Jean Laherrere 8 July 2017 · WB2016 UN2015 past UN2015 medium IIASA2014 medium UN2004 medium...

1

Jean Laherrere 8 July 2017 UN 2017: fertility, population and oil & gas production per capita The UN have published in June their 2017 population revision. There is no significant change on their world forecast compared to the 2015 revision. The change of the plot is less than the width of the curves

The evolution of UN forecasts since 1963 to 2017 displays a huge range, going up and down

0123456789

101112131415161718

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

popu

latio

n G

year

World population UN2015 & 2017

high 2015

high 2017

medium 2015

medium 2017

low 2015

low 2017

UN2015 past

UN2017 past

Jean Laherrere June 2017

no significant change between UN2017 & UN2015

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1950 2000 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300

wor

ld p

opul

atio

n G

year

UN world population forecast (medium) from 1963 to 2017

UN1963

UN1974

UN1979

UN1982

UN1991

UN1997

UN1998

UN2003

UN2006

UN2008

UN2010

UN2012

UN2015

UN2017


source : UN & Lerindon 2009

2

The UN forecasts since 1963 for 2050 and 2100 display significant variations within plus or minus one billion for the world, but much more for Africa, which is always on the rise!

Population forecast is based on fertility forecast UN2017 did not change world fertility significantly compared to UN2015 Forecasts are given with 5 ridiculous decimals, far beyond the accuracy of the estimate (only the first decimal could be right) Number of children per woman 2010-2015 2045-2050 2095-2100 UN2017 2.51645 2.24003 1.96567 UN2015 2.51129 2.24850 1.98516 Fertility rate forecasts are political, believing that in the future (2300) all countries should have equal rate being the replacement rate in order to stay flat for ever: it is pure utopia! Fertility rate were always going up and down UN2003 population forecasts were up to 2300, hoping that in 2100 more developed countries should have a fertility rate higher than the least developed countries: again, pure utopia

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

wor

ld p

opul

atio

n m

ediu

m fe

rtili

ty G

year of estimate

world population forecast medium for 2050 & 2100

world PRB for 2050

world UN for 2050

world UN for 2100

Africa UN for 2050

Africa UN for 2100

Europe UN for 2050

Europe UN for 2100


3

Some fertility scenarios were wrong before 2010, more should be beyond 2017

-Europe, Africa & North America The UN population forecasts (1988, 2012 & 2017) for Europe, North America and Africa are striking: in 2100 Africa forecast has doubled since 1998 and has increased significantly since 2012, when Europe and North America did not change since 2012. Europe population will decline after 2025 and Africa population is in a sharp increase.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 2125 2150 2175 2200

fert

ility

rate

child

ren

per

wom

an

year

world fertility rate UN 2015, IIASA 2014, USCB2007, UN2003 & WB 1988

WB1988

UN2003 medium

USCB2007

IIASA2014

UN2015 medium

UN2015 past

UN2017 past

UN2017 medium


4

The conclusion is that the starting population flood of Africa towards Europe is just a beginning and will continue for many decades. The present migrants were borne 20 years ago and any change today in fertility will not affect the coming decade!

-Country UN2017 has changed every number of UN15, reporting in particular for fertility rate too many decimals compared with the accuracy of the estimate.

-Nigeria -population

UN2017 has slightly reduced Nigeria fertility (red) of 2100 compared to UN2015 (blue), but has increased population of 2100! it seems queer, meaning less emigration forecasted at 0.3M in 2100?

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

popu

latio

n M

year

Population UN 2017, 2012 & 1998 for Europe, North America & Africa

Africa 2017

Africa 2012

Africa 1998

Europe 2017

Europe 2012

Europe 1998

North America 2017

North America 2012

North America 1998


5

UN2017 has increased population in 2100 by 42 M from UN2015 752 M to 794 M (against 300 M for UN2004): Europe population for 2100 is estimated only at 650 M. In 2100 Nigeria will be more populated than Europe! I doubt that the situation will be sustainable!

-oil & NG (natural gas) production

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

num

ber o

f chi

ldre

n pe

r wom

an

year

Nigeria fertility rate & forecasts

PRB

UN2017 past

UN2017 medium

WB2016

UN2015 past

UN2015 medium

IIASA2014 medium

UN2004 medium

UN2001 medium


0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

popu

latio

n M

year

Nigeria population past & forecasts

WB1988

NPC 1990

UN2001 medium

UN2004 medium

USCB 2010

IIASA2013 medium

UN2015 medium

UN2015 past

USCB 2016

UN2017 medium

UN2017 past


NPC = National Population Commission

6

More population means more resources needed, in particular more oil and gas production. The creaming curve of oil & natural gas (cumulative backdated 2P discoveries versus the cumulative number of new field wildcats (NFW) or fields) is extrapolated to the double get the ultimate of the countries. For Nigeria, the first creaming curve (vs NFW) is extrapolated towards 80 Gb for oil and 42 Gboe (640 Tcf) for NG

The second creaming (vs cumulative number of fields) is extrapolated towards 70 Gb and 40 Gboe.

7

The cumulative 2P discoveries is modelled versus time with both ultimates 70 & 80 Gb and 40 & 42 Gboe. The 70 Gb oil ultimate looks better, as the 40 Gboe for NG

The cumulative oil discovery and production are extrapolated towards an ultimate of 70 Gb.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200

cum

ulat

ive n

umbe

r of N

FW

cum

ulat

ive d

iscov

ery

Gbo

e

cumulative number of fields

Nigeria creaming curve data 1936-2010

1997-2010

1953-1996

O+C Gb

1997-2010

1953-1996

NG Gboe

NFW

Jean Laherrere 2017

8

The remaining oil reserves from different sources show that the present flat current 1P (proved) reserves are higher than the 2P (proven + probable) backdated (present estimate backdated to the discovery year) reserves. These 1P reserves are political, mainly for an OPEC member! Most of the discoveries occurred before 1973.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070

Gb

year

Nigeria cumulative oil discovery & production for ultimate 70 Gb

U = 70 Gb

discovery O+C

U = 70 Gb

produdtion

Jean Laherrere 2017

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Gb

year

Nigeria remaining oil reserves from different sources

backdated 2P

BP 1P

OPEC 1P

OGJ 1P

WO 1P

Jean Laherrere July 2017

9

These 1P are political and furthermore scientifically incorrect: the arithmetic aggregation of proved fields reserves does not represent the proved reserves of the country and the arithmetic of proved country reserves does not represent the proved reserves of the world: arithmetic aggregation underestimates the reality. The so-called “reserves growth” is mainly due to the poor practice of proved reserves. This poor practice is due to the SEC rules in the US, which want to protect the bankers. Bankers want to be sure to recover their loans if the oil company is bankrupted. These proved reserves should not be used for forecasting future production, as it is done by most official agencies. Nigerian crude oil production has sharply declined in 2016 due to attacks on pipelines by NDA (The Niger Delta Avengers), which is a militant group in Nigeria's Niger Delta. They started their attacks in 2016 and they announced more in 2017. On 8 June 2017, the New Delta Avengers declare: “We hereby declare ‘Operation Cripple Oil and Gas Production’ by any means available to us,” he said. “The Federal Government and oil companies – local and multinationals – operating in Delta State are hereby put on notice that effective from midnight, June 30, this year of upheavals 2017, there should be no more oil and gas operations in Delta State.” We assume that the fight will end in the next few years and that production will rise again to a peak around 2030 to a level of 2.5 Mb/d reached in 2005.

The oil peak of 2005 corresponds to a boom (37 G$) of current balances as reported by OPEC, but these balances fell down to negative in 2015.

0,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080

Mb/

d

year

Nigeria annual oil production for an ultimate of 70 Gb

production EIA

U = 70 Gb


Niger Delta Avengers Attacks

10

The Nigeria oil production per capita peaked in 1974 at more than 13 b, but after a plateau 1980-2007 is in 2016 at less than 4 b. The forecast for an ultimate of 70 Gb is that, after a step 2017 to 2025, the decline will continue to reach zero in 2080.

Nigeria oil production per capita is compared to GDP and oil export values: GDP per capita peaked in 2014 around 3000 $. Export values per capita peaked in 2011 around 600 $.

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

0,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

curr

ent b

alan

ces G

$

Mb/

d

year

Nigeria annual oil production & current balances

Mb/d EIA

current balances G$


0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080

oil p

rodu

ctio

n pe

r cap

ita b

year

Nigeria annual oil production per capita

prod /cap b

U=70 Gb


11

Despite large oil reserves, Nigeria future is bleak for several reasons: corruption, civil wars and galloping demography.

-Niger Niger has the world highest fertility rate to day over 7.5 children per woman, when in 2008 the UN medium forecast was below 7. But Boko Haram attacks girls going to school and fertility rate depends mainly on the female education.

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040

GPD

/cap

& ex

port

s val

ues/c

ap $

oil p

rodu

ctio

n pe

r cap

ita b

year

Nigeria annual oil productio, exports values & GPD (current $) per capita

prod /cap b

U=70 Gb

GPD /cap $

export/cap $


Niger Delta Avengers Attacks

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

num

ber o

f chi

ldre

n pe

r wom

an

year

Niger fertility rate

CIAWBPRBUN2017 pastUN2015 pastUN2017 mediumUN2015 mediumUN2008 mediumUN2003 mediumUN2000 medium


12

UN2017 forecasts a rate of 2.5 children per woman in 2100, leading to a Niger population of over 190 M compared to the present 20 M: it means almost 10 times more: it is impossible to keep all these population in Africa and it means large emigration towards Europe!

-Russia At the collapse of USSR in 1991, Russia was in deep trouble because low birth rate and high death rate as shown by the Wikipedia graph

0

30

60

90

120

150

180

210

240

270

300

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

popu

alat

ion

M

year

Niger population & forecasts

UN2017 past

UN2017 medium fertility

UN2015 high fertlity

UN2015 medium fertility

UN2003 medium

UN2000 medium

UN2015 past


13

But since 2000 from a low of 1.2 children per woman, fertility rate is on the rise

0,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

3,5

4,0

4,5

5,0

5,5

6,0

6,5

7,0

7,5

1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100

num

ber o

f chi

ldre

n pe

r wom

an

year

Russia fertility rate

PRBUN2017 pastUN2015 past + rand.orgUN2017 mediumUN2015 mediumIIASA2014 mediumUN2003 mediumUN2001 medium


14

The past population forecasts were chaotic, as the present one with the inclusion of Crimea not reported by the UN. UN 2017 for 2100 is 7 M higher than UN2015. Rosstat is much more optimistic with 147 M in 2050 against 133 M for UN2017 and 129 M for UN 2015!

-Russia oil and NG production The problem in Russia is that there is another classification of reserves introduced by Khalimov in 1979 estimating the reserves as ABC1 (assumed to be the best method in the world). The same Khalimov in 1993 stated that ABC1 were grossly exaggerated, because using the maximum recovery factor and ignoring economics. -Khalimov E.M., M.V.Feign 1979 "The principles of classification and oil resources estimation" WPC Bucharest, Heyden London 1980 p263-268 -Khalimov E.M., 1993, "Classification of oil reserves and resources in the Former Soviet Union" AAPG 77/9 Sept p.1636 The classification used by oil & gas major companies is the SPE/ PMRS where 2P (proved +probable) reserves are used to estimate the NPV Net Present Value when deciding the development of a field Gazprom in their annual reports was the only oil and gas company reporting ABC1 and 2P data after an “occidental” audit. The ratio 2P/ABC1 has varied since 2000 and presently is around 0.7.

100

110

120

130

140

150

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

popu

latio

n M

year

Russia population & forecasts

UN2001 medium

UN2004 medium

OECDstat

UN 2012 medium

rosstat2015

IIASA2015

gks.ru/B14 medium

UN2015 past

UN2015 medium

UN2017 past

UN2017 medium


2015 Crimea +2,6 M

15

Taking 2P/ABC1 of 0.75 for oil and 0.7 for NG the creaming curve are extrapolated towards an ultimate of 240 Gb for oil and 300 Gboe (1800 Tcf) for NG.

-Russia oil production The cumulative crude oil +condensate production (EIA includes condensate with crude oil because in the US most of the times they are measured together in the tank of millions of producing wells, when IEA includes or not condensate with crude oil following the way

0,0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

0,9

1,0

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

2P/A

BC1

year

Gazprom reserves ratio: 2P/ ABC1

crude oil 2P/ABC1

gas 2P/ABC1

condensate 2P/ABC1


0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 5500 6000

cum

ulai

tve d

iscov

ery

Gbo

e


Russia oil & gas creaming curve 1864-2012

G ABC1 Tcf/6

U = 1800 Tcf =300 Gboe

2P gas = 0,7*ABC1

O+C ABC1 Gb

U = 240 Gb

2P = 0,75*ABC1

Jean Laherrere 2016

16

condensate is sold either with crude either with NGL) is extrapolated towards 240 Gb as cumulative 2P discoveries. The difference provides the remaining 2P reserves

In 2016, I have already studied Russia together with Saudi Arabia and US. -Laherrere J.H. 2016 « World, US, Saudi Arabia, Russia & UK oil production & reserves -Comments on Rystad 2016 world reserves » August https://aspofrance.org/2016/08/11/world-us-saudi-arabia-russia-uk-oil-production- reserves-august-2016-jean-laherrere/ Russia remaining oil reserves varies widely with sources. The backdated 2P (green) decline since 1982, when the current 1P are on the rise except BP2017 and BP2015, but BP2014 is rising as other sources OGJ, EIA and WO

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

250

1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

crud

e oi

l + co

nden

sate

Gb

year

Russia cumulative discovery 2P = 0,75 ABC1 & oil production

U=240 Gb

O+C ABC1*0,75

U=240 Gb

CP

2P reserves

forecast

Jean Laherrere May 2017

17

Russia crude oil production is extrapolated for an ultimate of 240 Gb, showing a second peak (after the oil peak of 1988 at 11.5 Mb/d) in 2017 about 10.5 Mb/d. The decline after the second peak looks symmetrical with the rise since the trough of 1995

-Russia NG production From the creaming curve NG ultimate was estimated around 1800 Tcf, value which is confirmed by the Hubbert linearization of NG production on the period 2000-2016.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

rem

aini

ng re

serv

es G

b

year

Russia remaining oil reserves from different sources

2P= 0.75 ABC2

1P EIA/OGJ

1P WO

1P BP2017

1P BP2015

1P BP2014

1P BP2013

1P BP2012

1P BP2010

1P BP2008


Romashkino

Fedorovo

Samotlor

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

650

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1930 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 2050 2070

crud

e oi

l pro

duct

ion

Mt

crud

e oi

l pro

duct

ion

Mb/

d

year

Russia crude oil production & forecast for U=240 Gb as IEA/ WEO & EIA/IEO

WEO2016 NP

WEO2015 NP

WEO2014 NP

WEO2013 NP

IEO2016

liquids EIA

BP 2016

U = 240 Gb

crude oil

Enerdata Mt


18

Russia NG remaining reserves vary with sources. 2P=0.7 ABC1 declines since 1988 after a peak around 1300 Tcf 1P reserves from EIA/OGJ are flat since 1992 about 1700 Tcf, WO (World Oil magazine) went high in 2002 but returned back to flat, as BP 2007, but BP2017 is flat around 1100 Tcf, with no explanation except, as for oil reserves, the ousting of BP operator out of Russia changed their mind on reserves, showing that published reserves are political and not technical! But BP 2017 is partially right: EIA published Russia NG reserves are too high, but wrong by keeping them flat: Russia NG reserves are on decline. Furthermore, Arctic NG discoveries (like Stokman) are not presently economical.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800

aP/C

P %

cumulative NG production

Russia NG production: Hubbert linearization

ap/CP%

2000-2016


19

BP reports badly oil & gas reserves, in particular for UK and Russia Russia NG reserves were from 1999 to 2007 above 45 Tcf, from 2008 to 2012 between 40 and 45 Tcf and since 2013 between 30 and 35 Tcf It is hard to explain the behavior of BP on Russia oil reserves except that TNK-BP founded in 2003 with BP operator was brought by Rosneft in 2012. BP is now having interests in Rosneft but does not operate in Russia anymore.

0

300

600

900

1200

1500

1800

2100

2400

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

NG

rese

rves

Tcf

year

Russia natural gas remaining reserves from different sources

2P = 0.7*ABC1

WO 1P

CEDIGAZ 1P

OGJ/EIA 1P

BP2007 1P

BP2017 1P


883

1 059

1 236

1 412

1 589

1 765

25

30

35

40

45

50

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

Tcf

prov

ed N

G r

eser

ves

T.m

3

year

Russia: evolution of NG reserves from BP1999 to BP2017BP1999

BP2000

BP2001

BP2002

BP2003

BP2004

BP2005

BP2006

BP2007

BP2008

BP2009

BP2010

BP2011

BP2012

BP2013

BP2014

BP2015

BP2016

BP2017Jean Laherrere July 2017

20

Russia NG production is extrapolated with an ultimate of 1800 Tcf with a peak around 2025 about 25 Tcf: the previous peak was in 1990 at 23 Tcf.

NG forecasts by IEA (WEO2011 to WEO2016) displays rising production with no peak before 2040, but the wide range shows that IEA is uncertain and the last WEO2016 is much less for 2040 than WEO2012. IEA NG production forecasts for 2050 based on too optimistic reserves are wrong Russia oil & NG production in Gboe & forecasts are displayed with population In 2016 oil production equals NG production with the equivalence in energy 1 Gboe = 6 Tcf, it is not true in value.

0

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

27

30

33

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070

annu

al p

rodu

ctio

n Tc

f

year

Russia natural gas production & forecast for U= 1800 Tcf = 50 T.m3

U = 1800 Tcf EIA gross-reinjected BP EnerdataWEO2011WEO2012WEO2013WEO2014WEO2015WEO2016Gazprom


21

The oil & NG production per capita shows a peak at 55 boe in 2020 as the first peak in 1988

The decline after 2020 to 2050 is sharp, as was the rise 1960-1988, the production per capita in 2050 will be the same as in 1965. In the long-term oil & NG Russia future is bleak! Russia ruble depends very much on the value of the oil price. Since 2014 the correlation of the daily value of the ruble/dollar correlates very well with the oil price = WTI when multiplied by -1

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

popu

latio

n M

annu

al p

rodu

ctio

n G

boe

year

Russia oil & NG production, population & forecasts

U = 540 Gboe

oil & NG

U = 300 Gboe

NG Gboe

U = 240 Gb

crude oil Gb

UN2017 medium

population M


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

prod

uctio

n pz

er ca

pita

boe

year

Russia oil & NG production per capita

forecast

oil&NG/cap boe


22

Since 2014, the monthly value correlates better between the oil price and the USD/RUB

Since 2004 the daily WTI correlates very well with the US dollar value (major currencies) multiplied by -1 and shifted by 30 days. This correlation stopped in November 2016 when Saudi Arabia decided to cut production as Russia, but today the two curves seems to be back again.

-85

-75

-65

-55

-45

-35

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

1 January 2014 1 January 2015 1 January 2016 1 January 2017 1 January 2018

RU

B/U

SD*-

1

WTI

$/b

date

daily WTI & value ruble/dollar *-1

WTI

RUB/USD*-1


0,01

0,012

0,014

0,016

0,018

0,02

0,022

0,024

0,026

0,028

0,03

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

USD

/RU

B

WTI

oil

pric

e $/b

year

monthly oil price & dollar/ruble

WTI $/b

USD/RUB


23

Many analysts claim that WTI oil price decreases when US crude oil storage increases, but plotting the US private stocks of crude oil (green) correlates well with the WTI 13 weeks before (blue). It means that speculators buy oil and store it when oil price is low. Again, the correlation stopped at end 2016 with the Saudi Arabia/Russia cut, but the green curve seems to go down to meet the blue curve

-97

-96

-95

-94

-93

-92

-91

-90

-89

-88

-87

-86

-85

20

30

40

50

60

70

1-janv-2015 1-janv-2016 1-janv-2017 1-janv-2018

nom

inal

maj

or cu

rren

cies

dol

lar i

ndex

*-1

shift

ed 3

0 da

ys

WTI

oil

pric

e $/b

date

US WTI crude oil daily price and dollar value * -1 shifted 30 days

WTI $/b

dollar shift 30 days


http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/summary/indexn96_b.htmhttps://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DCOILWTICO/downloaddata

-115

-105

-95

-85

-75

-65

-55

-45

-35

-25

-15

300

320

340

360

380

400

420

440

460

480

500

520

540

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

WTI

*-1

13

wee

ks b

efor

e

US

priv

ate

stoc

ks c

rude

oil

Mb

year

US weekly private stocks crude oil & WTI *-1 shifted 13 weeks

Weekly U.S. Ending Stocks excluding SPR of Crude Oil "excluding lease stock" Mb

WTI *-1 13 weeks before

Jean Laherrere 7 July 2017

24

-China China population reported by the UN forgets the great famine of 1962 reported by Maddison

China population is forecasted to peak around 2025 at 1440 M. Previous forecasts were too high WB1988 or too low IIASA2014

Recently China present population was stated to be too high by 90 M. The policy of one child led to hiding facts. China statistics are not too reliable. China fertility rate is low and the forecast difficult.

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1950 1960 1970 1980

popu

latio

n M

China: population and great famine 1950-1980

Maddison 2010

UN2015 past

Jean Laherrere Sept 2016

0

150

300

450

600

750

900

1050

1200

1350

1500

1650

1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100

popu

latio

n M

year

China: population & forecasts

UN2017 past

UN2017 medium

UN2015 past

UN2015 medium

Maddison 2010

UN2001 medium

UN2004 medium

IIASA2014 medium

WB1988


25

-India India fertility was high before 1960 around 6 children per woman (it was around 5 for Gapminder 2009) and declined quickly to present 2.5.

India population is forecasted to peak around 2060 at 1.7 G. UN2015 was higher than UN2017

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

num

ber o

f chi

ldre

n pe

r wom

an

year

China: fertility rate

WB2016

PRB

UN2001 medium

IIASA2013 medium

UN2015 past

UN2015 medium

UN2017

UN2017 medium


0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1800 1825 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

num

ber o

f chi

ldre

n pe

r wom

an

year

India fertility rate ourworldindata.org

Gapminder2009

Davis

Mari Bhat

PRB

WB2016

UN2015 past

UN2015 medium

IIASA2014 medium

UN2001 medium

UN2017 past

UN2017 medium


http://www.gapminder.org/documentation/documentation/gapdoc008_v2.pdfhttps://ourworldindia.gov/fertility/

26

The comparison China and India shows that India will catch up China in 2025 at over 1.4 G In 2100 India is forecasted to be over China by more than 500 M! This kind of forecast is highly uncertain.

-Germany Germany fertility rate dropped as a cliff from 1900 to 1925 from 5 to 2 children per woman (France did it slowly from 1770 to 1940). Baby boom in 1960 and baby burst in 1990 at 1.3, presently 1.4.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100

popu

latio

n M

year

India: population & forecasts

www.populstat.info/Asia

WB1988

UN2001 medium

IIASA2014 medium

UN2015 past

UN2015 medium

UN2017 past

UN2017 medium


0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

mill

ion

year

China & India population UN 2017

China

India


27

Germany population peaked in 2004 with a low in 2010 and is forecasted by UN2017 to peak in 2022 at 82.6 M. UN2017 forecasts 71 M in 2100 against 63 M for UN2015. As the fertility rate was about the same, this 8M increase comes from immigration Germany demography is uncertain. UN reports “net migrant” every 5 years with already two peaks in 1990-1995 with 2.7 M and 2015-2020 with 1.9 M UN 2017 optimistic forecasts that immigration will decrease in Germany in the future: they do not look at their forecast of explosion in Africa. UN are blind as they are politically oriented!

0,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

3,5

4,0

4,5

5,0

5,5

1800 1825 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

num

ber o

f chi

ldre

n pe

r wom

an

year

Germany fertility rate

ourworldindata

PRB

UN2003 medium

WB2016

UN2015 past

UN2015 medium

UN2017 past

UN217 medium


https://ourworldindata.org/fertility/

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100

popu

latio

n M

year

Germany: population & forecasts

UN2017 past

UN2017 medium

UN2015 past

UN2015 medium

IIASA2013 medium

UN2004 medium

UN2003 medium

UN2001 medium

WB1988

www.populstat.info/

net migrants 5 yr

net migrants medium


28

-France France was the first country to reduce slowly its fertility rate. The baby boom was short 1947-1962 and high up to 3 with a low in 1990 at 1.7 then a high at 2 in 2010 and a forecast at 1.95 in 2100

France fertility rate is compared with UK for 1950-2100. France was ahead most of the times

Napoleon was able to combat Europe because France population was 30 M against 10 M in UK and 22 M in Germany, but fertility rate was 4.5 in France against 5.5 for UK and Germany

0,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

3,5

4,0

4,5

5,0

5,5

1750 1775 1800 1825 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

num

ber o

f chi

ldre

n pe

r wom

an

year

France: fertility rate

past

INED

UN2015 past

UN2017 past

WB 1988

UN2015 medium

UN2017 medium


1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

fert

ility

rate

: chi

ld p

er w

oman

year

France & UK: fertility rate from UN 2012 & 2017France UN 2012

France UN2017

France UN2012 medium


UK UN2012

UK UN2017

UK UN 2012 medium

UK UN 2017 medium


29

UK catches up France in 1945 and Germany in 1850!

France population will be in 2100 at 74 M for UN2017 against 76 M for UN2015. Past forecasts, as WB1988 or UN2001, were wrong.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200

popu

latio

n m

illio

n

year

France & UK: population, industrial revolution & climate change

France

UK

Germany

Jean Laherrere 2017

Romanwarming

Dark ages

Medievalwarming

Little Ice Age

Modern warming

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

popu

latio

n M

year

France population

Eurostat 2017 reference

Eurostat 2017 no migration

UN2015 medium

Eurostat 2013

UN2004 medium

UN2001 medium

WB1988

UN2015 past

UN2017 past

UN2017 medium

net migrant

forecast


30

Eurostat data includes overseas territories Many claims that poverty has increased in France, in fact poverty (threshold 50%) has declined since 1970 at 12% to a low oscillating between 7 and 8% since 1985. This oscillation of 1% is about the accuracy of the estimate. In fact, poverty is flat since 1985

The inequality (share of revenues for the 1% richest) in France is low compared to US, UK and Germany, only Sweden is below Challenges n°528 28 June 2017

0123456789

101112131415161718

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

pove

rty

rate

%

year

France poverty rate

threshold 60 %

threshold 50 %

Jean Laherrere April 2017

31

-UK UK fertility rate were oscillating between 4 and 6 children per woman from 1550 to 1870 and dropping sharply from 1880 and 1940. Sharp baby boom in 1960 up to 3 and since 1975 below 2.

UK population increased significantly after 2000 because a net migrant of 2 M in the period 2005-2010/ UK population in 2100 will be 81 M for UN2017 against 82 M for UN2015

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100

num

ber o

f chi

ldre

n pe

r wom

an

year

UK fertility rate

ourworldindata.org

PRB

WB2016

UN 2017 past

UN 2017 medium

UN2015 past

UN2015 medium

UN2008

UN2001


0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1800 1825 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

popu

latio

n M

year

UK population & forecastswww.populstat.info

UN 2001

UN 2008

UK Stats 2014

UN 2015 past

UN 2015 medium

UN 2017 past

UN 2017 medium

net migrant

forecast


32

-France & UK France fertility rate is compared with UK for 1950-2100. France was ahead most of the times

Napoleon was able to combat Europe because France population was 30 M against 10 M in UK and 22 M in Germany, but fertility rate was 4.5 in France against 5.5 for UK and Germany. UK population catches up France in 1945 and Germany in 1850!

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

fert

ility

rate

: chi

ld p

er w

oman

year

France & UK: fertility rate from UN 2012 & 2017France UN 2012

France UN2017



UK UN2012

UK UN2017

UK UN 2012 medium

UK UN 2017 medium


0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200

popu

latio

n m

illio

n

year

France & UK: population, industrial revolution & climate change

France

UK

Germany

Jean Laherrere 2017

Romanwarming

Dark ages

Medievalwarming

Little Ice Age

Modern warming

33

As UN reports the annual net migrant only every 5 years, we have multiplied this annual value by 5 in order to see it better. Most migrants stay in UK, 2 M were added annually during the period 2005-2010 it means that during the period 10 M were added, assuming that no one have returned to its original country. It is obvious that UK have overpassed France in 2010 because that attraction of UK for migrants.

-Qatar Qatar is presently a country in the medias: small and rich. Qatar fertility rate has followed the general decline being now around 2: the big problem is that Qataris represent a minority in their country.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

popu

latio

n M

year

France & UK population UN2017

France UN2017 past


France net migrant*5

UK UN 2017 past

UK UN 2017 medium

UK net migrant*5


34

Qatar population is today about 2 M with only 0.7 M of Qataris.

UN2017 forecasts Qatar population in 2100 at 3.8 M against 3.2 for UN2015.

-Qatar creaming curve

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

child

/wom

an

year

Qatar fertility rate

UN 2006 medium

UN 2006 low

PRB

UN2015

UN2015 medium

UN2017

UN2017 medium


0,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

3,5

4,0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

mill

ion

year

Qatar population

UN2017 medium

UN2017

ABS/OPEC

UN2015 medium

UN2015

UN 2006 medium

Qataris

Indians

net migrant UN2017

medium 2017


35

Qatar oil & gas discoveries from IHS 2011 displays a huge jump in 1971 with the discovery of North Field (1000 Tcf gas and 26 Gb condensate). North field drilled in 1971 represents two third d of the world largest gas field called North Dome, the other one third is South Pass in Iran drilled only in 1991.

The creaming curve: cumulative discovery versus cumulative number fields shows that the cumulative discoveries dated 2011 are close to ultimates: around 1000 Tcf for NG, 15 Gb for oil and 40 Gb for oil and condensate

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

cum

ulat

ive g

as d

iscov

ery

Tcf

cum

ulat

ive o

il di

scov

ery

Gb

& fi

eld

year

Qatar oil & gas cumulative discovery

O+C Gb

field

oil Gb

G Tcf


North Field reserves reported 1000 Tcf & 26 Gb condensate could be smaller

36

-Qatar natural gas production Proved NG reserves differ lightly between sources because a poor definition of the year (first for some, and rightly end for others):OPEC seems the most reliable, because there is no quota on NG production. Proved reserves plus cumulative production jumped sharply in 2001 from 11 T.m3 to 26 T.m3

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

cum

ulat

ive g

as d

iscov

ery

Tcf

cum

ulat

ive o

il di

scov

ery

Gb


Qatar oil & gas creaming curve

O+C Gb

oil Gb

G Tcf


NG ultimate 1000 Tcf ?total discovery 1P = 930 Tcf

0

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

cum

ulat

ive n

umbe

r of f

ield

s

G.m

3

year

Qatar natural gas cumulative discovery & production

discovery = backdated 2P

proved reserves + CP

proved reserves BP

proved reserves Cedigaz

proved reserves OPEC

cumul prod

field


North Field 1971

37

OPEC graph on proven NG reserves

The NG proved reserves & cumulative production from OPEC is displayed for Qatar (dark brown) and Iran (light green). Qatar 1P NG reserves jumped in 2001(when North Field was discovered in 1971), when Iran 1P NG reserves shows no jump despite was South Pars was drilled in 1991. The cumulative production +1P is flat since 2001 for Qatar around 26 T.m3 or 900 Tcf when it is flat since 2013 for Iran around 36 T.m3 or 1300 Tcf

If Iran produces more NG than Qatar (2016: 227 against 181 G.m3) Iran exports much less than Qatar (2016: 9 against 130 G.m3) GDP per capita for 2015 in current $ was 74 000 $ for Qatar against 6000 $ for Iran. Average Qatari is rich when average Iranian is poor!

0

177

353

530

706

883

1 059

1 236

1 412

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

Tcf

G.m

3

year

Qatar & Iran natural gas proved reserves & cumulative production from OPEC

Iran 1P+CP

Qatar 1P+CP

Iran 1P

Qatar 1P

CP Iran

CP Qatar


Qatar North Field 1971Iran South Pars 1991

38

The HL of NG production Qatar & Iran from OPEC displays a linear trend towards 4 T.m3 (2011-2016) for Qatar and 6.5 T.m3 (2010-2016) for Iran: these ultimates are” far from the cumulative production + proved reserves. Where is the reality somewhere in these huge range?

OPEC (ABS= Annual Statistical Bulletin) reports marketed NG production for OPEC members

0

50

100

150

200

250

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

G.m

3

year

Qatar & Iran natural gas production & exports

Iran prod

Qatar prod

Qatar NG exports

Iran NG exports


0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000

aP/C

P %

cumulative NG production G.m3

Qatar & Iran HL natural gas production from OPEC

Qatar aP/CP%

Qatar 2011-2016

Iran aP/CP%

Iran 2010-2016


39

The early ABS were reporting the detail of NG production with gross, marketed, flaring, reinjection and shrinkage,

The recent ABS are reporting only marketed annual production but also cumulative production

It is hard to forecast Qatar future production because the low level of Qataris people and the high level of NG reserves. In 2005 Qatar declared a moratorium on the development of North Field, but the freeze is over, but presently the fight between Qatar and the KSA+UAE upsets the future.

40

Apr. 3, 2017 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-gas-idUSKBN175181 “Qatar restarts development of world's biggest gas field after 12-year freeze” Qatar has lifted a self-imposed ban on development of the world's biggest natural gas field, the chief executive of Qatar Petroleum said on Monday, as the world's top LNG exporter looks to see off an expected rise in competition. Qatar declared a moratorium in 2005 on the development of the North Field, which it shares with Iran, to give Doha time to study the impact on the reservoir from a rapid rise in output. The vast offshore gas field, which Doha calls the North Field and Iran calls South Pars, accounts for nearly all of Qatar's gas production and around 60 percent of its export revenue. The development in the southern section of the North Field will have a capacity of 2 billion cubic feet per day, or 400,000 barrels of oil equivalent, and increase production of the field by about 10 percent, when it starts production in five to seven years, he said. On July 2017 Qatar decides to add an extra 30% to its existing LNG capacity by 2024. Between the 36 T.m3 from Qatar government, the 30 T.m3 of 2011 backdated 2P reserves and the 4 T.m3 of HL NG production, we plot our forecast using an ultimate of 20 T.m3 ( = 700 Tcf): it peaks around 2035 at 260 G.m3 (9 Tcf). The right production to use is not the marketed (yellow), but the gross-reinjected (orange) because the shrinkage is neglected, but for Qatar the difference is small EIA/IEO 2016 (purple) forecast (for marketed) for 2040 is about 240 G.m3, against 230 for IEA/WEO 2016

The condensate production (blue) was plotted in Mb/d on the same plot as NG (red) in G.m3 and it is remarkable to get a very good correlation for 25 G.m3 = 0.12 Mb/d = 44 Mb/a Condensate forecast could be based on NG forecast. NG ultimate of 20.T.m3 should correspond to 35 Gb

-Qatar oil production

0

0,12

0,24

0,36

0,48

0,6

0,72

0,84

0,96

1,08

1,2

1,32

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

250

275

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

cond

ensa

te M

b/d

G.m

3

year

Qatar natural gas & condensate annual production for an ultimate of 20 T.m3

EIA/IEO2013

EIA/IEO2016

WEO 2016 NP

U=20 T.m3

gross-reinj.

mark OPEC

prod BP 2017

exports ABS

losses

flare

condensate Mb/d


41

Qatar oil production includes a large part of condensate, there is a small part of GTL (gas to liquids). OPEC reports only crude oil , because there is no quota on condensate. For 2015 production is 0.66 M b/d for crude only, 1.5 Mb/d for crude + condensate and 1.9 Mb/d for oil. Qatar oil production has peaked in 1973 at 0.57 Mb/d with Dukhan (see below), but also in 2011 (rather plateau with uncertain decline)

On the creaming curve above, the ultimate of crude oil + condensate is about 40 Gb for crude oil + condensate, 15 Gb for crude oil, 25 Gb for condensate. From the HL of past production , ultimates are about 23 Gb for crude oil +condensate (2011-2016), 14 Gb for crude oil (2007-2015), 5 Gb for condensate (2011-2015) It appears that the ultimate of condensate is not reliable. From above on NG modelling with 20 T.m3, condensate ultimate should be about 35 Gb, very far from HL, but HL are on a limited period of 5 years and on a period where gas production was constraint

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

crud

e oi

l pro

duct

ion

Mb/

d

year

Qatar oil production from different sources

BP2017oilprod

EIAcrude+NGLprod

EIAcrude+condensateprod

OPECcrudeoilprod

EIAcrudeonlyprod

Jean Laherrère June 2017

42

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

aP/C

P %

cumulative crude +condensate production Gb

Qatar HL crude oil+ condensate production

1963-2011

2011-2016


0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0 5 10 15 20 25

aP/C

P %

cumulative crude +condensate production Gb

Qatar HL crude oil production

1949-2007

2007-2015


43

We have plotted crude + condensate production with ultimates of 25 Gb and 45 Gb.

The peak for 45 Gb ultimate is around 2035 at 1.8 Mb/d. IEA/WEO2016 forecasts Qatar oil production at 2.3 Mb/d in 2035: much higher (28%) than our forecast, but it is for oil liquids including GTL and others: the difference for 2000 is 0.74 against 0.9 Mb/d (22%) IEA/WEO 2016 NP forecasts Qatar oil production at 2.5 Mb/d in 2040, still rising with no peak in view.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

0 5 10 15 20 25

aP/C

P %

cumulative condensate production Gb

Qatar HL condensate production

1983-2015 2011-2015


0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

1

1,2

1,4

1,6

1,8

2

2,2

2,4

2,6

1900 1950 2000 2050 2100 2150

crud

e oi

l pro

duct

ion

Mb/

d

year

Qatar crude oil+ condensate production & forecasts

EIA crude+condensate prod

condensate

OPEC crude oil prod

U = 25 Gb

U = 45 Gb

IEA/WEO2016 NP

UNG= 20 T.m3


44

EIA/IEO does not provide the detail of the Middle East future oil production IEO2016 TableG3 reports that Qatar produced in 2012 0.1 Mb/d of other liquids (NGL and GTL) rising to 0.4 Mb/d in 2040 IEO 2014 reports “Qatar’s liquids production is poised to increase over the projection period through the application of GTL technology, which produces liquid fuels such as low-sulfur diesel and naphtha from natural gas. “

-Dukhan oil production Dukhan field was discovered in 1940 and started continuous production in 1949. Dukhan 2P reserves are estimated (2011) as 5800 Mb crude + 400 Mb condensate

After the second bumpy peak of 1994-2007, the decline 2007-2011 is assumed to continue until the end around 2070

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000

aP/C

L%

cumulative oil production Mb

Qatar Dukhan HL oil production

aP/CP%

1994-2010

2Preserves


45

-North Field NG production North Field was discovered in 1971 but production started only in 1991 North Field NG production is plotted until 2010 (close to Qatar NG production until 2016), and forecasted for an ultimate of 650 Tcf with a peak around 13 Tcf/a around 2040. This simple model for North Field can be changed by above ground constraints and the curve can be modified with the rule to keep the area below the curve as the same, being 650 Tcf.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080

crud

e oi

l pro

duct

ion

Mb

year

Qatar Dukhan oil production & forecast U = 6200 Mb

oil IHSoil RystadmedianU=6200 Mb


0

28

57

85

113

142

170

198

227

255

283

312

340

368

397

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1970 1990 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090 2110

G.m

3

NG

pro

duct

ion

Tcf

year

Qatar North Field NG production & forecast U = 650 Tcf

Qatar prod

U = 650 Tcf

N Field


46

Qatar is a rich country because of huge natural gas reserves, having two third of the world largest gas field and its small Qatari population. The estimate of Qatar NG ultimate is around 700 Tcf (20 T.m3) but it is estimated by some as being higher as 900 Tcf or more. Qatar NG production will peak after 2040 if there is no above ground constraints. Qatar could reduce its NFG production again, as it did in 2005. The main problem of Qatar is its huge wealth because of the North Field reserves: this wealth upsets its neighbors in particular Saudi Arabia. Rulers of the Middle East countries were in the past removed quietly or not: tribes rule the area and the present boundaries were drawn in the past ignoring tribes and religions. Anything can happen. OPEC countries lie on their oil and NG data or keep data confidential. Forecasting oil and NG production in the ME is an impossible task. -Algeria Algeria population was about 11 M at independence in 1962 and today is 40 M

PRB reports for 2016 a fertility rate of 3.1 children per woman, rising from 2.3 in 2010

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

popu

latio

n M

year

Algeria population with UN & USCB forecasts

UN 2006 medium

UN 2010 medium

USCB2012

UN2015 past

UN2015medium

UN2017 past

UN2017 medium


47

Emmanuel Macron, when candidate for President has described in Algiers the colonization of Algeria as a crime against humanity, and today President Bouteflika asks the crime to be officially declared. But France went in 1830 to Algiers to deliver Europeans slaves from Ottomans (Barbary pirates). Professor Robert Davis estimates that 1 million to 1.25 million white Christian Europeans were enslaved in North Africa, from the beginning of the 16th century to the middle of the 18th, by slave traders from Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli alone (Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast and Italy, 1500–1800) France invaded Algiers in 1830, after several previous attempts: Anglo-Dutch raid in 1816 and British raid in 1826 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbary_slave_trade) To keep Algiers safe, France was obliged to conquer the land around and military were followed by farmers. Today the Barbary Pirates are back again dealing with African migrants Libya! The number of Europeans in Algeria increased from 1000 in 1830 to 1 million in 1950, but the number of Muslims increased from 2 million in 1850 to 10 million in 1962 (independence) when French people went from 1 million down to 50 000 in 1970

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

num

ber o

f chi

ldre

n pe

r wom

an

year

Algeria fertility & forecasts

USCB

PRB

UN 2006 medium

UN2010

UN2010 medium

UN2012

USCB2012

USCB2013

UN2015

UN2017


48

The number of Muslim students in public primary school were around 40 000 against 110 000 European students in 1910, but in 1961 Muslim students were 735 000 (37% female) against 109 000 for European students: where is the crime to, bring education and health?

Crimes were committed from both sides during the fight 1830-1847 (100 000 French military killed!) and 1954-1962: it was war and war means deaths!

1 000

10 000

100 000

1 000 000

10 000 000

100 000 000

1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970

popu

latio

n lo

g sc

ale

year

Algeria population 1830-1970 log scale

muslim

european

french

Jean Laherrere Feb 2017

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970

num

ber o

f stu

dent

s k

year

Algeria: number of students in public primary schoool

muslims k

europeans k

Jean Laherrere Dec 2011

49

I was in Algiers from 1956 to 1962: European and Muslim civil people were both killed. It was not one way! The Sahara was explored mainly by French oil companies and I spent 5 years exploring the Sahara Desert (1956-1962), participating in the discovery of the two largest Africa fields: oil field = Hassi Messaoud and gas field = Hassi R’Mel. I wrote a long draft for a short paper in AAPG (American Association of Petroleum Geologists) Explorer magazine : Historical highlights (at the request of Hans Krause) published in September 2014 Vol 35 N° 9 “Refraction sparked huge African discoveries” reported on Internet ASPO France site as: History of the French discoveries in the Sahara Jean Laherrere http://aspofrance.viabloga.com/files/JL_2014SaharaLong.pdf The production of Hassi Messaoud, Hassi R’Mel and other fields found by the French companies represents to day the bulk of the Algeria income. Sonatrach annual report 2010: Hassi Messaoud and Hassi R’Mel regions represent 54% of total primary production -past oil & NG production OPEC reports the oil and gas production, exports, GDP, current balance and population for each OPEC members Algeria oil production (green) has peaked 2005-2008 at 730 Mb, gas production (red) has peaked in 2003 at 530 Mboe but rises again in 2016 higher than in 2003. GDP (purple current $) has peaked in 2014 at 214 G$, oil & gas exports value (brown) has peaked in 2008 at 83 G$. The decline in GDP, exports value is sharp since 2014 with the decline of oil price The current account balance (orange) is about 27 G$ deficit I 2015 and 2016 Algeria is in trouble, but thanks to the French colonization Hassi Messaoud and Hassi R’Mel production is helping a lot.

Algeria oil & NG (1 boe = 6 kcf) production has peaked in 2005 at 1250 Mboe and the ratio oil & NG export value versus GDP has peaked in 2006 at 49%, now in 2016 at 18%.

-30

0

30

60

90

120

150

180

210

0,0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

G$

annu

al o

il &

NG

pro

duct

ion

Gbo

e

year

Algeria oil & NG production, exports, GDP & current balance

oil Gb

NG 1 Gboe = 6 Tcf

GDP G$

exports G$

pet exports G$

current account balance G$


50

Algeria oil & NG production per capita has peaked in 2005 at 37 boe and GPD (current $) per capita has peaked in 2012 at 5 600 $.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

0,0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

0,9

1,0

1,1

1,2

1,3

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

% G

$ ex

port

oil

& N

G /G

DP

annu

al o

il &

NG

pro

duct

ion

Gbo

e

year

Algeria oil & NG production, % exports/GDP

prod oil+NG Gboe

% export/GDP


0

600

1200

1800

2400

3000

3600

4200

4800

5400

6000

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

40

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

GD

P pe

r ca

pita

$

annu

al o

il &

NG

pro

duct

ion

boe p

er ca

pita

year

Algeria oil & NG production & GDP per capita

prod oil+NG/cap boe

GDP/cap $


51

-future oil and NG production Algeria oil and NG ultimates are estimated at 33 Gb and 230 Tcf, extrapolating the cumulative 2P discoveries creaming curve

0

21

42

63

84

105

126

147

168

189

210

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

40

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

per c

apita

kg

annu

al o

il &

NG

pro

duct

ion

boe p

er ca

pita

year

Algeria oil+NG, grains production & wheat import per capita

prod oil+NG/cap boe

grains prod (smooth 5 yr)/cap kg

wheat import/cap kg


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

cum

ulat

ive d

iscov

ery

Gbo

e


Algeria oil & gas creaming curve

U = 230 Tcf

H1 1910-1987

G discovery Tcf/6

U = 33 Gb

H3 1910-1992

O+C discovery Gb

Jean Laherrere Jan 2012

52

Algeria oil remaining reserves from OPEC (as OGJ, EIA and BP) have been the same at 12.2 Gb since the last eleven years which is unrealistic, meaning that each year new discoveries were exactly the same as oil production. This wrong display shows well that proved reserves are completely unreliable! It was worse around 1970 where Algeria assisted by Russians experts (Russia classification ABC1) was reporting over 30 Gb of proven reserves, when World Oil magazine reported about 10 Gb. The backdated 2P remaining reserves (in green) have been declining since 1970, with a second minor peak in 1996, being in 2010 lower than the current 1P (political data)

The Algeria oil discovery is displayed with a 5 year smoothing, showing two sharp peaks. The crude + condensate production has peaked in 2007 and the 33 Gb ultimate provides a decline in line with the last ten years.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

rem

aini

ng o

il re

serv

es y

ear

end

Gb

year

Algeria remaining oil reserves from different sources

2P

1P OGJ/EIA

1P WO

1P OPEC/BP


Russian influence

53

The oil production per capita displays a sharp peak in 1970 and a second lower one in 2005 The flat extrapolation of the oil consumption shows that Algeria will cease to export oil around 2035.

0

73

146

219

292

365

438

511

584

657

730

803

0,0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

1,0

1,2

1,4

1,6

1,8

2,0

2,2

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070

oil d

iscov

ery

Mb

oil p

rodu

ctio

n M

b/d

year

Algeria oil discovery & production for an ultimate of 33 Gb

crude +condensate prod

U = 33 Gb

crude +NGL EIA

discovery smooth 5 yr


0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100

oil p

er c

apita

b/c

ap

year

Algeria oil production & consumption per capita

oil production

forecast

oil consumption BP

Jean Laherrere Jan 2012

54

The NG production is forecasted for this ultimate to be on a bumpy plateau at 3.8 Tcf/a for the period 2005-2018. But the decline 2020-2050 will be sharp, but similar to the rise 1975-2005! The symmetrical shape of the production cycle is fascinating!

-Conclusion Since many years in most of my papers I conclude that the problems of demography (in particular the huge increase of Africa population obliged to flood Europe) are more important than the problems of resources. It seems that my comments were not strong enough: I should shout more. I do not know how to do to alert the world, the numbers are there published by the UN. The immigration of Africans to Europe has just begun and it will increase for decades. The example of Nigeria forecasted to reach a population of 790 M in 2100 when Europe will be at 640 M is a proof that these forecasts are unstainable, in fact impossible. Something should happen to change it and I do not know what it would be. Some believe that Gaia will take care of it? Some believe that mankind should take care of it, but how? Changing fertility is a long process and depends mainly of female education: the Talibans and Boko Haram attacking girls going to school is still there. People hope that the present situation is just a crisis which will cease soon, they are wrong. I hope that my above graphs will convince some of the obvious problems of the world. The present flooding of young Africans was created 20 years ago, at their birth. It is why it is important to look at graphs of fertility rate and to criticize the UN utopic fertility scenarios. One of the problems is the lack of reliable data, in particular in countries in war as Sudan.

0

1

2

3

4

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080

annu

al T

cf

year

Algeria annual gas production & model U = 230 Tcf

U = 230 Tcf

gross-reinjected

Jean Laherrere May 2016

55

This paper is dealing only with few significant countries: there are many other countries to display, like other OPEC members and Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Israel, . It will be my next paper, but I will appreciate to receive yours comments before in order to show better graphs.

Jean Laherrere 8 July 2017 · WB2016 UN2015 past UN2015 medium IIASA2014 medium UN2004 medium...

Documents

Transcript of Jean Laherrere 8 July 2017 · WB2016 UN2015 past UN2015 medium IIASA2014 medium UN2004 medium...