Bill Nikides 31 August 2004

Islamism: The Evolving Conundrum

Face-to-face with Islamism September 11, 2001 trumpeted the arrival of a new and unsettling world. The choreographed destruction of three airliners crashing into the World Trade Centre and Pentagon by 19 young, Muslim jihadists, underlined warnings echoed by intelligence analysts, terrorist experts and journalists for years. The new millennium, far from mirroring Francis Fukuyama’s optimistic End of History, would be unstable, unpredictable and violent. The aftermath with its declaration of a “war on terrorism,” invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, implementation of anti-terrorism statutes, restrictions on travel and contentious testing of traditional alliances in the West, cast a pall over much of the world. It was not that 9/11 represented the arrival of a revolutionary age. The world had been undergoing tremendous change since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a decade prior. 9/11 was significant, however, in crystallizing those differences for governments and their citizens. As the events of that day unfolded, however, the public through the media came face-to-face with the 1

force that had precipitated the terror itself and threatened to repeat the tragic taking of life as part of an on-going jihad, or holy war conducted against the enemies of Islam. That force, Islamism became the instant topic of discussion throughout the West. Prime time television became crowded with information, polemic, and analysis all designed to either help the public make decisions concerning what to think and do about terrorism and, by extension, the Islamists that had perpetrated. Opinions proved to be, and remain, remarkably varied concerning what we popularly call Islamism. Baroness Cox saw in Islamism a direct connection between Islamism and “suicide killings and bombings. The 9/11 Commission Report, 2

completed by a body of US congressmen representing both Democrats and Republicans, concluded that “the enemy is… the threat posed by Islamist terrorism.” Conservative columnist Daniel Pipes embraced the blaming of Islamism and extended it. He stated, “better yet would be a war on Islamism, looking beyond terror to the totalitarian ideology that lies beyond it.” Pipes, not content with blaming Islamist terrorists, took aim at the ideology itself. Islamism itself is, in Pipes’ view, an unmitigated evil and a threat to civilization. Pipes’ theme resonates with much of the Western public, particularly in the USA, but it far from represents a consensus. Take for example, the statements of Graham Fuller, an acknowledged expert in Islamism working for the RAND Corporation. “Islamism is today the primary vehicle for the advancement of change and the overthrow of despotic regimes.” Far from viewing 3

Islamism as an unmitigated threat, Fuller and many other analysts and observers see positive benefits bound up in at least some expressions of Islamism. The problem of course is that this is no esoteric issue of interest to hoary, old academics or security specialists. As Muslim populations grow and expand throughout the West, understanding who Islamists are, what they believe, and how we, both as private citizens and as nations should respond, is of vital importance. Pipes and Fuller indicate that it will not be a simple process. Islamism has proven to

be a sometimes illusive subject. Studying it can be analogous to playing the old shell game. You have one pea under three shells, but which shell? Our failure to correctly understand the phenomena can lead us to either underestimate the danger posed to democratic society by some forms of Islamism or run the risk of polarizing our large Muslim populations, forcing them into the hands of people or organizations that may have everything to gain in creating a “Clash of Civilizations.” Huntington’s thesis could, therefore, become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Writing as a Christian, understanding Islamism properly also underlines yet another imperative. Christians cannot engage a world effectively that they do not understand. The complexity of Islamism underlines the necessity of proper understanding. Our engagement of the world is a process that has to flow in to directions. One thing further has been made clear by Islamism. Islam as it confronts the World has its own choices to make. As the distance between peoples decreases, as Muslims attempt to make a home in the West, choices must be made. What will the pattern be for Muslim-Western relations? Islamism has already served as a lightning rod of sorts already. We have everything to gain by endeavoring to understand dispassionately.

The challenges of exploring Islamism are particularly daunting. This stems from two mitigating factors. First, Islamism is an exceptionally diverse phenomenon that can and should be examined from a multitude of differing perspectives. Second, there is often little if any agreement on the part of Islamists concerning their own self-understanding. In other words, Islamists differ with one another concerning even what an Islamist is. Throwing differing analyses in from legions of scholars does not make the issues easier to understand. We could ask, why then even address such an illusive term? Why not address other words associated with some forms of Islam, such as “fundamentalism”? The answer, I believe, is that “Islamism” is the term most often used by Islamists to describe themselves.

I propose engaging our topic in three steps that I hope will serve to illuminate our understanding and suggest practical suggestions concerning directions to take as a consequence of our new understanding. First, we will examine how Islamists and experts define and describe Islamism. Second, we will compare recent expressions of Islamism from two different environments, Europe and Iran to see how perceptions of Islamism compare to the situational realities. Finally, we will attempt to place our findings in perspective, suggesting possible directions we can take as a consequence of what we have learned.

Unraveling Definitions and Characteristics Let’s start with an examination of what Islamism is and what characterizes it. Islamism is a term that emerged in the 1970s to refer to movements and ideologies using Islamic terminology, symbols, and an interpretation of history in order to articulate a political agenda. Islamism emerged in reaction to colonialism in the 4

Islamic world and claimed to be an emancipatory movement, often based on principles said to be derived from the Sharia (Islamic law). In other words, Islamism 5

is an idea either using religion for political ends or a fusion of religion and politics. Pipes, once again, strikes a less ambiguous stance. Islamism is “an ideology that demands man’s complete adherence to the sacred law of Islam and rejects as much as

possible outside influence with some exceptions (such as access to military and medical technology).” We see that Pipes concentrates on Islamists’ reliance on Sharia 6

and an insular quality, rejecting ideas from the outside. Richard Schifter, writing for the American Jewish Committee, identifies Islamism as a revolutionary political movement focused on the creation of an Islamic totalitarian state through activist political and social programs. Islamism, therefore, not only addresses both religion 7

and politics, it also deals with social, political, and personal life. A review of common descriptions of Islamism can be assembled that paint a common, coherent picture. “The Quran, traditions, and Islamic law properly understood and interpreted should be the basis of the state and society in all its dimensions. For the Islamist, Islam is a self-sufficient ideology.” It is a historically-8

anchored movement, going back to Islamic leaders such as Hanbal (9th century). It is the product of the historical development of Muslim people and also includes responses to colonialism, decolonization, the industrial revolution, modernism, capitalism and socialism. Its culmination is an Islamic political state, modeled on 9

what its proponents believe is the Caliphate of the early Islamic period. Finally, it is a movement prone to violence and antithetical to democratic, Western values. These characteristics create an image of Islamism that can be supported by the literature and actions of Islamists around the world, but they do not tell an accurate picture, because they leave far too much out. For example, Islamism can also be seen as a modern or post-modern movement, acquiring the language and symbols of a partly mythical past in order to reconstruct a new world, dramatically different in essence from the old. According to Abu-Rabi, it is a modern protest movement born in opposition to Western imperialism. Olivier Roy goes much further, asserting that 10

Islamism is in essence the heir of modern liberation movements popular in the 1970s and 80s. In this sense, it can also been see as kin to older forms of nationalism, 11

discredited in the 1960s and 70s by failures in confrontations with Israel and by their failure to deliver on promises for political power and economic success. Contrary to 12

its exclusively totalitarian image, it can endorse democracy. On the other hand, 13

more radical expressions of Islamism seem to find much in common with 19th century romanticism and 20th century fascism. Mohammad Tozy sees Islamism as “A 14

response at a given point in time to the need for social mobility and re-localization in a global environment.” Tozy places Islamism squarely in its time. His point is that 15

Islamists live in real, not disembodied circumstances, either in the Islamic world, or in the West. In the first case, Islamists need a justification to break free of their socio-economic and political constraints. They are often well educated, but under or unemployed people without opportunity for political or economic power and freedom. Tozy’s point is that Islamism gives freedom from their traditional social and cultural ties, allowing them to redefine themselves in order to create a more viable life in line with their raised expectations. At the same time, he also shows how Islamists react to their new surroundings in the West. Unwilling or unable to assimilate into Western culture, Islamists erect a ‘local’ culture, allowing them to maintain a distinct identity in the ‘global village.’ Clearly, Islamism exists in many different manifestations. How then do we undertake to explore and understand it? Islamist rhetoric demonstrates the highly variable nature of Islamism, but it does not alone account for its diverse portrayal by

scholars, politicians, the religious establishment and ideologues. How it is understood is also the product of how it is studied.

Learning How to Play the Shell Game

How to think About Islamism Definitions or straight-jackets? Scholars and researchers have traditionally divided the world of Islam up into a taxonomy of three types. These are traditionalists, modernists, and fundamentalists. Taxonomies are just labels that we 16

give things that help to describe and understand often complex ideas. They work as long as the labels correspond to reality. In the case of Islamism, all three have proven to be more of a milestone than a benefit. Islamism is an idea that seems to develop in dialogue with its environment. It is, to say the least, dynamic. The traditional division of Islam into these three parts continually fails to address the greater and greater exceptions to the rules. Scholars then have to resort to their next enterprise that of creating more and more labels to describe the specific manifestations of Islamism they encounter. Post-Islamism, Neo-Fundamentalism, EuroIslam, Salafism, post-modern Islam, and Neo-Ottomanism are all terms describing selective manifestations of the whole. Some such as neo-fundamentalism and post-Islamism derive from an attempt to maintain a narrow understanding of Islamism. They can help us understand, but they also serve to obscure what appears to be happening within the Islamic world. Perhaps, they also serve to obscure fundamental truths about Islam itself. The difficulty is understandable. Islamist books and websites often refer to the timeless, historical quality of Islamism’s beliefs. A careful examination of the Islamist world, however, indicates that the concept exists very much contingently. In other words, Islamism is not an exclusively ideological, self-defining movement. Its expression is very much a reflection of the time and place. Crossed-signals? As we just noted, Islamism says different things about itself. It has, for example, different goals. Kalim Siddiqui, an Islamist in Great Britain, and great admirer of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, stated that “Islam claims to produce the highest quality leadership and government. These claims… were converted into historical facts in the Golden Era of Islam.” Now compare that optimistic view of Islamism’s past with a statement made by Iran’s current President, the Islamist Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Khatami. “The dogmatists claim that they want a return to Islamic civilization but that civilization would still be here if it had provided answers to the people’s problems.” Metin Kaplan, the self-proclaimed ‘Caliph of 17

Cologne,’ and radical Islamist stated that “Every Muslim should overthrow the bad regimes in his country and set up an Islamic state.” The moderate Iranian, Islamist, clerical scholar countered stating, “Islam does not offer a specific and constant model for managing the politics of all societies.” The examples illustrate at least one fact; 18

there is no single manifestation of Islamism. Islamism retains the ability to surprise us. Even the most dogmatic writers acknowledge this. “It is strange to observe that the lively new ideas in Kemalist Turkey are Islamist ones, whereas the lively new ideas in Islamist Iran are secular ones.” The author reflects the fact that Islamism, to 19

some degree, moves outside of his conceptual box. Some scholars, like Pipes, often respond by using a label other than Islamism to describe the unexpected behaviour. A

better tack might be see in these actions the bahaviour of Islamists attempting to deal with their own circumstances, rather than redefining them as ‘post-Islamists’ for example. In other words, it is incumbent on us to reconcile our academic constructs with reality. 20

In a sense, Islamists are proceeding to think about their faith and political practice in a way analogous to that mentioned by H. Richard Niebuhr in his landmark classic, Christ and Culture. Niebuhr described five approaches for addressing the relationship of Christ and culture. The five were Christ against culture. Individual believers have to choose either Christ or the prevailing culture. The second, Christ of culture, sees Christ as the pinnacle of culture, affirming both. Christ above culture proposes a synthesis of Christianity and the state through the existence of divinely appointed leaders. Christ and culture in paradox ceases to attempt the reconciliation of the two. Both exist, in tension, as two ‘kingdoms,’ each claiming loyalty. Finally, Christ the transformer of culture proposes that Christ be seen as the transformer of both the spiritual and temporal worlds. It is possible to understand the Islamist dialogue with itself by substituting Islam, or more coherently, the Sharia law in place of Christ. Rather than attempting to decide whether Islamism is religious ideology with political overtones or political ideology with the trappings of religion, Niebuhr’s construct, or one that can be derived from it, shows the often complex interactions that take place when Islamists attempt to reconcile the two. Islam or the Sharia against culture seems to describe accurately the often violent relationship of Islamists to their social and traditional Islamist environments. Consider Hizb ut-Tahrir’s directions to its followers for interacting with the surrounding culture. The goal of immersing a follower in Islamism is “to cleanse her of …corrupt creeds, false thoughts and erroneous concepts.” The British-based Islamist group sees no good 21

thing manifest in British culture. Its members, therefore, must remain pure, either detached from or actively in opposition to the culture. Niebuhr’s second and third constructs seem to correspond to Iran under the Ayatollah Khomeini and the principle of a divinely appointed leader, velayat-e faqih. Politics and religion harmonize through this central office. On the other hand, Iran’s latest generation of moderate Islamists exemplify Niebuhr’s fourth and fifth categories, preferring to see two separate spheres of responsibility and expertise. Much of what transpires within Islamism is dialogue that embraces variations of these themes. Different filters. Islamism can and should be understood using a variety of tools. As an expression of ideology, it can be understood philosophically and theologically. The approach does have its hazards, however, in that it is all too easy to see it as the revival of arcane ideas and theological expressions dredged up from early Islam. To do so, however, may be to overlook the fact that it is also modern and post-modern people who do so. Many Islamists claim to be simply reviving the practices of their ancestors, particularly with regard to reviving the idea of a divinely ordained Caliphate. According to this historical-theological approach, answers to the question of what Islamism is must be located in the past.

Conversely, political scientists address Islamism as a political construct, or, constructs. In this case, Islamism is best understood as politics using the language of religion as a tool of legitimization. If this is so, Islamism really involves the placing

of contemporary ideas in ancient dress. Therefore, Islamism is best understood from the vantage point of the present.

Sociologists approach Islamism differently. One example is the use of discourse analysis, described by Robert Wuthnow in his, Communities of Discourse. This methodology analyzes the ways in which Islamism emerges as ideas from within a very specific environment and manages to grow beyond them. In other words, Islamism is the result of very specific social conditions. It starts out local. Sociologists use tools such as discourse analysis to find out how a local expression takes on a universal meaning. In this view, Islamism is seen as product of the relationship between social circumstances and ideology that results from a process of mutual influence, adjustment, and accommodation. Islamism begins as ideas that are articulated at a particular place and time; they lead to discourse in the community, are accepted by some, circulated, become ideologically stable, gain semi-autonomy and finally rest with some degree of contextual institutionalization.

Different agendas. Our opinions of what we see with regard to Islamism depend on our prejudices and differing vantage points. Take two ideas for example, Orientalism and Occidentalism. Orientalism refers to ideas advanced by the Islamic scholar Edward Said in his seminal 1978 work, Orientalism. Said makes three main points in his work which attempts to question the validity of traditional Western scholarship concerning Islam. Said’s first point is that although Western analysis claims objectivity, it really served as a highly subjective justification for the West’s colonization of the Orient. Second, Orientalism chopped down the Islamic forest in order to make the Western tree appear taller. In other words, the West needed a sense of moral and cultural superiority to fulfill its colonizing task, so it described the Islamic world as a stagnant, unenlightened place. Third, Orientalism as a concept is far too essentialist and simplistic, negatively stereotyping the Middle East in the process. The effects of his analysis have been profound. On one hand, they describe a prejudice for Westernism that, if true, significantly colours any attempt to examine Islamic ideas such as Islamism. At the same time, the accusation of Orientalism also serves to limit discourse concerning the subject. The charge, in other words, allows Islamism to develop without the benefit of critical, interpretive scholarship available through the West.

On the other side stands Occidentalism. The world refers to a much more recent work by that name, authored by Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, published in 2004. The authors describe Occidentalism as having several characteristics. First, its proponents advocate a revolt against rationalism, secularism, and individualism. Second, these are fed by a sense of humiliation and defeat, particularly at the hands of the West. Third, this humiliation becomes a cult of purity and cultural authenticity, particularly in opposition to the West’s superficiality and arrogant claims to universal authority, as it wrongly attempts to impose its values of democracy, the universal rule of law and market capitalism. In a sense, Occidentalists are 19th century romantics reacting to Enlightenment rationalism. Finally, Occidentalism views the West as a ‘bourgeois’ society, addicted to materialism, corruption, selfishness and its own security. The point in all of this, of course, is an interpretive one. Given the 22

prejudices of either perspective, neither can be relied upon for unconditional objectivity. Both have vested interests bound up in their interpretations. It is not an

intention to mislead. It is the fact that either ideology colours our interpretation of facts, events, and ideas.

Both Orientalism and Occidentalism can be seen as fears of the ‘other.’ If accurate, they betray prejudices that find their way in the popular consciousness. On one side stand people with an innate fear of not just radical Islamism, but of Muslims themselves. For them, immigration and cultural diversity can be seen as a threat to Western society. This bias against Islamists, of course, is by no means restricted to the West. Radical Islamists, in particular, emigrate to the West, because they are often hounded out of their own homelands. Hizb ut-Tahrir, for example began in Palestine, but was forced to relocate, centering itself in London. On the other hand, other observers of Islamism reflect an opposite bias, against the West and its values. Some of these opinions are generated by Muslims either in the West, or living in other parts of the world. Others are non-Muslims who, nevertheless, take a biased position in favour of Islamist explanations and causes because of their own political positions. One can, therefore, observe overlaps of opinion, common cause, and perhaps temporary alliances being made by European multilateralists, politically liberal Americans and moderate Islamists, all of which could be opposed to what they perceive to be American unilateralism. In this arena, sides can form, each of which expresses highly divergent views of Islamism. It is not difficult to see. If Roy is correct, and Islamism can be explained in part as an extension of European left-wing politics of the 70s and 80s, Islamism could quite conceivably find affinity with liberal movements in the West. It is interesting to observe that both contemporary radical Muslims living in the West and West European radical organizations in the 1970s are characterized by educated, middle class leadership and working class drop-outs. Far 23

from heeding Huntington’s cry for consolidation of the West in the face of a ‘Clash of Civilizations,’ Western scholars, politicians, and activists seem to express the presence of another fault-line. Consider this statement by the German journalist Claus Koch, “the American enemy must be declared the enemy.” Additionally, the Manichaean 24

expression of radical Islamism that divides humanity into two worlds, the lands of Islam and all others, seems to break down as well.

If then, the study of Islamism reflects a multitude of perspectives and a plethora of different agendas and biases, how then can we arrive at anything approaching useful understanding? Perhaps the best approach is to combine two methods. First, let us examine two completely different environments, from which Islamism emerges. Second, let us compare and contrast the two types of manifestations to see what we can learn.

Face-to-Face with Islamism in Post-Revolutionary Iran The Revolutionary context. The dominant feature concerning Islamism in contemporary Iran is, of course, the Islamic Revolution of 1978-97 that swept away the Pahlavi Regime of the Shah and replaced it with a new Islamic Constitution, the oversight of religiously trained ‘guardians,’ the velayat-e faqih, instituted by the Ayatollah Khomeini, and general formulation of revolutionary Islamism. The Iranian Revolution gained something of a monolithic identity, particularly in the West. It became difficult to separate revolutionaries, in fact, from their exemplar Khomeini.

Ina sense, it was impossible for most outsiders to distinguish what was going on underneath the beard. Ali Banuazizi, helpfully, identifies four types of political orientation present within the Iranian Revolution. These are important details, because they make far 25

more understandable the post-revolutionary period. The first type he identifies is the radical Islam of Ali Shariati. Shariati, long considered one of the principal architects of the Revolution, posited an Islamic state ruled by enlightened thinkers, similar to Plato’s ‘philosopher kings.” Shariati, however, left no room for the ulama (religious elders/establishment). Shariati was ambitious for a radical change in Iranian society, ushered in by a social revolution led by the young, Islamic intellectuals. He crystallized his thoughts under the rubric of two Shia principles that he believed would propel Iranian society into a liberating revolution. The first was the principle of the imamate. Shariati believed that a dominant leader with the right Islamic values would serve as a rallying point for the revolution, preventing its fragmentation and, most importantly, its dissipation. Second, Shariati elevated the concept of justice to becoming a core theological value for the revolution. Crucially, his concept of justice seemed to amalgamate Shia Islam with Marxist interpretation, socialism and existentialism. Shariati was, throughout his work, intent on uncovering an ideal, original Islam, not the historical expression of the last few centuries championed by the conservative ulama. His real contribution was fusing modernism and Islamic 26

revivalism together. In language reminiscent of left-wing radicalism, Shariati recast 27

Islam’s original purpose as liberating the oppressed of the Third World. The culprits in the global drama were capitalism and imperialism, not atheism or impurity. Finally, Shariati was significant in trying to reconcile Islamic government based on rule by a godly leader with some sort of representative government. 28

Banuazizi’s second type was represented by the militant Islam of Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini saw revolution as a necessary political step in the creation of an Islamic theocracy. His methodology was an amalgam of new ideas clothed in the rhetoric of the seminary. The blend found resonance with some intellectuals frustrated by the Shah’s regime, some of the clergy, and the bazaar merchants, representing conservative personal values badly offended by the Shah’s pro-Westernism. Nikki Keddie provides really useful insight into the dynamic posed by Khomeini and largely misunderstood by the public in the West. Keddie presents Khomeini’s innovation as established in the past and still expressing something new. She traces the continuing changing tradition of Islamic thought throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, culminating in Khomeini’s ideas. Perhaps, the ultimate 29

expression of his views concerning Islamism is contained in Islamic Government, compiled from student notes in 1971. The work focused on three ideas that under girded and equipped the revolution. As a unit, they represent Islamism in a highly contextualized Iranian form. At the same time, however, they also served as a rallying cry for global Islamism. First, the concept of monarchy is absolutely condemned. Second, the Islam apparent in the Quran and Tradition (sunnah) contains, “all the laws and principles needed by man for his happiness and perfection.” As an adjunct to the centrality of the Quran, Khomeini added that these laws need to be properly interpreted and applied by qualified Islamic jurists (faqih) who govern the country. This theocratic rule is exemplified by the term

“guardianship” (wilaya). Khomeini became the ultimate expression of the guardian, taking on the mantle once reserved in the Shia world for Mohammad or the hidden imam. Third, Islam is in danger, corrupted in its common expression by materialism, 30

Christianity and Zionism. It must, therefore, be purged of its contamination. The agent of purification would be the Ulama, functioning as the avant-garde of the Party of God (Hizbollah). The Iranian Constitution of 1979 summed up the application of 31

Khomeini and Shariati’s principles. It attempted to combine three kinds of rule, the rule by one, rule by a few wise men, and rule by the people. In retrospect, the attempted tripartite division has proven to be a step in the possible unraveling of the revolution. The cornerstone of guardianship was laid in the revolution by Khomeini’s doctrine of velayat-e faqih. Velayat-e Faqih embodies four principles. First, the term 32

velayat means to have jurisdiction over the affairs of others. It is, quite logically, an expression of Islamic scholars, men who combine the attributes of lawyers and theologians, much as Old Testament scribes would have. Second is the principle of appointment. Guardians are appointed by a divinely ordained ruler, not elected by the people. Third, is absoluteness, the belief that the jurisdiction of the leader or guardian extends over everything in society. In other words, the realm of the divinely appointed religious leader is not confined to the spiritual, but also includes the political, temporal world. Finally, Khomeini promoted the concept of jurisdiction, the most significant principle for organizing and implementing an Islamic society. The point is that political decisions have to correspond to religious dictates. More than that, politics, economics, government all become branches of Islamic jurisprudence. Islamic law, or at least its interpretation, becomes the foundation upon which all of society is built. Furthermore, as Mohsen Kadivar, a son of the revolution, notes, since everything hinges on the correct interpretation of Islamic law, the administration of Islamic society must remain in the hands of Islamic jurists, not the public. The Post-Revolutionary Revolution. Revolutionary Iran was typified by the binding together divergent groups under the charismatic leadership of men such as Khomeini and Shariati. Their power passed into the hands of hardened Islamist conservatives who control political outcomes, police powers, and the economic system. These successors have proven incapable of preventing large-scale disaffection with the revolutionary status quo. As the government proves incapable of delivering on revolutionary promises of freedom and prosperity, people gain increasingly a distrust of the Islamism championed in the 1970s. Far from remaining an ideal that galvanizes the nation and world, revolutionary Islamism appears to some to be more and more a “spent force.” The idea of an all-encompassing Sharia 33

looked after by a paternal guardian has taken on the appearance for many of hopeless naiveté, or on a more sinister note, as characteristic of public hypocrisy. The point seems to be that the Revolution promised a great deal, but its promise was undercut by a noxious cocktail of abuse of power by the clerics, a mismanaged (though not ruined) economy, eroded personal rights and corruption. The Revolution promised heaven, but all it seemed to deliver were shattered dreams. Mehdi Bazargan, the first Prime Minister of the Iranian Republic, once concluded that the greatest threat to Islam in Iran was the existence of the Islamic Republic. Simply put, the clerics have 34

lost their credibility.

All of this is immensely important to our understanding of Islamism. So much of what has characterized Islamism throughout the world was modeled on the Iranian Revolution. Therefore, whatever, emerges from the Post-Revolutionary period may have significant implications for Islamists elsewhere as well. In the largest sense, what makes the Iranian experience so important is that it describes what can happen when Islamists achieve their political and, in part, their social goals. Islamism is usually described by its standing in contradistinction to the prevailing political power. What happens when it gets what it wants? In a curious way, it would be analogous to 16th century Anabaptists becoming the dominant political force in Reformation Europe. So much of what defined Anabaptism was its stand as a counter-cultural force, both with regard to Roman Catholicism and the Magisterial Reformers. It would be difficult to see how it would react if it gained the majority. Likewise, we always seem to frame Islamism as an outsider movement. Some analysts cannot cope with the idea that Islamism might cease to be an outside force and become, rather, a statement of the establishment. The result of this inflexibility is a plethora of modifiers such as “post-Islamism.” I think it is far more likely that what we are currently experiencing in Iran is a differentiation of Islamism rather than a departure from the concept. Post-revolutionary Iran can be categorized several different ways. Broadly speaking, there are those who continue to identify Islamic society with the current political regime or, in the case of newly elected neo-conservatives, something closely aligned with it, , those who wish to Islamicize civil society in such a way that it would be easy to distinguish an Islamic from an alternative, those who see civil society as a neutral term, but which can be enhanced or informed by Islam in such a way that it protects the freedom of its citizens and promotes democracy, and militant secularists, largely drawn from the disillusioned ranks of former revolutionaries. In any case, there does appear to be a modifying of the Revolution’s strident militancy, a ‘Thermidorianization.” 35

The first alternative describes religious revivalists such as the Ayatollah Khameini and the Council of Guardians as well as his enforcers, the Revolutionary Guard and the Ansar-e Hezbollah, the Helpers of the Party of God. It unquestionably controls the political life of the country. The latter is representative of President 36

Khatami and his May Third Movement, which swept to Parliamentary victory in 1997. Most of these can be categorized as Reformist Islamism. Reformist Islamism 37

is well represented in Iran by intellectuals, both lay and clerical, as well as by liberal members of the press. It also absorbed, and retained for a time, pragmatists who appeared under the leadership of President Rafsanjani. These favoured compromise political positions and had wide-spread support from the middle class, government employees, professionals, and businessmen. The moderate reformists are represented by a few widely published representatives. These are Khatami himself, Mohsen Kadivar, Abdol Karim Soroush, and Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari. Radical reformists, emerging particularly after the parliamentary defeats of 2003 and 2004 include disaffected former Islamic revolutionaries now favouring a secular state, such as Mrs. Fatameh Haqiqatjoo, a former MP and leader in the leading reformist party, the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF) and people such as the current president’s brother, Mohammed Reza Khatami, the head of the IIPF.

Sayyid Mohammad Khatami, the president of the Republic of Iran, was the beneficiary in 1997 of a protest vote. The vote, more than anything else, served as a protest against the idea that Islam was an ideology. Fronted by Khatami, it reflected 38

the thought of Reformist intellectuals promoted and popularized in the journal Kiyan. Reformists, both moderate and radical (depending on the degree to which 39

they thought they could cooperate with the political status quo) represented middle class intellectualism and signaled a willingness of first generation revolutionaries to entertain revisions to the Islamist foundations of the Iranian state. These people were all revolutionary “insiders” who, following the death of Khomeini, found themselves largely disenfranchised by the political power apparatus that largely fell into the hands of conservative mullahs. Their connection to the revolution and its ideas meant that they were generally not disposed of replacing the revolution itself. Their cry was for “Islamic democracy.” In a sense, they wished to broaden the base of Islamism in order to allow it to serve as a bolster to democracy rather than serve as a bar to it. Khatami himself was committed to developing an “Islamic civilization” in Iran, something he felt under girded democracy itself. “We should, through the 40

Revolution, create a new system with different values that replaces a worn-out Western civilization.” He based himself and the movement that voted for him as 41

principled moderates in opposition to antidemocratic dogmatists, the hard-line Islamists. “If, God forbid, some people want to impose their rigid thinking on Islam and call it God’s religion- since they lack the intellectual power to confront the opposite side’s thinking on its own terms- they resort to fanaticism. This merely harms Islam, without achieving the aims of those people.” 42

Khatami served as the political face for the intellectuals who galvanized support for Khatami and the IIPF. Perhaps the most academically impressive of these is Abdol Karim Soroush. Soroush, a lay Islamic scholar, started out as a pro-regime ideologist, writing as a member of the High Council of the Cultural Revolution in the early 1980s, advocates the evolution of the Republic into something parallel to a secular, democratic form of rule. His quarrel is not with Islam, but the extension of 43

Islam into a political ideology, unlike his predecessor Shariati. He favours a democratic religious government, but one that has no room in it for a privileged clergy. In this sense, he appears to be a worthy successor to Ali Shariati. One reason for his desire to unseat the clergy is his claim that although a true Islam exists, it cannot be unambiguously known by us. Therefore, the correct interpretation of the Quran and Tradition cannot be guaranteed, even among the ulama, and, therefore, its application to all areas of life belongs to the public, not just a privileged few. Soroush goes further, insinuating that the clergy’s participation in politics has compromised, weakened, and discredited the faith. He thought, rather than attempt to apply arcane 44

reasoning to contemporary political or social problems, the clergy ought to be attempting to reconcile religion to the modern world. His desire uncovers a 45

phenomenon common to Islamism, its interaction with modernism. Far from ignoring or spurning it, Islamism has a constant dialogue with it, freely borrowing from and modifying its tenets. Ultimately Soroush wanted a truly religious society, not an ideological state. He felt that religion separated from the formal exercise of power was ultimately more influential and powerful within a society. His treatise, “Types of Religiosity” clearly

demonstrates his reasoning. He identifies three types of religiosity, pragmatic, 46

Gnostic, and experiential. The first he associates with the clergy. The language he uses to describe it is revealing in its negative tone. Its characteristics are that it is causal (not reasoned), imitative, dogmatic, legalistic, imitative, traditional and habitual. It is, as he notes, a religion that seeks movement rather than truth. It is the religion of slaves. Gnostic religiosity is, by contrast, reasoned, investigative, reflective, non-clerical, individualistic, and non-imitative. It is a religious search for the truth, not conformity and it has no role for clergy. The third type, experiential is identified by a sense of certainty. It is revelatory and mystical. The God it reveals is “a graceful and alluring beloved.” It climaxes as “The awesome mystery of the Truth enters the very being of the experiential believer like a mighty guest.” The fruit of this experience is union and ecstasy. Throughout, Soroush underlines the superiority of the latter two types of religiosity. His point, of course, is to show the preferred role for religion in society. Reformist Islamists have also been well represented by the clergy. These men are also first generation revolutionaries who became convinced that Islam would have to engage differently with society if the revolution was to achieve its earliest and noblest goals. Perhaps more urgently, these reformists believed that Islam’s future in Iran depended on it taking a different path from that which the conservatives practiced. Perhaps foremost among the reformist clerics has been Mohsen Kadivar, the seminary graduate and outspoken critic of velayat-e faqih. Kadivar, currently a visiting scholar at Harvard University Law School, and a strong proponent of democracy, finds velayat-e faqih irreconcilably opposed to the concept. Furthermore, he also sees the concept without warrant in the Quran. It is, therefore, an innovation not compatible with Islam. He lays out his arguments in “Velayat-e Faqih and Democracy.” There are three opinions concerning the subject. The position of the 47

Islamic Republic is that velayat-e faqih is the only correct form of Islamic government and is binding on the public. The second position is offered by what he calls traditional Iranian reformists. “Islamic democracy can be achieved through a conditional, elective Velayat-e Faqih. Finally, he notes the position of Iranian Muslim intellectuals. The concept of velayat-e faqih is not supported by religious proof. Far from challenging the concept on secular grounds, Kadivar resorts to Islam itself. In one sense, he is on safe ground. Even Khomeini himself had to defend the concept, not from a secular establishment, but primarily from fellow mullahs. His real goal is not to simply force the abandonment of the doctrine. Ultimately, he is challenging the Islamic basis for the current government. Boldly, he asserts that Islam does not, in fact, offer “a specific and constant model for managing the politics of all societies.” The implications of this statement are huge. He is stating, in direct opposition to mainstream Islamism, based on his established position as an Islamist, that Islam does not offer a blueprint for a universal government. He lays the blame for a false reliance on velayat with a false expectation concerning Islamic jurisprudence. His point is that Islamic law is not equipped to handle the specific issues of modern politics that are bound up in specific conditions not envisaged by early Islam and, therefore, beyond the competence of the jurists. He is really asserting that the jurists are really only equipped to provide general principles or historical data that has no current direct applicability. He caps his critique with his

most devastating observation. “More so than being a religious obligation, velayat-e faqih is a reflection of the Iranian theory of kingdom and Eastern despotism in the mind and essence of Shiite jurists, which has also been corroborated by the Platonic Philosopher-King.” In other words, he is standing Iranian political Islam completely on its head. The expression of Islamism practiced in Iran is, in fact, not halal, but rather, haram. It is unclean and should be forbidden. Once again, the heart of his argument is that genuine Islamism is best expressed through liberal or moderate reformist Islamism. His desire is to see Islam practiced in the public sphere, including politics, but not through the control of religious jurists attempting to reconcile the Sharia with a modern world. He also offers another challenge to radical Islamists. He takes up the issue of jihad, or holy war, stating that jihad cannot be a justification for conversion, but must only be resorted to as a defense of Muslim religious liberty. 48

Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, a professor of theology at Tehran University, writing for the journal Kayhan-e Farhangi and another cleric with impeccable revolutionary credentials, focuses his critique of Islamic government in Iran on the hermeneutic foundations for decisions. His conviction is that the Sharia, though complete in its structure, must be supplemented by science. Additionally the 49

most prudent role for the Sharia is not as a source for specific jurisdiction or legislation but, rather, as a font of general wisdom that can inform lawmakers. The ulama, therefore, as experts in the Sharia, do not have sufficient understanding to give them reliable knowledge concerning the best or most authentic form of Islamic government. Islam, in fact, does not offer a specific model for government. Nor 50

can any government claim to automatically be called “Islamic” simply by virtue of a Constitution or claims to following the Sharia, etc... The best that can be hoped for is the creation of a state that does not disagree with Islam. Furthermore, he states that political institutions are essentially political, not religious, making the mullahs ill-equipped to be responsible for the practical running of government. He is careful not to criticize velayat-e faqih, but his disqualification of clerical authority certainly casts doubt on the doctrine. Shabestari believes that laws are almost entirely situation-dependent and local, lacking any real theoretical foundation. Laws, in other words, are made on earth, by 51

people. Likewise, political actions are not part of worship or religious observance. They are civic duties that have to be performed. “People who cite Quranic verses and the Sunna to assert that founding a state is a religious commandment both confuse different concepts in these sources and interpret their meaning erroneously.” 52

Iran remains in considerable political turmoil. The moderate reformists such as Khatami and his May Third Movement, who swept into the presidency in 1997, have lost public support and nearly all of their political clout through two rounds of unfavourable parliamentary elections. The latest election held in February 2004 resulted in a near-complete defeat of moderate reformists, both candidates and incumbents. Only the radical reformists retain any real credibility among the Left. The jailed reformer Hashem Aghajari, for example, called on his supporters to boycott the elections, claiming that they were a sham. By contrast, President Khatami 53

reluctantly agreed with the call, even after the ruling Council of Guardians banned the majority of reformists from even standing election. The result was general disgust

from the public and a turning on Khatami. His downfall came as the result of his failure to stand up to the hardliners and deliver on the inflated expectations raised through two landslide election victories. The people had, since 1997, expected significant improvements in the economy, a move away from international isolation, and an increase in personal freedoms, leading to a demonstrably higher standard of living. Khatami’s attempts at civil reform were consistently blocked by the conservatives, but he failed to challenge them in a way that would produce the expected change. The result was frustration, anger, and growing cynicism from the electorate. The 2004 elections became a way of registering the public’s disapproval of the reformists they had previously trusted and a general disapproval of the entire process as far fewer voters headed to the polls than had in 1997 or 2000. The conservatives ended up garnering 70% of the Parliamentary seats, while the reformists a mere 20%. 54

The real victors in 2003-2004 were the neo-conservatives led by a younger generation such as the mayor of Tehran Mahmoud Ahamadi-Nezhad. Ahmadi-Nezhad retains strong ties to old revolutionary hands such as the Revolutionary Guards, but shuns old rhetoric and old agendas. The neo-cons represent the second generation of the Islamic Revolution, unlike their reformist competitors. They also differ from the reformists in the sense that they do not appear to favour intellectual argumentation. The twin mottos of Ahamadi-Nezhad’s administration in Tehran are “efficiency” and “clean government.” In fact, the neo-cons also distanced their 55

rhetoric and electoral practices from the conservatives themselves. The election saw little evidence of hard-core Islamist rhetoric. The neo-cons fielded celebrity candidates such as wrestlers and filmmakers to front for the campaign. Far from being hopelessly mired in the past, Iran’s conservative Islamists have found one more way to connect, at least in a temporary fashion, with young voters. It is not, however, likely that it will last, unless they can also find a way to deliver on their own rhetoric outlined in what they call the “China Model.” 56

The China model has four parts. First, the central focus of the government must be to reform and stimulate the economy, generating jobs and raising measurably the standard of living. Second, there must be a continued relaxation on cultural restrictions, especially concerning female dress, etc... The neo-cons see this as a kind of safety valve that can prevent a spark of dissent from igniting society. Third, they call for improved relations with the West in order to stimulate foreign investment and increase trade. It will be interesting to see how this objective squares with the discoveries of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Finally, in a manner reminiscent of Tiananmen Square, the model freezes further political liberization and forcefully suppresses political challenges to the regime. It is difficult to see at this point what the final form, if there is one, of this Islamism will be. It is too early to tell if this is the formulation of something new and permanent in Iran as an expression of the Islamist ideal, or if it is a stop-gap by the old guard. Preliminary indications are that the conservatives appear willing to trust the younger generation of conservatives with the revolutionary heritage.

The reformists, on the other hand, appear in disarray. The IIPF appears gutted and largely abandoned by the public. The moderates have been totally discredited, 57

much like liberal reformers were in Germany following their abortive revolution in

1848. The analogy may in fact be apt. In the case of Germany, the left’s loss of credibility paved the way for a revolution from the conservative right twenty years later. In this case, however, Iranians appear to maintain explosively high expectations for government. This may be a harbinger of a larger revolution to come if these are not met. It also remains to be seen who will be entrusted with meeting them. For certain, the original alliances of reformists are crumbling, separated too far from a wide base of popular support and heavily penetrated by security services. Additionally, many of the reformists have become disillusioned with a moderate Islamist agenda. Some of these have re-identified themselves as exclusive secularists while others seem to descry the political process altogether. The Forum of Militant Clergy (FMC) for example, has moved its focus entirely to working within the existing political framework to reform the country’s society. New political 58

organizations seem to be forming, more radical than their predecessors, but it remains to be seen how much power or influence they will exercise.

The Iranian journalist Majid Mohammadi suggests four alternatives for the reformist. They can join the exiled opposition and work for an overthrow of the regime, by force if necessary. They can return to civil society and develop grassroots support. The author notes, however, that Iranians generally do not show much interest in these sorts of organizations. They can continue on in the same political vein as they have shown in the past, with the same likely outcome, or they can wait for a “Velvet Revolution.” The latter proposal entails remaining active in society 59

while waiting for the regime to collapse under the weight of its own inefficiency and inability to deliver. In summary, it appears that Iranian Islamists are at a crossroads. One path attempts to define Islamism as something other than an ideology. The other attempts to make ideological Islamism more efficient and responsive.

Islamism in Europe: Strangers in a Strange Land The challenges faced by Islamism in Europe are different from those posed in Iran. Rather than seeing how Islamism should respond to the challenges of achieving one of its foremost goals, the creation of an Islamic state, European Islam is faced with the question of how to develop a presence as a minority within an alien culture. In a way, European Islamism conforms more closely with our traditional understanding.

Muslims in the Diaspora have three choices to consider. How should they reconcile themselves to their surroundings? What does “Islam” mean when it consists of millions of people removed from their originating cultures? A dynamic present in the Diaspora is that Muslims begin to think about Islam in a way that separates it from their ethnic culture. They can forestall this by remaining in close immigrant communities, but sooner or later contact is made with Muslims outside of this referent. The process is accelerated by the fact that their growing faculty for English eases their interaction with outsiders. It is in the great cities of the West that Muslims first encounter the global dimension of Islam. It, therefore, begs the question, what really is a Muslim? Muslims of the Diaspora also have to deal with the fact that the culture into which they immigrate is far from uniform. From the standpoint of the Muslim immigrant, there may not be a Europe, there may be many Europes. Europe manifests no single, coherent culture to which Muslims may reconcile themselves and

their Islam. Europe is experiencing great change as it distances itself from the colonial age, the Industrial Revolution, and perhaps modernism itself. The European response to Islam can, furthermore, be complex and confusing. Some segments of European society are firmly pluralist and eager to accommodate Muslims. Others are far less so, appearing to be more interested in safeguarding what they believe is a unique birthright of culture. The nations themselves also manifest divergent means of accepting new peoples. The immigration policies in the United Kingdom, France and Germany are enormously different from one another. To add to everything else, Muslims that are newly located to Europe encounter Muslims that emerge directly from the host nation. If the nations to whom they immigrate are “Christian” as they are often told, why then do some of the Europeans claim to be Muslim. The process of finding a common identity with people considered to be part of a completely different and possibly hostile culture is a difficult one. Additionally, living in the West offers challenges evident elsewhere, but appearing to a greater degree in the Diaspora. For example, they find in Europe a highly developed youth culture, with the youth often receiving preferential treatment. They also become exposed to the European political landscape, including the presence of a political, protest culture that matured in the 1960s and 70s.

Relocated Islam. As second question that must be asked by Muslims in the West is, “How can we integrate with the host culture without sacrificing our own identity? How do we avoid disappearing as an insignificant minority? This becomes an explosive issue for Muslims raised with the understanding that Islam is the pinnacle of culture and civilization. How can they simply choose to be subsumed within a more primitive society? Muslims generally in Europe prefer not to be assimilated into the prevailing culture wholesale, but if they wish to be both European and Muslim, how can they strike a balance? Where is the fulcrum? The answers to these questions can be separated into two categories. First, they can choose to form something that is assertively Muslim, but also accommodating to the majority culture. Olivier Roy calls this phenomenon “EuroIslam.” Roy also likens it to the formation 60

of a “Muslim church,” often an apt description for some of the Islamist expressions that demonstrate practices far closer to European or American Protestantism than they do traditional Islam. An expression of EuroIslam can be the Paris mosque and the moderate French Muslim movement that is carefully coordinated by both the French government and the Turkish embassy in Paris, the Union Turco-Islamiques (DITIB). Both are ways in which to provide Muslims living in France with the freedom to worship, while at the same time integrating the Muslims into the society as good French citizens. The approach, however, is difficult to maintain and has experienced growing setbacks since the early 1990s. As Roy points out, the Paris mosque, expressing views compatible with the secularist French state has experienced several defeats in recent Muslim Council elections. Typically, their candidates lost out to more radical Islamists. 61

Hyphenated Islam. The other choice Muslims interested in integration can make is to remain as island communities in the Diaspora. These “group-pluralists” band together as a means of easing into a foreign environment In this case, the 62

separateness becomes more important than the accommodation. Though most of these develop into stable communities, respectful of the host nation, they can become

focal points for the development of Islamist separatism and radicalism. To some degree, it is the outgrowth of trying to reconcile competing views of culture. The result is the creation of a “critical Islam” that results from living in the West and facing situations as a minority. Ingmar Karlsson, speaking from Sweden, warns of 63

the creation of a “ghetto-Islam” that remains hostile to Europe. This appears to be 64

much in evidence in the Turkish Muslim communities of Germany. Their relative isolation was accelerated, in part, by the immigration policies of the Germans who were reluctant to accept the Turks as anything more than guest workers. At the same time, the Turks also entertained an expectation that they would return home when they first arrived in large numbers in the 1970s, but these proved to be false expectations. The result was a large, unassimilated Muslim population without significant ties to the local community and no real political voice. The situation was thus prepared for politically activist Muslims. Many activist Islamists left Turkey, in fact, to avoid persecution from the authorities during the period and they settled among the immigrants living in large German cities. Many of the activists were 65

educated, highly motivated ideologues. They found ready ears among the largely rural Turks attempting integration into the urban German landscape.

Initially, the Turkish Islamists continued to be involved in Turkish politics, pushing for a change to the Turkish government. Eventually, however, their focus shifted to their new home in Germany or other European countries. Roy notes that a split within the Refah Party in Turkey resulted in a partial disassociation of Milli Gorus, the largest of the Islamist organizations in the European Diaspora, from domestic Turkish politics, though I must add that caution is called for here in not overstating this. We should not forget that the majority of the AKP, the current ruling Islamists in Turkey, are in fact supporters of the Milli Gorus movement. Reuel 66 67

Gerecht observes that “The Turks who have been arrested for association with Al Qaeda usually share one bond: they were either born or raised in Germany and are culturally more German than they are Turkish Muslim. Milli Gorus (National 68

Vision) claims over 210,000 members and is active in several European countries, to include the United Kingdom. It operates over 800 centres and controls over 500 mosques. It owns and operates, for example, the Islamic Culture and Recreation Centre in Dalston, North London. It was formed in 1985 as the European branch of 69

the Refah Party. It retains strong ties to the ruling Islamist party in Turkey Refah, 70

but its concentration is on Islamism in Western Europe. Typically, its greatest strength in France as elsewhere is among Turks living either in entry points of immigration such as Paris or highly industrialized cities such as those in Alsace, where they form the backbone of factory workers. Its most militant offices, 71

however, are in Germany where it claims some 24,000 members. 72

Milli Gorus asserts a strong sense of Islamist separatism. The imam of a mosque in The Hague controlled by Milli Gorus reacted to the 9/11 tragedy stating, “believers must not be governed by people who are not of the same belief; otherwise they go against the Quran.” The organization’s own official magazine Milli Gazete 73

summed up the purpose of the Islamist organization by stating that it served as a shield protecting fellow citizens from assimilation into a barbaric Europe. Militant Turkish Islamists are embracing the term “Ottomanism” to describe what they think that an Islamic society and, perhaps, an Islamic state should look like. The term has

found its way into the popular Turkish Islamist press, both in turkey and throughout the Diaspora. More extreme in its separatist and militant Islamist tendencies than Milli Gorus is Hilafet Devleti (Islamic State), also known as the Anatolian Federated Islamic State (AFID), founded in 1984 in Germany. Its leader, Metin Kaplan, the 74

self-proclaimed “Caliph of Cologne,” is serving a prison sentence for the incitement to murder of a rival in Germany. His organization sees itself, not only as separated from German society as a whole, but as a caliphate state complete with its own constitution and governmental structure. Unlike Milli Gorus, however, Hilafet 75

Devleti sees itself as the legitimate government of Turkey, calling on Turkish Islamists to overthrow immediately the government. Kaplan couches this as a religious duty. This would, if he got his wish, result in something similar to the Islamic Republic in Iran.

Global Islam. The third question is rather than assimilate into the majority culture, or protect their separate ethnic/religious identity, should Muslims in Europe reformulate their identity as something entirely new in order to adapt to their environment? European Muslims are forced to make choices that determine how they interact with the host nation. They can, of course, attempt to blend in, effectively subsuming their identity to that of the host. One becomes French or Danish, without a hyphenated prefix. They may, rather choose to remain in separate ethnic neighborhoods, such as those promoted by Milli Gorus or Hilafet Devleti. In the first case, the Muslim jettisons his original identity. In the second, he maintains it in a sort of stasis with that of his new home. These options, however, have been matched by a third potent possibility. Muslims gathering from all over the globe to new multi-cultural homes in the West are increasingly choosing the path of what Roy terms “Reformulation.” The reformulation takes place as Islamists from many separate homelands redefine their identity as “global” or “transnational.” In a sense, they may be part of a counter-globalization movement, serving as an alternative to the negative aspects of the secular cosmopolitanism they find. 76

There are many expressions of this reconstituted, recommunalized (Roy) Islam. It is easily and publicly visible in the international jihadist community, of which Al Qaeda is part. It is an expression of Islamism that not only does not centre in the Arab world; it seeks to distance itself from it. Most jihad websites are located in the West or Malaysia for example. Europe, however, may supply the best venue 77

for a global reformulation of Islamic identity. It provides Muslim activists with an opportunity to gain a new, universalist identity, new leaders that are no longer appealing to primarily ethnic constituencies, and new agendas. An essential ingredient in this process, however, is the separation of these Muslims from their original Muslim ethnic context. These Muslims have to form a new community, but that will not happen until they willingly break with the past. This helps explain the larger numbers of young people that become a part of this Muslim globalization. Second generation Muslims are often active participants in the global, youth culture. This places them at odds with their parents and their traditional values. Squeezed between old traditions they cannot comprehend and a new culture that may not fully accept them, a redefinition as global Islamists seems more than a viable alternative. 78

Once freed from the constraints of their old identity, they acquire or reconstruct a new identity that seems to fit better with their own experiences and

orientation. In order to do so, they become part of an imagined community without the constraints offered by ethnic ties. Their new identity is as members of a global 79

Ummah (community), bounded by a strict code of behaviour, often crafted along fundamentalist Salafist lines that allows them to identify with fellow communicants anywhere in the world and a proclaiming a new militant Islam to the unbelievers. The new community has new, highly visible, active members. Women play a far more significant role, unbounded by ethnic, cultural restrictions as do Western converts. 80

Though large numbers of these come from Muslim work in prison, many converts represent middle class, well educated backgrounds. Converts were, in fact, captured in Germany in 1996 and 2001 as part of Al Qaeda cells. Websites dedicated to Chechnyan jihadi martyrology are full of the names of “foreign fighters,” many of which originated as converts from Europe. In its most extreme expression, immigration becomes a tool of jihad, holy war. Al Muhajiroun, a London-based group chillingly announces its Islamist position on terrorism. “The one who says ‘we should fight against terrorism,’ he is fighting against Islam.” The article goes on to 81

describe the nature and boundaries by which violence in the name of Islam should be waged. There are no civilians in the fight except perhaps babies. The killing of innocent people is permissible and is not a sin. Finally, “If the people in the target are a mix between those who deserved to be killed and some who do not, that does not prevent to fight and kill all of them together.” Immigration is embraced in order to “enforce Islam and weaken the infidels.” To be sure, the vast majority of converts do 82

not become global jihadists. Once such convert, Michael Young, expresses his own position clearly. “I did not become Muslim to embrace nationalistic, independence, or separatist Islamic struggles around the world.” Nevertheless, transnational Islamism 83

is a source of militancy that challenges world communities today as a “new holy war community of believers.” 84

The global Muslims gravitate to Islamist organizations that speed their conversion. The radical Islamist organization headquartered in the UK, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party) as well as its likely front organization, Al Muhajiroun claims to exist in order to reestablish a worldwide Caliphate. It started as a Palestinian 85

Islamic movement in 1953, but shifted its focus to becoming a kind of export house for Islamism back into Muslim lands . Additionally, it claims that it will establish an 86

Islamic state in Britain and a recreated Caliphate by some time in the early 21st century. It publicly descries violence, but these statements are considered by many 87

to be suspect. The process that will bring this about primarily involves the purification of the Ummah. Purification is seen as a two-sided process. One side involves immersion in the Sharia, particularly with a Wahabi-like interpretation. The other side involves separation from every vestige of Westernism. The product of the two should be an Islamic society. This is why voting in national elections is 88

prohibited. Contrary to the opinions of conservative Islamist clerics in Tehran, voting itself is seen as “outside the fold of Islam.” It is portrayed as a Trojan Horse by Al Muhajiroun, persuading young, impressionable Muslims that they must, as it happens, unnecessarily choose, between the lesser of two evils. Curiously, the final product of this social engineering is often a strange mix of non-Western and Western values. Its proponents fuse Muslim antecedents, European leftist biases, post-modern expression and institutional distrust, and occasionally good old-fashioned Western excess.

“However ‘old time’ their theology may sound to Westerners, and whatever they may think of themselves, radical EuroIslamists are clearly more of a post-modern phenomenon than a pre-modern one.” The most militant of the transnationalist 89

Islamists have Western educations and highly Westernized lifestyles, at least until they encounter the rigid moral world of Hizb ut-Tahrir or sheikh Abu Hamza.

Engaging the Evolving Conundrum Islamism is a conundrum. It is both a puzzle and a problem. The examples of Iran and Western Europe reveal a great deal about the term and Islam. Far from being a rigid, anachronistic creed, Islamism defies simple definitions with its variety and seeming unpredictability. It harkens back to the mythical “Golden Age” of the Caliphate and produces activists who like fast cars and whiskey. It confuses observers in part because it is like the Nile, having more than one source. Islamism can and should look back to early Islamic reform movements such as Hanbalism for inspiration. These provide much of the language used by contemporary Islamism. It is important, in another sense, to identify roots for Islamism that are found deep within Islam itself. Simply put, Islamists are Muslims. Immediately following 9/11, I happened to overheard by a Muslim young lady while we both traveled on the Tube. She uncharacteristically asked me my opinion concerning the terrorist attack. I turned her question around and asked for her opinion. She replied by unequivocally denying that the attackers were Muslims at all. When pressed, she backed down a bit, but said that if they were Muslims, they were bad Muslims. The dilemma for most observant, non-militant Muslims is that Islamists are Muslims. They can hearken back to a heritage of militancy, however different the historical reality is from their imaginations, and consider themselves as part of the heart of Islam. This forces a crisis of legitimacy and authority within the Islamic world, particularly among the Muslims in the West. At the same time, contrary to their propaganda, Islamism is also something that is completely at home in the modern or post-modern world. It uses ancient referents but blends them with entirely new language and concepts. They can often find common cause, alternately with the left-wing activism of the latter 20th century and with the fascism of the 1920s-40s. If global jihadism is a statement of Islam in all of its purity, why do its proponents resort to European anti-Semitic propaganda in their popular literature? Even the paragon of Islamism, Ayatollah Khomeini, completely invented something unprecedented in his Velayat-e Faqih. We should not forget that when he proposed the measure, it was university students and small-businessmen that backed the measure, not the established clergy. A survey of Iranian Islamism, both before and after the Revolution, reveals lively interaction with and adoption of Western philosophy, socialist economics etc. Now that Iran seems more and more divided over what direction the country should take, we seem anxious to separate the different camps into Islamist and non-Islamist. We should have learned our lesson and realize that what Iran is experiencing is an evolution of Islamism. To be sure, Iran has many voices urging separation from the Islamist dream altogether. The point is that Islamism is changing along with everyone else. How then should we regard Islamism? It seems that the first thing we can do is not to paint it with too broad a brush. It is neither the monolith that Pipes suggests

nor the benevolent agent of change that is often implied in Fuller or Esposito’s writing. Islamism does point out Islam’s difficulties with dealing with worlds that it never envisaged. It began as a victorious, warrior religion. It expounds a religious ethos steeped in victory. Islamism is a reminder that it now is face-to-face with a world that does not mirror its past, making it difficult to deal with in the present. The tension and misalignment makes it all the easier for aberrant ideologies and mutations to attract Muslims today. The truth is that Islamism succeeds because it speaks the language of the present even if it sounds like the past. If it is something new, how then should it be approached? We should, probably concentrate more on listening and understanding than pronouncing. At the same time, we have an imperative to act against its most militant and violent forms, but, how to act? Clearly, Islamism evidences a significant, but not limitless ability to modify itself in order to deal with specific venues and circumstances. Perhaps the most significant of these is the issue of power. The Islamism we are most familiar with is a political “outsider” movement. It is a voice for the disenfranchised. It is easier, however, to complain about the performance of government than it is to assume those responsibilities yourself. When faced with success, in Iran for example, Islamism seems to move in one of two directions, neither of which would be really compatible with pre-revolutionary rhetoric. One direction is toward pragmatism, typified by the China Model. It downplays the openly Islamic features of Islamism and focuses instead on practical measures that it believes the public cares about. The other direction is towards a limiting of the role of Islam in government all together. After more than two decades of Islamist government, Islam is held in less and less regard, certainly as an ideology. The answers of some, the radical reformists in particular, seems to be to significantly limit the direct role of the Ulama, the Sharia, and the enforcers of the Islamist ideal in society. Apparently, success for Islamism leads, at least in these circumstances, to a roll-back of the Islamist ideology in society because the reality is that it apparently does not seem to work as advertised. On the other hand, in the case of Western European Islam, Islamists demonstrate a significant capacity to forsake their own religious history in order to achieve power and influence. When the direct corridors of power are unavailable, Islamism shows itself capable of embracing all sorts of community activity as a way of developing a grassroots base. As we mentioned earlier, Islam is also a religion of triumphalism. It is most familiar with being a majority or achieving majority status born on the wings of the Islamic state. Europe, of course, is not like that. It is not possible to approach seekers or new converts and simply absorb them into mosques that are largely expressions of national or ethnic religion. You cannot, regardless of the degree of effort, turn Anglo-Saxon Englishmen into Pakistani Muslims. Consequently, Islam in Europe, and Islamism in particular, have proven adept at reforming and redefining Islam for a new world. Claiming to be representatives of a timeless tradition, European Islamist have created something entirely new. They have managed to graft together elements of Salafism, Nietschean apocalyticism, a West European protest ideology and a kind of Protestant Islam into a vision of a militant, universal movement. Though its founders represented traditional Islamic cultures, it has moved well beyond those antecendents. It is different. It is religion and politics fused together in a manner quite unintelligible for the average European secularist.

Overall, Islamism appears to be a movement or movements all of which seem to be characterized by a plasticity, an ability to reform themselves in a manner that allows them to cope with their environments. Perhaps we can say that their activities are analogous to those of the 21st century church. When confronted with a secular, post-modern culture that does not correlate to any traditional understanding of Christianity, we respond in one of two ways. Either we attempt to adapt ourselves as much or as often as possible to the prevailing so that we cut down the cultural distance and improve communications or we adapt less, focusing on what we consider to be timeless truths and expressions, waiting for the world to come around to our point of view. It seems to me that Islam and its militant expression Islamism contend with the same issues. As a Christian, my imperative must be to bring the love of God and the truth of God to bear, whether I speak in societal or personal terms. We are bound to be truth-tellers, but truth-telling is only really effective if it is part of a conversation, not a monologue. We need to understand, not just Islamism, but Islamists. Who are the persons to whom we speak? If we merely address early Islamic history with them, we I am afraid, miss the boat. Islamists are after all, like us, fallen people struggling with a fallen world. Understanding their struggle should provide us with the empathy and the language to engage. Additionally, we live in a largely secular society where people are likely to lump all religious expression together. We can serve the public at large by providing them with focused understanding and detail they are likely to miss. The result of our effort concerning Islamism is that, rather than confusing things further, should be clarity. We will learn to distinguish among Islamist and Muslims in general. It will give us the means to deal more effectively with people that by all rights should become helpful, productive parts of public life as well as those that pose a very real threat to us. The lack of clarity is far worse, because it does not equip us to deal with either. We alienate those with whom we should find common cause and we ignore potential threats.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington: United States 1

Government Printing Office, July 2004), 362. Daniel Pipes, “The Triumph of the 9/11 Commission,” Capitalism Magazine http://capmag.com 2 Aug. 2004.

Caroline Cox and John Marks, “The West, Islam, and Islamism,” Occasional Paper no.4 (London: 2

The Centre for Islamic Studies and Muslim-Christian Relations, June 2003) 6.

Graham Fuller, “Is Islamism a Threat? A debate” Middle East Quarterly Dec. 1999.3

Guilin Denoeux, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam” Middle East Policy Vol. IX, no. 4

2, (June 2002): 61.

Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern World (Albany: 5

SUNY Press, 1996) 52. Ameer Ali, “Islamism: Emancipation, Protest, and Identity” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 20, no. 1 (2000) 11.

Daniel Pipes, “Distinguishing Between Islam and Islamism” Centre for Strategic and International 6

Studies (30 June 1998)

Richard Schifter, “Islamism” Briefings The American Jewish Committee (2001)7

Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity among British Muslims (London: I.B. 8

Tauris, 1994) 5.

Ameer Ali, 12, 23.9

Abu-Rabi, 52f.10

Olivier Roy, “The Islamists” interview, UC Berkeley, 2002.11

Francois Burgat, Face to Face With Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003) xixf.12

Ali R. Abootelabi, “Islam, Islamists, and Democracy,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 13

Vol. 3, no. 1 (March 1999) 1.

Aziz Al-Amzeh, “Conversation with Aziz Al-Amzeh on Islamism and Modernism, Part 1” www.iran-14

bulletin.org.

Mohammad Tozy, “Islamism and Some of its Perceptions of the West,” Islam, Modernism and the 15

West: Cultural and Political Relations at the End of the Millenium, ed. Gema Martin Munoz (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999) 157.

Frank J. Buijs and Jan Rath, Muslims in Europe: The State of Research (New York: Russell Sage 16

Foundation, 2002) 15.

Kalim Siddiqui, Stages of Islamic Revolution (London: Open Press, 1996) 90. Sayyid Mohammad 17

Khatami, “Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society,” Ahlul Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project (Karachi: The Foundation for the Revival of Islamic Heritage, www.al-Islam.org, 2000) 15.

Metin Kaplan, BBC News, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk, 27 May 2004. Mohsen Kadivar, “Velayat-e 18

Faqih and Democracy, www.kadivar.com.

Daniel Pipes, “Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism”.19

Francois Burgat, 180f.20

Hizb ut-Tahrir, “Hizb ut Tahrir’s Work,” www.hizbut-tahrir.org.21

Ian Buruma, “The Origins of Occidentalism,” The Chronicle of Higher Education 6 Feb. 2004, 22

http://chronicle.com.

Olivier Roy, “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?” The National Interest www.looksmart.com (Spring 23

2003).

Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of our Time 24

(London: Allen Lane, 2004) 56.

Ali Banuazizi, “Islamic State and Civil Society in Iran,” www.dayan.org (2001)25

Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University 26

Press, 2003) 202ff.

Anthony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present (New 27

York: Routledge, 2001) 325.

Forough Jahanbakhsh, “Religion and Political Discourse in Iran: Moving Toward Post-28

Fundamentalism,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs Vol. IX, Issue 2 (Winter/Spring 2003) 245.

Keddie, Modern Iran, 185.29

Black, 332.30

Keddie, 192f.31

Mohsen Kadivar, “Velayat-e Faqih and Democracy” www.kadivar.com. 32

Banuazizi.33

Ibid.34

Mohammed Tozy,154.35

Henry Munson, Jr., “The Ideologization of Religion in Response to Western Domination,” Iran and 36

Beyond: Essays in Middle Eastern History in Honour of Nikki R. Keddie, eds. Rudi Matthee and Beth Baron (Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 2000) 239.

Banuazizi.37

Forough Jahanbakhsh, 246.38

Abdol Karim Soroush, “Relgious Intellectuals and Political Action in the Reform Movement,” 39

Conference Paper, “Intellectual Trends in 20th Century Iran,” Princeton University, 21 October 2000.

Khatami, 5.40

Ibid., 10.41

Ibid., 9.42

Keddie, 296.43

Afshin Molavi, Persian Pilgrimages: Journeys Across Iran (London: W.W. Norton, 2002) 97.44

Jeffrey Usman, “The Evolution of Iranian Islamism from the Revolution through the Contemporary 45

Reformers,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law Vol. 35

Abdol Karim Soroush, “Types of Religiosity” (Originally published in Kiyan, 2000) www.seraj.org.46

Mohsen Kadivar, “Velayat-e Faqih and Democracy” www.kadivar.com. 47

Mohsen Kadivar, “The Freedom of Thought and Religion in Islam” www.kadivar.com. 48

Keddie, 307.49

Asghar Schirazi The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic (London: 50

I.B. Tauris, 1997), 280.

Ibid., 278.51

Ibid., 280.52

CNN News International, “Students Denounce Khatami Cave In” http://edition.cnn.com (15 Feb 53

2004).

Mark Gasiorowski, “Iranian Politics after the 2004 Parliamentary Election” Strategic Insights Vol. 54

III, Issue 6, Monterey, California: Centre for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School www.ccc.nps.edu (June 2004).

Kamal Nazer Yasin (pseudonym), “Iran’s Neo-Conservatives Poised to take Charge of Political 55

Agenda” www.iran-press-service.com (14 Aug 2004).

Gasiorowski.56

Safa Haeri, “First City Council Results Confirms the Defeat of Reformists” Iran Press Service 57

www.iran-press-service.com (March 2003).

Mahan Abedin, “Iran After the Elections” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin Vol. 6, nos. 2/3 58

(February-March 2004).

Majid Mohammadi, “Iran Defeated Reformists are Divided over what to do Next” www.iran-press-59

service.com (22 Aug 2004).

Olivier Roy, “EuroIslam.”60

Jean-Yves Camus, “Islam in France” www.ict.org.il (10 May 2004) 7.61

Frank Buijs and Jan Rath, 16.62

Peter Mandaville, “Europe’s Muslim Youth: Dynamics of Alienation and Integration” Islam in 63

Europe and the United States: A Comparative Perspective (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2002) 22).

Ingmar Karlsson, “The Muslim Immigrants- A Bridge between two Cultures?” Turkish Daily News 64

www.turkishdailynews.com (22 April 2002).

Francois Burgat, 175.65

Turkish Industrialists’ and businessmen’s Association, U.S. Representative Office (TUSIAD-US), 66

“Who’s Who in Justice and Development Party? Implications for Future” www.tusiad.us.com

Roy, “EuroIslam.”67

Reuel Marc Gerecht, “Holy War in Europe” The Weekly Standard Vol. 9, Issue 28 (29 March 2004).68

“British Muslims Monthy Survey” (reporting Q News 10 Feb 1995).69

Hasan Bousetta, “Debate: The Political Mobilization of Muslim Minorities in Europe” Merger, The 70

Newsletter of the Migration and Ethnic Relations Group for European Research (31 May 1997)

Camus, 18.71

Lorenzo Vidino, “Dutch Terror Treat” www.nationalreview.com (7 Jan 2004).72

Ibid.73

Associated Press and the BBC, “Turkish Islamist Arrested in Germany” www.ict.org.il (26 March 74

1999)

BBC News, “Turkish Exiles Test Germany’s Resolve” http://news.bbc.co.uk (2 June 2000)75

Reuven Paz, “Middle East Islamism in the European Arena” Middle East Review of International 76

Affairs (MERIA) Journal vol. 6, no. 3 www.meria.idc.ac.il (3 September 2002)

Roy, “EuroIslam.”77

Hasan Bousetta.78

Roy, “EuroIslam.”79

Bousetta.80

Al Muhajiroun, “Whovever Denies that Terrorism is a Part of Islam is Kafir” www.muhajiroun.com81

Reuven Paz, quoting the militant Abu Basir.82

Michael Young, “Frustrations of a Muslim Convert” www.islamfortoday.com. 83

Reuel Marc Gerecht, quoting Farhad Khosrokhavar.84

Imran Warheed, “US and British POWs Should be Treated as ‘Unlawful Combatants’ by Iraqi Army” 85

www.khilafah.com (24 March 2003).

Roy, “EuroIslam.”86

Peter Mandaville, 25.87

Hizb ut-Tahrir, “Today it is Fard (obligatory) for Every Muslim to Work to Establish the Khilafah” 88

www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org.

Roy, “EuroIslam.”89