1

throat slashed badly.Urbano Rubiaco, white guard, minor

throat slashes, deep stab wounds tothroat. ...

How did all this happen? How didit begin? What were the conditions andcircumstances under which a militantblack leader like Nolen was shot andkilled in the first place? Why was mostof the evidence suppressed? Why is itthat even now state investigators, dis-trict attorneys and prison officialsquickly gloss over and cover up theshooting deaths of other black inmatesbut bring the full power of penal, in-vestigatory , judicial and media forcesto bear in the deaths of prison guards?Why is it that the circumstances sur-rounding the death of an inmate, blackor white, can be suppressed and for-gotten while the killing of a guard can-not be hushed up or forgotten? Andfinally, what beatings, what killings,what fecal-infested food, what darkfilthy isolation, what parole refusal,what lies, what other indignities andwhat insight led or compelled theblacks to lash out and kill seven whiteguards? o o o And then what forcesrushed to a cataclysm on January 13,1970, when a corpulent white guardnamed Opie G o Miller squeezed off ashot that struck the breastbone ofWo Lo Nolen, a politicized black inmatewho, for years, had been a close friendand comrade of a black convict namedGeorge Jackson. o o o

JANUARY 13, 1970:

mE DEA11I OF W.L. NOLEN

s ergeant R. A. Maddix, a stocky

Southerner who carried his belly

a few inches in front of his wideleather belt, was the program sergeantresponsible for reopening the exerciseyard. Although Maddix said he wasaware of the "racial vendetta war" inO-wing, he stood by his decision thatonce the yard opened both blacks andwhites would be placed in the yard toexercise together. The only way thestaff was going to stop the racial war,he told a white trusty clerk namedJohn Martin, was to put everyone onthe yard, "and if there was trouble,kill a couple of those black bastardsover there." As the opening of theyard approached, Maddix began talk-ing about the officer who would man

the gun tower. The gun guard selectedwas Opie G. Miller, who, like otherguards assigned to gun towers, hadtrouble getting along with almost anyinmate, white or black. 0. G. Miller,Maddix confided to spmeone, was oneguard who "didn't care and wouldshootithose black bastards and end allthat trouble."

On December 29, 1969, Maddixhanded out mimeographed sheets toO-wing prisoners informing themabout yard release procedures. Themen would be allowed to exercise ingroups of up to 25. Each inmatewould be allowed to carry a towel,since all the showering would be donein the newly installed yard showers."When maximum yard is announced,"Maddix had written, "each inmatewho desires to go to the yard will re-move his clothing and stand by withhis clothes in his arms for release. Fail-ure to- prepare for yard release," thedirective continued in underlined type,'will be considered refusal to exercise,and will result in the inmate's exercisefor that period being cancelled. " Mad-

dix's handout then directed the in-mates to the O-wing sally port, a five-by-five-foot caged area, where the menwould be given an unclothed bodysearch. "So please cooperate," Maddixconcluded, and signed his name.

When the prisoners considered theunderlined sentence, mulling it overtogether with the almost constant ex-changes of racial taunts and insults andthe sly digs from Maddix and otherguards, they concluded that "failure toprepare for yard release" was some-how equivalent to a lack of courage orsimple fear. "I t was like an insuJt," ablack con told me. ...

The O-wing exercise yard, a40-by-150-foot concrete rectangle, wasflanked on the west by O-wing's drabbeige brick wall and on the east by theprison's hospital wing. ...Along theO-wing wall, prison officials hadplaced a heavy punching bag, a speedbag, a pull-up bar, a water fountainand an open-air shower platform. Abasketball hoop and backstop stood atthe center of the yard near the southend, while the north-end wall served asa backstop for handball. Twenty feetover the yard, atop the dental wing onthe south end, Soledad workmen haderected a wooden booth, the new guntower for the yard. In the booth that

John V. Mills, white guard, beaten andshoved to his death; George Jack-son, Fleeta Drumgo and John Clut-chette, three black inmates,

charged, acquitted.William Shull, white guard, stabbed to

death; seven blacks charged, threewent to trial, all acquitted.

Robert J. McCarthy, white guard,stabbed to death; Hugo Pinell,brown inmate, charged.

Kenneth Conant, white prison admin-istrator, stabbed to death; twowhites charged.

William Christmas, black inmate, shotto death at the Marin Civic Center.

James McClain, black inmate, shot todeath at Marin.

Jonathan Jackson, black youth, shotto death at Marin.

Harold J. HaIey, white judge, shot todeath at Marin; Ruchell Magee andAngela Davis charged; Davis ac-quitted, Magee now on trial.

Richard L. McComas, guard lieu-tenant, gun suicide, after about ahundred Soledad inmates weretransferred to Deuel prison; report-edly committed suicide because hefeared for the life of his men.

Leo Davis, white guard, stabbed todeath while guarding a "snitch"who testified in the murder ofguard Shull.

Paul Krasenes, white guard, stabbedand strangled to death.

Frank DeLeon, white guard, stabbedand shot.

Jere Graham, white guard, stabbed andshot; five blacks-George Jackson,Fleeta Drumgo, John Larry Spain,David Johnson and Willie Tate, onebrown-Hugo Pinell, and twowhites-an inmate named Luis Tala-mantes and an attorney, namedStephen Bingham-charged with thethree guards' deaths and the twostabbing deaths of:

John Lynn,Ronald Kane.George Jackson, shot to death by two

white guards.James Carr, considered George Jack-

son's closest friend on the outside,shot to death on lawn of his home;two whites charged.

Stephen Bingham, Berkeley attorney,charged with smuggling gun toJackspn and conspiracy in guards'murders, presumed by both law en-forcement and movement personstobe dead.

Four other people were criticallywounded in two of the above incidents

but they survived.

Gary Thomas, assistant district attor-ney, Marin County, paralyzed fromthe waist down by gunshot woundto spinal column.

Kenneth McCray, white guard, throatslashed from ear to ear .

Charles Breckenridge, white guard,

36 RAMPARTS

8

THE LEGACYOF AMILCARCABRALby Gerard Chaliand

state. The United Nations paid tributeto him, and more than 40 delegationsattended his funeral at Conakry .Hewas, in fact, probably the mostremarkable revolutionary politicalleader that contemporary Africa qas

yet produced.In the last 15 years there has been

no shortage of "dashing leaders"whose charisma transformed them into

mythical figures in their own lifetime.Cabral was not one of these. He pre-ferred patient organizing and carefullycalculated political initiative to earth-

shattering declarations and spectaculargestures. Over a period of seven yearshe founded and built his party and laidthe basis for the armed struggle he wasto lead for the next ten years; Througha slow process of political organizationand mobilization, combined withactual rnilit!lry struggle, he was even-tually able to establish contrQI overtwo-thirds of "Portuguese" Guinea

(Guinea-Bissau).

A small country of 14,000 square

miles and a population of

about 800,000, Guinea-Bissaudoes not have the economic wealth ofAngola and Mozambique with theirsubterranean riches. It is an agricul-tural country , and its harvest of riceand peanuts is exported to Portugal.Unlike Angola and Mozambique,where big international monopolieshold sway, Guinea-Bissau is ruled al-most exclusively by Portuguese in-terests. It is noteworthy that portu-gal's heavily adverse balance of tradeshows a surplus only for the Africancolonies. The latter have little to showfor their sacrifices: in four centuries of

Chri~tian and Portuguese "civiliza-

tion," Portugal produced less than 15university graduates from its Guinean"Overseas Province" and barely 2000children even attended school.

Cabral was born in 1925 in Guinea-Bissau. A mulatto of Cape Verdeanand Guinean descent, he belonged tothat elite group of Africans known as

"assimilados"-natives whom thePortuguese judged worthy of full citi.zenship. The remaining 99 percent ofAfricans were-until 1961-subject tothe so-called "native statute" that pro-

O n January 20, 1973, AmilcarCabral was shot to death in

Conakry , capital of the Repub-lic of Guinea. Leader of the liberationstruggle in the Portuguese colony of

Guinea-Bissau, Cabral was -widelyknown as one of the most importantfigures in the Third World-comparable in stature to a Ho ChiMinh or a Fidel Castro. His assassina-tion thus sent shock waves throughoutAfrica and around the world. Even so,the reasons fqr the conspiracy againsthis life remain obscure.

Gerard Chaliand is a French author who haswritten extensively on national liberation,armed struggle and the problems of social-ism in the Third World. His books includeArmed Struggle in Africa, Peasants of NorthVietnam, The Palestinian Resistance, andAlgeria: Failure of a Revolution. He firstmet Cabral in 1962 and visited the liberatedareas of Guinea-Bissau with him, in May.June 1966.

At 8 P .M. that evening, Cabral metwith a delegation from the Mozam-bique Liberation Front (FRELIMO).Shortly thereafter he proce~ded to areception at the Polish embassy, thenleft at 10: 15 P.M. and returned to his

cJosely guatded home six miles fromConakry. As he stepped from his car,he was shot down by Innocencio Kani,a member of his own party-the Afri-

can Party for the Independence ofGuinea and the Cape Verde Islands(P AIGC). Kani and others then seizedAristides Pereira, one of Cabral's prin-

cipal aides, along with a number ofother party leaders and forced them toboard a boat. The Cuban ambassador ,who was on his way to the P AJGC

headquarters at the time, heard theshots and telephoned Guinean author-ities immediately. The Guinean Navywas alerted and, after a chase, cap-tured the fugitives.

As of now, the only certainty isthat Amilcar Cabral was murdered bymembers of his own party. Severalhypotheses have been put forward'coJlcerning the motives of his assas-sins: ( I) they were Portuguese agents,to whom Lisbon had promised the in-dependence of Guinea-Bissau if thepresent leaders of the P AIGC ,wereeliminated; (2) they were party dissi-dents, and their action arose from in-ternal disputes between black " Afri-

cans" and mulattos from Cape Verde;or (3) they were involved with certainGuineans in positions of authoritywho were opposed to the president ofthe Republic of Guinea, Sekou Toure,

All of these explanations seemplausible, and it is possible that all aretrue, to one degree or another. 'Luiz

Cabral, Amilcar's younger brother,stated simply that " Amilcar Cabral's

death was a result of poor securitymeasures. During the last year, numer-ous deSerters from the African troops

serving Portugal joined the P AIGCwithout being screened."

The world press immediately recog-nized the significance of Cabral'sdeath. The New York Times and theWashington Post covered the story onpage one. The French daily, LeMonde, called him an exceptional/leader with the stature of a head of

RAMPARTS 17

2

By the summer of 1969, mutualfears and racial animosities betweenblacks and whites had increased tosuch intensity that five O-wing blackprisoners tried to take their complaints

in ways not actionable in court."Nolen meant that his charges would behard to prove, like leaving a cell dooropen "to endanger the lives of theplaintiffs." Also hard to prove was thefact that the guards made "false dis-ciplinary reports" to keep blacks onmax row in .the "hole" for longer

periods of time. ...In addition, Nolen swore that Sole-

dad officials were "willfully creatingand maintaining situations that createsand poses dangers to plaintiff [Nolenhimself] and other members of hisrace." Nolen said he "feared for hislife." The case never came to trial;four months after he wrote the peti-tion Nolen was shot to death by anO-wing guard. Two other black in-mates, one of whom signed Nolen's pe-tition, were also shot to death.

T he guts of Soledad Prison is the"main line," a long corridorwhich Warden Cletus Fitzharris

describes as "a quarter mile of mad-ness." Branching off from it, like steelfrom a telephone pole, are the prison's

various housing wings, dining halls,classrooms, its gymnasium and hos-

pital. The prison's maximum securityblock, O-wing, also extrudes from themain line. Like the other wings, 0-wing-called the Adjustment Center orA/C-is three tiers high. Each fl~or is a

double row of small one-man cells,

back to back.While Soledad's 2500 main-liners

shuffle back and forth in a daily rou-tine of reveille, showers, mess hall,vocational training, industry shops andclassrooms, O-wing inmates are lockedin their six-by-nine-foot cells, sur-rounded by three sides of solid walland a row of floor-to-ceiling barscovered with heavy steel mesh. Thirtyminutes a day, on some days, inmatesare let out onto a tier corridor to ex-ercise. There had been daily recrea-

tional periods for basketball, handballand punching bags in a small, narrowexercise yard adjacent to the wing it-self. The outdoor yard was closed and

integrated exercise periods ended,however, with the fatal stabbing of a

black inmate named Clarence Causeyin Apri11968. ...

Because of the Causey death andthe subsequent killing of another blackinmate by guards, racial antagonism inO-wing was intense. Vengeance for vio-lence and death to snitches are the twocornerstones of the convict code. Theblacks in O-wing swore revenge. Aware

of this, the guards stopped integratedexercises. The outdoor exercise yard,which had been used for basketballand handball, was closed. It was a time

to tighten security. Henceforth, onlyone inmate at a time would be allowed

out to exercise. ...

w. L. Nolen

and fears to court. Led by W. L.Nolen, a prison boxing champion whowas quickly becoming politicized, thegroup rued civil suits against WardenFitzharris, the Department of Correc-tions and several guards. ...TheNolen suits charged that the guardswere aware of "existing social andracial conflicts"; that the guardshelped foment more racial strife byhelping their white inmate "con-federates" through "direct harassment

T he murder of W. L. Nolen, onJanuary 13,1970, began an in-credible chain of tragedies that

led the California prison system to dis-aster. The initial consequence was thefirst killing of a guard in Soledad his-tory, a revenge murder, and from therethe poison spread. In the 19 monthsfollowing the January 13 incident, atleast 40 persons were murdered as aresult of events and circumstances inthe California prison system. Of the 40murders, 19 are directly linked to theseries of tragedies which began withthe shooting of W. L. Nolen. For thekilling of seven guards, two CDC staff

members and a Marin County judge,twenty-one blacks and two whites, allinmates, have been charged. No CDCguards or staff have been charged withthe shooting deaths of seven black

inmates.These men died:

w. L. Nolen, black inmate, shot bywhite guard, 0. G. Miller.

Cleveland Edwards, black inmate, shotby white guard, 0. G. Miller.

Alvin Miller, black inmate, shot bywhite guard, 0. G. Miller.Copyright @ 1973 by Min S. Yee

7

~i'

of Guinea, in order to train cadres tocarry the fight for ind.ependence to thecountryside. The recruits, a greatnumber of whom were young peas-ants, underwent six to eight weeks oftraining. For the first time in 406years of colanization, Guinean peas-ants had a chance to acquire somekind of education. They learned welland returned to Guinea-Bissau, oftento their natfve villages. There theyhave constituted the backbone of theparty inside the country .They under-stand and can communicate with thepeasants, and have thus been able tofind people who sympathize with theaims of national liberation and under-cut the influence of Portuguese agents.

\

about 1000 kilometers from theGuinean coast, have a population of200,000 mulattos, all considered to be

"assimilados. ")The party worked underground. A1

first, its members clime mainly fromurban intellectual and semi-intellectualbackgrounds, but their ranks weresoon swelled by workers and unem-ployed young people. During it~ firstthree years, the party concentrated onforming cells in the' major towns. OnAugust 3, 1959, ~ workers' strikebroke out in the port of Bissau. Portu-guese troops were used to suppress it,and 50 workers'were killed. After thestrike, the Portuguese Political Police(PIDE) succeeded in di$mantling a partof the PAIGC organization. Cabral fledto the neighboring Republic ofGuinea, which had won i~s indepen-dence from France the previous year .

In the wake of the August strike,leaders of the PAIGC re-examinedtheir strategy and decided that it was amistake to limit their work to thecities. Conditions in rural areas ap-peared favorable for armed struggle.

Thus the PAIGC set up a school forpolitical studies in Conakry , Republic

vided the legal basis for a policy ofapartheid. They were forbidden tomove freely in their own territory andwere subjected to forced labor.

In the early 1950s, Cabral went toLisbon to study in the university andgraduated as an agricultural engineer.There he met other "assimilados"-men such as Mario de Andrade andMarcelino dos Santos, who were laterto become leading figures in the An-gola and Mozambique nationalistmovements. Together they organized acenter for African studies to analyzetheir condition as a colonized people.

Later Cabral returned to Africa andtravelled for two years in Angola andGuinea-Bissau. The experience deep-ened his understanding of the effectsof colonialism and awoke in him astrong desire to form a political partywhich would dedicate itself to thestruggle for independence. After thepublication of. Census, his remarkablemonograph on "Portuguese" Guinea,Cabral, along with other nationalists,founded the P AIGC in 1956, andthereby united the struggle in .'Portu-guese" Guinea with the one in theCape Verde Islands. (The islands,

T he task they faced in 1960-61was not an easy one: Guinea-Bissau is a small but complex

society. About 30 percent of thepopulation is Moslem (Foulahs andMandingos) and the other 70 percentis animistic (Balantes, Mandjaques,Pepels). The M~slems, and especiallythe Foulahs, have a society whichfunctions under the traditional chief-tain system. Social distinctions arewell defined, as is the system of patri-archal slavery .The Foulahs werehistorically shepherds; today they owna significant amount of livestock. Theyhave a sophisticated economy basedon peanut farming, cattle raising and

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i18 RAMPARTS

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3

6

liberated territories. By 1966, it hadsucceeded in extending the struggle tohalf the nation's territory , despite thepresence of an increasing number ofPortuguese soldiers (10,000 in 1962;25,000 in 1966; 35,000 today), bol-stered with. substantial military assis-tance from NATO countries.

o nce having Ubetated territory,

Cabral developed a new kind of

political-administrative struc-ture in the zones controlled by thePAlGC. He formed committees on thevillage level, consisting of three menand two women who were electeddemocratically and who could be dis-missed by the village assembly. Insti-tuted at the grassroots level in 1964-65, this structure still constitutes thebasis of Guinea-Bissau's administrativeorganization. It manages production,solves communication problems (trans-portation of material and food), super-vises the people's militia in the village,and maintains constant contact with.the party. It has hot only allowed the.villagers to make their voices heard,but has also noticeably altered theconditions, of women and youngpeople by encouraging them to partici-pate in the struggle and the decision-making process. Forced marriage hasbeen forbidden; young girls, especially,have joined the party en masse asnurses and teachers, and sometimes as

. j

1

various forms of trade.In the early days of colonization;

the Foulahs collaborated with thePortuguese, and the latter, in ex-change, granted the Foulahs numerousprivileges. Along with the Cape VerdeIslanders, they became the instrumentof indirect rule over th.e animistictribes. The animists themselves haveno social stratification, the majorsocial distinction being age (the elderlymembers have moral prestige ). Theylive by rice farming, own little cattleand do not engage in commerce. As aresult, the animists have borne thebrunt of forced labor. In addition, thePortuguese imposed Moslem chiefs onthe animist villages; the chiefs thenkept the communities under strict sur-veillance and collected taxes. Thissystem of indirect rule enabled t1;1ePortuguese to maintaiQ a low profile atthe same time as they engineered thequick and easy subjugation of theanimistic population.

Cabral's special genius was to dis-

cover and exploit this reality. Far fromoverestimating the peasants' sponta-neity, as did Che Guevara and FranzFanon, he carefully based his militaryactIon on ongoing political work. Hisstrategy was thus closer to that of theChinese and the Vietnamese NLF .With years of political experience anda thorough knowledge of social condi-tions ih the area, Cabral had prepared

I

the conditions for an armed strugglewhich was to become the most signifi-cant in Black Africa.

In 1961, the P AIGC joined withFRELIMO of Mozambique and theMPLA of Angola to form the Confer-ence of Organizations of the Portu-guese Colonies (CONCP). By thattime, most British and French coloniesin Africa had achieved independence,but Portugal's fascist government andits economic backwardness ruled outthe possibility of even formal indepen-dence for its colonies. Armed struggleseemed the only road open to them.

Early in 1963, it began in thesouthern part of Guinea-Bissau, in thearea bordering on the Republic ofGuinea. It soon spread to the north,near the Senegalese border. By thuslaunching attacks in widely separatedareas, Cabral split the Portuguesetroops and prevented the destructionof the embryonic guerrilla movementthrough excessive concentration offorces. At,the same time, he maxi-rnized the impact on the population ofthe politico-rnilitary movement.

The P AIGC succeeded in liberatingthe Isle of Como, much to the chagrinof the Lisbon government. In an at-tempt to retake it, the Portugueselaunched an offensive with 3000troops in 1964, but failed to oust theliberation forces. That same year thePAIGC held its first congress inside the

RAMPARTS 19

..

4

-.

,,-,."

and holding party conferences.In 1966, Cabral appeared at the Tri-

continental Conference in Havana torepresent the nationalist movements ofthe Portuguese colonies. There he gavehis speech, "Theory as a Weapon,"which brought him recognition as oneof the major leaders of the ThirdWorld. In it he analyzed the role ofideology , the relationships betweenMarxist theory and the actual condi-tions (the level of the productiveforces) in African societies. He alsodiscussed the nationalist petty bour-geoisie as a potentially determiningforce in the revolutionary struggle.Through this speech, Cabral emergedas one of the rare theoreticians of theThird World, as well as a remarkablyable political and military leader .

fighters. The living conditions of therural populat,ion have improved dra-matically: every five or six villagesnow has a school and a small medical

center .In driving the Portuguese out of

these zones, the party has eliminatedthe Portuguese economy as well. In itsplace, the P AlGC has established alter-native economic relationships. For

example, at "People's Stores," agricul-tural produce can be exchanged for

goods (textiles, salt, etc.) supplied bythe party.

On the military level, each villagehas a militia made up of young volun-teers, which is responsible for thevillage's self-defense, and for gatheringinformation on Portuguese troopmovements. Some milita members goon to join the Army of the PAIGC,which is the principal military force inthe country .

The party has complete control ofthe military .Each guerrilla section in-cludes one political commissar forevery 10 to 20 soldiers. These politicalcommissars are charged with main-taining good relations between thegUerrillas and the population so thatthey can function together "like fleshand blood." Cabral' himself used tospend months at a time in the liber-ated zones, inspecting, speaking at thepeople's meetings, organizing and re-organizing, working with the cadres,

Vietnam. The P AIGC responded tothis tactic by increasing the mobilityof its units and then gradually destroy-ing the strongholds still held by thePortuguese forces. In this way, theparty maintained its control of twO'-thirds of Guinea-Bissau. (To be sure,the Portuguese dispute this claim, butover the past eight years, the party hasallowed dozens of observers to inspectthe different regions they control; in1971, for instance, the UN Decoloni-zation Committee visited the liberatedareas and verified the party's claims.)By 1972, the Portuguese controlledonly the coastal strip, the cities andthe central region occupied by theFoulahs-who had remained loyal to

them.Thus, at the time of Cabral's death,

the P AIGC occupied a strong positionin Guinea-Bissau. It had recently heldits first Assembly of Representativeselected from all the liberated terri-tories, and in October 1972 Cabral hadtold the UN's Decolonization Commit-tee that a State Council would soon be

proclaimed.It is perhaps unnecessary to add

that his death constitutes a consider-able loss for the PAIGC and for revolu-tionary Africa. What will happen nowin Guinea-Bissau depends largely onthe party's ability to close ranksaround a new leadership which wouldfollow the policy line developed byCabral. However, his political sense,his particular genius for combining in.telligence, flexibility, firmness andimagination, will be hard to replace.

All those who knew Amilcar Cabralwill remember his thin frame, theGuinean cap he always wore, his calmand humorous way of speaking, andhis poetry, too. He lived only to lead

his people to independence: an independence he hoped would be realwithout a corrupt and privileged ruliniclass, without government ministersand without a capital city. I remembea very large tree in the Olassato regiolwhere we arrived after a long journeyand he said to me, "You see, once WIhave independence this wouldn't blbad as a capital for our country: a tre,where you could rest after a trip to th'villages." And speaking of the futurehe added a phrase which he often repeated and which I will always remelT:ber as hiS own: "I'm telling you, it'going to be hard!" 1

o n the diplomatic level, AmilcarCabral proved that he was ashrewd politician, able to carry

out difficult negotiations with neigh-boring African countries-whetherfriend or skeptic. He succeeded inkeeping his party free from the conse-quences of the Sino-Soviet conflictand .carefully maintained a "non-aligned" status in the best sense of theword. "In order to co-exist peacefully,it is necessary to exist," he declared."Therefore, we are struggling for thatright." With great deftness, Cabralmaintained his objectives withoutserving the interests of any big power,socialist or otherwise.

Never neglecting an opportunity topublicize his people's cause andweaken the international position ofPortugal, he led a delega(ion from thePortuguese colonies to visit the Popein 1969. He made several trips toScandinavia, where the Swedish gov-ernment granted him humanitarian aidfor use by all the liberation move-ments in the Portuguese colonies. Healso travelled in the United States andput his case before the United Nations.In Europe, only France refused him

entry.While Cabral was carrying out these

important diplomatic missions, thePortuguese were developing increas-ingly sophisticated pacification tech-niques. They would, for example, takecontrol of important hamlets and con-duct helicopter offensives against liber-ated zones, following the pattern usedby the U.S. armed forces in South

20 RAMPARTS

5