presidential Decision Directive 56, “Interagency Management of Complex ContingencyOperations.”

2. CJCSI 2700.01, “International Military Rationalization, Standardization, andInteroperability Between the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations.”

3. CJCSI 3121.01 CH1, 22 Dec 94, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.”

4. CJCSI 6510.01A, “Defensive Information Operations Implementation.”

5. DOD 5105.38M, “Security Assistance Management Manual.”

6. DODD 2010.9, “Mutual Logistic Support Between the United States and GovernmentEligible Countries and NATO Subsidiary Bodies.”

7. DODD 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.”

8. DODD 5100.77, “DOD Law of War Program.”

9. DODD 5530.3, “International Agreements.”

10. JP 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.”

11. JP 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

12. JP 1-0, “Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations.”

13. JP 1-01, “Joint Doctrine Development System.”

14. JP 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

15. JP 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

16. JP 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.”

17. JP 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

18. JP 2-03, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information andServices Support to Joint Operations.”

19. JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

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JP 3-16

20. JP 3-01, “Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.”

21. JP 3-01.5, “Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense.”

22. JP 3-03, “Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.”

23. JP 3-05, “ Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”

24. JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

25. JP 3-07.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.”

26. JP 3-07.5, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant EvacuationOperations.”

27. JP 3-07.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign HumanitarianAssistance.”

28. JP 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.”

29. JP 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.”

30. JP 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.”

31. JP 3-14, “Joint Doctrine; Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space Operations.”

32. JP 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations.”

33. JP 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).”

34. JP 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.”

35. JP 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”

36. JP 3-56.1, “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.”

37. JP 3-57, “Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.”

38. JP 3-59, “Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support.”

39. JP 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.”

40. JP 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”

41. JP 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.”

42. JP 4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.”

C-3

References

43. JP 4-08, “Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.”

44. JP 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”

45. JP 5-00.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Campaign Planning.”

46. JP 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

47. JP 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) SystemsSupport to Joint Operations.”

48. NDP-1, “National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified MilitaryInformation to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.”

49. NSDM 119, “Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to ForeignGovernments and International Organizations.”

50. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy 43, “MilitaryTelecommunications Agreements and Arrangements Between The United States and RegionalDefense Organizations or Friendly Foreign Nations.”

C-4

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX DADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

D-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100,116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director forOperations (J-3).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

D-2

Appendix D

JP 3-16

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant (G-OPD), US Coast Guard2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

CommanderUSJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)116 Lake View ParkwaySuffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AADC area air defense commanderABCA American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies

Standardization ProgramACA airspace control authorityACC air component commanderACSA acquisition cross-Service agreementADP automated data processingAECA Arms Export Control ActAO area of operationsAOR area of responsibility

BOA basic ordering agreement

C2 command and controlC3 command, control, and communicationsC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligenceCA civil affairsCD counterdrugCFC Combined Forces Command, KoreaCINC commander in chiefCJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff InstructionCMO civil-military operationsCMOC civil-military operations centerCOA course of actionCOCOM combatant command (command authority)COM Chief of Mission

DOD Department of DefenseDODD Department of Defense DirectiveDOS Department of State

FHA foreign humanitarian assistanceFID foreign internal defenseFMS foreign military sales

GI&S geospatial information and services

HCA humanitarian and civic assistanceHN host nationHNS host-nation supportHQ headquartersHSS health service support

GL-2

Glossary

JP 3-16

IA implementing arrangementIO information operationsIPB intelligence preparation of the battlespaceISA international standardization agreement

JFC joint force commanderJOA joint operations area

LCC land component commanderLNO liaison officerLOA letter of offer and acceptance

MCC maritime component commanderMETOC meteorological and oceanographicMNF multinational forceMNFC multinational force commanderMOOTW military operations other than war

NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNCA National Command AuthoritiesNDP national disclosure policyNEO noncombatant evacuation operationNGO nongovernmental organizationNSC National Security CouncilNSDM National Security Decision Memorandum

OAS Organization of American StatesOPCON operational controlOPLAN operation plan

PO peace operationsPOLAD political advisorPOW prisoner of warPSYOP psychological operationsPVO private voluntary organization

QSTAG quadripartite standing agreement

RCA riot control agentsROE rules of engagementROK Republic of KoreaRSI rationalization, standardization, and interoperabilityRSN role specialist nation

SAO security assistance office/officerSAR search and rescueSOF special operations forcesSOFA status-of-forces agreement

GL-3

Glossary

SOP standing operating proceduresSROE standing rules of engagementSTANAG standardization agreement (NATO)

TACON tactical controlTPFDD time-phased force and deployment dataTTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UN United NationsUNC United Nations CommandUNMIH United Nations Mission in HaitiUNOSOM United Nations Operations in SomaliaUSC United States CodeUSG United States GovernmentUSSPACECOM United States Space Command

airspace control in the combat zone. Aprocess used to increase combateffectiveness by promoting the safe,efficient, and flexible use of airspace.Airspace control is provided in order toprevent fratricide, enhance air defenseoperations, and permit greater flexibility ofoperations. Airspace control does notinfringe on the authority vested incommanders to approve, disapprove, ordeny combat operations. Also calledcombat airspace control; airspace control.(JP 1-02)

alliance. An alliance is the result of formalagreements (i.e., treaties) between two ormore nations for broad, long-termobjectives which further the commoninterests of the members. See also coalition.(JP 1-02)

area of influence. A geographical area whereina commander is directly capable ofinfluencing operations by maneuver or firesupport systems normally under thecommander’s command or control. (JP 1-02)

area of interest. That area of concern to thecommander, including the area of influence,areas adjacent thereto, and extending intoenemy territory to the objectives of currentor planned operations. This area alsoincludes areas occupied by enemy forceswho could jeopardize the accomplishmentof the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational areadefined by the joint force commander forland and naval forces. Areas of operationdo not typically encompass the entireoperational area of the joint forcecommander, but should be large enough forcomponent commanders to accomplishtheir missions and protect their forces.Also called AO. See also area ofresponsibility. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility. 1. The geographicalarea associated with a combatant commandwithin which a combatant commander hasauthority to plan and conduct operations. 2.In naval usage, a predefined area of enemyterrain for which supporting ships areresponsible for covering by fire on knowntargets or targets of opportunity and byobservation. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs. The activities of a commanderthat establish, maintain, influence, or exploitrelations between military forces and civilauthorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian populace ina friendly, neutral, or hostile area ofoperations in order to facilitate militaryoperations and consolidate operationalobjectives. Civil affairs may includeperformance by military forces of activitiesand functions normally the responsibilityof local government. These activities mayoccur prior to, during, or subsequent to othermilitary actions. They may also occur, ifdirected, in the absence of other militaryoperations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. Group of plannedactivities in support of military operationsthat enhance the relationship between themilitary forces and civilian authorities andpopulation and which promote thedevelopment of favorable emotions,attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, orhostile groups. Also called CMO. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement betweentwo or more nations for common action.See also alliance. (JP 1-02)

coalition action. Multinational actionoutside the bounds of established alliances,usually for single occasions or longer

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-4 JP 3-16

cooperation in a narrow sector of commoninterest. See also alliance; coalition;multinational operations. (JP 1-02)

coalition force. A force composed of militaryelements of nations that have formed atemporary alliance for some specificpurpose. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (commandauthority). Nontransferable commandauthority established by title 10 (“ArmedForces”), United States Code, section 164,exercised only by commanders of unifiedor specified combatant commands unlessotherwise directed by the President or theSecretary of Defense. Combatantcommand (command authority) cannot bedelegated and is the authority of acombatant commander to perform thosefunctions of command over assigned forcesinvolving organizing and employingcommands and forces, assigning tasks,designating objectives, and givingauthoritative direction over all aspects ofmilitary operations, joint training, andlogistics necessary to accomplish themissions assigned to the command.Combatant command (command authority)should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.Normally this authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Combatant command(command authority) provides fullauthority to organize and employcommands and forces as the combatantcommander considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command(command authority). Also calledCOCOM. (JP 1-02)

commonality. A quality that applies tomateriel or systems: a. possessing like andinterchangeable characteristics enablingeach to be utilized, or operated and

maintained, by personnel trained on theothers without additional specializedtraining. b. having interchangeable repairparts and/or components. c. applying toconsumable items interchangeablyequivalent without adjustment. (JP 1-02)

compatibility. Capability of two or moreitems or components of equipment ormaterial to exist or function in the samesystem or environment without mutualinterference. See also interchangeability.(JP 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander orindividual assigned responsibility forcoordinating specific functions or activitiesinvolving forces of two or more MilitaryDepartments or two or more forces of thesame Service. The commander orindividual has the authority to requireconsultation between the agencies involved,but does not have the authority to compelagreement. In the event that essentialagreement cannot be obtained, the mattershall be referred to the appointing authority.Coordinating authority is a consultationrelationship, not an authority through whichcommand may be exercised. Coordinatingauthority is more applicable to planning andsimilar activities than to operations. (JP1-02)

force protection. Security program designedto protect Service members, civilianemployees, family members, facilities, andequipment, in all locations and situations,accomplished through planned andintegrated application of combatingterrorism, physical security, operationssecurity, personal protective services, ands u p p o r t e d b y i n t e l l i g e n c e ,counterintelligence, and other securityprograms. (JP 1-02)

functional component command. Acommand normally, but not necessarily,composed of forces of two or more Military

GL-5

Glossary

GL-6

Glossary

JP 3-16

Departments which may be establishedacross the range of military operations toperform particular operational missions thatmay be of short duration or may extend overa period of time. (JP 1-02)

geospatial information and services. Theconcept for collection, informationextraction, storage, dissemination, andexploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic,imagery (both commercial and nationalsource), gravimetric, aeronautical,topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural,and toponymic data accurately referencedto a precise location on the earth’s surface.These data are used for military planning,training, and operations includingnavigation, mission planning, missionrehearsal, modeling, simulation and precisetargeting. Geospatial information providesthe basic framework for battlespacevisualization. It is information producedby multiple sources to commoninteroperable data standards. It may bepresented in the form of printed maps,charts, and publications; in digitalsimulation and modeling data bases; inphotographic form; or in the form ofdigitized maps and charts or attributedcenterline data. Geospatial services includetools that enable users to access andmanipulate data, and also includesinstruction, training, laboratory support, andguidance for the use of geospatial data.Also called GI&S. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or militaryassistance rendered by a nation to foreignforces within its territory during peacetime,crises or emergencies, or war based onagreements mutually concluded betweennations. (JP 1-02)

information assurance. Informationoperations that protect and defendinformation and information systems byensuring their availability, integrity,authentication, confidentiality, and

nonrepudiation. This includes providingfor restoration of information systems byincorporating protection, detection, andreaction capabilities. Also called IA. (JP1-02)

information operations. Actions taken toaffect adversary information andinformation systems while defending one’sown information and information systems.Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

interchangeability. A condition which existswhen two or more items possess suchfunctional and physical characteristics asto be equivalent in performance anddurability, and are capable of beingexchanged one for the other withoutalteration of the items themselves, or ofadjoining items, except for adjustment, andwithout selection for fit and performance.See also compatibility. (JP 1-02)

interoperability. 1. The ability of systems,units or forces to provide services to andaccept services from other systems, units,or forces and to use the services soexchanged to enable them to operateeffectively together. 2. The conditionachieved among communications-electronics systems or items ofcommunications-electronics equipmentwhen information or services can beexchanged directly and satisfactorilybetween them and/or their users. Thedegree of interoperability should be definedwhen referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02)

joint. Connotes activities, operations,organizations, etc., in which elements oftwo or more Military Departmentsparticipate. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)

GL-7

Glossary

or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. See also joint force. (JP1-02)

military capability. The ability to achieve aspecified wartime objective (win a war orbattle, destroy a target set). It includes fourmajor components: force structure,modernization, readiness, andsustainability. a. force structure—Numbers, size, and composition of the unitsthat comprise our Defense forces; e.g.,divisions, ships, airwings. b. modernization— Technical sophistication of forces, units,weapon systems, and equipments. c. unitreadiness—The ability to providecapabilities required by the combatantcommanders to execute their assignedmissions. This is derived from the abilityof each unit to deliver the outputs for whichit was designed. d. sustainability—Theability to maintain the necessary level andduration of operational activity to achievemilitary objectives. Sustainability is afunction of providing for and maintainingthose levels of ready forces, materiel, andconsumables necessary to support militaryeffort. (JP 1-02)

mission. 1. The task, together with thepurpose, that clearly indicates the action tobe taken and the reason therefor. 2. Incommon usage, especially when applied tolower military units, a duty assigned to anindividual or unit; a task. 3. Thedispatching of one or more aircraft toaccomplish one particular task. (JP 1-02)

multinational force commander. A generalterm applied to a commander who exercisescommand authority over a military forcecomposed of elements from two or morenations. The extent of the multinationalforce commander’s command authority isdetermined by the participating nations.Also called MNFC. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

multinational operations. A collective termto describe military actions conducted byforces of two or more nations, usuallyundertaken within the structure of acoalition or alliance. See also alliance;coalition; coalition action. (This term andits definition modify the existing term andits definition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

National Command Authorities. ThePresident and the Secretary of Defense ortheir duly deputized alternates orsuccessors. Also called NCA. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organizations.Transnational organizations of privatecitizens that maintain a consultative statuswith the Economic and Social Council ofthe United Nations. Nongovernmentalorganizations may be professionalassociations, foundations, multinationalbusinesses, or simply groups with acommon interest in humanitarian assistanceactivities (development and relief).“Nongovernmental organizations” is a termnormally used by non-United Statesorganizations. Also called NGOs. See alsoprivate voluntary organizations. (JP 1-02)

operation. A military action or the carryingout of a strategic, tactical, service, training,or administrative military mission; theprocess of carrying on combat, includingmovement, supply, attack, defense, andmaneuvers needed to gain the objectives ofany battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Transferable commandauthority that may be exercised bycommanders at any echelon at or below thelevel of combatant command. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command(command authority). Operational controlmay be delegated and is the authority toperform those functions of command oversubordinate forces involving organizingand employing commands and forces,

GL-8

Glossary

JP 3-16

assigning tasks, designating objectives, andgiving authoritative direction necessary toaccomplish the mission. Operationalcontrol includes authoritative direction overall aspects of military operations and jointtraining necessary to accomplish missionsassigned to the command. Operationalcontrol should be exercised through thecommanders of subordinate organizations.Normally this authority is exercised throughsubordinate joint force commanders andService and/or functional componentcommanders. Operational control normallyprovides full authority to organizecommands and forces and to employ thoseforces as the commander in operationalcontrol considers necessary to accomplishassigned missions. Operational controldoes not, in and of itself, includeauthoritative direction for logistics ormatters of administration, discipline,internal organization, or unit training. Alsocalled OPCON. (JP 1-02)

private voluntary organizations. Private,nonprofit humanitarian assistanceorganizations involved in development andrelief activities. Private voluntaryorganizations are normally United States-based. “Private voluntary organization” isoften used synonymously with the term“nongovernmental organizations.” Alsocalled PVOs. See also nongovernmentalorganizations. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Plannedoperations to convey selected informationand indicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives, objectivereasoning, and ultimately the behavior offoreign governments, organizations,groups, and individuals. The purpose ofpsychological operations is to induce orreinforce foreign attitudes and behaviorfavorable to the originator’s objectives.Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

public affairs. Those public information,command information, and communityrelations activities directed toward bothinternal and external publics with interestsin the Department of Defense. Also calledPA. (JP 1-02)

rationalization. Any action that increases theeffectiveness of allied forces through moreefficient or effective use of defenseresources committed to the alliance.Rationalization includes consolidation,reassignment of national priorities to higheralliance needs, standardization,specialization, mutual support or improvedinteroperability, and greater cooperation.Rationalization applies to both weapons/materiel resources and non-weaponsmilitary matters. (JP 1-02)

standardization. The process by which theDepartment of Defense achieves the closestpracticable cooperation among the Servicesand Defense agencies for the most efficientuse of research, development, andproduction resources, and agrees to adopton the broadest possible basis the use of: a.common or compatible operational,administrative, and logistic procedures; b.common or compatible technicalprocedures and criteria; c. common,compatible, or interchangeable supplies,components, weapons, or equipment; andd. common or compatible tactical doctrinewith corresponding organizationalcompatibility. (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force which aids,protects, complements, or sustains anotherforce in accordance with a directiverequiring such action. 2. A unit which helpsanother unit in battle. Aviation, artillery,or naval gunfire may be used as a supportfor infantry. 3. A part of any unit heldback at the beginning of an attack as areserve. 4. An element of a command

GL-9

Glossary

which assists, protects, or supplies otherforces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. The commanderhaving primary responsibility for all aspectsof a task assigned by the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan or other joint operationplanning authority. In the context of jointoperation planning, this term refers to thecommander who prepares operation plansor operation orders in response torequirements of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. A commander whoprovides augmentation forces or othersupport to a supported commander or whodevelops a supporting plan. Includes the

designated combatant commands andDefense agencies as appropriate. (JP 1-02)

sustainability. See military capability. (JP1-02)

tactical control. Command authority overassigned or attached forces or commands,or military capability or forces madeavailable for tasking, that is limited to thedetailed and, usually, local direction andcontrol of movements or maneuversnecessary to accomplish missions or tasksassigned. Tactical control is inherent inoperational control. Tactical control maybe delegated to, and exercised at any levelat or below the level of combatantcommand. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

GL-10

Glossary

JP 3-16

Intentionally Blank

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCs

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

The CINCs receive the JP andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each JP and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each JP isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or JointStaff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrinepublications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub,makes required changes and prepares pubfor coordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing forapproval as a JP

STEP #4CJCS Approval

Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINTWARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF

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