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MedieualPhzlosophy and Theology 5 1996),3 9 4 2 . Printed in the United States ofAmerica

Expositions of the Text:Aqainas s Aristotelian CommentariesJOHN JENKINS, C.S.C.University of Notre Dame

ibro Aristotelis, qui Peri hermeneias dicitur,multis obscuritatibus involuto, inter multiplicesoccupationum mearum sollicitudines, expositionemadhibere curavi, hoc gerens in animo sic altiora proposse perfectioribus exhibere, u t tamen iunioribusproficiendi auxilia tradere non recusem.

St. Thomas Aquinas, Epistola N uncupatoria ofthe Commentary on Aristotle's Perihermena as

A slow bu t steady swing of a pendulum has been discernible dur ing the sec-on d half of the twentieth century in a n old debate o n the nature of the Aristo-telian commentaries of St. Thomas Aquinas.1 In 1950, ean Issac, O.P., wrote

Leo Elders, Daniel Frank, Jorge Gracia, Mark Jordan, David O'Connor,Thomas O'Meara, 0 . P., Robert Pasnau, and Paul Weithman were all most generousin reading and commenting on various versions of this article, and I am mostgrateful for their help. Versions were read at a colloquium of the Notre Damephilosophy department, at the 1994 meeting of the Midwestern Division of theAmerican Philosophical Association, at the 1994 Summer Thomistic Institute atNotre Dame, and at a conference at the University of Fribourg (Suisse),and I havebenefited from comments made by members of the audience on these occasions.Of course, opinions expressed herein are to be ascribed to me alone.1. cardinal ~ajet&, the first to provide a detailed commentary on one ofAquinas's works, addressed the problem in Angelici doc tm s Sancti Thomm AquinatisSumma Theologica in quinque tomos distn buta: cum com m ta r ii s Thomae de Vio CardinalisCajetani; elucidationibus literalibus f Seraphini Capponi a Porrecta Ordinis Praedica-torum (Patavii: ex typographia Seminarii, 1698), IIa-IIae, 172, art. 4, commentariaCardinalis Cajetani; and in subsequent centuries a succession of Thomistic scholarsoffered their opinions. Influential in shaping the twentieth-century debate werePierre Mandonnet, O.P., in Siger de Brabant et L AverroOme Latin au X Zm Si2cle(Louvain: Institut superieur de philosophe de 1'Universite 1911), pp. 39-42; andMartin Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geisteslebm: Abhandlungm sur Geschichte der Scho-lastik und Mystik (Munich: Hueber, 1926), pp. 266313. More recent contributionsinclude Marie-Dominique Chenu, O.P., Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, trans.A.-M. Landry, O.P., and D. Hughes, O.P. (Chicago: Regnery, 1964), pp. 203-32;Georges Ducoin, S.J., Saint Thomas Commentateur d'Aristote, RLchercMs de Phi-losophie1 (1955): 85-107; R. P. Ioannes Issac, O.P., Saint Thomas Interprete Des


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40 JO H N JE N K I N St h a tin t he Aristotelian com men tar ies Aquinas expresseshis own philosophicalviews,justas th eSummatheologiaeputsforth his theology.2In thisapprop ationistreadin g (as I shall call it) , what Aquinas presents in the comm entariesare his ownviews,albeit only philosophical ones which do not rely on Christ ian revelation. Et ienn e Gilson coun tered and claimed that Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle are so many expositions of the doctrine of Aristotle,n o tof what might be called his own philosophy. 3And more recently MarkJ o r d a nargued that theseworksare of the gen re of a literal commen tary, an dsuch a com mentary does not assert th at th e text un de r explication ist r u e .Itasserts only th at the text merits careful readin g. 4I n thishisto cistreading (asIshall call it), Aquinas intends only to offer anexegesisof Aristotle's writings,n o tto presen t his ownviewson t he mat ters un de r discussion.

I nwhatfollows I shall argue t ha t Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotlewere guided by sophisticated hermeneutical principles missed by both theappropriationist and the historicist. However, Aquinas gives no extendeddiscussions of the principles which guided his commentaries on Aristotle, ashe did for the interpretation of scripture and Christian patristic writers.5Asidefrom brief and general remarks, such as the epigraph above, it is only

Oeuvres D'Aristote, inScholastica RationeHistorico CriticaInstauranda(Rome: Bibliotheca Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani, 1951), pp. 35363; Etienne Gilson, whoseremarks are brief but influential, inHistoryofCh stian Philosophyin theMiddleAges(London: Sheed & Ward, 1955), p. 367, and in Elements of Ch stian Philosophy(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), p. 282; James A. Weisheipl, O.R,FriarThomasD'Aquino:His Life,Thought, and Work(G arden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), pp.272 285; Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator, inSt.ThomasAquinas 1274 1974:CommemorativeStudies (Toronto:Pontifical Institute ofMediaeval Studies, 1974), pp. 21338; Rene Antoine Gauthier, O.P., Saint ThomasetL thique a Nicomaque, inSentencialibpoliticorum. TabulaHimethicorum,LeonineEdition of Thomas'sOperaOmnia48 (Rome, 1882 ),i xxv;and the preface toSentenciaUbriDeanimainOperaOmnia45, pp. 293*88*;LudwigH dl, PhilosophischeEthik und Moral Theologie in der Summa fratris Thomae, inThomasvonAquin(Berlin: Zimmermann, 1988), pp. 23 42; Mark D. Jordan, Thomas Aquinas'sDisclaimers in the Aristotelian Commentaries, inPhilosophyand the God of Abraham:EssaysinMemoryofJamesA. Weisheipl, O.R,ed. R. James Long (Toronto:PontificalInstitute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991), p. 104, and in TheAllegedA stotelianism ofThomasAquinas,Etienne Gilson Series 15(Toronto:Pontifical Institute of MediaevalStudies, 1992); Francis Cheneval and Ruedi Imbach, in theeinleitungtoPrologezudenA stoteleskommentaren(Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1993), pp.xiii lx.

2. Issac, Saint Thomas, p. 355. Although others may not have asserted thisviewas starkly as Issac, it is not uncommon to find in the literature writers citing,without futher comment,passagesin the Aristotelian commentaries when they aretrying to discover Aquinas's ownviewson some philosophical issue. Such a procedureimplicitly endorses Issac's position.

3.Gilson,HistoryofCh stian Philosophy,p. 367.4. Jordan, Thomas Aquinas's Disclaimers, p. 104.5. For a discussion of the principles which guided scriptural interpretation, see,for example,Summatheologiae1.1.9 and 10 and the preface to the commentary onth eBook ofJ o b .For those that guide his reading of patristic writers, see the prefacetoContraErrores Graecorum.Hereafter theSummatheologiaewillbe referred to asST.


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AQUIN AS'S ARISTOTELIAN COMMENTARIES 41from acareful studyof his textsthatwe can infer the bestaccountof thesecommentaries.Mystrategyhereshallbe,first,toarguethat the now dominanthistoricist readingcannotexplaincertainpassagesinwhichAquinas'sviewsclearlyintrude in his commentaries, and for thisIshalloffer representativeexamplesof threekindsof suchpassages.Second,Ishallcontendthatif we takeseriously Aquinas'sdialecticaltreatmentof authorities,and ofwhatdeterminesthemeaningof anauthor'swordsand thecontentof his orher thoughts, we can see thatfor Aquinas the interpretation ofAristotle'stextswouldhavenotonlyallowedbut alsorequiredthe interpretertobringtobearhis or her ownviewson thetruthof theissueunderconsideration.

Althoughnotwhollyuncontroversial,the followingthesesconstitutea common viewaboutthe natureand circumstancesofcompositionofAquinas'sAristoteliancommentaries.6First,Aquinaswrotethecommentariesforpedagogicalpurposes,and theintended audiencewas studentsin thearts,whosecourse of studies would have been focused primarily on theworksofArist o t l e .

7 Second, Aquinas wanted to he lp his studen ts un derstan d Aristotle'sthou ght as it is expressed in his texts, not to presen t own. As he often writes in

t h ecommen taries, Aquinas's con cern is with un der stan din g the words ort h e int en tion or the min d of Aristotle, and therefore he was not interested inpassingjud gmen t on Aristotle's claims or in constructing his ownaccount of the matter. Third, he was concerned that in those places where

6.Veryprominent dissenters from thefollowingaccount include Gauthier andothers who endorse his fundamental claims, such as H dl, Cheneval, and Imbach.Gauthier claims that as a theologian Aquinas saw his tasks as those of asage,toproclaim truth and refute error. In Aquinas's Aristotelian commentaries he attempts to refute certain perennial theological and philosophical opinions thoughtto be in conflict with Christian revelation. Thus, in De anima commentary, heattempts to refute the materialism of the preSocratics and the idealism of Plato andto extract from Aristotle's texts a philosophical account of the soul,validfor alltimes, which could give the Christian a better understanding of the truth abouth u m a nbeings, as this is revealed by the word ofG o d.Due to limitations of space, Iwill not discuss Gauthier's understanding of Aquinas's commentaries here butconfine myselfto another reading. Nevertheless, Ibelievethat Gauthier's positionis extremely important and interesting and that my central claims here can enableus to understand Aquinas's project in the commentaries even if we adopt hisapproach. An explanation of how this is so, however, will have to await anotheroccasion.

7. As a 1255 decree of the University of Paris makes clear, the texts lectured onand studied in theArtsFaculty of Paris were the known worksof Aristotle, someworksfalsely attributed to Aristotle, and a handful of other works;Chartula umuniversitatis Pa siensis, ed. Henricus Denifle, O.P. (Paris: Parisiis: ex typis fratrumDelalain 1889), vol. 1, pp. 277 79. The education in Dominican houses of studyseems to havefollowedclosely that at Paris (pp. 385 86).


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42 JOHN JENKINSAristotle's works were in conflict with orthodox Christian doctrine, or at leastthoughtto be so, his students would not be led to take up heretical opinions.This con cern would, of course, have been heightened by the Latin Averroistcontroversies at Paris from the mid 1260s un til the mid1270s.8These thesesgiveus a historicist reading, with a minor twist: Aquinaswrote the commentaries to help students understand Aristotle's writings,but he brought in Christian doctrine where Aristotle's texts were in conflictwith, or thought to be in conflict with, orthodox doctrine. If these assumptions are correct, we would expect Aquinas to do several things in thecommentaries: (1) for the most part, he would, prescinding from anyjudgments on thetruth of Aristotle's claims, simply help the reader understandAristotle by providing as exegetically careful and accurate a commentary as he could; (2) he would, however, try to protect the reader fromheterodoxy by noting where Aristotle'sviewsare in conflict with orthodoxdoctrine; and (3) he would show the reader that where Aristotle's argumentswere in conflict with the faith, they were not valid and sound demonstrations with necessary conclusions, and thereby show that correctphilosophical reasoning does not conflict with divinely revealed doctrine. 9Toa great degree, these expectations are fulfilled.10

In certain passages, however, Aquinas's own theological and philosophicalviewsintrude in places and inwaysfundamentally discordant withthe essentially historicist reading just recounted . What follows is not an

8. Weisheipl claims that Aquinas undertook the writingofthe commentariesinresponseto thecontroversy over Latin Averroism atthe UniversityofParis.Aquinaswrote them, Weisheipl contends,tokeep students from Averroistic heresy whilethey attemptedtounderstand Aristotle's works. Gauthier and Jordan argue that thiscouldnothave beenhisinitial motivationforwriting,for thefirst commentary,onDeanima,waswritten between December1267 andSeptember1268 atSanta Sabinain Rome, before hereturnedtoParisandenteredtheAverroistic fray (G authier,prefacetoSentenciaHimDeanima,pp.283*94*;J o r da n , St.Thomas's Disclaimers ,p .105). Still, evenifwe grant Gauthier's and Jordan 's point, because Aquinas wroteth ecommentariesnot for hispeersbut forstudents,henaturally would have paidspecial attentiontothose places where Aristotle's doctrine seemedtoconflict withChristian doctrineand take care thathisstudents would nothave beenled tohereticalviews.Whenweturnto therelevant passages in thecommentaries,we dofind evidenceofthis concern.

9.AsAquinas writes, If theadversary believes noneofthat whichhasbeendivinely revealed, thereis no way toprovethearticlesoffaith through arguments,but onlytorefute arguments against faith, shouldhebringanyforward. Since faithis foundedoninfallible truthand it isimpossible that something contrarytotruthbe demonstrated,it isclear thattheproofs brought forward against faithare notdemonstrations,butrefutable arguments (ST1.1.8).Thisand allother translationsof Aquinasaremine.

10.Agood exampleof apassageinwhich Aquinas pursues these goalsisfoundin In octo librosphysicorumA stotelisexpositio8.2.986 (hereafter Inphysica). ThereAquinas presentsacareful exegesis of thetextandshows where Aristotle's claimsdoand do notconflict with faith. (Aquinas writes, And onepartofthis, namely,t h a tmotioalways was, isincompatible withourfaith. . . . Butanother partis not


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AQU IN AS'S ARISTOTELIANC O M M E N T AR I E S 43exhaustivelist butrepresentativeexamples ofthreesorts of passageswhichare problematicfor the establishedaccount .

Suggestive GlossesInthefamouspassages inNicomacheanEthics10.7 and 8,Aristotlearguestha talife ofcon temp la t ionis the highesthappinessfor ah u m a n ,althougha lifeofmoralvirtueaccordingtopracticalwisdomishappyin asecondaryway:

Hence it is clear that both the moral virtues and prudence are aboutcomposites. The composite virtues, properly speaking, are human insofar as a human being is a composite of soul and body. Thus also alifewhich is according to these (viz., according to prudence and moralvirtue) is a humanlife,which is to say an active life. And consequentlythe happiness which consists inliving this lifeis human. But the contemplative lifeand happiness, which is proper to the intellect, is separate and divine.11

Inonereadingthisgloss is astraightforwardsummaryofsomeofAristotle'skeyclaimsinthesechapters.Aristotle,as Aquinasrecognizes,iscontrastingtwokindsofhappiness tha tone may achieve one a r t h .1 2The first consistsin living a life inaccordancewiththemoralvirtues andpracticalwisdom;th e secondconsists in living acontemplativelife, one whosehappinessisth eexcellence of the activity of theintellect.Thelattersortofhappiness,th eexcellenceofreason,Aristotlewrites, is athingapart [ e p v inAristotle'stext;separatain Aquinas'st rans la t ion] , 13for it is the excellence

wholly contrary to faith. . . . We hold by faith that at some time the substance of theworld began to be, but, on the other hand, it would never cease to be. ) Aquinascontends that insofar as Aristotle's arguments are successful, they do no t undermine Christian faith. ( If anyone rightly examines the arguments here presented,th et ru th of faith cannot be efficaciously assailedby such argumen ts. ) In the courseof this lectio he adamantly rejects Averroes's interpretation of Aristotle. This andsimilar passagesare strikingly consonant with Weisheip sviews.See, for example,I nduodecim librosmetaphysicorumA stotelisexpositio7.5.2495 99 (hereafter Inmeta.);I n decentlibros ethicorum A stotelis adNicomachumexpositio1.9.11317 (hereafter Inethica);In A stotelis librum de animacommenta um3.9.726(hereafterIn deanim ); InlibrosA stotelis de caelo et mundo1.4.64 66 (hereafterIn decaelo).T henumbersin allreferences to the Aristotelain commentaries are to the book, lectio, and paragraphnumber in the Marietti editions.

11.Inethica10.12.2115.12. Aquinas writes, Me qui vacat speculationi ve tati, estmaximefelix, quantum

homoin hac vitafelix essepotest {Inethica10.11.2110).13. Aristotle NicomacheanEthics10.8, H 78a22 trans. W. D. Ross, rev. J. O.

Urmson, in TheComplete Works ofA stotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Bollingen Series(Princeton,N.J.: Princeton Unviversity Press, 1985), vol. II .


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44 JOHN JENKINSof the activity not of the composite of intellect and body but of the intellectalone.Hence,it is not a human happiness, the excellence of the activity ofth e whole human person, but is something apart or separate. And it isdivine because its activity is most akin to [ i ^eve ;cognatissima]14orsome likeness of [ o ;similitudo]15the activity of God, which is contemplation.16

F or Aquinas's Christian audience, however, these words would havesuggested something more, and Aquinas's glosses encourage this furthersuggestion. For them thelifeof perfect con templation is a th ing apart alsoin the sense that it is enjoyed after on e's earthly life, when on e beholds thedivine essence and knows other things through beholding the divine essence. 17This activity of the intellect is separate or apart in the further sensethatthe intellect is actually separated from its earthly body, and onelivesalife apart from earthly life. Aquinas encourages this suggestion when, immediately after the passage quoted above, he writes, To learn this muchabout this matter at present is sufficient, for whatever else which can bemade known with certainty is beyond what pertains to the proposition athand. [Aristotle] treats this in the third book of theDe anima,where heshows that the intellect is separate. 18 According to Aquinas's understanding of the third book ofDe anima,Aristotle argues that the intellect isseparate in the sense of being separable from the body and is destined foran immortallifeafter the death of the body.19

T h e term 'divine' (divinus)would alsosuggestmore to Aquinas's readers thanseems clearly expressed in the text at hand. In on e place AquinasglossesAristotle's claims bysayingthat the intellect is somethin g divine in us,an d he adds, plainly, a human participates with respect to his intellect in adivine similitude. 20 Aquinas's readers would have been reminded of hisunderstan ding of the doctrine in the book of Genesis that humans are madeinthe image and likeness ofG od.21M oreover, since he is here speaking aboutperfect happiness or beatitude, his comment would have suggested th e scripturalclaim that when we behold the divine essence in heaven, wewillbe like[God],for wewillsee him as he is (1 Jo hn . 3:2). Aquinas un derstands thisstate as the perfection of our assimilation toG od.22

Although Aquinas does not explicitly attribute these Christian understandings to Aristotle's words inNicomacheanEthics10.7 and 8, he does not

14. AristotleNicomachean Ethics10.8 1178b24, Il79a26.15.AristotleNicomachean Ethics10.8 1178b25.16. AristotleNicomachean Ethics10.8 1178b2122.17.ST1.12.613.18. Inethica10.12.2116.19.In deanima3.10.742 43.20.Inethica10.11.2106.21. Manifestum estautem quodin homine invenitur aliqua Deisim ilitudo, quaededucituraD eosicutabexempla ... .Etideoinhom ine dicituresseima goDeo,nontamenperfecta, sedim perfecta ( S T 1.93.1).22.ST1.93.4.


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AQUINAS'S ARISTOTELIAN COMMENTARIES 45discourage their suggestion, and in some places his comments encouragethem. This is difficult to understand on a historicist reading. If he is tryingto understand and help his readers understand Aristotle s views, it seemsthat he should be as interested in making the differences between Aristotleand a Christian view known as he is in making similarities known. It wouldcount against neither Aristotle nor Christian doctrine to admit that a paganphilosopher did not fully grasp what could be known through Christianrevelation about perfect beatitude for humans, and it would discourage theoverly zealous Aristotelianism of some Averroists. But Aquinas seems inter-ested in encouraging suggestions of a Christian understanding of Aristotle sclaims, not in marking differences.

Ambiguous GlossesIn Metaphysics12.9.1 17 4M 5-3 4, Aristotle con siders the na tu r e of divinethough t .Hebeg ins with puzzles. Do es divine th ou gh t haveanobjectornot?Is itssubstance thefaculty of though t or the act of thinking? If it has anobject, does it think ofitselfor of something else?And if something else,the same thing always or som eth ing different? Does it mat te r whe the r itthinksof thegoodor anych an ce thing ? Aristotle th en briefly argu es t hatthe divine thought is of that which is most divine and precious, which isGod, and it is changeless , for its substance is the act of thinking. Heconcludes: , Therefore it mus tbe of itself that the divine thou gh t think s(since it is the most excellent ofthings) ,and itsthinking is a thinkingonth inking. 2 3Aristotle 's theology appears at odds with a Christian view. When hestates, Either [thedivine bei ng ] thinks ofitselfor of something else, heclearly seemstoimply th atone but notbo thof thealternativesist rue .2 4Inadopt ing theforme r al ternative, that God 's thinkingis of his ownthinking,Aristotle rejects thelatter.Butthis sharply co ntrasts with Christian theology,according towhichGod notonly knowsbut also providentially ordersandguides Hiscrea t ion.

In hislectioon this text, Aquinas sets forth Aristotle 's argumentsandclaims clearly andfollows the text closely. After stating Aristotle's conclu-sions,hewrites,

We should also consider thatthePhilosopher intendstoshow thatGoddoesnotunderstand anotherbuthimself, insofar as thething under-stood is theperfection of the oneunderstanding ,and of the one whoistounderstand.And it isevident that n othin g elsecan beund erstood23.AristotleNicomachean Ethics1074b33-34.24.AristotleNicomachean Ethics1074b22. Aquinas'sowntranslationofthis lineusesthedisjunction autrather than vel.Theformer, but not the latter, tendstoimply that onlyone of thedisjunctsistrue.


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JOHN JENKINSby Godinsuchaway thatit is the perfectionofhis intellect. N everthe-lessitdoesnotfollow tha tallother thingsareunknowntohim:for inunderstanding himself he understandsallother things.25

Aquinas then justifiesthefinal sentencein theabove com men tbyarguingtha t the First Mover understands Himself perfectly,and the more perfectlysome principle isknown, themore perfectly is itseffect known init. 26Because the heaven and allofnature dependonGod,itis clear that God,in knowinghimself,knowsallthings. 27Aquinas concludes by counteringapossible objection that God's knowledgeofthings other than himself deni-grateshisdignity.28This glossisambiguous.On one reading, Aquinas intendsto setforthnot only what Aristotle explicitly claims butalso what Aquinas recognized ,and expected his readerstorecognize, followed from Aristotle's claims.Butif thisisso, Aquinas's readingisclearly tendentious.Headoptsaninterpre-tation which goes beyond andeven conflicts with Aristotle's texts,onewhich isshapedbyAquinas's own views. Suchareadingisclearlyatoddswith ahistoricist accountofthe comm entaries.A second possibilityistha t Aquinas intends, after presenting Aristotle'sviews,totell the reader what doesordoes no t follow from the philosopher'sclaims, even though Aristotle did not recognize these consequences. Such apractice is understand able, ahistoricist may argue, because this isanissueonwhich Aristotle's claims seem to be inconflict with orthodox doc trine,andAquinas would wishtoshow that the reis nogenuine conflict betweenthetruthsofrevelationand theconclusionsofnatural reason. But eveninthisreading, w hichismore innocuousforthe historicist,itis h ardtound erstandwhy Aquinas left thetext ambiguousand did notacknowledge thediffer-ences between Aristotelian and Christian doctrine, ashedoes elsewhere.29

Tendentious losses

InMetaphysics2.1.993b23-30wefindthefollowing passag e:A thinghas aqualityin ahigher degree than other thingsif invirtueofit thesimilar quality belongsto theother thingsaswell (e.g., fireisthe hottestofthings;for it is thecauseofthe heatofall o ther things)so that that which causes derivative tru thsto betrue is most true. Hencethe principlesofeternal things must alwaysbemost true (fortheyarenot merely sometimes true,nor isthereanycauseoftheir being,but

2b.Inmeta. 12.11.2614.26.1nmeta.12.11 2615.27.Inmeta. 12.11 2615.28.Inrneta.12.112616.29.Seen. 10above.


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AQUINAS'S ARISTOTELIANCOMM EN TARIES 47they themselves are the cause of the being of other things), so that aseachthing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth.

Aristotle's argument begins from this principle: if x is the cause of F iny,t h e n xis more F tha ny.He applies this to the causes of tru th : ifxis the causeof th e trut h ofy ,th en xis more true th any.He concludes th at the principlesof eternal th ings are most true, for (1) they are always true, and (2) theyare th e cause of being (an d hen ce tru th ) of other things, tho ugh they haven o cause of their being (and t r u t h ) .

A key phrase in this compact and obscure passage is cause of bein g( iov o fv i; causaut sint). Aristotelian com ment ators generally readt h epassagein the light of Metaphysics12 an d th e eternal th ings to be th ecelestial spheres, the celestial bodies they carry and their attributes, and the principles of etern al th ings to be th e separate substances which correspond to each sphere. There is no hint there of any doctrine of creationexnihilo.so Rather, th e separate substances are principles of the spheres in th atthey move th em as final causes. Thus the separa te substances are causes ofbeing, not in the sense th at they are causes of th e being of th e celestialspheres and bodies themselves, but in the sense that they are principles oft h eeternalmotionof these et ern al spheres, which they brin g about as finalcauses.

Aquinas reads the Metaphysics2.1 passage otherwise. His comment isfor th e most part clear, straightforward, an dwellgrounded in the text. Butnear th e end, regardin g th e reasons why the principles of etern al things aremosttrue, he writes,

These principles have no cause but are the cause of the being of otherthings. And because of this they transcend the celestial bodies in truthandbeing: although [the celestial bodies] are incorruptible, nevertheless they have a cause not only of their movement, as some havethought,but also with respect to their being, as the Philosopher hereexpresslysays.31

Aquinas believes th at Aristotle is claiming th at the separate substances arecauses of th e bein g of th e spheres, no t only of th eir motion . Aquinas findsin this text a doctrine of creation exnihilo.Having foun d such a doctrineexpressed here, Aquinasgoeson to interpret other lengthierpassages,suchasPhysics8, in light of it.32

30. Aristotle insists in the strongest terms that motion, and hence substances,are eternal {Metaphysics 12.6, 107lb6 7); and hegivesno indication that hefeelsthereis a need for a cause or principle of their existence.31.Inmeta.2.2.295.32. See especiallyInphysica8.2.974.Aquinas attributes to Aristotle a notion ofcreation exnihilobut a creation that was from eternity and not in time. Such anotion of creation was not wholly foreign to Christian thought. Boethius endorsesit and attributes it to Plato;Philosophiae consolationis(Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1960),lb. 5, pr. 6, 10910.


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48 JO H N JE N K I N SIf we isolate the passage in Metaphysics2.1, Aquinas's readin g of prin

ciples of eternal th ings an d cause of being is possible. Taking the wholecorpusin to account , however, the evidence from ot her Aristotelian texts ist o o slender to suppose h e held a full blown doctrin e of creationex nihilo.The in terpret at ion which Aquinas explicitly rejects, th at th e First Mover ist h e cause of the motion and not the existence of eternal things, seemsclearly preferable. Aquinas's reading of Aristotle seems biased by his Christ iandoct rine of creationex nihilo.Since Aquinas was no t generally a carelessreader of Aristotle's texts, his comments on these passages are difficult tounderstand in a historicist accoun t of his int ention s.

Alth ough large port ion s of th e commentaries consist of careful andcommendable exegeses with occasional comment and elaboration, as thehistoricist would expect, there are places where Aquinas's ownviews seemto shape h is co mmen t on and int erpreta tion of Aristotle's text, as th eappropriationist might expect. Thus some have been inclined to think thatt h e truth lies somewhere in the middle. Marie Dominique Chen u, O.P.claimed tha t while Aquinas showed great concern with the literal mean ingof Aristot le's text, he engaged in reverent ial exegesis in which th e principles and thefirststeps toward truth included in the textwillbe brought,so to speak, to their ripening. 33Chenu quoted Cajetan: 'Very often, [St.Thomas] glossesAristotle as Philosopher, not as Aristotle as such; an d thus,in favor of truth. 3 4But how, in Aquinas's own understan ding of his project,do the exegetical and constructive elements fit together, and what sort ofwork results? If Aquinas intendedexegesisof Aristotle but allowed his ownviewsto in trude, it would seem th at he did was badexegesis.If, on the oth erh a n d ,h e in ten ded to construct and present his ownviewsand yet did so int h e context of what appears to be a literal exegesis of Aristotle, it wouldseem th at he knowingly confused th e reader.

What is needed is an account of how the exegetical and constructiveelements fit together in a coherent understanding of these works. In thenext section I shall try to identify the hermeneutical principles behindAquinas's procedure and the factors which gaverise to these principles.

II

Aristotle was for Aquinas and his contemporaries not simply an ancientphilosopher but also an authority (aucto tas). For them the writings of anauthority were not texts to be simply learned and parroted; they were,rather, aids in one's inquiries into truth. Dialectical reasoning provided a

33. Chenu, Understanding Saint Thomas,p. 207. See also D ucoin, SaintThomas, who takes a similar position.

34.C h e n u , UnderstandingS aint Thomas ,p. 207.


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AQUIN AS'S ARISTOTELIAN COMMENTARIES 49m e t h o dby which authoritative claims could be used in one's inquiries. Inthis section I shall first consider the dialectical treatment of authorities,highlighting certain aspects that, I shall argue, influenced Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle. Central to this sort of treatment is a distinctionbetween an author's understanding of a key word or phrase and a fuller,more adequate account which the author may have onlyvaguely expressedor even imperfectly recognized. Subsequently, I shall consider aspects ofAquinas's views on linguistic meaning and mental states which furtherclarified and justified this distinction. We can then begin to discern thehermeneutical principles which guided Aquinas's commentaries onAristotle.

Authorities and DialecticIn the twelfth century Peter Abelard wrote Sic et Non,a juxtaposition ofdivergent claims of authorities on 158 theological issues. Although collections of thesayingsof authorities were not uncommon before Abelard, hiswork is distinguished by its systematic character and logical perspicuity.Abelard's 158 questions are divided into three parts, which together coverth erange ofissuesin Christian theology.

35Each question arises from a pointon which there are apparently divergent authoritative opinions, and the

opposition among them is rather starkly presented.36Although some have suggested that Abelard contrived surreptitiouslytoundermine accepted authorities, the prologue to the worksuggeststhat

his intention was the opposite. He hoped the collection ofsayings wouldstimulate young readers to the greatest effort in inquiring into truth for through doubting we come to inquiry; through inquiring we learn thet r u t h . 3 7 Faced with an apparent conflict between authorities, Abelardmakes clear that one'sfirst tactic should be to attempt to reconcile theauthorities by showing that the conflict is merely apparent.38Heoffers inth eprologue several strategies by which the dicta of authorities might bereconciled and conflict eliminated. Central to most of these is close attentionto the signification of terms and to the context of statements.

35.The firstpart (qq. 1105) concerns faith, God,divine powerandprovidence,angels,the fall,redemption,andChristology.Thesecon dpart(qq. 106 35)concernsthesacram ents.Thethirdpart(qq. 13658)con cerns Christian eth ics.36.On howAbelard 's workistraditionaland howinnovative,seeJeanJo livet,Arts du Langageet Theologie chezAbelard,Etudes de P hilosophic Medievale Series(Paris:Vrin,1982),especiallypp.238 51.37. Peter Abelard, Sic et Non: A C tica l Edition,ed.Blanche B. BoyerandRichardMcKeon (Chicago:U niversityofCh icagoPress,1976 77),p. 103.38. Abelard recognizes that reconciliation will not always be possibleandrecommends thatinsuchacase,'Theauth oritiesare to bebrought togetherandtheone ofstrongertestimonyandbetterconfirm edis to beheldaspreeminent(S icetNon,p.96).


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50 JO H N JE N K I N SWe find here what we can label, somewhat loosely, an Abelardian

approach to th e dialectical tr eat ment of authorities. Among t he importantfeatures of this treatmen t are (1) an identification of issues on whichdivergent authoritative opinions exist,which issues in turn become questions for the inquirer; (2) an assumption that authoritative opinions carryweightin deciding a question, a lthough this may not be absolute ;39 thus (3)a n assumption that for any question a resolution is to be preferredceterispa busif it can be harmonized with authoritativesayings;an d (4) strategiesfor reconciling resolutions to questions with authoritative sayings whichemphasize the signification of words an d the context of statements. It wasby following such a pro cedure , Abelard believed, that beginn ing fromdoubt on e could engage in a fruitful inquiry that leads to tr uth.

Abelard's approach was carried into th irteenth cen tury universities byP e t e r Lombard'sFourBooksofSentences, which was to become the standardtext for theological instruction, and by the institutionalization of the disputed question.40 As both a student and master, Aquinas was thoroughlyimbued with this dialectical approach to accepted authorities in a discipline. H e was train ed in disputat ions as a studen t, and as a master conductedn um erous disputation s. When he came to write theSummatheologiae,although he waswilling to be innovative in many respects, he adopted thestructure of a disputed question in each article.Aquinas, th en , stands firmly in th e Abelardian tradit ion of a dialecticalapproach to authorit ies. H e differs, however, in that respect in which th ewhole of the thirteenth century is distinguished from earlier scholars in theLatin West: he had access to an d studied carefully th e whole Aristoteliancorpus.Abelard, Pet er Lombard, and their twelfth century contemporar iesknew only some of Aristotle's logical works. They had the TopicsandSophisticalRefutations,which are import an tworkson dialectic, but they could notsee how dialectic played a role in Aristotle's own ph ilosophical investigations.Moreover, the study of dialectic after Boethius had moved away fromt h egenuin e dialectical context presupposed by Aristotle's Topicsand towarda focus on abstract principles, which would enable one to find the middlet e r m forsyllogisms.In this respect, it was more Boethian than Aristotelian .41

Thus, although Aquinas was heir to th e Abelardian tradition, his approach to discordant authoritative voices was enriched and further specifiedby his study of Aristotle. Abelard reco mmen ded reconciling auth orit iesby showing th at th e disagreem ent was merely apparent. Aristotle suggested

39. As Aquinas makes clear inST1.1.8,ad 2, different sorts of authoritiesvaryin theweighttheir statements carry in a discipline.40. On this see Weisheipl, ThomasD'Aquino,pp.124ff.;and GordenLeff,Pans

andOxfordin the 13th and 14th Centu es:An Institutional and IntellectualHistory(NewYork:Wiley,1968), pp. 16777.41.For a discussion of the differences between early medieval and Aristoteliandialectic, see Eleonore Stump,Dialecticand ItsPlacein theDevelopmentof MedievalLogic(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), especially chaps. 15.


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AQUINAS'S ARISTOTELIANCOMM EN TARIES 51more subtlewaysin which established opin ions, th ou gh in on e way actuallydiscordant, might be harmonized in some higher synthesis.

I n Topics,Aristotle emphasizes t he im por ta nc e of examinin g t henumber of meanings a term may have for the sake of (1) clarity, (2)ensuring that our reasoning is addressed to the facts and not merely toverbal disagreements, and (3) avoiding being misled byfalse reasoning.42Moreover, hesays,we must not only not e differences of senses bu t also tryto render definition s of terms, an d thus see how different senses of a te rmare related to one another:

We must not only treat of those terms which bear different senses, butwe must also try to render their definitions; e.g., we must not merelysay that justice and courage are called 'good' in one sense, and thatwhat conduces tovigorand what conduces to health are called so inanother , but also that the forms are so called because of a certainintrinsicquality they have, the latter because they are productive of acertain result and not because of any intrinsic quality in themselves.Similarly also in other cases.43

Aristotle goeson togivean elaborate set of tests for determining similarityand difference of meaning.

I n Aristotle's own scientific inquiries the attention to similarities anddifferences of sense is cen tral. When faced with a conceptu al question , 44Aristotle begins, in accord with the proper dialectical method outlined inTopics,45by considering the various v (i.e., com mo n or reputableopinions) on the matter. Each of these is shown, as it stands, to be unableto accoun t for certain difficulties. A critical step in th e procedu re is torecognize some possible equivocation in each of the v and to go onand differentiate the various senses of the key term or terms. Aristotle isable togive afull answer to the question when he has identified a certainsense of a key term as unqualified ( ), primary ( p cov), or strict(K p ) .Finally, although each of the v is t h e n shown to have gonewrong because it failed to grasp the fully adequate sense of the term,nevertheless each is shown to have partially grasped the solution and thus

42. Aristotle Topics1.18, 108al8 35.43.Topics1.15, 106a2 8, trans. W. A. Pickard Cambridge, in TheCompleteWorksofA stotle,ed.J o n a th a nBarnes, Bolingen Series (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1985), vol. I.44.1 do notwishtosuggestthat there is a sharp distinction between empiricaland conceptual questions in Aristotle. Yet as G. E. L. Owen has pointed out in

Tithenai ta Phainomena, inArticlesonA stotle: 1.Science, ed. Jonathan Barnes,MalcolmSchofield, and Richard Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1975), pp. 11318,in some of Aristotle's enquiries thephainomenaseem to be straightforward empiricalobservations, whereas in others they are common or reputable opinions. It is thelattercases, which are not based immediately on a specific set of observations, whichIam calling, ratherloosely, conceptual.

45.See Aristotle Topics8.5.


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52 JOHN JENKINSis accommodated in th e final, full answer. In this way, Aristotle believes, hissolution savesthe phenomena.'*46

Consider, for example, Aristotle's discussion of th e question of how amanwho judges rightly can behave incon tinently.

47H e begins by citing Socrates'sviewthat incont inen ce is impossible, th at no one . . . when h e judges

acts against what h e judges bestpeop le act so only by rea son of ignorance. 48This position, Aristotle notes, is opposed to the phen om en on thatpeople regularly behave incontinently. After listing some further puzzles,Aristotle identifies some possible equivocations in key terms an d makes somecrucial distinctions. First, with respect to kinds of knowledge, knowledge mayeitherbe of a universal premise or of a particular premise in a practical syllogism. Second, with respect towaysin which someth ing may be known, a person may have knowledge in the sense of actually using it or one may have itandnot be using it; the knowledge isthen merely dispositional. With thesedist inct ion s, Aristotle is in a position to offer his own analysis of incontinence.Th eincontinentperson is aware of two universal premises, such as

(1) Sweet things ought not to be tasted.(2) Tasting sweet things is pleasant.

Heis also aware of a particular proposition, such as(3) This is sweet.

Driven by a stron g appetite for pleasure, the incontin ent person is led tosubsume (3) u nder (2), and consequently he eats the cake. Thus (1),thoughh e has knowledge of it, remains do rm an t. Aristotle thenconcludesthe discussion by rem arkin g that the position Socrates sought to establishactually seems to result. 49 Although Aristotle, unlike Socrates, recognizesthe possibility of incon tinence, his account is such that the incontin entperson does not act against what he actually judges best but rather hisknowledge of a universal premise remains merely dispositional and doesnotcome into play in this practicalsyllogism.Although Aristotle disagreeswith the Socratic position about the possibility of incontinence,he believesheis able to accommodate Socrates's central insight in his solution.

Aristotle's dialectical procedure in scientific inquiry,then,involves (1)a sensitivity to equivocation in key term s in compet ing answers to some

46. My description of Aristotle's methodfollowsclosely that of MichaelFerejohn, TheOrigins ofA stotelianScience (New Haven,Conn.:YaleUniversity Press,1991), pp. 5455. See also J. D. G. Evans,A stotle's ConceptofDialectic(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1977), especially chap. 3; and Owen, Tithenai taPhainomena.47. AristotleNicomachean Ethics,7.2, 1145b2223.48.AristotleNicomachean Ethics,7.2, 1145b2728.49. AristotleNicomacheanEthics, 7.3, 1147bl516.


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A Q U I N ASS ARISTOTELIAN COMMENTARIES 53difficulty; (2) recognition that the solution lies in some more adequategraspof the sense of certain key terms; (3) a presumption that thelessthanadequate opinions nevertheless have some partial insight into the fullanswer; and (4) an attempt to show that the partial insight of other answersis included in, though superseded by, that of thefullanswer. Such a procedure helps bring conviction on the part of disputants, for they see how theyhave grasped the truth, albeit partially.Translated into the thirteenth century context of the disputed quest ion, the Aristotelian strategy becomes a powerful andwidely applicableprocedure for dealing with conflicting authoritative claims. A survey ofAquinas s responses to objections from authoritativesayingsshowsit is onewhich he employs ubiquitously.50

We find in Aquinas, then, a fruitful fusion of two traditions. On the oneh a nd , he inherited the Christian, Abelardian tradition, which founds inquiry within a discipline on authorities, identifies questions where there isan apparent conflict between authoritative claims, andseeks resolution byharmonizing authorities. On the other hand, Aquinas adopted and adaptedthe Aristotelian tradition of dialectical inquiry beginning from v ,which emphasizes attention to the possible equivocality of key terms incompeting opinions andseeks an adequate understanding of key notionswhich will resolve difficulties and enable one to understand v aspartial or perhapsvagueanticipations of thewhollyadequate account.One feature of Aquinas s Aristotelian approach is particularly importantfor our concerns. In some cases, reconciliation of a position with an authoritativesayingmay require finding a sense of the words of a writer or speakerwhich he or she did notfullyrealize. In reconciling his own account of incontinence with Socrates sview,Aristotle claims that the incontinent man doesn otact against his knowledge because the relevant piece of knowledge is universal,whereas practical judgment is of particulars, and it remains merely dispositional in this case. But these are distinctions which Socrates did not makewith respect to his claim. Thus, the harmonization of Aristotle sanalysiswithSocrates s claim requires that we attribute to Socrates s words an understanding which Socrates did not share and this implies some distinction be

50.In a survey of the first fiveq uestionsofparts 1, 12, and 3 of the S u m m atheologae, I found thirty nine objections in whichanonscriptural authorityiscitedand convincingly read asop posing theposition Aquinas adopts (I discoun ted(1)scriptural citations, for these are complicated by the great number of possiblesenses of a divinely revealed text; (2) obviously sophistical arguments, whicharebased on a clear misconstrual of an authoritative statement, which Aquinasdismisses summarily; and (3) cases in which theauthorityis cited only to supp ortapremiseof acontrary argumen tbut doesnot explicitly op po se Aquinas's position.)In all of hisresponseswefindtheelemen tsof an Aristotelian ap pr oach :he pointsout apossible equivocation in theauthoritative statem ent;he distinguishes two orm ore sensesofthe termorphra sein qu estion;and heargues t ha t altho ugh,iftakenin one way, the authoritative statement seems opposed to his position, takeninanotherway it can be fullyreconciled withhis view.


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54 JOHN JENKINStween a speaker's understandin g of the claims the speaker makes and anotherun derstan ding which the speaker did no tfullygrasp.

I nhis own writings Aquinas presupposes the same distinction betweenaspeaker's understan din g and a fuller account. This distinction, I shall nowargue, was further justified an d clarified by otherviewsAquinas held.

ExternalismAccording to Aquinas, general termssignify common natures, or quiddities51through aratio,or idea,52which is an apprehension of the intelligiblestructure of the essence, or quiddity.53 The definition of a term expressesthequiddity.54When someonefullyapprehends a quiddity, he or she graspsandis able togiveits proper definition.

Aquinas recognizes, however, that it is possible and even common fora subject to have an imperfect grasp of th e quiddity signified by the termsthesubject uses. F or instance, in his comm entary on the Apostles' Creed,Aquinas writes that our understan din g is so weak that no philosopher hasever been able fully to discover by investigation th e nature of a single fly;and it is said that one philosopher spent thirty years in solitude that hemight un derstand the nature of a bee. 55When someone's understanding is imperfect, he does notfully graspthe quiddity and his understanding is not expressed by a definition whichmakes clear the essence (which wewillcall anessentialdefinition). However,he does have some grasp of the quiddity, and this understanding is expressed by a definition which refers to common, salient at tributes (whichwe will call anominal definition). In the case of fire, for example, Aquinastells us that we can be ignorant of the substantial difference of its properdefinition, and must allow hot, dry body a definition which employsproper accidentsto stand in as th e definition of fire. 56And in anotherplace he writes, Nevertheless because substantial forms, unkn own to us ofthemselves, are known th rough their accidents, th ere is no difficulty withsometimes using accidents in place of substantial differences. 57 In a nominal definition, the proper accidents are used as effects of the substantialforms, and as making these forms known [manifestanteas]. 5SWhen the

51.ST1.30.4.52.ST1.13.1.53.T h o m a sAquinasExpositiosuperlibrum Boethiidet nitate5.2;ST1.85.1,ad 1an d2.54.ST1.29.2.5 5 . T h o m a s A q u i n a s In symbolumapostolorum,prologus,864, inOpusculatheologica,vol. II( R o m e :Marietti , 1954).56 .ST1.29.1,ad357.ST1.77.1,ad7.58.ST1.29.1,ad3.


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AQUINAS'S ARISTOTELIAN COMMENTARIES 5effects of a form are used in a nominal definition, there is some referenceto the form which is the cause; such definitions are implicitly or explicitlyreference-involving.59

Implicit in these and other passages is a view which has been dubbedexternalismin recent literature.60 The thought experiment which has beenused to motivate this doctrine, and which we can use to illustrate it, turnson precisely the sort of partial or imperfect understanding of a conceptor natu re which Aquinas discusses in the passages jus t c ited.61 Imaginethe following: Catherine lives on earth and has a twin living in a worldextremely similar to earth.62 The only difference between the respectiveworlds is that whereas on earth the liquid in oceans, lakes, and rivers isH 2O, in twin-Catherine's twin-earth the clear, colorless, tasteless liquid inoceans, lakes, and rivers is indistinguishable from H 2O to ordinary ob-servation but is in fact a different compound (or elem ent), which we willcall XYZ. Otherwise, the worlds are as similar as possible, and this simi-larity extends to the respective internal states of Catherine and twin-Cath-erine, which are taken to include bodily states, proximate sensory stimuli,and behavioral dispositions.Externalism is a doc trine which consists of two distinguishable bu t notindependent theses, the first of which issemantic externalism. In the twinworlds described, both Catherine and twin-Catherine call the respectiveliquids in lakes and oceans in their respective worlds 'water', their experi-ences of the respective liquids is indistinguishable, and the nominal defini-tion of each of the respective liquids is (let us say) 'a certain transparent,colorless, tasteless liquid '. Still, 'water' m eans som ething different for each:for Catherine it is H 2O, and for twin-Catherine it is XYZ. The meaning of'water', then, depends on the sort of liquid in the speaker's environmentand not solely on the speaker's internal states. Semantic externalism is the

59.For a fuller exposition of Aquinas's views on nominal definitions and for amore detailed argument that Aquinas espoused what we callexternalismbelow, seemy Aquinas on the Veracity of the Intellect, The Journalo fPhilosophy,88 (Novem-ber 1991): 623-32, and Good and the Object of Natural Inclinations in St. Thom asAquinas, Medieval PhilosophyandTheology,3 (1993): 62-96.60.Among the most imp ortan t articles are Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of'Meaning', inMind Language, andReality(New York: Cambridge University Press,1975);Tyler Burge, Individualism and the Mental, ed. P. French, T. Vehling, andH. W ettstein,Midwest StudiesinPhilosophy,vol. 4 (Minneapolis: University of Minne-sota Press, 1979), pp. 73-121; Other Bodies, in Thought andObject ed. AndrewWoodfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp . 97-120; and IntellectualNorms and Foundations of Mind, JournalofPhilosophy83 (1986): 697-720; ColinMcGinn, The Structure of Content, inThoughtandObject pp . 207-68; andMental ontent(New York: Blackwell, 1989).61. Tyler Burge , in a clear and illuminating discussion in Individualism andthe M ental, argues that the possibility of imperfect understand ing of a concept bycom peten t language users is what is key to ex ternalist argum ents.62.These worlds may be im agined to be actual worlds in different parts of theuniverse, or one or both may be thought to be merely possible.


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56 JOHN JENKINSthesis that the meaning or signification of certain terms (though certainlynot all terms) of a speaker or linguistic community depend partially on thespeaker ' s or community ' s environment .

Semantic externalism implies a second externalist thesis,mental contentexternalism.Since the m ean ing of 'water ' for Cath er ine de pe nd s on thenature of the l iquid in her environment, the individuation of Cather ine 'sbeliefs, desires, intentions, and other contentful mental states, which in-clude the concept of water , also depend par t ial ly on her environment.Catherine's belief that water is good to drink is a different belief fromtwin -Cathe rine's belief that water is go od to drink , for th e form er is a beliefabout H 2 O an d the lat ter abo ut XYZ. M ental con ten t externalism is thethesis that the individuation of some ( though not al l) contentful mentals tates of a subject de pe nd par tially on the subject 's env iron m ent. 6 3It will be helpful for the ensuing discussion to introduce certain terms,some of which do not have a clear correlate in Aquinas's writing. Neverthe-less, though cer tain terms may not be found, the dis t inctions they help usmake are implici t there. When we assign a meaning to a cer tain speaker 'ssentence, we implicitly attr ibute to the speaker the mastery of certain con-ceptsor, to use mor e Thom istic langu age, we attr ibute the a pp reh ens ion ofcer tainrationes.We can only suppose that C athe r ine m eaningfully asserts thatwater is good to drink, and is not simply uttering nonsensical sounds, if wesuppose that she is a competent English speaker who has grasped the con-cepts ofwater good and dunking. In a case of imperfect understanding, thespea ker 's grasp of a co nc ep t falls sho rt of full app reh en sio n bu t is sufficientfor competent use of the term in ordinary s i tuations. Thus we must dis t in-guish between theconceptof, say, water, which is its full esse nc e or ratio,and aspeaker 's conceptionof water , which is he r u nd ers tan din g of the con cep twhich is expressed in a nominal definition. Although it is somewhat of anoversimplif ication, we will suppose that a speak er 's conc eptio n is d ete rm ine dstr ictly by cond it ions inte rna l to the speaker a nd no t by the en viron m ent. Forexam ple, wh en Ca ther in e und ersta nd s water as 'a cer tain transp aren t, color-less, tasteless l iquid ' , he r ap pre he nsi on of these sensible predicates , unlikethat of the natural kind of water , does not depend on the external environ-ment. The conception, then, gives us the subject 's understanding, whichdepends on internal factors of the subject individualistically considered andno t on external , environm enta l con di t ions .6 4

63.We do n ot he re take up the question of the num ber and kinds of terms forwhich externalism is true. Natural kind terms, such as 'water', are clear examples.Elsewhere I have argued that for Aquinas, 'good' is an externalist term (see my Good and the Object of Natural Inclinations ). But many other terms, such asterms for sensible forms, are not, I would argue, externally determ ined .64.The oversimplification lies in supposing that a speaker's conception of anexternalist concept F is always internally determined. It may be that in some casesa speaker's conception itself includes another externalist concept G. In this case,however, we can replace that concept G by the speaker's conception of G and thusidentify the speaker's interna l, individualistic understand ing of the concept F.


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AQU INAS'S ARISTOT ELIAN COMMENTARIES 57When a speaker utters a sentence which involves the mastery of con-cepts of which her concep tion is only partial, the m eaning of her sentenceis externally determ ined. Thus, we can distinguishtwo componentsofmeaning.

first, there is the speaker's understanding, constituted by her conceptions;second, there is the full meaning, constituted by the concepts involved.Similarly, in ascribing a propositional attitude, such as a thought or desire,we can distinguish tw ocomponents ofmentalcontentthe re is the subject'sunderstanding of the con tent, determ ined by her conceptions; and the re isthe full understanding, determined by the concepts.65Most relevant to our present concerns are the implications of theseexternalist doctrines for interpretation. Given the dual-component ac-count of meaning and mental content, interpretation becomes a twofoldtask. If I am fully to understand Catherine's thoughts and claims aboutwater, then I must not only consider her conceptions; I must also considerthe concepts, the natures of the things in her environment, as I can bestdetermine these. Full interpretation, then, requires not only that I attemptto clarify what is in Catherine's head, as it were, but also that I constructthe best theory I can about what is in her environment. In this account,interpretation brings the effort to discern what a subject is thinking orsaying together with the effort to construct an adequate theory of thenatures or essences about which he or she is thinking or talking. And inthe latter effort it may be that I will arrive at an account which is superiorto the subject's understanding, and thus I may be said to know what heor she is talking and thinking about better than he or she does. Forexample, if I can distinguish H 2O from XYZ, I can make distinctions re-garding the thoughts and claims of the two Catherines which they them-selves were unable to make.The implications of Aquinas's externalism for his interpretation ofAristotle are perhaps apparent. Since Aquinas was an externalist with re-spect to semantics and mental content, he held that interpreting Aris-totle's thoughts and words required not only that he elucidate Aristotle'sunderstanding, as this is individualistically considered, but also that hebring in the best available account, as he could determine this by hisown lights, of the issues which Aristotle discussed. Thus we see how forAquinas the exegetical concern to make clear what was in Aristotle's headwas join ed with the effort to construct an adequate theory of the matterswhich Aristotle discussed. We have, then, the beginning of a rationalefor the presence of constructive as well as exegetical elements in the Ar-istotelian commentaries. However, more needs to be said about Aquinas'sstrategies in these works, and in the next section I will show how ourclaims enable us to deal with the problematic passages discussed in sec-tion I.

65. For this term and for a clear discussion of a dual-component account ofconten t, I am indebted to McGinn, Structure of Content.


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58 JOHN JENKINS

The sort of interpretation one gives of the sentences of agiven speakerdepends on one's purposes in the particular context. Full interpretation, asdefined by dual component accounts of meaning and mental content,could onlyserveas a distant ideal of interpretation and not as a practicalgoal of Aquinas's commentaries. Elucidation of all the essential definitionsandconcepts involved would require final knowledge of Aristotle's sciences,thecompletion of all inquiry in these areas. In the commentaries, Aquinaswas not interested in ending inquiry, but on the contrary, he wanted toin t roduce his readers to Aristotle so that they could fruitfully employ thisauthorityin their own inquiries. In this effort, I contend, his strategy was toteachhis readers about Aristotle's own individualistic understandingthefirstcomponent of meaning and mental contentof theissues discussed.Yet he also wanted tosuggestor show thewaysin which Aristotle's words areope n to, and can be incorporated in, a fuller and more adequate understandingthe second component of meaning and content. A full accountof key concepts is the work of further inquiries, and we should not expectAquinas togive it here. Still, he was interested in showing how Aristotle'swords may be open to this full account which may be further clarified in theinquiries of teachers and students. I shall now attempt to use the principlesidentified to make sense of the problematicpassagesdiscussed above.

Nicomachean Ethics 10.7 and 8 S u m m a theologae2 1.3.6,Aquinas asks wh eth er bea t i tu de consists incons iderat ion of thespecu lative scienc es. Aqu ina s's C hristianview is t h a th u m a n beat i tude consis ts in the fullvision ofG od 's essence inheaven,buth e m ust con te n d with Aristot le 's po sit ion, c i tedin the firsto bject ion of thisar t ic le , that human beat i tude cons is ts in activity according tovirtue,andamo ng these are the intellectual virtues of science, wisdom, and u n d e r s tanding , which per ta intocons iderat ionof th especulative science s.

Aquinas responds that theP hi losoph er speaksin theb o o koft h eE thicsab ou t im p erfec t felicity, anda b o u thow it can bea t t a inedinthis life. 6 6 Th isimper fec t bea t i tu de is a cer ta in par t ic ipat ion in the t r u e and perfec tb e a t i t u d e , 6 7andth us Aristo t le ' s un de rs tan din gofbea t i tu deis notinco mpat ib le wi th Aquinas ' s Chris t ian unders tanding .But, ofcou rse ,we do notfind the imp erfect perfect bea t i tu de dis t inct ion clearly expressed in Aristo t le 's texts . Aris tot le recognizes that human beat i tudeinthislife is im per fect in several ways,68 but he do es not speak straightforwardly ab ou t a

66. S T11.3.6. ad 1.67.ST12.3.6.68. Aristotle N icom achean Ethics1.11,1101a20 21.


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AQ UINA S'S ARISTO TELIAN COMMENTARIES 59perfect beatitude in an afterlife.69 Aquinas can m ake such a distinction withrespect to Aristotle's text, and thus reconcile Aristotle's claims to his own,only by attributing a sense to hum an beatitude which Aristotle did not, orat least did not clearly, recognize.When Aquinas comments on Aristotle's discussion of beatitude andcontem plation in the tenth book of theEthics,h e m akes clear, as best he can,Aristotle's own individualistic understanding of the key concepts beatitude,separate, and divine. However, he also suggests to the reader ways in whichAristotle's words are open to an understanding which Aristotle did notclearly express or even fully recognize. His comments indicate to his audi-ence the ways in which a fuller understand ing of Aristotle's key concep ts ispossible, given their m etaphysical and religious convictions, and thus showsthem how to incorpora te Aristotle's claims in their own inquiries.

M etaphysics 12 9Inthe key passage in A quinas's gloss (which is quoted above), Aquinas tellsus what Aristotle claims ( The Philosopher intends to show . . . ) and thengoes on to tell us what does and does not follow from his claim ( It is evidentthat . . . ) . It is left unclear whether or not Aquinas thought that Aristotleunderstood the consequences of his claim. Given Aquinas's herm eneu ticalprinciples, however, whether or not Aristotle understood these conse-quences, they are still implied by the text. Aristotle had an understandingof the concep t of God and of divine activity, and he did see that this divineactivity consists in a thinking on thinking. Whether or not his under-standing was limited to this, the full grasp of the concept of divine activitywould include an apprehension that in thinking on Himself,God knows allother things. Thus the full meaning of Aristotle's claim that God's activityis a thinking on thinking implies that God knows othe r things, whether ornot the speaker's individualistic understanding includes this implication.Aquinas here does not show great concern with determining thespeaker's meaning because, first, the evidence is insufficient. AlthoughAristotle does not explicitly assert the consequence, we cannot definitivelyrule out his recognition of it. Second, this determination is not critical forAquinas's purposes in the comm entary. Aquinas's concern is to help othersread Aristotle so that Aristotle's texts can contribute to their inquiries. Forthis, it is more important that Aquinas show the truth Aristotle's wordssignify rather than determine precisely what Aristotle's understandingwas.70

69.Aquinas draws this conclusion for him Inethica1.16.202), but he does notclearly assert it.70.SeeIn decaelo 1.22.228.


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60 JOHN JENKINSMetaphysics 2.1Thispassage is the most difficult to account for, for Aquinas attributes toAristotle the doctrine of a cause of being on thebasisof onepassagealone,though Aristotle does not introduce this notion anywhere else. And, Aquinas gives no indication that this is an account of thefull meaning and isdistinct from that of the speaker's understanding. Indeed, he claims thatAristotle expresslysays that the First Mover is the cause of the being, andn o tjustthe motion, of other things.

I t may be that the polemical, anti Aristotelian con text of Paris in theearly 1270sled Aquinas togivea tendentious reading of this passage. Still,givenhis hermeneutical principles, his reading is defensible.

Aquinas believed that the discovery of causes was gradual among theancientphilosophers. The earliest considered only the causes of accidentalchanges and for them all becoming was alteration. Subsequently, naturalphilosophers came to understand substantial change. Finally, Plato andAristotle discovered the causality of the principle of all being. 71 In anotherwork, Aquinas saysthat Plato did n otfullygrasp the notion of a creationexnihilo,for his first principle made the world from preexisting matter.72Aristotle did discover the notion of creation exnihilo,but onlyvaguely.Hemistakenly thought that G od's creation was from eternity. And althoughthis sort of causality could not be what he calls amotio,it isleft to Aquinastolabel it aneminatioand to describe it.73

I tseems, then , that Aristotle might have hit on the notion of a cause ofbeing, but he understood it onlyvaguelyand with an adm ixture of manyerrors. 74If we are right that Aquinas em braced a dual component accountof meaning, this is understandable. On this account, a speaker may be saidtohave acquired the concept ofF ,even though his or her understanding ofF isseverely limited, for the speaker's concepts and the meaning of his orh er words is notfixedby his or her understanding alone but by the natureoressence understood. Such a claim seems to be behind thebeliefthat itwas Joseph Priestly ra th er than Lavoisier who is credited with the discoveryof oxygen, even though Priestly understood pure air in terms of afalsephlogiston theory, dubbed it dephlogistonated air, and had averyminimal understanding of its properties.75Similarly, Aquinas might claim,Aris

71. Inphysica 8.2.975.72 . T h o m a s A q u i n a s Dearticulis fideietecclessiae sacramentisad archiepiscopumPani rmitanum, inLeon ine Ed i t ionofOperaOmnia42,p. 246.73 . Inphysica8.2.988.74.ST1.1.1.75 .Antoine Lavoisier, ofcou rse,was th e one whosepa rat ed this newly iden tified gasfrom ph logiston theo ryandgaveitth e n a m ep ncipe oxigine,whichh elatershor tened tooxygene. Although heclaim edtoha ve discovered oxygen, hisclaimisn o t recognized. SeeJ .R.P ar t ing ton ,A ShortHistoryofChemistry (Lo nd on : M acmillan, 1957),p. 129.


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AQUINAS S ARISTOTELIANCOMMENTARIES 61totlegrasped the notion of a cause of being in the briefpassageinMetaphysics2.1, even though his understanding of it wasvague and in manywaysmistaken. Nevertheless, Aquinas's principles of interpretation help us tounderstand his attribution of this understanding to Aristotle.

IV

Inthe epigraph, Aquinas states that in his commentary on thePe hermeneiash etried to provide an exposition of Aristotle's difficult text which would beuseful both to the more and to the less advanced. In their attempt tounderstand these commentaries, appropriationists and historicists bothseem to accept anexclusivedisjunction: either Aquinas was givingus hisownviewson ethics, physics, metaphysics, and so on, or, prescinding fromjudgment, he was simply trying to understand Aristotle's thoughts on thesematters.Since both sides can point topassagesin which Aquinas is clearlydoing one or the other, both can use this disjunction to marshal an argum e n tfor their position.H e re ,I have argued that the common premise ofthese two camps is mistaken. Aquinas's dialectical approach to authoritiesan d his externalism led him to hermeneutical principles which requiredt ha t in order to elucidate Aristotle's texts, he must both make clearAristotle's individualistic understandingandconstruct, or at leastsuggest,thebest account of the matter under discussion. In this way, Aquinas thought,h ecould provide expositions of Aristotle's texts which would be most usefulfor his readers' dialectical inquiries.

Although Aquinas adapted and refined Aristotle's procedures, he was,in commenting on Aristotle, following Aristotle's example. In hisglossonAristotle's discussion of the teachings of Anaxagoras, Aquinas explains thatAnaxagoras's more subtle doctrine can be found if. . . oneseeksdiligently[tostate] clearly and manifestly what Anaxagoras 'wishesto say', i.e., whathis intellect tended toward, but he was unable to express. 76Similarly, in thecommentaries Aquinas often sought to be true to Aristotle's text by presenting not only what Aristotle understood but also what his intellect tendedtoward, as Aquinas understood this by his own best lights. And Aquinas'sbest lights included both what he took as the insights of his own metaphysicsaswellas what he knew by the light of Christian faith.

If my major thesis is correct, there are implications for the pivotalquestion of the relationship of Aquinas's thought to Aristotle. Whereasappropriationistsbelievethey can find in Aquinas's writings strictly philosophical doctrines which can in turnbe identified with Aristotle's, historicists tend to draw a more orlesssharp distinction between the thought ofAquinas and that of Aristotle.Jo r da n ,for instance, recently remarked, How

76.Inmeta.1.12.196.


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62 JOHNJEN KINSunhappy it is . . . in how manyways,to allege that Thomas himself is aphilosopher of something called 'Aristotelianism.' '7'7 But if we have correctly identified Aquinas's hermeneutical principles, Aristotelianism becomes more flexible, and Aquinas could have both recognized thelimitations of Aristotle's teachings and still have considered himself to haveincorporatedthem in his own, and thus to be an Aristotelian. But this is atopicfor another time.

77. Jord an ,AllegedA stotelianismof Thomas Aquinas, p. 41.

Jenkins J., Expositions of the Text Aquinas’s Aristotelian Commentaries

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