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Biocrhics ISSN 0269-9702Volume 9 N w n h 5 1995

MORAL EXPERTISE: A PROBLEM INTHE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OFPROFESSIONAL ETHICISTSJAN CROSTHWAITE

ABSTRACTPhilosophers, particularly moral philosophers, are increasingly being involvedin public decisionmaking in areas which are seen to raise ethical issues. Forexample, D ame Ma ry Warnock chaired the Com mitteeo f Inquiry into Hu ma nFertilization and Embryology in the UK in 1982-4; the PhilosophyDepartment at Auckland was commissioned by the Auckland RegionalAuthority to report on the ethical aspects ofjluoridating the public water su ppbin 1990; and many o f us are serving on ethics committees o f various sorts. Notonly are philosophers actually being called on or consulted, but many of uswould argue that a philosophical contribution in such areas is essential.

The i n v o l v m t of moral philosophers in public policy decisions raises aquestion o f professional ethics, v iz, what role should a philosophers own moralperspective or ju&emeni3 play in the advice s /he gives, or contribution s h emakes, to public decision-making on ethical issues. Like most problems inprofessional ethics, this prompts rejlection on thc nature o f t h rofession, and inparticular on the expertise we take moral philosophy to o&. It aLro promptsrefleGtion on how processes o f public decision making in ethically problematicareas should be understood. I explore these issues in this paper,

1. INTRODUCTIONIn the Republic, Plato argued that philosophers should rule; thatthey should make the policy decisions for society because of theirsuperior wisdom, their knowledge of the good. Few philosopherstoday would go so far . Even though each of us may be convinced weknow whats best, we all have colleagues whom we would not wantas social legislators. However, increasingly philosophers are arguingthat philosophy can and should contribute to finding solutions tosocial problems, particularly where there are ethical issues to beaddressed.0 lackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995, 108 Cowley Road, Oxfo rd OX4 IJF, UKand 238 Main Street, Cambridge, M A 2142, USA.

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362 JA N CROSTHWAITEPhilosophers have been called to serve on public commissions of

inquiry into areas which are seen as both morally problematic andrequiring public policy decisions. For example, Dame MaryWarnock chaired the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisa-tion and Embryology in the UK (1982- ). In N Z , the BioethicsResearch Centre at the University of Otago recently produced areport for the Medical Council on ethical issues in reproductivetechnology and genetics.* In 1990 the Philosophy Department, TheUniversity of Auckland was commissioned by the AucklandRegional Council to report on the ethical aspects of fluoridating thepublic water upp ply.^ In addition to issues of public policy, it isincreasingly expected that ethics committees evaluating healthresearch and innovative treatment proposals should have access tothe expertise of a philosophically trained ethicist. The point is notjust that philosophers are becoming involved in debating practicalethical issues; many of us would argue for the necessity of aphilosophical contribution to such debates. It is then incumbent onus to be clear about the nature of that contribution.I think the involvement of philosophers, particularly ethicists ormoral philosophers, in such decision-making also raises an issue ofprofessional ethics for philosopher^.^ The question Im interestedin is what role a moral philosophers own moral perspective orjudgements should play in the advice she gives, or the contributionshe makes to the decision-making, on an ethical problem of publicconcern. Do the moral judgements of a moral philosopher have adifferent standing from those of the rest of the community in virtueof her professional expertise? Unless they do, it seems to me it wouldbe unprofessional to put them forward in the context of aprofessional opinion or consultation; moreover doing so has ethicalimplications. Here then, is a problem in professional ethics. Likemost questions of professional ethics, this prompts reflection on thenature of the profession, and in particular on the expertise we take The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and Embryology, reprinted in

Mary Warnock, A Qwstion ofLife, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985.Biotechnology revisited: Ethical and Legal Issues, a report prepared by theBioethics Research Centre, University of Otago, for the Medical Council of NewZealand.Auckland Uniservices Ltd., Report prepared for the Auckland RegionalCouncil by members of the Philosophy Department, University of Auckland,(unpublished, 1990). realise that describing philosophy (or any academic discipline) as a professionis tendentious, but I dont think the interesting debates over how to define aprofession really affect the issue I am addressing. Even if philosophy is not preciselya profession, the moral issue I am raising is strongly analogous to what arerecognisably questions of professional ethics.

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MORAL EXPERTISE 36 3moral philosophers to be offering. I think this paiticular problemalso prompts reflection on the processes of public decision making inethically problematic areas.

I want to start by considering the expertise that moral philoso-phers are offering in the area of public decisions about ethical issues.This will bring into focus the question of the role of the philosophersmoral views. I will then outline some positions and supportingreasoning with respect to this question, and finally reflect briefly onthe process of public decision on ethically problematic issues.

2. TH E EXPERTISE OF T H E MORAL PHILOSOPHERPhilosophers, of course, hold many different views about the natureof their discipline. My concept of philosophy locates me within theanalytic tradition, and the problem I a m raising is perhaps mostsharply focussed within that tradition, given its emphasis ondetached reflection over applied philosophy and its scepticismconcerning moral truth. I think that consideration of what it is thatwe take ourselves to be imparting in teaching philosophy shows thatphilosophical expertise divides into three categories: skills, know-ledge and values.The skills we seek to impart are particularly those- f clarification and analysis of concepts and problems, and- f construction and assessment of arguments and viewpoints.While these skills are common to different specialist areas ofphilosophy, the knowledge required by different areas may differ.For example, we would not expect an ethicist to be as knowledgeableabout theories of the mind as about ethical theories. Generallydescribed, the knowledge component of philosophical expertiseconsists of:- nowledge of philosophical problems, questions, positions and

theories (e.g. ethical theories, theories of knowledge, viewsabout human nature and society)- nowledge of assumptions, consequences and criticisms of

different positions or views- nowledge of types of argument and likely problems (e.g.,fallacies like false dichotomy or ambiguities of scope).It is in the area of values and attitudes that there is likely to bemost contention about what I am claiming to be philosophicalexpertise. I think that part of teaching philosophy is to teach:- ommitment to understanding issues and views

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364 JAN CROSTHWAITE- ommitment to reasoned support and evaluation of beliefs or- willingness to question ke y assumptions and challenge- nterest in finding solutions to philosophical questions andSuch values and attitudes mean that the expertise of a moral

philosopher will include not only skills of reasoning and analysis andknowledge of ethical theories and the aigumentation surroundingethical issues and problems, but also

claimsreceived wisdomproblem^.^

- critically examined moral perspectivefrom which some judgements on particular issues are likely tofollow. It is this component in particular of philosophical expertisewhich underlies the issue which concerns me here.Let me make three further comments before proceeding withdiscussion of that problem. First, Im not claiming that onlyphilosophers possess the skills or knowledge Ive just outlined,though I do want to defend the claim that philosophers are theappropriate specialist consultants if these are the skills andknowledge one wants. Techniques of reasoning, argumentation andanalysis are used in all good reflective thinking within any disciplineand many professions. Nor is knowledge of philosophical issues andviews, either historical or contemporary, restricted to philosophers.But academic philosophy has a particular commitment to fosteringand training people in this package of skills and understanding.6 Itis arguable also that the values and attitudes I have specified aredistinctive of the practice of philosophy, particularly when directedtowards philosophical problems and theorising. They, and thispractice, may be found outside academic philosophy, but if one is

Very similar descriptions of the fundamental expertiseof moral philosophers aregiven by Peter Singer, Ethical Experts in a Democracy, pp. t 53 -4 , and JamesNickel, Philosophy and Policy, pp. 140-4, in Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory,David M. Rosenthal and Fadlou Shehadi (eds), University of Utah Press, 1988.In Ethics and Experts Cheryl Noble is critical of the usefulness ofphilosophers in addressing public policy issues, Hnrtings Crnk Report, June 1982,7- . In response to the following discussions of her paper (Zbid. 9- 14) Noble saysphilosophers have an overblown faith in their techniques of logical and conceptualanalysis. On the one hand, they imagine that moral error is in significant degreeproduced by logical and conceptual obtuseness, and on the other that they are bytraining more skilled than other scholars as well as lay thinkers in avoiding fdlacies.Neither of these ideas, it seems to me, has much truth to it. (Ibid.: 15) Noblespoint is surely a salutary warning against hubris, but I am inclined to think thatphilosophical training is a better guarantee of such skill, in the sort of areas inquestion, than other disciplinary training. This is because it is consciously and

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MORAL EXPERTISE 36 5looking for such expertise one would normally look to the professionwhich explicitly espouses it. One would look to an accreditedengineer for engineering advice, even though it is possible forsomeone outside that profession to have the knowledge and skillsrequired to provide it. Similarly then, society should look toprofessional philosophers for philosophical expertise. However,wherever someone offers or is consulted on the basis of this packageof skills and understanding, the moral issue I am interested in willarise.

Having said this, my second comment is to acknowledge that theaccount of philosophy I am offering here may be thought rathernarrowly focussed. Many philosophers would claim a widerunderstanding and area of reflective thought for the discipline than Ihave outlined. I have tried to pick what I think might be capacitiesthat most academic philosophers in Australia or New Zealand (and Ithink also in much of Britain and the USA) who might be involvedin moral consultancy would agree to be basic to their discipline.Of course, thinkers within (and outside 00 hilosophy might rejectthe aims Ive outlined, holding them inappropriate or misconceivedin some way, but this isnt a dispute I want to enter here. A self-reflective philosopher should also be aware of critiques (for example,from feminism and post-modernism) of the discipline and moregenerally of the sort of analytic goals and values Im endorsing here.Awareness of such critiques would improve the skill base I amdefending by fostering an alertness to the w ay in which backgroundtheories, assumptions and interests can lead to the framing ofquestions, and to the effect of such frames in directing andcircumscribing debate and the possibility of solutions.

The third comment I wish to make is about the nature of thecritically examined moral pe r~pec tive ~hich I am claiming to bepart of the expertise of moral philosophers. Such a perspective couldbe a normative ethical theory, or it could be a meta-ethical position(nihilism, relativism or objectivism), which will have consequencesfor the assessment of both normative theories and particularjudgements. I have chosen the vague term perspective inpreference to more specific terms like theory or values in order toleave quite open what such a perspective might be and the extent towhich it might be individual or shared by others in the profession.explicitly directed to fostering the ability to detect undarity and fallacious thinking.It is not, of course, a perfect guarantee of skill in this area; nor is it a guarantee ofwisdom. take this term from Nickel, who understands t as having beliefs about valuesand moral norms which have been critically examined, tested for consistency, andsystematised to some degree (Philosophy and Policy, p. 144).@ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995

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36 6 J A N CROSTHWAITEAll I am interested in is considered ethical views which haveimplications for judgements on particular issues. This brings me tothe issue I want to discuss.

3 .PHILOSOPHERSA PROBLEM FOR CONSULTANT MORALIf, in looking at the expertise of moral philosophers, we concentrateon skills of clarification and argument, together with knowledge ofethical frameworks and reasoning, then it would seem that theirusefulness in social decision-making on ethical issues is largely to dowith the forms of ethical debate rather than with the substance ofethical judgement. This suggests their role should be to facilitatemoral debate and the making of moral decisions by those who carryresponsibility for doing so. Moral philosophers are moral carto-graphers; they provide a map of the moral terrain for those whoneed to find a way through it. But is this the extent of theirprofesssional contribution?

Let me return for a moment to what we require of studentslearning philosophy. While comprehension of the layout of the fieldof debate, the positions, pathways, firm ground and quagmires, ispart of what we look for in our students, we take the mark of adistinctively philosophical inquiry to be engagement with the debateitself. We criticise student essays for failing to engage and come tosome informed conclusion about the question at issue. Moralphilosophers then, as part of their professional competence, willarrive at informed opinions on moral issues. The moral perspectivethey bring will ground judgements when engaged with issues. B utare such judgements, and the perspective which grounds them,merely personal opinion, or are they part of professional expertise?Should a consultant moral philosopher be merely a reporter andfacilitator of moral debate, or should she engage in that debate indefence of a particular position? Philosophers can certainly map themoral terrain, but should they also point the way through it?

For example, I hold the view that the use of fetal tissue forresearch and therapy is morally permissible (provided that adequatesafeguards against the exploitation of women as providers of suchmaterial are in place). This is a contentious view. I support it byreference to a preferred moral framework, one which emphasisesassessment of the consequences of a suggested action for overallhuman wellbeing. I dont think that appeal to a framework of rightsis the ultimate ethical tribunal; I -think that rights are subsidiary toquestions of utility - hough it will usually be better for humanwellbeing to maintain and support a framework of human rights.

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MORAL EXPERTISE 367My judgement about the use of fetal tissue is supported also by ametaphysical position which denies that a fetus has the same statusas an ordinary adult, as a person or bearer of rights and interests.This also is a contentious position, and its ethical implicationsextend beyond this particular issue. I think this issue presents agenuine moral problem and I am well aware of a range ofalternatives to my own views on it. Nonetheless, I am committed tomy judgement.My current judgement is not fixed; i t could be altered byinformation which affects my assessment of the likely harms andbenefits of using fetal tissue- ncluding harms to women (throughpotential exploitation) and harms to the community throughpermitting actions which lead to some change in important values. Itcould change were I to be given reason to revise my basic moralframework, though this is less likely than being given reason torevise a particular judgement. Suppose as a philosophical ethicist Iwere to be consulted, or even appointed part of a committee set up todecide about whether to prohibit or permit the use of f e t a l tissue forresearch and therapy. What should I do? Should I present myviews? Should I survey the positions and arguments? With orwithout indicating my own assessments?I see three options here.

(1) Moral cartography;I could present explanations of the different positions which havebeen or could be taken on the issue, outlining their respectiverationales, strengths and weaknesses. While providing a neutralevaluation of the various positions, I would not indicate or arguein favour of the one I judge best.

This is similar to what we might expect normally of a judgesumming up for a jury: a clear indication of the legal issues andpossibilities and their bases, but no direction as to what verdict togive.An alternative model is provided by the more usual sort of expertconsultation, for example the sort of advice one would expect whenconsulting an acoustic engineer about the desirability of somestructural feature in a concert hall.(2) Expert ju dp mm t:

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36 8 J A N CROSTHWAITEThis might, but need not, include an explanation and evaluation ofalternative points of view.If we think that it is important not merely to argue for onespreferred position but to present and argue against the alternatives,then we could go instead for a third option.(3) A charted path:

I could present the different moral positions on the issue,outlining their respective rationales, strengths and weaknesses,and indicate the conclusion I draw from this about what is righttogether with the reasoning which supports it.

To return to the cartography metaphor, this is a map which marksboth the position of the treasure and the route to it.Which of these options one chooses may depend on the manner ofthe moral philosophers involvement in the moral debate. Moralphilosophers could be involved either: (i) as external consultants or(ii) as members of bodies making decisions, or recommendations topolicy makers, on ethical issues. What is appropriate for thephilosopher qw member of a decision-making body will depend onthe nature of, and the proper procedures for, such decision-making,and whether their membership is as a professional ethicist or not.For the moment, let me focus on the simpler case of professionalconsultation. Suppose a committee established to decide whether ornot to permit the use of fe tal tissue for therapeutic research consultsme in the capacity of moral philosopher. What form of response isprofessionally appropriate?

Surely how I report depends on what the committee wants of me?Those consulting usually specify what it is that they want from theirconsultants. The committee should specify what it wants from me-clarification of the issues, principles and arguments appealed to(what I have called a map of the moral terrain), or the answer totheir problem, an authoritative pronouncement on the rightness orwrongness of such use of fetal tissue. Being asked for the rightanswer is something moral philosophers resist: we spend a lot oftime dissuading those who consult us from thinking that ethicists canbe asked for the answer to a moral problem in the way amathematician might be asked for the answer to a difficult equation.But some still have such expectations, and this highlights the point Iwant to make here that what the committee expects as a professionalopinion is a function of its view of the professional expertise it isengaging. It is, by and large, up to philosophers to determine andspecify the nature of the professional expertise they are claiming for

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MORAL EXPERTISE 369moral philosophy and professional ethicists. We can say that moraljudgements are a proper part of the professional competence ofmoral philosophers, or that this competence is restricted toexplaining issues, arguments and positions. So we cannot at thispoint simply leave it to the committee to determine its ownrequirements.

4. PROS AND CONSSo which of options (l), (2) and (3) should we go for? I should makeclear that in raising this question, I a m not assuming that there is aunique right answer to each moral problem. Nor a m assuming thatevery moral philosopher will make a moral judgement about what isthe right course of action for each such social problem. (Though it isworth remembering that views like there is no significant moraldifference to be discerned between these two suggested courses ofaction or the committee must itself decide which of the followingarguments carries most weight are themselves moral judgementswithin such a context of inquiry.) All I am assuming at the momentis that the sort of basic professional expertise we credit to moralphilosophy is Zihh to result in moral philosophers both having amoral perspective and making judgements in particular situations.Given this, the question about what to do in such cases arises.Deciding that moral judgement is properly within the professionalcompetence of moral philosophers will invite the further question ofwhether it may be incumbent on us to provide such judgementswhen professionally consulted. But I dont wish to tackle thathere.Let me start with option (2) - xpert judgement. It would clearlybe wrong when consulted as a moral philosopher to offer only myjudgement that using fcetal tissue is morally permissible. I cannotsay simply, In my judgement as a professional ethicist the use offcetal tissue for therapeutic purposes is morally right. I must at leastprovide the reasoning by which I arrive at this assessment. Ingeneral, expert opinions should be supported by reasons, to allowfor peer review at least. In the case of moral consultation though,there are additional bases for this requirement, partly practicalconsiderations to do with clarity and understanding, but moresignificantly issues connected to how we should conceive of theprocess of moral deliberation.

The significance of a moral claim may not be clear or fullyunderstood without understanding the reasoning behind it. Particu-lar moral judgements are rarely a simple matter of X is wrong,but@ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995

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370 J A N CROSTHWAITEusually involve some reference to how X is to be understood orinterpreted, to the context in which it occurs (the intentions behindthe action or its likely consequences), perhaps to the values of thesociety within which the judgement is being made, and maybe to theforce or meaning with which wrong is to be understood. Inexplaining my position on the use of fetal tissue earlier, I felt theneed to include a proviso that the possibility of exploiting womenwas ruled out. Why this should be included is hard to understandwithout appeal to more about the social context in which thesuggested use of fcetal tissue would occur and the ethical relevance ofconsequentialist concerns. Further, in the area of moral debate it isoften difficult to be clear precisely what the issues are; problemsrequiring policy decisions usually involve a complex mixture ofissues and questions, some factual, some political and some ethical,and there are usually conflicting interests and points of view. Sortingout what are the real issues of contention or difference is important,as well as establishing which are questions of fact, which ofinterpretation, and which of value.

In arguing for the need to provide reasons however, I amassuming that moral judgement is a reason-governed activity. If onewere to hold an extreme subjectivism about moral judgement -that anyones opinion was as good as anyone elses on moralquestions - hen one would see no ground for providing reasons.But neither would one see any grounds for consulting a moralphilosopher. Moral decision-making at the social level could be nomore than counting votes. I think that recognition of the importancein some way of reasoning to moral judgement is consistent withmany different meta-ethical positions. It is also fundamental to theidea of the possibility of moral expertise, and to any advocacy of arole for moral philosophy in such deliberation.To the extent that moral judgements are reasoned, and henceopen to evaluation, expert judgements should include their reason-ing. But then we must turn to the obvious objection, not only to (2 )but to (3) , that there is no notion of an expert moral judgement.This is a widely held view, and one shared by some moralphilosophers. C.D. Broad says, for example:

It is no part of the professional business of moral philosophers totell people what they ought or ought not to do ... Moral

It might be that some forms of intuitionism could recognise the possibility ofmoral expertise- n the form of especially sensitive consciences, for example -without recognising a role for reason in moraljudgement. One could perhaps arguefor a role for philosophical training in sensitising conscience, but I think i t

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MORAL EXPERTISE 371philosophers, as such, have no special information not availableto the general public about what is right and what is wrong.g

I am not claiming that philosophers possess special informationabout what is right or wrong. Rather I am suggesting that theybring special skills and background information which are appropri-ate and helpful to deliberation on such issues. They usually bringalso experience of reflecting on such issues in a context ofprofessional debate which encourages awareness of the implicationsof and connections between lines of thinking, and of the possiblesignificance of various features of morally problematic situations.I am also arguing that the sort of skills and knowledge that arepart of the expertise of moral philosophy foster informed moraljudgement. People other than philosophers may be as able to makereasoned and informed moral judgements, though there is surely adifference between what the general public is able to say aboutcomplex moral issues and what professional philosophers are able tosay (as is evident in the professional journals).I0 Of course, thisprofessional competence does not issue always in uniform sharedprofessional judgements. Neither moral perspectives nor particularjudgements are uniform within moral philosophy. But this does notmean either that professional philosophical competence is irrelevantto moral judgement nor that such perspectives and judgementsshould not be included within the professional competence of moralphilosophers. Other professionals also disagree on issues within theirprofessional competence. The fact that there is disagreementamongst experts (about both perspectives and particular judge-ments) is not sufficient to rule out the possibility of a professionalexpert judgement, though it makes it important that such judge-ments be themselves open to debate.implausible and prefer to rest my case on the relevance of reason to moraljudgement.

C.D. Broad, Ethics and llrc Hislory OfPhilosophy, (cited and discussed by Singerin Moral Experts, Amlysis, 32:115-117, 1972, and again in his Ethical Expertsin a Democracy, p. 149).

lo Peter Singer makes this point in Ethical Experts in a Democracy. The extent of disagreementin moral judgement is often exaggerated, and itsnature often misunderstood. Moral philosophers will often agree on the relevantissues and even values with respect to a particular area, though they may differ onthe relative weight they assign to these. I suspect that it is often easier to get

agreement, particularly in the situation of committee decision-making, on specificmoral judgements about a particular issue than to get agreement on the backgroundperspective from which to derive these. It is important to realise here the influenceon the resulting judgement of the need for a social decision, as opposed to thecontemplation of moral issues in isolation from the necessity of action or policydecisions.63 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995

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372 JAN CROSTHWAITEBut an informed moral judgement is not the same as having the

right answer. Moral judgements are both disputed and fallible.There is no independent verification of their correctness, as onewould have were two engineers to disagree on the load-bearingcapacity of a particular structure. The only validation for moraljudgements is in the reasoning which supports them. They shouldneither be accepted nor offered for acceptance on the basis of theprofessional standing of the moral philosopher, but only on the basisof the reasoning s/he provides in their defence. Moreover, givendisagreement within professional moral philosophy on moralperspectives as well as particular judgements, it is also importantthat the alternative perspectives which are being rejected i nadvancing a particular judgement should be made clear. Wherejudgements are validated largely by the reasoning which supportsthem, it is particularly important that they be presented in thecontext of all the options or alternatives.

Some further reasons support the requirements both that moralphilosophers survey the options on a given problem or issue and that.they provide the reasoning behind any judgement they might offer.One is the nature of their expertise. I am not claiming that makingreasoned moral judgements comlitutes the expertise of moralphilosophers. I am saying that their professional expertise indudesthe capacity to make such judgements. This capacity derives fromthe primary constituents of philosophical expertise: the skills,knowledge and values I first outlined. Any notion of expertjudgement is warranted by this primary expertise and should beoffered as grounded in it. Further, the profession does not want togive the impression that it is claiming moral wisdom as itscompetence. I think that moral wisdom is distinct from the moralexpertise I have been outlining, and that neither implies the other.'?Providing only judgements, however ably reasoned, wouldimply a claim to moral wisdom.

Finally, offering the other components of our professionalexpertise is also important in the context of the sort of decision-making involved in socially problematic ethical is s u e ~ . ' ~he socialprocesses of moral judgement should involve the informed decisions

Precisely what moral wisdom is, I a m unsure, but the notion seems to me toallow for an understanding of moral issues and right action which need not bereflective in the way that I am interpreting moral judgements which flow from thephilosophical moral expertise.

It is my experience that the usefulness of philosophers on ethics committeesand similar bodies is not restricted to their moral expertise (however defined). Thegeneral argumentative and clarificatory skills of philosophy can be used on otherthan directly moral matters to help committees see and sort out issues.

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MORAL EXPERTISE 373of appropriate bodies, not simply of professional ethicists; and thesedecisions should themselves be moral judgements, not simply theciting of the moral judgements of others, however expert. Onecannot make moral judgements without information about andconsideration of the moral options. Hence, I think we should rejectoption (2) - xpert judgement, and that the choice lies between (1)and (3) - neutral or a guided map. How then to choose?Options (I) and (3) agree that if I am consulted as a philosopherand ethicist I should make clear the different views about themorality of this practice and their grounds. I should provide for thecommittee what of my expert knowledge is relevant to theirconcerns. But what about the crucial difference between them?What should I say about my own viewpoint?

Two considerations may weigh against option (1). Surely onesconsidered viewpoint (particularly where this is a preferred theoreti-cal framework) will affect the way in which one views, and presents,the various alternatives. If so, then the objective, neutral presen-tation of alternatives envisaged in (1) is not a real possibility, and thepretence of it is positively misleading and dangerous to adequateethical deliberation. Of course, it is part of the training and values ofphdosophers to fairly present opposing viewpoints. But thereremains a legitimate doubt about the degree to which this can bedone in a genuinely neutral fashion. Given this doubt, one should atleast make ones own position clear so that others can be aware andwary of a possible slant in the presentation and evaluation ofpositions.* This could be done perhaps without going so far asoption (5 ) ;for example, by stating ones moral perspective (and anyparticular judgements one has made on the issue) but not arguingfor or defending these. I think such a compromise is unsatisfactoryhowever, because it leaves such views with the aura of authority butwithout defence or location in the process of argumentation being setout. There is something evasive about saying: The alternatives hereare A and B. Personally, I think B is right but I wont say why.Rather, here are some things one might say for and against bothalternatives.The second argument for (3) in preference to (1) derives from thenature of the sorts of opinions or judgements at issue. The moral

I A similar issue arises in the context of teaching philosophy- o what extentshould one make clear to students ones own position on an issue or problem towhich they are being introduced? Views vary between teach them the truth as yousee it and never let them k n o w where you stand. I think it is important thatstudents be aware of the possibility that the neutral presentation of positions maybe contaminated by personal perspectives, and that they cannot assess this withoutsome indication ofwhere the presenter comes from.0 lackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995

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374 J A N C R O S T H W A I T Ephilosopher who has conscientiously considered an issue and arrivedat a view of what action is right should surely be concerned that thedeliberating committee makes the right decision. At the very least,she must be seriously concerned that it not make the wrong decisionand advocate something she judges morally wrong. Doesnt thismean she should try to influence the committees decision to move itin the right direction? I think the answer to this is yes, but that i tmust be done in a way which respects the proper processes of ethicaldeliberation and the role of decision making bodies. Hence I want tocome down in favour of option (3)- ne should survey the ethicalterrain, and where one feels judgements are warranted one shouldgive these and ones reasons for them.

But there are problems with option (3) . First, there is the pointthat a moral judgement on a particular issue does not flow directlyfrom moral theorising alone. It usually requires factual information,including information about social consequences and frameworksand sometimes about social values. A consultant moral philosopheris not always in possession of such relevant information. Without it,she is not in a position to make a considered professional judgement.But one cannot even present moral perspectives helpfully withoutindicating the impact of factual issues. Hence these must be takeninto account in the presentation of options, even if only in ahypothetical manner. (The fact that moral assessments, and indeedthe presentation of moral options and perspectives, is not indepen-dent of other information suggests that it may be better to havephilosophers as committee members rather than merely externalconsultants. In this way they have full access to what information thecommittee has and can obtain.)

But whether consultant or committee member, there is a furtherproblem with the idea that a moral philosopher should makeavailable her own moral judgements. That one particular view is theconsidered opinion of a professional moral philosopher is likely toadd weight to it. (This is also a problem with the compromisementioned above, of acknowledging but not arguing for onesposition.) Busy committee people faced with a problem on whichthey have consulted an expert are likely to go straight to theconclusions or recommendations in the report, rather than wadethrough the reasoning which backs them. This is particularly likelywhere people are uncomfortable about dealing with moral problems,and where a lot of the rest of the report seems to be carefulconsideration of wrong views! Why bother? This possibility meansthat option (3) may work against the sort of process of moralassessment and evaluation that philosophers support, though not sostrongly as option (2).

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MORAL EXPERTISE 375This may not be such a great problem for the ethicist who is

convinced that hers is the right view (though one might still haveconcerns about contributing to right action for the wrong reasons).If ones ethical concern is to see right done, then how much does themeans of achieving it matter? But note that this line of reasoningwould tend towards an even more professionally problematicsuggestion that the moral philosopher should simply respond inwhatever way she thinks most likely to be effective in moving thecommittee in the right direction. One could appeal sophistically tothe prejudices or, more charitably, the moral perspectives of thecommittee to lead them to a conclusion one thinks correct though forreasons one thinks they would not accept. But this is hardlyconsistent with professional integrity, particularly given the empha-sis on reasoning in moral judgement that I have been advocating.

I do not think that moral philosophers should assume that theirown judgements are authoritative and should carry the day. Moraljudgements are insecure, and moral theorists fallible. We stand thebest chance of right judgements when the process of generating themis a matter of informed and careful debate amongst many differentpeople. No matter how carefully I derive my final judgement fromthe understanding and evaluation of all the options, someone whosimply takes my judgement on trust, rather than engaging in thisprocess of reasoned justification with me, has missed an importantpart of the process of ethical deliberation and judgement. (This toois an argument for the involvement o f a moral philosopher in thecommittees deliberating and decision making, rather than simply asan outside consultant providing a written report to be considered.)The interactive process of debate is extremely important to theunderstanding and evaluation of moral argument, and it is hard todo on ones own.Behind what I have been saying about these alternatives are twomain claims. The first, that moral judgement essentially involvesreasoning, I have already discussed. The second is that public bodiesdeliberating on ethical issues must themselves engage in the processof making moral judgements. Id like now to briefly address thissecond claim.

5.PROBLEMSTH E NATURE OF PUBLIC INQUIRY I NTO ETHICALI have been talking about the contribution of moral philosophers tosocial decision-making on ethical issues. But surely the appropriate-ness of any philosophical contribution will be a function of thenature of the process to which it contributes. So how should we@ Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995

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376 JAN CROSTHWAITEunderstand the processes of social decision-making involved here? (Iam assuming a context of committees or commissions which havebeen authorised to make either recommendations or decisions aboutaction or policy in areas of moral concern.)

There are basically two models for understanding the delibe-rations of such bodies. Which of these provides the better account ofthe nature of social deliberation on moral issues is a contentiousquestion in the intersection of moral and political philosophy, andnot one I will address here. What I want to argue here is that oneither model, it is important that a body engaging in suchdeliberation must carry out a process of moral analysis andreasoning which involves access to the kind of contribution I amclaiming a moral philosopher can provide.

The first model is provided by scientific investigation, such as aresearch team trying to discover the cause of AIDS. The assumptionhere is that there is an answer to be discovered, the existence ofwhich is independent of the process of discovery. The role of theethics committee/commission is to discover what is the morally rightaction or policy in a given situation. How it should do this is aquestion of what are the best procedures or processes for ascertain-ing moral truths (a question whose answer is not independent ofones theory about the nature of moral truth).

The second model is provided by political processes, such as theuse of voting in a democracy to decide the answer to the questionWho should govern? On this model, there is no truth about whoshould govern that exists independently of the process of decision;the procedure determines the answer to the question. That ajudgement about right action or policy is the result of the properlyconducted deliberations of a properly constituted body makes i tcorrect. The difficult questions of justification concern claims aboutwhat are the proper processes and constitution for such bodies.

One thing which may be significant here is exactly what is takento be the question such committees are answering. Is it a questionlike Is the therapeutic and research use of fetal tissue morallyright? Or the different, though connected, question Should thissociety permit the therapeutic and research use of fe ta l tissue? Onecould adopt the second, process-oriented, approach to the latterquestion while still thinking that there is a deliberation-independentanswer to the former. Addressing the former question should be partof what goes into a decision on the latter (provided one is not a moralsceptic), but the latter is a wider question. For example, it mayinvolve costhenefit analyses which extend beyond the morality ofthe procedures being assessed; it will involve views about therelationship between social instutitons and morality- or example,

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MORAL EXPERTISE 377we may think that society should permit what some hold morallyunacceptable (as in the case of abortion) because of wider concernsabout the social imposition of values to the detriment of individuals,or we may think that what activities are socially sanctioned shouldlag behind enlightened moral thinking in order to reflect majorityviews. These are themselves difficult issues in the overlap of moraland political philosophy. Even in a morally cohesive community,there may be a gap between morally right action and what acommunity should enforce, but in a pluralist community, theproblem of disagreement on what is morally right makes even morecomplex the question of when and why to impose right action orprohibit wrong action.

On the first model, the scientific model, it might be tempting tothink that the appropriate mode of ascertaining the right answer toan ethical problem is to consult experts. But for the reasons Iindicated in my discussion of the expert judgement approachabove, I reject the idea that such consultation is simply a matter offinding out what the experts think the right answer is. Because of theroom for dispute in matters of moral judgement, it is important thatany body trying to determine the right answer must engage withthe reasoning offered in support of any view. The committee needsto evaluate such reasoning, and to do this with respect to moralconclusions is to enter into moral deliberation. N o deliberativeprocedures will guarantee a correct decision, but processes ofanalysis, reasoning, and informed critical appraisal of options andviews, are the best guide we have to moral truth.

On this understanding then there is a need for the contribution amoral philosopher can make to such deliberations. It seems to mealso, that the moral philosopher should be part of the committee,rather than an outside consultant. As part of the deliberating body, aphilosopher has easier access to relevant information and is also ableto assist in the processes of deliberation and of evaluating reasonsand judgements which that body must carry out. (There is also lessrisk in this situation of a judgement the philosopher may offer beingsimply accepted as expert and right without engagement with thereasoning behind it.)

But what about the second model? There seem to be two mainreasons for adopting such a model: scepticism about the existence orknowledge of moral truth, or a view that political values (democraticand egalitarian in particular) require certain kinds of decision-procedures in areas of social disagreement or uncertainty of thiskind. A full-fledged moral scepticism is unlikely to hold that whatdecision a committee arrives at is the morally right one, but mightaccept that it is right in the sense of being the appropriate basis for@ Blackwell Publishen Ltd. 1995

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378 JAN CROSTHWAITEaction. But on either view, the procedures for decision and theconstitution of the body making them are crucial.

Thinking of social decisions on moral problems on this modelmight suggest taking a moral vote, that is, a head count of theviews in the society about what is right. (The moral sceptic is goingto have to take this as an expedient move, rather than as justified bymoral considerations.) But on either basis for adopting such amodel, it is unlikely that moral experts would be accorded aspecial role. While I think that views within a society are significantfor decisions about policy, I want to reject the idea that moraldecisions should be reached by counting heads, even givendemocratic values. The reasoning behind a mora! judgement isrelevant to the weight it should be accorded in determining socialpolicy. (I dont mean that a moral judgement has to be without flawto merit consideration, but it should at least be informed, consistentand not grounded in obvious falsehood.) Moreover, in the sort ofissues likely to be ethically problematic there is often great risk thatendorsing a majority view will be unjust to minority values andinterests, and can promote oppressive (and hence unethical) policyand actions.Even if a committee ultimately reaches its own decision by avote, I think that the processes which lead up to this must involvethe sort of deliberation to which I am suggesting philosophers canusefully contribute. In the sort of democratic framework which is thesource of such a procedural approach to ethically problematicsocial issues, it is important that any decision-making body be ableto justify the decisions it takes; part of the authority of its decisionsas a basis for social action or policy is through its own deliberativeprocess. Issues, possible positions and their grounds need to be laidout and assessed. Philosophers are often better able to articulate andprovide rationales for moral views than lay persons who hold them,and this seems to me an important contribution that a moralphilosopher can make to such deliberations. And in making anydecision about social policy, considerations must be addressed whichamount to moral deliberation. The harms and benefits consequenton an action or policy, its impact on the framework of rightsrecognised by the society and its coherence with the values of thesociety as a whole and its constituent groups, are as significant for

It is interesting that ethics committees and similar bodies often preferconsensus decision-making to decision by vote. One can discern both moral andpolitical reasons behind such a preference. Jonathan D. Moreno has an interestingdiscussion of consensus in this context in his Ethics by Committee: The moralauthority of consensus, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 13:411-432, 1988.

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MORAL EXPERTISE 379pragmatic and political decisions as for judgements about moralrightness. The expertise of moral philosophy is an aid to suchdeliberation.

6. CONCLUSIONDecisions about what actions or policy should be adopted in anethically problematic situation cannot be taken in the absence ofunderstanding the reasoning behind different moral assessments of apractice, action or issue. Hence, engagement in moral deliberationabout the rightness of something is a preliminary to and componentof any decision about social policy with respect to it. The sorts ofinformation on which such deliberation must proceed are at least inpart the appropriate province of moral philosophers. Moreover,where moral philosophers make particular judgements or endorsemoral perspectives in the light of their expertise, I think it isappropriate that these should be made available to the deliberatingbody. This is not so that such judgements can carry the day, butbecause they provide both an example of and an aid in the process ofdeliberation in which the committee must engage. In one sense whatIve been saying is that ethics committees must do, for politicalreasons, what moral philosophers are trained to do; they shouldhence be able to make full use of that professional training.Philosophy DepartmentUniversity o Auckland

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