Isomorphic mimicry can camouflage be sabotaged
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Transcript of Isomorphic mimicry can camouflage be sabotaged
Lant PritchettUniversidad Diego Portales
Instituto de Políticas PúblicasOctober 11, 2011
“Development” is a four-fold transformation of ‘rules-systems’ (with complex interacting pieces)
• ADMINISTRATION
• Rational, professional organizations
• SOCIETY• Equal social
rights, opportunities
• POLITY• Accurate
preference aggregation
• ECONOMY• Enhanced
productivity
Transforming Rules
Systems
Figure 1: Development as a four-fold modernization process
Chile has been one of few complete development successesOnly 10 countries in the
post WWII period that have managed to have:
Extended episode of rapid economic growth (>4 ppa in GDP per capita)
Electoral Democracy (high POLITY rating)
Capable Bureaucracy (high BQ, low corruption)
Country Region
Japan East Asia
South Korea East Asia
Spain Europe
Portugal Europe
Ireland Europe
Israel ?
Austria Europe
France Europe
Finland Europe
Chile South America
Source: Pritchett and Werker 2011
A much more common experience is failure in at least one dimension of the “development” process
Economic stagnation
Lack effective polity so that citizens do not control the state (even with elections)
Failure of a transformation to national identity and social cohesion/basic equal rights
Failure of the state to acquire the institutional and organizational capability to implement policy
At the launch of an institute of public policy, an important question is what is “public policy?”
Realized States of the World
(Ω)Actions by agents
of the state(A)
Intended Outcomes
EE(Everything
else)
Official or de jure public policy isa mapping from states of theworld to actions by an authorized agent of the state with intended outcomes
Outline of my talk:Failures in Policy Implementation
Gap between “policy” and “policy”: the de jure-de facto gap
“Capability traps” as slow progress in the acquisition of the capability for effective policy implementation
Escaping “baby ontology”
The camouflage of “isomorphic mimicry”
Sabotaging the natural camouflage with:
Performance measurement
Authorization of positive deviation
Disruptive innovation as the path to OECD
“Looking like a state” in India: Nobody is there but no one is absent either
Super whiz-bang program to improve nurses with better technology, better incentives, civil society engagement, failed completely as physical attendance was 30 percent.
The state cannot control the mapping “If its Monday be at work”
Both treatment and control present on ‘monitored’ days about a third the time
Source: Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, 2008 ( figure 2)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Feb-
06
Mar-
06
Apr-
06
May-
06
Jun-
06
Jul-
06
Aug-
06
Sep-
06
Oct-
06
Nov-
06
Dec-
06
Jan-
07
Feb-
07
Mar-
07
Apr-
07
May-
07
Month
Present
Half day
Absent
Exempted days
Machine problems
Source: Duflo presentation
The initiative changed the juridical or official reality from “absence” to “exemption” without transforming actual policy implementation—presence was unchanged
De facto or “realized” policy is driven by agent choice, which is an endogenous outcome of a system and de jure “policy” is only one element—and “realized” policy matters to outcomes
Realized States of the World
De jure Policy
Actions by agents of the state
(A)
IntendedOutcomes
EE(Everything
else)
(Publicly authorized)
Agents
Realized (de facto)
Policy
Comparing what “legal compliance” would take versus what firms say they actually do
Comparing “legal time for compliance” and actual firm responses—no correlation, consistently less
Source: Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett 2010
Huge gaps in what firms report: for instance, of 191 firms in Chile where the DB reports 155 days to get construction permit…
10th: 7 days 25th: 20 days
75th: 120 days
90th: 360 days
What is “administrative capability of the state”? Organizations of the state able to induce behavior of
implementing agents consistent with carrying out the stated objectives of the organization Perhaps a narrow gap between de jure and de facto policy, or
Location of country in the gap in outcomes between optimal actions of agents of the state versus outcomes with purely selfish objective function maximizing actions by agents of the state (allowing for “street level bureaucrats” actually doing better than de jure)
Somehow aggregated across the organizations of the state (e.g. tax, police, education, regulation, health, infrastructure)
“Capability Traps” are when there is stagnation in the pace of acquisition of state capability for policy implementation: How long till Haiti reaches Singapore?
Been independent for 200 yearsand is only this far about Somalia(complete anarchy)
At that pace Haiti reachesSingapore in 2,000 years
Using available time series from ICRG to extrapolate scenarios of progress—current progress is slow
Country Bureaucratic Quality Corruption
Current
Level
(scale 0 to
4)
Years to Singapore (4) at: Current
Level
(scale 0 to
6)
Years to Singapore
(4.5)
Own past
pace,
1985-2009
Average
country
pace
Pace of
fastest 20
improvers
Own past
pace,
1985-2009
Pace of
fastest 20
improvers
0.0080 0.075 0.061
Haiti 0 Infinity 503 53 1 84 57
Nigeria 1 Infinity 377 40 1.5 Infinity 49
Sudan 1 72 377 40 1 Infinity 57
Iraq 1.5 120 314 33 1.3 Infinity 52
Nicaragua 1 Infinity 377 40 2.5 Infinity 33
How (not “why”) are capability traps sustained?
What are the techniques of successful failure?
How do organizations manage to sustain a lack of progress while maintaining legitimacy, surviving as an organization, and even attracting more and more resources?
How is the gap between rhetoric and performance sustained?
The camouflage of isomorphic mimicry
(Remember: Red and black, friend of Jack, Red and Yellow, Kill a Fellow
An expertise in public policy avoids explanations that rely on baby ontology
Babies understand the world in terms of
Agents: things with “will” that actteleologically
Stuff: things that are acted upon byagents
Which is why they laugh at balloons, asthey are baby ontologically weird
Most of us, nearly all of the time, operate in the world successfully with“baby ontology”—outcomes are explained because some agents wanted iror the properties of the natural world
But systems are an ontological third category that explain outcomes without teleology.
Space fornovelty
(E)Valuation ofnovelty
Organization Goal:Legitimation
(growth, resources)
Leadership
Front-line worker Choices
Open
Functionality
Demonstrated Success
Value Creation
Act with ConcernedFlexibility
Closed
Agenda Conformity
IsomorphicMimicry
(mimetic or normative)
OrganizationalPerpetuationAgents
(leaders, managers,Front-line workers
Organizations (firms, ministries, NGOs) choose strategies
System Characteristics(Context, Environment
for Organizations)
Evolutionary ecosystem: Agents, organizations, systems
Compliance
Space fornovelty
(E)Valuation ofnovelty
Organization Goal:Legitimation
(growth, resources)
Leadership
Front-line worker Choices
Open
Functionality
Demonstrated Success
Value Creation
Act with ConcernedFlexibility
Closed
Agenda Conformity
IsomorphicMimicry
(mimetic or normative)
OrganizationalPerpetuationAgents
(leaders, managers,Front-line workers
Organizations (firms, ministries, NGOs) choose strategies
System Characteristics(Context, Environment
for Organizations)
Why economists love markets like we do when we do: Good markets are a system that leads to
ecological learning
Compliance only
Firms can enter
Consumers vote with
their feet/dollars
Mo
tivates inn
ovatio
n an
d
“creative destru
ction
”
Space fornovelty
(E)Valuation ofnovelty
Organization Goal:Legitimation
(growth, resources)
Leadership
Front-line worker Choices
Open
Functionality
Demonstrated Success
Value Creation
Act with ConcernedFlexibility
Closed
Agenda Conformity
IsomorphicMimicry
(mimetic or normative)
OrganizationalPerpetuation
The dangers of public systems: it can align on isomorphism as an optimal strategy
Compliance
Monopoly providers (as users of public
resources) risk averse
“more of the same (alignment of political interests) but better”
Mo
tivates isom
orp
hic
mim
icry as an
org
anizatio
nal strateg
y, w
eal leadersh
ip, fro
nt-lin
e m
alaise
Chile’s problem?
Chile has successfully avoided the problems of Afghanistan, Somalia (complete state failure) or even of India, or other Latin American states of a “flailing” state with weak capability to implement policy and hence slippage (e.g. corruption, ineffectiveness)
But… in making the final push to its legitimate aspirations as an OECD country, what are the dangers of isomorphic mimicry?
To catch the OECD Chile has to do it better than the OECD…it cannot win a race of “more of the same”
This way be (fiscal)Dragons…imitating otherOECD systems leads to highcost isomorphic mimicry….
“We’ll have OECD performancewhen we have OECD inputs”
Education for instance: “normative isomorphic mimicry” is not a strategy for OECD performance
Empirical illustrations from Mexico or Brazil that expanding spending, at existingassociations of spending with learning outcomes leads to very little gain—even atFIVE TIMES higher absolute spending only 20 points of the gap is closed (or at Denmark’s ratio of spending to GDP only about 20 points gain)
Source: Pritchett (forthcoming), chapter 4
Can Isomorphic mimicry camouflage be sabotaged?
How can the space for innovation be created for scalable ideas?
How can performance measures get real traction over behavior of organizations?
De-legitimization of “looking like a state” or merely looking like success
Authorization of directed positive deviation: swap freedom to innovate for higher performance accountability
Mixture of “orthodoxy”—foundations in“compliance”—but need “positive deviations”to be authorized and evaluated
Mark Morris dancing the female lead in Dido and Aenas—classic tradition—Greek myth, Baroqueopera but with innovation
Design policy based on global “best practice”
Implement according to local constraints
LowerOutcome
OutcomeHigher
Outcome
Rent Seekers Bureaucrats Innovators
Organizations & Agencies
Policy Makers
Space forAchievable
Practice
Policies include process
barriers to prevent
malfeasance
Process controls
also prevent potentially
useful process
deviations
Design water/sanitation program on local “Best Fit ”
Typical Practice
Internal authorization of positive deviation
Standard outcomes
Lower outcomes
Rent Seekers Bureaucrats Innovators
Policy Makers
Space forAchievable
Practice
Po
licy Deviatio
n
Feedback on Outcomes
Better outcomes
Cap
abil
ity
AffordabilityLow High
High
Low
Pursuit of “Best Fit”
Weak processes or technology
“Modern” State,Weberian Ideal,Appropriate for “high-end” users
21st Century State,Context specific,Appropriate for
most users
“Disruptive technology,
Appropriate for “low-end” users
Disruptive innovation (Christensen 2007)—surpass leaders from below—not head to head
Summary Successful outcomes from policy depend on policy
implementation not just policy Policy implementation is determined by the structures of
systems—not the will of agents Isomorphic mimicry—the imitation of the trappings of
functional systems without their drive for performance is a constant risk in public systems
Sabotage of camouflage is de-legitimation of just “looking like a state” and creating space and evaluation of scalable systemic innovations—performance measurement and positive deviation
Disruptive innovation—jumping past best practice rather than imitating one’s way to success
My work drawn on Andrews, Pritchett, Woolcock, 2010, “Capability Traps? The
Mechanisms of Persistent Implementation Failure” http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424651/
Spartans, Paper Tigers and Keystone Cops: The Financial Crisis of 2008 and Organizational Capability for Policy Implementation
Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett, 2011, “Doing Business and How Business is Done: Measuring the investment climate when firms have climate control”
The Rebirth of Modern Education (chapters available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/lpritch/