IURII a. LEVADA Homo Post-soveticus

8/22/2019 IURII a. LEVADA Homo Post-soveticus

1/36

6 SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

6

English translation 2002 by M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Translated from the Russiantext 2000 by the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Presidium of the RussianAcademy of Sciences, and the author. Homo Post-Soveticus, Obshchestvennyenauki i sovremennost, 2000, no. 6, pp. 524.

Iurii Aleksandrovich Levada, Doctor of Philosophy, is director of the RussianCenter for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM).

Sociological Research, vol. 40, no. 6, NovemberDecember 2001, pp. 641.

2002 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.ISSN 10610154/2002 $9.50 + 0.00.

IURII A. LEVADA

Homo Post-Sovieticus

[From the editors ofObshchestvennye nauki i

sovremennost:] Society and the reforms

The surveys that VTsIOM [the Russian Center for Public OpinionResearch] has conducted every five years since 1989 as part of theSoviet Man Program, like the centers other surveys, provide scholarswith huge amounts of material to consider. Among this abundance ofmaterial, a special place is held by findings that indicate what funda-mental changes have taken place in the last decade in the behavior,habits, and the very nature of Soviet Everyman; what has remainedunchanged; and where there have been mutations of stereotypes thatbecame deeply rooted in the Soviet period. The article by Iurii Levadathat we here present to our readers touches on only a few traits ofpost-Soviet man, but we think they are very important.1

The adapted individual

The individuals adaptation to a changed social environment be-comes urgent and universally significant when society must deal


2/36

NOVEMBERDECEMBER 2001 7

with abrupt turning points at which almost all its forces and groupshave to choose between forced adaptation and disintegration. TheSoviet experiment produced not so much a new human type as anindividual who was wholly adapted to Soviet reality, one willingto accept it as a given, with no alternative. A society that was closedon all sides, even from its own historical reality, raised genera-tions who could not imagine any way of life except the one theywere given. The lack of alternatives turned the universal practiceof adaptation into a habit, a mass behavioral structure that wasneither dissected nor subject to analysis.

Those who adapted included people from a great variety of so-cial groups, revolutionary adventurist fanatics, remnants of theformer elites, and those who had been the lower orderspeasants,petty bourgeois, workers, and so on. None of the revolutionarydreamers and organizers of the Russian inversion were preparedfor what actually happened after 1917. Circumstances forced notonly domestic opponents but also those who would have liked toremain on the sidelines to adapt to the new, harsh realities. Thesocial and political revolutions were accompanied by such rela-tively rapid (and hence minimally prepared) processes as massiveurbanization, heavy industrialization, the stripping of peasantsfrom the countryside, technical advances, mass education, and soon. Moreover, all these processes took place under conditions ofmass social mobilization and tension, under the Terror.

Adaptation could take various forms, from primitive survival tothe utilization of new instrumental (for example, technical literacy),organizational, and career models. Adaptation could be accom-plished by lowering ones requirements (both of consumption andof value), by reevaluating symbols (for example, making the tran-sition from egalitarian to hierarchically distributed values), bychanging role and instrumental functions (peasants became workersat state enterprises, representatives of the free professions became

civil servants, political leaders became bureaucrats), and so on.But even a strong adaptation does not mean that an individualhas assimilated all the social requirements. The Soviet system didnot create the new, simple, completely socialized individual


3/36


envisioned by the radical dreamers, whom official propagandamade use of throughout its existence. In fact, it created not asimple individual but one who was merely simplified in termsof ideas and needs. Nor was this a new individual, but one more orless strongly adapted to a social reality that was given and irre-versible. At the individual level, the whole system of deals madewith the state, which was intrinsic to the Soviet arrangement, in-evitably led to moral corruption, the acceptance of sham, the pad-ding of figures, string pulling, bribery, and doublethink. Theseconditions were necessary if society and the economy were to func-tion. The collapse of the Soviet system did not introduce anythingfundamentally new; it only eliminated the social and institutional(punitive) regulators that had limited the effect of the corruptingmechanisms.

The relative swiftness and easiness of this collapse, at least inits official aspects, showed how unstable the compromise betweenstate and individual that defined socialism really was. At the sametime, it revealed how unprepared Soviet Man was to adjust to thesituation that developed after the collapse of the comfortable so-cial roof [krysha, the same word used for a criminal protectionracketEd.].

It is significant that this was the third time since the middle ofthe nineteenth century (the first two were in 1861 and 1917) inwhich all individuals were forced to adapt to a changed environ-

ment. This adaptation is universal because everyone has had toadapt to the new conditionsthose who are bitterly opposed todemocratic market civilization and those who are confirmed ad-vocates of it, those who are nostalgic for our former greatness andthose who care only about their own well-being. Again, therefore,we find ourselves in a situation of forced choicea choice im-posed from outside, as it were, but already made; a situation that isnot yet familiar but must be accepted as a given. Thus, in todays

political debate that is tearing our whole society apart, the issue isnot so much the choice of what path the country should take butrather whether society (or the nation) can adapt itself to the choicethat has been made. On the practical plane, moreover, the issue to


4/36


be resolved is the cost of successful adaptation to the changedsystem of authorities and guidelines.

Forced adaptation does not by any means mean resignation,consent, or approval. The social situation cannot be ignored, but itcan be disputed and rejected. One can seek out niches in whichone can lead a more serene and secluded existence (in reality, suchniches must always be purchased for a certain price). The un-precedented opportunities for social, value, and moral choice thatexist amid the disintegration of customary and compulsory regu-lative mechanisms create conditions that accommodate variouslevels and types of social adaptation, which are subject to analysisfrom various angles. Scholars have the opportunity to examine thedifferent aspects of this rather complex phenomenon analyticallyand empirically.

Based on the regular surveys conducted by VTsIOM, we cansee some very obvious changes over the last five years. What hasincreased most notably is the percentage of elderly andthis meritsspecial attentionvery young people who say, I cant adapt tothe changes. The no change indicator remained the same in theyounger age group but dropped considerably among all othergroups. The percentage of those who have to hustle rose sharplyin all groups except the oldest (fifty-five and above), which sim-ply does not have the ability to engage in that kind of adaptivebehavior. The percentage of those who mentioned new opportu-

nities did not rise in any of the age groups, and even fell some-what in the most active cohort (twenty-five to forty years old).Citizens with a higher education make up the only group in

which the percentage of those who cannot adapt has not changedand is still relatively low (16 percent, as previously). In this groupthe percentage of those who have gained new opportunities isalso about the same. Even so, the number of those whose situationhad not changed went down, and there was a big increase (from 33

percent to 41 percent) in the proportion of those forced to hustle.People with a secondary education are much more likely to acknowl-edge that they cannot adapt to the changes but less likely tomention the absence of change. Here, too, there was a big increase


5/36


(from 33 percent to 45 percent) in the percentage of those forcedto hustle, the strongest indicator of frequency of such behavioramong all groups. In this group new opportunities are mentionedsomewhat less frequently than before (6 percent, as compared with4 percent). The percentage of those who cannot adapt went upamong those with less than a secondary-school education (from27 percent to 46 percent), and the proportion of those who re-ported the absence of change went down. At the same time, therewas no change in the forced to hustle indicator (apparently theresult of few realistic opportunities and resources), and the samewas true in the case of new opportunities, presumably becausethat indicator could not fall below 3 percent.

In Moscow and St. Petersburg, like everywhere else, the pro-portion of those convinced that they cannot adapt rose, whilethose who did not report any particular changes in their situationdeclined. Here, however, the relatively high number of thoseforced to hustle remained unchanged (at 38 percentwe mayassume that people exhausted their resources five years ago), andthere was a noticeable increase (from 7 percent to 12 percent) inthe percentage of those who mentioned new opportunities. Inmost cities the percentage of those forced to hustle rose sub-stantially, almost to the level of the capital cities (34 percent). Inthe towns this indicator reached its maximum level (41 percent).Here, as in the villages, what is mentioned most frequently is the

impossibility of adapting to the changes and the necessity of hus-tling; less frequent are reports of a lack of change in ones situa-tion and the existence of new opportunities.

On the whole, we can say that older people are usually the onesthat cannot adapt (73 percent of those older than forty, of whom50 percent are older than fifty-five). In this group the proportionof people with a higher education is lower than average (one-halfthe norm), while many more than average have little education.

Those that report no change hardly differ at all from the averageindicators. Those in the most active age groups are most likely tofind it necessary to hustle (70 percent are aged between twenty-five and fifty-four, although among the population as a whole that


6/36


cohort accounts for 50 percent). Among those who are adaptingactively to steadily worsening conditions, 72 percent have a sec-ondary or a higher education. Among those who are finding newopportunities, 72 percent are aged forty or below, and 77 percenthave a higher or a secondary education. The general conclusionwe can draw from this is fairly simple: those who have social re-sources (youth, an education) are more active.

Let us add a few occupational characteristics to the variousgroups. Almost half of those who cannot adapt are pensioners,followed (in terms of numbers) by workers, the unemployed, andspecialists; this group includes no entrepreneurs or military ser-vice personnel. More than half of those who do not report anychanges in their current situation are pensioners and workers. Inthe forced to hustle group, 60 percent are workers, specialists,and pensioners. Finally, among those who are finding new op-portunities we most often encounter entrepreneurs, specialists,and executives, of whom, moreover, about one-third work in thenonstate sector. Naturally, none of the groups singled out here canbe classified as socially homogeneous: almost all the social strataare represented to some degree in each one.

Let us turn to the different adaptive groups assessments of thescale of the changes that took place in 1994 and 1999 (see Table1). It is clear that, on the whole, assessments of this scale by par-ticular groups changed little over five years (which indicates a

certain stability in the group frameworks). Views of the significanceof the changes increased in all groups, anda very important pointparticularly in the group that considers the changes unremarkable.

If, however, we assess the sign (approval or disapproval) ofthe changes that are taking place, we uncover a quite predictablepicture of a universal, demonstrable nostalgia for the system thatexisted before 1985. Fifty-eight percent agree that it would bebetter if everything in the country had remained . . . as it was be-

fore 1985. This number includes 73 percent of those who havefailed to adapt, 49 percent of those who believe that nothing haschanged, 55 percent of those forced to hustle, and 24 percent ofthose who have discovered new opportunities. The roots of this


7/36


nostalgia lie in the predominantly negative assessment of the situ-ation in recent years. In all the groups of interest to us, MikhailGorbachevs perestroika period and Boris Yeltsins presidency arecharacterized very harshly.

The picture changes somewhat in regard to a more detailed ex-amination of particular types of change. We will limit ourselves totwo examples (see Table 2). All the adaptive groups, it turns out,are more likely than not to assess free enterprise as a positive devel-opment, and only among those who cannot adapt does a majorityobject to becoming more like the West. Finally, it is of interest tolook at an integral indicator of a more or less practical attitudetoward the changes, namely statements about the necessity of con-tinuing or terminating the economic reforms. Over the five-yearperiod, attitudes toward the reforms in general became more defi-nite in all groups (fewer respondents found it difficult to answer). Inall the groups the level of positive assessments of the reforms wentup to some extent (especially, of course, among those who had foundnew opportunities and among those who were forced to hustle).

Table 1

The Scale of Changes (100% per column)

I cannot I see no I have to I have newResponses Year adapt change hustle opportunities

There have been 1994 58 47 63 68big changes 1999 59 51 61 73

Essentially,nothing has 1994 12 18 10 12changed 1999 10 11 10 8

Not long ago,it seemed asthough life hadchanged, butnow I can seethat everything 1994 19 21 16 13is the same 1999 19 23 20 12

Difficult to say 1994 11 14 11 7

1999 12 15 9 7

Types of adaptive behavior


8/36


At first glance we seem to have uncovered a paradox: no onelikes the changes, but no group contains a majority that opposes

them. People are reluctant to accept as given imposed changes thatare not desired by the majority, changes that have had unexpectedconsequences for almost the entire population.

Now let us try to sort out the emotional balance that can beobserved among the various adaptive groups. Positive feelings(hope, confidence, freedom, and so on) clearly predominate onlyin the small group that has found new opportunities. True, this isalso where we find the greatest incidence of loneliness (clearlycaused not only by the groups small numbers but also by the verynature of the activities of the adventurous entrepreneurial stratumand similar groups). Among those who report no changes therehas been no loss of hope, dignity, andto some extenteven free-dom and confidence. Almost half of those who cannot adapt or areforced to hustle are indifferent; resentment and despair are alsomore prevalent in these groups. Admittedly, we can discern oneessential difference: aggressiveness is minimal among those whocannot adapt (10 percent) and is found most often (16 percent)among those forced to hustle. The constant necessity to work

Table 2

Respondents Assessment of Specific Changes (100% per column)

I cannot I see no I have to I have newResponses Total adapt change hustle opportunities

What has Russia gained from the introduction of free enterprise?

More benefit 50 35 51 59 89

More harm 25 31 22 24 5Difficult to say 25 34 26 17 6

What has Russia gained from becoming more like the West?

More benefit 38 24 42 46 59

More harm 23 32 19 21 17

Difficult to say 39 44 39 33 24

Types of adaptive behavior


9/36


hard and to hustle obviously also gives rise to emotional imbalance.Seventy-three percent of those who have found new opportuni-

ties think of themselves asfree (versus 16 percent who say theyare not); this figure is 46 percent among those who believe thatnothing has changed (versus 45 percent), 37 percent among thoseforced to hustle (versus 54 percent); and only 22 percent amongthose who have failed to adapt (versus 62 percent). Many morepeople, however, consider themselves to be happy than think ofthemselves as free. On average, the ratio of those who are happyto those who are unhappy stands at 49 : 37. Among those whohave found new opportunities, this ratio is 72 : 17 (no one in thisgroup is completely unhappy!). Only among those who havefailed to adapt do those who are unhappy predominate35 : 49.

Let us take a look at a series of data from surveys of the Ex-press type. In the past few years these surveys have regularlyasked this quasi-expert question: Do you think that most inhabitantshave adapted to the changes that have taken place? Since 1998 an-other question has been added, whether the respondents familyhas adapted. Comparable data from two years give the impressionthat there has been hardly any change in the indicators of adapta-tion. All that is noticeable is that they fluctuate around somemedium level. At the same time, it is easy to note a definite corre-spondence between trends in indicators of the have alreadyadapted type and the changes are going in the right direction

type. It seems quite likely that changing assessments of adapta-tion in general are close to the changes in (but not to the level of)the equally general positive assessments of the national situation.When the situation in the country and in the family are compared,however, we can clearly see that the former is assessed much morenegatively than the latter. We can assume that reports in the massmedia are one source of peoples opinions about the situation of mostpeople in the country, while their opinions about their own situation

are based on their immediate experience. In reality, what is goingon is a more complex interaction and mutual projection of sources.It turns out that, when asked about their own situation, many

more people in all groups (except, perhaps, the youngest respondents)


10/36


describe themselves as having already adapted than when they areasked about the national situation. When people are asked about thelikelihood of adapting in the near future, however, the opposite istrue: most people assume that others are adapting. Personal experi-ence also encourages more negativity (they will never adapt).

In conclusion, I would like to touch on one fundamental meth-odological question: is it correct to classify as one type of adaptivebehavior a position in which respondents state, I cannot adapt?One of my objectives is to verify that this position actually signalsone type of adaptive behavior (or even a set of types). The charac-teristic features of the structure of variant behaviors identified inthe survey can be represented as follows:

people who have discovered new opportunities for themselveshave acquired new instrumental means to satisfy their own grow-ing needs (upward adaptation);

those who have been forced to hustle make use of unfamil-iar means to maintain their present status or a reduced status(downward adaptation);

those who believe that nothing in particular has changed forthem have found a certain niche from which they cannot see thechanges that are taking place or that makes these changes seemrelatively unimportant (isolating adaptation); and

those who have not adapted define their own situation in suchterms as I cannot adapt; these are people who have been forced

to minimize their own needs and status aspirations and who viewthat reduction extremely negatively (destructive adaptation).It deserves emphasis that none of the adaptive types identified

(to some extent provisionally) fully coincides with any of the groupsexamined in this article; the only ones that can be considered typi-cal are the centers or nuclei of such groups, which are moststable and consistent in their traits. None of the variants of adap-tive behavior can be considered stable under present social and

historical conditions. In the survey findings this is generally ex-pressed as a feeling of uncertainty about the future; this trait ischaracteristic of representatives of both the new and the oldtypes of behavior.


11/36


Dissatisfied Man: protest and patience

One typical reaction of the masses to the unending chain of suffer-ings, privations, and troubles that the individual in Russian soci-ety has had to endure throughout almost all of pre-Soviet, Soviet,and now post-Soviet history, a trait that is universally acknowl-edged and confirmed by numerous observations and empirical stud-ies, is the clear prevalence of patience over active protest, adapta-tion over rebellion, and passive dissatisfaction over a fight for onesrights.

Outside observers (and those who have been lured by revolu-tionary upheavals or who fear them) clearly feel a growing senseof the paradoxical character of what is taking place in todaysRussia, given that the public mood is no longer kept silent but canbe expressed through political institutions, the mass media, andthe streets. If we are to eliminate this paradox, we must deter-mine the social conditions and structures that shape and maintainthat combination (or, more precisely, that interaction) of dissatis-faction and patience in society. Any appeal to national tradition(it has always been this way), national psychology (we desirelittle, we expect less, we endure everything, etc.), or the ineffec-tiveness of present-day public dissatisfaction (background dis-satisfaction) may record undisputed facts but does not account forthem. Any explanation produced within the framework of a socio-logical survey must obviously take into consideration those char-acteristics of social institutions and structures of interest to us herethat depreciate mass dissatisfaction, redirecting it into passive pa-tience, the search for an external source of evil, and so on.

Traditionally, Soviet Man has been characterized by his politi-cal teachers (and his literary and artistic teachers) as absolutelyloyal to and trusting of the authorities, satisfied with his situation,and confident of a bright future. Admittedly, the real Everyman ofthe Soviet period was not immune to rebellion, but not only did helack legitimate opportunities to express his dissatisfaction, theconditions did not even exist to make him aware of it. Compulsoryunanimity was maintained not only through the fear of punishment


12/36


for the slightest deviation from the states requirements but also(and this is even more important) by a situation in which therewere no alternatives, no reference points for comparing andevaluating actions.

Todays bundle of nostalgic sentiments and views also containsthe notion that before, there was no level of mass dissatisfactionsimilar to that of today. In fact, this type of dissatisfaction, muchless discontent expressed in this way, really did not exist, nor couldit have. The years of stagnation [the Brezhnev periodEd.]earned this appellation precisely because there was no differencebetween the future and the past (our own past, because some-one elses past remained outside the boundaries of the massesperception). Today such differences are appreciable, and compari-sons seem to be automatic, often with unfortunate results. Betweentwo-thirds and three-quarters of Russias population think that theyare living worse now than they did before, that their lives are con-siderably worse than they had expected, and, to top it off, that theylive worse than most people around them. This last idea (worsethan others) shows the extent of subjective tendencies, in thiscase toward comparative self-disparagement in peoples assess-ments of their own situation.

One particular and urgent problem (in both practical and theo-retical terms) is the means by which the public expresses its dis-satisfaction. The glasnost (openness) of the first years of

perestroika brought the various types of discontent to the surfaceand immediately revealed the lack of any appropriate social andpolitical language capable of expressing them, as well as the ab-sence of appropriate structures that might employ such language(programs, parties, elites). This gave rise to the predominance ofprotest based on mood, on emotion, which soon began to degen-erate and to revert to the traditional forms of Soviet paternalismand patriotism.

The mechanism of social and political mobilization (and suchindicators of it as provisionally unanimous support for the sym-bols and actions of the authorities), the mechanism that had beenformed earlier, retained its significance even in the years when


13/36


hopes of perestroika flourished. It took the political polarizationof 1993 for the chaos and hardships of the reforms to become thebasis of solid and increasingly widespread social dissatisfaction.It needs to be emphasized that mass discontent did not manifestitself either after the first strikes in 1989 or after the empty shelvesand empty purses of 1992. Demonstrations of support for the re-forms still predominated, and Egor Gaidar actually found himselfat the peak of public approval after he left the government at theend of 1992 (by the way, this is an excellent argument against theoversimplified consumerist treatment of todays social protest!).

The legitimation of the conservative social and political oppo-sition (in mass consciousness) played a huge role in overcomingthe structures and traditions of the mobilization society. Howeverparadoxical it may seem at first glance, monolithic, coercive unitywas brought down through the efforts of those who advocated themonolithic model of society. At the same time, as if in passing,public dissatisfaction came into its own, and from various direc-tions (for example, some people are dissatisfied with the swiftnessof the changes, others are unhappy with how slow they are, andstill others dislike the changes themselves). The question, how-ever, is this: Who is to articulate (and thereby to organize) publicdissatisfaction, and how?

Time has shown that none of the social structures, institutions,and mechanisms that were destroyed or devalued by the changes

of the 1980s and 1990s has actually been razed to the ground.This is also true of the mechanism of mass social and politicalmobilization. In truncated and restricted form (for a limited pe-riod, in a limited area, among just part of the population, etc.),mobilization mechanisms can be switched on even in a societythat is split and dissatisfied.

In particular, it is necessary to distinguish such behavioral cat-egories as almost universal (diffuse) dissatisfaction from mass

moods of (directed) protest and organized struggle to achieve cer-tain social ends. Dissatisfaction that is directed against every-thing, as it werefrom ones own situation to the countryspredicament, the policies of the national leaders, and so onis


14/36


hardly directed against anything: it is, so to speak, a steady state ofpublic opinion, a kind of general background for all its parametersand fluctuations. It is against this background that flashes of ap-proval for the actions of particular political leaders can be seen aswell as outbursts of extreme public dissatisfaction (sometimes withthe same leaders), which then turn into a form of chronic, back-ground dissatisfaction and are channeled into mobilized ag-gressiveness, the fears that accompany it, and so on. To paraphrasethe well-known ironic saying of the 1970s (everyone is unhappy,but everyone votes for ), we might say that these days everyoneis unhappy, everyone is against, but they vote in various waysand put up with everything.

By the way, in the overwhelming majority of cases the publicdirects its dissatisfaction at social and political institutions andofficials. Meanwhile, it assesses its personal situation more calmly.A composite survey covering 1994 through 1999 found that 52percent were satisfied (completely or mostly) with their so-cial situation, versus 34 percent who were completely or mostlydissatisfied. However, only 16 percent were satisfied with thematerial condition of their families, versus 82 percent who weredissatisfied. Forty-five percent were satisfied with their lives as awhole, whereas 48 percent were not.

Is the mood of universal dissatisfaction characteristic only ofRussian society today? Or can it be considered part of some his-

torically determined national psychology, of Russian national char-acter or some such thing? If we stay within the bounds ofsociological interpretations of historical phenomena, it is reason-able to suggest that universal and diffuse dissatisfaction is an in-evitable byproduct of any reform period, in which the traditionalframework of life has been undercut, new orientations are not yetclear, means of realizing new possibilities do not exist, illusionsare being shattered, and so on. Various strata of Russian society

(and all its groups) have been enduring such changes for two orthree hundred years.We can logically separate three basic directions in which present-

day public dissatisfaction is being transformed into particular kinds


15/36


of actions: economic, political, and nation-state (the provi-sional nature of this division is examined below).

Most often, surveys record peoples readiness to protest againsteconomic policies and declining living standards. The compos-ite survey of 199499 found that in that period, on average, 27percent thought that there might be mass demonstrations in theirtown or village against rising prices and declining living stan-dards, 57 percent believed that such actions were unlikely, and17 percent found it difficult to answer. In the same span of time,23 percent of the respondents, on average, announced that theymight take part in such actions (versus 60 percent who said thatthey would not).

Survey findings show that the reserve of patience goes downfrom one year to the next, but the stated potential for protest haschanged relatively little. After peak levels that were clearly linkedto the suffering caused by the financial collapse of August 1998,indicators of economic dissatisfaction gradually returned to thelevel where they had been before the crisis. Moreover, there is asubstantial difference between respondents statements that theyintend to take part in protests and actual participation: participa-tion was always considerably less than the declared intention. Forexample, on the eve of the loudly prepared all-Russian protest of 7October 1998, about 10 percent stated that they were ready to takepart in the strikes and temporary work stoppages. But in fact, (ac-

cording to the surveys) not more than 3 percent actually took part.Let us highlight certain characteristics of protest that relate toeconomics. First, for the most part protest is directed not againstthe specific owners and the specific economic conditions of pro-duction at a particular enterprise or in a particular sector but ratheragainst the authorities and their economic policies. Second,these complaints, however grandiosely expressed (the empty potmarches at the start of the reforms, the miners picket lines in front

of the government building in 1998), do not add up in terms ofmeaning to more than a petition sent to the power structures. Third(and perhaps most important), with a few exceptions the protestorsdemands were not aimed at raising wages or improving working


16/36


conditions (as is typical of Western countries) but only at fulfill-ing existing obligationsbasically, paying wages on time.

Whereas classical liberalism (and Marxism) considered theworkers movement a factor in technical and social progress be-cause of its economic demands, we simply do not see this in ourreality: the oldthat is, Sovietpaternalistic distributive struc-tures of economic management are the ones protecting themselvesthrough mass protests. Many economic protests amount to astruggle for what used to be. In the absence of methods andorganizational means of waging a real struggle to expand rightsand improve conditions, mass protest inevitably reverts to the mostfamiliar forms (which are by no means random, as used to bethought). This is confirmed by activities that have acquired a cer-tain sensational notoriety in recent years, such as the seizure ofenterprises, carried out by a trade union or a strike committee inthe interests of the former owners or administrators.

Protest against political institutions is primarily conservativeand populist in naturean imaginary rebellion based on mood orsentiment, the outlook of the past, and organized by members ofthe former elite.

Gorbachevs attempt to reform the Party and the Soviet systemwas late by thirty to fifty years, which is why it led to the unex-pected collapse of the whole structure. By its very makeup, theSoviet party in power turned out to be incapable of becoming

the party of progress, but no other structure was fit to performthat function either. As a result, the party in power was forcedfor the sake of self-preservation to continue the reform line (or,more precisely, the inertia of reforms), which was devoid of anyprogram and content.

The initiators of reform were not able either to bring together anew, enlightened, and reform-minded elite that could create a forceor to convince Everyman that the state of affairs dubbed (all too

solemnly and incomprehensibly) the reforms would be useful andbeneficial to him. The only support available to them came fromunreliable institutions and levers of established presidential author-ity, which ultimately turned them into hostages of these institutions.


17/36


The outcome was to discredit the democratic forces and to rel-egate them to the fringes of the political scene.

Meanwhile, substantial changes were taking place in the viewsof the conservative opposition (that is, the communists). Althoughthe CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] has a rela-tively large and stable constituency, it does not actually aspire topower but only stakes out a position as a pressure group vis--vis the regime. It consistently supports the authorities on all fun-damental mattersthe approval of prime ministers, adoption ofbudgets, policies in the Caucasus, and so on. The overblown stand-off between the right wing and the left wing in 199596 even-tually lost all meaning, and by 1999 it had turned into a strugglefor the center of the political field. Moreover, as noted above,central means nothing more than a position captured from theextremes. In this situation, populism undergoes a characteristicevolution as a policy by which to gain the support of the masses,one that is used by almost all political movements (except the demo-cratic elite).

It is against this background that moods and actions of politicalprotest are evolving at the end of the 1990s. The emotional dissat-isfaction among the masses that was directed against the Party andthe Soviet system in 198990 gave way after 199394 to some-thing that was no less emotional and considerably more massivenamely, disillusionment with democratic forces and reforms. But

the resulting fairly broad support for the left opposition has notfound practical realization and has gradually turned into a hope ofmaintaining the status quo, which calls itself centrism.

This situation of debilitating and exhausting conflicts and pro-tests, leading to forced compromises, could have continued untilthe 1999 Duma elections or beyond, if these elections and the wholepolitical life of the country had not been haunted by the necessityof replacing the president and by the real nature of the presidential

regime in 2000. The grand political intrigue connected with thisis not comparable in significance to the ups and downs of inter-party competition in the months leading up to the elections. Thissituation also explains the emergence of Vladimir Putin as a strong


18/36


prime minister with presidential ambitions, drawing his supportnot from a possible balance of political and parliamentary forcesbut directly from the national mobilization of the masses. This lastterm merits special consideration.

The tensest zone of dissatisfaction and protests in the country,including open (even violent) conflicts, is the national-state zone.In this field the whole Soviet partystate machine suffered its mostdecisive defeat in 198891 (and there is a definite, although notcomplete, historical analogy with the collapse of the Russian mon-archy in the same field). In this context, naturally, the term na-tional means nation-state rather than ethnic or interethnic. Thefactor of national integration, involving political and economic aswell as moral solidarity (to use Emile Durkheims terminology),which is important to the existence of any state, inevitably be-came painful but essential when state formations of the empiricaltype were in crisis. A national complex, in this sense, or a complexof nation-state identification can be identified as a certain system ofinterconnected values and attitudes, expectations and symbols,behavioral and emotional standards that are shared by everyonethat is, by a sufficiently large portion of the population belongingto a variety of social status, political, and other groups.

The surveys confirm that a complex of national identificationcan be maintained by both internal factors (a shared way of life,economy, and references to our history and to traditional sym-

bols) and by external factors (distance from others and oppo-sition to them). Moreover, when internal ties are weak, as iscurrently happening in Russian society, the role played by the sec-ond factorthat is, external self-assertionrises and even be-comes exaggerated. Conversion of the national complex into anawakened, activated state or condition is now practically im-possible without an appeal to some outside threat and externalenemy. Use of this time-tested technique can be seen from two

directions, from above (the authorities) and from below (themasses).Judging from all the data, a primitive but strong factor has proved

to be effectivethefearof terrorists who seem to be elusive and


19/36


everywhere; the ordinary human fear for ones own life, security,home, and belongings. Another obvious point, moreover, is thatthis package of anti-terrorist fear also includes such age-old ex-amples of the negative mobilization of public opinion (seeminglyprepared in advance) as the rejection of Western intervention,shame over receiving Western aid, indignation about the inva-sive dominance of Caucasians in the Moscow markets, and soonincluding, of course, the universal striving (not characteristicof the military elite alone) to erase from historical memory themilitary and political defeat of 1996.

In this connection, I think, it is also appropriate to call to minda quite different but nonetheless important situation: attitudes to-ward the displaced art treasures (art objects taken as war tro-phies). Despite relatively stubborn resistance from governmentalstructures that are bound by certain international norms and obli-gations, both the public and the two chambers of the Russian Par-liament remain wholly committed to the simple and eternal ideaof exacting revenge for wrongs done (an eye for an eye, a theftfor a theft, take ten of theirs for one of ours, etc.). The echoesof this old confrontation show just how far the Russian public opin-ion is willing to stray from civilized standards, even when the fac-tor mobilizing it is nothing but directed historical memory.

The revenge mechanism was started at the beginning of thesecond Chechen war, and quite successfully, using the whole might

of state structures and the mass media. Simple fear, cleverly di-rected (or directed by chance, not that important a difference inprinciple), turned out to be a stronger mobilizing force of publicopinion than all the challenges of the imperial complex or stateconsciousness.

The main role in any negative mobilization of public opinion isplayed by the enemy complex, which those who initiatedperestroika once tried to destroy in purely verbal ways. This com-

plex was worked out in fine detail and tested during the evolutionof Soviet Man, and its features have not lost their importance tothis day. With an enemy it is possible to act like an enemy withoutfeeling constrained by considerations of law or humanity. Suspicion


20/36


can be tantamount to a conviction, punishment can precede a courttrial or investigation, mass intimidation can take the place of anysearch for specific guilty parties, and so on.

All these trappings of political mythology have been describedand exposed many times, but they will never go out of use so long associety (that is, society itself and public opinion, not just official war-time propaganda) needs its enemy complex, preserves it carefully,and makes active use of itin particular, for self-determination,to ensure that the repository of guilt inevitably turns out to be some-one who is alien and hostile.

What was remarkable in the social and political mobilization ofthe autumn of 1999 was the transformation of what had initially(in 1994 and 1995) been a democratic protest against militaryaction in Chechnya into almost unconditional support for a con-siderably tougher course. Because what is involved here is not amass reaction but rather the behavior of a highly qualified politicalelite, the motivation is clearly not primarily the paroxysms of simplefear, as mentioned above, but more complex factors of politicalcalculations and functional relationships. This has a severe impacton how public opinion as a whole assesses what is happening: theweak antiwar protest, deprived of its voice, is ultimately not heard.Moreover, in this case the verdict issued by public opinion isretroactivethat is, it retroactively justifies actions of five yearsago that, until recently, were seen as tragic mistakes or even sim-

ply as crimes.Thus, the fundamental weakness of all forms and types of pro-test that can be observed in Russian society is determined not byrandom or situational factors but by the weakly structured charac-ter of society itself. Neither the social upheavals nor the quasi-political passions and intrigues of recent years have led to theformation of stable political divisions that do not depend on thevertical line of elite structures ruling authority and the sovereignty

of individuals in relationship to ruling authority. The potential forinstant social mobilization (negative mobilization) that societyexhibited in the autumn of 1999 offers convincing proof that thepublic has not moved far from the mechanical monolithic quality


21/36


that served to maintain absolute power and made it possible for itto be manipulated without considering the consequences. No so-cial protest can be effective if it has not been articulated, if it doesnot find support from a definite structure of firmly establishedpublic interests, groups, and institutions. Until this situation changesfundamentally, social protest will reinforce the reserves of socialpatience.

Deceptive Man: doublethink, Russian-style

According to the findings of the most recent Soviet Man survey,only 3 percent of the respondents in March 1999 indicated that thebest candidates would win our countrys elections: 83 percentwere convinced that the most clever would win (with certainsmall fluctuations, this distribution of views is characteristic of allsocial strata and political groups without exception). Right afterthe 1999 elections to the State Duma, 50 percent of the respon-dents said the elections had been not very honest or completelydishonest. Even so, most respondents in this survey (55 percentversus 27 percent) expressed satisfaction with the results. Appar-ently, the explanation for this obvious (and typical!) paradox ofmass consciousness in this country can be sought in the very crite-ria the masses use, the standards by which social processes andevents are evaluatedthat is, the normative field of human exist-ence that operates under current conditions.

Observations and surveys show that this field has many dimen-sions: coexisting in it are different criteria, reference points, andsystems of coordinates of normative assessmentswhat is per-missible, what is useful, what is proper, and so on. Moreover, thesecriteria, as a rule, turn out to be provisional and vague. These arenot rigorously defined imperatives; instead, they set the bound-aries or limits of what is permissible or relatively tolerable (wecan put up with it, it could be a lot worse, and so on). Such anormative field of human existence promotes the formation ofdeceptive behaviors and character traits in their bearer, DeceptiveMan. This person adapts to social reality by looking for loopholes


22/36


and ways around the normative system; that is, he looks for op-portunities to use the rules of the game within the normativesystem to serve his own interests, even as (and this is no less im-portant) he constantly tries to evade these rules in one way or an-other. This makes it necessary for him to excuse his own behavior,perhaps justifying it by reference to the necessity of self-preserva-tion, what other people do, or perhaps by appeals to normativesystems of a different rank (higher interests, and so on). Theunending fluctuation of social sentiments in an era of changes, asurge of enthusiasm followed by disappointment, the rise and fall ofcelebrities ratings, and so on, indicate the obvious frivolity of eachchoice and the portion of crafty self-deception embedded in it.

It is true, of course, that a deceptive desire to evade prohibi-tions and find convenient behavioral niches in normative systemsat various levels (social, group, or individual) can be found amongpeople of all times and nations. For example, when a survey showsthat among Russians today only 11 percent can say that they havenever lied to anyone, and only 32 percent can say that they havenever taken something that belonged to someone else without per-mission, it attests to one of the simplest and most widespreadtypes of human deception. This type is based on the diversity ofnormative fields themselves (social, group, role, and other fields),which determine the orientations and frameworks of eachindividuals activity. What interests us, however, are the more spe-

cific types and structures of deceptive behavior that are linkedto the specific functioning of social norms in particular historicaland nation-state conditionsfor example, the evasion of civicobligations and disobedience to the traffic rules.

The version of normative polycentric relativism that is soprevalent in Russian society at present was formed at the intersec-tion of several breakups of regulative structures that had been piledon top of one another throughout history. Russias endless mod-

ernization produced countless variants of normative conflicts atall levels of human existence and self-awareness. This was thefoundation, in particular, of all great nineteenth-century literature,the opposition between truth as veracity (pravda-istina) and


23/36


truth as justice (pravda-spravedlivost), between the truth ofthe little guy and the truth of the powers that be, between thesalvation of mankind and the tears of the child, and so on. In thissituation, Deceptive Man almost inevitably became Unhappy Man.

The Soviet period proclaimed a new value system that wouldbe universal in its significance and absolute in its sources (enactedin the name of and at the directive of historical progress), one thatwas called upon to take the place of or subordinate to itself allexisting systems. In fact, all it did was change the signs and theterms in a few normative fields and build another one on top ofthem. The formula what is moral is what is useful to . . . (theblank to be filled with such ringing phrases as the working people,the cause of communism, etc., but actually meaning what is inaccord with plans and directives from above) elevated a purelyutilitarian normative system to absolute status. In reality, the uni-versally significant and all-encompassing normative value systembroke down into many criteria groupings of big and little truth,what is and what ought to be, long-range interests versus needsof the moment, and so on.

One of this systems most salient characteristics was that therequirements imposed on the individual were fundamentally un-feasible. No one could accept the twists and turns of political op-portunism as something dictated by history. No one could giveall he had to fulfill the Five-Year Plan. The grandiose plans

could not be completed without figure padding, pull (blat

), thecommandeering of scarce resources, and so on. This, then, cre-ated Deceptive Man, Soviet-style. Absolute coercion gave riseto absolute readiness to engage in deceptive adaptation. The indi-vidual, deprived of any opportunity to resist, agreed either solemnlyor silently with the imperative prescriptions while persistently look-ing for loopholes that would enable him to avoid them.

The success of this system (for decades, at any rate) would have

been impossible if it had been based solely on mass coercion andmass deception. We can now see how naive people were in the1960s80s in blaming the underhandedness of the people on the all-knowing and supremely cynical Party and the political upper crust


24/36


(in the spirit of the doublethink mechanism as depicted by GeorgeOrwell). Deceptive Man, at every level and in all his forms, notonly put up with deception but was ready to deceive himself. Infact, he was in constant need of self-deception, again for the sakeof self-preservation (including psychological self-preservation)to cope with his own dichotomy, to justify his own deception. Thedeception that exalts us is more than just an accurate poetic for-mula. The whole mechanism of the Soviet system shaped bothdeceptive slaves (to use Tatiana Zaslavskaias apt expression)and no less deceptive bosses. Both these types deceived eachother as well as themselves.

Under conditions of universal deception, the fulfillment of nor-mative imperatives became a more or less deceitful deal (of thewe pretend to work, and they pretend to pay us sort). The im-peratives themselves, moreover, were personalized in the extreme(the civil compact came down to no more than an agreementbetween the fare cheat and the streetcar conductor).

The coexistence and interaction of various normative fields, withtheir criteria of what is and is not permitted, what is and is notapproved, are intrinsic to various social systems in which a dis-tinction is maintained between the everyday and the festive, whatis one persons and what is anothers, what is private and what isofficial, and so on. The specifically Soviet version (which hasbeen preserved in full to this day) blurs and erodes the distinctions

between normative fields. The deceitful mind easily surmountsprovisional barriers and finds numerous loopholes in prescriptionsor, to put it briefly, plays the game without rules. All that hap-pened after the collapse of the Soviet system was that deceptionsurfaced on both sides.

Deceitful behavior in the era of stagnation meant primarily ad-aptation to stable structures, careerism based on conformism. Thereform era is changing the character of adaptive behavior. The

instability of all structuresincluding power structures, shadowstructures, pressure groups, and support groupsis creating con-ditions that foster short-term pyramid schemes (not only finan-cial and economic ones but political pyramids as well, at various


25/36


levels of the hierarchy of power) and fast-track careers. This explainswhy certain personality types are in demand, especially CleverMan, who can turn a fluid situation to his own advantage and canchange his views and propensities to match current conditions.

The surveys show that public opinion lacks hard and fast linesof separation distinguishing approved behavior from that which isnot. This also applies to the fulfillment of social obligations ofvarious kinds. Let us look at the figures in Table 3 in more detail.The provisional norm index that is used in the last column hasthe smallestnumerical value with respect to the most importantstate duty of military service. We can assume that this is theresult of the de-statization of individuals that has been going onin recent years, the weakening of identification with state institu-tions and symbols (which also accounts for the latest calls tostrengthen statehood through the revival of the army and militarymight via violent escapades and punitive expeditions. The surveyfindings make it possible to judge the ground on which such callshave fallen).

It is quite remarkable that for the groups up to the age of forty,evading military service seems to be quite justified: the closer therespondents are to draft age, the more inclined they are to justifythe avoidance of this sacred duty. The youngest respondents, thosedirectly subject to conscription, are more than twice as likely tojustify draft evasion as to condemn it. The person who complies

with the norm here (as with all the other positions listed, by theway) belongs to the oldest cohort.Educational level has a similar effect on the acceptability of

avoiding military service: the higher the educational level, the loweris the norm index; and respondents who are highly educated aremore likely to justify such evasion than to condemn it. Settlementpatterns do not show such direct dependency. Military service isconsidered least obligatory in the cities [excluding the capital].

The situation is better in the villages, in Moscow, and (maximumapproval!) in the towns. Admittedly, among Moscow respondentswe find the largest percentage of cautious assessments such assomewhat wrong and the fewest categorical statements. Among


26/36


Table 3

How Acceptable Is It to Violate Social Obligations? (%)

In your view,how acceptable Not Absolutely Somewhat Not at all Normis it to: acceptable wrong wrong wrong index

Evade military service

Total, including: 28 15 25 23 1.21

1824 years old 15 13 27 35 0.43

2539 years old 23 10 25 33 0.70

4054 years old 26 13 31 21 1.23

55 years old and up 40 22 19 9 4.40

Higher education 22 11 29 29 0.76

Secondary education 28 11 24 25 1.12

Less than secondaryeducation 30 20 23 19 1.58

Moscow 27 5 29 23 1.17

Other city 24 12 27 26 0.92

Town 31 17 22 22 1.40

Village 25 16 25 22 1.14

Refuse to pay taxes


1824 years old 19 22 29 24 1.11

2539 years old 20 19 35 18 1.06

4054 years old 24 23 29 12 2.00

55 years old and up 33 30 20 4 8.25




Moscow 40 19 28 9 4.44

Other city 24 22 28 15 1.60

Town 24 25 28 16 1.50

Village 22 25 29 11 2.00

Take something from an enterprise


1824 years old 22 23 22 15 1.47

2539 years old 26 22 29 10 2.604054 years old 32 27 23 7 4.57

55 years old and up 39 29 19 3 13.00

(continued)


27/36


city respondents enlightened tolerance clashes with ideologicalintolerance toward the evasion of military service.

The highestvalue in the norm index as presented in Table 3refers to the ancient problem of pilferers. This may simply indi-cate that in an economy that is no longer based on scarcity thecustomary compensatory mechanism (customary since the timeof Chekhovs criminal) has largely lost its meaning. But there isanother possibility: the means of obtaining additional income thatwas most prevalent among working people and, in fact, most tol-erated during the Soviet period was being covered up out of purehypocrisy, a deceitful desire to appear more decent.

The failure to pay taxes is the most modern social sin, un-known under the state economy. It is condemned by all categoriesof respondents older than forty but is somewhat more acceptableto younger respondents. As with the other positions, those whoobey the normative standard are the older respondents, for whomthe norm index is appreciably higher than in the other groups.Evidently, educational level is linked to market deception, sothe less-educated condemn tax evasion considerably more harshlythan those who are highly educated.

Table 3 (continued)

How Acceptable Is It to Violate Social Obligations? (%)





Moscow 47 21 16 13 3.61

Other city 33 27 22 7 4.71

Town 30 28 23 8 3.75

Village 26 21 26 8 3.25

Note: The norm index is the ratio of the extreme positions (not acceptable:not at all wrong). Data on those who found it difficult to answer are not given.


28/36


Table 4 presents composite data reflecting the public assess-ment regarding the acceptability of violating some other socialnorms. As we can see, strong condemnation is prompted by theviolation of private obligations (not paying debts), failure to payfor purchases (shoplifting), and the rather exotic case of con-cealing a treasure that one has found. The concealment of incomeis condemned to a limited extent, and purchase of goods on theside generally do not provoke much disapproval.

Now let us turn to a series of findings about a particularly com-plex form of deceptive behavior, in which people feel compelledto deceive themselves. Table 5 shows generalized responses to thequestion, Have you ever acted in a way contrary to what youconsider fair and proper? These findings were obtained duringsurveys conducted for the Soviet Man Program in 1989 and 1999.

What particularly merits attention is that on the whole, peoplehave become much more deceptive in the last ten years. Not 17

Table 4

Acceptability of Violating Social Norms (%)


Ride the streetcarwithout a ticket 16 18 37 21 0.76

Conceal part of

ones income toavoid taxes 25 24 28 14 1.79

Not to repay debts 57 26 9 3 19.00

Hide recoveredtreasure fromthe state 16 16 26 15 1.07

Buy items thathave been takenfrom enterprises 14 17 31 22 0.63

Buy goods onthe side 12 14 28 28 0.43

Not to pay foritems taken froma store 55 26 10 4 13.75


29/36


Table5

Extentto

WhichDeedsCorrespond

toViewsofTruthandJustice(%)

Haveyouever

actedinaw

ay

contrarytow

Yes,

Yes,

Yes,

Yes,

Yes,

Yes

,

youconsider

forthe

forthe

formy

forthe

outof

outof

Difficult

fairand

Never

collective

bosses

family

bu

siness

weakness

fear

Constantly

tosay

andproper?

19891999198919991989199919891999198

9199919891999198919991989199919891999

Total,including:

17

12

4

6

18

13

5

16

24

32

13

15

4

9

6

4

21

20

Aged25

andunder

18

10

5

7

8

6

6

18

23

39

20

23

4

9

6

4

20

18

Aged2539

12

30

3

6

23

14

5

19

23

35

12

17

3

11

8

4

20

18

Aged4059

20

9

3

6

18

19

7

14

20

33

13

15

3

11

5

6

24

20

Aged60and

over

20

23

6

6

16

10

3

13

29

23

8

9

7

6

5

2

18

25

Higher

education

14

8

8

7

24

21

5

16

26

39

18

21

7

10

5

4

18

13

Secondary

education

17

11

3

5

19

14

4

16

24

35

13

15

3

11

8

4

19

18

Lessthan

secondary

education

18

6

4

7

13

10

7

16

24

25

11

14

4

8

5

4

26

25

Entrepreneu

r

17

13

3

20

55

15

5

7

3

Manager

19

10

7

3

32

31

4

14

31

60

11

9

2

11

0

2

9

7

Specialist

13

9

5

7

22

18

7

14

24

37

19

21

6

14

6

1

17

15

Officeworker

24

11

5

16

17

16

5

17

22

36

13

21

3

12

8

2

15

8

Worker

14

9

2

7

19

14

5

15

23

29

13

16

4

10

6

5

24

21

Student

18

5

8

6

4

3

10

26

30

43

29

27

5

7

2

7

17

10

Pensioner

20

21

2

5

16

10

3

13

25

26

5

8

6

8

5

2

26

25

Haveyoue

ver

actedcontrary

towhatyou

considerfair


30/36


percent but only 12 percent now claim that they have never had occa-sion to act contrary to their own ideas about what is right and fair.Except for young working people between twenty-five and thirty-nine (which is, admittedly, very important) and, to a small extent, themost elderly, all the other groups state that they have frequent occa-sion to act against their consciences. But changes have taken place inthe combinations of factors that prompt people to act that way.

In 1999 considerably fewer respondents mentioned pressurefrom the bosses as a factor promoting deception. A notable ex-ception here is the bosses themselvesthat is, managers and di-rectorsamong whom the importance of making a deal with theirconscience under pressure from above remained at the previouslevel (32 percent and 31 percent, the highest indicator of all thegroups!). The same was true of office staff and older employees.Specialists, workers, and pensioners are less likely to blame theirdeception on pressure from the bosses. Like all young people, stu-dents rarely felt the need to check out what the bosses wantedeven in 1989, and nowadays they do so even less often.

At the same time, there has been an appreciable increase in thenumber of those who think that they have to act against their con-science for the business, as if the will of the bosses had turnedinto some kind of generalized corporate interest. This probablyreflects the growing tendency for individuals to identify with theirenterprise or firm, the new actor (subekt) in the social game (and

hence the agent of deceptive behavior). There was an especiallysharp increase in excuses based on the good of the businessamong managers and specialists, as well as among the youngestrespondents, whereas there was no change in the case of pensionersand those with little education.

Evidently, the de-statization or privatization of the individualis linked to an increase in the frequency of excuses based onfam-ily pressure. Here there are hardly any appreciable differences

between groups. Excuses based on pressure from the collectiveoccur more often but remain rather rare. Entrepreneurs and officeworkers are more likely to mention this factor (evidently, what isat work here is corporate personnel interests).


31/36


One phenomenon, somewhat unexpected and difficult to explain,is the greater frequency of excuses based on fear for ones nearest anddearest. All groups of respondents mentioned this. To some extent, itis a variation on the increased family pressure mentioned above.Evidently, a general climate of greater fear also exists in society.

The percentage of respondents who stated that they constantlyact against their conscience was not very large ten years ago, andit went down in all the observed groups (from 6 percent to 4 per-cent). In the same period there was an approximately equal in-crease in the frequency of excuses based on my own weakness(only managers did not want to admit to this).

The 1989 and 1999 surveys make it possible to compare andcontrast assessments of occupations that various groups considerunpleasant. Here our findings reveal substantial shifts in the in-dicators, with a decline in three positions: command others, con-vince others of something that I do not believe in myself, and (toa lesser extent) do something that I do not understand. All thesepositions can be considered to have been extremely ideologicallysaturated in the Soviet period, and the retreat from them is defi-nite evidence that society has moved away from the old, politi-cized model of human behavior.

In addition, the findings show that people are not as attracted tothe necessity of engaging in civic work (or in todays version,politics) as they were ten years ago, even though the content of

the terms has changed appreciably. This kind of activity is moreappealing to young and highly educated people, less attractive tothe elderly and those who have less education. Obviously, politicalopposition, which provokes some interest among the older cohorts,has a certain importance. The necessity of being subordinate toothers, however, is as unappealing as ever. Compared with the situ-ation ten years ago, this necessity is now more annoying to pen-sioners and those with limited education and somewhat less

annoying to young people.Observations regarding the rise and fall of confidence in thepolitical leaders of this country in recent years (Gorbachev, Yeltsin,Grigorii Yavlinsky, Aleksandr Lebed, Boris Nemtsov, Evgenii Pri-


32/36


makov . . . the list could go on) force us into repeated recollectionof the well-known statement by Nikolai Berdiaev, who wrote aboutthe Eternal Feminine in the Russian soulthat is, the Russiansreadiness to trust anyone who can demonstrate strength and makepromises. In itself, comparison explains nothing. Excitement overnew idols (followed by fairly rapid disillusionment) reflects a lackof inner social organization. Evidently, the historical roots of thisphenomenon are to be sought in the relationship between state andpopulace in pre-reform Russia: as long as modern social institu-tions (civil society) do not work, the masses are both willingand inclined to look for external organization, from autocratic au-thorities or some other guiding force. Within the framework ofour theme we touch on just one aspect of the process, the ability ofa great many people to get carried away with personalized symbolsand then to be disappointed in them. Moreover, whereas in thebeginning the masses saw their leaders as symbols of particularideas or, at the very least, attractive slogans, later power itself be-came the object of symbolic representation. Thus, promises to turnthe country around have given way to demands to impose order.

In this cycle of fascination followed by disappointment, thepublic mood is determined, at least in part, by its leading seg-mentthe part that is more educated, politicized, influential, andcapable of setting examples of behavior for the others. Amid allthe convulsions this country has endured in the recent past, it has

been noted (including on the basis of mass surveys) that changesin public sympathies have been observed specifically in these strata.It is not the relatively benighted masses that suffer from gull-ibility but rather the enlightened upper strata. The lack of so-cial organization and civic consciousness primarily characterizesour intellectual and politicized elite (in the broad sense of the word,not in reference, naturally, to the competing gangs of the nefariouskitchen cliques [kukhni] seeking power).

Studies of the electoral situation in the country (during the pre-vious electoral cycle) showed that most of the population did notbelieve the candidates campaign promises and did not have muchhope that the promises would be fulfilled, which is why they did


33/36


not lodge any complaints against their favorites immediately afterthe elections. Complaints were always lodged retroactively, when thefavorites were no longer favorites. Here, two linked questions de-serve special attention. First, which factors elevate a little-knownbureaucrat to a pedestal and make him a favorite of public opinion?Second, why does the public abandon him with equal ease andswiftness?

One explanation, at least, may grow out of the considerationsset forth above. Mass enthusiasms, especially when oriented to-ward exceptionally important favorites, are ambivalent and am-biguous from the outset: ostentatious delight that is artificiallyfomented (not only from without but also from within, via mecha-nisms of self-deception) always goes hand in hand with hiddenunbelief, bitter jealousy, and so on. At a certain moment, the wholestructure is turned upside down, as it were, and what was hiddenbecomes dominant and clearly visible. Every such turn, moreover,has nothing to do with experience and rational judgment; after all,fascination with the latest favorite of public opinion is not backedup either by the experience of the masses or by familiarity withthe favorites activity, program, and ideas (And we hate and welove by chance). But the chief factor causing a change in sympa-thies is the contrast between the characteristics attributed to anold elected official and those attributed to a new one. For ex-ample, the image of a dynamic and decisive Gorbachev was con-

trasted with the image of the decrepit and indecisive Brezhnev;then the decisiveness of Yeltsin was contrasted with the indeci-siveness of Gorbachev; later still, the images of the younger andmore decisive Lebed, Nemtsov, and Putin were contrasted withthe image of the decrepit Yeltsin (there were also other figureswho became objects of paired comparisons and contrasts). This,by the way, gives rise to an inescapable component of all suchexchanges of powerthe shifting of blame onto the preceding

era, regime, or leader as a way for each new group taking its placeat the top to assert itself (and, as much as possible, to justify it-self). Such transformations of a sacred image into one that isdamned, infernal, is characteristic of all mythological thinking.


34/36


The enemy complex that is invariably present in public opinioncreates ambivalence of meaning between ones own and theenemys and the possibility that the signs will be changed (but ina suppressed and frightened society the change will take placeprimarily in one direction, by converting ones own into enemies).

When society is disunited and traditional and group interper-sonal structures are weak, the individual with all his cares andworries constantly finds himself standing alone facing the regime,social institutions, and the mighty pressure of the mass media andpublic opinion. If he gives in to the compunction to conduct him-self like everyone else and demonstrate this publicly (includingin his responses to scholars questions), he relieves himself of re-sponsibility for shared positions but does not overcome hisaloneness vis--vis everyone else. Only 13 percent of the re-spondents in 1999 (mostly young people) stated that they hadmany close and reliable friends; in 1989 that answer was givenby 42 percent. Nowadays, 74 percent say that they can completelytrust only one or two people who are close to them.

Inevitably, Russian reality is moving the sociopsychologicalbarriers and distances that begin at the apartment next door andthe next street, to a nationwide scale as the regions draw apartfrom one another. This is leading to an extreme social version ofasthenic syndrome, the inability and unwillingness to experi-ence the troubles and sufferings of others, even a persistent de-

sire to wall ourselves off from them (We live without sensing thecountry beneath usthese words have long since taken on themeaning of a universal formula of behavior). Asthenic behavior isdeceptive, because the situation in which others actually findthemselves is familiar to anyone who watches television, muchmore familiar than ever before. But the television viewer remainsa spectator, and what worries him most is the fear that he himselfmight become a victim. Another factor that affects the viewing

masses is becoming accustomed to seeing reports of misfortunesfar away: the kinds of information about disasters, conflicts, andnatural catastrophes that were such a novelty ten years ago havebecome an everyday occurrence.


35/36


A situation that includes mass political mobilization, mass wars,and mass victims can only reinforce societys asthenic syndrome.When suffering and victims take on mass proportions, people areonly capable of feeling their own personal losses. Moreover, thescale of suffering and loss available to public opinion today islargely determined by the powerful influence of the modern massmedia. In an era of television mobilization, the coverage of massvictims is concentrated entirely in the hands of the mass mediaand the political wheeler-dealers connected with them: how view-ers and voters perceive these victims depends on them. This iswhy the asthenic syndrome of mass indifference is so strong.

In his classic novel [1984], George Orwell defines doublethinkas the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in ones mindsimultaneously. The Party intellectual knows in which directionhis memories must be altered; he therefore knows that he is play-ing tricks with reality; but by the exercise ofdoublethinkhe alsosatisfies himself that reality is not violated. . . . [T]he essential actof the Party is to use conscious deception while retaining the firm-ness of purpose that goes with complete honesty. . . . To tell delib-erate lies while genuinely believing in them . . . all this isindispensably necessary [2]. While introducing this fruitful termto the language of science and politics, Orwell was not examiningthe internal mechanism that combines these contradictory beliefs.We can view this as a situation that has been deliberately oversim-

plified for the sake of the purity of the thought experiment.Clearly, Orwell deliberately assumed a rigid distinction betweenthe cynically rational calculations of the all-powerful elite (theInner Party, as he called it) and the submissiveness of the politicallower orders (the Outer Party). And he clearly overestimatedthe ability of the ruling elite (Inner Party) to perform, consciouslyand concertedly, the role of collective Grand Inquisitor.

In reality, however, as shown by whole series of exposures and

realizations related to successive changes among the ruling elitesand upper classes, such a distinction simply does not exist. Thelevel of concerted and rational behavior on high is no greaterthan it is in the lower tiers of the social and political pyramid. The


36/36


upper classes inevitably live by the same rules of deceptivedoublethink that are typical of their inferiors; they are just as self-deceptive, confusing desire with reality; and if, from time to time,they have to declare their resolve to extricate themselves from thevicious cycle, they only become more hopelessly entangled. Thatis why the political elite (the head) has fallen apart and becomecorrupted (spiritually and morally).

The experience of ten years of reforms and upheavals in Russiaconfirms this once more. Even the harshest criticism of this situa-tion retroactively (which means, in effect, shifting blame ontoones predecessors) is not enough to escape the boundaries of thecircle drawn by the deceptive mind. The replacement teamshope that a military campaign with no prospects of success canproduce the desired results is cynical and deceptive. Moreover,the hopes of yesterdays idols of radical democracy that support-ing that course of action may allow them to retain their connec-tions with ruling authority (or the mechanisms that serve it) areeven more profound examples of doublethink. So far, neither soci-ety nor its leaders have succeeded in breaking out of the circle.

Note

1. For more detail, see [1].

References

1. Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia: ekonomicheskie i sotsialnyeperemeny, 1999, nos. 5 and 6; 2000, no. 1.

2. Oruell, Dzh. [Orwell, G.] 1984. Dallosh, D. 1985. Moscow, 1992, p. 201.[Orwell quoted from the Signet Classic edition (New York: New AmericanLibrary, 1950), pp. 17677.Ed.]

IURII a. LEVADA Homo Post-soveticus

Documents

Transcript of IURII a. LEVADA Homo Post-soveticus