Military Intervention:

The United States and The United Nations

John McKeeman

Danny Newman

E.D.G.E. 297A

November 28, 2003

Introduction:

Recent actions taken by the United States government and its military forces have

sought to ensure democracy and freedom for all people of the earth. Not only for those

living in oppressed countries such as Iraq or Afghanistan, but also, and perhaps more

importantly, to those living in the United States; to protect our own freedoms and safety.

In each of the two mentioned countries, the United States declared that it had undeniable

proof that injustices had been committed by Iraq and Afghanistan and that a military

strike was justified because of this evidence. In the case of Afghanistan it was the 9/11

attacks on New York City’s Twin Towers and Washington’s Pentagon, with a fourth

attempt at destruction that was avoided thanks to the courageous efforts of passengers on

Flight 90 which downed in rural Pennsylvania. In Iraq’s case, the United States CIA and

intelligence officials made claims that weapons of mass destruction had been found and

located in Iraq. Because these weapons were said to exist, the United States claimed that

it had no choice but to initiate a preemptive attack to not only ensure Saddam Hussein

could not use these weapons, but also to “free” the people of Iraq from the reign of

Hussein and his sons.

However, as months have passed since the “successful” attacks on Iraq began and

ended, many people and countries around the world have come forward to question

whether the United States acted in accordance with international law when it took these

preemptive measures against Iraq. Despite the United Nations sending in WMD experts

to search the country for said weapons, none have been found as of yet. This fact has

given even more fuel to the fire in the debate on the United States’ actions. Not only did

Iraq not make any military strikes provoking the U.S., now the reason that President Bush

gave for necessitating the attacks (the existence of deadly WMD) appears to be a farce.

In light of this, leaders such as Germany’s Defense Minister Peter Struck have declared

that:

Preventive (military) action requires unambiguous intelligence. The weapons of mass destruction which cannot be found in Iraq have shown how thin the ice can be when one embarks on a war of self-defense on the basis of supposedly clear proof of an imminent threat. One can ask the question whether what the United States did in Iraq was legitimate under international law.i

These words echoed those of German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder who was extremely

verbal against the U.S. and its decision to invade Iraq.

The most stinging question remaining from the Iraqi mess is not what will come

of the nation, or who will rule it after U.S. forces set up a government and Constitution,

but rather, was the United States’ actions illegal in their strike against Iraq? Did they

violate the “rules of warfare” as outlined in both the NATO and UN charters? Did past

precedents dealing with similar issues such as Afghanistan and incidents in the Balkans

and Bosnia lead the U.S. to believe it was actually acting in accordance with international

law? If not, then the U.S. and specifically President Bush could presumably be taken up

on charges of breaking said international laws. Where is the line drawn between Bush’s

actions, invading a country supposedly to ensure international safety, and the actions of a

dictator, say Hitler, who also invaded nations at his own free will for his “reasons”?

Now this is not to say that we in any way support the horrific actions taken by Hitler, but

it is merely posed as somewhat of a thought-provoking question. If Bush can invade and

ultimately destroy Iraq, then rebuild it as he sees fit and claim that it was done for

“democracy,” then can’t almost any invasion be justified? Especially in the Iraqi case

where much evidence points away from the military actions being taken for Bush’s

claimed purposes, and instead towards ensuring low prices for oil and removing the

“headache” that has been the Hussein regime. Nonetheless, at the heart of this debate is

the hard, international legal facts involved.

Examination into Past Precedents:

To start the investigation into the exact legality of the United States’ actions, we

looked back at past precedents and laws that emerged as a result of international conflict

and intervention. In order to examine a situation, it is first necessary to define the legal

and theoretical background derived from earlier conflicts. Two specific examples,

Kosovo and Somalia both rendered changes to international law and the UN charter. In

Somalia, the utter lack of a government as well as inter-clan warfare created a void in

power and an obvious humanitarian crisis as refugees, while fleeing the country,

unintentionally were impeding assistance efforts. Also, an enduring and far-reaching

famine had gripped the country for years accompanying the disastrous collapse of the

economy and any resemblance of an organized state. In Kosovo, persecution of an ethnic

population at the hands of the same government that had earlier reversed the previous

state of autonomy in that nation was the issue at hand. In this case, a void in government

was not the problem; rather it was the repression, denial of civil and political freedoms

and rights that characterized the governing force. It was deemed that the internal

struggles between the Serbs and Kosovars, two groups which constantly dehumanized

and discredited each other by reclaiming national myths as their cause, had led the nation

to a point where, in the words of David Goldhagen in an article titled “A New Serbia”

and appearing in the New Republic Magazine:

Any people that commits such deeds…clearly consists of individuals with damaged faculties of moral judgment and has sunk into a moral abyss from which it is unlikely to emerge unaided.ii

The United Nations reaction to the situation in Somalia was to adopt several

Resolutions which characterized the Somalian situation as one that was “a threat to

international peace and security.” Because of this declaration, it was deemed that the

authorization of humanitarian assistance was proper. Resolution 794 declared this to be

so:

Recognizing the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful of its deteriorating complex and extraordinary nature…Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.iii

After this Resolution was passed, Operation Restore Hope was put into place, marked by

many disagreements between the United Nations and the participating forces, as well as

many arguments between UN peacekeepers and local Somalians. The UN Secretary

General sought to pursue a written out path towards nation building that involved both

economic reconstruction and national reconstruction. UNOSOM II forces determined

that they wanted to pursue a much more aggressive policy than that suggested by the

Secretary General, in their words they did feel they had to be seen as “Good Samaritans.”

Because of this attitude of the UNOSOM II forces, which the U.S. representative to the

UN declared to be an “unprecedented enterprise,” the troops soon led to even more

internal conflict and civil unrest.iv

This situation is similar to the current situation in Iraq, as U.S. troops are being

attacked and seen as evil despite honest efforts to support and rebuild the nation. In the

worst incident, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were ambushed, in total 56 people were

wounded between Pakistanis and Somalians, with 20 killed. In the Somali example, the

troops were soon uneasy with their situation, and discords broke out between Italian,

French and the Islamic nations who quickly saw the mission losing its intended purpose.

Eventually, with the mandate far from fulfilled, the U.S. contingent withdrew its troops

and soon after, the UN did the same.v Finally the operation was reduced to a standard

and traditional peacekeeping mission, only attempting to assist in the political building

process in Somalia.

The situation in Kosovo on the other hand was controlled entirely by NATO, with

the UN Security Council held at bay. In other words, no official UN authorization was

given to the mission that was begun, overseen and ultimately terminated by NATO. The

lone move that the UN Security Council made in the Kosovo incident was to enact

Resolution 1244 on June 10th, 1999. This Resolution merely stated the end of hostilities

and announced that the search for a political solution, based on the general principles

agreed upon by both the President of Finland and a Special Representative of the Russian

Federation. Resolution 1244 also made it legal for member states and other international

organizations to establish a security presence to ensure the success of the political

rebuilding process.vi

However, when the situation in Kosovo began to appear beyond the point of self-

control, it actually was somewhat of a preemptive strike that was made by NATO

coalition forces, similar to the Iraqi situation. In February of 1999, the Rambouillet

agreement, an Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, was issued

and offered to the leaders presently in power in Kosovo. It stated that there would be

wide autonomy for the province within the immediate area, called the FRY. Then, at the

end of a three-year period, a review would be done to determine whether the nation was

set to self-rule one again. If the agreement were to be accepted by Kosovo’s leaders, it

would have authorized NATO forces to patrol and have access to the entire area under

FRY’s territory. A warning of the use of force accompanied the discussions over

whether or not to accept the Rambouillet agreement. Finally, FRY authorities rejected

this accord and the military operation started as a result. The entire Yugoslav territory

was covered in the operation. The United Kingdom’s Prime Minister Tony Blair said,

“This was a moral cause…we now have a chance to build a new internationalism based

on values and the rule of law.”vii Not only that, but the operation was also seen as fueled

by other geographic and political, as well as strategic factors, of which included NATO’s

i Barnes, Jeffrey “Germany’s Leaders Question Bush’s Policies in Iraq.”ii Goldhagen, David “A New Serbia”iii Glennon, Michael Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism After Kosovo p 191-194iv Glemmon, Michael p 196-201v Chatterjee, Deen Ethics and Foreign Intervention p 76vi Bundu, Abass Democracy by Force? p 101vii Tsagourias, Nikolaos Jurisprudence of International Law p 108

credibility and ability to re-establish a region which was deemed to be extremely volatile

and dangerous to the neighboring regions.

An important distinction to make in the Kosovo incident is the timing and thus the

cause of the mass human injustices that took place in the nation. After the operations had

begun, an enormous number of refugees sought protection in the neighboring countries,

with the intention to flee the persecution brought upon them by Yugoslav authorities.

The question is still unanswered whether the human rights nightmare either was a

predetermined policy decided upon by Yugoslav authorities, which would then justify

NATO’s actions. Or perhaps, if in fact the human rights issue was a result of the NATO

troops presence in the area that then may have provoked the Yugoslav’s actions.

The answer to this question is vital if we are to use the Kosovo example to

compare it to the Iraqi issue. If the former was true, that Yugoslavian leaders were

committing these crimes against their own citizens thus provoking a NATO response,

then the U.S. could potentially justify its actions in Iraq. It is well known knowledge that

for years Saddam Hussein and his sons brutally tortured and murdered citizens at will,

sometimes even using "human shields” to protect Presidential compounds against any

potential air strikes. Not only that, but in the early 1990’s there is evidence that early

forms of biological weapons were tested by Hussein on his own citizens, as well as

neighboring Iranians. Bush has used this information to justify the need for an

international response, claiming that as Hussein build even more WMD it was imminent

that he would use them again.

In attempting to examine and critique both the Kosovo and Somali operations, the

fact that a human catastrophe was developing cannot be overlooked. Not only that, but

the operations, similar to the ongoing Iraqi one, incited emotions and passions and in

turn, caused much destruction. As we are currently witnessing attempts to build a stable

democratic institution in Iraq, we cannot help but to look back and notice that the same

goals in the Somali operation, that of political stabilization and democratic institutions

has not yet materialized. In Kosovo, the operation is still in its second stage, with little

real progress to date.

Also, it is important to realize and emphasize that in both cases a global outcry

and general feeling of compassion and/or sympathy helped to propel the actions taken.

Similar to the Iraqi situation, the international community was slow to volunteer to

respond, due to the encumbering issues of sovereignty and non-intervention. Thus, it is

proof that indeed there does remain “Ethical Development in a Global Environment,” that

human sensitivity can in fact precipitate the stimulus for international actions. A

secondary motive, of either instilling democracy or protecting assets can always be

formulated. However, in both the Kosovo and Somali cases, there were widespread

media images in magazines, newspapers and on television that drew out the human

instinct to help. The sight of starving babies in Somalia or mass graves in Kosovo can

lead to demand from a nation’s population to act as human beings and help out a fellow

man in need, despite feelings that the nation should be autonomous and handle its own

problems.

The far-fetched mandates of the operations of installing democratic

institutions, creating a civic society and setting up national

reconciliation coincides with or are prerequisites for the enjoyment

of human dignity. viii

viii Glennon, Michael p 213

In the case of Iraq, there was little media that displayed injustices by the Hussein regime.

Instead, most of the media showed unsuccessful UN inspectors’ attempts to find WMD

throughout the Iraqi countryside.

Examining the Kosovo operation further, it should be said that the operation in

fact was broken down into two phases, the military phase (phase 1) and the civilian phase

(phase 2). While many claim that the military actions were justified and sufficient in

protecting lives, it is also widely accepted that this was not the case; that the military was

not impartial and instead sought to punish the Serb people as a means of degrading the

Serb regime in power. Intentionally or not, it created thousands of refugees and, more

importantly, it further stirred the ethnic melting pot in the area that will no doubt be an

immense slowdown to any attempts at reconciliation in the area. The civilian stage is still

ongoing with the goal to create a civil society; again, this will be slow to fully and

effectively complete as a result of the military actions. If the situation in Iraq is to have

any measurable level of success then the U.S. and UN needs to make sure it does not

handle the civilian stage of the operation as poorly as in Somalia and Kosovo.

United States Domestic Policy:

To the proverbial alien, stepping onto Earth for the first time and asking about

various nations’ policies regarding international intervention, the United States’ answer

would appear to be a confusing mystery. Although it does indeed have a legal regime set

up in this area, perhaps the most complicated on the entire planet, the political culture and

demand is somewhat out of sync with that regime. In the Constitution is a framework for

declaring war and thus the use of military forces. However, in the history of the United

States more than 200 instances of international use of force have occurred, with only five

occasions of Congress officially declaring war. Following the Vietnam War the War

Powers Resolution was passed which sought to rejoin the President and Congress in

declarations of war, and the use of armed intervention. However, since that legislation

was passed the forces continue to be used even at a more frequent pace, with only the

1991 Gulf War receiving congressional approval. What then, is the American law?

The setup of who can authorize the use of force in America is specifically made

to be complex, thus intended to avoid a dictatorial leader with complete military

obedience below him. A mix of constitutional and statutory provisions outlines the basic

regime, rendering those who both order and control armed forces accountable to the

democratic controls. Throughout the United States’ history discontent has arisen with the

system and calls for even more accountability have surfaced. During the post-WWII

through the end of the Cold War, those who support enhanced accountability have

pointed towards the possibility that units of American armed forces could be called upon

automatically by either the United Nations or a similar international alliance. Also during

this time, a concern existed in America regarding the decision-making structure of

international alliances and organizations. The worry was that if America decided to

intervene in an issue, how easily could an international organization such as the UN veto

the decision. Following the Vietnam War, political debate on the issue of the

authorization of force changed focus, now aiming more towards the extent to which

presidential power to make war should be reined in if at all. In other words, what are the

circumstances that require a president to gain congressional support and authorization

before commanding the use of force?

An examination further into the Constitution of the United States is necessary to

fully understand the domestic side of America’s foreign policy decisions. Two

provisions stand out: the declaration of war clause and the commander-in-chief clause. A

third clause, the treaty clause, addressed the question whether a treaty can automatically

commit America to the use of force. In article 1, section 8 the Constitution empowers

Congress to formally declare war. Other war related powers are also given to Congress

in this section, including to lay taxes for the purpose of providing national defense, raise

and support armies, maintain a navy, punish offenses against both the law and the nation,

and so on. Finally, the Constitution also grants to Congress “all legislative Powers

necessary and proper for carrying into execution…all…Powers vested by this

Constitution in the government of the United States.”ix

Thus, exactly how far a president can go without stepping into the congressional

war power has been, and continues to be the subject of intense scrutiny and debate.

Many interpret that the intent of the Founding Fathers was to grant the president the

power to “make” war, whereas Congress had the power to “declare” war. The distinction

between these two words has been evidence in this debate. Many argue that by

substituting “make” for “declare” when outlining the commander-in-chief clause, the

framers intended for it to be clear that only in an imminent, narrow, emergency time can

the president use armed forces. It is stated that the commander-in-chief can use force and

has the “power to repel sudden attacks.” As James Madison wrote:

Those who are to make a war cannot in the nature of things, be the

proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced,

continued or concluded.x

ix Ku, Charlotte Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law p 219-222

This unfortunately does little to clarify the specific powers of the president. Like many

other pieces of legislation in the United States there is ambiguity here. Was the situation

in Iraq an urgent, emergency situation?

Those who support a broad presidential war-making power claim that when

interpreting the Constitution, tradition has long had the final word. That is, for the past

200 plus years, the use of force as commanded by the president has happened so many

times that it clearly is legal. On the other hand, those against a broad presidential war-

making power respond that almost all of those uses of force have been on a very small

scale, with no serious threat to large casualties or long-term involvement. The specific

article at debate here is Article 2, section 2 of the Constitution, outlining the Commander-

in-chief clause. “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of

the United States, and of the militia of the several states.”xi Again, a look back at history

suggests that the framers actually intended a narrow power, with this clause only

conferring minimal policy-making authority. Even Alexander Hamilton, a framer who

supported broad presidential powers, argued that the President’s authority “would amount

to nothing more than the supreme command and the direction of the military and naval

forces, as the first General and Admiral of the Confederacy.”xii

When examining the treaty issue, and whether any treaty could commit the United

States to use armed forces, it is doubtful that the Constitution would support such a

treaty. In fact, there is explicit evidence that this is not to be the case in any treaty. “A

treaty may not declare war,” proclaimed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in

x Ku, Charlotte p 225xi Tsagourias, Nikolaos p 215-216xii Ku, Charlotte p 226-227

its report on the Panama Canal Treaties, “because the unique legislative history of the

declaration of war clause clearly indicates that that power was intended to reside jointly

in the House of Representatives and the Senate.” xiii What this committee makes reference

to is found in Madison’s notes on the Philadelphia Convention. At said convention,

Hamilton and Charles Pinckney had submitted a plan that would have empowered the

executive “to make war or peace, with the advice of the Senate.” This was met with

overwhelming sentiment against it. A clever remark was made by George Mason when

he said that only the Senate was needed to declare peace, and thus it should require both

the House and the Senate to declare war because it should be easier to get out of war than

into it.xiv

Nine years following the drafting of the Constitution, James Madison, now a

member of the House of Representatives said that “Congress (the House) in case the

President and Senate should enter into an alliance for war, would be nothing more than

mere heralds for proclaiming it.”xv Basically, it is clear that the framers were explicit in

intending not to confer war making powers on the Senate and president alone, but rather

to include the House in decisions or committing the United States to war. And,

accordingly, treaty makes have never rendered any of the three parties out of control in

the use of force. In sum, no treaty has ever committed the United States to war without

conferring and receiving a declaration from Congress. When responding to the Panama

Canal Treaties, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said:

All such treaties implicitly reserve to the United States a right of

choice in each individual situation to act, militarily, as it deems

xiii Bundu, Abass p 111xiv Ku, Charlotte p 219xv Ku, Charlotte p 220

appropriate under the circumstances. Any treaty which did not do

so would, in the Committee’s opinion, unconstitutionally divest the

House of Representatives of its share of the war-making power and

would, unconstitutionally, delegate to the President the power to

place the United States at warxvi

As mentioned earlier, the War Powers Resolution, enacted in 1973, plays a large

role in U.S. intervention policy. The central and most controversial provision, section

5(b) declared that a limit of sixty days may pass in an armed force intervention before

congressional authorization is necessary. Another important section, 8(a) imposes that no

treaty or statute could confer the power on the president to introduce armed forces into a

hostile situation. This section is in accordance with the 1945 United Nations

Participation Act, which again never “specifically authorizes” the introduction of armed

forces into any conflict. Only a special agreement in Article 43 of the UN Charter, only

after UNPA agreement from Congress, could such authorization be provided. Given this

knowledge of Section 8, it is clear that it attempts to state the Congressional

understanding that neither the UN Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty is altered by the

ratification of the War Powers Resolution.xvii

United States and International Policy:

When the United States refused to join the League of Nations and instead joined

the UN, NATO and other alliances, it made it clear that it “reserved the right to decide for

itself when to use armed force, and that in no circumstances would it automatically be

xvi Glennon, Michael p 87-89xvii Tsagouias, Nikolaos p 275-276

required to do so.” While maintaining the focus of examining the recent Iraqi incident,

this section is extremely important. The process by which the United States goes about

deciding whether or not to commit armed forces to international operations is a subset of

the process in which the United States decides whether or not to use force at all. This

was described in the above section regarding domestic policies on the matter. Further,

there is, and has never been, a domestic legal requirement that the use of force be

“authorized by any international organization, although political considerations often

make it, along with participation from other nations, desirable.” The U.S. has welcomed,

largely for political rather than legal reasons, the initial Security Council authorization of

enforcement. Later, again they supported the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution which dealt

with the Korean War. Later still, the U.S. showed its support for UNEF 1 in the Middle

East, ONUC in the Congo, the UNSC authorization of Chapter VII actions to liberate

Kuwait and finally the UN missions in Somalia and Kosovo.xviii

Again, it is very important to note that, prior to this current Iraqi conflict, the

United States has, independently, used its military on numerous occasions. These

occasions include, since 1945, the 1962 Cuban quarantine, the 1964 Dominican Republic

invasion, the Vietnam War, the 1983 Grenada invasion and the 1988 invasion of Panama.

The UN Security Council authorized not one of these operations, and, with the lone

exception of the Vietnam War, all these military actions were done after orders from the

president, with no congressional approval. One must recognize that the United States

military is a very unique and specific group to study. In fact, historians argue, and it is

commonly accepted that not since British conquest following Napoleon’s defeat has any

single military power had such dominance.

xviii Ku, Charlotte p 117-130

Since the 1980’s, the United States has accounted for more than one-fifth of the

world’s total economic output, a figure that many claim is the reason of America’s ability

to attain and deploy such a powerful military. America’s military budget in the 1990’s

almost surpassed those of all NATO countries combined, and its military spending, as a

percentage of GDP was more than half of what it was during the Vietnam War.

Technological advancements are the main reason the United States is able today to

conduct such thorough and efficient war. Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, many military

observers ranked the forces of Iraq as the fifth most powerful in the world. We were all

witnesses, via various media including six o’clock news coverage featuring aerial shots,

to the quickness in which U.S. airstrikes subdued Iraqi forces. In the Kosovo War in

1999, more than half of all NATO airstrikes were flown by U.S. pilots; the result after 11

weeks of high tech “smart” bombings was zero NATO casualties and the surrender of

Yugoslav forces.xix

The clear superiority of U.S. military forces has led to some of the reasons that

the United States feels it should have the authority to act alone. For example, the “free

rider” problem has plagued U.S. military officials for years. Congress was very

dissatisfied with the disparity between U.S. contributions in Kosovo with that of its allies.

Over 75 percent of the 1,092 military aircraft deployed in that conflict were American, 90

percent of high-risk reconnaissance missions were flown by U.S. pilots and over 80

percent of precision-guided missiles including 95 percent of all cruise missiles fired were

done so by the U.S. This was not a single case. Operation Deliberate Force in the

summer of 1995 over Bosnia again showed the disparity to be clear.

xix Glassner, Martin The United Nations at Work p 183-184

This conflict illustrated that a sustained NATO combat expedition

is impossible without U.S. muscle. The satellite intelligence,

electronic jamming, and other technological contributions were

virtually all American, and the United States flew two-thirds of all

aircraft sorties.xx

This lack of sharing the burden between the U.S. and its allies has influenced American

attitudes concerning participating in international organizations such as NATO or the

UN.

Three specific “attitudinal clusters” have come up repeatedly while discussing

future American participation in international operations, notably multilateral operations.

First, although the United States is routinely criticized abroad for its over-willingness to

inadequately consult with its allies and to fight alone, many members of Congress

question why nations that do not put up nearly the same amount of military supplies and

manpower should have as large a say in the direction of military operations involving

U.S. forces. Secondly, several U.S. military officials believe that multilateral operations

have become dysfunctional because of the large capabilities gap between America and

some of its allies. These officials believe that “allies” of the U.S. choose to join in these

multilateral agreements more for political appearance than for military backing. And

thirdly, criticism against the U.S. when it attempts to pursue “casualty-free” battle

through use of highly technological battlefield strategies from countries either unwilling

or incapable of doing so makes little to no impression on American policy makers, either

civilian or military.

xx Bundu, Abass p 156-158

Franklin Roosevelt, while President, did not wish to sign into an accord that

would bind United States to send its troops to Europe, nor did he support any clause that

would set up a permanent, international police force. In fact, he wanted to limit U.S.

troop involvement overseas to naval and air forces. His ultimate wish was that member

states of the UN would provide and maintain forces that would be available for collection

action, and even then only after approval by the Congress and executive. The most

pertinent piece of UN legislation concerning the use of force is Article 43. This, in

conjunction with Article 24(2) is what outlines the powers that nations have to commit

troops to international conflicts. The wide powers that authorize the use of force in

complex operations do not contradict the powers in the UN Charter, Article 1.

Essentially, the Security Council does not exceed its powers when it designates to send

troops into battle. However, this Article 24(2) is what came into question in the Gulf

War in 1991 when several countries, the U.S. included, were deemed to have used

excessive force beyond the customary “limitation of proportionality.” Article 2 involving

specifically enforcement action under Chapter VII outlines as specifically as any section

of the Charter exactly when international operations are justified. “Intrusive missions are

justified as responses to threats to international peace and security, regardless of any

factual basis for the claim.”xxi Where the international community outcries is that the

Security Council needs to approve of such actions, even if in the past, actions have been

taken without said approval.

xxi Glassner, Martin p 255-261

The World Responds

On March 19, 2003, President Bush of the United States told the world what it

had been expecting for months. After issuing a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to

relinquish power and leave Iraq, Bush announced that air strikes on Iraq had begun as

Saddam had predictably failed to comply with the terms of the ultimatum.xxii Ignoring the

wishes of the United Nations and many countries of the world, America went to war

against Iraq. President Bush had long made the case that Iraq had weapons of mass

destruction and was therefore an imminent threat to global stability and American

security; but he had failed to persuade the rest of the world to follow him into combat as

they had in Afghanistan after September 11. What followed was a quick dismantling of

Iraq’s meager military defenses, as American and British forces entered and occupied the

country with little difficulty. But President Bush had thought that it would also be that

easy to justify the war to the world once the weapons of mass destruction were found

after the smoke cleared. This might have been, but for the fact that the weapons did not

appear as Bush had so confidently predicted they would. What ensued was a wave of

skepticism for American foreign policy and general displeasure with the country as a

whole.

Whether or not the United States invasion of Iraq was justified as a valid action in

the fight against terrorism under international law and in accordance with the various

treaties the United States has entered into, it has undoubtedly had a powerful impact on

America’s relations with the rest of world, in many cases weakening trust and support for

the United States. In the western world in particular, strong bonds of similar culture and

xxii Stevenson, Richard W. Blair Gives Bush Support, But Receives Little Back. New York Times, November 21, 2003.

like-minded foreign policy, which had for years kept America close to its overseas

counterparts, have been weakened and in some cases, almost completely destroyed. With

President Bush’s blatant disregard in invading Iraq for the general international will as

expressed through the United Nations and by many various countries individually, many

of America’s longtime friends have turned into voices of opposition. On the other hand,

some countries, such as Britain, Spain, Japan, Poland, Turkey, and India, decided to back

the United States, causing a divide to form in the western world and causing the people of

these countries to oppose their administrations. This paper will examine the results of

American foreign policy, both in invading Iraq and in the course of action the United

States has pursued since then, as seen in various countries’ responses to American

actions, as well as the effects America has had on international communities, as seen in

the United Nations and the European Union.

One of America’s unlikely allies is Spain. From the beginning, Prime Minister

Jose Maria Aznar and the Popular Party, currently in power, supported the United States

in the war against Iraq, not only by voicing approval, but by lending troops to the cause

as well. While nearly eighty percent of the Spanish population oppose their government’s

position, Aznar has been unwavering in his backing of America. According to Felix

Vacas, professor of international law at Madrid University's Institute for International and

European Studies, joining America in the war on Iraq was a terrible political move. In the

face of upcoming municipal and regional elections, Aznar has put his party at a great

disadvantage, with millions demonstrating their disapproval of the current administration

and the leading national newspaper constantly criticizing the government for backing the

US instead of joining forces with the rest of Europe in an effort to prevent war.xxiii But as

Jeremy Bransten explains, Aznar’s steady support of Bush is more a matter of principle

than politics. The Popular Party is very conservative, and it replaced the Socialists as the

ruling party in Spain, so the move to back America might be part of an effort to realign

Spain as a conservative nation amongst the general liberalism of Europe. But while doing

this certainly has put Spain in America’s good graces, the rest of Europe is not at all

happy. As Dan O'Brien describes it, "In terms of the repercussions in Europe, it's almost

certain that both France and Germany will want to punish Spain and be seen to punish

Spain. It's important to remember that Spain is the largest beneficiary of [European

Union] funds, which mostly come from Germany. So the idea that a middle-weight

country, that receives so much funding, could undermine the Franco-German position is

something that will be taken very seriously by the French and the Germans, and it won't

go unpunished." He continues to discuss how Aznar’s unpopular foreign policy has

angered both the liberals and the religious conservatives in Spain, especially since the

Catholic Church has taken an official stand against the invasion.xxiii Yet with so much

suggesting that Spain would be one of the many countries to resist the United States

when the issue of war on Iraq first emerged, the country’s Prime Minister has done the

opposite, bringing his country into the improbable triad of America, Spain, and Britain.

Unlike Spain, Britain did not surprise the world when it announced its backing of

America in the war. While the United Nations denied that there was sufficient evidence

of Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction to justify military action, Prime Minister

Tony Blair of Britain sided with President Bush in making the case that Saddam Hussein

had been “working to break through barriers that have constrained him from rebuilding

xxiii Bransten, Jeremy. Spain: What Motivated Aznar To Side With The U.S. Against Iraq? http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/03/19032003182036.asp

his military and the deadly weaponry that he possessed a decade ago.”xxiv This was Bush’s

main argument in making the case that military action against Iraq was necessary: that

United Nations sanctions had not succeeded in preventing Saddam from acquiring the

ingredients for a weapon of mass destruction, and that the inspectors were not being

given access to the real locations of construction of these weapons. “The 108 U.N.

inspectors were not sent to conduct a scavenger hunt for hidden materials across a

country the size of California. The job of the inspectors is to verify that Iraq's regime is

disarming. It is up to Iraq to show exactly where it is hiding its banned weapons, lay

those weapons out for the world to see and destroy them as directed. Nothing like this has

happened.”xxv In siding with Bush, Prime Minister Blair cited a report produced by the

Joint Intelligence Committee, a committee comprised of the heads of all Britain’s spy

agencies, which judged the potential threat Iraq would pose with weapons of mass

destruction. While saying that the idea of a nuclear weapon being produced in Iraq was

unreasonable, because Iraq could not acquire weapons grade uranium, the document did

assert that "Iraq has managed to rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure

destroyed in the Gulf War and in Operation Desert Fox in 1998."xxiv It also mentioned that

there were many individuals and firms helping Iraq, one being an Indian chemical

engineering firm that was caught helping Saddam set up rocket fuel factories.xxiv Another

report by the British government said that Iraq possessed chemical and biological

weapons, and with the renewed missile production, Saddam could strike a number of

targets in the countries surrounding Iraq, including US/British allies and bases. xxiv In the

State of the Union, President Bush listed some of the specific threats Saddam was said to

possess: anthrax, botulinum toxin, sarin gas, mustard gas, and VX nerve agent. President

Bush and Prime Minister Blair made the argument that Saddam had not only violated the

UN orders to disarm and allow inspectors full access, but also that he was continuing a

program of creating biological and chemical weapons, and was attempting to build

nuclear weapons. They believed that Iraq posed an imminent danger to the world and that

a preemptive strike was necessary to prevent Saddam from using his weapons. It was on

this point that the debate hinged, with America and Britain on one side, and Germany and

France leading the charge on the other side.

From the beginning, Germany and France were two of the most outspoken

opponents of a war on Iraq. Unlike Tony Blair, who sided with the US despite the

widespread disapproval of the British public (a huge majority of which supported

US/British military action in Afghanistan), the leaders of Germany and France spoke for

the people of their countries when they expressed their desire that the United States not

invade Iraq.xxvi President Jacques Chirac of France, on the day that America announced it

was going to war, called Bush’s decision illegal and misguided.xxvii Having opposed the

idea of war since it had surfaced months ago, he did not accept the conclusions drawn by

the American and British leaders based on lack of evidence that Iraq had weapons of

mass destruction. "Whether it involves the necessary disarmament of Iraq or the desirable

change of the regime in this country, there is no justification for a unilateral decision to

resort to force, Iraq today does not represent an immediate threat that justifies an

immediate war.” Chirac went on to criticize Bush for “throwing off the legitimacy of the

xxiv Tyler, Patrick E. Britain’s Case: Iraqi Program to Amass Arms is ‘Up and Running.’ New York Times, September 25, 2002.xxv Bush, George W. State of the Union. January 29, 2003. xxvi Tagliabue, John. France and Germany Draw a Line, Against Washington . New York Times, January 23, 2003.xxvii Cowell, Alan. A Worried World Shows Discord. New York Times, March 19, 2003.

United Nations” in pursuing war as an option after trying and failing to gain UN

approval. xxvii In the battle to gain global support, Bush simply had not been able to

overcome the argument that Iraq might still be hiding some weapons from UN inspectors,

but with sanctions in place, it would be extremely difficult for Saddam to acquire

weapons of mass destruction, and he has reason not to attack America, Europe, or any of

the countries around Iraq because of the overwhelming military might, (a counterattack

would certainly be supported by almost every powerful first-world nation), that would

fall on his head as a result. Despite early signs that it would be difficult if not impossible

to persuade all 5 members of the UN Security Council to authorize an invasion of Iraq,

Bush made it clear that the United States were going to war, with or without the rest of

the world behind them.

Germany was the other country that resisted the idea of military action on Iraq

from very early on in the process of international deliberation. Chancellor Gerhard

Schroder made it clear that Germany would not be convinced that all other options had

been exhausted and that war was a reasonable action. But after fearing that France would

cave in and back the US, leaving Germany as the lone opponent of war, the two countries

signed a pact to stand together against the idea of invading Iraq.xxvi Not only did Germany

oppose war on Iraq, but it further increased the divide by siding with France and Belgium

in opposing a NATO contingency defense plan in the case of Turkey being attacked if

there were to be a war with Iraq.xxviii This greatly disappointed President Bush, who

expressed great displeasure that members of the alliance would fail to protect one of its

members, and went on to say that such a move certainly hurt the alliance as a whole.xxviii xxviii Smith, Craig S. with Richard Bernstein. Diplomacy: 3 Members of NATO and Russia Resist U.S. on Iraq Plans. New York Times, February 11, 2003.

But on the main point of contention, war with Iraq, France and Germany were joined by

longtime US opponent Russia; the three countries made a joint declaration to oppose the

prospect of war on Iraq and instead suggested more rigorous inspections within the scope

of UN Security Council Resolution 1441.xxviii

But France and Germany were merely the two most outspoken of the many

countries that opposed the war on Iraq. Moreover, the people of the few countries that

supported the war were generally opposed to it, as were the people of those whose

governments opposed it. As Alan Cowell described the mood of the international

community after Bush announced that America was about to go to war, “Underlying the

world's response was a sense that corrosive divisions caused by the crisis would fester,

whatever the outcome in Baghdad. Indeed, the European split over Iraq was depicted as

further evidence of what critics depict as the continent's impotence in international

crises.” Results of an opinion poll conducted in 9 countries, including many of America’s

European allies and Russia, serve as evidence that anger toward the US only increased as

it became more apparent that America was set on war; giving "empirical support to critics

who say the Bush administration has squandered an outpouring of good will and

sympathy among allies and partners in aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist

attacks.”xxvii After a devastating attack on civilian and government targets such as that of

September 11, it was easy to forge a coalition to back the United States in retaliation.

Unfortunately, President Bush did not convert the international support into a long-term

global alliance. Instead, his decision to pursue a war against Iraq regardless of

tremendous international opposition caused a major rift to develop between the two sides.

Now that the American, British, and Spanish soldiers occupy Iraq with Saddam

Hussein’s regime destroyed, the most pertinent question is what will happen to the

transatlantic alliance. In a letter written by Denis MacShane, the UK’s minister for

Europe, he says that most European Union countries want to sustain the alliance with

America. But they want it only under the condition that certain major changes take place.

Specifically, there must be more European coordination and capacity building. This will

allow Europe to begin to develop as a unified power on the level of the United States,

with military prowess giving weight to decisions made amongst the nations in the union.

The countries also want a more effective NATO, which will help bridge America and

Europe. MacShane argues that while many Europeans want nothing to do with America

after Iraq, “Twenty-first century geopolitics requires that the two great regions of

democracy, rule of law, civil society, and open markets should work together. If we work

against each other, only the forces of evil will win.”xxix While it might not be easy to

reconcile the political differences and disagreements between America and Europe, if a

unified European foreign policy is even conceivable in the first place, cooperation

between the two is certainly a worthwhile goal for all countries involved to pursue.

This is not an easy situation to approach, however. From the perspective of the

European countries that opposed America on the Iraq issue, the first problem to be solved

is containment of the United States. One argument is that a common foreign policy for

Europe is desirable in the future, but will have negative results if implemented now.

“Assurances that EU military structures should, naturally, not compete

with NATO do not become any more credible with repetition. Apparatuses

xxix MacShane, Denis. America is Our Security, But Europe is Our Future. Letter to the Independent – London, October 23, 2003.

have the habit of growing. In the medium term, dual structures are

therefore foreseeable and unavoidable. This must lead to a further

weakening of NATO, which has, in any event, been declared dead by

some military experts.”xxx

Under this reasoning, it would be preferable to attempt to increase the power of

organizations that include both Europe and America, such as NATO and the United

Nations. That way, European foreign policy and American foreign policy would be

components of international policy as governed by these bodies, rather than two separate

and potentially conflicting entities.

xxx Die Tageszeitung. Contain United States with NATO; an Independent European Security Policy is Ominous. BBC Monitoring, October 22, 2003.

Concluding Remarks

While nations such as Germany and France might be extremely upset with the

United States decision to use force against Iraq, international law and precedents such as

Kosovo and Somalia favor the side of the United States. The main concern of a nation

such as Germany is that the United States, being the superpower that it is, will continue to

wield its technologically advanced troops at will, without consulting the UN member

nations first. However, when you examine the fine print of the UN Charter there is

definitely ambiguity that suggests that any imminent threat to world safety can be

deemed a justifiable cause to use force. Therefore, if a nation sought to bring the United

States or President Bush specifically on a war crimes tribunal for its preemptive strikes

against Iraq, it would be nearly impossible to prove that in America’s eyes, Iraq was

anything short of an “imminent threat.” It is undeniable that a fracture between political

decisions made by the international community and the ensuing effectiveness of

undertaken operations exists. On one hand, the legitimacy of the United States carrying

out UN decisions on such a large-scale effort, such as the widely criticized somewhat

disproportionate use of force in the 1991 Iraqi conflict comes into question. On the

reverse side, without a nation such as the United States taking a strong and leading role,

UN missions often can lead to ineffective operations.

United States law also provides the necessary ambiguity from which Bush can

defend his position. The 200 plus precedents of an executive sending troops into a

conflict provide more than enough support for Bush to claim he was well within his

bounds. The Commander-in-chief clause clearly gives the president the power to

authorize the use of his military to carryout any imminent and necessary peacekeeping

and safety-ensuring operations. And, with the War Powers Resolution, the sixty-day

clause also applies, giving the executive up to sixty days to deploy his troops before

requiring the consent of the Congress. So, while indeed domestic law and precedent

allows for an executive to willingly commit his troops to overseas conflicts, the United

Nations Security Council, in the words of the UN Charter, must approve such actions

taken by a member state. Here is where Germany and France shout injustice. But again,

the ambiguity and possibility that such an imminent threat existed in Iraq gives a defense

for Bush, as he can claim that to acquire the Council’s approval may have taken too much

time, at which point weapons may have already been used by Hussein.

Works Cited