J.F. Wippel, Medieval Reactions to the Encounter Faith and Reason

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Medival Reactions

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The Aquinas Lecture, 1995

Medival Reactions

to the

Encounterbetween

Faith and Reason

Under the auspices of theWisconsin-Alpha of Phi Sigma Tau

by

John F. Wippel

Marquette University PressMilwaukee1995


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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 94-74397

ISBN 0-87462-162-3

Copyright 1994

Marquette University Press

Published in the United States of America


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Prefatory

The Wisconsin-Alpha Chapter of Phi Sigma Tau, theNational Honor Society for Philosophy at MarquetteUniversity, each year invites a scholar to deliver alecture in honor of St. Thomas Aquinas.

The 1995 Aquinas Lecture,Medival Reactionsto the Encounter between Faith and Reason, was de-livered in the Tony and Lucille Weasler Auditoriumon Sunday, February 26, 1995, by Monsignor JohnF. Wippel, Ordinary Professor of Philosophy in theSchool of Philosophy and Academic Vice-Presidentof The Catholic University of America. Born in Pomeroy, Ohio, John Wippel began hisseminary training at St. John Vianney Seminary inSteubenville, Ohio and completed his undergraduatework at The Catholic University of America where healso earned an M.A. in Philosophy and a Licentiate inSacred Theology. After ordination in 1960 he taught

for one year at The Catholic University of Americaand then pursued doctoral studies at the University ofLouvain which awarded him the Ph.D. in 1965. Healso holds the post-doctoral degree ofMatre-Agrg delEcole Saint Thomas dAquinfrom Louvain-la-Neuvewhich he received in 1981. He resumed teaching at

The Catholic University of America in 1963 andbecame Ordinary Professor in 1972. Since June of1989 he has been Academic Vice-President of theUniversity.


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Monsignor Wippel received the Cardinal Mer-cier prize from the University of Louvain in 1981

for his book, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfreyof Fontaines. He is also the author of MetaphysicalThemes in Thomas Aquinas(1984). He is coeditor andcoauthor ofMedieval Philosophy: From St. Augustineto Nicholas of Cusa(1969); he is editor of Studies inMedieval Philosophy(1987) and author of the chapter

in that volume on Thomas Aquinas and Participa-tion. He is coauthor of Les questions disputes et lesquestions quodlibtiques dans les facults de thologie, dedroit et de mdecine(1985), having contributed PartII of that volume, Quodlibetal Questions, Chieflyin Theology Faculties. He has translated Boethius of

Dacia: On the Supreme Good, On the Eternity of theWorld, On Dreams(1987). Besides his books, Msgr. Wippel is the authorof over fifty articles in journals and in encyclopediasand chapters in books on medival philosophy.Some of his most recent articles bear the following

titles: Godfrey of Fontaines: Divine Power and thePrinciple of Noncontradiction, Individuation inJames of Viterbo, Thomas Aquinas on What Phi-losophers Can Know about God, Thomas of Suttonon Divine Knowledge of Future Contingents, TheLatin Avicenna as a Source for Thomas AquinassMetaphysics, and Truth in Thomas Aquinas. To Msgr. John F. Wippels distinguished listof publications, Phi Sigma Tau is pleased to add:Medival Reactions to the Encounter between Faith and


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Medival Reactions

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Medival Reactions

to the Encounter between

Faith and Reason

John F. Wippel

Introduction

In order to introduce this topic I would like to

turn to the Prologue of Bishop Stephen Tempierswell known condemnation of 219 propositions is-sued March 7, 1277, at Paris.1However one mayassess the justification for such action on the part ofthe Bishop, the contents of his decree point to a crisisat the University of Paris. According to the Prologue,

the prohibited propositions were allegedly taught bycertain members from the Arts Faculty there at thattime. After denouncing these members from Artsfor having exceeded the limits of their own faculty,the Bishop comments:

So as not to appear to be asserting what they thusinsinuate, however, they conceal their answers insuch a way that, while wishing to avoid Scylla,they fall into Charybdis. For they say that thesethings are true according to philosophy but


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not according to the Catholic Faith, as if therewere two contrary truths, and as if the truth of

Sacred Scripture is opposed to the truth in thesayings of the accursed pagans, of whom it iswritten, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise.(I Corinthians 1:19).2

It is generally agreed today that no members of the

Arts Faculty of that time in fact defended a double-truth theory, i.e., the claim that two contradictorypropositions could both be true at one and the sametime.3But I have cited this text for other reasons,to show how acute the encounter between faith andreason had become in Parisian philosophical andtheological circles by that time, and also to showhow widely received was the distinction betweenwhat one accepts as true on the strength of divinerevelation, on the one hand, and on the strength ofunaided human reason, on the other.

I. Earlier Reactions to theFaith-Reason IssueThe distinction between faith and reason was notan original discovery on the part of the thirteenthcentury, of course. It is already present in some of theFathers of the Church, especially so in St. Augustine.

While Augustine was interested in constructing whatmight best called a Christian wisdom rather than anykind of separate philosophy, he was quite familiarwith and well versed in philosophical thinking, es-


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Encounter between Faith and Reason 3

pecially in Neoplatonism. For his appreciation of thedistinction between understanding or proving some-thing on purely rational or philosophical groundsand believing it on divine authority, one may turnto Bk II of his De libero arbitrio. There, in attempt-ing to buttress the claim that God gave free will tohuman beings, he raises the issue of Gods existence.Augustine is not content to let his partner in this

dialogue, Evodius, accept Gods existence solely onthe grounds of religious belief. In fact, in the courseof Bk II, Augustine gradually works out one of thestrongest and lengthiest versions of an argumentfor Gods existence based on eternal truths that theWestern world would ever see. At the conclusion of

this argument Augustine maintains that he and hisdialogue partner now accept Gods existence as truenot only by faith, but by a sure if somewhat tenuousform of reasoning.4

At the same time, in this same treatise Augus-tine had argued that it is one thing for us to believe

that God exists on the authority of Scripture. It issomething else for us to know and to understandwhat we believe. Unless believing is different fromunderstanding, and unless we first believe the greatand divine thing that we desire to understand, theprophet has said in vain: Unless you believe, youshall not understand. As a consequence, we findin Augustine strong support for a position adoptedmany centuries later by St. Anselm of CanterburyUnless you believe, you will not understand.5


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For Augustine this admonition does not meanthat he has therefore rejected the role of rational orphilosophical argumentation. It does mean that ifone is to be properly disposed to appreciate fullythe force of such argumentation, at least in casesinvolving such sublime issues as Gods existence, oneshould first believe and then seek to understand. Infact, for Augustine in Bk II of his De libero arbitrio,

working out a conclusive argument for Gods exis-tence based on eternal truths is a good illustrationof what it means to understand. Also worth mentioning in this respect is thecontribution of Boethius. In him the Latin Westhad a good illustration of a Christian who could and

did write purely philosophical works, and who alsoproduced some theological tractates. Even one of thelatter, often referred to as his De hebdomadibus, is infact highly philosophical; indeed, it is almost a workof pure philosophy. In addition to this treatise andto his logical writings and translations, his Consola-

tion of Philosophymust be recognized as a significantliterary and philosophical contribution to subsequentLatin thought. Hence, if he did not work out indetail a theoretical solution to the faith-reason issue,he illustrated in practice how one might be both abelieving Christian and a philosophical thinker andwriter and, in most of his theological tractates, howone might apply reason to the content of faith.6

For a more clearly recognizable continuationof the Augustinian tradition on the faith-reason is-


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sue developed in highly original fashion, one mayleap forward in time to St. Anselm of Canterburyin the late tenth and early eleventh centuries. Infact, one might call him the medival herald of thisapproachfidesquaerensintellectum(faith seekingunderstanding). By Anselms time the intellectualclimate in the Latin world had changed considerably.The Carolingian revival had come and gone, and

had been followed by a period of increased interestin dialectic, or in what we might call correct logicalthinking and argumentation. This was owing inpart to the fact that a small part of Aristotles logicalwritings had been preserved in Latin translation forthe largely non-Greek reading Latin West since the

time of Boethiuss translations of these works. Thisheritage included an Introduction by Porphyry tothe first of Aristotles logical works, known as theIsagoge, along with Aristotles Categories itself andhis De interpretationeand Boethiuss independentlyauthored logical treatises. It was only after Anselms

time that the other parts of Aristotles logical writ-ings were rediscovered in Boethiuss translations orretranslated, in the case of the, Posterior Analytics,and then made available in Latin.7

While controversies had broken out betweendialecticians and anti-dialecticians before and dur-ing Anselms time, participants on both sides werewell versed in the logic of the day, or in dialectic.One is reminded of St. Peter Damian, one of theleading anti-dialecticians, and the dialectical skill


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he manifests in his letter On Divine Omnipotence.There he examines the question whether God hasthe power to make past events not to have been andoffers dialectical arguments for each side. In fact,by appealing to the authority of faith, he pushes hiscase so far as to suggest that God does indeed possesssuch power.8

Anselm himself was highly skilled in dialectic as

his writings clearly attest. While he, like Augustine,was still interested in contributing to the develop-ment of a Christian wisdom, he penned writingsthat are clearly theological and others that are morephilosophical in content. For examples of the latterone may cite his De grammatico, to be sure, but also

his De veritate, and De libertate arbitrii. As theirmodern translators note in referring to the lattertwo, while Anselm does appeal to biblical or eccle-siastical authority in these treatises, his manner ofargument is such as to seek for rational rather thanconfessional bases for his conclusions.9And almost

everyone is familiar with the interesting combinationof philosophical and theological reasoning presentin his Monologion of 1076, and the considerableamount of philosophical content present in hisProslogionof 1077-1078.10

While Anselm would not separate philosophyfrom theology so sharply as would some thirteenth-and fourteenth-century writers, he was deeply inter-ested in finding convincing arguments (rationes) tosupport or to demonstrate rationally conclusions he


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had originally accepted on faith. So confident is heof possible success in such an undertaking that heeven claims to have discovered necessary arguments(rationes necessariae) to support, even to demonstrate,some truths which almost all other leading Christianthinkers would regard as beyond human reasons abil-ity to prove and hence as matters of purely religiousbelief. Thus in his Cur Deus Homo, surely directed

to a central religious and theological topic, he notesin the Preface that he has divided this treatise intotwo books. The first deals with certain objectionsraised by unbelievers who reject the Christianreligion because they regard it as repugnant to hu-man reason. Hence, setting aside all ones belief in

Christ as if nothing were known about him, Anselmpromises to prove by necessary arguments (rationes)that it is impossible for anyone to be saved withoutChrist.11

In Bk I, ch. 1 he writes that in replying to thosewho inquire about this particular problem of the

Christian faith, i.e., why God became man, he isaccustomed to give the rational foundation, the ra-tiones, for such belief. He is now about to set downsuch thoughts in writing. Those Christians whohave asked him to do this have made this requestnot in order that they might approach their faith bybeginning with reason, but so that they might takedelight in understanding and contemplating thatwhich they believe, and that they might be prepared


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to give satisfactory answers to those who ask them forthe reason for that hope which lies within them.12

To me this means that for Anselm the Augustin-ian call to believe first and then to seek to understandcontinues to hold. For Anselm the dialectician, tofind necessary reasons for that which one alreadybelieves is part of the task of an enlightened faith.But Anselm also recognizes here and even more so

in his Proslogion that rational argumentation canalso be effective in dealing with an unbeliever andin enabling such a person to move from unbelief tobelief. This more apologetical appeal to reason canand, in the case of the Proslogions argumentationfor Gods existence and its derivation of the divine

attributes, surely does lead to major contributionsto medival philosophical thought by Anselm.13

II. The High Middle Ages1: The New Philosophical Sources

Before we turn to the thirteenth-century encounter

between faith and reason, a word should be saidabout the new philosophical sources that had becomeavailable by that time. Reference has already beenmade to the Boethian translations of Aristotles Cat-egoriesand De interpretationeand his translation ofPorphyrys Isagogewhich remained known to Western

thinkers during the following centuries. These worksconstituted what was often referred to as the OldLogic (Logicavetus) and were also used in Anselmstime. Not too long thereafter, more or less parallel-


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ing the end of Peter Abelards career, the remainingworks from Aristotles logical corpus, known as theNew Logic (Logicanova) again became available inLatin translation.14

Whether any of these works (Logicanova) werealready available in time for Abelard to employ themeffectively, especially the Priorand Posterior Analytics,is highly unlikely.15Nonetheless, their absence did

not prevent Abelard from making significant contri-butions to the development of logic (dialectic). Andwe should also note, if only in passing, that Abelardhimself is another good example of a medival writerwho could produce purely philosophical works (inlogic), and who would eventually turn his attention

to theological topics as well, if only to run counterto ecclesiastical authority in some of his theologicalendeavors.

Especially interesting efforts to come to termswith the faith-reason issue are to be found in twoof his works, his Dialogue between a Philosopher, a

Jew, and a Christian, and his treatise on Ethics, ScitoTeipsum. The first work is difficult for us to interpretboth because of its unfinished nature, and becauseit is sometimes not easy to determine whether Abe-lard himself holds the views he assigns there to thePhilosopher or to the Christian. In the second partof the Dialogue, where the conversation is betweenthe Philosopher and the Christian, the emphasisshifts to the meeting between pagan philosophicaland Christian views on morality. This great inter-


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est in ethical problems is central to Abelards ScitoTeipsum, though there the perspective is decidedlymore theological.16

But in neither of these works nor, for that matter,in his other strictly theological works, does Abelardwork out a fully satisfying or consistent solution tothe faith-reason issue. Nonetheless, he clearly hada high appreciation of the value of philosophical

thinking and writing both in its own right and as atool for theological reflection.17

Shortly after Abelards time the treasury of philo-sophical literature of non-Christian origins availablein Latin translation became much greater. ThusAristotles other logical writings, known as the Logica

nova, soon became available, and owing to this trans-lation activity both from Arabic into Latin and fromGreek into Latin, by the year 1200 or thereabouts themajor part of the Stagirites writings were accessiblein whole or at least in part in Latin translation. Alongwith these, Latin translations of important Arabic

originals by thinkers such as Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi,Avicenna, Algazel, Averroes and Moses Maimonidesalso became available to Christian thinkers duringthe twelfth and thirteenth centuries together withcommentaries on Aristotle by classical commentatorssuch as Alexander, Simplicius, Themistius, Ammo-nius, and John Philoponus, and a number of otherpseudo-Aristotelian and related works.18

As more and more of these previously unknownphilosophical sources began circulating in the West,


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it was inevitable that Christian thinkers would haveto react to and absorb this new learning. And pre-cisely because so much of it was purely philosophical,they would also have to reflect more deeply aboutthe appropriate stance Christian thinkers should takeon the faith-reason issue. As is well known, the pathwas not always smooth.

2: Early Ecclesiastical ReactionsAlready in the year 1210 a council was held atParis for the Bishops of the ecclesiastical provinceof Sens. The views of two individualsDavid ofDinant and Amalric of Bnewere singled out forcondemnation, and a prohibition was issued under

penalty of excommunication against reading thebooks of Aristotle on natural philosophy or theCommentaries on the same at the newly foundedUniversity of Paris. New statutes for the Faculty ofArts at the University were promulgated in 1215 byRobert of Couron (formerly a theology professor

at Paris and then Papal Legate). After requiring thatMasters in Arts should read Aristotles books on boththe old and new logic, and after mentioning readingAristotles Ethicsand Topics, Bk 4, the statutes pro-hibited reading AristotlesMetaphysicsand books onnatural philosophy as well as Summaeof the same.Reading should be taken in these texts in the senseof lecturing, and the Commentaries and Summaein question were probably Avicennas paraphrases.


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Private consultation was not prohibited, nor wereMasters in Theology prevented from using them.19

In a letter to the Masters of Theology at Paris ofJuly 7, 1228, Pope Gregory IX warned them againstrelying unduly on philosophy and profane noveltiesin their teaching of theology. Evidently many of themwere now using the new philosophical sources. Andanother letter from the Pope on April 13, 1231,

Parens scientiarum Parisius, aimed at ending a greatUniversity strike of some two years duration, alsodirected that Masters of Arts at Paris should not usethe previously prohibited librinaturalesuntil theyhad been examined and purged from all suspicionof error. Ten days later, in a letter of April 23, the

Pope appointed a three-man commission to examineAristotles librinaturales. The probable chairman ofthe commission, William of Auxerre, died in Romein November 1231, and this may explain why thecommission never carried out its task. The factthat it would have been practically impossible to

purge Aristotles writings may have been anotherreason.20

So far as we can determine, the prohibitionagainst lecturing on these works was observed in themain in the Arts Faculty until at least ca. 1240. Thisis reflected in the surviving works produced by theseMasters until that time, which concentrate heavilyon logic and ethics rather than on metaphysics andnatural philosophy, and some of which also takecare to distinguish between philosophy and theol-ogy. But Roger Bacon clearly did lecture on the libri


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naturalesduring his time as a Master in Arts at Paris,i.e., ca. 1245. And by the year 1250 or thereabouts,Aristotle was securely established both in Arts and inTheology at Paris, so much so, in fact that the 1255statutes for the Arts Faculty required reading all ofthe known works of Aristotle. Hence by that timewe can already speak of a Latin Aristotelianism inboth of these faculties at Paris, though in each case

we are dealing with versions of Aristotle which areheavily colored by Neoplatonic and Avicennian ele-ments.21

The cause of Aristotle was greatly helped byAlbert the Great who taught at Paris from 1240 or1243 as a Bachelor and then as a Master in Theology

until he moved to Cologne in 1248. Aristotles causewas also significantly advanced by Thomas Aqui-nas, who followed Albert to Cologne in 1248 butreturned to Paris as a Bachelor and then as a Masterin Theology from 1252 until 1259, and who wouldagain serve asMagisterregensin Theology there from

1269 until 1272. Alberts reputation was immenseand in addition to his many theological writings, hewould eventually produce an extensive list of com-mentaries or paraphrases on Aristotles works.22

Aquinass contributions to the spread of Aris-totle are so well known that I will not detail themhere, though I will return below to his views on thefaith-reason issue. Suffice it to say that from the verybeginning of his literary career he was quite familiarwith and very positively disposed toward the works


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of the philosophers while developing his personalphilosophical and theological thought. Alberts influ-ence in developing this spirit in the young Aquinasshould not be overlooked. Thomas, too, wouldeventually produce a series of highly regarded literalcommentaries on many of Aristotles works.23

Many Latin thinkers recognized that there wasmuch of value in the writings of Aristotle and his

Greek commentators and in Arabic originals pennedby Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, Algazel, Averroes,and Moses Maimonides. But it also came to berecognized, if only gradually in some cases as withAverroess Long Commentary on the De anima, thatsome of their viewseven many in certain cases

were at odds with orthodox Christian belief.24

3: Radical Aristotelianism

Also worth mentioning was the development ofthe Faculty of Arts at Paris as a center for philosophi-

cal studies by the 1260s and 1270s, if not earlier.This development, along with the circumstancesalready mentioned above, set the stage for the ap-pearance of another kind of Latin Aristotelianismin that faculty in the 1260s which would provokeconsiderable alarm in various quarters, and whichwould eventually lead to the prohibition of 13propositions by Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris in1270, and then of 219 articles in 1277. Sometimesreferred to as Latin Averroism, this movement in theArts Faculty was much broader than that and can be


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better described as Heterodox Aristotelianism, as VanSteenberghen preferred, or as Radical Aristotelian-ism, as I prefer to do.25 While relatively little is known about the originsof this movement in the Arts Faculty prior to theCondemnation of 1270, cooperative research inrecent decades has shed more light on these events.26For instance, it has long been known that St. Bo-

naventure attacked some of the views defended byadherents of this movement in his Lenten Confer-ences of 1267 and 1268.27

More recently, Ignatius Brady has made knownand edited some questions of the Franciscan Mas-ter, William of Baglione, which date from 1266-

1267, and which address in detail certain positionscondemned by Tempier in 1270, especially thosehaving to do with numerical unity of the possibleintellect, the denial that this individual human beingcan be said to understand, and the theological issueconcerning whether the separated soul suffers from

fire. Williams discussion of unicity of the possibleintellect, by the way, indicates that he already hada first-hand knowledge of Averroess Commentaryon the De anima. This issue was crucial, of course,because if distinct intellective and spiritual powersare not present in different individual human be-ings, the possibility of personal survival after deathis undercut.28

In any event, in December of 1270, BishopTempier condemned 13 propositions and excom-


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municated all who shall have taught or assertedthem knowingly. At least four of these are foundin works by Siger of Brabant from the Arts Facultywhich have been dated prior to 1270: (1) that theintellect for all human beings is numerically one andthe same; (5) that the world is eternal; (6) that therenever was a first human being (homo); (8) that theseparated soul cannot suffer from corporeal fire in

the afterlife.29 These views appear in Sigers Quaestiones intertium de anima and in his Quaestio utrum haecsit vera: homo sit animal.... Of these condemnedpropositions, only the first is uniquely defended byAverroes.30Closely related to it in the eyes of a Thom-

as Aquinas is the position defended by condemnedproposition 2that it is false or improper to say: a(meaning this individual) human being understands.(This would be an extreme version of the Averroisticview that only one separate possible intellect thinksin individual human beings). Personal immortality is

explicitly denied by proposition 7. For Aquinas, bothof these views would follow from Sigers defense ofunicity of the possible intellect, even though neitheris explicitly defended in so many words in Sigerssurviving writings.31

Other prohibited propositions would subject hu-man beings to sheer necessity and thereby undercutfreedom of choice (3, 4), or reduce the will to a purelypassive power moved necessarily by the desired object(9), or reject Gods knowledge of individuals (10) or


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of things other than himself (11) or his providence(12), or Christian belief in the resurrection of thebody (13).32 In the year 1270 Thomas Aquinas produced hisDe unitate intellectus (contra Averroistas), attackingnot only Averroes but his Latin followers, presumablySiger of Brabant above all others. Aquinas challengedunicity of the intellect both as a defensible reading

of Aristotle and on purely philosophical grounds.The appearance of the term Averroists in the titlein some ancient manuscripts undoubtedly did muchto introduce this expression into later usage. Yet forThomas the particular Averroistic position at issuewas unicity of the possible intellect.33As for Siger of

Brabant, Thomass intervention, along with BishopStephens Condemnation of 1270, seems to have hada moderating effect on his subsequent discussions ofunicity of the intellect and on other points as well, aswill be seen below. Such development did not savehim, along with Boethius of Dacia, from becoming

major targets of Tempiers much more sweepingcondemnation in March 1277. Indeed, during the 1270s various events indicatethat the Condemnation of 1270 had not destroyedthe Radical Aristotelian movement in the Faculty ofArts. For instance, St. Bonaventures Collationes inHexameronof 1273 point to continuing concernon his part about certain errors of Aristotle andother Arab philosophers. Bonaventure maintainsthat Aristotles rejection of divine exemplar causality


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was at the root of many of his other shortcomingsin metaphysics, such as the absence of a doctrine ofdivine knowledge of individuals, divine providence,and divine foreknowledge of contingents, the Ar-abs introduction of a doctrine of necessitating fate,and Aristotles omission of a theory of reward andpunishment in the life to come. Bonaventure alsosingles out Aristotles seeming defense of an eternal

world and unicity of the intellect as this is attributedto Aristotle by Averroes.34

Giles of Romes Errores Philosophorum, dated byits modern editor between 1268 and 1274, is addedevidence of concern about the views of Aristotle,Averroes, Avicenna, Algazel, Al-Kindi, and Maimon-

ides.35

And if one agrees with Van Steenberghenthat Giles of Lessines letter to Albert the Great fallsafter 1270, it also points to continuing concern inthe 1270s about certain heterodox positions beingadvanced by leading members in Arts of that time(quiinphilosophiamaioresreputantur). Thirteen of

the fifteen propositions listed by Giles are identi-cal with the thirteen condemned by Tempier in1270.36Giles of Romes De plurificatione intellectuspossibilisseems to date from the mid 1270s. It is yetanother witness to ongoing concern about the issueof unicity of the human possible intellect. Certainanonymous Commentaries on Aristotles De animaand Physicsdating from the 1270s also contain viewswhich would be addressed in the Condemnation of1277.37


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4: The Condemnation of 1277.

It is not all that surprising, therefore, that Pope John

XXI, himself a former Master in Arts at Paris andbetter known to us as Peter of Spain, would write toStephen Tempier on January 18, 1277, and ask himto undertake an investigation about certain danger-ous doctrines which were rumored to be circulatingat the University. The Bishop was to determine by

whom and where such errors were being propagatedand to report his findings back to the Pope as soonas possible. Instead, as is well known, Stephen as-sembled a commission of sixteen theologians, includ-ing Henry of Ghent, and apparently consulted someadditional personal advisers as well. In short order

a list of 219 propositions was drawn up. Withoutreporting back to the Pope before acting, he issuedhis sweeping condemnation on March 7, 1277,ironically three years to the day after the death ofThomas Aquinas in 1274.38

While this list is much broader in range than the

13 propositions condemned in 1270, the concernsaddressed there reappear, along with many more.Considerable study has been devoted to this eventbeginning especially in 1977 on the occasion of its700th anniversary, and continuing down to the pres-ent time. Important books have been published byR. Hissette, L. Bianchi, and K. Flasch, along withmany other article-length studies or book chapters.39Yet puzzles remain.


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For instance, while many of the condemnedpropositions clearly undermine orthodox Christianteaching whether measured by that days standardsor by those of today, other propositions do not. Thussome twenty years later, Godfrey of Fontaines, anesteemed member of the Theology faculty, wouldpublicly defend Thomas Aquinas for having beentouched by the prohibition of 1277 and would con-

clude that the then Bishop of Paris should at leastsuspend the condemnation of those propositionswhich appeared to have been taught by Thomas.40Infact this step was not taken, but in 1325, two yearsafter Aquinass canonization, Stephen of Bourret, theBishop of Paris at that time, revoked the condemna-

tion of those articles in so far as they touched on orwere asserted to touch on Aquinass teaching.41

One can only conclude that on points such asthese, Tempiers advisers and/or Tempier himselfwere so colored by their own theological positionsthat they easily regarded opposed views as heterodox.

There was a highly conservative group within theTheology Faculty itself which was opposed to manyof Aquinass philosophical and theological positionsas well as to the clearly heterodox views of the RadicalAristotelians. Moreover, a somewhat later remark byGiles of Rome makes it clear that some of the propo-sitions were condemned not on the advice of theMasters but because of the stubbornness of a certainfew. Giles may have had in mind some of Tempiersother advisers as well as Tempier himself.42


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Even so, today we find it difficult to understandwhy it would have been regarded as heretical to holdthat because separate intelligences lack matter, Godcannot produce many intelligences within the samespecies (43-81), or to maintain that God cannotmultiply individuals within a species without mat-ter (42-96).43Also puzzling is the condemnation ofcertain views defended by Albert and by Thomas

as well as by certain Masters in Arts concerning thepresence of angels in place. Witness proposition55-204 and the seeming incompatibility of its be-ing condemned along with proposition 54-219, asGodfrey of Fontaines pointed out in his QuodlibetXII, q. 5, and as even Henry of Ghent, a member

of the commission of theologians as we have noted,himself recognized in his Quodlibet II, q. 9, datingfrom the Christmas quodlibetal session of 1277, andhence only a few months after the Condemnationof March 7.44

On the other hand, it is easy enough to under-

stand why many other propositions were censured.A number of them bear on the nature of philosophyand, at least when taken at first sight and out of con-text, appear to do so at the expense of theology. Forinstance, proposition 1-40 is generally acknowledgedto be directed against Boethius of Dacias De summobono. It reads: There is no more excellent kind oflife than to give oneself to philosophy. When takenout of context this condemned proposition wouldleave no place for the religious believer to hold that


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the life of the saint or the mystic or the theologianmight be more excellent. But when taken in contextwithin the treatise, it is clear that Boethius is seekingto determine, by relying on reason alone, what is thesupreme good accessible to human beings. In fact, hedoes recognize in one passage a higher kind of hap-piness which we expect in the life to come on theauthority of faith. Again, proposition 2-154 states

that Only the philosophers are the wise men of thisworld. This appears to be directed against anothertreatise of Boethius, his De aeternitate mundi. But inthat text Boethius states that the philosophers wereand are the wise men of this world. The qualifieronly does not appear in Boethiuss text.45

Other propositions directly challenge the valueof the Christian Law, for instance, 180-175: Thatthe Christian Law impedes one from learningand 181-174: That fables and falsities are presentin the Christian Law as in others. Still others aredirected against the value of theology, for instance,

182-153: One knows nothing more when oneknows theology, and 183-152: The statementsof the theologian are based on fables. But it mustbe acknowledged that no one has yet successfullyidentified with certainty the precise source or targetfor any of these.46

A number of condemned propositions compro-mise Gods knowledge of individuals, or his provi-dence, or his omnipotence.47Still others deny thatGod can produce anything denovo, or more than


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one world, or that he can immediately produce morethan one effect, thereby recalling the NeoplatonicAvicennian theory of mediate rather than immediatecreation through a process of necessary emanation.48Eternity of separate intelligences or of the universe isdefended or implied by a number of other proposi-tions.49Others have to do with unicity of the possibleintellect, while still other condemned propositions

detract from or eliminate human freedom.50Proposi-tions 185-1 and 186-2 would reject Christian beliefin the Trinity and in the eternal generation of theWord. A considerable number of the prohibited propo-sitions deal with moral matters, such as the claim

that one should not pray (202-180), or that oneshould not confess ones sins except for the sake ofappearances (203-179), or that simple fornication(between an unmarried man and an unmarriedwoman) is not a sin (205-183), or that there are novirtues other than the acquired or innate (200-177).51

Also condemned are propositions asserting that oneshould not be concerned if something is said to beheretical because it is against the faith (201-16), and,curiously enough, that one should not be concernedabout burying the dead (204-155).52

Somewhat more complex is the condemnationof the view that humility is not a virtue or a virtuousact if it leads one not to manifest that which onehas and to despise and debase oneself (211-171),as well as the claim that one who is poor (deprived


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of material goods) cannot act well in moral matters(212-170). The remote source for the position onhumility is surely Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics, BkIV, c. 3, where he discusses the great souled personand one who is unduly humble. The proximatesource appears to be the first of Siger of Brabantsmoral questions (Whether humility is a virtue),where he distinguishes two meanings of humility,

one an extended and changed meaning which appliesto someone who pretends to lesser good in himselfthan he actually has, and the other a proper mean-ing describing that which restricts ones appetitefrom tending to extremely arduous goods which arebeyond him according to right reason. According to

Siger the former is not a virtue but the latter, alongwith greatness of soul, is.53The remote source for the proposition requiring

material goods for right moral action also appears tobe Aristotles Ethics, Bk X, c. 8, but the proximatesource may be an anonymous commentary on the De

animaedited by M. Giele. There the author sums upAristotles position by citing him as holding: Blessedare those who are well provided with external goods,and contrasts this with the Christian view: Blessedare the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom ofheaven.54

Also interesting is the condemnation of thestatement that death is the end of things to befeared (213-178), especially so if R.A. Gauthier iscorrect in thinking that it was taken from a Tabula


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libri Ethicorum(an alphabetical catalog of positions)drawn up from the Nicomachean Ethicsand AlbertsCommentary on it under Thomas Aquinass direc-tion by a secretary ca. 1270.55

Many scholars have been struck by the hap-hazard way in which the various propositions wereorganized in the original list, and there have beenboth medieval and modern efforts to impose greater

order and organization upon them. But K. Flasch hasrecently come to the defense of the original order-ing. On the other hand, L. Bianchi has offered aninteresting and plausible explanation for the appar-ent lack of overall order and organization. Differentparts, he proposes, were drawn up on separate rolls

by different members of the Commission, and thensimply attached to one another in succession.56Inany event, inconsistencies appear within the final list,and on at least some occasions, mutually exclusivepropositions are condemned, as Godfrey of Fontainespointed out long ago.57

Another puzzle has to do with the intendeddirect targets of the condemnation. Apart from twobooks which are identified in the Prologue, neitherthe titles nor the authors of the works from whichthe propositions were drawn are explicitly named.58Both internal evidence and early manuscript testi-mony indicate that Siger of Brabant and Boethiusof Dacia were primary targets.59

Hissette has concluded from his careful inves-tigation that of the 219 articles, 30 appear to envi-


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sion directly Siger of Brabant, and 13 directly targetBoethius of Dacia. He has also identified 14 othersas directed against anonymous writings from theArts Faculty, recently edited by Delhaye, Giele, andZimmermann.60He thinks it probable that 14 morewere aimed at Siger, three more at Boethius, and fourat two of the anonymous works just mentioned. For72 others he can only offer plausible hypotheses as to

the identity of their intended targets, and for another68 written sources remained unidentified.61

A. de Libera has focussed his attention on thosepropositions having to do with moral matters and,noting the difficulty of finding written sourcesauthored by members of the Arts Faculty for many

of them, has suggested that some were not in factdefended by Masters of Arts at the time, but wererather projections by Tempier and/or his advisersabout dangerous views that could and eventuallydid arise.62To some, myself included, this suggestionmay seem a bit extreme, but the absence of written

sources for a fairly large number of the condemnedpropositions must be acknowledged. One can onlyspeculate about sources from that time which havenot survived, and about others which are yet to beidentified. Also controverted today is the question as towhat extent Thomas Aquinas was directly targetedby Tempier and his advisers. Many scholars andsome medival writers have noted the presence ofAquinass views among the condemned propositions


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and have concluded that he was indeed directlytargeted.63Hissette has stressed Tempiers statementin the Prologue to the effect that these errors werecirculating in the Faculty of Arts. Hence, while heacknowledges that a number of them do indeedexpress positions defended by Aquinas, Hissetteargues that in most of these cases similar positionscan be found in the writings of Masters in Arts of

that time. Therefore the latter, not Thomas Aquinas,should be regarded as the primary and direct targetsof the prohibition.64

Some other interpreters, myself included, thinkthat Tempier and his advisers knew quite well whenthey were condemning a view defended by Aqui-

nas. To single out perhaps the most distinguishedtheologian on the Commission, Henry of Ghent,he was quite familiar with Aquinass views on manyof the disputed points. Therefore, to say that, incondemning a position defended both by a Masterof Arts and by Aquinas, members of the Commis-

sion and Tempier were directly envisioning only theformer appears to me to be somewhat forced, whatone might call a distinction without a difference. Inmy opinion, Tempier and his censors were perfectlywilling to include Aquinass views in their list whenthey judged it appropriate.65

In connection with this, however, it is interestingto note that another Belgian scholar, R. Wielockx,has recently discovered and edited an intriguing setof propositions which were drawn up by Giles of


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28 John F. Wippel

Rome in defense of his own views at about the sametime, i.e., in March 1277, but after the Condemna-tion of March 7. According to Wielockxs historicalreconstruction, these resulted from a separate inquiryconducted by the theologians against Giles and,because of his refusal to retract, he was exiled fromthe Theology Faculty at Paris until 1285 when thePopes intervention resulted in his reinstatement.66

Moreover, though perhaps with somewhat lesscompelling evidence, Wielockx has also concludedthat still another inquiry by the Masters of Theologyhad been initiated by Tempier against Aquinas him-self. If so, this might explain why one of Thomassmost contested theories, his defense of unicity of

substantial form in human beings, was not includedin Tempiers list of March 7, even though it wouldbe included in another much shorter list condemnedby Archbishop Robert Kilwardby at Oxford a fewdays later (March 18, 1277), and would again becondemned in 1284 and 1286 by Kilwardbys suc-

cessor as Archbishop of Canterbury, John Pecham.According to Wielockxs reconstruction, Tempiersprocess against Aquinas did not come to term be-cause of instructions he received from Cardinals inthe Roman Curia during the vacancy in the papalsee caused by the death of Pope John XXI on May20, 1277.67

Rather than spend more time now on officialecclesiastical reactions to Radical Aristotelianism andthis part of the faith-reason encounter in thirteenth-


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century Paris, I would like to turn to the views onfaith and reason of three principal figures in theevents just recountedThomas Aquinas, Siger ofBrabant and Boethius of Dacia.

III. Theoretical Solutions to the

Faith-Reason Issue1: Thomas Aquinas

As is well known, Aquinas defended a fundamen-tal harmony between faith and reason. One mayconsult the first question of his Summa theologiae,or Bk I, cc. 4-7 of his Summa contra gentiles. Butperhaps nowhere else in his writings is this broughtout so clearly as in q. 2, a. 3 of his somewhat earlier

Commentary on the De Trinitateof Boethius. ThereThomas is defending the appropriateness of usingphilosophical argumentation and authorities in thecourse of ones theologizing. The gifts of grace areadded to nature, he writes, not so as to destroy na-ture but so as to perfect it. Hence the light of faith,

which is given to us as a grace, does not destroy thelight of natural reason which is also given to us byGod. While the natural light of reason is of itselfinsufficient to discover those things that can bediscovered only through faith, it is impossible forthose things given to us by God through faith to be

contrary to those which are instilled in us by nature.Otherwise, one or the other would have to be false.(Understood here, of course, is the assumption thattwo contradictory propositions cannot both be true


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at one and the same time.) And, continues Thomas,since both of these come to us from God, God him-self would then be the author of falsity, somethingwhich must be rejected as impossible. Aquinas alsoacknowledges that by the light of natural reasoncertain imitations or similitudes may be discoveredfor those truths which are made known to us onlythrough faith.68

So far Aquinas has been comparing the light ofreason with the light of faith. Now he applies histhinking to theology (sacradoctrina) and to philoso-phy. Just as sacred teaching is grounded on the lightof faith, philosophy is based on the natural light ofreason. Therefore, it is impossible for those things

which pertain to philosophy to be contrary to thosewhich belong to faith, even though they fall shortof them.69

One might ask, of course, especially in light ofthe events which would transpire at Paris soon afterThomas had written this treatise: What happens

when the findings of philosophers contradict theteaching of faith? Thomass serene reply is that ifanything is found in the sayings of the philosopherswhich is contrary to faith, this is not philosophybut rather an abuse of philosophy following fromsome deficiency on the side of reason. Hence it willbe possible by using philosophical principles eitherto reject an argument of this kind out of hand byshowing that it is impossible, or at least by showingthat it is not necessary.70


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Thomas must make this distinction if he is toavoid falling into a kind of rationalism that wouldenable us to demonstrate revealed mysteries, i.e.,truths which can be discovered only through faith.In Thomass own words: Just as those things whichare proper to faith cannot be demonstratively proved,so certain things contrary to them cannot be dem-onstrated to be false, but they can be shown not to

be necessary.71 Thomas sums this up by noting that one mayuse philosophy in ones theologizing in three ways:(1) to demonstrate certain preambles of faith, suchas those things which can be proved by naturalargumentation about God, for example, that God

exists, that God is one, and other things of this kindconcerning God or creatures which are proved inphilosophy and presupposed by faith; (2) to manifestmysteries of faith by certain likenesses, as Augustineoften does in his De Trinitate; (3) to resist attacksagainst the faith in the two ways just mentioned,

i.e., by showing that they are false or, at least, thatthey are not demonstrated.72As he makes clear onother occasions, e.g., in Summa contra gentilesI, c. 4,if there are certain truths about God which naturalreason can discover, such as his existence or unity,such knowledge is not easily gained by philosophicalinquiry. Consequently, Thomas also argues that itwas very fitting for God to have revealed such truthsto us.73


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In light of such a position we can readily ap-preciate how little patience Thomas would havehad with any real or even any apparent double-truththeory. Hence we can understand something of thevehemence with which he writes near the end of hisDe unitate intellectusagainst his unnamed Christianadversary who would defend unicity of the possibleintellect. Even more serious is what he says thereaf-

ter: By reason I conclude necessarily that the intellectis numerically one, but I firmly hold the opposite onfaith.74

Thomas faults his opponentSiger of Brabantpresumablyfor thinking that faith deals withthings whose contraries can be demonstrated nec-

essarily. For Thomas only a necessary truth can bedemonstrated necessarily, and its opposite is falseand impossible. Indeed, in this treatise Thomas hadargued against unicity of the possible intellect bothon historical groundsit is an incorrect reading ofAristotle and on purely philosophical grounds. He

had shown to his own satisfaction that the Averroisticposition is both false and impossible. His Christianopponents position would imply that faith deals withthe false and the impossible, something which noteven God could bring to pass. Such a position, writesThomas, the faithful cannot bear to hear!75

And he concludes his treatise by laying down apersonal challenge to Siger: If anyone who glories ina falsely named science wishes to say anything againstwhat we have written, let him not speak in corners


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nor before boys who do not know how to judgeabout such difficult matters: but let him respond inwriting against this treatise, if he dares; and he willfind not only myself, who am the least among others,but many other zealous defenders (zelatores) of truthby whom his error will be resisted or his ignoranceremedied.76

Throughout his career Aquinas would remain

true to his conviction that there should ultimately beharmony between faith and reason and hence, whenthey both are correctly practiced, between theologyand philosophy. Interestingly enough, it is in thissame early work, his Commentary on the De Trini-tateof Boethius, that he works out in Question 5 his

most detailed discussion of the distinctions betweenand the subjects of the three theoretical sciences,natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics.Without pausing here to enter into a long discus-sion of whether he was a theologian or a philosopheror perhaps a Christian philosopher, I would only

repeat the position I have developed elsewhere. Hewas both a philosopher and a theologian since hehad recognized from the beginning of his career theneed to develop a sound philosophy if he was to haveany chance of developing a sound theology. For ustoday this means that if one is interested in studyingthe philosophical thought of Thomas Aquinas, onecan surely do so. One should take ones cue fromThomass own presentation of the subject matter,the distinctive methodologies, and the order to be


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34 John F. Wippel

followed in the philosophical sciences, and apply thisto all of his texts which have philosophical content.In doing this one must be as conscious at all timesas Thomas himself was of the distinction betweenfaith and reason, and between philosophy and theol-ogy.77

Although by profession Aquinas was a theo-logian, his contribution to philosophical thinking

was enormous, and was evidently so recognized bymany of his contemporaries, including membersof the Arts, i.e., the Philosophy Faculty at Paris.78With this I would now like to turn to two of thosemembers from the Arts Faculty and their views onthe faith-reason issue, namely, Siger of Brabant and

Boethius of Dacia.

2: Siger of Brabant.

In dealing with Siger of Brabant, I shall use twoapproaches. First, I shall offer a necessarily briefoverview of his actual practice when he deals with

sensitive issues involving faith and reason. Second,special attention will be directed to a relatively recentdiscoverya brief explicit discussion by Siger ofhis views on the relationship between philosophyand theology (sacra scriptura) preserved in two ofthe four surviving manuscripts of his Quaestiones inMetaphysicam. Reference has already been made to the factthat some of Sigers opinions were condemned byBishop Tempier in 1270, and that his espousal of


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Averroess defense of unicity of the possible intel-lect had been sharply attacked in that same yearby Thomas Aquinass De unitate intellectus. Conse-quently, questions of dating and relative chronologycan become important in assessing Sigers views onthe faith-reason issue. Eternity of the world is one issue on which Sigersthought seems to have developed. The recent editor

of his Quaestio utrum haec sit veradates this workafter 1268 but before 1270. In this discussion Sigerasks whether the statement that a human being isan animal would be true if no human being existed.After presenting and then rejecting a number of at-tempts by others to resolve this issue, Siger concludes

that its hypothesisthat at some point in time thehuman species did not existis intrinsically con-tradictory. He notes that from such an hypothesiscontradictory consequences may be drawn. But ifone rejects the hypothesis itself and denies that thereever was a time when the human species did not ex-

ist, one resolves the problem. This is Sigers solution,even though it clearly implies eternity of the humanspecies.79

But in another work which is prior to 1270, hisQuaestiones in tertium De anima, Siger asks whetherthe (separated) intellect is eternal. He notes that ac-cording to Aristotle it is eternally produced, even asis the world. He adds that while Aristotles positionon this pointeternity of the intellectis indeedprobable, it is not necessary. It is also more probable


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than Augustines defense of creation and infusion ofthe human soul in the course of time.80

In subsequent writings when he deals with theeternity of the world or of separate intelligences, Sigeris careful to qualify his presentation of the eternalistposition in some way. Thus he presents argumenta-tion for the eternity of the (First) Intelligence in hisImpossibilia(ca. 1272). The Intelligence depends for

its existence on the First Principle. Since the Intel-ligence lacks any capacity for not-existing (for thenonexistence of its cause is impossible, and so, too,is its own nonexistence), it is impossible for it to lackthat relationship to its cause by reason of which italways exists. Here we would seem to have a defense

of both the eternal and necessary existence of theIntelligence. But, adds Siger, we say this accordingto the opinion of the philosophers.81

So too, in discussing eternity of the world inhis De aeternitate mundi(ca. 1272), Siger frequentlyqualifies his presentation of the eternalist position by

noting that this is so according to the philosophers,or according to Aristotle, or by noting that he is onlyrepeating Aristotles opinion.82

He does the same in his De anima intellectivaofca. 1273. He begins by observing that, in responseto the request of his friends, he here proposes toestablish what is to be thought about the soul, espe-cially about the issue of its separation from bodies.He will do so by following the texts of recognizedphilosophers rather than by asserting anything about


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this on his own. On one occasion he even remarksthat perhaps The Philosopher thought differentlyfrom the truth and from that wisdom which havebeen handed down through revelation concerningthe soul, and which cannot be proved by naturalargumentation. There he adds, echoing the words ofAlbert the Great, that he is not now concerned withthe miracles of God, since he is discussing natural

things in terms of natural philosophy.83Farther onin ch. 5 of this same treatise he discusses the eternalexistence of the intellective soul in the past, butmakes it clear that here he is presenting Aristotlesposition. He also takes Aristotle as holding that theeternal intellective soul is caused.84

In the Cambridge manuscript version of hisQuaestiones in MetaphysicamSiger offers an interest-ing comment at Bk III, q. 15 (Cambridge ms. num-bering), after presenting Aristotles view that any-thing that is ungenerated must also be sempiternal.These arguments do not appear to be demonstrative,

comments Siger, but beg the question. Moreover, thisposition is opposed to what we as Christians hold tobe true. Nor should we seek human arguments forthings which are of faith, since such things cannotbe proved by argumentation. After citing Avicennain support of the need to rely on the testimony ofthe prophet in matters of faith, he adds: I believethat, just as those things which are of faith cannotbe demonstrated by human reason, so too there aresome human arguments for positions opposed to


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such things which cannot be resolved by humanreason.85

While this passage again confirms that Siger nolonger accepts as his own Aristotles eternalist posi-tion regarding separate (ungenerated) substances, italso reveals his acknowledgment that in certain caseshuman reason cannot resolve arguments which maybe offered against the teachings of faith. The contrast

with Aquinass position in his De Trinitateis striking.There Thomas had maintained that in such cases oneshould be able to show by using human reason eitherthat such positions are false or at least that they arenot necessarily demonstrated!86

Closely linked with the eternalist position was

the Neoplatonic theory of necessary emanation (orcreation) of the universe and the axiom that from theOne only one effect can be produced immediately.This theory was well known to Thomas, to Sigerand to their contemporaries because its Avicennianversion was available in Latin translation. As Avi-

cenna presents it in his MetaphysicsIX, c. 4, fromGod only one effect can be produced immediately,the First Intelligence. This eternally produced Intel-ligence eternally produces the Second Intelligenceand the soul and body of the outermost heavenlysphere. This eternal process is repeated by the SecondIntelligence which produces the Third Intelligenceand the soul and body of the second sphere, etc.,resulting ultimately in the Tenth Intelligence whichis our separated Agent Intellect and also the Datorformarumfor terrestrial beings. Coupled with this


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was the view that God necessarily produces the FirstIntelligence, and that the other emanations also fol-low from this necessarily and eternally.87 As mentioned above propositions were con-demned in 1277 which defended this Neoplatonic-Avicennian view. For instance, proposition 20-53asserts that God must produce necessarily whateveris made by him. Proposition 28-44 states that from

the one First Agent a multiplicity of effects cannot beproduced. And proposition 33-64 maintains that theimmediate effect of the First Cause must be only oneand most like the First Cause. Aquinas had argued atlength against this position, as one would expect.88

In his De necessitate et contingentia causarum

dating from 1271-1272 Siger presents the view thatGod is the immediate and necessary cause of the FirstIntelligence but only the mediate cause of other ef-fects such as the other Intelligences, the spheres andtheir motions, and things subject to generation andcorruption. He justifies this by citing the Neopla-

tonic axiom that from the one simple Being onlyone effect can proceed immediately. However, ontwo occasions in this discussion he refers to this asbeing so according to the mind of the philosophers.Hence some question remains as to whether this wasindeed his personal position.89

In his Quaestiones naturales (Lisbon), datingfrom 1273-1274, the sixth question asks whethermany things can be caused immediately by the FirstCause. Here Siger acknowledges that he cannot


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demonstrate this either one way or the other. Hecomments that Avicenna has not really proved hisclaim that from the First Principle only one effectcan proceed immediately.90

Given these passages as well as a textually muti-lated discussion in the Munich version of his Quaes-tiones in Metaphysicam, a number of contemporaryinterpreters have concluded that Siger never really

accepted the theory of necessary emanation as hispersonal view.91But the fuller and recently editedversion of his Quaestiones in MetaphysicamV, q. 11(Cambridge ms.), probably dating around 1273 orslightly later, reveals a Siger who sets forth this theoryin sympathetic terms and argues for it. Against the

claim that the First Agent by acting through itsintellect can produce many different effects, Sigercounters that this can be the case only if there aredifferent ideas (rationes) within that intellect. Butwithin the intellect of the First Being different ideasare not present. The First Being can understand other

things only by understanding one idea (ratio), itsown essence. It will understand many other thingsonly insofar as within itself they are one. Moreover,Siger also here maintains that prime matter is notcaused immediately by the First Cause, nor even byany immaterial substance.92

Yet, in his still later Commentary on the Liberde causis (ca. 1275-1276) Siger reserves the act ofcreation to the First Cause alone. Thereby he ineffect rules out the theory of mediate emanation or


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creation which is an essential part of the Avicenniantheory of emanation.93

In sum, therefore, Siger clearly did not acceptthe emanation theory as his own by the time of hisLiber de causis and probably did not do so in hisearlier works. But he seems to have been strongly at-tracted to this position at the time of his Quaestionesin Metaphysicam, and hence was not fully consistent

on this issue. As already noted, Sigers best known reason forbeing called a Radical Aristotelian, or in this case, aLatin Averroist, is his early defense of unicity of thereceiving or possible intellect in his Quaestiones in IIIDe animawhich, as we have seen, dates from before

1270. There in q. 1 he denies that the vegetative,sensitive, and intellective parts of the soul are rootedin one simple substance or soul.94 In subsequentquestions he argues that the intellect does not per-fect the human body through its substance but onlythrough its power, and that it is present in the body

by thinking in the body and moving it. The verynature of the intellect precludes it from being mul-tiplied individually in individual human beings.95Itis because intelligible objects are conjoined with ustaken as individual human beings that the (single)intellect is also conjoined with us. These intelligibleobjects are present in each of us because of distinctintentions which are produced by our individualpowers of imagination. This fact enables the intellectto think in numerically distinct individual human


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beings, but it remains one in substance and power.96The agent and the possible intellects are two powersor two parts of one separate substance. On this finalpoint, Siger differs from Averroes who would makeof them not one but two distinct substances.97

Reference has already been made to Aquinassdevastating attack against Averroes and Siger in hisDe unitate intellectus. Not all of the points that Thom-

as attributes to his opponent can be found in SigersQuaestiones, but it seems clear enough that Siger isindeed the unnamed opponent. Perhaps Thomas wasbasing himself in part on oral reports, or on otherreportationes of Sigers lectures.98 It is now widelygranted that Siger did respond to Aquinass challenge

(. . . let him respond in writing against this treatise,if he dares . . .), but in a lost work known to us ashis De intellectu. We have some knowledge of thiswork owing to the testimony of the Renaissancephilosopher, Agostino Nifo. Insofar as we can judgefrom the excerpts and references given by Nifo, in

this treatise Sigers thought on the human intellecthad developed somewhat, but in it he still defendedunicity of the possible intellect.99

Far more important in tracing Sigers develop-ment on this issue is his De anima intellectivaof ca.1273. As we have already noted, in the Prologue tothis work Siger proposes to state here what is to bethought about such issues according to the texts ofthe proven philosophers rather than to assert any-thing on his own.100


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In Ch. III, while examining in what way theintellective soul might be regarded as the form andperfection of the human body, he notes that out-standing men in philosophy, Albert and Thomas,hold that the substance of the intellective soul isunited to the body and gives being to it, but thatthe power of the intellective soul is separate fromthe body because it does not use a corporeal organ

in thinking. After pointing out certain differencesin their views, Siger criticizes both of their positionsfor missing Aristotles intention and for failing toestablish their points. His representation of Aquinassposition is somewhat curious and not fully accurate,but this may be because he is now struggling to an-

swer Aquinass earlier charge in his De unitate intel-lectusthat the Averroistic and Sigerian theory cannotreally enable one to say that the act of thinking canbe assigned to this or that individual human beingrather than to the separate possible intellect.101

But in this same context Siger acknowledges that

here he himself is only seeking to determine the viewof the philosophers and, in a passage already noted,comments that Aristotle may have held somethingother than that truth and wisdom which have beengiven to us through revelation. He goes on to inter-pret Aristotle as holding that the intellective soulis separated from the body in its being, i.e., that itis a separate intellect, but that it is united with thebody in its operation.102Interestingly also, in Ch. VI,while seeking to determine Aristotles view concern-


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ing the separation of the soul from the body, Sigerargues that according to the Stagirite, an infinity ofhuman beings have already existed. If each of thesepossessed its own intellective soul, and this soul wastotally separated from its body at the time of death,an infinity of intellective souls would now exist inseparation from the body. Siger finds such a viewunreasonable and contrary to the mind of Aristotle,

who would reject such an (actual) infinity.103 In this same context Siger remarks that someonemay counter that it is erroneous to hold that soulsare not completely separated from their bodies (afterdeath) and do not then receive reward and punish-ment in accord with their behavior in this life. Siger

replies that, as he has said from the beginning of thistreatise, his primary purpose here is not to determinethe truth of the matter concerning the soul, butrather Aristotles view concerning this.104

He acknowledges that philosophers who are notfamiliar with the works of souls totally separated

from the body may not hold that they do so exist;but there is nothing to prevent there being otherhuman beings who are naturally prophets and whodo know about things which the rest of us cannotdiscover except by believing in the testimony of aprophet. In other words, Siger here acknowledgesthat human reason can only go so far in investigatingsuch a topic, and suggests that if one wishes to pursuethis issue any further, one should turn to revelationgiven through a prophet. Even so, here he refers to


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natural prophets rather than to prophecy based ongrace and revelation, perhaps again because he iswriting from the philosophers perspective ratherthan from that of the Christian.105

In Ch. VII Siger turns to the issue of numericalmultiplication of the intellective soul. Once againhe warns that he is examining this question onlyinsofar as it pertains to the philosopher and can be

understood by relying on human reason and expe-rience. He is seeking to determine the mind of thephilosophers in this matter rather than the truth,since he is proceeding philosophically. He adds thatit is certain according to revealed truth (that truthwhich cannot deceive) that intellective souls are

multiplied with the multiplication of individual hu-man bodies. In other words, now he acknowledgesthat in fact each individual human being has hisor her individual intellective soul, but accepts thison the strength of revelation. For he also notes thatcertain philosophers have maintained the opposite

position, and that the opposite seems to follow fromthe way of philosophy.106However, after offering a series of arguments

against numerical multiplication of intellectivesouls, Siger grants that powerful arguments can alsobe advanced for the opposite position, i.e., to showthat intellective souls are multiplied numericallyeven as are individual human beings. Moreover, henow also finds Avicenna and Algazel defending thisview, and notes that Themistius recognizes numerical


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multiplication of agent intellects. With much greaterreason, comments Siger, would Themistius also holdthat the possible intellect is multiplied numerically.In doing this he is now taking into account otherPeripatetics whom, Aquinas had charged in hisDe unitate intellectus, Siger and his associates hadignored by relying exclusively on Averroes.107

Siger concludes that because of the strong ar-

guments that can be offered for either side of thismatter, and because of the difficulty of the issue, hehad long been in doubt about what should be heldon the strength of natural reason and what Aristotlethought concerning numerical multiplication of theintellective soul. Now, he states: In such doubt one

must adhere to the faith which surpasses all humanreasoning.108

In sum, Siger here adopts an undecided positionconcerning what natural reason can establish aboutnumerical multiplication of the intellective souland hence (by implication) about personal survival

and immortality. He also ends by expressing doubtabout what Aristotle really held on this point. Henow grants a role for religious belief in deciding theissue, unless, of course, one wishes to tax him withinsincerity. Earlier in this century Mandonnet didexactly that, and rejected his protests of religiousbelief in individual intellective souls as efforts on hispart to avoid censure rather than as honest expres-sions of his own position. On the other hand, hissincerity had been defended by others, especially F.


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Van Steenberghen of Louvain. Personally, I have al-ways been inclined to take Sigers protests of personalreligious orthodoxy in this treatise at face value.109 In any event, the relatively recent discovery andthen the publication in 1972 of a long lost work bySiger, his Quaestiones super librum de causis, havecast new light on this issue and especially on Sigersfinal recorded position. In this work, dating from ca.

1275-1276, Siger defends in q. 26 the view that theintellective soul is indeed a perfection and form ofthe human body, but not in such a way that we cansay that the intellective power is separated. Curiouslyenough, in adding this qualification, Siger seems tobelieve he is here opposing Aquinas. In his De unitate

intellectus, c. III, Aquinas had written that the humansoul is not said to be the form of the body in termsof its intellective power, since that is the act of noorgan. Hence, as regards its intellective power, Aqui-nas holds that the soul is immaterial, i.e., receivesintelligible content in an immaterial way, and that

it knows itself. And in Summa theologiaeI, q. 76, a.1, ad 1, Aquinas explains Aristotles reference to theintellect as separate as meaning that it is not thepower of a corporeal organ.110

Siger takes exception to this and argues that theintellective soul is the form and perfection of thebody, but not in such fashion that its power is sepa-rate; rather its very substance is the act and perfectionof matter and so too is its power, he maintains. But healso asserts that the intellective soul perfects the body


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in such fashion that it also subsists in its own rightand does not depend upon matter for its existence. Ingranting that the intellective soul is a perfection andform of the body, and yet that it subsists in its ownright, his agreement with Aquinas is much greaterthan his difference.111

Even more important is his discussion in q. 27.There he explicitly rejects the Averroistic denial that

the intellect is multiplied numerically in individualhuman beings. He now finds that view both hereticaland irrational in itself. A major part of his argumentrests on the claim that if there were only one intellectfor all human beings, when that intellect was unitedwith one body or one matter as its form, it could

not simultaneously be united with other bodies andmatters. For it could not simultaneously think of dif-ferent objects and be actually perfected by differentintelligible species at one and the same time. Yet weknow from experience that different individual hu-man beings do constantly think of different objects

at one and the same time. Hence the intellect mustbe multiplied numerically.112

Here we seem to have Sigers implicit acknowl-edgment of the justice of another of Aquinass chargesin his De unitate intellectusagainst the Averroisticposition, namely, that it cannot really account forthe fact that a number of different individual hu-man beings can really think of different things atone and the same time. Of course Aquinas was alsoheavily moved by the testimony of consciousness


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and the absence of any awareness on our part thatsome separate intellect is really thinking in us whenwe are aware that we are thinking.113 In sum, Siger has now moved very far from hispre-1270 view concerning the intellect and is indeeddefending a perfectly orthodox position when viewedfrom the religious side. Moreover, he has also movedbeyond the hesitancy he expressed in his De anima

intellectivaconcerning what human reason can deter-mine on this topic, even though his hesitancy aboutwhat Aristotle really held on the matter remains.Hence, as regards unicity of the intellect, had hebeen judged solely in light of his Quaestiones superlibrum de causis, he should not have had difficulty

with Stephen Tempier and his censors in 1277. Ifwe may safely assume that they had access to thistreatise, it is clear that, at least in this case, they werenot moved by Sigers change of view. They were stillundoubtedly aware of his pre-1270 views on unicityof the intellect and so, without naming him, once

again condemned the position Bishop Tempier hadpreviously condemned in 1270. Thus propositions117-32, and 126-121 are directed against unicity ofthe (possible) intellect or against the denial that it isthe form of the body. For the latter also see proposi-tions 120-105, 121-11, 125-119.114

Interestingly, in q. 12 of this same work Sigerexamines the issue of the eternity of the createdIntelligence. After presenting arguments for andagainst this, he concludes that because the author-


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ity of the Christian faith is greater than any humanargumentation and greater than the authority of thephilosophers, we should hold that the Intelligencedoes not exist from eternity even though we have nodemonstration to prove this. Moreover, in a movethat brings him closer to Aquinass position both onthe faith-reason issue and on eternity of the world,he adds that the arguments supporting eternity of

the Intelligence are not necessary and then attemptsto resolve them philosophically.115

On the other hand, Sigers discussion in q. 28of another sensitive issue may have provoked someuneasiness in the minds of Tempier and his advisers,assuming again that they read it. Be that as it may,

in this question Siger asks whether the essence ofthe First Cause can be understood by our intellect.Siger offers a number of arguments in support of thisclaim, and then another series of arguments againstit. But he does not decide the question either way,or even indicate why he leaves it undecided. Perhaps

we have lost his determination of this question.116

This particular issue was troubling to Tempierand his advisers, so much so that they seem to havebeen inconsistent on this matter and to have con-demned both the view that we can arrive at somekind of knowledge of Gods essence in this life, andthat we cannot. Thus prohibited proposition 9-36holds that we can know God through his essence.But condemned proposition 10-215 asserts that wecan only know of God that he is, or that he exists.Godfrey of Fontaines was pleased to point out some


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years later the incompatibility of Tempiers condemn-ing both of these propositions at the same time.117

As for Siger, in most of his discussions of ourknowledge of God, he holds that we know him byreasoning from knowledge of his effects to knowledgeof him as their cause. This, of course, is perfectlyorthodox. But in one manuscript version (Munich)of his Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, at III, 1, he asks

whether it is impossible for us to know the FirstCause essentially. He comments that some hold thatit is impossible for us to have essential knowledge ofthe First Cause and of separate substance, but thatAverroes holds the opposite view. After some discus-sion he offers the curious suggestion that it seems

that someone who is deeply versed in philosophycan move from knowledge of the effects of the FirstBeing to an understanding of its essence. This text isboth puzzling in light of the view Siger has expressedelsewhere, and rather obscure in itself. It may havebeen envisioned by Tempiers advisers in formulating

condemned proposition 9-36.118

In the main, however, we may conclude that inhis Quaestiones super librum de causis, his final workso far as we know, Siger was much more concernedabout reconciling his positions with Christian or-thodoxy. We have already seen this with respect tohis views on unicity vs. multiplicity of the possibleintellect, and on eternity of the First Intelligence.Moreover, as mentioned above, in this work he clear-ly rejects the Neoplatonic theory of necessary and


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eternal emanation. In q. 36 he presents a number ofarguments for and against the possibility that one im-material substance might produce another. He thenargues that the act of creating, that is, of producingthe being (esse) of something from no presupposedsubject, is restricted to the First Cause both accordingto the Platonists and in truth. Nor can the power tocommunicate esse without using any presupposed

subject be communicated to an intelligence even asan instrument of the First Cause. Sigers reasoninghere follows very closely that developed by Aquinasin, for instance, his De potentia, his Summa contragentiles, and his Summa theologiae.119

While our knowledge of Sigers final years is

very sketchy indeed, it is clear that he, along withtwo other Masters in Arts, Bernier of Nivelles andGosvin de la Chapelle, were cited in a documentissued on November 23, 1276, to appear before theFrench Inquisitor in January 1277, and hence wellbefore the Condemnation of March 7, 1277. It seems

likely that he and the others had already departedfrom the kingdom of France and that Siger himselfwent to Italy, where, it has been suggested, he wasplaced under some kind of house arrest but providedwith a secretary. There is no indication that he wasever found guilty of the crime of heresy. Some timebefore November 10, 1284, he died, having beenslain, perhaps by his secretary. But he would beimmortalized by Dante in the Divine Comedy, whoplaces him in Paradise and has St. Thomas Aquinas


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introduce him. It has been suggested that Dante mayhave been aware of Sigers moves in a more orthodoxdirection in his final work.120 Before leaving Sigers views on faith and reason,it will be helpful for us to turn to his only explicit dis-cussion of the relationship between philosophy andtheology as this is preserved in two of the survivingmanuscript versions of his Quaestiones in Metaphysi-

cam. As Armand Maurer has shown in a recent study,Sigers discussion here follows very closely ThomasAquinass presentation of sacra doctrina in q. 1 ofSumma theologiaeI.121

As does Thomas in his discussion in the Summaand elsewhere, Siger recognizes two kinds of theol-

ogysacred theology or what Siger himself callsthe science of theology that is Sacred Scripture, andanother theology which is a part of philosophy. Hebegins by referring to Aristotles MetaphysicsVI, 1(1026a18-19) where the Stagirite notes that thereare three theoretical sciencesnatural philosophy,

mathematics, and theology. Siger comments thatthe science of being as being deserves to be calledtheology, as is evident from Aristotles text. Sinceboth this science and Sacred Scripture are knownas theology, he proposes to show how they differ. Inclose correspondence with Thomass discussion inthe Summa, Siger brings out six differences betwee

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