Ja Zu Deutschland

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1/14Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498527

PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER SERIES

WORKING PAPER NO.170 NOVEMBER 2009

THEGERMANCONSTITUTIONAL COURTSAYS Ja zu Deutschland!

DANIELHALBERSTAM AND

CHRISTOPHMLLERS

GERMAN LAW J.,VOL.10-8,(2009)



TheGermanConstitutionalCourtsays"JazuDeutschland!"DanielHalberstam&ChristophMllers

UniversityofMichigan,AnnArbor

UniversityofGttingen,Germany

AbstractIn announcing the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional

Court or FCC) on the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty, the Presiding Justice of theSecondSenatesummedupthejudgmentbyproclaiming: TheGermanBasicLawsaysyestothe Treaty of Lisbon. The decision has since receivedmuch praise from commentators for

havingstruck

down

only

the

existing

version

of

an

accompanying

federal

law

while

preserving

GermanysratificationoftheTreatymorebroadly. Thedecisionisthuslikenedtoanotheractofjudicialcooperation,theFCCs1992decisionontheMaastrichtTreaty.

This short comment explains what is old and what is new about the FCCs current

decisionaboutEurope. ThecommentexposestheFCCshighlydeceptiveinvocationofhavingtakenaEuropefriendlystanceininterpretingtheGermanBasicLaw. Thediscussionexposesthemyriadcontradictionswithintheopinionandthedecisionsstrangeconsequencesboth in

terms of the concreteworkings of the EuropeanUnion and in terms of its grand theory of

democracy. The comment highlights the FCCs mistaken understanding of the EuropeanParliament,theprofoundfailureoftheCourtsreflexiveideaofstatesovereignty,andtheway

inwhich

the

opinion

condemns

Europe

to

aperpetual

state

of

deficiency.

In

all

this,

the

Federal

ConstitutionalCourtinstallsitselfasthesolearbiterofGermanysconstitutionaldestinyevenabovethepeoplethemselves.

AsubversiveopinionwithmoretwistsandturnsthaneventheFCCitselfcomprehends,thedecisionultimatelystandsasacrudespeechactassertinglittlemorethanthepoweroftheCourtitself.

Daniel Halberstam, Eric Stein Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School [Email: [email protected]].

ChristophMllers,ProfessorofPublicLaw,UniversityofGttingenLawSchool[Email: [email protected]].
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]



Halberstam&Mllers 2TheGermanConstitutionalCourtsays"JazuDeutschland!"

ByDanielHalberstam&ChristophMllers

[in10GERMANLAWJOURNALNo.8(2009)]

A. IntroductionInannouncingthedecisionoftheBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG FederalConstitutionalCourt)onthe

constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty,1 the Presiding Justice of the Second Senate summed up the

judgmentbyproclaiming: DasGrundgesetzsagtJazumVertragvonLissabon.

B. RepetitionTheGermanCourtrepeatsmuchthathadbeensaidbefore. Mostfundamentally,theCourtexplainsonce

againthat

it

views

the

European

legal

order

as

asecondary

order,

derived

from

that

of

the

Member

States. TheCourtcontinuestocomparetheEuropeanUniontointernationalorganizationsbyrepeatedly

discussing international and supranational organizations2 in one breath. Once states transfer

sovereignpowerstosuchaninstitution,3thelattermayindeeddevelopindependentlyandshow[]a

tendency of political selfenhancement.4 And yet, the Member States remain the masters of the

Treaties.5 ThefunctionalConstitutionofEurope,i.e.theprimarytreaty lawconstitutingthepowers

of theUnion, simply remains an abgeleitete Grundordnung, i.e. a derivative legal order. So, too,

EuropeancitizenshipisaderivativestatusthatdoesnotchallengetheexistenceoftheGermanpeople

(Staatsvolk).6

As in theMaastrichtCase, theCourtmakesway for theapplicationofEuropean lawwithinGermany.

European law does not preempt Member State law in the sense of annulment but forces back

conflicting

Member

States

law

to

allow

for

the

application

of

Community

law.

7

The

Court

pledges

to

adheretotheoldSolangecompromiseandrefrainfromreviewingEuropeansecondary lawandactsfor

theircompatibilitywithfundamentalrightsas longastheEuropeanUnionguaranteesanapplicationof

fundamental rights that in substance and effectiveness is essentially similar to the protection of

fundamentalrightsrequiredunconditionallybytheBasicLaw.8

Daniel Halberstam, Eric Stein Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School [Email:[email protected]]. Christoph Mllers, Professor of Public Law, University of Gttingen Law School [Email:[email protected]]. ThankstoDieterGrimmandtheparticipantsintheSIASSI2009seminarforhelpfuldiscussions,andtoMatejAvbeljforpointingouttheCourtsmisstatement regardingnationalrepresentationintheEuropeanParliament.

1 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, available at:http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html.2See,e.g.,id.atpara.237.3Id.atpara.231.4Id.atpara.237.5Id.atpara.231.6Id.atparas.34650.7Id.atpara.335.8Id.at191(citingBVerfGE73,339(376,387);BVerfGE102,147,(164)).
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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TheLisbonDecision 3

Unsurprising, then, is theCourtselaborationof the impossibility thatGerman state institutionswould

grant the EuropeanUnion license to determine its ownpowers (KompetenzKompetenz).9 Similarly

unsurprising isthe insistenceonGermanyspowerto leavetheUnion,which, intheCourts(somewhat

sloppy) view, would not be an instance of internationally problematic secession, but merely the

withdrawalfromaStaatenverbundthatisfoundedontheprincipleofreversibleselfcommitment.10

The

LisbonTreaty

presents

no

problem

in

this

regard,

11

especially

as

it

now

makes

the

previously

existing

right

ofwithdrawalexplicit.12

C. InnovationDespiteamplerepetitionoftheMaastrichtrefrain,theCourtdidmanagetocoversomenewground

bothattheconcrete levelof imposinglegalrulesaswellasatthe levelofconceptualizingtheEuropean

andMemberStatelegalorders.

I. OperationalMatters

1. BlockingPasserelle

Thecentral

innovation

of

the

Courts

Lisbon

Case

concerns

the

so

called

passerelle

clauses,

which

allow

the Council tomove from unanimity to qualifiedmajority voting or from the special to the ordinary

legislativeprocedure.13

Theseprovisionsgivenationalparliamentssixmonthstovetoaproposedswitch

inprocedure. TheCourt,however,fusestherepresentativeoftheGermangovernmentintheCouncilto

itsnationallegislaturebyholdingthatGermanysrepresentativeintheCouncilmustinnocaseagreetoa

changeinprocedureunlessanduntilthelegislaturehasvotedonthematter. Silenceonthepartofthe

BundestagandBundesrat,theCourtexplains,is . . .notsufficient forexercisingthisresponsibility.14

Moreover,withregardtothegeneral(asopposedtosubjectmatterspecific)bridgeclauses,avotebythe

legislatureisnotenough. HeretheCourtrequirestheGermanlegislaturetotaketheextrastepandpass

alawtoratifywhattheCourtdescribesasachangeinprimarytreatylawwithinthemeaningofBasicLaw

Article23(1).15

2.The

Curious

Case

of

the

Emergency

Brake

TheCourtevensubjectsthesocalledemergencybrakesystemtoaforced legislativevoteto instruct

Germanys representative in the Council. In the course of considering certain legislative proposals

concerningcriminal law16

andsocialsecurity,17

aCouncilmembermayraiseanobjectionthatsuspends

9Id.atpara.233(citing,amongothers,89BVerfGE155,187f.,192,199).10

Id.atpara.233.11

Id.atparas.29899.12

See,e.g.,id.atpara.329.13

See,e.g., id.,atpara.316. Seealso,TreatyofLisbonAmendingtheTreatyonEuropeanUnionandtheTreatyEstablishingthe

EuropeanCommunity,

Dec.

13,

2007,

art.

48(7)

2007

O.J.

(C

306)

1[hereinafter

Lisbon

Treaty]

(general

bridge

clause);

Lisbon

Treaty

art.31(3)(CFSPbridgeclauseCouncil);ConsolidatedVersionoftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,May9,2008,art.81(3),O.J.C115/47, at78 (2008) [hereinafter TFEU] (family law);TFEU art. 153(2) (social rights);TFEU art. 192(2) (certainenvironmentalprovisions);TFEUart.312(2)(multiannualfinancialframework);TFEUArt.333(2)(enhancedcooperation).

14 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 413, available at:

http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html..15

Id.atparas.319and413.16

TFEUarts.82(3)&83(3).


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Halberstam&Mllers 4considerationofthemeasureandrefersthemattertotheEuropeanCouncil.

18 Theseprocedurespushin

theoppositedirectionasthepasserelleclauses,suspendingthemoreCommunityfriendlyprocedurethat

wouldbeusedabsentinterventionbyaMemberState. Nonetheless,theCourtsubjectstheseemergency

brakesalongwiththepasserelleclausestoanaffirmativeinstructiononthepartoftheBundestagand,

whereappropriate,theBundesrat.

TheCourts

decision

on

the

emergency

brake

provision

leads

to

arather

surprising

result.

Recall

that

in

theemergencybrakeprovisionsthemoreCommunityfriendlyprocedure isthedefaultprocedure. This

procedure is only set aside upon the objection of a Member State representative in the Council.

Nonetheless,theCourtholds:

[T]he German representative in the Council may only exercise this

right of the Member States on the instruction of the German

Bundestagand,totheextentthatthisisrequiredbytheprovisionson

legislation,theBundesrat.19

Thishasthreecuriousconsequences. First,theGermanrepresentative intheCouncilcannot invokethe

emergencybrakeagainstthewishesofparliament. IftheGermanparliamentchoosesnottoinvokethe

emergency brake, then neither can the German government. This stands inmarked contrast to the

situationunder

the

passerelle

clauses,

where

the

German

government

as

well

as

the

German

legislature

mustagreebeforethemoreCommunityfriendlyprocedureisused. Second,theGermanrepresentative

in the Council cannot act at all with regard to the emergency brake provision in the absence of

parliamentary instruction. Thismeansthat iftheGerman legislature isdeadlockedorotherwisefailsto

act,themoreCommunityfriendlyprocedurewillbeused. Here,too,theCourt,most likelyunwittingly,

pushesinfavornotagainstintegration.

Third,theCourtspeaksonlyaboutinstructingtheGermanrepresentativeintheCouncil,sayingnothing

abouttheGermanrepresentativeintheEuropeanCouncil. ThismeansthattheGermanlegislaturemight

instruct the German representative in the Council to invoke the emergency brake only to have the

Germanrepresentative intheEuropeanCounciltothrowthematterbacktotheCouncilthus liftingthe

brakealtogether.

3. ImpliedPowers,theFlexibilityClause,andUltraViresReview

IndiscussingtheUnionsflexibilityclause,theCourtopenswithatendentiousslightofhand. Itsuggests

that the doctrine of implied powers is, in principle, nothing unusual in the scheme of European

integration. TheCourt likenstheeffective interpretationofpowers(wirksameKompenzauslegung)to

theU.S.doctrineofimpliedpowers, (citing the InternationalCourtof JusticecaseonReparationfor

Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations), and to the French doctrine of effet utile in

internationaltreatylaw.20

AlthoughtheCourthereaddsaparentheticalcitationtoPierrePescatorefor

an understanding of the latter concept especially as regards European law, the main gist of the

17TFEUart.48(2).

18UnderArticle48TFEU,theEuropeanCouncilmaythenterminatethelegislativeprocess,asktheCommissionforanewproposal,

orreferthematterbacktoCounciltoproceedwiththe legislativeprocess. UnderArticles82and83TFEU,theEuropeanCouncilmayonlyreferthematterbacktotheCouncilafteraunanimousvoteanddoesnotappeartohavetheoptionofrequestinganew

proposalfromtheCommission. UnderArticles82and83TFEU,however,nineMemberStates,mayalsochoosetoproceedonthebasisoftheclosercooperationprovisionsoftheTreaty.19

Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 400, available at:

http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html(emphasisadded).20

Id.atpara.237.


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TheLisbonDecision 5paragraphsuggestsaninternational,asopposedtoconstitutional,understandingofimpliedpowers.

21 A

constitutional understanding of implied powers that invokes the U.S. tradition would have had to

grapplewiththepowerfulvisionof impliedpowers laidout inJusticeMarshallsopinion inMcCullochv.

Maryland. TheCourtssimplecitationto international lawassomehowrepresentativeoftheAmerican

traditionofimpliedpowersisaratherunderhandedwayofavoidingthiscomparison. Weareleft,then,

withnoargumentfortheCourtswatereddownunderstandingoftheimpliedpowersdoctrineinEurope.

The Court further subjects any Council decision to resort to the general implied powers provision of

Article 352 TFEU to a ratification law pursuant toBasic LawArticle23(1). The Lisbon Treaty lifts the

currentlimitationofArticle308EC(whichdemandsthattheuseofimpliedpowersservethegoalsofthe

internalmarket) toallow the invocationof impliedpowers in the serviceofallpoliciesdefined in the

Treaties.22

IntheCourtsview,thisnewgenerality leavesthescopeofthe flexibilityclause illdefined

and,thus,tantamounttoaninvitationtosubstantive,fundamentaltreatychanges.23

TheCourtalsosees

thisasraisingconcernsinlightoftheconstitutionalprohibitionagainstgrantingtheUnionplenarypowers

or against delegating to theUnion thepower to determine itsown competences.24

Accordingly, the

Courtsays,theflexibilityclausecanonlybekeptwithinconstitutionalboundsbysubjectingitsexerciseto

aratificationlaw.

Finally,theopinionhighlightsthepotentialforultraviresreviewintheCourtitself. Afterreiteratingthe

possibilityof

such

review,

which

had

already

been

laid

out

in

the

Maastricht

Case,

the

Court

elaborates

significantlyonthisideahere. ItengagesintheratherinterestingargumentthattheEuropeanfriendly

application of constitutional law demands that the Court engage in ultra vires review itself. More

importantly,however,theCourtexpresslylaysouteachofthevariouspossibilitiesforsuchreviewunder

currentprocedures. Anditcloseswithwhatlookslikeaninvitationtothelegislaturetocreateadditional

typesofproceedingsbeforetheCourtthatareespeciallytailoredtoultraviresreviewandidentityreview

to safeguard the obligation of German bodies not to apply in Germany, in individual cases, legal

instrumentsoftheEuropeanUnionthattransgresscompetencesorthatviolateconstitutionalidentity.25

4. CollectiveSecurityandInternationalRepresentation

In theLisbondecision, theCourtsuggests for the first time that theEuropeanUnion iscurrentlynota

systemof

collective

security

within

the

meaning

of

Basic

Law

Article

24(2).

It

says

that

even

ifthe

EuropeanUnion...weretobedeveloped intosuchasystem,nosupranationaldecisionmakingcould

control the specificdeploymentofGerman troops.26

This raises the interestingpossibility thatefforts

suchasthecurrentGermannavaldeploymentonthecoastofAfrica,whereGermantroopsaresubjectto

ajointEUcommand,areunconstitutional. UnderArticle24oftheBasicLaw,Germanymayonlyrestrict

itssovereignpowersoveritsowntroopsinthecontextofasystemofcollectivesecurity. IftheEUdoes

notcurrentlyqualifyassuchasystem,thenGermanywouldpresumablyhavetomaintaincommandover

itsowntroopsunlesstheinterventionisauthorizedbytheUNorNATO.

The Court similarly treads unreflectively into international terrain by suggesting, without warrant or

argument, that states have to keep their formal status as a contracting party in an International

21

Id.

at

para.

237.

22TFEUart.352(1).



Id.atpara.328.25

Id.atpara.241.26

Id.atpara.255.


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Halberstam&Mllers 6OrganizationsothattheirmembershipwillnotbecompletelymediatedbytheEuropeanUnion.

27 The

WTO is thecase inpoint. TheCourt seems toassume thatWTOmembershipmustbeorganizedbya

mixedagreementunderwhichMemberStatesremainparties. TheCourttellsusthatiftheEUalonewere

amemberof theWTO, theGerman statewould somehowbedeprivedof itsproper function in trade

negotiations. But it isfarfromclear,withregardtothepowerstheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilfor

example,whatthisdoctrinecouldmeanfortheinstitutionalstructureof international law. Indeed,one

mightwell

argue

that

the

Court

frustrates

the

national

interest

it

seeks

to

serve.

Under

the

existing

conditions of a European Customs Union it seems odd that the European member states would be

inevitablycommittedtofragmentingtheircommonEuropeannegotiatingpower. Inanyevent,thereal

practicalimpactoftheCourtsdecisiononthispointisdebatable.

II. ImaginingaUnionofMemberStates

1. Statehood(re)gained

FortheCourt,democracy isaconceptthat is limitedtoastatewithapeopleand itsterritory. Without

eitherdrawingoninternationalorconstitutionallawtomakeitsclaimsexplicittheCourtemphasizesthe

idea of territoriality. The basic point seems to be to define European territoriality and European

citizenshipasderivativephenomena. InsodoingtheCourtdoesnotstrugglewithprimaryorsecondary

lawon

citizenship,

borders,

or

security.

Instead,

it

immunizes

itself

from

these

potentially

burdensome

considerations. Europe without borders is merely accessory to the state territory of the member

states.28

So,thestateisastatebecauseitisautonomous;itisautonomousbecauseitisastate.

2. TheEuropeanParliamentDismissed

InordertoensureamonistconceptionofEuropeandemocracyviathenationalpoliticalprocesstheCourt

mustdeprive theEuropeanParliamentof its legitimacy. Itdoessowithaproblematicbutwellknown

move,thejuxtapositionofparliamentarismanddemocracy,apatternbelongingtotheworsttraditionsof

Germanconstitutionaltheory.29

TheCourtbelittlesthegrowingemancipationofParliamentariansfrom

their roleasmembersofnationaldelegations and theirgrowing constitutional selfperception aspan

Europeandelegateson a leftrightdimension.30

Nordoes it creditParliaments remarkable efforts to

controlthe

Commission.

All

this

is

rendered

worthless

because

of

the

European

Parliaments

election

procedure.

The Court states correctly that the voting mechanisms to the European Parliament do not function

accordingtoastrictruleofdemocraticequality,one(wo)man,onevote. Asaconsequence,however,the

CourtdeniesanyclaimonthepartoftheEuropeanParliamenttodemocraticrepresentation. TheCourts

statist logicassumesthat, ifthere isnopeoplethere isnoparliament. Asthere isnoEuropeanpeople,

theEuropeanParliamentisnotarealparliament,i.e.apopularrepresentation(Volksvertretung).Itisonly

a second chamber, a logic that en passant denies the United States Senate as well as the Swiss

Stnderatitscharacterofdemocraticrepresentation.31

27Id.atparas.37475.

28Id.atpara.345.

29CARLSCHMITT,DIEGEISTESGESCHICHTLICHELAGEDESHEUTIGENPARLAMENTARISMUS(1923).

30SeeDanielHalberstam,TheBrideofMessina:ConstitutionalismandDemocracyinEurope,30EUR.L.REV.775(2005).


http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html..


8/14

TheLisbonDecision 7Atwin fallacy liesburied inthisargument. On theonehand, thedistinctionbetweena representative

parliamentandanonrepresentativesecondchamberthatisnotstrictlyapportionedaccordingtoone

persononevoteisspecifictoGermany. IntheGermanpoliticalsystemthesecondlegislativeorgan,the

Bundesrat,comprisesrepresentativeoftheLndergovernments. Asabodycomposedofexecutives,itis

not, strictly speaking, a parliament. But to draw on this distinction to undermine the representative

quality of the European Parliament belies the Courts assertion that the standards it applies to the

EuropeanUnion

do

not

reflexively

repeat

national

constitutional

law.

Ontheotherhand,theCourt isnotevenabletogiveacoherentdescriptionoftheGermaninstitutions.

Elsewhereintheopinion,itclearlyidentifiestheBundesratasachamberofanationalparliament.32

If

theBundesrat,anonegalitarianrepresentationofthestates executives,istreatedlikeaParliament,then

theEuropeanParliamentmust,afortiori,betreatedasone,too.

There is more. The almost FrenchRepublican egalitarian demands the Court applies are especially

irritatinggiventhefactthattheGermanfederalsystem isoftendiscussedasaprimeexampleofanon

majoritarian political system.33

Onemight argue in favor of the Court that it insists on at least one

egalitarianbody inademocraticorder. But even this isnot convincingbecauseegalitarian legitimacy

necessarily disappears in thejoint decisionmaking procedure. According to the Courts logic, a law

makingprocedure that requires the consentofBundestag andBundesrat,which is regularly the case,

couldeven

violate

the

democratic

principle

of

the

German

Basic

Law

in

Germany.

That

aGerman

court,

operatinginasystemthatisnotoriousforfederaldeadlock,sovigorouslyadvocatesastrictmajoritarian

conceptionofdemocracymustbeoneofthedecisionsbiggerironies. Andthefactthat,accordingtothe

decision, the Federal government acting at the European level must at times be controlled by both

Bundestag andBundesrat, leads to a final shortcircuit. To borrow from thewords of the Court, the

Germansystemitselfmightbeoverfederalized.

CaughtinitsowncontradictionstheCourtlooksforcontradictionsintheEuropeanlegalorder. TheCourt

holds that the electoral law of the European Parliament shows an assessment of values that is in

contradictiontothebasisoftheconceptofacitizensUnionthat[theUnion]hasofitself.34

Thealleged

contradictionstemsfromthefactthattherepresentation intheEuropeanParliamentdoesnottakeas

its nexus equality of the citizens of the Union (Article 9 TEU Lisbon), but nationality.35

But this

assessmentof

the

European

law

is

flatly

wrong.

An

Italian

citizen

who

lives

in

Lithuania

votes

for

the

Lithuaniancontingent intheEuropeanParliament. ASpanishcitizenwho lives inGreececanstandasa

candidateforelectionsoftheGreekcontingenttotheEuropeanParliament. Itisaterritorialnexusthatis

created by the right to free movement that defines the representative structure of the European

Parliament. Thatmightnotliveuptoanystrictidealofdemocraticequalitybutitstillhasa logicthatis

connectedtotheratherprofoundideaofEuropeancitizenship.

3.AnUnnecessaryTheoryofNecessaryStateFunctions

Forquitea longtimeastrangecommonplace inGermanconstitutionalscholarshiphasbeenthe lackof

anyStaatsaufgabenlehre,that is,atheoryofwhatnecessarytasksthestatemustfulfill.36

Itwashoped

thatscholarsmightdefinethisfieldinapurelyconceptualeffortwithoutanyreferencetothenecessarily

32Id.atpara.407.

33 GERHARD LEHMBRUCH, PARTEIENWETTBEWERB IM BUNDESSTAAT (3d ed. 2000); Fritz Scharpf, TheJointDecision Trap: LessonsfromGermanFederalismandEuropeanIntegration,66PUB.ADMIN.239(1988).34

Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 287, available at:http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html..35

Id.36

SeeCHRISTOPHMLLERS,STAATALSARGUMENT146n.67(2000).


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Halberstam&Mllers 8opendemocraticprocess. Thisdreamofa conceptualdeductionof thebeingoressenceof the state

Wesenanditsagendasnevertookconcreteform. Instead,itremainedanostalgicsentimentaboutwhat

mighthavebeenacompletetheoryofthestate.37

It isnoaccidentthatsucha theoryhasneverbeenwritten.38

Inadifferentcontext, theUnitedStates

SupremeCourthasalsostruggledwith,and retreated from,comprehensivelydefiningwhatconstitutes

traditionalareas

of

state

regulation.

39

An

open

democratic

process

makes

it

difficult

to

define

in

any

comprehensivewaywhatareasof legislation form thestatesnecessary tasks. Tobesure,any such

theorywould, indeed,helpusdrawmetaconstitutional linesaroundthepowerofthestate. Anysuch

doctrine could then protect the state from various forms of disaggregation, privatization, as well as

Europeanizationand internationalization. Still, inGermany,thedreamofaStaatsaufgabenlehreproject

haslongbeenforgotten.

Forgotten? Suddenly and without precedent the Courts Lisbon Case develops its own

Staatsaufgabenlehre. TheCourtdefines five areas inwhich the statemust take a role: Criminal law

(substantialandprocedural),warandpeace,publicexpendituresandtaxation,welfare,andcultureand

religion. Thesetasksare,accordingtotheCourt,especiallysensitive fortheabilityofaconstitutional

state todemocratically shape itself.40

But is thereany theoryorargumentbehind this list? We find

none in theopinion. TheCourtmerely refers to itsown imaginationofpastsovereignty. Theopinion

assertsthat

seit

jeher,

since

ever,

the

state

has

fulfilled

these

tasks

as

an

expression

of

its

sovereignty.

This is obviously not the case. The welfare function of the European nation state has often been

describedasthebeginningoftheendofthe ideaofsovereignty,asthepointofdissolutionofthestate

into society.41

Religionwasadecisive topicof theWestphalianTreatySystem that standsat thevery

beginning of the modern concept of sovereignty in Public International Law, a concept the Court

otherwise explicitly endorses. Religiondidnotbelong to state sovereignty at the verymomentof its

invention.42

Ontheotherhand,whatabouttheomissionofCivilLaw inthe list? Despitethefactthat

GermanBGB,theCivilCode,wasthecentralcodificationofthenewlyfoundedGermannationstate,the

Court does not even mention this area of law as being special to the German states identity or

sovereignty. Andwhat about the controlover currencya field thatoften hasbeenmentioned as a

classicalprerogativeofthestate? Fromeitherahistoricalorasystematicperspective,thelistmakesno

sense.

Then again, why does the Court classify just the five areas on its list as necessary parts to state

sovereignty? Theanswer is simple. Thetheoryof theCourt isaposthocargument in supportofa

preordainedresult.

37Thisfeelingseemstoberathercommon. See,e.g.,CHRISTOPHMLLERS,DERVERMISSTELEVIATHAN(2008).

38TheclosestbookmaybefromHansPeterBull. SeeHANSPETERBULL,DIESTAATSAUFGABENNACHDEMGRUNDGESETZ(2ded.1977).

39 Forthedevelopmentoftraditionalcomponentstatepowers,see,e.g.,NationalLeagueofCitiesv.Usery,426U.S.833 (1976);

Garciav.SanAntonioMetropolitanTransitAuthority,469U.S.528(1985);NewYorkv.UnitedStates505U.S.144(1992);Printzv.UnitedStates521U.S.898 (1997);UnitedStatesv. Lopez,514U.S.549 (1995). In the contextofU.S. federalism, theSupreme

Courtssubstantive

distinction

between

the

areas

of

state

and

federal

powers

is

notoriously

undertheorized,

as

is

the

Courts

proceduralororganizationalunderstandingofcomponentstateautonomy. See,e.g.,DanielHalberstam,Comparative FederalismandtheIssueofCommandeering,inTHEFEDERALVISION213(KalypsoNicoladis&RobertHowseeds.,2001).40

Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 252, available at:http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html..41

ThepioneeringauthormaybeHaroldLaski. SeeHAROLD J.LASKI,STUDIES INTHEPROBLEMOFSOVEREIGNTY (1924).Butseealso the

worksofLonDuguit.42

STEVEND.KRASNER,SOVEREIGNTY:ORGANIZEDHYPOCRISY7980(1999).


10/14

TheLisbonDecision 9The only concrete holding of the decision with its myriad treatiselike passages strikes down the

Begleitgesetz, the accompanying statute that organizes the participation of the Bundestag and the

Bundesratwith regard to thepasserelleprovisionsof the treaty. According to the Court, the Federal

government in certain areas cannot agree to a passerelle procedure that shifts from unanimous to

majoritydecisionmakinginthecouncilwithoutconfirmationbyparliament. Asaninitialmatter,itseems

rather questionable whether this mechanism increases the effectiveness of parliamentary control.43

Whatis

most

striking,

however,

is

that

the

policy

areas

that

define

sovereignty

map

perfectly

onto

the

subjectmatterofthespecificpasserelleclausesthatareatissueinthiscase.

OnecannotbutsuspectthattheCourtdesigneditstheoryaroundtheonlyresultitcouldpossiblyachieve.

Without becoming responsible for the fall of the LisbonTreaty on the one hand, but with the firm

intentiontoshow itsreadinessto intervene,ontheother,thetreatmentofthepasserellewasaperfect

target. This small result thus wags a metaconstitutional theory that no proper constitutional

interpretationcouldcreate.

Thedeep ironyofthispartofthedecision lies inthefactthattheallegedtheoryofthesovereignstate

simply stems from a negative reading of the European Treaties. There is no convincing systematic

argumentwhyotherpolicyareasdonotnecessarilybelongtothestate. WhattheCourtdeemstobe

protected are merely the leftovers of European integration recycled as necessary elements of state

sovereignty.A

more

devastating

bankruptcy

of

asolipsistic

theory

of

the

state

is

hard

to

imagine.

4. TheConstitutionalDoublebind

TheCourtleavesEuropeinadoublebindacombinationofmutuallydefeatingcommands.44

Ontheone

handwe learnabouttheforbiddenfinalityofaEuropeanBundesstaat. Ontheotherhand,thecurrent

levelofintegrationissaidtofailminimalconstitutionalstandardsforaEuropeanpolity. ThemoreEurope

seekstodeepenitspolity,then,themoreitrunsupagainsttheprohibitionsoftheGermanconstitution.

AtsomepointEuropeanintegrationmuststoportheGermanswillhavetogiveuptheirconstitution.

The treatment of the European Parliament is a case in point. The Court dismisses the legitimacy

achievementsoftheEuropeanParliament. But itdoesso inreviewingwhethertheTreatyrespectsthe

democraticprinciples

that

the

German

constitution

demands

of

European

integration.

But

why

does

the Court examine the European Parliament at all if, as the Court suggests, all democratic legitimacy

stems from the Member States? The answer is that the Court seems to accept that the European

Parliament delivers some additional legitimacy to the EU as long as the EP does not become too

important,i.e.ofequalimportancetotheCouncil.

The suggestion that theParliamentadds legitimacy to theUnion seems to contradict theCourtsown

explicit thesis that the frameworkofdemocracy issomethinginviolable thatcannotbebalanced.45

Moreover,theargumentabouttheEPsadded legitimacycreatesastrangeambivalenceinwhichtheEP

somehowremainsbothanecessaryelementandathreattotheconstitutionalityofEuropeanintegration.

TheCourtshowsasimilarambivalenceinreviewingEuropeanSocialPolicy.46

Ontheonehand,European

integration cannotbeapurelymarketorientedproject. Thiswould violate theGerman constitutional

obligationto

promote

the

social

principle

in

the

EU.

On

the

other

hand,

it

would

be

even

more

43SeeinfraPartC.

44GREGORYBATESON,STEPSTOANECOLOGYOFMIND159338(1999).



Id.atparas.39394.


11/14

Halberstam&Mllers 10dangeroustoerectacompleteEuropeanwelfaresystemandtherebyestablishaEuropeanBundesstaat

throughthebackdoor.

These ambiguities, thejuxtaposition of numerous commands pulling in opposite directions, create a

doublebind. WhateverEuropedoesinwhateverwayitdevelopswouldseemtoviolatethestandards

setforthbytheCourt. Theremightbetoomuch,andtheremightbetoolittleparliamentarylegitimacy;

toomuch

or

too

little

social

standards,

and

so

on.

Notwithstanding

its

grand

announcement

that

the

BasicLawhas renouncedall formsof politicalMachiavellianism, theCourt turnsout tobeawicked

strategistitself. Readcarefully,itsdecisioncondemnstheEUtofinalitinastateofperpetualdeficiency.

C. TheRoleoftheConstitutionalCourtI. InstructingtheGermanParliamenttoInstructtheGermanGovernment

TheLisbondecisionurgestheGermanBundestagtocontrolthegovernmentinawaythattheparliament

itself could have done but did not do. Early commentators of the decision were quick to criticize

parliament for its failure and to congratulate the Court for its democratic sensitivity.47

But did the

BundestagreallynotknowwhatitwasdoingwhenitdecideduponthesocalledAusweitungsgesetz(i.e.

thenowunconstitutionalstatutethatorganizestheparticipationoftheBundestagandtheBundesrat in

theprocess

of

European

integration)?

Political science has taught us that parliamentary control of international negotiations between

governmentsisanextremelyproblematicandoftenfruitlesseffort. Thetwolevelgameofgovernments

in the internationalarenahasoftenbeendescribed,48

andthere isso farnoconvincingremedy toput

national parliaments in a stronger position in such settings. This is particularly problematic in

parliamentary systems inwhich themain responsibility of themajority is to back and strengthen the

government.49

TheauthorsoftheBasicLaw,evermindfulofthedemiseofWeimar,wereespeciallykeen

to guarantee the stability of the government. It seems quite improbable that formal obligations of

parliamentaryconsentwillmateriallyenhanceParliamentspolitical influence intheEuropeandecision

making procedure. Parliament will not have more substantial influence but it will be explicitly held

politicallyresponsiblefortheresultsthataredefinedbythegovernment.50

TheCourtsprofessionofconcernabouttheutterdestructionoftheGermanconstitutionseemsstrange

in lightof its failure tograpple substantivelywith the singlemost importantprovisionon the subject:

BasicLawArticle23. Thisprovision,whichbringstheprojectofEuropeanintegrationintotheframework

of theBasicLaw,expressly requires that theFederalgovernmentadhere to theordersof theGerman

Bundestag. Theexplicit ideaoftheprovision isthattheGermanparliamentmay,butneednot,commit

theFederalGovernmenttoacertainposition intheEuropeancontext. Thisnormexpressesrespectfor

thedemocraticwillofthelegislaturethatseemsespeciallywellsuitedtoaparliamentarysysteminwhich

theparliamentarymajorityregularlyhasthesamepoliticalagendaastheGovernment. Onewouldthink

that the framers of Article 23 meant to provide a comprehensive statement of the constitutionally

requiredrelationshipbetweenParliamentandGovernmentinmatterspertainingtoEuropeanintegration.

47See,e.g.,HeribertPrantl,Verfassungsgericht zu Lissabon-Vertrag - Europische Sternstunde, SDDEUTSCHEZEITUNG,July1,2009.

48RobertD.Putnam,DiplomacyandDomesticPolitics: TheLogicofTwoLevelGames,42INT'LORG.427(1988).

49WALTERBAGEHOT,THEENGLISHCONSTITUTION69(1967).

50Inadditiontothat,thereisacertainironyinthefactthatinothercasesofforeignrelationslawtheCourttookjusttheopposite

stance. Inmany cases regarding theparliamentaryparticipation in thedevelopmentofNATO, theCourt didnotonly refrain to

developconstitutionalduties forparliamentaryparticipationbut,tothecontrary,defined itsconstitutional limits. BVerfGE68,1;

BVerfGE104,151.


12/14

TheLisbonDecision 11TheCourtdoesnotengagewithanyofthisandsimplyholdsthattheprovisionsoftheAusweitungsgesetz

violateBasicLawArticle23(1),whichisthegeneralnormrequiringthatGermanyparticipateinEuropean

integrationaccordingtodemocraticstandards. TheCourtdoesnotseemtoconsiderthepossibilitythat

Article 23(1) may not be the relevant norm, as Basic Law Article 23(3) provides the definitive and

comprehensive statementof the constitutionally requiredprocedural standard that shouldgovern this

case. TurningtoBasicLawArticle23(3),however,wouldbeinconvenient,giventhattheBundestagand

theBundesrat

specifically

adhered

to

its

provisions

during

the

deliberations

on

the

ratification

of

the

LisbonTreaty.

ThedecisiontosetasidethespecificnormofBasicLawArticle23(3)infavorofinvokingthemoregeneral

normofArticle23(1)onlymakessenseinlightoftheCourtsmassiveEuroskepticreservationsexpressed

inthecourseofanalyzingthestatute. BecausetheCourtisconfrontedwithaspecificconstitutionalnorm

thatseemstogovernthecaseathand,theopinionmustturntoagrandtheoryofdemocraticlegitimacy.

Italsoneedsasuperconstitutionalnormtotransformthistheoryintolegalargument.

This iswhereBasic LawArticle79(3)comes in. Thenormativebasis for transforminghigh theory into

insuperable doctrine is the socalled eternity clause. This norm imposes certain unalterable

constitutionalstandards, includingtheprincipleofdemocratic legitimacy. TheCourtseemsto interpret

Article23(1)inthelightofArticle79(3)togivethefirstnormahigherstatusallintheserviceofbypassing

themore

specific

Basic

Law

Article

23(3).

But

Article

79(3)

was

not

meant

to

protect

Germany

against

Europe. It was meant to prevent the German state from a new 1933, from a slow slippage into

totalitarianism without an obviously illegal break. Though nobody in the constituent Parliamentary

Councilbelievedthatanynormcouldsaveapoliticalorder,thenormwouldnonethelessserveasasign

fortheidentityofthenewdemocraticconstitution. ItisthushighlydubiousthatBasicLawArticle79(3)

wasmeanttopreservethesovereigntyoftheGermanstatewithintheprocessofEuropeanintegration.

TooperationalizethetheorythatEuropeandemocracyisgroundedexclusivelyintheMemberStates,the

Court conjures up the idea of a modification of treaty law (Vernderung des Vertragsrechts)51

that

needstheexplicitconsentoftheGerman legislature.52

Vernderung isanotherkeyterm intheCourts

elaborateopinionthatmustbeexaminedwithcare. ItsignifiesthemodificationoftheTreatiesthatisnot

a formalamendment (whichwouldbe termedaVertragsnderung). Onemight,ofcourse,argue that

everysubstantial

reinterpretation

of

the

Treaties

is

amodification

of

the

treaty

of

the

former

kindnot

allofwhichcandemandafreshroundofratification. Moreover,theTreatyofNiceknowsmanyexplicit

textualprovisionsthatallowforwhattheCourtwouldnowtermmodifications,suchasthepossibility

to change the number of European Commissioners or Advocates General on the ECJ by unanimous

decisionofthecouncil.53

ButtheCourtdoesnotobjecttothese. Instead, itseemstoobjecttothose

modifications that were somehow not sufficiently defined in the Treaty. We are generally left to

wonderwhatthismeansinpractice,butonethingisclear: byintroducingthetermofVernderung,the

Courtinstallsitselfasthearbitertodistinguishperhapswiththehelpofitsflawedadhoctheoryofstate

functionsbetweenthemodificationsthatrequireratificationandthosethatdonot.

PerhapstheCourtsmostplausibleweknowitwhenweseeitobjection istoArt.352TFEU,thenew

FlexibilityClause. ThenearuniversalapplicabilityofthisclausethreatenstoleavethescopeofEuropean

competences truly open ended. But to submerge this real concern in a host of unsubstantiated

judgments,as

the

Court

did,

obscures

the

real

question

of

articulating

more

precisely

and

more

usefully



Id.53

TreatyEstablishingtheEuropeanCommunity,Dec.24,2002,art.213(1)(3),2002O.J.(C325)33,120[hereinafterECTreaty];EC

Treatyart.,222(2).


13/14

Halberstam&Mllers 12what should be done about Article 352 TFEU and why. To be sure, Article 352 TFEU may well be

overbroad. ButifeveryinvocationofArticle352TFEUdemandsratification,eventhemorelimitedresort

toArticle352TFEU formarketpurposes (which theCourtapproved intheMaastrichtCaseabsentany

specialnationalratificationprocedure)willnowbemuchharderthanitwaseverbefore.

TheremainingjudgmentsontheGermanparliamentsrelationwiththegovernmentseemhighlysuspect

aswell.

It

is

unclear

why

the

specific

passerelle

clausesor

even

the

general

passerelle

clauseshould

be

subjecttonationalratification. Tobesure,theseclausestightenEuropeanintegration. Butthescopeof

thistighteningisperfectlydefined. Therearenumerousclausesthatprovideforqualifiedmajorityvoting

andtheordinarylegislativeprocedure. Whattheseproceduresentailisperfectlyknown. Indeed,choices

betweenthetwoformsofdecisionwithregardtoasinglepolicyareaalreadyexist,asinthefamoustwin

articlesof94 and95ECor themanyprovisions that allow for a choiceof governancebydirectiveor

regulation. Moreover,theMemberStatescouldclearlyhaveoptedtosubjectalltheareascoveredbythe

variouspasserelleclausesdirectly to themore integrateddecisionmakingprocedureon suchmatters.

ButtheCourtgivesnoreasonwhythisgreaterpowerdoesnotincludethelesserpowerexercisedhere.

TheCourtsdecisionontheemergencybrakealsomakesnosensewhatsoever. Here,theCourtsubjects

the invocation of the emergency brake to the prior consent of the German legislature. Although

integration enthusiasts shouldwelcome the interesting and almost certainly unintended result of this

holding,54this

part

of

the

opinion

does

not

safeguard

Germany

from

any

creeping

loss

of

power.

II. SuperCounterMajoritarianism

The idea that the eternity clause of Basic Law Article 79(3) protects German sovereignty (or

statehood)isanacademicinventionofthe1980s.55

IntheLisbonCasetheCourtnowusesthisnormto

createasomewhatirritatingchoicebetweentwoalternatives: ThepeopleofAdenauer,Brandt,andKohl

whowantcontinuedEuropeanintegrationandempowermentoftheEuropeanparliamentinathoroughly

democraticspiritmustremainwithintheboundsdeterminedbytheCourtorelsetheGermanpeople

mustgiveupitsconstitution.

Inarathersurprisingtwist,theCourtseemstoexpanditsreviewingpowerbeyondalllimitstoreachfor

judicialcontrol

even

of

the

pouvoir

constituant

of

the

German

people.

Given

the

general

carelessness

of

theopiniononemightthinkthepassagesinquestionsaremerelyaccidental. Butasthereatleastthree

referencestothisidea,weshouldtaketheCourtatitsword. TheCourtstates,forexample,thatArticle

23(1)oftheBasicLawdoesnotbindtheGermanstate,buttheGermanpeople.56

Inotherpassages,

the Court explicitly leaves openwhether the German people themselvesmight not be bound by the

eternityclause.57

If thiswere true,however, therecouldbeno revolutionaryescape intoaEuropean

federationfortheGermanpeoplewhatsoever.

Finally,theCourttakesBasicLawArt.146(whichenvisionsthattheGermanpeoplemaygiveitselfanew

constitution)tocontainarightthatcanbeinvokedbyindividualsinCourt.58

Thisideaisconceptuallyso

absurdthateventheCourthasahardtimeexpressingit. Welearnthatthisisapreconstitutionalright

thattheBasicLawmerelyconfirms.59

TheCourtexplainstheideainits,bynowcharacteristicmove,of

54SeesupraSectionB.

55SeeMLLERS,supranote36,atCh.17.



Id.atpara.217.58

Id.atpara.180.59

Id.atpara.179.


14/14

TheLisbonDecision 13denyingwhatitsupports: ThefactthatArticle146oftheBasicLawdoesnotestablishan independent

claimthatcanbeassertedbyaconstitutionalcomplaint...isnotcontrarytothepossibilityoflodginga

constitutionalcomplaintagainstthelossofstatehood. Forthisdoesnotruleoutthataviolationmaybe

challenged under Article 146 of the Basic Law in conjunctionwith the fundamental rights and rights

equivalenttothefundamentallaws....60

Allin

all,

the

revolutionary

act

of

constitution

making

is

down

sized

to

an

ordinary

act

that

is

henceforth

underreviewoftheCourt. Accordingtothedecision,thepeoplewhowantademocraticrevolutionmust

petitiontheCourt.

D. ConclusionThe German Federal Constitutional Court has never made true on theMaastricht Cases promise to

reviewEuropeanactsundertheultraviresdoctrine. InnocasesinceSolange I61

hasCourtreviewedor

struck down an act of the European authorities. Maastricht had come to look like a hollow threat,

especiallyaftertheCourtpassedontheopportunityto intervene intheBananaCase.62

Thecaseofthe

LisbonTreaty,therefore,putconsiderablepressureontheCourttoshowitstruecolors. Woulditsoften

the project of national constitutional review or give some kind of new credibility to its claims in the

MaastrichtCase.

AsthenakedjudgmenttouchesonlyuponGermanstatutorylaw,theentiredecisionseemsratherlikea

performativeutterance inwhich theCourtunderlines itsown importance ina strange combinationof

rhetoric and verbosity. The Lisbon Case takes over 421 paragraphs tomake several confused points.

Indeed,theCourtsopinionmightmakeeventhemosthardenedcriticnostalgicfortherelativeclarityof

theMaastrichtCase,whichtooklessthanhalfasmanywordstoreviewahistorictreatyamendmentthat

gavesubstantialnewpowerstotheEuropeanpolity,erectedtheEuropeanUnion,establishedaCommon

SecurityandDefensePolicy,andcreatedanewcurrency.

HastheCourtsaidJazumVertragvonLissabon? Wethinknot.63

60Id.atpara.180.

61

BVerfGE

37,

271.

62BVerfGE102,147.

63Thereisonerathernicepointintheopinionatparagraph415. Article1,4(3),cl.3oftheActExtendingandStrengtheningthe

Rights of theBundestag and the Bundesrat in EuropeanUnionMatters provides that in formulating theGerman governmentspositionwithregardtothegeneralbridgeclause,theBundesratandBundestagcaneachoverridetheothersinvocationoftheveto.As theCourtproperlypointsout,however,only theBundestagcanoverride theBundesratssuggestionofaveto. Toallow theBundesrattooverridetheBundestagsveto,isamisunderstandingofGermanconstitutionallaw. Wecouldnotagreemore.

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