J Public Adm Res Theory 1997 Mahler 519 40

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Influences of Organizational Culture

on Learning in Public Agencies

Julianne Mahler

George Mason University

ABSTRACT

Thisarticleexamines anunderappreciated influence on

organizationallearning: th ecultureofthe organization. Because

organization culture informsthe sensemaking an dinterpretation

ofthe kindsofambiguities seeninpuzzling data, problematic

situations,uncertainprogram

technologies,

and obscurelinks

betweenproblems and solutions, it m ay beusefulto consider

someparticular ways thatculture guideslearning.Culturepro-

vides a reservo ir oforganizational meanings againstwhich

results,

experience,

an dperformancedata are interpreted and

inquiries

about

changes in

procedures

and program technologies

can

proceed.

The

more

equivocal

the data or technologies, the

more

influence

the

culture

is likely to have in shaping the course

of

learning. The examples

g iven in the article suggest

this

pattern

and offer a basis for a m odel ofthe influences thatcultureh as on

learning inpublic

organizations.

Organization learning refers to the capacity of organizations

to change themselves in response to experience. Learning is con-

cerned with how organizations monitor their operations, their

results, their environments, and their clients for clues to the

adequacy of their performance. It focuses on how organizations

come to identify some situations as problems and how they

attempt to correct them. Learning organizations do not ignore the

consequences of their actions, try to shift the blame for failures,

establish policies to subvert the detection of errors (Argyris

1991),

or redefine what counts as success. They embrace error

(Korten 1980) and try to understand its sources. Learning organi-

zations change themselves by altering their rules, strategies,

structures, routines, program technologies, or even their goals in

an attempt to come closer to achieving their objectives.

Not all change is learning, but learning is thought to be an

J-PART7(19 97):4:5 19-54 0 especially informed and effective type of change because it

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Influences of Organizational Culture on Learning

represents a conscious effort to interpret and analyze results in

order to correct problems rather than a blind reaction to crises or

to the latest management fad. Interest in organizational learning

has grown among public administrators because it addresses the

issues of change, innovation, and environmental adaptation, all

major concerns in organization theory and practice for decades

and clearly important now as public organizations are being rein-

vented and reengineered. The organizational learning approach

highlights

the act ofchanging

by examining how agency mem-

bers struggle to apply experience and information to entrenched

routines, to attribute causes to the problems they face, and to

create remedies for these problems. Individual learning becomes

organizational when these lessons are institutionalized, making

them available to other members.

But not all organizations do learn. The converse of the

learning organization is a static organization, in which pro-

cedures, routines, and objectives persist in the face of perceived

inadequacies. Perhaps even more commonly, inaction results

because members remain unaware of problems or accept them as

unalterable conditions (Barzelay 1992, 22-33).

CULTURE AND LEARNING

This article examines an underappreciated influence on

learning: the culture of the organization. Because organization

culture informs the sense making and interpretation of the kinds

of ambiguities seen in puzzling data, problematic situations,

uncertain program technologies, and obscure links between prob-

lems and solutions, it may be useful to consider some particular

ways that culture guides learning. Specific elements of an organi-

zation's culture may affect the capacity of the organization to

learn and may influence what it learns and how it learns. Though

culture has most often been seen as a source of resistance

(Schein 1992, xiv) or source of defensive routines (Argy ris

1991) to learning and change, we might also consider its more

creative potential as a basis for the interpretation of situations and

experiences that could prompt learning and the construction of

effective solutions. Examples of both patterns are seen in the

cases reported here. Though the more interesting influence of

culture may be how it guides or inspires learning, whether it

fosters or blocks it, culture's effects on learning deserve study.

Several examples from the cases of organizational change

efforts described below suggest the outline of a model of the

relationship between culture and learning. The model highlights

the role of culture in influencing how agency actors make sense

of equivocal program results and the implications of these results

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Influences of Organizational CultureonLearning

for program and management procedures. The case examples

show the particular importance that beliefs about the legitimacy

of various sources or types of information sometimes have for

organizational learning. Correspondingly, the cases suggest some

of the ways that cultural values that surround existing procedures

influence the kind of changes that would be seen as feasible,

valid, or professional. These beliefs and values might be thought

of as constituting a culture of information and a culture of

organizational technology.

The thesis offered here is that together these elements of

culture influence the capacity of the agency to learn and the

direction that learning will take. Agency beliefs may spur the

recognition of problems or justify the status quo. They may

inspire innovative technologies or prescribe greater orthodoxy.

All this implies that learning by agency actors depends not only

on the collection and retrieval of output data and other kinds of

information, it also depends on the culture of beliefs, norms, and

professional identities that provides the context of meaning for

this information.

THEORIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

Organizational learning is a very broadly defined

phenomenon, with no one widely accepted characterization (Fiol

and Lyles 1985). An overview of this large literature cannot be

offered here (but see Cohen and Sproull 1996; Daft and Huber

1987;

Dixon 1992). However, two models of learning capture

much of the diversity in theoretical formulations in the field. A

distinction in versions of learning exists between those who view

learning as the working of a rational, information-based system

(Levitt and March 1988; Huber 1991) and those who see it as a

socially constructed process (Daft and Huber 1987; Morgan

1986; Dixon 1992). The former version is an elaboration of the

information-processing model of organizations while the latter is

indebted to interpretive theories in the social sciences (Rabinow

and Sullivan 1987; Burrell and Morgan 1979; Rosenberg 1988).

Rational-Analytic Theories of Learning

Most writers characterize the learning process as a more or

less analytic activity in which members assemble information

about past efforts, search out problems and solutions, and adopt

incremental or fundamental changes in operations, routines, or

standards to improve the organization's responses. The key

element in all this is the processing of information, which

includes collecting, distributing, storing, and retrieving infor-

mation (Huber 1991; Walsh and Ungson 1991) and using this

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information in analysis, search, decision making, and subsequent

monitoring. This view of learning is linked closely to cyber-

netics-inspired information-processing models of decision making

such as the several forms of rational and bounded rational choice.

The breakdown of these information processes when technology

is poorly understood or goals are not agreed on leads to organi-

zational anarchy and incomplete, interrupted learning (March and

Olson 1979).

Much of the literature on the information-processing model

of organizational learning focuses on barriers to learning and

searches for ways to improve learning by increasing the quality,

quantity, and distribution of information. For example, learning

from experience requires a diversity of experience and experi-

mentation, but this is curtailed by premature control (Landau and

Stout 1979), routines designed to reduce ambiguity and unpre-

dictability (Levitt and March 1988), and low tolerance for risk

(Huber 1991). Information that is not routinely collected may be

richest in data about the need for change, such as errors in

coordination or conflicts in priorities. But these data are by

definition not systematically collected or assembled, though they

may be reflected in cultural expressions or other forms of

collective m emory (Levitt and March 1988; Huber 1991; Walsh

and Ungson 1991). Learning also requires that information about

experience be routed to those who are making decisions or those

conducting analyses to recommend choices. Howeverespecially

in complex, hierarchical, program agenciesthis often does not

happen (Bushe and Shani 19 91; Huber 1991 ; Pressman and

Wildavsky 1979).

Information collection also may be incomplete or distorted

(Downs 1967), and in some cases administrators do not want to

know about problems or performance gaps (Kaufman 1973).

Even when performance monitoring is reliable, administrators

may have very little idea about how to use the information to

improve performance, because their understanding of program or

task technologies is poor or there is disagreement about the

cause-effect links in the program, such as appears in education

and crime reduction technologies (Wilson 1989). In the absence

of real understanding about the nonobvious twists in relations

between inputs and outputs in dynamic systems, overcorrection

can be much worse than inaction (Senge 1990).

Even when learning is successful, however, it may be diffi-

cult for outsiders to identify. In some cases learned changes may

not have an immediate or evident effect on behavior. Yet die

lessons learned may make it possible for the organization to con-

tinue performing even if circumstances change drastically or

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become unfavorable in the future (Cook and Yanow 19%). Some

lessons may be kept in reserve by the affected actors to be put

into practice when the appropriate circumstances arise.

Interpretive Theories of Learning

An alternative model of learning emphasizes the inter-

subjectivity of organizational knowledge and the interpretive

character of the learning process

itself.

Learning proceeds

through sharing interpretations of events and through reflection

on these interpretations, which leads to adjustments in operations

or changes in policies and procedures (Walsh and Ungson 1991;

Daft and Huber 1987; Argyris and SchOn 1978). Learning is

characterized by dialogue, in which the richer the media of com-

munication (e.g., face to face rather than electronic) the deeper

the sharing and the greater the potential for learning (Daft and

Huber 1987). The availability of multiple interpretations, if they

are well understood by actors, is said to increase learning (Huber

1991).

In a similar vein, Jenkins-Smith (1990) and Sabatier and

Jenkins-Smith (1993) found that though policy learning (i.e.,

cognitive change in positions taken by members of policy coali-

tions) was rare, it was most likely to occur in professional

forums where alternative expert interpretations of program tech-

nologies are debated. Policy learning arises from dialogue about

alternatives and reflection about alternative interpretations of

evidence.

Organization learning is propelled by the tension that results

from the basic equivocality of virtually all organizational infor-

mation (Weick 1979). Because the evidence the actors have is

ambiguous, sense must be made of it in the context of existing

beliefs and assumptions of members. This is an act of interpreta-

tion, not solely of data collection and dissemination. This tension

can be seen in the contrast between the new logic of a proposed

innovation and the existing dominant logic. In cases reported by

Bouwen and Fry (1991), tension leads to struggle and confronta-

tion and is resolved through the negotiated reconstruction of the

organization. In their case studies of organizational learning, the

greatest innovations were seen when actors confronted each other

repeatedly over attempts to make changes in the organization

an d

were made aware of their progress or lack of progress. These

cases illustrate the role of interpretation, and conflict among

interpretations, in debating options and the struggle to arrive at

solutions. Learning is preserved in shared interpretations stored

in the organizational memory (Walsh and Ungson 1991) and in

the enacted organizing process (Weick 1979). This view of how

lessons are institutionalized reinforces the point noted earlier that

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Influences of OrganizationalCulture on Learning

learning may not be immediately evident in new procedures, even

though it has occurred.

There may be less to the distinction between these two

models of learning than most authors suggest, however, espe-

cially with regard to their advice about how to improve learning

or about the role of culture in learning. While they differ in their

characterization of the inquiry process as relatively objective or

interpretive, their advice about improving learning often empha-

sizes increasing the availability of information and becoming

better systems thinkers (Senge 1990). Daft and Huber (1987),

among others, go further to suggest that organizations need a

logistic system to distribute information and an interpretive

system to help actors integrate their interpretations. Little

attention is paid, however, to the specific influences of organi-

zational cultures on learning, which is especially surprising in the

case of the interpretive model, given its concern with social

meaning, the basis of culture.

Who Learns?

Another question that bears on theories of organizational

learning is: Who learns? Since the organization is an abstraction

and does not have a mind that can be changed, organization

learning typically is viewed as dependent on, though different

from, individual learning. This means that lessons learned by

individuals become organizational learning when they are insti-

tutionalized in a variety of formal and informal ways as rules,

routines, standards, technologies, norms, or tacit communities of

practice. In this way the impact of lessons survives over time,

and they can be integrated into other organization processes.

Learning by agency members can fail to become organization

learning when individual knowledge of problems is not institu-

tionalized. Argyris and Schdn (1978, 9) note for example, There

are too many cases in which organizations know

less

than their

members. There are even cases in which the organization cannot

seem to learn what every member knows.

There are contending views about who it is that learns,

however. Some emphasize that learning is a cognitive process

that only individuals can undertake. In this view, organizational

learning is individual learning that occurs in organizations and

from which the organization may benefit. Research then focuses

on finding ways to speed or shape individual learning curves to

improve overall organizational effectiveness. Here the term

organization learning

is used metaphorically. Some research

based on this approach, however, finds evidence for the existence

of organizational learning as defined in the previous paragraph

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Influences of rganizational Culture on Learning

'Epple, Argote, and Devadas (1996), for

example, explicitly adopt such a view in

their research on irammg across shifts in

industrial settings to determine if such a

thing as organizational learning apart

from individual learning can be identified.

They conclude that individual learning

that becomes embedded in new technol-

ogies makes some contribution to what

might be called organizational learning.

In another example Cariey (1 996) reasons

that *[s]ince organizational or group

performance is dependent on the experi-

ence and capabilities of individual mem-

bers . . . organizations should learn as

their personnel learn. In her study of

turnover and learning, she simulates indi-

vidual learning and concludes that despite

new recruitment, turnover leads to net

information loss in the memories of indi-

vidual acto n and to poorer organizational

performance. She notes, how ever, that

many other studies have found improved

performance with increases in routiniza-

tion or in "socially shared cognitions or

memories" (p. 2 56) and suggests that if

"knowledge repositories" such as stan-

dardized routines, computer data bases,

or even files had been made part of her

simulation, she would probably have

found less information loss with turnover.

The ideas of a "dominant logic" (Bouwen

and Fry 1991) or "Iogic-in-use* (Argyris

and Schfln 1978) are used in ways that

are somewhat similar to the idea of an

organizational culture, but generally they

do not include the symbolic and emo-

tional attributes of culture. Logk-in-use

likely reflect the imprint of cultural

assumptions of various professional,

occupational, or policy groups within an

organization.

when it concludes that the whole organization is better off when

new individual knowledge can be stored and shared in some way.

This finding is close to the idea of institutionalized knowledge.

1

The other end of the spectrum also is represented in the

literature: organization learning means that organizations them-

selves learn, in ways that are independent of what individual

members are learning. Cook and Yanow (1996, 438) perhaps put

this best when they argue that just as an individual cannot be said

to perform a symphonic work, organizational knowing resides in

the organization as a whole. When a group acquires the know-

how associated with its ability to carry out its collective

activities, that constitutes organizational learning.

The model proposed here takes the first view: Organiza-

tional learning is a distinct and real organizational process, linked

both to individual learning and to organization-wide action to

preserve the lessons learned. The focus here is on seeking out the

effects of culture as they influence learning by individual agency

members acting either in isolation or collectively. The model

proposes that culture can affect the learning seen in the choices

that agency actors make when they identify a situation as a prob-

lem, diagnose the source or character of the problem, devise pos-

sible solutions, and determine how to institutionalize the.lessons

learned. Thus culture's potential influence extends from inter-

preting situations to preserving the lessons learned.

ROLE O F CULTURE IN THEORIES OF

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

Writers in the field of organizational learning typically

assign one of three roles for organizational culture to play in

learning: storehouse for past history and lessons to be passed on

through socialization (Levitt and March 1988; Walsh and Ungson

1991; Schein 1992; interpretive filter through which members

view events and their own actions (Shrivastiva 1983; Hedberg

1981;

Levitt and March 1988); or source of strategy and action

(Hedberg 1981).

2

1 am not suggesting that these are inappropriate

roles for culture, but the implications of these roles have not

been developed, and their effects on the learning process have

not been investigated. Though it appears that they refer to differ-

ent effects of culture, the case studies that will be described

shortly show them to be different portrayals of the same process.

It is not simply that some cultures are more likely to foster

learning than others (though Schein [1992] does imply this posi-

tion, arguing that a learning culture would be one in which the

organization was assumed to dominate its environment, members



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Influences of

Organizational

Culture on Learning

collectively adopted a pragmatic view of truth, and human nature

was seen as good

an d

mutable, and so forth [pp. 365-66]). The

learning literature seems to show, however, that learning occurs

in myriad cultures; therefore it makes more sense to look at the

ways that cultural elements define the content and style of learn-

ing than to suppose that only some types of culture allow learn-

ing. If culture influences the uses that

are

made of the informa-

tion an organization has and can learn from, and if it can be seen

to shape the alternatives for change that are considered, we can

see culture-based learning in action.

Before we explore the specific effects of organization

cultures on learning, the idea of culture itself needs clarification.

Like learning, there are numerous formulations of the concept

(Schein 1992; Ott 1989; Trice and Beyer 1993; Van Maanen and

Barley 1985). A common conceptual definition of organization

culture is that it refers to the collectively held and symbolically

represented ideas members of an organization have about the

meaning of the organization and the work they do. Van Maanan

and Barley (1985, 33) describe the evolution of cultures when

they define it as a living historical product of group prob lem

solving . Others take the learning element further, defining

organization culture as the accumulated shared learning of a

group (Schein 1992, 10) or as the . . . collective phenomena that

embody peoples' responses to the uncertainties and chaos that are

inevitable in human experience (Trice and Beyer 1 993, 2) .

Culture often is considered to be composed of two elements:

the overt

signifiers

of culture and the

meanings

the signifiers

have to the actors themselves (Trice and Beyer 1993). The form-

er includes icons, rituals, stories, myths, argot, ceremonies,

office layout and space use, and decorative displays. These con-

stitute the symbols of a culture to the degree they represent or

connote the emotional and ideational content of the culture. These

outward signifiers have been termed

artifacts

(Schein 1992; Ott

1989) or

forms

(Trice and Beyer 1993) though sometimes they

represent the culture

itself.

The interpretation of these artifacts

reveals the content of organizational culture (i.e., the beliefs,

values, philosophies, norms, and justifications that actors

collectively hold about the meaning of the organization and their

work in it). The work identity of members, the assumptions they

hold about how the work is to be done, and the meaning to pro-

fessionals of the program technologies they employ all contribute

to this content. Based on these collectively held beliefs, members

interpret or make sense of events and judge what counts as a pro-

fessional prog ram, valid information, a plausible inference, a just

decision, and so forth. Cultures are created from many sources,

including the larger culture; the socialization that members

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received in prior educational, professional, and work settings; the

history of events and personalities in the organization; and the

accretion of collective efforts to make sense of all these over

time.

All this tells us that the study of organizational culture is

essentially interpretive. It rests on the view that actions of

organizational members are informed not only by rules, incentive

schemes, and orders but also by a collectively created comm on

frame of reference (Van Maanen and Barley 1985, 31). The

ongoing cultural frame of reference takes numerous forms and is

evident in rituals, myths, often-repeated stories, and many other

kinds of artifacts. But the underlying collective beliefs about the

organization that these artifacts represent provide the context for

interpreting organizational data and events.

It is this collectively created frame of reference that makes

culture important to organizational learning. I propose that this

frame of reference fills in the gaps in the inevitably equivocal

information about results and experience. The importance of cul-

ture to the study of organizational learning in public organiza-

tions is that individual and collective behaviors and prescribed

activities are not solely the product of new information or

innovative decision support technologies. Behavior and activity

also depend on the interpretation of that information in the

context of the historically developed organizational meanings

represented or symbolized in the organization's rituals, myths,

and ceremonies.

Inclusion of culture as an element in organizational learning

extends our capacity to explain what happens in the learning

process and why learning often does not occur. The culture-based

approach to learning offered here tempers the information-proces-

sing model of organizational change and learning with an inter-

pretive view of the process.

CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON LEARNING

Specific influences of culture on learning can be observed in

the following assemblage of examples of learning efforts. In these

examples culture sometimes inspires learning and in other instan-

ces blocks it. Together they provide the basis for the model of

culture-based learning that will follow. The examples cluster

around five kinds of direct effects of culture on learning: the role

of culture in interpreting performance results; informing the

meanings inscribed in established routines; defining what consti-

tutes legitimate information; specifying the consideration to be

given to external demands; and defining subculture relations.



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Influences of

Organizational

Culture on Learning

This list of examples is not meant to be exhaustive but to suggest

the types of linkages between culture, interpretation, and learning

that can be seen in public organizations.

The Role of Culture in Interpreting Performance Results

How does culture influence the interpretation of the events

that we expect will stimulate learning? What meanings do mem-

bers draw from apparent disasters and triumphs? More specif-

ically, how do commonly held beliefs as revealed in myths about

the true mission of the organization, legends about past successes

or failures, or stories about the identity or prowess of its officials

influence the interpretation of prominent or conspicuous events as

problems to be remedied, or situations to be accepted resignedly,

or opportunities to be taken.

We generally expect that failures, especially well-publicized

failures, will lead to a reexamination of procedures or even more

fundamental changes in basic premises and that public success

similarly will lead to efforts to duplicate or extend the triumph.

But a culture-based learning approach would suggest that the

meaning of apparent disasters or successes and the lessons to be

derived from them cannot be assumed. Responses may be influ-

enced strongly by the beliefs officials hold about their profes-

sional identities as revealed in the organization's myths and

legends. All these affect what problems are perceived as real,

what work is deemed good, and what results are expected.

Perhaps the most common and unfortunate instances of this

thesis are the cases in which public failures do not bring self-

study and action because internal professional norms have inured

members to expectations of better things. In other cases, how-

ever, professional definitions of what counts as a good manage-

ment strategy have led to program designs that are innovative and

responsive.

One case that illustrates both patterns over time is described

by Barzelay (1992). In the purchasing department of Minnesota

state government, interorganizational cooperation was rare, which

resulted in a series of costly crises that stretched over many

years.

Routines in the unit were designed to take advantage of

cost minimizing tactics such as holding orders until there were

enough to get volume discounts and taking the lowest bids for

items judged to be comparable by those in the purchasing unit.

Because of these routines lengthy delays for educational com-

puters caused cancellation of classes, and quality of laboratory

equipment was so poor that it could not perform the work for

which it was purchased.

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Influences of rganizationalCulture on Learning

This situation was accepted all around as undesirable but

unalterable in a state bureaucracy. The long-standing culture

within purchasing and other bureaus included the belief that

program offices could not be trusted to spend state dollars

wisely. State rules also required these practices as economies.

Program staff had learned to accept delays and substandard qual-

ity as the price paid for public service. The culture of distrust

insulated the purchasing department from the kind of feedback it

got from other departments. At this point in the case, the cultural

beliefs surrounding the work technology clearly had blocked

learning.

This began to change, according to Barzelay, only after

newly appointed officials from outside the agency began a long

process of inculcating a new ethos of internal customer service.

Starting from the bottom up, the reformers worked to have

agency members reconceptualize their work as service to profes-

sional workers in other state agencies, rather than as routine

paperwork for greedy, irresponsible bureaucrats. This resocial-

ization took years but began with an understanding of the existing

professional culture of the agency. What emerged finally, accord-

ing to the reports of some participants, might be considered a

culture change. As a result, Barzelay notes, what had been con-

sidered an unalterable condition was redefined as a problem. A

bottom to top search for solutions turned up many changes in the

technology and financing of state procurement. The innovative

procedures that resulted illustrate the new capacity of officials to

learn from their mistakes, using customer feedback and market-

like mechanisms to monitor their performance and spur further

changes. Rules and state laws were changed. Under the emerging

culture of the agency, a new system of financial accountability to

the state was created based on tracking the link between cus-

tomers and payers, by definition not a typical procedure in

bureaucracies. In this case the slow change in beliefs about

service, trust, and responsibility opened the way for innovative

ideas about the design of services.

Argyris collates a number of cases of policy making and

administration at the highest executive levels in which learning is

blocked by specific features of organization culture. The Reagan

White House staff culture of hiding overt conflict (Argyris 1991)

and protecting the presidential staff from criticism (Noonan 1990)

prevented an examination of overall budget planning. This is the

pattern Argyris calls an organizational defensive routine that

blocks the detection and correction of error.

In contrast, David Korten's (1980) analysis of the character-

istics of successful third world development programs illustrates



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Influences

ofOrganizational

Culture

on

Learning

the ways that culture canstimulateand shape learning. Features

that distinguished successful development programs were prin-

cipally that they started small, accepted responsibility fortheir

errors,

andlookedto thetraditional waysoftheir clientsfor

inspiration in designing local solutionstoproblems.

But behind these good learning strategies were stable pro-

gram structuresandgroupsofprofessional staff. Permitting

project buildersto remain together, maintaining theethosof

planning withthepeople that drovetheprogram,waslinked

more often to program success thanthe common procedure,

whichwas to try toduplicate the formal structural characteristics

of promising programs in other settings with otherstaff. It was

no tthe formal program structuresbut the staffs commitmentto

working closely with local people, their tacit understanding of

how to do so and thecultureof grassroots action among project

builders that shaped

the

program learning

and

made

the

projects

successful. Theprofessional cultureof theagencies provideda

context

for

interpreting local situations

and

choosing

a

method

to

achieve effective development.

The Effects of Collective Meanings Invested

in Existing Routines

What meanings

are

invested

in

existing routines,

and how do

members reacttochallenges to these routines? Whatdoorganiza-

tional rituals, argot,

or

often-told stories symbolize about

the

meaningsofparticular routines, programs,orprocedures? What

do rituals connoting,

for

example,

the

scientific

or

humanitarian

character of agency work tellusabouthow officials will respond

to particular criticisms

of

program paradigms? What does

the cul-

tural contentofprogramsand entrenched routines suggest about

the kinds

of

problems that will

be

recognized

or how

debate

about alternatives will proceed?Towhat kindsof program

changes would

it

even occur

to

officials

to

give serious consider-

ation?

According

to the

information-processing model

of

organi-

zational learning (Daft andHuber 1987;Huber 1991; Walshand

Ungson 1991), learning

is

institutionalized

by

encoding

new

proceduresornorms intotheroutines for search, work tech-

nology, communications,

or

decision m aking.

The

work culture

can tell

us

about

the

meanings

of

the various routines

and

norms

to

the

members

and can

help

us

understand

and

cope with resis-

tancetochanging routines.Insome cases, proposed changesin

routines

may be

defined

in the

culture

as

unprofessional,

as

a quickanddirtyfix orin thecaseofefforts todissem-

inate lessons learned

in a

large organizationas meddling

by

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Influences of

rganizational

Culture on Learning

headquarters. However, the cultural investment in routines also

may reflect professional values or local priorities that foster

learning by insisting on improved results or valuing constant

experimentation. Thus the specific cultural assumptions built into

routines either can impede or encourage learning.

These influences of culture on learning are illustrated by the

case of a large federal bureau charged with carrying out regula-

tory programs for many other agencies. Bureau personnel include

examiners of several types and investigators with law enforce-

ment responsibilities. Investigators, who are law enforcement

professionals, operate in an aura of particular danger and are said

to enjoy more autonomy and higher salaries than other types of

bureau personnel. The distinctive status of the investigators also

is indicated by their separate chain of command. Examiners, in

contrast, view their jobs as the carrying out of the bureau's core

professional work, and they reportedly feel underappreciated for

their role in identifying many of the cases that the investigators

then pursue to completion. All this contributes to the dominance

of the law enforcement professional culture within the agency, an

emphasis on control, and, until recently, little opportunity for

employee participation.

This cultural setting appears to have limited the capacity of

agency officials to respond to acknowledged problems. External

oversight agencies identified several serious agency failings. In

one case, in response to criticisms of work backlogs, some

agency officials proposed new examination procedures to speed

inspections. These new procedures involved using sampling tech-

niques to select likely lawbreakers, but this innovation was long

resisted because it clashed with the law enforcement ethos within

the agency. Sampling was inconsistent with the collectively held

belief that every guilty party should be apprehended and that the

long-honed skills the officials used to size up likely suspects, not

a statistical interval, should guide their efforts.

In another instance, officials in the central personnel depart-

ment and in some of the regional offices of the bureau proposed

to introduce total quality management (TQM) as the centerpiece

of a new management approach. This approach was meant to

combat a variety of internal and external criticisms of the bureau,

including stress, low morale, and problems with recruitment.

Again, however, consistent with the law enforcement culture of

much of the organization, management finally rejected all the

empowerment and involvement programs, preferring to react to

the criticisms with renewed efforts to monitor and control

employees rather than to experiment with greater autonomy and

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Influences ofOrganizational Culture on Learning

responsibility. In this case the role of culture was to defend

routines from change (Mahler 1995).

The Influence of Cultural Beliefs on the Legitimacy

of Information Sources or Forums

How do rituals surrounding the transmission or communica-

tion of information affect the credibility of the information or

other aspects of its interpretation? Stories, language, and visual

displays are artifacts that can reveal much about the organiza-

tional identity of officials and help explain why some channels or

types of communication are valued over others, influencing what

kinds of reports will be seen as convincing. In some settings,

many forms of data may be used. In others only data secured in

particular, company ways are accepted, or different channels of

communication may invoke different norms. Rituals can tell us

how members identify data that is valid or what forums for

exchange or dialogue are considered appropriate or useful. The

focus of literature on the information processing approach to

learning is mostly on improving and increasing information flow.

While these are important issues, the impact of culture on

communication can provide clues to how an organization actually

uses this data in learning. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993)

address this process in case studies of policy learning that

illustrate that the professional communications in professional

forums are more likely to lead to real change in the positions of

policy actors than are exchanges that occur at public forums,

which include industry or interest groups. Dialogue in such pro-

fessional settings engages actors in different roles than, does

public d iscourse.

Communications patterns in an agency like the Agency for

International Development (AID) also illustrate this pattern. The

culture of AID very much involves work in the field. One of the

dominant beliefs is that only in the field does one experience

what development work is really aboutworking directly with

people on sustainable projects. Since many staff come to the

agency from the Peace Corps, whose philosophy puts the highest

priority on field work, this is not surprising. According to this

belief headquarters' analysis cannot comprehend the experiential

reality of work in the field (Mahler 1988). Thus, learning is

much more likely to result from field experiences than from

analysis of data in Washington. Communiques from the field are

accorded highest status and quickly passed around the office. To

receive one is an indicator of the importance of one's work.

Lessons drawn from the field are considered the most legitimate

bases for changing policies or procedures.

532/J-PART,

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This collective cultural belief does not necessarily thwart

change, but it does influence which information about results will

be attended to and what kinds of new solutions are likely. In one

section of the agency, the most favored programs are those that

work directly with the farm sector, rather than through other

development mechanisms such as economic policies. The former

kinds of projects were protected by artful descriptions when the

environment, in the shape of a new presidential administration,

changed the external policy requirements and the resources avail-

able to the agency. The agency learned how to adapt to changed

policy eras while protecting its programs in the field.

The Influence of Culture on the Consideration

Given to External Demands

How does the organization socialize officials to deal with

outsiders, such as clients, oversight institutions, interest groups,

other agencies, or local residents? How does the collective frame

of reference about actors in the external environment influence

the level of attention or inattention that particular outsiders

receiv e? What kinds of needs, requests, or demands will officials

see and put on the agenda for change?

Culture-based assumptions about clients, oversight agencies,

and other organizations and actors articulate the meaning of

power and dependency relations, the legitimacy of external

claims, and service obligations to organization members. There

are vast differences in organizational cultures and ideologies with

regard to environmental relations generally, specific client

relations, and links to interorganizational networks of other

agencies and groups. What assumptions the agency holds about

client services and who it defines as its clients are concerns

highlighted by the present interest in TQM and reinventing

government. These beliefs are represented in various ways

formally in mission statements and rules for treating client

applicants and informally in language use; in stories and rituals;

and even in the physical surroundings in which clients wait, over-

sight hearings are held, or administrators function (Goodsell

1989).

Learning from results is much more likely, of course, when

results in the form of client outcomes or interorganizational

cooperation can be seen to have some effect on the organization.

This effect is notoriously difficult to observe in some types of

public organizations where neither outputs nor outcomes are

directly observable, such as the coping organizations that Wilson

identifies (1989). External sanctions for inadequate client out-

comes often are weak, so learning may depend almost exclusively

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Influences

of

O rganizational Culture

on

Learning

on organizational ethos, professionalism, and thepublic service

ethic,

and

these

may be

part

of

the culture

itself.

Korten's cases illustrate such apatternof responsivenessto

clients.Oneimportant difference between successful andunsuc-

cessful international development projects

was

that

the

successful

projects worked withthe local population. Officials respectedand

builton local traditional solutions (Korten 1980).Aless salutary

example comes from J.S.

Ott

(1989),

who

tells about

the

case

of

an accounting firm that customarily described itsclients in the

most derogatory termsandexperienced, notsurprisingly, avery

high client turnover rate. Complaints from clients were

not

taken

seriously. Because clientsdid notunderstand theservices that

were performed andcouldnotdiscernthequalityofservices,

their questions

and

complaints were seen

as

unworthy

of

attention

by thehighly sophisticated staff. Understanding themeaningof

cultural expressions abouttheenvironmentcantellusmuch about

how learning from failures

and

successes might

be

blocked

and

how learning mightbeencouraged.

The Influence

of

Subcultureson Communication

and Learning Dialogue

What impactdohostile subcultures haveon thespreadof

reforms or innovations?

How do the

norms

of a

subculture influ-

encetheinterpretation of information from other admiredor

despised groups?

Organizational subcultures often arise based

on

differences

in geography, professional orientation, program responsibilities,

functional specialization,

or

other groupings (Trice

and

Beyer

1993). Diverse ideologies often emerge among subcultures,and

these differences canenhanceorimpede learning. Interchange

among subculturescansparknew learning. Communication

across these linescanleadto newperspectivesand insights into

tasksorprogram technologies. Beck (1993) showshow new

organization structures

at

NASA opened multiple lines

of

com-

munication among professionals in different project groupsand

disciplines. This spurrednewcommunications patterns associated

with self-reports

of

greater innovation.

Deep, long-standing divisions between groups

in

organiza-

tions

can

however, limit learning

as

lessons adopted

by

some

groupsarespurnedbyothers.A new widely praised structural

change

was

adopted

by the law

enforcement group

in the

large

federal bureau mentioned earlier. Itseffect was to streamline

administration between headquartersand thefield, agoal across

the organization.

The

change

was not

adopted

by

other divisions,

534/J-PART October

1997


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Influences of rganizational Culture on Learning

however, in part because of the distrust between the law enforce-

ment group and the other groups (Mahler 1995).

A MODEL OF THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE

ON LEARNING

The preceding case examples illustrate the effects of several

different types of cultural elements in organization learning.

These cultural elements included organizational and professional

identities and work standards, rituals that connote the importance

of various sources of communication, subculture factions based

on professional identities, collective beliefs about the deficiencies

of clients or other departments, and beliefs about the wisdom of

clients and their traditional ways. It is time to summarize the

influences of these cultural elements on the course of learning in

a model.

Though there is no suggestion that the few examples sum-

marized here represent all types of organizational learning in

public organizations, the cases do illustrate two specific patterns

of culture's influence on learning. The first concerns the influ-

ential of shared beliefs about the forms and sources of informa-

tion on the interpretations of equivocal performance data. The

examples suggest that the more ambiguous the results appear to

the organization members, the more influential the collective

beliefs about the legitimacy and meaning of information sources

seem to be. These beliefs might be termed the culture of informa-

tion. Put another way, the more difficult that situations are for

officials to assess or the more controversial the agency's results,

the more agency actors will rely on cultural beliefs to determine

if the news is bad, good, or inconsequential. These interpre-

tations of data form the basis for either deciding to go on with

business as usual or launching an effort to improve the situation

(i.e.,

learning). Where there is less ambiguity about what results

might mean, culture should have less influence on learning.

Many factors, including competing professional norms or the

clarity of goals and expectations for the agency, could affect the

degree of ambiguity seen in the results data.

While the case examples presented here do not demonstrate

all these implications, they do illustrate the general pattern. In the

Minnesota case, staff were caught in the controversy between

their own well-entrenched procedures and frequent outside criti-

cism. Their ethos allowed them to label this criticism as irrespon-

sible. This interpretation changed as the culture of customer

service slowly took hold. In the case of the Agency for Interna-

tional Development, requests, inquiries, and other communiques

from the field were accorded the highest priority, and therefore



18/22

Influences ofOrganizational Cultureon Learning

led to action. In these examples the specific cultural beliefs about

the legitimacy of information sources themselves guided the inter-

pretation of equivocal and controversial situations. These inter-

pretations were critical in blocking self-examination in the firm

Ott studied and in the first years in Barzelay's account of the

Minnesota case. However, later in the Minnesota purchasing

agency and in the AID example, cultural beliefs about informa-

tion spurred the diagnosis of situations as problems and energized

actors to seek solutions.

A second and related pattern that emerged in these examples

concerns culture's role in guiding the analysis and debate about

solutions to acknowledged problems, particularly when existing

technologies are not well understood or are controversial. Collec-

tive beliefs about professional standards and identities and the

meanings attributed to the agency's mission shape perceptions

about legitimate options for new programs and procedures,

including the option of no action. This set of beliefs might be

called the culture of technology in an agency. Culture's role in

influencing the process of procedural analysis and the direction of

change is perhaps especially important for public organizations

because of the inherent ambiguity of many program and mana-

gerial technologies. Both Perrow (1967) and Wilson (1989),

among many others, have defined the technologies of public

organizations to include not only equipment but the whole collec-

tion of program procedures established to transform cases or situ-

ations into the state prescribed in public law or regulation. Often

such technologies are difficult to establish because the intent of

public policy is unclear, as much of the implementation research

demonstrates.

An even greater difficulty, however, in the design or

redesign of program technologies is that many agencies receive

mandates to undertake programs for which effective technologies

have not been discovered, (e.g., to protect neglected children, to

serve internal customers). This means that even if negative per-

formance data were unambiguous, they might not contain much

in the way of clues as to how to rectify problems with a pro-

gram. When program technologies are not well understood or are

controversial, the search for ways to adjust or redesign them

must fall back on other kinds of knowledge, including organiza-

tional beliefs about what it means to do a good, professional job.

Thus culture plays a role in learning by filling in gaps in techno-

logical understanding with the collective wisdom of the organiza-

tion. Again, the less ambiguous or controversial the technology,

the smaller the role for culture.

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Influences o f

Organizational

Culture on Learning

This pattern is seen in several examples, particularly those

from the large federal bureau. Here, consistent with the dominant

law enforcement ethos, proposals to adopt sampling techniques to

remedy a work backlog were rejected. Traditional management

controls were continued despite evidence of stress, low morale,

and recruitment problems. Other examples from this agency

illustrate how imitative learning as a means of problem solving

can be blocked by hostile subcultures. These illustrations suggest

that management improvement technologies may be particularly

poorly understood, making them subject to cultural influences.

But cultural beliefs about what constitutes a good program

also can fill in when technology is ambiguous and controversial,

as in the case of international development, where again the

influences of agency culture appear to be important in program

definition. For example, Korten (1980) spotlights the attentive-

ness of program officials to the traditional ways that their clients

devise solutions to development problems; he notes that these

programs are remarkable because of their relative success in a

field where much controversy surrounds methods of development

and sustainability. In one of the program areas at the Agency for

International Development, officials favored hands-on training in

the field, consistent with core culture values, over nationwide

economic policy change.

These observations, along with the existing portrayals of the

organizational learning process, suggest a model of the ways in

which culture influences learning. Culture provides a reservoir of

organizational meanings that agency actors can draw from to help

interpret results and make sense of existing and proposed

procedures and program technologies. The influence of culture is

most likely when agency results or technologies are ambiguous

and controversial. This model builds on the interpretive approach

to organizational learning, which emphasizes the equivocality of

organizational information and the value of reflection and

dialogue, and it also acknowledges the information processing

perspective, which emphasizes the importance of data collection

and analytic problem-solving techniques when ambiguity or

controversy is low. In both cases the lessons learned by

individuals in the context of cultural interpretations become

organizational learning when they are formally or informally

shared with other agency actors as rules, new technologies,

stories, or group norms. Hard lessons may become part of the

agency mythology, contributing to future interpretations. The

examples given above suggest this pattern but do not offer a

systematic test of the model. The exhibit illustrates these

relationships.

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Exhibit

Settings in which the Influence on Learning of Beliefs about

Information Sources and Procedures is Most Evident

Level of ambiguity and equivocality in

performance data and results

Low ambiguity High ambiguity

Low levels of High reliance on High reliance on

know ledge culture of tech- cultures of information

nologies and technologies

Level of knowledge or

agreement about procedures ... :.. .

and technologies

High leve ls of Little reliance on High reliance on

know ledge culture culture of information

The exhibit suggests that the likely influence of culture is

most pronounced when ambiguity or controversy surrounds both

the information about results and the associated procedures or

technologies of the agency. When ambiguity is low, however,

less reliance on cultural interpretations is likely.

Culture clearly is not the only influence in learning, but

given the ambiguity of results and the forces that shape program

technology, its role appears to be significant both in blocking

some changes and in spurring others. These effects of culture

have not been the subject of particular study in research on

organizational learning or in related studies of program imple-

mentation and evaluation. Generally, the meaning of data and

program processes to actors are not considered. The framework

drawn here offers a more systematic basis for studying cultural

influences on learning and the resulting changes in programs and

procedures.

CONCLUSIONS

The exploration of linkages between organizational culture

and learning leads to a model of the specific forms of influence

that culture exerts in the learning process. Beliefs and norms

about information and professional work standards are influential,

particularly when agency events or results are subject to ambig-

uous interpretations and do not clearly indicate a remedy.

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A model of the conditions under which cultural influences

are particularly important for agency learning makes a contribu-

tion to our understanding of learning in public organizations

because it balances the typical emphasis on devising more sophis-

ticated data collection, retrieval, and dissemination systems with

attention to what the information means to administrators and

how it actually is interpreted and used. It highlights the possi-

bilities for alternative forms of discourse, analysis, and debate in

learning by emphasizing the interpretive elements of learning.

Clues for building more effective learning routines are

especially welcome in public organizations, which are typically

constrained in extraordinarily complex ways from responding

directly to results. James Q. Wilson provides a catalog of the

constraints on the actions and perspectives of public managers

(1989). Learning in governmental organizations requires serving

a variety of external constituents, some of whom are customers,

some professionals, some overseers, and some opponents with a

variety of agendas for the organization. Many current reform

efforts such as reinvention and the National Performance Review

are aimed at altering these external constraints. Studies of the

internal inspirations for innovations and the limitations on change

embedded in the organization's culture have a useful contribution

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