John Ellis, The Trouble With Fragrance

7/30/2019 John Ellis, The Trouble With Fragrance

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objects that predicating motion of a quality is to view it as having a separatenature. 15 He then goes on to offer the first alternative:

Soperhaps it is better to saythat every fragrance and all accidents of such asort existwith their own substance and are never drawn away from it, while (a) the substanceat one time is stretched out, having been rarefied, and dispersed among othersubstances, and (b) at another time changes into itself the things continuous andnaturally fitted to undergo change, which is manifestly seen in the case offire. Forthe initial spark is not what spreads over all the material, but the fire which is

multiplied quickly from it."

As this passage shows, Simplicius prefers, given the objection he has foundto the tense solution, a stricter construal of inherence than it allows:

accidents never separate from their own substance. All three alternativesconform to this stricter construal. The first alternative, which I've sub-

divided into two parts, (a) and (b) above, is perhaps best understood as

supplying two possible explanations of how an accident can appear to

separate from its subject. This solution attempts to explain away the fra-

grance problem. The explanation involves nothing unusual taking place onthe part of accidents, but turns solely on certain, perhaps unexpected or

unrecalled, capacities of substances. If the fragrance appears to separate

from its subject, it could be either that (a) the substance has been rarefied insome way and dispersed among other substances, or (b) the substance itself

may have grown. It may appear that the heat which was at the source of the

fire is now, on its own, some distance away. What has really occurred, or

could have occurred, Simplicius seems to be saying, is that the fire itself has

grown.

Simplicius then offers a second possible solution which also conforms to a

strict construal of inherence, but does so by suggesting that the fragrance is

not an accident after all:But perhaps it is clear from what has already been said" that the fragrance of theapple and incense are complements of the form and they would not be said to be inwhat has been completed as in a subject.'8

Accordingly, the fragrance of the apple is not threat after all to the defini-tion of accidents. Since the fragrance is a part of the apple's form, it fails to

satisfy the first of the conditions of the definition: 'not as a part'. It may still

puzzle us how this answer would solve the problem of smells generally. Let


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it be granted that apple fragrances are complements of the forms of apples;nonetheless, are all smells related to their source in the same way? We don'tknow how Simplicius would have answered that question. In his defence,

one might say that at least this answer would solve the problem underdiscussion. It would then be left to the next opponent to counter. This maynot satisfy, but we should remember that the fragrance of the apple had

become a standard problem by the time of Simplicius. It was probablyinvented by Lucius or his followers. 19 Simplicius at any rate, seems to have

thought so. For, in the passage just quoted, he refers back to 48,1 - 49,9,where he discussed a difficulty (involving the complements doctrine) raised

by 'those around Lucius'. And Simplicius' second alternative is itself

couched in terms of what 'they would be said to be'; presumably in accord-ance with the doctrine of Lucius and his followers. Simplicius, therefore,

may think that he has satisfied them with the complement solution; he is

apparently addressing the problem only as it is raised.

Simplicius finishes off this section by referring in a condensed way to

Ammonius' effluence solution, marshalling in the standard evidence :2o

That some substance is also carried awaywith such fragrances, the wrinkling of the

apple and the consumption ofincense indicate."

Philoponus

Philoponus, another pupil ofAmmonius (490 - 570s AD), does little morethan repeat his teacher in his Categories commentary.22 He only adds a

counter to an objection to Ammonius' cloth argument. If it sometimes

occurs that we still inhale a foul smell even though a cloth is applied, it maybe that either the cloth has slipped, its position changing in such a way that

the odour is allowed passage, or the fragrant effluence has been blownabout and thus rarefied enough to pass through the fabric. 23

Like Ammonius, Philoponus does not indicate whether he prefers theeffluence solution to the tense solution. Later, however, in his de Anima


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commentary,24 Philoponus comes to realize that the effluence solution is

inconsistent with Aristotle's de Anima. For on Aristotle's theory, as Philo-

ponus understands it, the medium is only supposed to convey, incorporeal-the activities of the odours. In the case of smell, the medium does this

through its 'diosmic', or transodorant capacity (fi 610apog justas in the case of sight, the capacity is called 'transparent' and,in the case of sound, 'transsonant' But if smell takes place bymeans of effluences from fragrant objects, the air, or water, no longerfunctions as a medium. The objects of smell themselves would only be

carried by the air or water to the sense organ, and smell would then take

place by contact, a result explicitly rejected by Aristotle. 28

Philoponus comes to realize the inconsistency by considering a problemwhich the diosmic theory cannot handle, why does one odour overpoweranother?

Someone might raise the problem, if the sense of smell apprehends through themedium, it being air and water, whydoes one odour overpower another? For often,when there is a bad odour an ensuing sweet odour overpowers it, or also vice versa,which ought not occur ifair were fit for transmitting odours, and the odorous

vapours themselves did not come to the sense organ, just as the air transmits all

colours, and the activity of, say, white never overpowers someother

colour, e.g.,black, because the colours themselves don't come to be in the air, but [only] theactivities of them. Thus it ought to occur also in the case ofodours, if, at least, [theair] transmits only their activities and not the vapours themselves, which arebodies.'"

Philoponus points out that this problem is worsened if one considers the

rival theory that 'sensation is, not by means of the medium, the apprehen-sion of what is smellable, but the object of smell itself comes to the sense

organ'.3 For in that case, the diosmic theory is not only challenged by the

overpowering problem, but also by a rival, effluence theory. But Philopo-


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lies beyond without the existence of an adjoining body, but with a kind of void inbetween (ifthat is possible)?39

Apparently, Plotinus did not regard qualities and activities in the same way.Qualities, he seems to say, are covered by the Aristotelian definition of

accidents, but activities are not. Nothing prevents them, then, from trav-

eling 'to what lies beyond without the existence of an adjoining body'.Therefore, because the diosmic theory involves the separation of activities,not qualities, it may be seen as a solution to the fragrance problem.

Olympiodorus and Elias

In fact, the diosmic theory was so regarded in the Categories commentariesof Olympiodorus40 (495/505, died after 565) and Elias4l (fl. 541). Elias

mentions it as one of three solutions to the fragrance problem. 4' He attri-

butes the diosmic theory to Aristotle, the effluence theory to Plato and a

theory which brings 'together the Aristotelian and Platonic views' to Ploti-

nus. Olympiodorus, on the other hand, attributes the effluence theory to

'the Aristotelians'43 and, evidently, the diosmic theory to Plotinus.44 Al-

though they apparently disagree as to who gets credit for the diosmic and

effluence theories, both Olympiodorus and Elias treat the diosmic theory asa solution to the fragrance problem.

The disagreement is, to some extent, only apparent. By 'the Aristote-

lians', Olympiodorus probably means Aristotle's commentators, for it was

Ammonius, after all, who introduced the effluence theory as a solution to

the problem. Plotinus' credit for the diosmic theory is more problematic.First, let us see how Olympiodorus describes Plotinus' solution.

Plotinus brought to bear a different solution when he solved that aporia, alleging as

a cause the transodorant (bCouRov)[capacity] of the air. For he said that the air,being potentially transodorant, becomes in actuality fragrant, and in this way we

apprehend the fragrance.

Now, according to the diosmic theory as I have construed it, the air does not

become fragrant. As we saw in Philoponus, only the activity of the fra-

grance is supposed to be transmitted through the medium. If the fragrance


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itself were to come to be in the medium, then the medium would no longerbe trans-odorant ; it would itself be odorous. But as Alexander says,45 'the

air is not odorous, but when it transmits one of the odorous things it

becomes trans-odorant Such, I think, is the traditional under-

standing of the diosmic theory. Olympiodorus, then, is either introducing a

new way of construing 'diosmic' or has simply gotten the theory wrong.Elias, on the other hand, does not use the term 'diosmic' in his descrip-

tion of Plotinus' view.

Plotinus, bringing together the Aristotelian and Platonic views, holds that part ofthe air is changed by the fragrance. For the fragrance, remaining in the apple,generates another quality like itselfwhichchanges part of the air, and which is what

we perceive.The view here attributed to Plotinus has it that the medium is affected, but

the resultant quality or fragrance is not identical to the fragrance in the

apple. It is a new quality, an offspring, ifyou will, of the original fragrancein the apple. The apple's fragrance, then, has not moved from it. It is in this

way that the Plotinian view can be seen as a solution to the fragrance

problem.The view does rely on Plotinus, I believe, in that it involves one quality

generating another quality like itself, as we will see shortly. Plotinus him-self, however, would probably have found the view objectionable. He

repeatedly argues against the need for a medium in the case of sight,46 and,since he takes sight to be the representative case '41 his arguments are

presumably to be applied to the other senses, about which he says verylittle. The sense in which the view relies on Plotinus can perhaps best be

seen ifwe first look at an anonymous gloss on Philoponus in Cat. 36,10. The

author not only follows Elias' description of Plotinus' view, but he also adds

a comparison.And Plotinus claims that part of the air changes into a smellable quality. For thefragrance, remaining in the apple, generates another quality like itself which

changes part of the air, and which is what we perceive. As also the heat in the firedoes not come to us cold having left the fire behind, but remaining in the fire itgenerates in the air another heat, formally the same as itself.

Now Plotinus uses the example of the heat in fire to illustrate how, since the

One 'abides unchanged', it can nonetheless generate the Intellect.

In each and every thing there is an activity which belongs to substance and onewhich goes out from substance; and that which belongs to substance is the active


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actuality which is each particular thing, and the other activityderives from that firstone, and must in everything be a consequence ofit, different from the thing itself: asin fire there is a heat which is the content of its substance (auf.lJt'YIQoaarnv

o?aiav),and another which comes

into being from that primary heat when fireexercises the activity which is native to its substance in abiding unchanged as fire.48

The context of Plotinus' remarks is far removed, of course, from that ofinherence and the fragrance problem. What I'm suggesting is that theycontain the idea of one quality generating another like itself, and so the

comparison in the anonymous gloss (quoted above) is not without prece-dent in Plotinus. Yet the view attributed to Plotinus is, as already stated,not one which he would have accepted. Elias seems to be more interested in

making Plotinus a harmonizer than reporting his views accurately. Eliasdoesn't tell usjust how the Plotinian view harmonizes Plato and Aristotle. I

suppose he thought that the Plotinian view follows the 'Platonic' effluence

theory in that it involves one quality coming from another or, in a sense,

coming out of the fragrant object. And it is similar to the Aristotelian

diosmic theory insofar as a medium is responsible for transferring fragran-ces from the sense object to the sense organ. The difference remains, of

course, that the medium is changed in the process: it takes on the newly

generated fragrant quality. And,unlike the effluence

theory,Elias' 'Ploti-

nian' view gives the medium an essential role to play in the sensory process.

Interestingly, after saying 'none of these opinions are true on their own'

and then leveling objections against each of them,49 Elias goes on to claim,

The three [views]are, at all events, true altogether, but in the case of those whosmell poorly, effluences are also required;5in the case of those who smell accurate-

ly, the transodorant [capacity]of the air is also sufficient; while in the case of thosewith an average sense ofsmell, the change of the air is sufficient as well. 51

Elias points out that 'according to none of the views do qualities pass overfrom subject to subject'.52 But he evidently does not regard this feature of

the solutions as an advantage, because he ends his discussion of Categoriesla24-5 by saying,

It was also possible to solve these things more simply, [by saying]that Aristotle didnot say 'what is incapable ofexisting separately from that in which it was', but 'fromthat in which it is', and wherever the quality is, it is in a subject.53

Is the tense solution still a live option for Elias? This would be somewhat

surprising, since Simplicius, as we have seen, objected to the tense solution,


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and Olympiodorus, who was arguably Elias' teacher,54 left it out of hisdiscussion of the fragrance problem altogether. Elias has shown us hisrebellious side: by diverging from his teacher in his presentation ofthe three

main solutions to the fragrance problem and by arguing that the three arenot true on their own, but are true altogether, thus gaining some credit forhimself for the new amalgamation. Perhaps suggesting that the tense solu-tion is the simpler way of solving the problem would above all reveal anattitude ofindependence. But it seems more likely55 that Elias has tacked onthe tense solution for completeness' sake. Afterall, he has shown himself tobe far more interested in the more sophisticated solutions and may have

meant, not that the tense solution is 'simpler' in the sense of elegant, but in

the sense of 'more simple-minded'.

Concluding Remarks

There would seem to be a clear development of the way the commentators

construed 'in a subject'. Starting with Porphyry's tense solution, it is pos-sible to see a gradual movement away from that solution and the weak

construal it implies, toward the stronger reading implied by the other

solutions. Ammonius introduces an alternative, the effluence solution,

albeit without indicating his preference. His students, Philoponus andSimplicius, add further developments or modifications to his view: Simpli-cius, by rejecting the tense solution and offering new alternatives; and

Philoponus, by turning the discussion more towards psychology and reveal-

ing both the conflict between the effluence and diosmic theories and his

preference for the latter. This shift in the discussion towards psychology is

evidenced by Olympiodorus, who responds to the fragrance problem onlywith alternative psychological theories, making no mention of the tense

solution. And finally Elias, although mentioning the tense solution, de-votes most of his energy to evaluating the alternative psychological answers

to the fragrance problem .

Memphis State University

John Ellis, The Trouble With Fragrance

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