Japan, Rapanui and Chile's Uncertain Sovereignty

Grant McCallThe University ofNew South Wales

Two recent articles by Japanese researcher Mr. HideoMatsunaga (1991, 1994)2 in The Journal of the PacificSociety prompt me to think about Chile's relationship to itsPacific territory, Rapanui, as the people of Easter Island callthemselves and their land.

In the course of commenting on Matsunaga, and a sourceabout Japanese ambitions in the Pacific contemporary to hisdocumentation (Shimizu 1938), I want to explore myexplanatory concept of "Uncertain Sovereignty" by which Imean the ambivalence that I think always has characterisedChilean official feelings about Rapanui since theirrelationship formally began on 9 September 1888 whenPolicarpo Toro read his proclamations and hoisted hiscountry's flag along side the existing Rapanui one (see Hotuset al 1988).

"Uncertain sovereignty" I take to mean an unconsciousofficial attitude, provoked by the circumstances ofColonialism's culture (Thomas 1994) which at oncediscomforts government opinion, provokes aggressivereactions to criticism and abidingly prevents effective policyand action.Outsider Claims

Prior to Chile's annexation, there had been otherclaimants to Rapanui, the earliest one being in 1770, whenthrough their colony in Peru, Spaniards concluded asuccessful visit to the place with a formal annexation of their"San Carlos Island", complete with signed document andappropriate military ceremonial (Mellen 1986).

Although first sighted by Europeans in 1722, it was notuntil 1862 that slave raids, disease and out-migrationsubdued the Rapanui population. For some time in the 1860sto 1880s it was unclear which European power had control ofthe place France (who had missionaries there), Britain(whose Navy had collected a moai, or ceremonial figure, therein 1868) or the USA, whose influence was growing in thePacific. Additionally in the last three decades of the 19thcentury, Russian, German and Chilean warships had stoppedfor visits, to collect artefacts and publish their reports (For fulllisting, see McCall 1976; 1990).

The respective exploring parties of three countries,France, Britain and the USA, had recommended annexation,as did the German one in 1882. Spain's earlier claim had beencompletely forgotten after a century and never has beenrevived.

When Chile annexed Rapanui in 1888, it would seem thatthe uncertainty surrounding the sovereignty of Easter Islandwould abate. But, even then, there was alleged trouble. In thelibrary of the Bishop Museum, there is an unattributedclipping from a San Francisco newspaper with a story abouthow France and Chile fought a naval battle over the latter's

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claim to the island. This speculation was totally untrue, andseems to be based on an over-inventive seamen's account to acredulous reporter who, perhaps, paid for the information?The French Consul in San Francisco, Pesoli, writes to Parison 21 September 1888, including a clipping from another SanFrancisco newspaper, the Daily Report of 19 September,indicating perhaps the basis of the sea battle rumour. Thearticle declares:

'Great indignation is felt in all theislands', said Mr. Thorne, 'over the seizureof Easter Island by Chile. Captain Toro ofthe cruiser Angamos planted the Chileanflag and took possession in the name of hisGovernment. What makes the people on theneighbouring islands feel so bad is the factthat Chili is going to establish a penalsettlement there, and they have no desire forthat kind of neighbours.

When in Papeete Captain Toro wasvery proud of his seizure, and whenremonstrated with by the French officersoffered, if they would sail their men-of-waroutside, to fight them, one after the other.The offer was not accepted,]

In the French National Archives there is a letter dated 12December 1902 explaining away a reported rumour ("bruif')in Peru that Chile was about to cede Rapanui to the USA4 Afew years later, there was an exchange of letters between the(British) Foreign Office and Williamson Balfour, the latterwanting to urge His Majesty's Government to purchaseRapanui from Chile. These negotiations, when they werediscovered, prompted some minor changes in theadministration of the place which, for the most part, haslanguished unattended under the Chilean mandate for muchof its history, until the last three decades.

Again, concern over sovereignty surfaced in a storycirculating in 1984-5: the publicised threat of an Americanbase being re-established on the Island. There was a secretcommunications base on Rapanui from 1966 to the election ofSocialist President Dr. Salvador Allende, in 1970, but itquietly did its work as the island was infrequently visited

5On

the election of Allende's left-wing government, the USAcontingent of the base summarily departed, leaving equipmentand a few dozen illigitimate children who today wonder abouttheir distant fathers, safe in the anonymity of a large anddistant land.

The question of sovereignty in 1984 arose when NASA,the (USA) National Aeronautics and Space Administration,proposed to establish an emergency landing site for their

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Voyager space shuttles, complete with full radar facilities.Many people internationally were suspicious of NASA's ColdWar motives and actions and saw the Chilean government (atthat time, a dictatorship)'s eager acquiescense a sign that thecountry was willing to trade part of their control of Rapanuifor American money. In the event, and after careful treatynegotiations into 1986, NASA's scaled down plan wasaccepted, but never fully implemented owing to thesuspension of the American space program early in that yearas a result of a launch disaster.

In 1988, to mark the centennary of the acquisition ofRapanui by Chile, the Islander citizen's committee, Te MauRapanui (often called the "Rapanui Council of Elders")published a detailed monograph, demonstrating thecontemporary population's relationship to their land, anddecrying the almost century of neglect that the island hassuffered under Chilean rule (Hotus et at 1988). Themonograph does not question Chilean sovereignty, but it doessuggest strongly that Rapanui has never been treatedequitably by the Chilean Government.

Chilean ClaimsTo an outsider looking at Rapanui and Chilean affairs,

the Elders's charge of derelection makes reasonable sense. Inthe beginning of the relationship, a Chilean Naval Captain,Policarpo Toro Hurtado, convinces his government topurchase the commercial interests on the island, to permithim and his brother, Pedro Pablo, to carry on the Frenchfounded sheep and livestock ranch and to license"immigration". Only about twenty Chileans respond to hiscall and settled on the island in 1888, the year of theannexation. Then, in 1892, the Toro brothers's ship sinks,most of the colonists depart or had died and the ranch isabandoned. For half a dozen years, there is no record thateither Chilean government or private interests sent anyone tocheck up on their toe hold in an Oceanic empire. And. theGovernment, as is well-known, never paid completely for theTahitian-based commercial interests, nor ever re-imbursedthe Toro brothers for their colonisation expenses.

The story gets worse.An unscrupulous entrepreneur, Enrique Merlet, acquires

the ranching concession and sends a representative, AlbertoSanchez Manterola, to the island, where the elected (in 1892)King of Rapanui, Simeon Riro 'a Kainga Rokoroko He Tau,receives him well and attempts to come to a mutuallycongenial agreement with the outsider commercial interests.who soon were to usurp legitimate Rapanui claims. If KingRim had known what was going to happen to himself and hispeople, he might never have feasted Sanchez so well, noroffered him such abundant hospitality. In 1899, Merlet, withSanchez's knowledge, has King Riro assasinated, dismisses aremorseful Sanchez and installs an Englishman, HoraceCooper, to brutalise the Rapanui population into submissionand starts making expansive and extravagent claims toownership of the entire island.

Merlet begins propogating the story so well known tooutsiders, Chilean and foreigner, that a decadent King Riro

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drank himself to death whilst in Chile and that the Rapanuiwere half castes and only remotely related to the originalinhabitants of the island (see e.g. Metraux 1940).

Apart from occasional visits by the Chilean Navy.accounts of which were published in Chilean Navalpublications, the Chilean government in the early part of thiscentury makes no intercession or move to assist thepopulation it so happily annexed a little over a decade before.

It is not until 1914, and then only after a mis-understoodrevolt (See McCall 1992) that results in a full Naval enquiry.that the first Chilean government representative is installed inthe place. Prior to that, the manager of the commercialinterests, an English-Scottish company, played Governmentrepresentative as well.

Even after that, it was not until the Catholic Church,through Mgr. Rafael Edwards, intervened that the education.health and general well-being of the Rapanui were taken upby the Chilean Government, reluctantly. By "reluctantly". Imean that the Government charged the commercial interestswith implementing health and education at their expense,which was kept always at a minimum. The Chileangovernment benefitted from lease payments and meat suppliesfor its ships, but returned none of this to the Rapanui or theisland.

So, the Rapanui languished on their island. forbidden toleave it for much of this century. even confined to a fewhectares of home and agricultural space in the areas known as"Hangaroa" and "Moeroa" today (For more detail. see McCall1994).

An Offer to Imperial JapanIn the 1930s, French ambitions in the Pacific had long

since cooled (See Bare 1987), Germany was thinking aboutother parts of the world, the USA had its Great Depressionand Britain was struggling with a tempestuous Europe.However, another growing world power was making itselfincreasingly well-known in the Pacific. the import of whichwould be much clearer in a few years time.

Mr. Shin Shimizu (1938). formerly editorial writer of theliji Shimpo, writes his explanation of the Japanese interest inthe South Seas, which is published in English by the ForeignAffaires Association of Japan in November 6

Shimizu (1938 I) notes that he writes his thirty-onepage pamphlet because he "feels he must do .. to seek tocorrect certain false impressions which have influenced othernations in the attitude they have taken up towards our[Japanese] quite legitimate activities in the South Seas".

The writer claims a 400 year antiquity of Japaneseinterest in the South Seas, noting that there are Japanesecitizens spread around Southeast Asia and that they have hadsuccess in agriculture, fishing and commerce due to their"exceptional industry and a physical constitution which madethem fit to work in tropical countries", noting especially hiscountrymen's successes in the Philippines, then ruled by theUSA (Shimizu 1938:2) He has especial praise for Japan'sfishermen who brave the elements and hostile foreigngovernments in their quest for a good catch (1938:5--6)

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He (1938: 7) notes that in 1936, the Japanese governmenthad evolved "an effective South Seas policy", including thecreation of a South Seas Section in the Foreign Office and,simultaneously, the South Seas Development Company whichwere to be concerned with the sending of migrants to SouthSeas places, the acquisition of land leases, "monetaryassistance for development work" and anything else requiredto strengthen Japan's position in that region.

Shimizu (1938:9) comments also on the increasedJapanese Naval activity of the day, noting that it is for defenceand to "safeguard our national rights, elevate the nationalprestige and promote the nation's development". Whilst notdirectly relevant to the argument here, one of the motivatingfactors in Japan's push to the South Seas is her growingpopulation, outstripping local resources. Shimizu(1938: 18-20, 28-29) writes that land in the South Seas issparsely occupied and poorly developed. Japan's surplus,energetic population should find a home there, he affirms,which they could profitably develop for all humankind.

Shimizu (1938:30)'s penultimate paragraph is pertinentto the next part of our story. He writes:

The Japanese are far from attemptingto change the colouring of the world map;they only desire to get an outlet for theiroverpopulation at least in the South Seas. Itis desirable that the various governments ofthe South Seas will lease part of theirterritories to Japan or at least makearrangements whereby the Japanese cancarry on some industrial undertakingstherein to the extent of providing alivelihood for her surplus population.

So, the context is right for Japan in the 1930s to beinterested in acquiring South Seas lands and Chile, owing toits history of neglect and disinterest, is prepared to realisecash from a wortWess (from their point of view) and neglectedterritory. These two interests, unbeknownst to the Rapanui, ofcourse, meet for a couple of months in mid-1937.

Given that context of Japanese expansion and the need todevelop what they consider undeveloped lands, a potential forImperial interest in Rapanui becomes plausable. even thoughthe remote territory is small compared to the other lands beingsought

Whilst distant from Chilean interests, both governmentand commercial. Rapanui in the 1930s is a thriving operationfor the Williamson, Balfour company. The company have allthe cheap labour they need, are largely unfettered by Chileangovernment requirements and have ready markets for thewool and other ranch products produced which are exporteddirectly overseas to South America and Europe. Exploited forhalf a century as a "Company Island", Rapanui is acomfortably profitable enterprise for it's foreign developersand their frankly named, "Easter Island ExploitationCompany" (See Porteous 1978, 1981, 1993; cf. Hunt 1951).

Matsunaga begins his discussion of the Japaneseevidence for Rapanui being put on sale by Chile by reportingthat in an earlier publication of a former Japanese

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Ambassador to Chile, Mr. Eiji Kawasaki, in the Nihon KeizaiShimbul1 (Japan Economic Times) of 30 June 1975, mentionsfor the first time in print the Rapanui deal.

In the course of a brief description of Rapanui and itshistory, Kawasaki (deceased in 1985) reports that hissuperior, in 1938, Mr. Tetsuichiro Mayake, had "heard of therumoured

7intention of the Chilean Defence Ministry to cede

Easter Island to Japan". Kawasaki continues his tale:Needless to say, Ambassador Mayake

reported this [offer of cession] to theJapanese Government The Japanese Navywas keenly interested in the island, However,negotiations were informally discontinueddue to the island's proximity to Australia8

and the detrimental effects that this mighthave had on the course of Anglo-Japaneseand US-Japanese relations".

Matsunaga investigates further and discovers thatMayake was appointed Ambassador to Chile on 25 July 1936;Kawasaki served, as he said, as a temporary actingAmbassador in September 1940, and returned home due theoutbreak of World War II in the Pacific after the Japanesebombing of the American military installations at PearlHarbour in December 1941.

Matsunaga continues to dig and finds a document in theJapanese Foreign Ministry dated 7 July 1936, which containsa general description of Rapanui and its contact history,including the conditions of the lease of the sheep ranchcompany, Williamson, Balfour. Matsunaga believes that thedocument was a background paper for the sovereignty transferdiscussions. References in the document suggest that at leastcommercial discussions were taking place, with the idea ofRapanui as a potential base for the Japanese fishing industry.represented by the large commercial company, Nihon Suisan.

Nihon Suisan was asked to be a party to the Rapanuinegotiations since it was a fisheries firm, with shipping andtrawling interests throughout the Pacific. In September of1937, the Nihon Suisan's ship, Tonan-maru 11, commencedwhaling in the Southern Pacific for the first time, so a base inRapanui would have been very useful for their purposes.

But, Nihon Suisan, in its published company historiesexamined by Matsunaga, does not mention these negotiations.Perhaps they were too speculative or, given the turbulentevents of World War II, simply forgotten?

Matsunaga too suggests that other, more commandingworld affairs were occupying the Imperial Navy and theJapanese Government at that time: 1937 was the year whenthe Sino- Japanese War erupted. It was also a year when theAxis powers (Japan, Germany and Italy) were firming uptheir "Anti-Comintern" agreements which had beendeveloping for some time.

What Matsunaga might have speculated is that theapproach regarding Rapanui might have been on the initiativeof an individual, rather than the official government WhilstChile was neutral during World War II, there were many Axissympathisers in the country. Rapanui was a fairly obscureplace in the 1930s and it could be that the negotiations were

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not so much on the level of government, but by interestedindividuals, eager to please a country with whom theysympathised. That is, a Chilean official, could well haveapproached the Japanese Ambassador with a plan for eithereconomic cooperation or, even, cession of sovereignty, butprobably did so as an individual, rather than on behalf ofofficial government intentions.

It is unlikely that the Chilean concerned was more thanremotely familiar with Rapanui. The individual who providedthe Japanese Legation in Santiago with some details ofeconomic life on the island had little navigation knowledge,for the position of the place was given as 25° SLat and 105°E! Matsunaga picks up on the error, which placed Rapanuinear Singapore!

The correct coordinates, incidentally, are 27° 5' SLat and109° 20' W.

I sent a brief manuscript critique of the first Matsunaga(1990) article to him, through the Pacific Society in Tokyo. Inrebuttal, he goes back to archive sources to discover furtherevidence that the negotiations were very official and not justan indivuduaJ's private urges. In his "revised" second article,Matsunaga demonstrates, I think, that the negotiationsbetween Chile and Rapanui were more than the rumours theyseemed to be in his first report.

The author embarked on a detailed examination ofJapanese Diplomatic archives, especially the 32 cases of"Cesion and rental of territory of various countries andmiscellaneous rumores" (A-4-1-0-1), most especially thatsection dealing with Chile: "Information from LatinAmerican Countries, Miscellaneous: Chile (A-6-4-0-13-3)",which has resulted in additional light being thrown on thisincident which. in its Japanese and Chilean context, does notseem so bizarre after all.

The Chilean Government is recorded as having offeredRapanui for sale to the highest bidder on 8 June 1937. Twodays later. notice of this is sent to Tokyo in a top secret, codedtelegram by the Japanese Legation in Santiago de Chile. Thetext 9reads:

On the 8th, a call was received from theUnder Secretary of the Chilean Navy. Mr.Hara 10 made his way to the office and theUnder Secretary says the following: Owingto a difficult financial situation, thegovernment wishes to sell Easter Island andSalas y Gomez to Japan, England, the USAor Germany, by order of the President andthe Ministry of Defense. It is wished toknow if Japan is interested in acquiring it,that this information should becommunicated to your government and wewish a rapid reply, since this matter as yethas not been communicated to any othercountry.

Diplomat Rara takes the matter very seriously. Theexchange between the Japanese diplomats in Santiago andtheir superiors in Tokyo is conducted in top secret code, as amark of the importance placed on the Chilean offer. It is

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further revealed to the Japanese diplomats a couple of dayslater that "The Chilean Navy needs to construct some cruisersand other war ships and in order to do that needs extrafinance; therefore, the proposal to sell some islands of littleimportance to Chile".

This observation of "little importance to Chile" ofRapanui is entirely in keeping with the history of negligenceofthe time that I mention above and described in most seriousChilean sources on the place. Moreover, the sale is to thehighest bidder since the Chilean Government does not fix aprice for their real estate; they would take the highest priceoffered, they told the Japanese. If the Chilean governmentcontemplates selling national lands, it is going to do it for topdollar!

A telegrame from the Japanese Legation in Santiago toTokyo of 1 July purports to quote the President of Chile whosays that "according to the law, we (the Government) mustobtain the approval of the Congress". At the same time, thetelegramme notes that the Chilean Government is no\\carrying on negotiations with the USA as well as Japan. B)14 July, a parcel of information about Rapanui is sent by theJapanese Legation to Tokyo, and included amongst thosepapers is the fanciful book by E. C. Branchi (1934), L 'Isola d,Pasqua. Impero degli antipodi which was indeed published irSantiago three years before, but is wildly inaccurate on mOSIpoints to do with the island. Branchi was an amateur partisanof the sunken continent story of Oceanic origins. There is anote appended to these materials:

As it [Rapanui] is very distant, withpoor soil, there are no minerals. nor anygood harbour for anchorage, and also hasno strategic value. for these reasons, theChilean Government retains these islands[sic] only to isolate lepers and expatriatecriminals (7)11.

Taking all this into account, the Director of AmericanAffairs, Mr. Yoshizawa, writes on 23 July (sent on 26 of thesame) to both the Director of Administration of the Ministryof the Navy, Mr. Toyota, and to Mr. Tamura, the President ofNippon Suisan. the fishing company. In this note. hesummarises the Japanese Navy response as:

l. It [Rapanui) doesn't seem to havemuch value from the point of view ofmilitary strategy, but in spite of that it wouldbe better to have the place:

2. In the future when aviation is moredeveloped, this island certainly will be ofgreat benefit; nevertheless, at this moment,it has very little value as an air base;

3. From the point of view of industry,the geography of the bay is suitable for afishing base, but the Ministry of Fisheriesand the specialist companies in that areashould be consulted;

4. From the diplomatic point of view,it is evident that the USA would oppose thisas a Japanese possession, so that although it

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would be a military objective, one ought torefer to its [Rapanui's] ends [for Japanj interms of fisheries. (8)

From the Japanese documentation, the consideration topurchase Rapanui lasted a scant two months, from the firsttelegram of 9 June to the closing letter of 9 August, with nofurther notations, as other events distracted Japanese interestor, perhaps, the Chilean government met some internalopposition to the cash raising proposal.

Matsunaga firmly places the eventual failure of thenegotiations on larger world events. The 6 July 1937 letterfrom the Japanese Government Director of AmericanAffaires, Yoshizawa, to Tamura, President of the NipponSuisan fishing interests, a natural developer of Rapanui,pre-dates by one day the "Rokokyo Incident" which sparkedthe Japanese-China War. At that crucial time, Japan did notwish to risk displeasure either with Britain, the nationality ofthe commercial concessionaire on Rapanui, nor the USA'sjealous guard of South American relations through its oftinsisted "Monroe Doctrine" dating back to 1823.

The President of Chile mentioned in the dispatches wasArturo Alessandri Palma (1868-1950), in his third term. Hisperiod in the Presidency commenced in 1920, ceasing in 1924with a military coup, returning in 1925. In 1932, Alessandriwas elected President again, continuing his promises to cureChile's recurrent economic problems. The year after the briefnegotiations with Japan, his government lost in elections to a"Popular Front" because in spite of an improved economicsituation, Alessandri was said to have not taken sufficientinterest in social welfare.

Colonialism and Uncertain SovereigntyAs is not unusual in colonialism, much of the

negotiations of a subject people's fate takes place withouttheir consent or, even, knowledge. Almost contemporary withthe Chilean offer to sell Rapanui to the highest bidder is thestory that Vanuatu was offered by Britain and France as ahomeland for Jews from Nazi Germany. Noted journalist,David Jenkins, read documents a few years ago in USAgovernment archives of moves on the eve of the Pearl Harbourbombing to sell or give Papua New Guinea to the Japanese, toappease the needs of the growing empire and to avoid war. 12

Chilean plans for Rapanui are discussed and agreed inSantiago, only later are they brought to the island asdecisions. Chile, in these sorts of relations with Rapanui, isnot unique as a metropolitan power dominating a distantterritory. Between nominally sovereign states, much foreignaid discussion takes place distant from those who eventuallyare to receive programmes which often are unsuitable and faildue to lack of local consultation.

Matsunaga demonstrates clearly that the 1937negotiations between Japan and Chile were very real. Thereare other allegations of sale, though, that are much morespeculative. During my second field trip (1984-5), I was toldby two different persons that Chile was negotiating with theUSA (or Japan) to transfer the island in exchange for acancellation of outstanding foreign debts.

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As the little Polynesian polity has greater contact with theworld, there is less lag time between what people outsideRapanui are saying about the place and what people locallyknow.

To cope with this uncertainty and the perceived threat ofdecisions being taken without local consultation, Rapanui(like others) resort to rumour. On Rapanui itself, gossip andrumour play a large role in community life. Gossip, thediscussion of a third, absent party by two or more personspresent, is a method of building connections and associations.By the very act of listening to gossip, those present colludeagainst the topic of the conversation. Sometimes, gossip mayhave a basis in fact, but as often it will be speculation andconjecture: the purpose of the gossiping act is social, in termsof bonding, and not informational.

Rumour is somewhat different. Its purpose is to clarify, toanswer, to attempt to solve what it unclear and rumour onRapanui usually centres on the actions of outsiders and theirintentions, since these are so poorly communicated andexplained locally.

For example, the story of a naval battle between Franceand Chile in 1888 that I mentioned above was reported to meduring my first fieldwork from 1972-1974 in two ways. Oneinformant located the action at the time of the Chileanannexation, much as I rt:counted it above; a younger personsuggested that it had almost taken place in 1965, when ayoung Rapanui school teacher led a successful protest forhuman rights on the island that resulted in the territorybecoming a full civil one in 1966. Some others transformedthis rumour into gossip and told me that it was the schoolteacher who had summoned the French warships, which storypersists in some quarters, even official ones, to this day!

Rumour, therefore, in the colonial context, can be takenas a kind of informational protest; a cry from a local minorityagainst an impenetrable national bureaucracy; an attempt toescape what the sociologist Max Weber called the "IronCage" of contemporary, invigilated society.

I do not believe, as I first thought, that the 1937Japan-Chile negotiations over Rapanui were rumour. Clearly,they had a very serious basis in factual, albeit brief,communications. In the conlext of Japan's views of itself ashaving a legitimate right, even need, to expandpopulationally, militarily, cdmmercially, even territorially,into the South Seas in the I930s, as Shimizu documents, shewas a natural potential buyer from a cash strapped Chile. Thefisheries angle provided added interest to the negotiations.

Chile's Uncertain SovereigntyThis leads me to the question of Chile's "uncertain

sovereignty" that I mention in the title of this historicalenquiry into a tiny footnote.

I do not believe that Chile has been at ease with itscolonial stance, and the Rapanui have been aware of this forsome time. On the one hand, there were the needs of nationalpride, some way of marking the victory of the "War of thePacific" and Chile's projected role in the internationalcommunity. In the European scramble for colonies of the

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1880s, having a colony was to become an important countryand, so, Chile was pursuaded to follow suit, unlike any of theother South American republics, mostly founded on theFrench revolutionary ideals of "liberte, egalite andfraternite". Chile had no need to expand into the Pacific,having sufficient colonisable land in the recently (then)pacified South. And, desolate though it was, there was theland to the north with its rich promise of mineral wealth.Chile's act of colonialism was not out of desperation, but outof pride. Chile had no practical use for Rapanui and,particularly in the 19th century, had severaJ ranches manytimes the size of Rapanui on its own mainland. Chile did notneed the Rapanui lands and did not have the facilities toexploit the Rapanui seas. The colonisation was a mistake and,therefore, the Chilean government abidingly hasdemonstrated an uncertainty, even an ambivalence, as in thenegotiations for sale I cite above, about its singular colonialpossession.

Even when no actual negotiations were in train, Rapanui,in their own uncertainty about Chile's official intentions,imagined deals being made, as usual, behind their backs.

The Chilean government did not know what to do withRapanui at the end of the 19th century and scarcely has cometo any conclusion about what to do with it at the close of thisone. The government archives are choked with plans forRapanui and every few years, ernest governments create newcommissions to study what is to be done with Rapanui, adistant place about which few Chileans know anything otherthan that they should feel a kind of paternaJ affection.Government ministers and, since the dictator Pinochet,Chilean Heads of State, visit Rapanui, bestow a public workor two and depart with promises of radical change andimprovement. Each commission affirms its intentions to doreal work, unlike predecessors, and succeeds only in planningfor tropicaJ development in a sub-tropical environment, theproduction of produce that will be too expensive to sellanywhere, owing to distance and, more recently, theencouragement of tourism without taking into account thepoor transport infrastructure by the government monopolyairline, LAN-Chile.

To take a recent example, in late 1994, anothercommission has been created in response to Rapanuidemands to be taken seriously. In October 1994, the "IslandCommission of the RegionaJ Council" went to Rapanui," ... with the aim of analysing together with the organisedcommunity of Easter [Island] a proposed law to redefine theplace's legal status,,13 President Eduardo Frei, during a fourhour stop over on Rapanui, announced on 10 November theconstruction of a new air terminaJ, airport renovations and asea port, opened a new Governor's Office, offered to turn overadditional government lands to the local population and toincrease flights (Air Force and LAN-Chile) to the island '4.The visit was marked by a protest of Rapanui carrying theirown flag, who were not permitted to enter the area where thePresident was making his promises.

As 1994 ended, yet another government commission wasannounced by President Frei, this time to present "specific

Rapa Nui JournaJ 6

plans" for the Chilean mainland regions of Aisen andMagaJlanes, along with Rapanui. This commission is to ~"interministerial" and, as usual, it begins by gatheringinformation about its territory of focus, as if the task hadnever been done before l5 The interministerial and theRegionaJ Council Committees almost certainly will deliverconclusions in 1995 much like those that have been producedin the past and, most likely, with similar misunderstandingsand consequent errors.

On the basis of this indicative Japanese incident, andothers aJluded to above, I believe that Chile will continue tobe troubled by its "uncertain sovereignty" over Rapanui untilit changes the way that it has related to the place since 1888.That was the last time that the Chilean government, thoughCaptain Policarpo Toro, took even minimal interest inconsulting the Rapanui themselves. Governmentcommissions rarely have Rapanui on them and there hasnever been an open, public consultation on the island itself bya decision-making, ranking government body. The twobodies created at the end of 1994, by their very governmentalnature, have no Rapanui representation and, apart from theusual comfortable visit to the island that these committeesmake, usually for a few days, there will be no open, publicconsultation with the Islanders.

Therefore, the information that goes into these officialand costly enquiries remains inaccurate and fanciful and,consequently, so do the conclusions and recommendationsthat result, however well-intended. Chile will continue tosuffer its official angst of "uncertain sovereignty" so long asit continues to fail to consult the Rapanui about Rapanui.

The Islanders have long been willing to talk, but theyhave yet to find anyone in power in Chile free from the fearof "uncertain sovereignty" to listen to what they know abouttheir island and what should be done with it.

Footnotes1. Grant McCall teaches social anthropology at the University ofNew South Wales.2. Both these references are in Japanese. Matsunaga (1991) wastranslated for me by William Purcell, while Matsunaga (1994), withfurther evidence for his case (prompted by his reaction to mycommentary on his earlier piece, he says) was translated byTaiheiyo Gakkai Shi, and kindly sent to me by Dr. Juan Grau, of theEcologicallnstitute of Chile.3.Archives d'Outre-Mer, SG Oceanie, A-121, c131, Pesoli, Gerantdu Consulat de France, San Francisco it Colonies et Marine, 21septembre 1888.4. Archives d'Outre-Mer, SG Oceanie 141, Dossier B25.5. The American "secret" base in the 1960s actualiy was a jointfacility with the Chilean Air Force, although official documents thatI have seen suggest that the line of command was not always clear.When Dr. Allende was a parliamentarian and visited Rapanui, hewas refused permission to inspect the base. However, the fewtourist parties venturing to the island in 1967 and 1968 often wereinvited by the American commander to take coffee and donuts onthe base itself. My first visit to Rapanui was in one of those partiesin November 1968.6. I read a copy of this in the French Archives d'Outre-Mer inAix-en-Provence, catalogued under "BR. 10720B".

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7.. In a brief personal interview in June 1994, Matsunaga told methat the translation "rumomed" should have been more like "talkedabout", for reasons that he is able to demonstrate in his reasearch.8. This false assertion is based on the incorrect geographicalpositioning of Rapanui as being near Singapore, which Matsunagamentions further on.9. Matusaga quotes in Japanese the original Japanese text. I mustwork from the translation in Spanish by Taiheyo Gakkai Shi,already credited above. It is likely that nuance may have been lostbut, I think, the plain meaning text is clear enough.10. Mr. Takeshi Hara was the Military Attache to the JapaneseLegation with considerable knowledge and experience of theSpanish language and Latin American affairs. He had beendecorated by foreign governments at his previous postings and hadbeen in Chile since 1930 Hara would have been easily able to tella "rumour" from a concrete government olIer through hisexperience and his network of contacts in the country.II. These page numbers refer to the unpublished Spanishtranslation by Taiheyo Gakkai Shi.12. David Jenkins (pers. com.) told me that the documents containeda note that for the deal to go through, of course, Australia and theNetherlands, "owners" of New Guinea Island and surroundingterritories, would have to be consulted I

13. EI Mercurio (Valparaiso), 23 October 199414. There were several articles reporting these events and romises,but the most complete is by Elia Simeone Ruiz in EI MercurioSantiago) of 11 November I994.J 5. EI Mercurio (Santiago) of 5 December 1994.

BibliographyBare, Jean-Franyois. 1987. Tahiti, les temps et les pouvoirs. Pour

une anthropologie historique du Tahiti post--europeen.Collection Travaux et Documents N° 207. Paris, Editions del'ORSTOM.

Branchi, E. C. 1934. L'lsola di Pascua. Impero degli Antipodi.Santiago de Chile Edizioni dell'Instituto di Cultura Italiana.

Frei, Henry P. 1990. Japan's southward advance and Australia.From the sixteenth century to World War ll. Melbourne,Melbourne University Press

I-Iotus, Alber10 and El Consejo de Jefes de Rapanui. 1988. Te mauhalU 0 Rapanui Nui. Los soberanos de Rapa Nui. Santiagode Chile, Editorial Emision and Centro de Estudios PoliticosLatinoamericanos Simon Bolivar.

Hunt, W. 1951. Heirs ofgreat adventure: The history ofBalfour.Williamson and Company, Limited. London, Balfour,Williamson

Matsunaga, Hideo 1991. "The history of a proposed cession ofEaster Island to Japan". Journal of the Pacific Society W 49(Vol 13, W4, January 1991): 31-33.

Matsunaga, Hideo. 1994 "Of Japanese Government's OfficialRecords on Chile's proposed cession of the Easter Island toJapan in 1937". Journal of the Pacific Society N° 61 (Vol16, W 4, January 1994) 17-20

McCall, Grant. 1976 "European impact on Easter Island.Response, recruitment-and the Polynesian experience inPeru". Journal ofPacific History II: 90-105

McCall, Granl 1990. "Rapanui and outsiders: 1l1e early days" inBruno Illius & Matthias Laubscher (eds), Circumpacljica.Festschriftfur Thomas S. Barthel. Frankfurt am Main, PeterLang. Pp. 165-225.

McCall, Grant. 1992. "37 Days that shook the (Rapanui) world TheAngata cult on Rapanui". in D. H. Rubinstein (ed.),Proceedings of the Pacific History Association. Mangilao,

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University of Guam Press. Pp. 17-23.McCall, Grant. 1994. Rapanui. Tradition and survival un Easter

Island. Second revised edition. Sydney, Allen & UnwinMellen Blanco, Francisco. 1986. Manuscritos y documentos

espanoles para la historia de la Isla de Pascua: La expediiondel Capital D. Felipe GOl1Zalex de Haedo a la Isla de Pascua.Collection Biblioteca CEHOPU Madrid, Cedex. 381 pages.

Metraux, Alfred 1940. The ethnology of Easter Island Bulletin160. Honolulu, Bernice P. Bishop Museum.

Porteous, 1 Douglas. 1978. "Easter Island: the Scottishconnection" Geographical Review 68(2): 145-56.

Porteous, 1 Douglas. 1981. The Modernization of Easter Island.Western Geographical Series 19. Victoria, University ofVictoria Press.

Porteous, 1 Douglas. 1993. "The modernization of Rapanui". In.Stephen Roger Fischer (ed.), Easter Island Studies.Contributions to the history of Rapanui in memory ofWilliam T Mulloy. Oxbow Monograph 32 Oxford, OxbowBooks. Pp.. 225-227.

Shimizu, Shin. 1938. Japan in the South Seas. Tokyo, The ForeignAlIairs Association of Japan.

Thomas, Nicholas. 1994. Colonialism's culture. Anthropology,travel and government. Melbourne, Melbourne UniversityPress.

Vergara Marquez de la Plata, Victor M. 1939. La Isla de Pascua.Dominaci6n y dominio. Memoria de Prueba. Santiago deChile, Publicaciones de la Academia Chilena de la Historia.

Readers are reminded that the views ofcontributors are notnecessarily shared by the Editors or by the Foundation.

Comment on the two hanauYaram Meraz, San Francisco

Two recent articles in these pages (Mulloy 1993, Langdon1994) have renewed the old argument over the meanings ofthe Rapanui terms hanau 'e 'epe and hanau momoko. Botharticles have a case to make, but neither presents a completestory.

Langdon disagrees with Mulloy's interpretation of theword momoko as meaning 'thin', suggesting that it was alater intrusion into the language, postdating the firstrecording of the hanau momoko tradition, but predatingEnglert. Presumably, Langdon would have it originally mean'short-eared', in contrast with 'e 'epe, presumably meaningsomething like 'eared', from epe, 'earlobe'. However,mokotl/oko with the meaning 'thin' or 'sharp' was recordedby Roussel in his vocabulary, collected in 1865 (Roussel1908, Churchill 1912), whereas no mention of the 'long ears'or 'short ears' was recorded until twenty years later(Thomson 1889). A more recent study (Johnston 1978, withinformant Sergio Rapu), attempts to provide a comprehensivelist of reduplicated words in Rapanui, and gives moko, 'thin';Illokomoko, 'very thin' and momoko, 'thin (plural)'. Thepattern of full reduplication to indicate quantit.y and partialreduplication to indicate number is almost universal in this

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