January 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Here are selected January 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law:Constitutional LawBill of Rights; Rights under custodial investigation. As found by the Court of Appeals, (1) there is no evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on the person of Nagares; (2) Nagares did not complain to the officers administering the oath during the taking of his sworn statement; (3) he did not file any criminal or administrative complaint against his alleged malefactors for maltreatment; (4) no marks of violence were observed on his body; and (5) he did not have himself examined by a physician to support his claim. Moreover, appellant’s confession is replete with details, which, according to the SC, made it highly improbable that it was not voluntarily given. Further, the records show that Nagares was duly assisted by an effective and independent counsel during the custodial investigation in the NBI. As found by the Court of Appeals, after Nagares was informed of his constitutional rights, he was asked by Atty. Esmeralda E. Galang whether he accepts her as counsel. During the trial, Atty. Galang testified on the extent of her assistance. According to her, she thoroughly explained to Nagares his constitutional rights, advised him not to answer matters he did not know, and if he did not want to answer any question, he may inform Atty. Galang who would be the one to relay his refusal to the NBI agents. She was also present during the entire investigation. Thus, the SC held that there was no duress or violence imposed on the person of Nagares during the custodial investigation and that Nagares was duly assisted by an independent counsel during such investigation in the NBI. People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Capitle and Arutor Nagares, G.R. No. 175330, January 12, 2010.Bill of Rights; Double jeopardy. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. On occasions, however, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible.  But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he was not able to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. Complainant Vizconde cited the decision inGalman v. Sandiganbayan as authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case.  But the Court observed that the government proved inGalman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was “dictated, coerced and scripted.”  It was a sham trial.  In this case, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA.  He has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not really go through the process. Antonio Lejano vs.

People of the Philippines / People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al., G.R. No. 176389/G.R. No. 176864. January 18, 2011.Bill of Rights; Unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. In this case, the SC found that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine. First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe that a crime was being committed. Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband items, or evidence of the offense they were then suspected of committing. The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial discovery was indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized contraband be identified and known to be so. The law merely requires that the law enforcer observes that the seized item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. Hence, the two receivers were admissible as evidence. Elenita C. Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2010.Bill of rights; Unreasonable searches and seizures. In this case, there was a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto.  The following are the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van. The crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting officers. Furthermore, accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea. People of the Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun, et al., G.R. No. 180452. January 10, 2010.Constitutionality;   Lis mota . The SC observed that the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 (Philippine National Red Cross charter) was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the previous decision of the SC; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. The SC reminded that it will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. A court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties. Under this rule, the SC held that it should not have declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter.  Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on the matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011.Congress; Creation of private corporations. The SC observed that the purpose of the

constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations was to prevent the granting of special privileges to certain individuals, families, or groups, which were denied to other groups.  The SC found the Philippine National Red Cross Charter is not covered by the constitutional provision, as it does not grant special privileges to a particular individual, family, or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve the common good. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011.Eminent domain; Just compensation. It is the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking that is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. Prior to the NPC’s introduction of improvements in the area where the subject parcel of land is located, the properties therein, including the disputed lot, remained agricultural and residential. The SC found that it was only upon entry of the NPC in Barangay San Roque, and after constructing buildings and other facilities and bringing in various equipment for its multi-purpose project, that the lands in the said locality were later classified as commercial or industrial. Moises Tinio, Jr. and Francis Tinio vs. National Power Corporation/National Power Corporation vs. Moises Tinio, Jr. and Francis Tinio, G.R. No. 160923/G.R. No. 161093, January 24, 2011.Government contracts; Payment based on quantum meruit for illegal contracts. The government project involved in this case, the construction of a dike, was completed way back on 9 July 1992. For almost two decades, the public and the government benefitted from the work done by respondent. According to the SC, public interest and equity dictate that the contractor should be compensated for services rendered and work done. To deny the payment to the contractor would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. Justice and equity demand compensation on the basis ofquantum meruit. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011.Philippine National Red Cross; Status. The SC found merit in Philippine National Red Cross’s contention that its structure is sui generis. National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief and health and social programmes. National societies were held to be organizations that are directly regulated by international humanitarian law, in contrast to other ordinary private entities, including NGOs. The auxiliary status of a Red Cross Society means that it is at one and the same time a private institution and a public service organization because the very nature of its work implies cooperation with the authorities, a link with the State. The SC further noted that the creation of the PNRC was a result of the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention which has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011.State; Immunity from suit. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. It would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable to defeat respondent’s right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have for years received and accepted benefits from the

project and reaped the fruits of respondent’s honest toil and labor. The rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011.Agrarian LawAgrarian reform; Coverage. The main issue for resolution by the Court is whether the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions that included lands devoted to livestock under the coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word “agricultural” showed that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government. Thus, lands devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, and thus exempt from agrarian reform. In the instant case, the MARO in its ocular inspection found on the Lopez lands several heads of cattle, carabaos, horses, goats and pigs. There were likewise structures on the Lopez lands used for its livestock business. Hence, the Court found that the Lopez lands were in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used as industrial lands for livestock-raising. The Court affirmed the findings of the DAR Regional Director and the Court of Appeals that the Lopez lands were actually, directly and exclusively being used for SNLABC’s livestock business and, thus, are exempt from CARP coverage. In contrast, however, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and as such, are thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage. Republic of the Philippines, rep. by Dept. Agrarian Reform vs. Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp./Agri-Business Corp. vs. Dept. Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 178895, January 10, 2011.Administrative LawAdministrative remedies; Exhaustion. Respondent in this case filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioners since, according to him, a large amount of money was still due him under the “Contract of Agreement” involving the construction of a dike, executed between him and petitioners. On the other hand, petitioners aver that respondent should have first filed a claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) before going to the courts. The SC held that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. The exceptions to these rules are the following: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case, the SC found conditions (c) and (e) as present. The government project contracted out to respondent was completed

almost two decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant government office or agency will definitely prejudice respondent. More importantly, the issues in the present case involved the validity and the enforceability of the “Contract of Agreement” entered into by the parties. These, according to the SC, are questions purely of law and clearly beyond the expertise of the Commission on Audit or the DPWH. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011.Career Executive Service; Coverage. The Career Executive Service covers presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Department Manager II of the PEZA does not require appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under the CES. The Third Level of Career Service covers only the positions in the CES as enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987 and those identified by the Career Executive Service Board as of equivalent rank, all of whom are appointed by the President of the Philippines.Modesto Agyao, Jr. vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182591. January 18, 2011.Election LawCandidate; Disqualification. A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate. Apart from the qualifications provided for in the Constitution, the power to prescribe additional qualifications for elective office and grounds for disqualification therefrom, consistent with the constitutional provisions, is vested in Congress. However, laws prescribing qualifications for and disqualifications from office are liberally construed in favor of eligibility since the privilege of holding an office is a valuable one. Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Arnielo S. Olandria,G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011.Certificate of Candidacy; Requirement of being sworn. According to the SC, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandria’s claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. This was held not to be a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Arnielo S. Olandria, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011.Local Government CodeLocal government officials; Suspension pending appeal. Respondent Barriga was held administratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman as a result of anomalous transactions pertaining to the handling of the trust fund of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu in the Central Visayas Water and Sanitation Project. This decision was appealed to the CA but was not implemented immediately. According to the SC, it is clear from Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, that when a public official has been found guilty of an

administrative charge by the Office of the Ombudsman and the penalty imposed is suspension for more than a month, just like in the present case, an appeal may be made to the CA. However, such appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory and the implementation of the decision follows as a matter of course. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is clear that an appeal by a public official from a decision meted out by the Ombudsman shall not stop the decision from being executory. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and Dinah C. Barriga, G.R. No. 172224, January 26, 2011.(Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for her help in the preparation of this post.)

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February 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Posted on March 22, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV

Here are selected February 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on

political law.

Constitutional Law

Administrative cases; right to be presumed innocent. The trial court was correct in

declaring that respondents had the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

This means that an employee who has a pending administrative case filed against

him is given the benefit of the doubt and is considered innocent until the contrary is

proven. In this case, respondents were placed under preventive suspension for 90

days from 23 May 2002 to 21 August 2002. After serving the period of their

preventive suspension and without the administrative case being finally resolved,

respondents should have been reinstated and entitled to the grant of step

increment. The Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System, et al.

v. Albert M. Velasco, et al. G.R. No. 170463,   February 2, 2011 .

Equal Protection; valid classification. Petitioners argue that there is no substantial

distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress

and municipalities that did not have pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a

cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one

municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The SC held

that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the “mad rush

of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities” and the apprehension that

before long the country will be a country of cities and without municipalities. It found

that the imposition of the P100 million average annual income requirement for the

creation of component cities was arbitrarily made as there was no evidence or

empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount.  The

imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20

million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become

component cities. The SC also found that substantial distinction lies in the capacity

and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their

respective provinces.  Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this

capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in

accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the

very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the

11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. League of

Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al.

v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No.

176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056,   February 15, 2011 .

Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose. In this case, the Mactan Cebu

International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and/or its predecessor agency had not actually

used the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for

the purpose they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and

development of Lahug Airport. In fact, the Lahug Airport had been closed and

abandoned. Also, in this case, it was preponderantly established by evidence that the

National Airport Corporation, MCIAA’s predecessor, through its team of negotiators,

had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to

repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport

purposes. The SC held that the government acquires only such rights in expropriated

parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties. This

means that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is

expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it

as a matter of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly

deducible from the condemnation judgment. The SC held that the decision in Civil

Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of approving expropriation, to allow

recovery or repurchase upon abandonment of the Lahug airport project. In effect, the

government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed public

use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the

government.  Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis

of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners can demand the reconveyance of

their old properties after the payment of the condemnation price. A condemnor

should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for

expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose.  If not,

then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the

latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated

in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of

expropriation. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, et

al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal

capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat

in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos.

168770 & 168812,   February 9, 2011 .

Expropriation; reconveyance of expropriated property. In accordance with Art. 1187 of

the Civil Code on mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it

may have obtained from the parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the landowners

need not require the accounting of interests earned by the amounts they received as

just compensation. Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing that if the thing is

improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the

creditor, the landowners do not have to settle the appreciation of the values of their

respective lots as part of the reconveyance process, since the value increase is

merely the natural effect of nature and time. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v.

Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v.

Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E.

Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-

Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812,   February 9, 2011 .

Impeachment; narration of facts. Petitioner urged the Court to look into the narration

of facts constituting the offenses vis-à-vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations

in the complaints. The SC denied this as that would require the Court to make a

determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a

purely political question, which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the

legislature. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee

on Justice, et al.G.R. No. 193459,   February 15, 2011 .

Impeachment; publication requirement. Petitioner contended that she was deprived

of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2,

2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints.

She likewise tacked her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution

which directs that “Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively

carry out the purpose of this section.” While “promulgation” would seem synonymous

to “publication,” there is a statutory difference in their usage. Promulgation must thus

be used in the context in which it is generally understood, that is, to make

known. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood.  Between the

restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless

it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. Since the

Constitutional Commission did not restrict “promulgation” to “publication,” the former

should be understood to have been used in its general sense.  It is within the

discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in

much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a

decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It

is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to

promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of

promulgation.  The SC observed that it is in no position to dictate a mode of

promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Had the Constitution intended

to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as

it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries. Even assuming that

publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the

effectiveness of the Impeachment Rules, which faithfully comply with the relevant

self-executing provisions of the Constitution.  Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The

House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459,   February 15, 2011 .Impeachment; One-Year Bar Rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.” Petitioner reckoned the start of the one-year bar from thefiling of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days beforethe opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress.  She posited that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the SC found that the previous case ofFrancisco v. House of Representatives was applicable to this case. There the SC held that the term “initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint.  The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchstick light the candle at the same time.  According to the SC, what is important is that there should only be one candle that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459,   February 15, 2011 .

Impeachment; sufficiency of form and substance. Petitioner claimed that Congress

failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the

basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules. The SC

found this claim to be untenable. The determination of sufficiency of form and

substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional

grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such

determinative function to public respondent. Contrary to petitioner’s position that the

Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in determining the

sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the

constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a “verified complaint or

resolution,” and that the substance requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts

constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the

committee.” Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where

a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is

made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section

3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a “hearing.”  Prudential

considerations behooved the Supreme Court to respect the compliance by the House

of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any

contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez

v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al.G.R. No. 193459,   February 15,

2011.

Internal Revenue Allotment; just share. Congress, who holds the power of the purse,

in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of respondent

municipalities, having seen their respective capacities to become component cities of

their provinces, temporarily stunted by the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing

respondent municipalities to convert into component cities, Congress desired only to

uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local government units “enjoy

genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest

development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in

the attainment of national goals,” which is the very mandate of the

Constitution. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of

Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al.

v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056,   February 15, 2011 .

International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP, by entering into

theAgreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its

waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC

for erring Americans committing international crimes in the country. As it were,

the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmation of the Philippines’

national criminal jurisdiction.  National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always

the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal

offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the

ICC.  Thus, the Philippines may decide to try “persons” of the US, as the term is

understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system; or it may

opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US “persons”

committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction

of the ICC over them.  In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to

the Philippines with respect to “persons” of the RP committing high crimes within US

territorial jurisdiction. By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually

have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of

sovereignty.  By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some

aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive

and absolute jurisdiction.  The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender

may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one

contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other.  Bayan

Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity

as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618,   February 1, 2011 .

International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under international

law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of

their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating

functionaries have remained within their powers. However, a treaty has greater

“dignity” than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond

doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the

people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any

prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-Surrender

Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious validity, partaking as it

does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. 

Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in

which the Court stated: international agreements involving political issues or changes

of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent

character usually take the form of treaties; while those embodying adjustments of

detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those

involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature  take the form of

executive agreements. According to petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not

fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern Sea

Trading case that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as

commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark

and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and settlement of

claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that the categorization of subject matters

that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is

not cast in stone.  There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a

given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of

international relations.  The primary consideration in the choice of the form of

agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the

form they so wish to further their respective interests.  The matter of form takes a

back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a

treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement

each labor under thepacta sunt servanda principle. Bayan Muna, as represented by

Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,

et al. G.R. No. 159618,   February 1, 2011 .

Judicial Review; expanded   certiorari   jurisdiction . Respondents raised the impropriety

of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition.  They argued that public respondent (the

Congress) was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in

taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political

act that is discretionary in nature, and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a

preliminary investigation. The case of Francisco v. House of

Representatives characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the

expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court reflects, includes the power to

“determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

Government.” The SC found it well-within its power to determine whether Congress

committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the

exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of

jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court. Ma. Merceditas

N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al.G.R. No.

193459,   February 15, 2011 .

Judicial Review; ripeness. An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the

requisite of ripeness.  The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the

direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct. In the present

petition, the SC found no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the

simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of

promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House

(Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate

interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two

impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. 

Petitioner was, therefore, found not to have acted prematurely when she took the cue

from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be

initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year. Ma. Merceditas N.

Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No.

193459,   February 15, 2011 .

Legal Standing; requirements. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner

assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be

able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he

sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its

enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.  In fine,

when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is

a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. In this case, as citizens,

petitioners’ interest in the subject matter of the petition is direct and personal.  At the

very least, their assertions questioning the Non-Surrender Agreement between the

Philippines and the US are made of a public right, i.e., to ascertain that

the Agreement did not go against established national policies, practices, and

obligations bearing on the State’s obligation to the community of nations. Bayan

Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity

as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618,   February 1, 2011 .

Stare Decisis ; nature . The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts

to doctrinal rules established by the Supreme Court in its final decisions. It is based

on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it

should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any

attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy

and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil

Code. The previous case of Lubrica and the present case involve two different issues.

The relief prayed for in the previous case ofLubrica is that the amount for deposit in

favor of the landowner be determined on the basis of the time of payment and not of

the time of taking. But in the present case, the prayer of the LBP is for the deposit of

the valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and Department of Agrarian Reform

and not that of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. The principle of stare

decisis, therefore, does not apply. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P.

Pagayatan, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and

Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee of Federico Suntay, et al.,G.R. No.

177190,   February 23, 2011 .

Sovereign Immunity; expropriation. The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be

successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking

without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being

first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. The SC cited the previous case of De los

Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court where it ruled that the doctrine of sovereign

immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen.  In

exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercised its jus imperii, as

distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area, where

private property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being

paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an

action for payment by the owners. Air Transportation Office v. Spouses David and

Elisea Ramos, G.R. No. 159402,   February 23, 2011 .

Sovereign Immunity; sovereign function and proprietary function. The immunity from

suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong.

Practical considerations dictate the establishment of immunity from suit in favor of

the State. Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual,

government service may be severely obstructed and public safety endangered

because of the number of suits that the State has to defend against. An

unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its

own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of

sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper;

otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to

distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental

function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been

upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to

such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in

pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business. In this

case, the juridical character of the Air Transportation Office (“ATO”) as an agency of

the Government was not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but

was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an

activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity.

Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. Air Transportation

Office v. Spouses David and Elisea Ramos, G.R. No. 159402,   February 23, 2011 .

Supreme Court; modification of doctrines and principles. The doctrine of immutability

of decisions applies only to final and executory decisions. Since the present cases

may involve a modification or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or principle, the

judgment rendered by the Special Third Division may be considered unconstitutional,

hence, it can never become final. A decision rendered by a Division of the SC in

violation of the constitutional provision, that only the SC En Banc may modify or

reverse a SC doctrine and principle, would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore,

invalid.  Any entry of judgment may thus be said to be “inefficacious” since the

decision is void for being unconstitutional. That a judgment must become final at

some definite point at the risk of occasional error cannot be appreciated in a case

that embroils not only a general allegation of “occasional error” but also

a serious accusation of a violation of the Constitution, viz., that doctrines or principles

of law were modified or reversed by the Court’s Special Third Division August 4, 2009

Resolution. David Lu v. Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al./Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al. v. David

Lu/John Lu Ym, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals of Ceby City, et al. G.R. No.

153690/G.R. No. 157381/G.R. No. 170889.   February 15, 2011 .

Administrative Law

Administrative Proceedings; findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies. Petitioners

argue that the Commission on Audit (COA) committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction in declaring the prepayment stipulation in the

contract between Land Bank and Remad Livestock Corporation (REMAD) proscribed

by the State Audit Code of the Philippines. The Supreme Court did not give merit to

petitioner’s argument. It emphasized that the COA Auditor noted that “nowhere in the

documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme with REMAD.” It is well

settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, are generally

accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence,

in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction.  If the

prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners should have produced the

document to prove such fact as alleged by them in the present petition.  However,

the Supreme Court was at a loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was

authorized as its review of “Annex I,” the document to which petitioners base their

authority to make advance payments, does not contain such a stipulation or

provision. In addition, the Supreme Court noted that much reliance was made by

petitioners on their allegation that the terms of the Credit Facility Proposal allowed for

prepayments or advancement of the payments prior to the delivery of the cattle by

the supplier REMAD.  It appears, however, that a CFP, even if admittedly a pro

formacontract and emanating from the Land Bank main office, is merely a facility

proposal and not the contract of loan between Land Bank and the cooperatives. It is

in the loan contract that the parties embody the terms and conditions of a

transaction. If there is any agreement to release the loan in advance to REMAD as a

form of prepayment scheme, such a stipulation should exist in the loan

contract. There is, nevertheless, no proof of such stipulation as petitioners had failed

to attach the CFPs or the loan contracts relating to the present petition. Based on the

foregoing, the COA was not faulted for finding that petitioners facilitated the

commission of the irregular transaction. Ruben Reyna, et al. v. Commission on

Audit, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011.

Agrarian Law

Agrarian Reform; exclusion and exemption from coverage. The deliberations of the

1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all

lands exclusivelydevoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising from the coverage of

the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner’s admission that, since 2001,

it leased another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its cause. The SC, in this case,

accorded respect to the CA’s observation that the assailed MARO reports and the

Investigating Team’s Report do not actually contradict one another, finding that the

43 cows, while owned by petitioner, were actually pastured outside the subject

property. Milestone Farms, Inc. v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 182332,   February 23,

2011.

Agrarian Reform; just compensation. The issue in this case is whether or not the Court

of Appeals erred in ruling that RA 6657, rather than P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, is the

law that should apply in the determination of just compensation for the subject

agricultural land. The LBP and the DAR argue that P.D. No. 27, as reaffirmed by E.O.

No. 228, should be applied in determining the just compensation for the subject

property of the case. They contend that P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 prescribe the

formula in determining the just compensation of rice and corn lands tenanted as of

October 21, 1972. As the subject property was tenanted and devoted to rice

production in 1972, the just value should be fixed at the prevailing rate at that time,

when the emancipation of the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil was

declared in P.D. No. 27. As to R.A. No. 6657, both the LBP and the DAR insist that it

applies only to ricelands and cornlands not tenanted as of October 21, 1972.

According to them, the government’s OLT program on tenanted privately-owned rice

and corn lands pursuant to P.D. No. 27 continues separately and distinctly from the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) acquisition and distribution program

under R.A. No. 6657. The SC held that RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and

EO 228 having only suppletory effect. This is so since the provisions of R.A. No. 6657

are also applicable to the agrarian reform process of lands placed under the coverage

of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, which has not been completed upon the effectivity of R.A.

No. 6657. It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on

the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to

determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. Land Bank of the

Philippines v. Magin V. Ferrer, et al./Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by

Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman v. Antonio V. Ferrer and Ramon V. Ferrer. G.R. No.

172230,   February 2, 2011 .

Agrarian Reform; initial valuation and just compensation. It is the initial valuation

made by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land Bank of the

Philippines that must be released to the landowner in order for DAR to take

possession of the property. Otherwise stated, Sec. 16 of RA 6657 does not authorize

the release of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator’s determination of just

compensation for the land which has not yet become final and executory. Land Bank

of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 46,

San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee of

Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No. 177190,   February 23, 2011 .

Civil Service Law

Regulations; Civil Service. Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government

agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent

character are to be filed. Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure,

Resolution No. 306 was about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and

Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly,

the assailed resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the

personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these

resolutions with the UP Law Center. The Board of Trustees of the Government Service

Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M. Velasco, et al. G.R. No. 170463,   February 2, 2011 .

Local Government CodeCityhood; criteria for conversion. The cases involved here were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the SC En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause. Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the SC En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional. Thereafter, on August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, reinstated the November 18, 2008 Decision.  The SC held that the Cityhood laws were constitutional. Based on the deliberations by Congress on R.A. No. 9009, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009.  Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC,

et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056,   February 15, 2011 .

Legislative power; amendment. R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC.  But the SC also

held that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption

clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned

municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore,

also amendments to the LGC itself. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v.

COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of

Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No.

178056,   February 15, 2011 .

(Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for her help in the preparation of this post.)

Dissension in the Court: February 2011Posted on March 9, 2011 by Jose Ma. G. Hofileña

The following relates to select decisions promulgated by the High Court in February

2011 where at least one Justice felt compelled to express his or her dissent from the

decision penned by the ponente.

1.         No Retreat, No Surrender   (Velasco vs. Carpio)

The Rome Statute

In December of 2000, the Philippines became a signatory to the Rome Statute, an

international treaty which created the International Criminal Court (ICC), through

which the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established with “the power to

exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international

concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.”  The

serious crimes covered by the Rome Statute pertain to those considered grave under

international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes

of aggression.  To date, however, the ratification by the Senate of the Rome Statute is

still pending.

Included among the provisions of the Rome Statute are certain obligations imposed

on parties to the treaty to surrender persons charged with covered crimes upon the

request of the ICC.

The Non-Surrender Agreement

In May of 2003, through an Exchange of Notes, the Philippine government agreed to,

and accepted the terms of, the United States proposed non-surrender bilateral

agreement (NSA).  The NSA in pertinent part, provides that current or former

Government officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or

nationals of one Party that are present in the territory of the other Party shall not,

absent the express consent of the first Party, be surrendered by the second Party to

any international tribunal or to a third country for purposes of being surrendered to

an international tribunal, unless it is to a UN Security Council tribunal.

The Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other

Crimes Against Humanity

In December 2009, Republic Act No. 9851, otherwise known as the “Philippine Act on

Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against

Humanity” (RA 9851) was enacted.  Section 17 of RA 9851, provides:

Section 17. Jurisdiction. –  x x x x

In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense

with the investigation or prosecution of a crime punishable under this Act if

another court or international tribunal is already conducting the

investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime.  Instead, the

authorities may surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the

Philippines to the appropriate international court, if any, or to another State

pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties.

Bayan Muna, a duly registered party-list group, filed a petition seeking the nullity of

the NSA on several grounds among which is that the NSA contravenes the obligations

of the Philippines under the Rome Statute and likewise contravenes the provisions on

RA 9851.

In the majority decision, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco disposed of the arguments put

forth by Bayan Muna and upheld the validity of the NSA.

The NSA, which is an executive agreement which, as opposed to a treaty, does not

require Senate ratification, complements, rather than contradicts, the Rome Statute

(even as the ponente points out that the binding effect of the Rome Statute on a

party such as the Philippines that has signed, but not completed ratification, is less

than on those countries that have both signed and ratified the same).  Extensive

discussion was had to show how the Rome Statute, by its very terms, upholds the

primary jurisdiction over so-called international crimes rests, at the first instance,

with the state where the crime was committed and only secondarily, with the ICC.  On

this basis, Justice Velasco holds that:

The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken collectively, argue

against the idea of jurisdictional conflict between the Philippines, as party to

the [NSA], and the ICC; or the idea of the Agreement substantially impairing

the value of the [the Philippines’] undertaking under the Rome Statute. 

Ignoring for a while the fact that the [the Philippines] signed the Rome

Statute ahead of the Agreement, it is abundantly clear to us that the Rome

Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the [the

Philippines], over serious crimes committed within their respective borders,

the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the

signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.

x     x     x

…For nothing in the provisions of the [NSA], in relation to the Rome Statute,

tends to diminish the efficacy of the [Rome] Statute, let alone defeats the

purpose of the ICC.  Lest it be overlooked, the Rome Statute contains a

proviso that enjoins the ICC from seeking the surrender of an erring person,

should the process require the requested state to perform an act that would

violate some international agreement it has entered into.

Moreover, the majority observes that Article 90 of the Rome Statute recognizes the

primacy of international agreements, such as the NSA, entered into between States,

even when one of the States, such as the United States, is not a State-Party to the

Rome Statute.

With respect to the assertion that the NSA contravenes RA 9851, Bayan Muna had

argued that under Section 17 of RA 9851, if the Philippines does not prosecute a

foreign national for violations of RA 9851, it is left with only two options: (1) surrender

the accused to the proper international tribunal; or (2) surrender the accused to

another State if such surrender is “pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and

treaties.”  Justice Velasco writes that the view espoused by Bayan Muna asserts that

“these options of the Philippines under Sec. 17 of RA 9851 is not subject to the

consent of the United States, and any derogation of Sec. 17 of RA 9851, such as

requiring the consent of the US before the Philippines can exercise such option,

requires an amendatory law.  In line with this scenario, the view strongly argues that

the Agreement prevents the Philippines—without the consent of the US—from

surrendering to any international tribunal US nationals accused of crimes covered by

RA 9851, and, thus, in effect amends Sec. 17 of RA 9851.  Consequently, the view is

strongly impressed that the Agreement cannot be embodied in a simple executive

agreement in the form of an exchange of notes but must be implemented through an

extradition law or a treaty with the corresponding formalities.”

The majority believes, however, that there is nothing in the NSA that runs counter to

RA 9851.

Rather than reading the above quoted second paragraph of Section 17 of RA 9851 as

requiring the Philippines to surrender to the proper international tribunal those

persons accused of crimes sanctioned under said law if it does not exercise its

primary jurisdiction to prosecute such persons, the main decision views the options of

the Philippines thereunder to be discretionary on account of the use of the word

“may” in the statute and therefore, should be interpreted as being merely permissive.

The sole dissent was provided by Justice Antonio P. Carpio.  He took the view that the

NSA, as an executive agreement, should be declared ineffective and unenforceable

unless and until ratified by the Senate of the Philippines.

The dissenter stresses that an executive agreement, such as the NSA, “cannot amend

or repeal a prior law, but must comply with State policy embodied in an existing

municipal law. This also means that an executive agreement, which at the time of its

execution complies with then existing law, is deemed amended or repealed by a

subsequent law inconsistent with such executive agreement. Under no circumstance

can a mere executive agreement prevail over a prior or subsequent law inconsistent

with such executive agreement.”

Justice Carpio believes that the NSA impermissibly contravenes RA 9851 which limits

the options of the Philippines, in cases where a crime is under investigation by an

international tribunal, only to surrendering the relevant persons to the international

tribunal (which obligation is not subject to a consent requirement) or to the State of

such person but only pursuant to an extradition law or a treaty.

As for the Rome Statute, he notes that even if the Senate has not yet ratified the

Rome Statute, the same embodies generally accepted principles of international law

enforceable in the Philippines under the Philippine Constitution pursuant to Section 2,

Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

According to the dissenting opinion, “[i]t is a principle of international law that a

person accused of genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity shall be

prosecuted by the international community. A State where such a person may be

found has the primary jurisdiction to prosecute such person, regardless of nationality

and where the crime was committed. However, if a State does not exercise such

primary jurisdiction, then such State has the obligation to turn over the accused to

the international tribunal vested with jurisdiction to try such person.”  The NSA, per

Justice Carpio, violates this surrender obligation.

(Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. vs.   Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive

Secretary, et al.,   February 1, 2011 ,  G.R. No. 159618. See dissenting opinion here.)

(author’s note:  It seems to this author that the point where the majority and

dissenting opinions clash is essentially on a matter of statutory construction, with

both sides reading the Rome Statute and RA 9851 is opposing manners.  This authors

has long observed that there is probably a statutory construction rule that will

support any view you wish to take so at the end of the day, it is actually a difficult to

reconcile opposing interpretations.  That the United States wants to impose its own

rules through a NSA rather than accede to the Rome Statute as did the 139 signatory

countries (it surely must not be whimsical if 139 nations saw wisdom in the treaty) is,

however, a different, albeit not any less difficult, matter.)

2.         Unconstitutional, Constitutional, Unconstitutional,

Constitutional   ( Bersamin v. Carpio )

In the judicial version of the “She Loves Me, She Loves Me Not” game, The Supreme

Court, speaking through Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, ruled as constitutional the 16

“Cityhood Laws” that the court earlier ruled to be unconstitutional prior to which it

had upheld the same as constitutional after it had first invalidated these laws as

being unconstitutional.

To recall, at issue in these cases was whether or not the 16 Cityhood Laws which

declared certain municipalities as cities even as each such municipality did not

achieve the P10,000,000 income standard set out in the Local Government Code

violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which states that:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,

merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in

accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and

subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the

political units directly affected.

and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

In this latest decision, the majority noted that the bills that eventually became the 16

Cityhood Laws were pending before Republic Act No. 9009, which introduced

amendments to the Local Government Code including the raising of the income

requirement for cities from P20,000,000 to P100,000,000, was enacted into law. 

Theponente pointed out that in the legislative debates relating to Republic Act No.

9009, it was emphasized by that law’s sponsor that the pending bills for cityhood

should not be affected by the proposed change in the income standard.  In light of

this, the majority took the position that the clear legislative intent was that the 16

Cityhood Laws were from the beginning intended to constitute exemptions to the

higher income requirement that was enshrined in Republic Act No. 9009 and that the

exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation

of that intent.

That Congress is empowered to amend the Local Government Code is undisputable.

Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the [Local Government Code].  But it is

also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through

the exemption clauses found therein.  Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly

exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009,

such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the [Local

Government Code] itself.  For this reason, we reverse the November 18,

2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and

stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses,

are not found in the [Local Government Code].

Thus, according to the majority, the Cityhood Laws are compliant with the criteria

established in the Local Government Code as required by Section 10, Article X of the

Constitution.

With respect to the assertion that the Cityhood Laws violates the equal protection

clause of the Constitution given that there is no substantial distinction between the

fact that the bills relating to the Cityhood Laws were pending during the enactment of

Republic Act No, 9009 and other bills that were not so pending at that time, Justice

Bersamin concluded that “[u]pon more profound reflection and deliberation, we

declare that there was valid classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the

equal protection clause.”

Justice Bersamin chides the above view that there is no substantial distinction

because the substantial distinction should not be gauged merely on the whether or

not a bill was pending but rather on the capacity and viability of respondent

municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces.  Said the

ponente: “Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and

viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating

economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust

of the [Local Government Code], manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills

during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. 

Truly, the urgent need to become a component city arose way back in the

11th Congress, and such condition continues to exist.”

Justice Antonio P. Carpio, who penned the decision that this new ruling overturned,

issued the sole dissenting opinion.  In his dissent, he reiterated that the Cityhood

Laws violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution because those statutes

effectively created cities not in accordance with the criteria set out in the Local

Government Code.

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow

the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any

other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution

requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria

necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a

municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law,

like the Cityhood Laws.

Justice Carpio thereafter reiterated his position that there is no substantial distinction

between municipalities with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and

municipalities that did not have pending bills and that the mere pendency of a

cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a substantial distinction that would satisfy

the equal protection clause. Such “pendency” is not rationally related to the purpose

of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into

cities.

In addition, the dissenter expressed that limiting the exemption only to the 16

municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all

similarly situated. “Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent

municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.

Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it

were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be

unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.”

(League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. vs. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al.

vs.   COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. vs. COMELEC, et al.  February 15, 2011,

G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056.  See dissenting opinion here.)

(author’s note: For some strange reason, this author cannot seem to make up his

mind as to his position in this case.)

March 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Posted on April 26, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV

Here are selected March 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on

political law.

Constitutional Law

COMELEC; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction. The Supreme

Court held in this case that despite recourse to it, it cannot rule on the issue of

citizenship of petitioner Gonzalez.  Subsequent events showed that Gonzalez had not

only been duly proclaimed, he had also taken his oath of office and assumed office as

Member of the House of Representatives. Once a winning candidate has been

proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of

Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to the

candidate’s election and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction

begins. Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856,   March

8, 2011.

Equal Protection. The main issue in this case is whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt

from corporate income tax and VAT with the enactment of R.A. No. 9337. The

Supreme Court held that under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of

the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, petitioner is no longer exempt from

corporate income tax as it has been effectively omitted from the list of GOCCs that

are exempt from it. The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming exemption to

prove that it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so claimed. In this case, PAGCOR

failed to prove that it is still exempt from the payment of corporate income tax,

considering that Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337 amended Section 27 (c) of the National

Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the exemption. PAGCOR

cannot find support in the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as the

legislative records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting dated October 27, 1997, of

the Committee on Ways and Means, show that PAGCOR’s exemption from payment of

corporate income tax, as provided in Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the National

Internal Revenue Code of 1997, was not made pursuant to a valid classification based

on substantial distinctions and the other requirements of  a reasonable classification

by  legislative bodies, so that the law may operate only on some, and not all, without

violating the equal protection clause.  The legislative records show that the basis of

the grant of exemption to PAGCOR from corporate income tax was PAGCOR’s own

request to be exempted. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of

Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172087,   March 15, 2011 .

Impeachment; Initiation. The Supreme Court reiterated its previous ruling that the

term “initiate” as used in Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution refers to the filing of

the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action on said

complaint.  The initial action of the House of Representatives on the complaint is the

referral of the same to the Committee on Justice. Ma. Merceditas C. Gutierrez v. The

House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459,   March 8, 2011 .

Impeachment; Promulgation of Rules. When the Constitution uses the word

“promulgate,” it does not necessarily mean to publish in the Official Gazette or in a

newspaper of general circulation.  Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article XI of

the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of “to make known” as it should be

generally understood. Ma. Merceditas C. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives

Committee on Justice, et al.,G.R. No. 193459,   March 8, 2011 .

Non-impairment Clause. Petitioner PAGCOR, in this case, states that the private

parties/investors transacting with it considered the tax exemptions, which inure to

their benefit, as the main consideration and inducement for their decision to

transact/invest with it.  Petitioner argues that the withdrawal of its exemption from

corporate income tax by R.A. No. 9337 has the effect of changing the main

consideration and inducement for the transactions of private parties with it; thus, the

amendatory provision is violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

The SC held that a franchise partakes of the nature of a grant which is beyond the

purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Under Section 11, Article

XII of the Constitution, PAGCOR’s franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or

repeal by Congress such as the amendment under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence,

the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424

by withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which may

affect any benefits to PAGCOR’s transactions with private parties, is not violative of

the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Philippine Amusement and Gaming

Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172087,   March 15, 2011 .

Senate Ethics Committee; Due Process. This case refers to the ethics complaint filed

against Sen. Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200 million for the C-5

Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. Petitioners allege that

the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the

Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process. The SC did not agree. The

Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has

been recognized and affirmed by this Court. The only limitation to the power of

Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and

publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with,

according to the SC, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend

its own rules. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole

represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714,   March 8, 2011 .

Senate Ethics Committee; Equal Protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate

Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming

jurisdiction over the complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that

the act was discriminatory and removed Senator Villar’s recourse against any adverse

report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as a body. The SC did not agree with

this. The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that “all matters relating to the

conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and

its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on

Ethics and Privileges.” However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name its

members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily

an investigation about one of its members’ alleged irregular or unethical conduct is

within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it

from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the

Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court

and declared that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not

before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the

investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy

undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of

the Senate. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole

represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714,   March 8, 2011 .

Senate; Publication of Rules. Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the

Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not

necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of

the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March

2009. Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the

Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole. The SC held that the

Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate.

Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to

the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly

provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. In this particular case,

the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be

published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required

under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole

is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. To comply with

due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights

of its own members are affected. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee

of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714,   March

8, 2011.

Senate; Quorum and Voting. If the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole,

a majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Otherwise, there will be a circumvention

of this express provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the

Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with

requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this

case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of

the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail. . Aquilino Q. Pimentel,

Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan

Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714,   March 8, 2011 .

Unlawful Expenditure for being Excessive; Factors. Price is considered “excessive” if it

is more than the 10% allowable price variance between the price paid for the item

bought and the price of the same item per canvass of the auditor.  In determining

whether or not the price is excessive, the following factors may be considered: (a)

supply and demand forces in the market; (b) government price quotations; (c)

warranty of products or special features; (d) brand of products. In this case, the issue

was whether the computer units bought by Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)

from Tetra were overpriced. The records showed that while the respondents found

nothing wrong per se with the criteria adopted by the CDA in the overall evaluation of

the bids, the technical aspect was seriously questioned. The final technical evaluation

report was apparently manipulated to favor Tetra, which offered a Korean-made brand

as against Microcircuits which offered a US-made brand said to be more durable, at a

lower price. The SC concluded that the price per item of the PC units, laptop and UPS

were overpriced by almost 50%.  This comparison was based on the initial purchase

of 23 PC units with the bid price by Tetra of Php1,269,630.00 (23 PC units, 1 unit 386

Tower and 1 unit 386 Notebook) under Disbursement Voucher No. 01-92-12-

2399. There was an additional (repeat) purchase of 21 PC units for Php929,649.00

(same price per item of Php44,269.00) and one unit UPS for Php86,000.00. The total

contract price obtained by Tetra was Php2,285,279.00, of which COA disallowed the

amount of Php881,819.00 representing the overprice per the auditor’s

findings. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838,   March

8, 2011.

Unlawful Expenditure; Liability of Public Officers. The SC held the petitioner liable

personally and solidarily for the disallowed amount of Php881,819.00. The doctrine of

separate personality of a corporation finds no application because the Cooperative

Development Authority is not a private entity but a government agency created by

virtue of Republic Act No. 6939 in compliance with the provisions of Section 15,

Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, respondents satisfactorily established

that petitioner acted in bad faith when he prevailed upon the Development Academy

of the Philippines-Technical Evaluation Committee (DAP-TEC) to modify the initial

result of the technical evaluation of the computers by imposing an irrelevant grading

system that was intended to favor one of the bidders, after the bids had been

opened. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838,   March

8, 2011.

Administrative Law

Administrative Proceeding; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. This case refers to the

ethics complaint filed against Sen. Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of

Php200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations

Act. Respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the

Senate and that the Supreme Court must uphold the separation of powers between

the legislative and judicial branches of the government. The SC held that the doctrine

of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not

require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their

resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are

within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not for an administrative

agency or the Senate to resolve. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee

of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714,   March

8, 2011.

Agrarian Law

Agrarian Reform; Qualifications of Beneficiary. DAR Administrative Order No. 3, series

of 1990, enumerated the qualifications of a beneficiary: (1) Landless; (2) Filipino

citizen; (3) Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family

at the time of filing application; and (4) Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to

cultivate and make the land productive. The SC found that petitioner Lebrudo does

not qualify as a beneficiary because of (1) and (3). First, Lebrudo is not landless.

According to the records, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Amelia Sangalang issued

a certification dated 28 February 1996 attesting that Lebrudo was awarded by the

DAR with a home lot consisting of an area of 236 square meters situated at

Japtinchay Estate, Bo. Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite. Next, Lebrudo is not the actual

occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the filing of the application. Loyola and her

family were the actual occupants of the lot at the time Loyola applied to be a

beneficiary under the CARP. Julian S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios

Loyola, G.R. No. 181370,   March 9, 2011 .

Agrarian Reform; Role of Land Bank of the Philippines. In this case, the issue was

whether the Land Bank of the Philippines has the personality to file a petition for

determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court. The SC held

that LBP did. The LBP is an agency created primarily to provide financial support in all

phases of agrarian reform pursuant to Section 74 of RA 3844 or the Agricultural

Reform Code and Section 64 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

of 1988. In the previous case of Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of

the Philippines, the SC held that LBP is not merely a nominal party in the

determination of just compensation, but an indispensable participant in such

proceedings. It is primarily responsible for the valuation and determination of

compensation for all private lands. It has the discretion to approve or reject the land

valuation and just compensation for a private agricultural land placed under the

CARP. In case the LBP disagrees with the valuation of land and determination of just

compensation by a party, the DAR, or even the courts, the LBP not only has the right,

but the duty, to challenge the same, by appeal to the Court of Appeals or to this

Court, if appropriate. Davao Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R.

Nos. 181566 & 181570.   March 9, 2011 .

Agrarian Reform; Sale or Conveyance of Land. It is clear from Section 27 of RA 6657

that lands awarded to beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Program (CARP) may not be sold, transferred or conveyed for a period of 10 years.

The law enumerated four exceptions: (1) through hereditary succession; (2) to the

government; (3) to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or (4) to other qualified

beneficiaries. In short, during the prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or

conveyance of land reform rights is void, except as allowed by law, in order to

prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws. In this case, petitioner Lebrudo

insists that he is entitled to one-half portion of the lot awarded to Loyola under the

CARP as payment for shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the

lot from respondent Loyola’s mother, Cristina Hugo, to Loyola’s name. Lebrudo used

the two Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola alloting to him the one-half portion

of the lot as basis for his claim. In other words, waiver of rights and interests over

landholdings awarded by the government is invalid for being violative of agrarian

reform laws. Julian S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola,G.R. No.

181370,   March 9, 2011 .

Election Law

Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Disqualification of Candidate; Period for Filing

Petition. Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private respondent Reno G. Lim both

filed certificates of candidacy for the position of Representative of the 3rd

congressional district of the Province of Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections. On

March 30, 2010, a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of

Candidacy (COC) was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA No. 10-074 (DC)] on the ground

that Gonzalez is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father and

a Filipino mother, and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the

age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.

625. The SC explained the difference between Cancellation under Section 78 of the

Omnibus Election Code and Disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC. A petition to

cancel a candidate’s COC may be filed under Section 78 of the OEC exclusively on the

ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false.

On the other hand, a petition for disqualification of a candidate may also be filed

pursuant to Section 68 for committing prohibited acts referred to in said section. As to

the ground of false representation in the COC under Section 78, the Court in a

previous case elaborated that the misrepresentation must be material, i.e.

misrepresentation regarding age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of

natural-born Filipino status. In this case, the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) based on

the allegation that Gonzalez was not a natural-born Filipino which was filed before the

elections is in the nature of a petition filed under Section 78.  The recitals in the

petition in said case, however, state that it was filed pursuant to Section 4 (b) of

COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and Section 68 of the OEC to disqualify a candidate for

lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification.  The COMELEC

treated the petition as one filed both for disqualification and cancellation of COC, with

the effect that Section 68, in relation to Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure, is applicable insofar as determining the period for filing the petition. This

Rule provides the prescriptive period of filing to be not later than the date of

proclamation. On the other hand, the procedure for filing a petition for cancellation of

COC is covered by Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides as the

prescriptive period to be within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of

certificate of candidacy. Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 represents another

attempt  to modify by a mere procedural rule the statutory period for filing a petition

to cancel COC on the ground of false representation therein regarding a

candidate’s qualifications.  Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 would supplant the

prescribed period of filing of petition under Section 78 with that provided in Section

68 even if the latter provision does not at all cover the false representation regarding

age, residence and citizenship which may be raised in a petition under Section 78. If

the purpose behind this rule promulgated by the COMELEC – allowing a petition to

cancel COC based on the candidate’s non-compliance with constitutional and

statutory requirements for elective office, such as citizenship, to be filed even beyond

the period provided in Section 78 – was simply to remedy a perceived “procedural

gap” though not expressly stated in Resolution No. 8696, the Court, in a previous

case, had already rejected such justification. Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on

Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856,   March 8, 2011 .

(Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for her help in the preparation of this post.

This post will be updated to include additional March 2011 cases.) 

April 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Posted on May 18, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV

Here are selected April 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on

political law.

Constitutional Law

Cityhood Laws; Equal protection. The petitioners in this case reiterate their position

that the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the

Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just

share in the national taxes. This was denied by the Supreme Court. Congress clearly

intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted

from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009 (the Cityhood Law). The House of Representatives

adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain

Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the

coverage of Republic Act No. 9009.  However, the Senate failed to act on Joint

Resolution No. 29. Even so, the House of Representatives readopted Joint Resolution

No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded Joint

Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for approval. Again, the Senate failed to approve Joint

Resolution No. 1.  Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually

filed in the House of Representatives, and were all unanimously and favorably voted

upon by the Members of the House of Representatives. The bills, when forwarded to

the Senate, were likewise unanimously approved by the Senate. The acts of both

Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in

the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to

exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. 

Thereby, R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but

by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses. League

of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the

Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et

al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056.   April 12, 2011 .

Cityhood Laws; Just share in national taxes. The share of local government units is a

matter of percentage under Section 285 of the Local Government Code (LGC), not a

specific amount.  Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis

of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also

dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities

increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. However, the

Supreme Court noted that the allocation by the National Government is not a

constant, and can either increase or decrease. With every newly converted city

becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal

revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual

amount received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a

necessary consequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC. In this case, since

the conversion by the Cityhood Laws is not violative of the Constitution and the LGC,

the respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for

cities. League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of

Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the

Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No.

178056.   April 12, 2011 .

Expenditure of Public Funds; Requirements. The Administrative Code of 1987

expressly prohibits the entering into contracts involving the expenditure of public

funds unless two prior requirements are satisfied. First, there must be an

appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in the contract. Second, there

must be attached to the contract a certification by the proper accounting official and

auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and such funds are available.

Failure to comply with any of these two requirements renders the contract void. The

clear purpose of these requirements is to insure that government contracts are never

signed unless supported by the corresponding appropriation law and fund availability.

The Supreme Court found that the three contracts between Philippine National

Railways (PNR) and Kanlaon do not comply with the requirement of a certification of

appropriation and fund availability. Even if a certification of appropriation is not

applicable to PNR if the funds used are internally generated, still a certificate of fund

availability is required. Thus, the three contracts between PNR and Kanlaon were

found to be void for violation of Sections 46, 47, and 48, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I,

Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, as well as Sections 85, 86, and 87 of the

Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. Philippine National Railways v. Kanlaon

Construction Enterprises, Co., Inc., G.R. No. 182967.   April 6, 2011 .

Locus Standi. For a party to have locus standi, one must allege “such a personal stake

in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which

sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for

illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”  Because constitutional cases are

often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a

preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question

raised. It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the

event their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment is denied and their Motion for

Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of

the Resolution is denied with finality. Indeed, according to the Supreme Court, they

have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case,

such that if the Resolution ordering finality be not reconsidered, their election to their

respective positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would

all be nullified and be put to naught. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs. Executive

Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050.   April 12, 2011 .

Moot and academic Principle; Exception. The “moot and academic” principle is not a

magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. 

Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave

violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and

the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires

formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4)

the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs.

Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050.   April 12, 2011 .

Administrative Law

Government Employee; Dishonesty; Misconduct. Dishonesty is defined as the

concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or

connected with the performance of his duty. On the other hand, misconduct is a

transgression of some established or definite rule of action, is a forbidden act, is a

dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere

error in judgment. More particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer.

The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. In this

case, petitioner’s acts were found by the Supreme Court as clearly reflecting his

dishonesty and grave misconduct. He allowed the Spouses Abuan to use his position

as SSS Senior Member Services Representative to make their “clients” believe that he

could give them undue advantage – over others without the same connection – by

processing their SSS claims faster. Likewise, his acts, according to the SC, imply

malevolent intent, and not merely error in judgment. He was aware of what the

Spouses Abuan were doing and was complicit in the same. At the very least,

according to the Supreme Court, he failed to stop the illegal trade, and that

constitutes willful disregard of the laws and rules. Jerome Japson v. Civil Service

Commission, G.R. No. 189479.   April 12, 2011 .

Agrarian Law

Agrarian Reform; Right to just compensation. Apart from the requirement that

compensation for expropriated land must be fair and reasonable, compensation, to be

“just,” must also be made without delay. In simpler terms, for the government’s

payment to be considered just compensation, the landowner must receive it in full

without delay. In the present case, it is undisputed that the government took the

petitioners’ lands on December 9, 1996; the petitioners only received full payment of

the just compensation due on May 9, 2008. This circumstance, by itself, was found by

the Supreme Court as already confirming the unconscionable delay in the payment of

just compensation. APO Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of

the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195.   April 5, 2011 .

Local Government Code

Local Government; Requisites for creation of province. The central policy

considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability,

efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. 

The criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code, i.e., income, population and

land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. Without doubt, the primordial

criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is

economic viability.  This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC. However, there

is an exemption provided in the Local Government Code in terms of the land area

requirement. When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or

more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in

Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC, if the local government unit to be created is

a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the

enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the

LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Supreme

Court found no reason why this exemption should not apply also to provinces.  In fact,

the Supreme Court observed that considering the physical configuration of the

Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands

would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or

municipalities.  It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy

decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for

component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for

provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the

LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section

461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent. The Court thus upheld the

validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs. Executive

Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050.   April 12, 2011 .

(Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for her help in preparing this post.)

May 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Posted on June 23, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV

Here are selected May 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.Constitutional LawDeclaration of unconstitutionality; doctrine of operative fact.  An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.  The doctrine of operative fact is an exception this rule.  It applies as a matter of equity and fair play, and nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences that cannot always be ignored. It applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.  The doctrine cannot be applied to this case, as to hold otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner who was illegally dismissed from employment and would allow his employer to profit from a violation of an unconstitutional provision of law.  Claudio S. Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management and Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 179532.   May 30, 2011 .Judicial review; review of executive policy.  Petitioner here seeks judicial review of a question of Executive policy, which the Court ruled is outside its jurisdiction.  Despite the definition of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road extension is not within the province of courts.  Such determination belongs exclusively to the Executive branch. Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, et al., G.R. No. 188296.   May 30, 2011 .Administrative Law; Public OfficersAdministrative cases; due process.  Petitioners argue that they were denied due process because their order of dismissal was not accompanied by any justification from the Board of Directors of Philippine Estates Authority, which merely relied on the findings of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission.  The Court dismissed this argument on the basis that petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard in the course of PAGC’s investigation.  The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence a party may have in support of his defense. The demands of due process are sufficiently met when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.  Petitioners here actively participated in the proceedings before PAGC where they were afforded the opportunity to explain their actions through their memoranda.  The essence of due process is the right to be heard and this evidently was afforded to them. Theron V. Lacson v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al./Jaime R. Millan and Bernardo T. Viray v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 165399 & 165475/G.R. No. 165404 & 165489.   May 30, 2011 .Administrative proceedings; due process.  The essence of due process is simply an

opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.  In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.  As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.  Petitioner here was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him and he submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a pre-charge investigation.  When the Office of the Legal Service conducted a summary hearing on the complaint, petitioner was again duly notified of the proceedings and was given an opportunity to explain his side.  He was not denied due process.  Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141.   May 31, 2011 .Administrative proceedings; length of service as an alternative circumstance.  Length of service as a factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative cases is not always a mitigating circumstance.  It is an alternative circumstance, which can mitigate or possibly even aggravate the penalty, depending on the circumstances of the case.  Where the government employee concerned took advantage of his long years of service and position in public office, length of service may not be considered in lowering the penalty. The Court will take this circumstance against the public officer or employee in administrative cases involving serious offenses, even if it was the first time said public officer or employee was administratively charged.   Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141.   May 31, 2011 .Appeal; doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.  The Supreme Court denied this petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  Petitioner here went to the Court of Appeals to appeal the orders of Laguna Lake Development Authority.  Petitioner cites deprivation of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.  The Supreme Court agreed with the CA that such appeal was premature since the law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy which should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial intervention.  Petitioner’s contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDA’s findings is at best speculative and presumptuous.  Universal Robina Corp. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, G.R. No. 191427.   May 30, 2011 .Civil service; security of tenure.  Career service officers enjoy security of tenure as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution and the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, which provides that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process.  The tenurial protection accorded to a civil servant is a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process.  Procedural due process requires that the dismissal, when warranted, be effected only after notice and hearing.  Substantive due process requires, among others, that the dismissal be for legal cause, which must relate to and effect the administration of the office of which the concerned employee is a member and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public.  Nevertheless, the right to security of tenure is not tantamount to immunity from dismissal.  Petitioners cannot seek absolute protection from this constitutional provision.  As long as their dismissal was for a legal cause and the requirements of due process were met, the law will not prevent their removal from office.  Theron V. Lacson v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al./Jaime R.

Millan and Bernardo T. Viray v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 165399 & 165475/G.R. No. 165404 & 165489.   May 30, 2011 .Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; requirements; examples. The acts of respondent constitute the administrative offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, which need not be related to, or connected with, the public officer’s official functions.  As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee.  Under the Civil Service law and rules, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. However, the Court has considered the following acts or omissions, inter alia, as Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to safe keep public records and property; making false entries in public documents; falsification of court orders; a judge’s act of brandishing a gun and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; and a court interpreter’s participation in the execution of a document conveying complainant’s property which resulted in a quarrel in the latter’s family. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141.   May 31, 2011 .Government owned and controlled corporation; requisites.  The Court here ruled that Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation is a private corporation.  It was not created by a special law but was incorporated under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  It is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Although the Bases Conversion Development Authority owned almost all of the shares of Expocorp at the time of the latter’s incorporation, the Board of Directors of Expocorp allowed a private corporation to buy its shares constituting 55.16% of its outstanding capital stock two months after incorporation.  With the BCDA as a minority stockholder, Expocorp cannot be characterized as a government-owned or controlled corporation. A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government.  Since Expocorp is not a GOCC, its officers and employees are private individuals who are outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.People of the Philippines v. Luis J. Morales, G.R. No. 166355.   May 30, 2011 .Misconduct; relation to the official performance of duties.  To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to, and must be connected with, the performance of official duties.  The duties of respondent here as a member of the GSIS Fund Management Accounting Department do not involve the modification of IP addresses, the offense he committed.  The act was considered unauthorized, precisely because dealing with the GSIS network’s IP addresses is strictly reserved for personnel of the Information Technology Services Group, who are expectedly knowledgeable in this field.  Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Arwin T. Mayordomo, G.R. No. 191218.   May 31, 2011 .Procedural due process; right to cross-examine.  While the right to cross-examine is a vital element of procedural due process, the right does not require an actual cross examination but merely an opportunity to exercise this right if desired by the party entitled to it.  In this case, while National Police Commission Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 provides that the sworn statements of witnesses shall take the place of oral testimony but shall be subject to cross-examination, petitioner missed this opportunity precisely because he did not appear at the deadline for the filing of his supplemental answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly the hearing officer

considered the case submitted for decision.  And even with the grant of his subsequent motion to be furnished with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, he still failed to file a supplemental answer or counter-affidavit and instead filed a motion to dismiss.  Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141.   May 31, 2011 .Agrarian LawTenancy relation; elements.  RA 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, defines a tenant as a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter’s consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under a leasehold tenancy system.  For a tenancy relationship to exist, the following essential elements must be shown: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties.  The presence of all of these elements must be proved by substantial evidence. Estate of Pasto Samson v. Mercedes & Ruberto Susano/Julian Chan v. Mercedes and Ruberto Susano, G.R. No. 179024/G.R. No. 179086.   May 30, 2011 .(Teng thanks Charmaine Haw for her assistance in preparing this post.)

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July 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Posted on August 19, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV

Here are selected July 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.Constitutional LawCourt proceedings; denial of due process.  The SC here ruled that the Energy Regulatory Commission did not deprive petitioners of their right to be heard.  Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is granted, there is no denial of due process. In this case, prior to the issuance of the assailed ERC Decision approving Meralco’s application for rate increase, petitioners were given several opportunities to attend the hearings and to present all their pleadings and evidence.  Petitioners voluntarily failed to appear in most of those hearings.  Although the ERC erred in prematurely issuing its Decision (as the same was issued prior to the lapse of the period for petitioners to file their comment on the application), its subsequent act of ordering petitioners to file their comments on another party’s motion for reconsideration cured this defect. Even though petitioners never filed their own motion for reconsideration, the fact that they were still given

notice of the other motion and the opportunity to file their comments renders immaterial ERC’s failure to admit their comment on the rate application.  National Association of Electricity Consumers of reforms, Inc. [Nasecore], et al. vs. Energy Regulator Commission (ERC), et al., G.R. No. 190795. July 6, 2011.Value added tax on toll fees; non-impairment clause.  Petitioners argue that since VAT was never factored into the formula for computing toll fees under the Toll Operation Agreements, its imposition would violate the non-impairment of contract clause of the constitution.  The SC held that Petitioner Timbol has no personality to invoke the non-impairment clause on behalf of private investors in the tollway projects.  She will neither be prejudiced nor affected by the alleged diminution in return of investments that may result from the VAT imposition.  She has no interest in the profits to be earned under the TOAs. The interest in and right to recover investments belongs solely to the private tollway investors. Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol vs. The Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 193007. July 19, 2011.Administrative LawPublic official; effect of resignation on filing of administrative complaint.  The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.  It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since the operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public service.  The SC observed that indeed it has held in the past that a public official’s resignation does not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation.  However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the past cases, the Court found that the public officials – subject of the administrative cases – resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains. First, Andutan’s resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign.  Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one year and two months after his resignation. What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. If the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any official – even if he has been separated from the service for a long time – may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum.  Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.  Office of the Ombudsman vs. Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr., G.R. No. 164679. July 27, 2011.Public officials; prohibited positions.  Respondent in this case was charged with violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713 for solicitation or acceptance of gifts by reason of public office.  The CA found that RA 6713 was repealed by RA 6938; thus, respondent was not liable.  The SC found the contrary.  There was no repeal.  The ban on Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) officials holding a position in a cooperative provided in RA 6938 should be taken as a prohibition in addition to those provided in RA 6713 and specifically applicable to CDA officials and employees.  True, RA 6938 allows CDA officials and employees to become members of cooperatives and enjoy the privileges and benefits attendant to membership.  However, RA 6938 should not be taken as creating in favor of CDA officials and employees an exemption from the coverage of Section 7(d), RA 6713 considering that the benefits and

privileges attendant to membership in a cooperative are not confined solely to availing of loans and not all cooperatives are established for the sole purpose of providing credit facilities to their members. Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity as General Manager of Claveria Agri-based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Filomena L. villanueva/Office of the Ombudsman vs. Filomena L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R. No. 169198, July 6, 2011.Public officials; misconduct.  The prohibition in Section 7(d) of RA 6713 is malum prohibitum.  It is the commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated.  Therefore, it is immaterial whether respondent has fully paid her loans since the law prohibits the mere act of soliciting a loan under the circumstances provided in Section 7(d) of RA 6713. Neither is undue influence on respondent’s part required to be proven as held by the CA. Whether respondent used her position or authority as a CDA official is of no consequence in the determination of her administrative liability. And considering that respondent admitted having taken two loans from CABMPCI, which is a cooperative whose operations are directly regulated by respondent’s office, respondent was correctly meted the penalty of suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon  for violation of Section 7(d). Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity as General Manager of Claveria Agri-based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Filomena L. villanueva/Office of the Ombudsman vs. Filomena L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R. No. 169198, July 6, 2011.Agrarian ReformAgrarian reform; distribution of shares to farmers.  In this case, Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement, Inc. (FARM) argues that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional as it permits stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer; in fine, there is stock certificate ownership of the farmers or farmworkers instead of them owning the land, as envisaged in the Constitution.  For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution. The Supreme Court denied FARM’s contention of unconstitutionality.  First, there was a failure on the part of FARM and its members to raise the question of constitutionality at the first opportunity.  It took them 27 years before they raised the same before the SC and after they have already received some benefits from its implementation.  Second, the issue of constitutionality is not the lis mota of this case, the lis mota being the alleged non-compliance by Hacienda Luisita, Inc. with the conditions of the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) to support a plea for its revocation.  And before the Supreme Court, the lis mota is whether or not the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented, offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions.  The SC held that any of these key issues may be resolved without going into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657.  Finally, there appears to be no breach of the fundamental law.  The wording of the Section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is unequivocal––the farmers and regular farmworkers have a right to own directly or collectively the lands they till.  Accordingly, the basic law allows two modes of land distribution—direct and indirect ownership.  Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted.  Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by individual farmers.  Therefore, Section 4 expressly authorizes collective ownership by farmers. No language can be found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or

cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity through which collective ownership can be exercised.   Hacienda Luisita, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011.  (Teng thanks Charmaine Haw for her assistance in preparing this post.)

August 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Posted on September 22, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV

Here are selected August 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.Constitutional LawCitizenship; collateral attack prohibited.  Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen.  To prove his point, he refers to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichong’s father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father.  Under Philippine law, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149.   August 23, 2011 .Citizenship; forfeiture; application for an alien certificate of registration.  Vilando’s assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother because the latter became a Chinese citizen when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959, likewise failed.  Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichong’s mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship.  He failed to establish his case through competent and admissible evidence to warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling.  Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of Philippine citizenship.  Obtaining an ACR by Limkaichong’s mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship.  Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship.  The Supreme Court has consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship.  For renunciation to effectively result in loss of citizenship, the same must be express.  Such express renunciation is lacking in this case.  Accordingly, Limkaichong’s mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.  Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149.   August 23, 2011 .Citizenship; natural-born citizen.     With Limkaichong’s father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.  Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the

subsequent issuance of a certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age.  The HRET was, thus, found to have ruled correctly in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen.  Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149.   August 23, 2011 .Constitutionality of statutes; writ of certiorari and prohibition.  Writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of statutes and the acts of the other branches of government.  Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011.House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; jurisdiction.  The HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship.  The 1987 Constitution vests the HRET with the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives.  This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET.  However, such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong.  To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which is not permissible.  Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149.   August 23, 2011 .International law; UNCLOS III; RA 9522.  The Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ contention that RA 9522 “dismembers a large portion of the national territory” because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.  Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.  The Court said that UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory.  It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], and exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.  On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf.  In other words, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves.  In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).  In sum, UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely,

lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011.International law; archipelagic waters.  Petitioners contend that RA 9522 unconstitutionally “converts” internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.  To this the Supreme Court held: Whether referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of the Constitution or as “archipelagic waters” under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011.International law; rights of innocent passage. In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community. The fact that, for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More important, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011.Judgment; law of the case.  The doctrine of the law of the case means that whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule between the same parties in the

same case, whether correct on general principles or not, continues to be the law of the case for as long as the facts on which the legal rule was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.  In G.R. No. 137285 (which was the predecessor of this case), the Supreme Court upheld the annulment of the Compromise Agreement and recognized that the agreed upon mode of payment of the just compensation for Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 was cancelled.  The SC ratiocinated that it is notable that it mentioned nothing in the said case about the invalidation of the amount of just compensation corresponding to the mode of payment, which was the value of Lot 434 at the time, which silence was the Court’s acknowledgment that the parties understood and accepted, by entering into theCompromise Agreement in 1993, that the just compensation for Lot 1406-B was Lot 434 (or the value of Lot 434, which at the time of the swap in 1993 was definitely much higher than Lot 434’s value in 1981).  Export Processing Zone Authority (now Philippine Economic Zone Authority) vs. Estate of Salud Jimenez, G.R. No. 188995.   August 24, 2011 .Moot and academic principle; exception.  A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.  Limkaichong’s term of office as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental from June 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired.   Moreover, there was the conduct of the 2010 elections, which has also rendered this case moot and academic.  However, citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, may be questioned at anytime.  For this reason, the Court deemed it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits based on the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”  The question on Limkaichong’s citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.  Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149.   August 23, 2011 .NPC Charter; prescription.  The SC ruled that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 (the NPC Charter) is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land.  The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages.  It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.  National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828.   August 24, 2011 .Power of Eminent Domain; action to recover just compensation from the state and action for damages; distinction.  An action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from an action for damages.  The former, also known asinverse condemnation, is intended to recover the value of property taken in fact by the government defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.  On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages.  When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held

responsible.  The two actions are different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on the Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments.  Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation,  for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation.  National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828.   August 24, 2011.Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; reckoning value.  The RTC based its fixing of just compensation ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the complaint, instead of reckoning it from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395. The SC affirmed this and ruled that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC’s entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit.  NPC’s entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings.  Reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is warranted.  National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828.   August 24, 2011 .Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; rentals.  In this case, the CA upheld the RTC’s granting to the Heirs of Macabangkit of rentals of Php30,000.00/month “from 1979 up to July 1999 with 12% interest per annum” by finding NPC guilty of bad faith in taking possession of the land to construct the tunnel without their knowledge and consent.  However, the SC found that the granting rentals is legally and factually bereft of justification, in light of the taking of the land being already justly compensated.  Accordingly, the SC deleted the award of back rentals and in its place prescribed interest of 12% interest per annum from November 21, 1997, the date of the filing of the complaint, until the full liability is paid by NPC.  National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828.   August 24, 2011 .Power of Eminent Domain; limitations.  The power of eminent domain is not an unlimited power.  Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution sets down the essential limitations: (a) the taking must be for a public purpose; and (b) just compensation must be paid to the owner.  In addition, the owner is entitled to legal interest from the time of taking until the actual payment in order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he was in before the taking occurred.  In this case, it is undeniable that just compensation was not promptly made to the Estate of Salud Jimenez for the taking of Lot 1406-B by the petitioner.  In view of this, the SC found the CA’s fixing of legal interest at only 6% per annum as insufficient for that rate would not ensure that compensation was just in the face of the long delay in payment.  Accordingly, it imposed a 12% per annum legal interest, from August 23, 1993, the date of the approval of the failed Compromise Agreement, until the full amount of the just compensation is paid, instead.  Export Processing Zone Authority

(now Philippine Economic Zone Authority) vs. Estate of Salud Jimenez, G.R. No. 188995.   August 24, 2011 .Power of Eminent Domain; meaning of taking.  There was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation.  Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking.  Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value.  It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.  In this case, NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit without going through formal expropriation proceedings and without procuring their consent or at least informing them beforehand of the construction.  NPC’s construction adversely affected the owners’ rights and interests because the subterranean intervention prevented them from introducing any developments on the surface, and from disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by sale or mortgage.  This was considered by the SC as compensable taking.  NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land.  National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828.   August 24, 2011 .Administrative LawAdministrative offense; exoneration.  The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him.  If the exoneration of the employee is relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed must be made.  If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same.  The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.Administrative proceedings; substantial evidence.  Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies where the quantum of evidence required establishing a fact is substantial evidence.  Often described as more than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.  In this case, there is no dispute regarding the fact that Esguerra had altogether failed to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement under the POEA-SEC.  Beyond his bare assertion that CSMSI (employer) “never gave him referrals to continue his medications as recommended by the foreign doctor” despite his call on 8 July 2003 “to inform them that he will report the next day in order to submit his medical evaluation abroad,” Esguerra did not present any evidence to prove justification for his inability to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician.  Thus, he was not awarded disability benefits and sickness allowance.  Coastal Safeway Marine Services vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 185352, August 10, 2011.Public officers; No work-no pay principle; Exception.   The general rule is that public officials are only entitled to compensation if they render service.  This is otherwise

known as the “no work-no pay” principle.  However, back salaries may be awarded even for unworked days to illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on the constitutional provision that “no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.”  In order, however, to fall under this exception, two conditions must be complied with: (a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges; and (b) his suspension must be unjustified.  In this case, the two conditions were present.  The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of (violation of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty (claimingovertime pay despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was charged with.  The second condition was met as the respondent’s committed offense merits neither dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one month), but only reprimand.  In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed until his reinstatement to his former position – i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension pending appeal.  For the period of his preventive suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries. The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.Public officers; kinds of preventive suspension.  There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending investigation and (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal.  Compensation is due only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal should the employee be ultimately exonerated.  The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011. Election LawElection contest; preliminary conference.  The questioned notice of preliminary conference issued in the instant election protest was defective in that (1) the notice issued by the MCTC clerk of court was a generic notice of hearing without any mention that it was for preliminary conference, and (2) it was served on the party himself despite being represented by counsel in contravention of Rule 9, Section 21 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.  For this reason the Supreme Court disagreed with the RTC’s finding that impliedly ascribed all fault to petitioner in failing to timely file his preliminary conference brief. Ceriaco Bulilis vs. Victorino Nuez, Hon. Pres. Judge, 6th MCTC, Ubay, Bohol, et al., G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011.Election contest; COMELEC’s jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court found no merit in petitioner’s argument that Rule 28, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure limits the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari in election cases to issues related to elections, returns and qualifications of elective municipal and barangay officials.  According to the Supreme Court, said provision, taken together with the succeeding section, undeniably shows that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC whenever a judge hearing an election case has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  A petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest is within the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC.  Ceriaco Bulilis vs. Victorino Nuez, Hon. Pres. Judge, 6th MCTC, Ubay, Bohol, et al., G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011.(Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for her assistance in the preparation of this post.)

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September 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Posted on October 21, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV

Here are selected September 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.Constitutional LawCOA; Powers and function.  Under the 1987 Constitution, the Commission on Audit is vested with authority to determine whether government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds.  Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is vested with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property. This includes the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.  LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.  Luciano Veloso, Abraham Cabochan, Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion and Marlon M. Lacson vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 193677. September 6, 2011.Local government units; grant of award to employees.  In the exercise of its power to “determine the positions and salaries, wages, allowances and other emoluments and benefits of officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from city funds and provide for expenditures necessary for the proper conduct of programs, projects, services, and activities of the city government”, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040, which authorized the conferment of the EPSA (Exemplary Public Service Award) to the former three-term councilors and, as part of the award, the qualified city officials were to be given “retirement and gratuity pay remuneration.”  The Supreme Court, however, noted that the above power is not without limitations, such as the rule against double compensation.  The recomputation of the award disclosed that it is equivalent to the total compensation received by each awardee for nine years that includes basic salary, additional compensation, Personnel Economic Relief Allowance, representation and transportation allowance, rice allowance, financial assistance, clothing allowance, 13thmonth pay and cash gift. Undoubtedly, the awardees’ reward is excessive and tantamount to double and additional compensation.  The remuneration is equivalent to everything that the awardees received during the entire period that he served as such official.  Indirectly, their salaries and benefits are doubled, only that they receive half of them at the end of their last term.  Luciano Veloso, Abraham Cabochan, Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion and Marlon M. Lacson vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 193677. September 6, 2011.Constitutionality; Tariff and Customs Code.  In this case, the issue was the validity of Customs Administrative Order No. 7-92 and Section 3506 of the Tariff and Customs

Code (on the assignment of customs employees to overtime work).  Section 3506 provides: “Customs employees may be assigned by a Collector to do overtime work at rates fixed by the Commissioner of Customs when the service rendered is to be paid by the importers, shippers or other persons served.  The rates to be fixed shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise.” The Supreme Court disagreed with the CA in excluding airline companies, aircraft owners, and operators from the coverage of Section 3506 of the TCCP.  The term “other persons served” refers to all other persons served by the BOC employees. Airline companies, aircraft owners, and operators are among other persons served by the BOC employees. The processing of embarking and disembarking from aircrafts of passengers, as well as their baggage and cargoes, forms part of the BOC functions. BOC employees who serve beyond the regular office hours are entitled to overtime pay for the services they render.  The SC also noted that the BOC created a committee to re-evaluate the proposed increase in the rate of overtime pay and for two years, several meetings were conducted with the agencies concerned to discuss the proposal. BAR and the Airline Operators Council participated in these meetings and discussions. Hence, BAR cannot claim that it was denied due process in the imposition of the increase of the overtime rate.  Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al. vs. Borad of Airlines, et al., G.R. No. 193247/G.R. No. 194276. September 14, 2011.Undue Delegation; Tariff and Customs Code.  The SC did not agree with the Court of Appeals that Section 3506 of the TCCP failed the completeness and sufficient standard tests. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.  The second test requires adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.  Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Section 3506 of the TCCP complied with these requirements.  The law is complete in itself that it leaves nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives authority to the Collector to assign customs employees to do overtime work; the Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates; and it provides that the payments shall be made by the importers, shippers or other persons served.  Section 3506 also fixed the standard to be followed by the Commissioner of Customs when it provides that the rates shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise.  Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al. vs. Borad of Airlines, et al.,G.R. No. 193247/G.R. No. 194276. September 14, 2011.Sequestration and Freeze Orders; nature and purpose.  Without making a definitive conclusion as to the validity of the Sequestration and Freeze Orders being the main issue in Civil Case No. 0142 which is yet to be decided by the Sandiganbayan, the SC concluded that the pieces of evidence enumerated by Tourist Duty Free Shops, Inc. (TDFSI) do not show that it has a right to be protected and that the implementation of the Sequestration and Freeze Orders violates its rights.  The power of the PCGG to sequester property claimed to be “ill-gotten” means to place or cause to be placed under its possession or control said property, or any building or office wherein any such property and any records pertaining thereto may be found, including “business enterprises and entities” – for the purpose of preventing the destruction, concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise conserving and preserving, the same – until  it can be determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in truth “ill-gotten.”  On the other hand, a freeze order prohibits the person having possession or control of property alleged to constitute ill-gotten wealth from transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such

property, or from assisting or taking part in its transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation.  In other words, it commands the possessor to hold the property and conserve it subject to the orders and disposition of the authority decreeing such freezing.  Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), et al., G.R. No. 152500. September 14, 2011.Administrative LawPublic officers; administrative vs. criminal liability.  It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act.  Administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability.  First, there is a difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed.  Second, there is the principle that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability.  Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case for violation of R.A. No. 3019 by the Ombudsman does not foreclose administrative action against Cataquiz, as the general manager of Laguna Lake Development Authority.  Office of the President and Presidential Anti-Graft Commission vs. Calixto R. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, September 14, 2011. Public officers; effect of removal or resignation from office on administrative liability.  Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability.  Despite his removal from his position, Cataquiz can still be held administratively liable for acts committed during his service as General Manager of the Laguna Lake Development Authority and he can be made to suffer the corresponding penalties.  Office of the President and Presidential Anti-Graft Commission vs. Calixto R. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, September 14, 2011.  (Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for assisting in the preparation of this post.)

October 2011 Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Posted on November 14, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV

Here are selected October 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on

political law:

Constitutional Law

Constitutionality of RA 10153. Republic Act 10153 reset the ARMM elections from August 8, 2011,

to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s

regular national and local elections. The law also granted the President the power to appoint

officers in charge for the Office of the ARMM Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and

the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who will hold said offices until the officials duly

elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.  In addressing the

constitutionality of this law, the Court discussed the following issues:

Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections?  Yes. While the Constitution does

not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent

towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the

Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately

making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of

elections.  The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done

among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least

number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections – whether national or local –

to once every three years. This intention finds full support in the discussions during the

Constitutional Commission deliberations.  These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with

the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the

constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second

Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.  Although called regional elections, the

ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local”

election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

Does the passage of RA 10153 violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution?  No. That

section provides that before a bill passed by either the House or the Senate can become law, it

must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies

to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment.  In this case, the records show that the

President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the

immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local

elections.  Following Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the President’s certification exempted both

the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement. 

Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA 9054 violate

Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable

laws?  Yes.  Even assuming that RA 9333 and RA 10153 did in fact amend RA 9054 (the Court ruled

in this case that those two laws did not amend RA 9054), the supermajority (2/3) voting

requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 has to be struck down for giving that

law the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands. 

RA 9054 is the Second Organic Act of the ARMM, which provided that the first ARMM elections

would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. RA 9333 is one of several laws prior to

RA 10153 that reset the date of the ARMM regional elections.  Section 16(2), Article VI of the

Constitution provides that a “majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.”  As

long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these

bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session.  Within a quorum, a vote of

majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.  In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of

RA 9054 requires a vote of no less than 2/3 of the Members of the House of Representatives and of

the Senate, voting separately, in order to amend that law.  Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is

higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the

plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.  While a

supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the

Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it

significantly constricts the future legislators’ room for action and flexibility.

Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only to the creation of autonomous regions under

paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the Constitution?  Yes.  RA 9054 enlarged the plebiscite

requirement in the Constitution with respect to the ARMM.  This enlargement violates Section 18,

Article X of the Constitution.  Section 18 states that a plebiscite is required only for the creation of

autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be

included in the autonomous regions. This means that only amendments to, or revisions of, the

Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation ofautonomous regions – i.e., those aspects

specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act –

require ratification through a plebiscite.  These amendments to the Organic Act are those that

relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the region’s judicial system, i.e.,

the  special  courts  with  personal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and

extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under

Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.  The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any

of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic

Act. Therefore, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial

amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with the plebiscite  requirement.

Does RA 10153 violate the autonomy granted to the ARMM?  No.  Petitioners argued that while

synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the

autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume

that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates – synchronization and

regional autonomy – such that it is necessary to choose one over the other.  The Court found

this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction that

the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole,  and one mandate should not be given importance

over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear.  Synchronization is an

interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that the

Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA 10153, which

provides the measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on

the interests that must be respected.  Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of

being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing features,

except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances. 

Further, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution

never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to

operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by

the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for

regional autonomous determination.  The autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to

defeat national policies and concerns.  Since the synchronization of elections is not just a regional

concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM

cannot be used to exempt the region from having to act in accordance with a national policy

mandated by no less than the Constitution. 

Given the constitutional objective of synchronization, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or

violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA 10153 the concomitant problems that the

adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it?  No.  The Court here identified the following

options open to Congress in order to resolve the problems: (1) allow the elective officials in the

ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections

assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire

when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to

appoint officers in charge, pursuant to Section 3 of RA 10153, until those elected in the

synchronized elections assume office.  The Court held that in choosing to grant the President the

power to appoint OICs, Congress chose the correct option and passed RA 10153 as a valid law.

Holdover option is unconstitutional.  This option violates Section 8, Article X of the

Constitution, which states that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for

more than three consecutive terms.  Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are

covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; Congress cannot

extend their term through a law allowing officials to serve in a holdover capacity.  If it will be

claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result

is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like

the  extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do

indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of

the incumbents.  Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of

the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an

unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. 

COMELEC has no authority to order special elections.   Another option proposed by the

petitioner is for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant

to Section 5 and 6 ofBatas Pambansa Bilang 881.  The power to fix the date of elections is essentially

legislative in nature.  Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled

August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections

synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections.  By so doing, Congress

itself has madea policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special

elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other

elections.  After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the

contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC.  The Court, particularly,

cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively

legislating.  Further, the constitutional power of COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress

to call for and to set the date of elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and

regulations relative to the conduct of an election. COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of

special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant. 

The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials.  Even assuming that it is

legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis

exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials

elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office.  The Court is not empowered to

adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office

of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials, is specifically

given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the

Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes in the 1992

congressional elections, and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President in order to

synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power.  The settled rule is that terms

fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute.  More particularly, not even

Congress and certainly not the Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in

the ARMM forless, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years, as this tinkering would

directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.  In the same way that the term of

elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortenedby

putting an expiration date earlier than the three years that the Constitution itself commands.  This

is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail.

 Does the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs violate the Constitution?  No.  The

power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the

exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be

clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article

VII of the Constitution, which pertinently states that the President shall appoint all other officers of

the government whose whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.  Since the

President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA 10153, it falls under this group of officials

that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the

assailed law rests on clear constitutional basis. 

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under

Section 3 of RA 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and

legislative officials be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This

requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the

appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.  But the Court said this alleged  constitutional

problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA 10153 were to be mistakenly

read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions.  RA

10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM sets outs in terms

of structure of governance.  What RA 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for

the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional

Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the

officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This

power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on

the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.

Given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of

constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is

the choice of the President’s power to appoint – for a fixed and specific period as an interim

measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – an unconstitutional or

unreasonable choice for Congress to make?  Admittedly, the grant of the power to the

President under other situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the

adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not “democratic

and republican.” For then, the people’s right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to

be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic regime.  This is the grant that

would frontally breach the “elective and representative” governance requirement of Section 18,

Article X of the Constitution.  But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited

circumstances contemplated in RA 10153 where the period is fixed and, more important, the terms

of governance – both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA 9054 – will

not systemically be touched nor affected at all.  RA 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously,

with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary

measures that synchronization of elections requires.  

Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a

local community, the ARMM, as well as the community’s choice of leaders, but this will take place

under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures

have been adopted and used in the creation of local government units and the adjustments of sub-

provinces to the status of provinces.  These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national

demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis-à-vis the regional interests involved). 

The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of

the inherent police power of the State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of

the interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.

Furthermore, the “representative” character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be

affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment

process; only the “elective” aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs.  In this regard,

RA 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by providing,

under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the

Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.  Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc.,

et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et

al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The

Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et

al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo vs. The Commission on Elections, et al./Jacinto V. Paras vs. Executive

Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 196271/G.R. No. 196305/G.R. No. 197221/G.R. No. 197280/G.R. No. 197282/G.R. No.

197392/G.R. No. 197454. October 18, 2011.

Ombudsman; power to grant   immunity .  In this case, petitioner argues that by excluding the

respondents in the information, the Ombudsman is engaged in “selective prosecution” which is a

clear case of grave abuse of discretion.  He claims that before the Ombudsman may avail of the

respondents as state witnesses, they must be included first in the information filed with the court. 

Thereafter, the Ombudsman can ask the court for their discharge so that they can be used as state

witnesses under the conditions laid down in Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.  The

Supreme Court held petitioner’s claim to be erroneous.  The Ombudsman has the power to grant

immunity by itself and even prior to the filing of information in court.  RA No. 6770 fully recognizes

this prosecutory prerogative by empowering the Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject to “such

terms and conditions” as he may determine. The only textual limitation imposed by law on this

authority is the need to take “into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court,” – i.e.,

Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.  The rule under RA No. 6770 clarifies that in cases

already filed with the courts, the prosecution merely makes a proposal and initiates the process of

granting immunity to an accused-witness in order to use him as a witness against his co-accused. 

If there is any distinction at all between the public prosecutor and the Ombudsman in this

endeavor, it is in the specificity of and the higher priority given by law to the Ombudsman’s

purpose and objective.  This accounts for the Ombudsman’s unique power to grant immunity by

itself and even prior to the filing of information in court, a power that the public prosecutor himself

generally does not enjoy.  Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion in this case.  Erdito Quarto vs.

The Hon. Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, et al., G.R. No. 169042. October 5, 2011. Police power; zoning. Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city council, police power by virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of Quezon City.  With regard to the power of local government units to issue zoning ordinances, jurisprudence has recognized that the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.   However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary.  Based on the foregoing, the power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality.  In this case, it is clear that

the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City.  More especially so because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA.  Consequently, the enactment of the ordinance in this case is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust.  Emilio Gancayco vs. Cito Government of Quezon City and Metro Manila Development Authority/Metro Manila Development Authority vs. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired), G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933. October 11, 2011.

Right to privacy; unreasonable search and seizure.  This case involves a search of office computer

assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed

from the service. The employee’s personal files stored in the computer were used by the

government employer as evidence of misconduct.  Petitioner questions the legality of the search

conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and

consent.  He said this search violated his constitutional right to privacy.  The right to privacy is a

facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. 

Relying on US jurisprudence, the Court noted that the existence of privacy right involves a two-fold

requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and

second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable

(objective).  Once the right is established, the next inquiry is whether the search alleged to have

violated such right was reasonable.  This proceeds from the principle that the constitutional

guarantee under Section 2, Article III, is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of

unreasonable searches and seizures. 

In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, the court needs to balance the invasion of

the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the government’s need for supervision,

control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.  A public employer’s intrusions on the

constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for non-investigatory, work-

related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the

standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.  Under this reasonableness

standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable.  Ordinarily, a

search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be “justified at its inception” when there are

reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty

of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related

purpose. The search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably

related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the

misconduct.

Applying the above standards and principles, the Court then addressed the following issues:  (1) 

Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2)

Was the search authorized by the respondent Civil Service Commission Chair, the copying of the

contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer, reasonable in its inception and scope?  Here,

the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include: (1) the employee’s relationship to the

item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was

seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item. 

The Court answered the first issue in the negative.  Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual

(subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which

contained his personal files.  Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which

he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other

employees or visitors.  Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to

prevent other employees from accessing his computer files.  On the contrary, he submits that

being in the public assistance office of the CSC, he normally would have visitors in his office.  Even

assuming that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he

claims, the same is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers.  The

CSC had implemented a policy that puts its employees on notice that they have no expectation of

privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers.  Under this policy,

the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. 

This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that computer resources were

used only for legitimate business purposes. 

On the second issue, the Court answered in the affirmative.  The search of petitioner’s computer

files was conducted in connection with an investigation of work-related misconduct.  Under the

facts obtaining, the Court held that the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at

its inception and in scope.  Briccio “Ricky” A. Pollo vs. Chairperson Karina Constantino-David, et

al., G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011.

Administrative Law

Administrative agencies; due process.  Procedural due process is the constitutional standard

demanding that notice and an opportunity to be heard be given before judgment is rendered.  As

long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no

reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the opportunity to be heard.  A formal or trial-

type hearing is not always necessary.  In this case, while the petitioner did not participate in the

August 17, 2006 pre-hearing conference (despite receipt on August 14, 2006 of a fax copy of the

August 11, 2006 order) conducted by the GSIS, GSIS President and General Manager Winston

Garcia’s decision of February 21, 2007 duly considered and discussed the defenses raised in the

pleadings filed by petitioner’s counsel.  Furthermore, what negates any due process infirmity is the

petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration which cured whatever defect the Hearing

Officer might have committed in the course of hearing the petitioner’s case.  Again, Garcia duly

considered the arguments presented in the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration when he

rendered the June 6, 2007 resolution.  Thus, the petitioner was actually heard through his

pleadings.  Monico K. Imperial, Jr. vs. Government Service Insurance System,G.R. No. 191224. October 4, 2011. 

Administrative agencies; findings of facts.  In this case, petitioner was found to have committed

the acts complained of, i.e., he approved the requests for salary loans of eight GSIS Naga Field

Office employees who lacked the necessary contribution requirements under PPG No. 153-

99.  However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the findings of the GSIS, the CSC and the CA that

the petitioner’s acts constituted grave misconduct. While great respect is accorded to the factual

findings of administrative agencies, the Supreme Court did not characterize the offense committed

as grave. No substantial evidence was adduced to support the elements of “corruption,” “clear

intent to violate the law” or “flagrant disregard of established rule” that must be present to

characterize the misconduct as grave.  Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court

did not see the type of open defiance and disregard of GSIS rules that the CSC observed.  In fact,

the CSC’s findings on the petitioner’s actions prior to the approval of the loans negate the

presence of any intent on the petitioner’s part to deliberately defy the policy of the GSIS.  First,

GSIS branch managers have been granted in the past the authority to approve loan applications

beyond the prescribed requirements of GSIS; second, there was a customary lenient practice in the

approval of loans exercised by some branch managers notwithstanding the existing GSIS policy;

and third, the petitioner first sought the approval of his immediate supervisor before acting on the

loan applications. These circumstances run counter to the characteristic flagrant disregard of the

rules that grave misconduct requires.  Thus, the his liability under the given facts was found to

constitute as simple misconduct only.  Monico K. Imperial, Jr. vs. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 191224.

October 4, 2011. 

Administrative proceedings; due process.  Due process in administrative proceedings requires

compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which

includes the right to present one’s case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2)

the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to

support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the

evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties

affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the

law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a

subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know

the reasons for it and the various issues involved.  In the present case, the fifth requirement was

not complied with.  Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which

were eventually made the bases of petitioner’s decision that found him guilty of grave

misconduct.  The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitioner via a

Motion for Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the

violation of his right to due process in this case.  Reyes filed the said motion precisely to raise the

issue of the violation of his right to due process.  As it were, petitioner rendered its Decision dated

September 24, 2001 on the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to Reyes.  Thus, it cannot be

said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations therein

or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.  Office of the Ombudsman vs. Antonio T. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512. October 5, 2011.

Government contract; lack of appropriation.  Petitioner DPWH argues that the contracts with

respondents were void for not complying with Sections 85 and 86 of Presidential Decree 1445, or

the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, as amended by Executive Order No. 292.  These

sections require an appropriation for the contracts and a certification by the chief accountant of

the agency or by the head of its accounting unit as to the availability of funds.   In this case, there

was an appropriation amounting to Php400 million, which was increased to Php700 million. The

funding was for the rehabilitation of the areas devastated and affected by the eruption of Mt.

Pinatubo, which included the Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River for which some of the channeling,

desilting and diking works were rendered by respondents’ construction companies.  It was,

however, undisputed that there was no certification from the chief accountant of DPWH regarding

the availability of funds for the disputed expenditure.  In spite of the lack of certification, however,

the Supreme Court held that jurisprudence has consistently recognized the rule that payment for

services done on account of the government, but based on a void contract, cannot be avoided. 

The contract in this case was not illegal per se.Department of Public Works and Highways vs.

Ronald E. Quiwa, doing under the name “R.E.Q. Construction,” et al., G.R. No. 183444. October 12, 2011. 

Government construction contracts; price escalation.  The issue here is whether Presidential

Decree 1594 requires the contractor to prove that the price increase of construction materials was

due to the direct acts of the government before a price escalation is granted in a construction

contract.  Petitioner argues that Section 8 of PD 1594 requires the following conditions before an

adjustment of the contract price may be made: (i) there was an increase or a decrease in the cost

of labor, equipment, materials and  supplies for construction; and (ii) the increase or decrease is

due to the direct acts of the government.  Petitioner stresses that respondent failed to show the

existence of these conditions.  The Court disagreed.  The contractor does not need to prove that

the increase in construction cost was due to the direct acts of the government.  PD 454, which was

enacted prior to PD 1594, provides (in relation to adjustment of contract price for public works

projects) that “increase of prices of gasoline and other fuel oils and of cement shall be considered

direct acts of the Government.”  Consequently, when PD 1594 reproduced the phrase “direct acts

of the government” without supplying a contrary or different definition, the definition and

coverage provided by the earlier enacted PD 454 were deemed adopted by the later decree.  Thus,

proof of increase in fuel or cement price during the contract period is enough to justify a claim for

price escalation based on such increase.  Philippine Economic zone Authority vs. Green Asia

Construction & Development Corporation, etc., G.R. No. 188866. October 19, 2011.

MMDA; power to demolish.  MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of

2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice Gancayco’s property.  It further alleges that it

demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904, as

amended.  However, the Supreme Court held that the power to enforce the provisions of

the Building Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways, not in MMDA. 

Since there was no evidence that the MMDA had been delegated by the DPWH to implement the

Building Code, it necessarily had no authority to carry out the demolition. Additionally, the penalty

prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of illegally constructed

buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of a fine or by

imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court.  The ordinance itself clearly states that it is

the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance.  Emilio

Gancayco vs. Cito Government of Quezon City and Metro Manila Development Authority/Metro

Manila Development Authority vs. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired), G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933. October

11, 2011.

Election Law

Election protest; failure to file preliminary conference brief.  In exercising its powers and

jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC “must not

be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes.” Here, notwithstanding the fact

that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was not verified, the COMELEC should have considered

the merits of the said motion in light of petitioner’s meritorious claim that he was not given timely

notice of the date set for the preliminary conference. The essence of due process is to be afforded

a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of one’s claim or

defense.  It is the denial of this opportunity that constitutes violation of due process of law.

Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing.  The fact that petitioner somehow

acquired knowledge or information of the date set for the preliminary conference by means other

than the official notice sent by the COMELEC is not an excuse to dismiss his protest, because it

cannot be denied that he was not afforded reasonable notice and time to adequately prepare for

and submit his brief.  This is precisely the reason why petitioner was only able to file his

Preliminary Conference Brief on the day of the conference itself. Hence, by denying petitioner’s

motion for reconsideration, without taking into consideration the violation of his right to procedural

due process, the COMELEC also guilty of grave abuse of discretion.  Salvador D. Violago, Sr. vs. Commission

on Elections and Joan V. Alarilla, G.R. No. 194143. October 4, 2011.

Public Officers

Public officers; dishonesty.  Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting

honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder

upon inquiry.  In other words, good faith is actually a question of intention.  Although this is

something internal, one can ascertain a person’s intention not from his own protestation of good

faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his conduct and outward acts.  In this case, the

facts and circumstances surrounding petitioner’s acquisition of the Certificate of Eligibility cast

serious doubts on his good faith.  He made a deal with a retired CSC official and accepted the

Certificate of Eligibility from the latter’s representative. These circumstances reveal petitioner’s

knowledge that the CSC official could have pulled strings in order to obtain his Certificate of

Eligibility and have it delivered to his residence.  Besides, whether some CSC personnel should be

held administratively liable for falsifying petitioner’s Certificate of Eligibility is beside the

point.  The fact that someone else falsified the certificate will not excuse him for knowingly using

the same for his career advancement.  Thus, the Supreme Court held that that the CA did not err

in affirming the penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties imposed by the CSC.  Cesar S.

Dumduma vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182606. October 4, 2011.

 (Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for assisting in the preparation of this post.)

November 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Posted on December 21, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV

Here are selected November 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law.Constitutional LawAgrarian reform; control over agricultural lands.  Upon review of the facts and circumstances, the Court concluded that the farm worker beneficiaries (FWBs) will never have control over the agricultural lands as long as they remain as stockholders of HLI.  Since control over agricultural lands must always be in the hands of the farmers, the Court reconsidered its earlier ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI.  A revisit of HLI’s Proposal for Stock Distribution under CARP and the Stock Distribution Option Agreement upon which the proposal was based reveals that the total assets of HLI is PhP590,554,220, while the value of the 4,915.7466 hectares is PhP196,630,000.  Consequently, the share of the farmer-beneficiaries in the HLI capital stock is 33.296% (196,630,000 divided by 590,554.220); 118,391,976.85 HLI shares represent 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of the 118,391,976.85 HLI shares unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be placed in the hands of the farmer-beneficiaries.  Control, of course, means the majority of 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 divided by 2 plus one HLI share).  The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control of HLI.  Hence, control can never be attained by the FWBs.  There is even no assurance that 100% of the 118,391,976.85 shares issued to the FWBs will all be voted in favor of staying in HLI, taking into account the previous referendum among the farmers where said shares were not voted unanimously in favor of retaining the

SDP.  In light of the foregoing consideration, the option to remain in HLI granted to the individual FWBs will have to be recalled and revoked.  Moreover, bearing in mind that with the revocation of the approval of the SDP, HLI will no longer be operating under SDP and will only be treated as an ordinary private corporation; the FWBs who remain as stockholders of HLI will be treated as ordinary stockholders and will no longer be under the protective mantle of RA 6657. Hacienda Luisita Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al., G.R. No. 171101. November 22, 2011.Command responsibility. One of the issues raised in this case was whether or not the President, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.  The Supreme Court held that the President may be held responsible or accountable.  To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:  (a) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; (b) the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and (c) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.  The President, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, the same may nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence.  In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when: (a) the acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel are involved.  As to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the military.  The Supreme Court held, however, that aside from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish former President Arroyo’s responsibility or accountability for his abduction.  Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.  In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel H. Rodriguez; Noriel H. Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 191805 & G.R. No. 193160. November 15, 2011.Expropriation; denial of due process.  In this case, the petitioner argues that it was deprived of its right to due process when it was not given an opportunity to present its evidence.  The petitioner claims that the committee tasked by the court to receive evidence on just compensation did not conduct any hearing to enable the parties to present their respective evidence.  Instead, the committee based the Report on documents submitted by the parties, verifications from offices, ocular inspections and local market conditions, and unsubstantiated statements as to the highest and best use of the properties, and the devaluation of the peso.  The Supreme Court held that there was no such deprivation of due process.  The pleadings it submitted and the testimonial evidence presented during the several hearings conducted all prove that the petitioner was given its day in court. The Court noted that the RTC acceded to the petitioner’s request, over the respondents’ objection, for the reconvening of the

Committee for reception of evidence and further proceedings. It also heard and allowed both sides to present evidence during the clarificatory hearings and rendered a decision based on the evidence presented.  Republic of the Philippines vs. Sps. Tan Song Bok, G.R. No. 191448. November 16, 2011.Expropriation; valuation of expropriated property.  One of the issues in this case was whether or not the RTC and the CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of just compensation of the subject properties.  The Supreme Court held that even in expropriation cases, “questions of facts are beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as a petition for review may only raise questions of law.  Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding on this Court.”  Thus, the Court affirmed the ruling of the RTC and the CA that the Report is founded on evidence.  The petitioner’s tax declarations, the BIR zonal valuation and the deeds of sale it presented are not the only proof of the fair value of properties. Zonal valuation is just one of the indices of the fair market value of real estate.  By itself, this index cannot be the sole basis of “just compensation” in expropriation cases.  Various factors come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. Republic of the Philippines vs. Sps. Tan Song Bok, G.R. No. 191448. November 16, 2011.Operative fact doctrine.  The operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid.  The Court rejected the view that the applicability of the operative fact doctrine should be limited to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.  While orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch have fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code and jurisprudence, the phrase “executive act” does not have such specific definition under existing laws.  The term “executive act” is broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under the executive department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the Court.  Even assuming that the operative fact doctrine applies only to executive issuances like orders and rules and regulations, said principle can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to decisions made by the President or the agencies under the executive department. This doctrine, in the interest of justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive branch. In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later nullified. This Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity and fairness.  Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be complied with because it has the force and effect of law, springing from the powers of the President under the Constitution and existing laws.  Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it may have produced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must be respected.  Hacienda Luisita Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al., G.R. No. 171101. November 22, 2011.Presidential immunity from suit; non-sitting president.  The Court of Appeals found respondents in G.R. No. 191805 – with the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry – to be accountable for the violations of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security

committed by the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army.  It, however, dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of her presidential immunity from suit.  Regarding this issue, the Supreme Court held that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure.  Thus, the rationale for the CA’s dropping of the case against former President Arroyo no longer exists in the present case.  It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.  The intent of the framers of the Constitution is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.  Applying the foregoing rationale to this case, it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context ofamparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez. In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel H. Rodriguez; Noriel H. Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 191805 & G.R. No. 193160. November 15, 2011.Taking and just compensation in agrarian reform.  The Court maintains its earlier ruling in this case that the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time that the farm worker beneficiaries (FWBs) were considered to have owned and possessed the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. These lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition.  The minority contends that it is the date of the notice of coverage, that is, January 2, 2006, which is determinative of the just compensation HLI is entitled to for its expropriated lands. To support its contention, it cited numerous cases where the time of the taking was reckoned on the date of the issuance of the notice of coverage.  However, a perusal of the cases cited by the minority would reveal that none of them involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to this case. Moreover, it should be noted that it is precisely because the stock distribution option is a distinctive mechanism under RA 6657 that it cannot be treated similarly with that of compulsory land acquisition as these are two different modalities under the agrarian reform program. In this regard, it should be noted that when HLI submitted the SDP to DAR for approval, it cannot be gainsaid that the stock distribution scheme is clearly HLI’s preferred modality in order to comply with CARP. And when the SDP was approved, stocks were given to the FWBs in lieu of land distribution. As aptly observed by the minority itself, “[i]nstead of expropriating lands, what the government took and distributed to the FWBs were shares of stock of petitioner HLI in proportion to the value of the agricultural lands that should have been expropriated and turned over to the FWBs.” It cannot, therefore, be denied that upon the approval of the SDP submitted by HLI, the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita became subject of CARP coverage. Evidently, the approval of the SDP took the place of a notice of coverage issued under compulsory acquisition.  Hacienda Luisita Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al., G.R. No. 171101. November 22, 2011.Election LawBarangay elections; three-consecutive term limit rule.  Mendoza was a candidate

forBarangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, Oriental Mindoro, in the 29 October 2007Barangay Elections. Prior thereto, Mendoza had been elected as Barangay Captain ofBarangay Balatasan for three consecutive terms, on 9 May 1994, 12 May 1997 and 15 July 2002.  On 26 October 2007, respondent Senen C. Familara (Familara) filed a Petition to Disqualify Mendoza averring that Mendoza, under Section 2 of RA No. 9164, is ineligible to run again for Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, having been elected and having served in the same position for three consecutive terms immediately prior to the 2007Barangay Elections.  When the case was brought to the Supreme Court, one of the issues Mendoza raised was the constitutionality of the retroactive application to the 1994Barangay Elections of the three-consecutive term limit rule.  The Supreme Court held that the issue has already been settled in the case of COMELEC v. Cruz.  The Court reiterated that no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the Local Government Code and can still be found in the current law.    Constancio F. Mendoza vs. Senen C. Familara & Commission Elections,G.R. No. 191017. November 15, 2011.(Teng thanks Charmaine Rose K. Haw for assisting in the preparation of this post.) 

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