CHAPTER II

ISLAMISATION IN BANGLADESH FROM SECULAR TO ISLAMIC STATE

Bangladesh emerged as an independent country after a bloody civil war, with the

active support of India in 1971. The country geographically known as East Bengal was

the part of the eastern wing of Pakistan since 1947. If the movement for Pakistan led to

the separation of the Muslim majority areas of India in 1947, the second partition of the

sub-continent debunked the myth of religion as a stable basis of nation-state. What

imparts distinction to the Bangladesh nationalist movement is the fact that in spite of

fraternal relationship between the two wings of Pakistan, the Bengali East Pakistan found

inspiration from its unique regional and local traditions to spearhead a movement against

its relatively stronger wing. The people of Bangladesh attributed their social, cultural

economical and political exploitation to the West Pakistani rulers and organised a

national movement on secular issues. What lends motivation to the movement was not

the alarm of Islam in danger but to restore and replenish their lost cultural glory as a

distinct people and .to put an end to their economic degeneration in the hands of their

Pakistani Masters.] The emotional attachment to their cultural traditions and distinct

linguistic heritage has nuances that overshadowed the Islamic unity of the two wings at

that point of time. Thus, Bangladeshi nationalism that emerged in the course of the

liberation struggle led by Sheikh Mujib' Awami league was primarily rooted on the

unique combination of land and language.

Soon after its independence, Bangladesh adopted this East Bengali nationalism

together with socialism, democracy and secularism as state ideology, relegating Islam to

private sphere. However, the assassination of the fIrst elected Prime Minister Mujibur

Rahman and the overthrow of his government by a military coup in August 1975 brought

in an Islam-oriented state ideology by shunning secularism and socialism. Not long after

his ascendancy as the new ruler in November 1975, General Ziaur Rahman replaced the

secular "Bengali nationalism" with "Bangladeshi nationalism." Outwardly though

inclusive, the new Bangladeshi nationalism essentially highlights the Muslim identity of

the country, differentiating its Muslim majority Bengalis from their Hindu majority

counterparts in West Bengal in India. With the patronisation of political Islam by the

I See Craig Baxter, "Pakistan and Bangladesh" in Frederick L. Shiels (ed.), Ethnic Separatism and World Politics (Lanham, University Press of America, 1984), pp. 208-262. Also see, A.M.A. Muhith, Bangladesh: Emergence of a Nation (Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International, 1978).

113

state, efforts were made by its protagonists to celebrate their Muslim-ness and protect

Muslim interests.

Ironically, however, Bangladesh unlike Pakistan has a long history of syncretistic

cultural practices, as reflected in Bengali folk cult, literature, music and festivals? A

brief historical overview of the phenomena would explain the peculiarities. Prior to the

Muslim conquest at the beginning of 13th century, a number of religious cults along with

tantric Buddhism had existed side by side in the area3 Islam and the Sufi saints were

accepted by the easy going folks who already had the past experiences of liberalism and

pluralistic co-existences from ancient times'- It was in such favourable conditions that

Islam grew in strength by adapting itself to the demands of local people and their local

living conditions.4 "Initially in Bengal, Islamic cosmology was incorporated within the

local belief system, and Islamic ideas and concepts were presented using familiar

indigenous terms. Thus, the Prophet Muhammad was called an avatar and Allah was

referred to as prabhu, gosai and niranjan (Bengali words used to refer to God.). 5 It is true

that these words were later replaced by the orthodox Islamists nomenclature, but it

nevertheless explains the catholicity of culture, which is not imposed but organic in its

nature.6

This chapter begins with the discussion of the war of liberation leading to the

emergence of Bangladesh as an independent sovereign entity followed by a critical

examination of the post-liberation spirit and the state-ideology based on the principles of

Mujibism to highlight the limitations and the reasons for the loss of its credibility. The

2 Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslim, 1871-1906, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 190.

3 Bengal first came under Turkish influence in 1204. Lakhnauti was the capital of Muhammad Bakhtyar Khalji. Sultan Ruknuddin KaiKaus conquered Satgoan and reigned from (1219-1300). Sultan Shamsuddin Firuz Shah extended the Conquest right upto Sylhet and slowly whole of East Bengal came under Muslim rule. See, Sheikh Rustani Ali, Islam in Bangladesh,

4 AminurRahim, "Communalism and nationalism in Bangladesh", Journal of Asian and African Studies, voL 42, No.6, p. 557.

5 Sufia M. Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh (New Delhi: Vistaar Publication, 2006), p. 33.

6 Talukdar Maniruzzman, "Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends," in Rafiuddin Ahmed, Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. 1990), p. 69.

114

chapter ends with an attempt to analyse the social location of Islam, which would help

identify the roots of the fundamentalist challenge in contemporary Bangladesh.

War of Liberation

The war of liberation, which led to the emancipation of Bangladesh, was the

product of the cultural and political aspirations long suppressed by the hegemonic

Pakistani establishment. "Bengali pride was pronounced and easily identifiable. And

pride was translated into cultural nationalism. A state of mind rooted in language and

embellished by history would not yield to alien demands for confonnity with a more

distant was culture. Urdu and Persian poetry were no substitute to Bengali rhyme and

prose." Bengali Muslims were urged by the West Pakistani counterparts to memorialise

Md Iqbal, while their beloved poets were ignored and even ridiculed. British imperialism

had been overbearing and stressful, but by contrast, the conditions Pakistani

establishment would foist upon Bengal were intolerable for the Bengalis. The Muslim

League had come to symbolise the worst of tyrannies and the dream that was once

Pakistan had become a night mare.7

To channelise the over-whelming support of the Bengalis regarding their

uniqueness, the Awami-League under the guidance of Mujib took charge. Maul ana

Bhashani, another strong man of the party held the view that Awami league would be an

alternative to the Muslim League.8 The Awami League, however, had no opportunity to

articulate the local grievances and highlight its programmes because President Ayub's

Basic Democratic system kept it isolated. Despite being politically marginalised, Mujib

made a deal with the West-Pakistani politicians according to which he promised to back

them in their bid to oust President Ayub in return for their support for his "six point

progfamme", which, among others, included the following:

l. Pakistan should be a federationunder the Lahore Resolution of 1940. which implied the existence of two similar entities. Any new constitution according to the Bengalis had to reflect this reality;

7 Lawrence Ziring. Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad An Interpretative study. (Karachi: Oxford University press. 1992). pp.I-15.

8 See Craig Baxter; Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting ( Boulder. Colorado: West view, 1984). p.23.

115

2. the federal government should deal solely with defence and foreign affairs;

3. there should be two separate but freely convertible currencies. East Pakistan would have a separate banking measure as well as separate fiscal and monetary policies;

4. The federal unit should have the sole power to tax;

5 Separate accounts from foreign exchange earnings would be maintained. The federating units would be free to establish trade links with foreign countries;

6. East Pakistan would have a separate militia.9

Rather than addressing the grievances of the East wing, then government of Ayub

Khan and the West Pakistani opposition parties tenned the "six point" ofthe League as a

secessionist ploy and a proactive policy was under way to frustrate the Mujib's plans.

Mujib was arrested for conspiring against the state, known as the "Agartala Conspiracy

case."IO Long years in prison and attacks on him for treason and conspiracy only raised

his iconic status among his people who were determined not to give up their liberation

struggle half way. It may be recalled that the deep seated anguish of the people of East

Bengal was due to their subjugation in all fields of existence, at the hands of the Pakistani

vested interest. To mention a few, the Muslim League ministry which ruled East Bengal

until 1954, became unrepresentative and thus indifferent to the interests of East Bengalis.

The Awami league favoured joint-electorates to make democracy more inclusive and

broad based while the Muslim league was not sensitive to minority representation and

their interests. II The Bengalis suffered from lack of parity in administration and

bureaucracy too. The Bengali membership in the Military services was a mere 6 per cent.

All high level post including that of the governor of East Bengal was held by Mohajirs

and West PakistaniS.12

Similarly, the economic grievances included channelisation of funds worth

Rs.730 million on an average per year from the Eastern wing to the West. I3 In addition,

substantial amount of foreign assistance went to the West wing to be invested in the

9 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (Kant: Dawson, 1980), pp. 185-87.

10 It was alleged that with explicit Indian support Mujib and his followers worked on an agenda for an independent country in the Indian town of Agartala located to its North-Eastern border.

II Craig Baxter, South Asia Politics and Government (Colorado: united States of America, 1987), pp. 235-236.

12 Ibid., p. 236.

13 S.R. Chakravarthy, "The National Liberation Movement: Problems and Prospects", in S.R. Chakravarthy and V. narain (ed.), Bangladesh: Volume Two Domestic Politics (Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1986), p. 2.

116

Indus Basin project while East Bengal remained economically weak with no industries

and no banking. Finally, the suppression of their linguistic and cultural identity

strengthened Bengali particularism. According to a leading Bangladeshi analyst, "The

pre-conception that Bengalis are inferior Muslims, susceptible to Hindu culture and

language and therefore not reliable Pakistanis became linked in the minds of many West

Pakistanis with almost Paranoid fear that the Indian government was constantly engaged

in political and cultural subversion in East Bengal. These ideas, in turn, prevented those

in power in Pakistan from viewing East Bengal's political demands positively.,,14 With

such perception, the Pakistani regime formulated a board to re-orient textbooks on

Islamic lines and censorship was imposed on the press. The biggest onslaught, however,

was on the issue of Bengali language, which led to the upsurge of regional feelings and

the movement saw massive mobilisation of student and youth power in Bangladesh. ls

The assertion of Bengali national identity saw its high mark during the language

movement and formed the basis of the liberation struggle.

Predictably, the change of guard in Pakistani from Ayub to Yahya Khan did not

change the ground realities in East Bengal. Apart from the language issue and six points

programme, the Pakistani establishment was confronted with a host of controversial

issues, notably the withdrawal of material law, limiting the role of the army, transfer of

power to the people's representatives and an enquiry about political killings. A de facto

Awami-League government was established in East Pakistan when Bangabandhu taking

a cue from Mahatma Gandhi asked his people to start a week long civil-disobedience

movement. The movement saw a massive mobilisation of Bengalees leading to the

hosting of the national flag of Bangladesh. However, the course of the war was marked

by extremely violent events including "ethnic cleansing" and the bloody massacre of the

students and intellectuals.16 The l~ge scale repression turned the people increasingly

14 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dacca: Bangladesh Books International, 1980), p. 13.

15 The Pakistan Public Service Commission removed BangIa from the list of approved subjects, as well as from currency notes and stamps. The Central Government's proposal of writing Bengali in Arabic script further made the East Bengalis edgy.

16 To get a detailed eyewitness account of the slaughter of intellectuals bordering on genocide, see Kabir Chowdhury, Genocide in Bangladesh (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), p. 22 and Hamida Rahman, "Katasurer Badhyabhumi" (The killing ground of Katasur), Daubuj Azad (Dhaka), 2 JanuaryI972.

117

skeptical about the legitimacy of the Pakistani state, and streams of teeming Bangladeshis

left their home for security to bordering India. The mass exodus gradually dragged India

into the East-Bengalis conflictP The internal situation in Bangladesh was extremely

volatile with pitched battle between Mukti bahini (Bangladeshi fighters) and East Bengal

Regiment. IS Eventually, Indian intervention set off yet another round of military

confrontation between the two countries. I9 The war of liberation witnessed the

historically inevitable result, the surrender of the Pakistani troops and birth of Bangladesh

in December 1971.

The Language Movement

The importance of the language movement, which laid the secular basis of the

first government in Bangladesh and disturbed the national cohesion and solidarity of

Pakistan, defined in terms of religion need to be further examined. The most distinctive

features of the people of East Pakistan which fonned a common bond between them are

racial and ethnic stock, historical identity, geographic contiguity, shared economic

interest and last but not the least, cultural and linguistic unity. The Bengalis were the

largest ethnic group in Pakistan and their ethnicity was prominently different from the

Pakistanis. The people of the west wing had greater links with the Arabs and Turcomans

while the Bengalis were bereft of any racial mixture. The shorter, darker and friendly

Bengali was starkly different from the taller, fairer martial westerner.20 Part of their

discontent when East Bengal was a part of united Pakistan was the discrimination they

faced on the basis of their presumed "non-martial" attributes.21

Geographically, East Bengal was fonned by a delta of two major rivers, Ganga

and Brahmaputra and the area receives the highest amount of rainfall in a year. A look at

17 The Indian involvement was officially aimed at creating a congenial situation in which the refugees could return, but in reality New Delhi hopes to gain influence over the new state by decidedly supporting the secession of East Bengal from Pakistan. To achieve its objectives, India offered military training to the Mukti Bahini guerillas and other logistical assistance to sustain their fight with the Pakistani army.

18 Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh, n. 13, pp. 82-99.

19 For details regarding Indian role in the Civil War, see Hasan Askari Rizvi, Internal Strife and External Intervention: India's Role in the Civil War in East Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive publishers, 1981).

20 M. Rafiqul Islam, The Bangladesh Liberation Movement (Dhaka: The University Press, 1987) p. 67.

21 Craig Baxter, Government and Politics in South Asia (Colorado: West view Press, 1987), p. 229.

118

its physical map shows that numerous streams and tributaries crisscross the land and

increases the country's vulnerability to annual flooding during monsoon.22 Thus

climatically and ecologically the delta land of East Bengal has hot humid weather

conditions. The maze of channels give rise to thick forests, mangroves good farming

conditions and at the same time a culture and food habits dependent on its vegetation and

nvers. Whereas West Pakistan's topography is endowed with snow-clad high mountain

ranges like the Karakoram and Hindu Kush to its north and dry rocky plateau of

Baluchistan in its southwest and the Thar desert in its southeast. Much of its culture is

based on tribal structure and follows a conservative brand of Islam, closer to their West

Asian brothers.23

The most profound dissimilarity was, however, perceived to be in the sphere of

language. Urdu, the official language of Pakistan was one of the ideological cornerstones

of the country and its strict imposition on linguistically distinct and sensitive Bengalis

trigged regional mobilisation and resistance against the central authority. Commenting

on the language between the two wings, Ayesha Jalal writes, "Pakistan's central leaders

had expected to hasten process of assimilation and secure allegiance to a monolithic

notion of state sovereignty. Instead they created an arena of fierce contestation where

Urdu, Mughal power and an Islam, more doctrinal than syncretic in complexion, gave a

powerful stimulus to the articulation of regional dissent in the linguistic idioms". 24 When

Muslims of the subcontinent gained nationhood in 1947 there was intense identification

with a religious ideology but with the rise of Bengali linguistic nationalism in the 1950's

and 1960's in East Bengal, language became the symbol of unity is defining their

political identity.

The debate about the place of Bengali language had starte4 way ahead in 1948,

when Muhammad Ali Jinnah publicly announced that East Bengalis must learn to speak

Urdu. The language issue turned into a crisis when in 1952 the government of Pakistan

revived its old agenda to enforce Urdu as the state language. It is not an exaggeration to

22 D.K. Concise Atlas of the World Digital Mappingfor the 2]" Century, pp. 152-53.

23 Islam, The Bangladesh Liberation Movement, n 20, p. 67.

24 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 225.

119

say that the pent up discontent and disillusionment against Pakistan found a vent in

protest movement against Urdu. The Bhasha Andolon or the language movement was

successful in mobilizing large sections of the populace and the students in particular to

launch a political agitation. Fearing mass mobilization against the new law the central

government outlawed all public meetings and rallies. Several students and civilians died

in police firing and police crackdown on February 21, 1952?5 This day is honoured in

Bangladesh as the Language Martyr's Day and aptly described as the Mussalmaner

Swadesh Prattabartan (the home coming of the Bangal Muslims)?6

The attitude of the Pakistan government and the painful events of February 21

stirred the collective conscience of the young nation. The Awami Muslim League

founded by Maulana Bashani, Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy, Ataur Rahman and Sheikh

Mujibur Rahman had established itself as a political party and spearheaded the interest of

the people of East Bengal. By the later part of 1950's it broadened its political base and

welcomed non-Muslim Bengalis into its fold, corollary to its inclusive plans the party

dropped the name Muslim and came to be known as Awami League only.27 The complete

political death of Muslim League from the soil of East Bengal in the 1954 election was an

indicator of the future course of events?8

The Central command in Pakistan was not ready to give up easily. To strike at the

basis of ethno linguistic nationalism of the East Bengalis, the government sponsored

institutions like the Pakistan Council, Bureau of National Reconstruction (BNR), Writers

Guild Bengali Development Board and Nazrul Academy. The function of these

institutions was to exercise censorship on secular literary works as un-Islamic, and

Islamise Bengali language and culture.29 The result of this government effort was that

poets like Rabindranath Tagore and his works were painted un-Islamic and Kazi N~

25 "Language Movement" (PHP), Banglapedia - The National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, Asiatic Society of Bangladesh at http://banglapedia.netJhtIL0063 .htm

26 Badruddin Umar, Sanskritik Sampradaikata (Dhaka: Janamaitri Publications, 1996), pp. 8-11.

27 Sufia Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh, n.5, p.121.

2& "UF elections Victory" (PHP), Chronicles of Pakistan. http://tberepublicofrumi.com/54.htm

29 A.K. Roy, "The Role of Intellectuals -Pakistan Period" in Dilip Chakravarthy, A Nation is Born (Calcutta: C.V. Bangladesh Sahayak Samiti, 1974), p. 45.

120

Islam's works were considered highly Islamic.3o Rabindra Sangeet was banned on the

basis that it was not in conformity with the ideology of Pakistan. Matching their actions

with words Ayub Khan commented in 1967, "East Bengalis ... still are under

considerable Hindu culture and influence.,,31

Suppressing the Bengali national identity by the Pakistani establishment

boomeranged into a national movement which raw power was unable to quell. Two days

after the fIring event on February 21, 1952, People built a column near a site closer to

Dhaka Medical College were students were killed in the Police fIring. Bengalis recognise

February 21 as Shaheed Dibash (Martyrs' Day). Though the police annihilated all traces

of this people's monument within days of its birth and obstructed the construction of

another minar which was being readied to remember the martyrs of Elrushey (21) the

powerful images of Bengali struggle to protect their rich heritage remained unblemished.

Abdul Gaffar Choudhury's poem Amar Bhaiyer rokte Rangano, which means My

Brothers Blood Spattered became the most celebrated song allover East Bengal. The

motif of the song is

Can I forget the twenty-first of February incarnadined by the blood of my brother? The twenty-first of February, built by the tears of a hundred mothers robbed of their sons,

Can I ever forget it?

Wake up today, the twenty-first of February. Do wake you, please. Our heroic boys and girls still languish in the prisons of the tyrant. The souls of my martyred brothers still cry. But today everywhere the somnolent strength of the people have begun to stir and we shall set February ablaze by the flame of our fierce anger.

?32 How can I ever forget the twenty-first of February •

Many poems have been written on Ekushey but this song by Abdul Gaffar became

the indelible melody of the Language movement. The song is sung every year on 21

30 Ibid., p. 45.

31 Philip Oldenburg, "A place insufficiently Imagined", The Journal of Asian Studies, 44, No.4, August 1985, pp. 711-733.

32 The poem is translated by Kabir Chowdhury. See HenryGlassie and Feroz Mahmud, Living Traditions: Cultural Survey of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2008), Series-II, pp.578-579.

121

February in the Probhat Feri, by people from all parts of the Bangladesh march

barefooted to theShaheed Minar to pay homage to those killed in the language

movement demonstrations by singing Amar Bhaier Rokte Rangano. ''This newly formed

sacred space and event identified two imagined communities, one a common oppressor

and the second the Bengali nation (encompassing many religious communities).,,33 Thus

language acted as a powerful tool to unify East Bengalis and reinforced their belief in a

shared Bengali identity, during the course of their struggle. The language movement

strengthened the bond of the people with heir land and later secured its independence

from Pakistan.

Role of Literature

The post-language movement gave birth to a new literature which was full of

hope and determination to fight communalism, prejudices and obscurantism. The

literature published with the spirit of patriotism, challenged the ideological base of

Pakistan. This new brand of creative literature helped facilitate the spread of socio­

cultural and political consciousness. There is a sizeable body of liberation war creative

writing which stands today as the intellectual wealth of society. Here are few quotations

from poet Shamsur Rahman's poem, Liberty

"Liberty you are my mother's white Sari fluttering in the breeze in the yard, Liberty, you are the red color of Mehdi on the tender palm of my sister.

Liberty, you are die naming poster in my friend's hand.

Liberty, you are the thick black loose hair of my wife flowing in the wind

Liberty, you are the colored shirt on my son, the play of sunlight on my daughter's cheek.

Liberty, you tire my garden,

The song of the cuckoo,

The rustling leaves

Of an ancient banyan tree,

The note book where I write my verses

Just as I choose.'.34

33 Sufia Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh, D. 5, p.126.

34 "Liberation War", Muktadhara (A Site for the Bangalees), May 9, 2001 at http://muktadharar.net/plllhtmi

122

This poem evokes joy, love, hope romance and sensitivity. It highlights the

Bengali jest for life, and freedom. Yet in another poem, I Curse Them, poet Shamsur

Rahman reflects anger and hatred against the genocide unleashed by the Pakistani junta:

I curse today those devils of hell, who compelled me to run up the stairs with my feet deep in the blood of my parents. on rivers

and make my bed in wild forests I curse them: let them forever wander with rotting bodies hung around their emaciated necks. I curse them: Their cup for quenching thirst will always fill to the brim with blood, the blood with which they flooded the soil of Bengal. I curse them!,,35

In the field of novel writing, the liberation war provided the core them. The novel

Rifle Roli Awrat (Rifle Bread Women) by Anwar Pasha reverberates with secularism and

human values. The protagonists in the novel were people from different ideological

outlooks but they carry the message of national unity. It was the novelist's tragic fate

that he was picked up by the Pakistani collaborators and killed just two days before the

liberation of his beloved country.

Mujibur Rehman's Tenure as Prime Minister

The state of Bangladesh was born in 1971 out of a mass movement based on non­

religious principles. Secularism therefore was officially declared to be one of the state's

guiding principles India's role as a mid wife in the birth of a new nation was an

established fact. Apart from the secular orientation of the freedom movement, the active

involvement of USSR along with India in favour of Bangladesh also gradually influenced

the leaders of the independence movement to adopt secularism as a state principle when

35 Kabir Chowdhury, "The Liberation War and Creative Writing", MUla-Mona (Freethinkers), December 16,2006, p.3 at http://mukta-mona.comlspecialeventl16decemberlkabir_chowdhury.11206.htm

123

the law of Bangladesh was framed in 1972.36 Being the chief spokesman of the people of

Bangladesh, the Awami League was given an absolute majority to exercise power and

thus fr~g of the Constitution was an uncomplicated affair.37

Awami League rode like a colossus on the principles of Mujibism which is a

political philosophy and includes nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism as its

core principles. Keeping with the spirit of the liberation movement the right wing parties

which were suspected of collaborating with the occupational army were banned. The left

however were officially permitted to function owing to their supportive role in the

nationalist war.38

As the young nation set out to build its institutions, Prime Minister Mujibur

Rehman explained the secular plank of a predominantly Muslim populated nation.

"Secularism", he said, "does not mean the absence of religion; Hindus will observe their

religion. Muslims will observe their religion; Christians and Buddhists will observe their

religions. No one will be allowed to interfere in other's religion. The people of Bengal

do not want any interference in religious matters. Religion cannot be used for political

ends.,,39 To achieve the lofty ideals of secularism the Constitution of Bangladesh laid

down several provisions. Article 41, for instance, gives every citizen the right to profess,

practice or propagate any religion. Religious education in institutions of learning was not

compulsory and formation of religious parties prohibited.4o Article 12 stood for the

implementation of secularism by eradication of a) communalism in all forms; b) the

granting by the state of political status in favour of any religion; c) the abuse of religion

36 Ahmed ShufiquI Haque and Md Yeahia Akhter, "Bangladesh, The Ubiquity of Islam: Religion and Society in Bangladesh", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 4, p. 203.

37 Avul Fazl Huq, "Constitution making in Bangladesh", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 46, No.1, pp. 59-76.

3& Rounaq Jaban, Bangladesh Politics Problems and Issues (Dhaka: University Press, 1980) p. 73.

39 Government of Bangladesh, Parliament Debates, October 12, 1972 (Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh, 1972) p. 20.

40 Ministry of Law, Parliamentary Affairs on Justice, Government of the .Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh -(January 1975) (Dhaka: Govt. Printing Press, 1975).

124

for political purposes; and d) any discrimination against or persecution of persons

practicing a particular religion.4)

As already noted, religion was the shield for the protagonists of Pakistani

nationalism to ignore/deny the legitimate economic, linguistic and cultural aspirations of

East Bengalis. Even brutal massacres were carried out by the AI Razakars, AI Sham and

AI Badr against the people of East Bengal to stamp out their un-Islamic dreams. The

emphasis on secularism was thus a product of the spirit of the movement. To realise its

brand of nationalism Sheikh Mujibur Rehman discontinued the old practice of recitations

from the Holy Quran and substituted it with a programme based on morality and ethics

called the "speaking the Truth".42 He instructed the state controlled media to give equal

opportunity for religious citations from Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity.

This over exposure of other religious ideology other than Islam was not accepted among

the Muslims and there was a backlash.43 The policy of the government which aimed at

distributive justice maligned the concept of secularism and Mujib's tough stance against

the religious right led to clandestine activities and the Awami League faced opposition

from the "far right".44

Secularism Reversed

Although the political structure and the constitution were secularized, the

dynamism to make secularism a successful institution was missing. The nature of society

remained primarily Islamic. The heightened nationalist feelings during the liberation

struggle were sustained by the colonial repression of the West Pakistanis. "In the

resultant struggle for emancipation, as Mujibur Rehman called it, they clutched at every

mark of Bengali individuality. The hatred towards the Bengali was total: his culture was

belittle, his efficiency suspected and even his eating habits and way of life were held in

41 The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Ministry of Law, Government of Bangladesh, 1972), p. 5.

42 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends", in Rafiuddin Ahmed, ed., Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh (New Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1990), p. 69.

43 Ibid.

44 Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, n. 38, p. 73.

125

contempt. As a result, there developed, over the painful years, a seething hatred towards

West Pakistan".45

The irony was that once free from the immediate insecurity of being overwhelmed

by West Pakistan's identity and oppression, the secular tools were superseded by the

dynamics of faith. Mujib's close association with Hindu India and political friendship

with Russia gave impetus to rumours of India's hegemonic designs in the region. To

corroborate this they noted the mindless smuggling and illegal inter-regional trade

between the two countries.46 One comes across numerous instances where attempts were

made by Mujib and his followers to discontinue the pursuit of secularism envisaged a few

years ago. His policy of giving equal opportunity to all religious eitations was joked as

"multi-theocracy',.47 The absence of Islamic phrases and symbols in a Muslim mjajority

nation was not taken well be his people.

Wary of a growing sense of alienation from the masses, Mujib on many occasions

emphasised that secularism in Bangladesh was not atheism and even began to Islamise

his public conduct and speeches. Mujib declared that he was proud to be Muslim and that

his country was the sec~nd largest Muslim state in the world.48 As if to send a strong

message regarding his adherence to Islam Mujib was seen leading a Munajaat (prayer) in

November 1972.49 Mujib used terms like Insah Allah (Only if Allah wishes), Bismillah

(in the name of Allah) Tawba and lman (faith).50 Mujib departed from secular traditions

of greeting people with Joy Bangia only (Victory to Bengal) and used Khuda Hafeez

(May God protect yoU).51 Mujib's secularism boomerang~ in the most important field

45 P. Sharan, "Nationalism, Socialism and Democracy in Bangladesh", in D. Bhattacharya, Nation, n. 29, p. 94.

46 Asim Roy, ed., Islam in History and Politics Perspectives from South Asia, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 220.

47 Talukdar Maniruzzman, "Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends", in S.R. Chakravarthy ed., Bangladesh: History and Culture (New Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1985), pp. 49-50.

48 Bangladesh Observer, II January 1972, p. I.

49 Quoted in Ali Riaz, "God Willing": The Politics and ideology of Islamism in Bangladesh", Comparative Studies of South Asian Africa and Middle East, 23: I & 2 (2003), p. 309.

50 Ibid., p. 309.

51 Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, "Islam in Bangladesh Politics", in Hussain Mutalib and Taj ul Hashmi (ed.), Islam, Muslim and Modern State (New York; St. Martin's Press), 1994, p. 106.

126

of education. Following the guidelines of the 1973 Interim Report of Education

Commission the government of Mujibur Rehman, introduced sweeping changes in the

educational textbooks. Pakistani heroes were deleted from history text books, religious

instructions from grades one to eight was abolished, while it was made an optional course

for students belonging to humanities only from grades nine to twelve. There were

provisions for the minorities to study their own religion. The political idealism or high

ground was rejected by the people. Responding to questionnaires distributed by a

government sponsored commission on Education, 75 percent of Bangladeshis indicated

their support for the continuation of religious instruction as a part of their curriculum. 52

Mujib revived the Islamic Academy which was banned in 1972 and upgraded it to

a foundation to propagate the ideals oflslam. To meet the growing Islamic aspirations of

the people the government of Mujib increased the annual budgetary allocation for

Madrassas; from 2.5 million in 1971 to 7.2 million Taka in 1973.53 The change in the

State's approach to religion was perceived to be too little and a belated gesture, and

Mujib was accused of plotting to rob the sense of identity of the Bengali Muslims which

kept them united. 54 Among the other pro-right gesture which established the self

contradiction of the Awami League was Mujib's visit to Lahore to be a part of the Islamic

Summit in 1974 and his role at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' conference held in Jeddah

to initiate the process towards setting up Islamic Development Bank.55

Failure of Secularism

Mujibism as a political philosophy underwent radical changes just a few years of

its initiation due to a variety of factors and forces hostile to it. One of the most important

challenges of the post liberation government was the re-construction of the war ravaged

52 The Commission circulated a 551 Questionnaires Professors, teachers, principals, V.Co's, student organization, journalists and Islamic teachers. See, the Bangladesh Sikkha Commission Report (Dacca, May 1974), p. 61. Also, see Maniruzzman, "Bangladesh Politics", n. 6, p. 193.

53 B.M. Monoar Kabir, "The Politics of Religion: The Jamaat-Islami in Bangladesh", in Ahmed ed., Religion Nationalism, n. 6, pp. 124-125.

S4 Matiur Rehman, Bangladesh Today: An Indictment and Lament (Wellinghborough, 1978). The author describes Mujib's secularism as positive hostility to the Church.

ss Syed Anwar Husain, "Bangladesh and the Islamic Countries 1972-82" unpublished paper presented at the i7'h Bengal Studies Conference at the institute of World Affairs. Salisbury, USA, July 10, 1982, p. 29.

127

economy. There were fears about Bangladesh's survival owing to the total collapse of

infrastructure in the 9 month war and economic colonization by Pakistan prior to that.56

A UN report estimated the cost of reconstruction in Bangladesh at $938 million. 57 The

priority before the A wami League government was to provide swift relief and

rehabilitation to returning refugees, reconstruction of economic infrastructure and

creating conditions for a socialist economy to flourish. 58

A number of successful operations created semblance of economic stability but

expectations were soaring and there were some glaring failures. 59 Bangladesh under

Mujib witnessed the politics of patronage. Sheikh Mujib was extremely large hearted

when it came to distribution of benefits be it direct financial assistance, professional

placements, various appointments, permits and licences etc, to Awami Leaguers. This

according to Mujib was a minor compensation for their great sacrifices for the

independence of Bangladesh.60 In the words of an observer, "The creation of a parasite,

affluent class, divorced from production and squandering easy money on conspicuous

consumption, only aggravated the economic problems ... With the people's swollen

aspirations and the very unfavourable resource/population ratio, government patronage

satisfied only a few but alienated many.'.61

When basic industries like banking jute, sugar, textiles and insurance was

nationalized all appointments to high posts were Awami League activists, who being

non-professionals led the industries to losses.62 There was large scale smuggling and

black marketing of goods near the Indo-Bangladesh border and these belied hopes of a

mutually beneficial co-operation and economic trade between India and Bangladesh. The

56 At in~ependence Bangladesh was described as an "international basket case". The enormity of economic problems had made Bangladesh totally dependent on external assistance.

57 Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, n. 38, p.75. Also, see Bangladesh Observer, March 26, 1974.

58 Ibid., p. 75.

59 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International, 1980), p. 159.

60 Ibid., p. 161.

61 Q.K. Ahmed, "Aspects of the Management of Nationalised Industries in Bangladesh" Bangladesh Development studies, Vol. 11, no. 3 (July 1974), pp. 678-679.

62 Ibid. p. 671.

128

high rate of smuggling reduced percentage of official trade through right channels and the

high price of the finished product in the Bangladeshi market remained high.63 The

natural disaster of 1974 when people died of starvation dampened the spirit of the people

towards the new government un-official sources estimated the number of famine related

death at 100,000 by the end of October 1974.64 The state of affairs led to a massive

exodus of villagers to towns and cities in search of relief.

The Awami League government, however, ordered for their forceful exit from the

national capital. The Jatiyo Rakhi Bahini was given the orders to keep them outside the

cities limits.65 The Rakhi Bahini, a para-military force consisting of the former Mukti

Bahini members and unemployed youths had no discipline or rigour of the army and they

indulged in mindless looting of the villagers. In the midst of such chaotic state of affairs,

the army bereft of prestige and power nurtured a deep sense of resentment against the

Awami League leadership. The cycle of events which unfolded in 1975 in the form of a

coup eliminated the father of the nation and his entire family (with the exception of his

daughters who were outside the country) without a murmur of public protest.66

Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's ideas and programme prior to 1971 had provided the

basis of Bengali nationalism, but his failure to address the pressing economic issues

undermined its legitimacy and along with it Mujib's secularism lost its popular appeal.67

The departure ofMujib from the national political scene encouraged pro-Islamic forces to

regroup under the cover of various social welfare organizations with the purpose of

helping the poverty sticken masses during the famine. The internally generated coup

leaders installed Khondokar Mostaq Ahmed as the President. But after months of army

63 Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, n. 38, p. 76.

64 Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution, n. 59, p. 162.

65 The Jatiyo Rakhi Babini or the National Security Force was bought into being by Mujib amidst rumours that it is a substitute for the Bangladesh army. For details, see Ziring, Bangladesh from Mujib, n. 7, pp. 103-4.

66 Ibid.,p.l04.

67 Jalal, Democracy, n. 24, pp. 87-89.

129

unrest and political uncertainty, Genral Zia-ur-Rehman declared himself as the Chief

Martial Law Administrator.68

Awami League: A Divided House

Mujib's secularism project could not be implemented with sincerity partly due to

lack of unity among the Awami League leadership. The student wing of Awami League

were divided into two factions one group supported Mujibism while the other split on the

Question of supporting scientific socialism. A new party under the name of National

Socialist party or the Jatiyo Samajtantric Dal was formed. The various key divisions

within Awami League were brought about by a former student League leader, Serajul

Alam who formed the Bangladesh Communist League.69 Following the split in the

Awami League's student wing in 1972, the AL Labour front and AL-affiliated

Association for Freedom Fighters was also divided.7o Most of the splinter groups came

together to protest against economic hegemony and political imperialistic designs of

countries like Russia, India and others on Bangladesh. To keep up the mask of unity the

term Mujibbad was popularized by Awami League. Mujibbad which meant Mujib's

ideals was projected to be the answer to the ill-effects of capitalism and communism.

"This attempt to develop and ideology based on a personality cult however hurt Mujib's

image. By identifying the new political structure too closely with his personality, Mujib

is held responsible for all the deficiencies of the new system. Even the personal failing of

the Awami Leaguers are blamed on Mujib and MUjibbad',.71 The factionalism inside

Awami League posed a serious challenge to Mujib's leadership and at the same time

undermined the credibility of the party which was generally seen as the rightful heir of

the liberation war.

68 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (England: Dawson, 1980), pp. l31-l32.

69 Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, n. 47, pp. 167-68.

70 Ibid., p. 168.

71 Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, D. 38, p. 73.

130

BAKSAL

Mujib was bogged with not only dissidence within Awami League but also by

violent excesses committed by the Rakhi Bahini. The para-military force which enjoyed

the blessings of Mujib and Awami League ~ained notoriety for annihilating those rural

leaders who dared the League's candidates in polls or posed any kind of a political threat

to them. The indiscipline displayed by the para-military organization who had taken

upon themselves the role of eliminating Mujib's detractors was also accused of

murdering Awami Leaguers.72 The Bangladesh anny was called in to deal with the

domestic situation, re-establish law and order, and restore credibility of the nation in the

eyes of its own people. Mujib not only initiated a role for the Bangladesh anny in its

internal affairs, he also altered the political process by declaring a state of emergency on

28 December 1974.73 Faced with internal challenges to his leadership and governance

Mujib dissolved the Awami League party and turned increasingly dictatorial. He altered

the high ideals of liberation movement by taking retrogressive steps lice destroying the

judicial independence, suppressing fundamental rights, thwarting democratic proceedings

and resorted to totalitarian control. In his scheme of absolute authority the ideals of

secularism was also sacrificed.

Mujib amended the Constitution to provide for a Presidential form of government

and the President had the authority to form one national party and debar any of the

political groups who oppose this arrangement. The emergency order ensured a five year

term for Mujibur Rehman as President from the date of the constitutional amendment.14

The new national party imposed on the people was the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik

Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants, workers and peoples League) or BAKSAL. By

imposing BAKSAL Mujib went against the pop~ar aspirations of the people and against

his own ideology of Mujibbad. "BAKSAL was not only a coercive assembly; it was

predicated on the elimination of other organizations. BAKSAL was Mujib's way of

expressing his one-party state. Thus in a more significant way, BAKSAL was meant to

72 Anthony Mascarenhas, Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986), p. 44.

73 Ziring, Bangladeshfrom Mujib, n. 7, p. 101.

74 "The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary December 28, 1974" cited in Maniruzzaman's Bangladesh Revolution, n. 47, p. 178.

131

serve the purpose of the Bangladesh's personal dictatorship, not the cause of national

development and unity - - - Mujib heralded the establishment of BAKSAL with the

phraSe the second Revolution.,,75

Commenting on the objectives of the "Second Revolution" which stood to wipe

corruption, to increase agricultural and industrial production, to control population

pressure and to bring about national unity, scholars like Rounaq Jaban felt that the above

mentioned goals were reformist by nature and failed to explain the need of a revolution to

achieve them. 76 The system initiated by Mujib led to curtailment of civil liberties and

people's fundamental rights. Press censorship was established, some dailies were banned

while some were nationalized.77 Mujibur Rehman rationalized these policies as the need

of the time since the nation faced multiple challenges from anti-systemic forces.78 But

the factional fights within Awami League were no less cause for concern. The result was

contradiction in policy matters and bad governance which led to loss of credibility of the

leaders. Last but not the least the authoritarian tendencies has much to do with erosion of

his popularity.

Naxalite Violence

One of the major forces which were directly responsible for the failure of

Mujibism was the violence unleashed by he extremist factions of left parties. The fear of

ultra left was deeply entrenched in their minds. There were a number of ordinances

directed against the extremist factions by the AL government. They included (a)

establishment of special tribunals to prosecute unsocial elements for disturbing law or

administration in any manner; (b) To arrest without warrant on suspicion of having

committed the above offences; (c) removal of any governmental employee, even the

police from service without right to appeal; (d) exemption of the above law from un

constitutionality; (e) giving the President special power to declare emergency when the

75 Ziring, Bangladeshfrom Mujib. n. 7, p. 105.

76 Jaban, Bangladesh Politics, n. 38, p. 118.

77 June 16, 1975 saw the closure of 20 daily newspapers. While Ittefaq and The Bangladesh Times were nationalised, many others like Holiday was banned.

78 See, The Statesman (Weekly), Calcutta, December 21,1974.

132

security or economy is threatened by war or internal disturbances; (f) to enable the Jatiya

Rakxld Bahini JRB to arrest or search without warrant, with no appeal against these

actions; (g) to authorise the government to ban Unions, associations or parties if their

activities were found prejudicial to national interest; (h) to detain a person to prevent him

from committing the prejudicial act. 79

The mindless acts of looting, sabotage and rising incidence of political violence

was fixed on the ultra leftists like the Sarbohoras headed by Siraj Sikdar. The ideology

of the Sarbohora Party was to initiate a revolution by forming a united front of peasant

workers and of the down trodden linguistic and national minorities. The party was highly

critical of Awami League for its closeness with India which in their perception was an

expanding imperial power.80 Parties having the similar world view were other left forces

likethe Sammobadi Dal and East Bengal Communist Party Marxist-Leninist (EBCPML).

They held the view that socialism has failed to meet the aspirations of the people and the

only hope which remained was a social revolution engineered by the poor of the country.

Role of Collaborators

Mujibur Rehman was exceptionally harsh on the collaborators of Pakistani army

who belonged to the right-wing parties. These collaborators had acted due to their

ideological convictions, recruited by the Jamaat-i-Islam and Pakistani forces to

undermine the liberation war. Though the noose was tightened around their necks just

after independence, they continued their work in secrecy.8l Mujib established special

Tribunals to ensure punishment for the 1971 collaborators of Pakistani army, but the laws

against them were not full proof as a result of which out of 37,471 cases against them,

only 2,848 were decided by October 31, 1973. Out of 2,848 accused only 752 were

punished and the remaining 2096 were proclaimed not guilty.82 This liberalism towards

the collaborators ended with Mujib's general amnesty towards them which exempted the

79 The provisions of the Special Power Act 1974 were taken from the proceedings of the Jatiyo Sangsad as quoted in Maniruzzam, The Bangladesh Revolution, n. 59, p. 176.

80 Ibid., p. 236.

81 See, Ekattorer Ghatak Ke Ko thaye (Dhaka: Center for Spreading the Consciousness of liberation war, 1987), pp. 70-71.

82 Ibid., p. 69.

133

under trials as well those convicted from any kind of punishment. Their release from

prison according to official sources was to enable them to participate in the third

anniversary of Bangladesh's victory celebrations on 16 December 1973.83 While critics

describe the release of collaborators as a calculated measure on the part of Mujib's

government to counter the radical violence unleashed by the left parties allover

Bangladesh.84

Whatever may be the motive of the government their release and soft treatment

towards the collaborators indicated that Mujib and the leaders within Awami League

were not prepared to stretch the entire exercise any more. The national elite failed to

carry forward the ideology of the liberation war and looked for policy reversals. The end

product of their action resulted in the rehabilitation of the collaborators inside

Bangladesh, who later became the torchbearers of Islamic fundamentalism. Thus,

Mujibism which stood for the principles of Nationalism, Socialism, democracy and

secularism underwent radical changes, after a few years of its initiation. Commenting on

the reasons for the failed secular experiment critics give a number of reasons, prominent

among them was the Islamic identity of more than 80010 of its population, the lack of

compatibility between secularism and forces needed to sustain it and some identify with

the overdose of secularism during the initial years of Mujibur Rehman's regime.

Scholars like Talukdar Maniruzzaman argue that the cultural conditions to nurture the

ideology of secularism is absent in Bangladesh. According to him, "secularism in

Bangladesh did not reflect Bangladesh's societal spirit and history and it arose as a

utilitarian expediency in the political field".85

Refuting the culturist argument of Maniruzzaman, Ali Riaz has contended that

culture/spirit is an abstraction which emerges from the material basis of society. He

further adds secularism as practiced in the Indian sub-continent is distinctly different

from the western variant of secularism. Unlike in the West, secularism entails polity

separation, which in other words means distinction between sate and the church, in the

83 Ibid., p. 22.

84 Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution, n. 59, p. 22.

85 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh Politics Secular and Islamic Trends", in Rafiuddin Ahmed. Religion Nationalism, n. 6, p. 69.

134

sub-continental case, it, however, advocates a role for the state in religious affairs. In

some ways the state is neutral in so far as individual faiths are concerned, and in other

ways state plays a positive role in protecting and ensuring equal treatment to all.

According to Ali Riaz secularism in context to Bangladesh and India is not an alien

concept, instead it is home grown, suiting to the imperatives of multiple identities.86

Secularism to be successful in a given society does not require any pre-condition.

Its success or failure depends on the composition and commitment of the ruling elite.

There may be variation in practices depending on the political exigencies, but secularism

nevertheless is not culturally driven. Ali Riaz also considers such explanations as the

reaction to secular experiment, legitimacy crisis, and external aid as too generalised

without any analytical depth. The crisis of legitimacy is for instance not simply political

or constitutional; it has had its roots in the failure on the part of the ruling elite, to build

and sustain its ideological hegemony.87 A stable polity is dependent on the ability of the

leadership to forge an ideology which enjoys a larger societal consensus. In a short span

the post independence elite of Bangladesh had difficulty in establishing the ideological

hegemony of the ruling elite. The crisis had its beginning with Mujib faltering in his

commitment and pursuit to realise his goals, and the state of affairs aggravated with the

ouster of Mujib from the political scene.

Bases of Bangladeshi Nationalism

Soon after Mujib's death there was a perceptible shift in the emphasis from

syncretistic, linguistic nationalism and secular ideology to the search for a new identity

shaped by distinctions such as ''we'' vs ''they''. Reflective of this trend, ancient texts

were researched by historians to highlight the differences between the Indian part of

Bengal and the contemporary Bangladesh notwithstanding the fact that both of them

belong to the same geographic area, share the same written and spoken language, have

the same food habits and living conditions. Curiously, few scholars even came with the

theory that there were two Bengals and Bengal in historical and cultural terms is not

86 Ali Riaz, "God willing": The Politics and Ideology ofIslamism in Bangladesh", Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and Middle East, VoL 23, No.1 & 2, 2003, pp. 302-305.

87 Ibid.

135

monolithic.88 The author of the work on Bangladesh nationalism, M Anusuzzaman, for

instance, begins with the political history of the rulers and the dynasties, which

influenced in different ways the history of the two Bengals. He defmes political culture of

the two sides in three directions: social equality, localisaton and vernacularisation. He

argues that West Bengal in the ancient times was known as Radha, Sushma, Uttar Radha,

and Dakshina Radha, while areas around the present Bangladesh was known as Harikela,

Pundravardhana and Varendra.

Regarding the rulers, he brings in the distinctiveness by insisting that West

Bengal and adjoining area were under Hindu ruling dynasties like king Sasanka and later,

the Guptas, while Vanga/Bangladesh was under the Buddhist rule. He opines that the title

of Maharajadhiraja held by the Vanga kings reveals then fierce independent orientation,

while the history of present West Bengal/Gauda was inconsistent. The author

differentiates between the two Bengals by asserting that the ancient people of Bengal

were non-Aryans but there was marked Brahmancal influence in their culture because the

Aryan rulers invited and patronised Brahmins from northern regions of India. While the

Aryan rulers were anti-Buddhists, the Vanga kings were Buddhists. Bengali language and

literature had the same literacy style but the Buddhists scholars of Vanga developed

Bengali by writing charyapads in local Buddhist-Sanskrit (Magadh-prakrit), which was

ignored by the Hindu rulers of Sen Dynasty.89 The real transformation came during the

Muslim period (12th century A.D.) when the entire region was named as Bangladesh.90

Bangladesh under the Muslim rulers, according to Aniruzzaman, attained greater

social equality because Islam was based on equality, and there were mass conversions of

low-caste Hindus to Islamic faith. Second, there was localisation, which to the author is

proved by the fact that the Muslim rulers assimilated with the native by learning their

language and cultures, by altering their food habits and using locally available materials

for housing. Local people were appointed to key-posts and they faced no discrimination

88 M. Aniruzzaman, "Bangladesh Nationalism" in Emajuddin Ahamed (ed.), Bangladesh Politics (Dhaka, Centre for Social Studies, 1980), pp.92-82.

89 Ibid., p. 83.

90 M.A.Rahim, Social and cultural History of Bengal, Vol. I (1201-1576), (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1963), pp. 1-6.

136

while using facilities like dykes, roads, tanks and wells. All this, according to the author,

stood in sharp contrast to the Aryan ideals.

After the Muslims, came the British rule which developed Calcutta and its

adjoining areas only. The partition plan of Bengal comprised of geographical areas

roughly corresponding to Vanga and Gouda and thus seemed to change the directions of

history as explained above. The author puts forward the argument that the 1947 plan of

Partition of Bengal was accepted because a united Bengal would mean a greater scope for

the Muslim culture and divided Bengal would allow presentation of Aryan hegemony in

East Bengal. "That West Bengal opted to join India is a strong argument supporting

historical Aryanisation.',9l The author does not limit the distinctiveness to the political

arena alone. He suggests that East Bengal being predominantly Muslim majority

province didn't experience any Brahma Samaj type of reform movement, which its west

Bengal counterpart did. Bengali Muslims stood in revolt against Muslim Pakistan when

more than two decades of rule hindered localisation.

This sort of historical analysis has, doubtless, contributed to the reinvention of

Bangladesh as a national entity distinct from Indian Bengal. Similar thesis was

subsequently incorporated into the official ideology under Ziaur Rahman in an attempt to

forging close ties between the territory and Allah. The arguments advanced by the

Bangladeshi scholar like Aniruzzaman may not stand closer scrutiny of historical facts as

some of them are puerile, hackneyed while other narratives are either concocted or

simply manipulation of historical facts. Nevertheless thesis of this nature has many

takers, particularly those involved in the redefinition of national identity based on the

fusion of land and Islam in the post-Mujib Bangladesh. The state-sponsored Bangladeshi

nationalism is thus an attempt to highlight the historical continuity of Bangladesh as a

separate political and cultural entity and to underline the cultural distinctiveness of the

country and its organic linkages with Islam.

91 Aniruzzaman, " Bangladesh Nationalism", p. 88.

137

Zia Period

Major General Ziaur Rahman inserted the Islamic invocation "Bismillah-ir

Rahman-ir Rahim" (In the name of Allah the Beneficent, the Merciful) above the

preamble of the Constitution.92 Zia ur Rahman amended Article 8(1) of the Constitution

and removed secularism from the principles of state policy. The amendment changed the

state's approach to religion. It not only included absolute trust and faith in Almighty

Allah, but also affirmed its faith on nationalism, democracy and socialism "meaning

economic and social justice, together with principles derived from them . . ... shall

constitute the fundamental principles of state policy',.93

A new clause which was clipped to Article 25 stressed that ''the state shall

endeavour to consolidate preserve, and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim

countries based on Islamic solidarity.,,94 The amendment ordered that the citizens of

Bangladesh would be termed as "Bangladeshi" and not as a ''Bengalee'' as described by

the 1972 Constitution. (Article 6) Zia ur Rahman shunned linguistic nationalism and

opted for territorial and religious nationalism. By coining the term Bangladeshi, he tried

to forge a distinct identity of his people as different from their ethnic cousins in the

Indian part of Bengal. After the ruling military elites interpretation of nationalism Awami

League and few left parties who spearheaded the liberation war were branded as

supporters of secular nationalism, while Zia's new party, the Bangladesh Nationalist

Party (BNP) and all the right wing Islamic parties irrespective of their political

differences were known to be supporters of Bangladeshi Nationalism.95 By using political

Islam President Zia got the much needed legitimacy for his rule.

Article 38 of the Constitution was amended to bring back religious based politics.

The prominent Islam based parties who were allowed to come into being were the

Muslim League, the Jamaat-e-Islami, Nizam-e-Islam, Islamic Democratic League,

92 Zia ur Rahman felt that the Constitution needed he amendments since "there is much resentment among the people". For the full text of President Zia's Speech see Th~ Bangladesh Observer, April 23, 1977.

93 "The Proclamation [Amendment] Order. 1977", The Bangladesh Observer. April 23. 1977.

94 Ibid.

95 Sayeed Iftekhar Ahmed, "Resurgence of Islam in Bangladesh Politics", South Asian Journal. January 2002 at http://www.Southasianmedia.netlmagazine/Journalillresurgenceoflslam.htm

138

Islamic Party, Jamaat-e-ulama-e-Islam, Bangladesh Khilafat Andolan National United

Front and Freedom Party etc. These Islamic parties were banned by Mujib due to their

role during the liberation war (Mukti Joddha).96 Their presence however was legally

endorsed by Ziaur Rehman who ratified the political parties Regulations of 1976. The

state patronization of Islamic parties allowed them to expand their agenda in civil society.

All the right wing parties have their student and youth wings too, prominent among them

include the Islamic Chatra Shibir and Jubo Shibir. These student organizations along

with their parent bodies strive for the establishment of an Islamic society. They began to

increase their social base through various socio-cultural and socio-religious organizations

like the Bangladesh Masjid Mission, Masjid Samaj and Bangladesh Islamic centre.97

These socio-cultural religious groups support, propagate and highlight the Islamic

heritage of Bangladesh by undertaking large scale publications of Islamic literature.98

The government of Ziaur Rehman created a party of its own known as the

Bangladesh Nationalist party. In its efforts to be radically different from the Awami

League, the BNP took the services of Anti-Awami League elements like the Muslim

League. The military junta appointed Shah Azizur Rahman of the Muslim League as the

Prime Minister and received the good will and services of Maulana Abdul Mannan, Chief

of Jamiat-i-Mudarresin (Association of madrassa teachers) the pirs of Sarsina, Jaunpur

noted for their rabid hatred for the Awami League and India into their party.99 In later

years, it was this party of Ziaur Rahman which with the active cooperation of Islamic

forces worked towards enhancing the Islamic identity of Bangladesh.

Apart from constitutional amendments to restore the supremacy of Islam, Ziaur

Rahman undertook some cosmetic measures to increase the visibility of Islam in national

life. They include hanging of Islamic posters and writings from the Holy Koran in public

96 See M. Kabir, Experiences of an Exile at Home: Life in Occupied Bangladesh, (Dhaka: The Author . Press, 1972), pp. 103-120.

97 K.M. Mohsin, "'Trends ofIslam in Bangladesh in S.R. Chakravarthy and Virendra Narayan. Bangladesh: History and Culture, Vol. 1 (Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1988), p. 109.

98 The low cost of books on various aspects of Islam make them popular among the masses. Some of the popular journals include the islamic Foundation Patrika and periodicals like Sabuj Pata, Sampan, Saptadinga, Mayur Pankhi etc.

99 Taj ul Islam Hashmi, Islam is Bangladesh Politics in Hussain Mutalib and Taj ul Islam Hashmi (ed.), Islam, Muslim & Muslim State Case Study of 13 Countries, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1994), p. 112.

139

places, flying of Eid-Mubarak cutouts along with the national flags on Eid, issue of

messages on religious festivals like Fd-i-Miladunnbi, Shab-i Barat, Muharram. Azan

(call to prayer) and principles of shariat was telecast through the mass-media. President

Ziaur Rahman laid the foundation of the Islamic University in Kustia, and a full-fledged

ministry under the Division of Religious Affairs. The Islamic Academy was pumped with

funds for research facilities and upgraded into a foundation. 1oo

Ziaur Rahman was conscious of his country's self esteem and the under current of

resentment against Mujib's overtly pro-India-Soviet Union foreign policy stance. 101

Islam was a powerful rallying cry for all those who criticized Mujib for his over­

dependence on India. While addressing the officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Zia said, ''the most significant development in the field of foreign policy of Bangladesh

was that Bangladesh was now in a position to make her own decisions and formulate her

own independent policy to serve her national interests."I02 This policy won him much

acclaim among the intelligentsia, high and middle ranking civil and military officers,

journalists teachers and others. I03 Ziaur Rahman expanded Bangladesh's relations with

brother Muslim countries. After 1975 there were a number of economic and good will

delegations from Bangladesh to Islamic countries and in 1977 President Zia paid an

official visit to Saudi Arabia Apart from aid close relations with the Islamic benefactors

gave rise to increased use of Islamic symbols in national life. In other words, there has

been quantum growth in "institutional Islam" followed by the inflow of petro-<iollars. 104

Important legitimising tool for Zia was to use Islam both in domestic and foreign

policy domain, so as to project his new regime as opposed to the preceding one. In other

words Zia's rule was founded on the negation of what Mujib stood for. In the foreign

100 Emajuddin Ahmed and Dil Roushan Jinnat Ara Nazneen, Islam in Bangladesh, p. 2.

101 M. Rashiduzzaman, "Changing Political patterns in Bangladesh: Internal Constraints and External fears", Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No.9, September 1977, p. 793.

102 Reported in Bangladesh Times July 30, 1977 as quoted in Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution, n. 59, p.208.

103 MM. Khan and Habib Mohammad Zafarullatt, "The 1978 President Elections: A Review in S.R. Chakravarthy ed., Bangladesh: Domestic Politics, Vol. 2 (Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1986), p. 106.

104 Syed Anwar Husain, "Religion, Nationalism and Politics in Bangladesh", in R. Ahmed ed., Religion Nationalism, n. 6, p.145.

140

policy sphere for instance Zia made concerted efforts at courting support of Muslim

countries not simply for material benefits, but also for distancing Bangladesh from the

India centric policy of his predecessors. Interestingly the new foreign policy of Zia served

the twin purposes of asserting its autonomy and at the same time building bridges with

the US and its allies in West Asia. This in a way marked the U-tum in Bangladesh's

foreign policy from a pro India - Soviet to increasingly pro-West in a block divided cold

War era. The consequences of this policy change were reflected deeply in strengthening

the Islamist elements inside the country, especially by creating the material base for the

Islamist resurgence. The pro-Western leaning drew Bangladesh closer to the Islamic

World, particularly the US allies in the Gulf, which, in tum, facilitated the steady flow of

funds from the oil rich Gulf countries, contributing to the Islamist consolidation. The

petro-dollars, which various Islamist organizations received to preach an orthodox

narrow version of Islam, were invested in various farms and business establishment, thus

sustaining the Islamist organisations to carry forward their mission. lOS

The role of Ziaur Rahman in the Islamic revival of Bangladesh would be

incomplete without a mention of the retum of the Amir of Jamaat-i-Islami, Golam Azam.

The chief of Jamaat gained notoriety for collaborating with the Pakistani army to

massacre Bengali intellectuals during the war of liberation. The Pakistani army and para­

military units known as the al-Badr and ai-Shams were aided in their gruesome task of

killing Bengalis with the help of adherents of right wing parties like the Muslim League

and Jamaat-i-Islami in 1971.106 Golam Azam fled to Pakistan during the liberation

movement and returned with a Pakistani passport. His return in 1978 during Ziaur

Rahman's tenure, his safe stay in Dhaka in spite of serious allegations against him and his

continued stay even after the expiry of his visa- all indicated Ziaur Rahman's desire to

rehabilitate him politically. 107

105 For details see, "Rise of Fanatic Extremism in Bangladesh", Awami League News Letter, vol. 4, no. 12, December 31, 2005,p.l0.

106 The Pakistani army and their right wing E. Bengal collaborators carried out their operations in three phases (a) Operation search light, (b) operation search and destroy and (c) operation scorched earth. They also took to raping Bengali women. In the genocide operations the intellectuals were taken to Rayerbazar, a marshy wet land in Dacca and gunned down blindfolded. See Bangladesh Genocide Archive http://muktadharar.netlplllhtml

107 H. Karlekar, Bangladesh the Next Afghanistan? (New Delhi: Sags publications, 2005), p. 52.

141

The controversy regarding Golam Azam's homecoming was triggered off by

Jahanara Imam, who authored the popular book, Ekattorer Dinguli. A public trial of

Golam Azam in the people's court on the national day of Bangladesh in 1992 took place

where 2000,000 people witnessed the trial. lOS In brief, the entire Golam Azam episode

reveals how political moves were closely linked to Islam which served as a legitimiser for

Zia, for consolidating his regime. In all the post-Mujibur Rahman period saw active

Islamic symbolism to assuage the feelings of fellow Bangladeshi who suffered from the

psychology of neglected faith. 109 Zia's death in 1981 in a violent coup brought another

military general to power. What appeared to be a pattern in Bangladesh at that period of

time was to capture power through unconstitutional means and then form a party, use

government machinery to create support base and finally utilize Islam to gain legitimacy.

General Ershad who succeeded Ziaur Rahman could not be any different from his

predecessor.

Hussain Muhammad Ershad Regime

The right wing forces unleashed during Zia's regime further consolidated under

General Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1983-1990) who like his predecessor persisted with

the policies of institutionalising Islam. General Ershad was convinced of the role of Islam

in the national life of his people and expressed his views before even before assuming the

office of the President. He said, "Islam being the religion of the majority of the

population will be given the highest place in the country's future constitution and Islamic

provisions will be included wherever necessary.110 Both the regimes of Zia and Ershad

respectively created space for the Islamists to be a part of mainstream politics, and raised

Islam to be the highest ideology and agenda of the state. l ]]

108 For details, see, "Nirmul On the March", Dhaka Courier (April 3-16), pp. 14-16 and (May 7, 1993), Vol. 9, No. 40.

109 M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Liberals and Religious Right in Bangladesh", Asian Survey, vol. XXXIV, no. II, (November 1994), p. 984.

110 See Bangladesh Observer, January 15, 1983.

III Ali Riaz,lslamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 103.

142

Ershad often used emotive Issues like Israeli attacks on Muslim Shrines in

Jerusalem and called upon complete refrain from all public activity on some days as a

mark of solidarity for fellow Palestinians. Similarly, the Farakka water crisis with India

was given an Islamic colour by him. He played the Indian card to build up an united front

among Bangladeshis. He once stated, "It is being said today that if we do not get water

from Farakka the northern and southern regions of Bangladesh will turn into a desert, but

I want to remind every body concerned that Islam was born in a desert, but Islam didn't

die. Islam could not be destroyed".i12

In one of the study it was indicated that majority of Bangladeshis would like to

see non-cleric, western English educated, anti Indian and Islam loving politicians to take

over as administrators of their country.ll3 Ershad perhapd tried to fit into this description.

He declared Friday as weekly holiday and introduced the Zakat fund (charity collections)

for the needy. Ershad wanted to give an Islamic colour to the Shahid Minar or the

Martyrs Monement. He objected to the paintings on the premises of the historic

monument un-Islamic and declared that it should be substituted by recitations from the

Koran.114 He tried to keep with popular traditions like frequenting mosques, shrines and

places of Islamic faith, and flaunted his close relationship with some influential pirs like

the Pir of Atrashi, Charmoni and Sarsina.115 Ershad stressed on a mosque-based society

and ensured liberal grants for their upkeeping. He encouraged mosques to receive foreign

assistance for their development. ll6plush with funds from Saudi and Gulf-based

organizations, the Islamists were able to spread their network and increase their politico­

religious clout in the days ahead.

General Ershad's most significant step towards Islamising Bangladesh was the 8th

amendment of the cons.titution which established Islam as the state religion of

112 Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends" in Charavarthy (ed.), Bangladesh History, n. 47, p. 71.

JJ3 Razia Akter Banu, Islam in Bangladesh (Leiden E.1. Brill, 1992), p.

114 Karlenkar, Bangladesh, n. 107, p. 53.

115 See, Syed Abdul Maksud ed., Gono Andolon 1982-90 (Bengali) (Dacca: 1991) as quoted in Hashmi, "Islam in Bangladesh" in Mutalib and Hashmi, Islam, n. 99, p. 114. When People at the helm of affairs take the blessings of Pirs, it reveals the kind of influence they could yield in society. 116 -Karlekar, Bangladesh, n. 107, p. 5~.

143

Bangladesh. The constitutional injunction read, "The religion of the Republic is Islam but

other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in the republic."ll7 His State

Religion Act found support among majority of Bengali Muslims as far no one has talked

of bringing about alterations in it. Not satisfied with this measure or as if not to give H.M.

Ershad the glory of being an Islamic benefactor in Bangladesh the Chief of Muslim

League Kazi Abdul Qader demanded Bangladesh to be declared an Islamic Republic.

According to him Islam as the state religion falls short of fulfJlling the movement of the

people of Bangladesh towards establishing principles of Shariat and Quran as the guiding

principles of the state.1I8

There were protests from certain civil society organisations like Naripalchyo and

Oikyo badhyo Nari Samaj who reminded the nation of the spirit of liberation movement

and questioned the construction of a new identity, but their number was miniscule in

comparison to the might of military junta. 119 Soon the military regime faced a rigorous

political Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and in the 1990 elections

the Bangladesh Nationalist party formed the government with Jamaat-i-Islami as its

supporting coalition partner. The presence of Jamaat in the MRD gave it some legitimacy

in the eyes of the people and from those days there has been no looking back for it.

Bangladesh Jamaat e-Islami

The Jamaat-e-Islami was a conservative organization of Indian Muslims since

1940's its founder Maulana Maududi was strongly opposed to partition of India on

theological grounds, but later accepted Pakistan and worked for the establishment of an

Islamic state based on Sharia laws.120 Jamaat began its innings in independent

Bangladesh (1971) as suspects and collaborators of the occupying forces. The reason of

117 The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Deputy Controller, Government Printing Press, 1990).

118 See Sangram (Bengali daily), June 14, 1988. It is also reported that Muslim theologians like Maulana Mohammadullah (Hafizjee Huzur) who had good contacts with Iran, issued a fatwa condemning Ershad's government as illegitimate and un-Islamic.

119 The feminist organisation distributed leaflets which read that religion is a personal issue and the state has no business to Meddle with it. See Mutalib and Hashmi, Islam, Muslims, n.99, p. 118.

120 For Maududi's views, see Abdul Ala Maududi, Islamic Law and Constitution (Karachi: lamaat-i-Islami Publication, 1965)

144

their being suspects revolves around their dubious role during the massive national

movement. 121 The party remained underground for a few years only to emerge as a

political force under the watchful eyes of the junta rulers. Secondly its participation in

the movement for the restoration of democracy (1990) against the junta rule of Ershad

gave it the much needed political legitimacy. Its staying power in Bangladesh politics is

subject to great research and holds the key in deciding the trajectory of the nation's

political destiny.

Apart from its role in bringing about "awakening among Muslims" according to

the demands of their faith, Jamaat desires that ''the sovereignty of Allah must be

established in all fields of human existence. Mosques and Parliament taqwa and addl.

dikr and shariah are inalienable dimensions of the same reality.,,122 The objectives of

Jamaat-e-Islam is the establishment of the Islamic system in all spheres of life, the first

step dikr therefore is to preach Islam as a revolutionary ideology and then organize and

train those who accept the ideology through complete submission, and then the trained

Muslims commit themselves to the task of capturing state power in order to replace the

un-Islamic regime with an Islamic leadership.123 The whole idea of an Islamic polity is to

implement Islamic social, economic, political ethical, moral and penal laws, and if

necessary enact new legislations only in the spirit of Holy Koran, Sunnah and Prophet's

traditions.124 Seen from this perspective an Islamic community is only empowered to

propel an Islamic state and therefore, Jamaat has its doors open only for Muslims who are

committed to the above cause. The Jamaat in Bangladesh is an Islamic nationalist party

and its ultra conservative cadres work to counter Bengali nationalism and socialism. The

Bangladeshi Islamists have an unfavourable attitude towards the syncretic traditions and

liberalism of Bengali culture. In a profound shift from the relatively plural Bengali

121 The Jamaat-i-Islami now accepts he independence of Bangladesh, and does not want any kind of a reunion with Pakistan.

122 See Jammat website, www.jamaat-e-Islami.org

123 The guidelines and strategy to bring about an Islamic Revolution is mentioned in Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi, The Process of Islamic Revolution (Bengali translation from Urdu) (Dacca: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1962) mentioned in U.A.B. Razia Akter Banu, "Jamaat-i-Islami in Bangladesh: Challenges and Prospects", in Mutalib and Hashmi (ed.), Islam Muslims, n. 99, p. 84.

124 See, Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Press, 1961), pp.70-109.

145

religious and cultural practices the Islamists in Bangladesh consciously incorporate the

exclusive principles of their faith in its undiluted form. 125

The role of Jamaat during the liberation days was highly unimpressive. Cadres

from Jamaat and other right wing parties had formed action groups namely the Razakars,

Al Badr, and Al sham to massively sabotage the liberation movement both in rural and

urban areas. Targets of their attacks were not only the Mukti Bahini guerillas but also all

liberal thinking intellectuals so that the new state remains deprived of their services in

nation building.126 The most dreaded of Jamaat leaders was Abdul Kader Molla who was

famously called the butcher of Mirpur (a place on the outskirts of Dacca). Though

considered a war criminal, he was never persecuted and occupied the post of public­

relation secretary of Jamaat in Bangladesh.127 Thus, Jamaat has survived the hostile

environment of post liberation days owing to the general clemency granted by Mujibur

Rahman and later allowed to flourish openly by general Zia. In fact the Jamaat and other

allied parties never had it so good under the martial law. Here were generals in politics,

who not only indulged in Islamisation and Islamic rhetoric, but also put them at the

political centre-stage. The phase of benevolence towards Islamists was manifested when

General Ziaur Rahman allowed Golam Azam to enter Bangladesh with a Pakistani

passport. The Chief of Jamaat was declared as the enemy of the' nation and his citizenship

was cancelled in 1973. The restoration of his political status rose the question as to how

would a foreign national be allowed to preside over the fate of a Bangladesh based

party?128

To counter the Islamic ideologues and their patrons the Nirmul Committee or the

National Coordination Committee for the implementation of the spirit of the Liberation

War and elimination of the killers and· collaborators of 1971 was formed. The committee

125 Sayeed Iftekhar Ahmed, "Resurgence ofIslam", n. 95 , p. 4.

126 Eyewitness accounts of the relatives of People who were picked up by Razakars and Al Badr forces describe them as Bengalis. The only survivor of the Rayerbazar killings describes the captors and murderers of Bengali intellectuals as fellow Bengalis. See Dilwar Hossain, Ekottorer Ghatok-dalalera ke kothay (Dhaka: MJCBK, 1989), P. 37.

127 Abdul Kadar MolIa was accused of killing hundreds of people in 1971.

128 For a detailed account of the role of Jamaat and Golam Azam, see Shahriar Kabir, Bangladesh Amraa Ebong Ora (Dhaka: Ananya, 2005), pp. 11-16.

146

was non-political and held Gano Adalats (people's court) to try Azam for sedition. Many

prominent citizens of civil society heard the case for days and on March 26, 1992 the

people's court held a public trial and held him guilty.129 The government ignored the

people's verdict, and charged him with a technical case of non-possession of a passport.

A three member bench of the Bangladesh High Court rejected the executive order of

1973 and passed a judgment declaring him a citizen of Bangladesh. Golam Azam's legal

rehabilitation points to the greater political strategy of Begum Zia, who used him to dent

the political constituencies of the Awami League. As the government had repealed the

collaborators Acts to save the anti-liberation agents and appointed them to high ranking

government posts, the liberation forces seemed to have lost half the battle.130 In addition,

the internal feud among the pro-liberation parties had always made their struggle against

Jamaat a weak one.

Jamaat's Operational Methods

The Jamaat-e-Islami seeks to make mosques the centre of all Islamic activities.

To give impetus to preaching Islam as a revolutionary ideology Jamaat places emphasis

on the establishment of educational institutions, spread of adult education and set up

reading centres for the common man. l3l The ideological engineering project requires

control over schools colleges, madrassas and the student wing of the party. Jamaat-e­

Islami has as very strong student organization known as Islamic Chatra Shibir. Apart

from Shibir, bulk of its members comes from madrassas. The Jamaat has kindergarten

schools in every district and has separate English medium schools like the Manarat

School and University.132 It also has coaching centres to help deserving poor students to

get into various professional courses.133

129 See, Dhaka Courier (Dhaka), Vol. 9, May 7,1993.

130 BNP or the Bangladesh National Party has the support of Jamaat and Islami Oikya Jote (lOJ) in the Jatiyo Sangsad. They have been given ministries and other responsible posts.

131 The programme of the party is written under the sub section heading "Social Reform", at www.jamaat­e-islami.org

132 Smruti S. Pattanaik, "Ascendancy of the Religious Right in Bangladesh politics: A study of Jamaat-e­Islami", Strategic Analysis, Vol. 33, no. 2, March 2009, p. 277.

133 Ibid., p. 277.

147

The Islamic Chatra Shibir like its parent body Jamaat has a wide network and has

many serious academics from Bangladesh's schools and universities as its cadres.134

These foot soldiers of Islam later percolate into all spheres of life and all sectors of the

state including education and army services. Jamaat's student front Shibir were all out to

undermine the position of the united opposition parties among students in various

university campuses. 135 It has its alternative media in the form of a newspaper called

Sangram and exercise great influence on the Islamic Research Institute. Shibir

encourages the students to take up Islamic studies and prepares hem to fight the

ideological battle for an Islamic state.136 Shibir members have strong student fronts in the

universities of Rajshahi, Chittagong, Shahjalal University of Science and Technology,

Khustia Islamic University and Jahangir Nagar, The ICS has close ties with similar

Muslim groups in Pakistan, Middle East, Malaysia and Indonesia. It is suspected to have

ties with Islamists groups within India and Pakistani intelligence services.137 It has links

with terror outfits like the Arakan Rohingya National organization on extremists Islamist

group of Burmese Muslims and AI Qaeda outfits in Bangladesh. Inside Bangladesh it has

secret and deep association with home bred Islamist organization like the Harkat ul-Jihad

Bangladesh (HUJIB) Jagrata Muslim Janata (1MB) and other Islamists groupS.138

A look at its Karmashuchi (programme), however, reveals that the ICS is an

organisation which seeks to spread Islam among the student community, to train and

organise them for an Islamic order, to produce men with great morality and ethics, to

create and sustain Islamic education and to free humanity from all kinds of exploitation

by an Islamic-revolution.139 Even though the ICS appears to be a benevolent and a

cultural organization committed to raise Islamic consciousness among the students, its

other activities and external networks makes it a militant outfit, comparable even to the

134 V.A.B. Razia Akter Banu, "lamaat-i-Islami''. n.99, p. 85.

135 The Islamic Chatra Shibir has impressive victories in the student elections in the various universities. It has a indoctrination plan and puts special emphasis on character building, disciplined action to generate Islamic consciousness.

136 South Asia Terrorism portal, Shibir section, available at http://www.satp.org

137 Ibid.

138 Ibid.

139 See their website, www.jamaat-e-islami.org and www.shibir.com

148

Taliban.140 In his comprehensive study on Islamists in Bangladesh, Karlekar has

forcefully argued that Jamaat and its associate outfits are comparable to Taliban not only

on matters concerning theocracy and following the basic tenants of Islam, but also in

matters related to women, recreation, entertainment and socio-cultural practices. He

admits that the implementation of the retrogressive measures have not yet taken place in

Bangladesh, but if conditions remain favourable to empower, it politically the possibility

of a 'joyless' Bangladesh is not far. 141

Financial Support

Major portion of financial support came from donations from external sources and

through the Islamic NGO's controlled by them. The main patrons are Saudi Arabia and

Gulf States. The Saudi based Muslim world League (Rabita al Alam al-Islami) and the

AI-Haramayne Foundation (AHF) are major donors. The AI-Haramaine Foundation

which was banned in September 2002 after UN marked it as a terror network is said to

have brought TK 20 crore through the NGO Affairs Bureau from 1997 to 2001. AI-

Haramaine has TK 19 crore more to be utilized on Islamic education in 38 distracts of

Bangladesh.142 Jamaat also received funds from Islami Bank and AI-Arafa Bank for its

madrassas.143 Intelligence sources say that other militant groups received funds from

UAB based welfare organisation Al Fuzaira, and Khairul Ansar Al Khairia, Kuwait based

Doulatul Kuwait, and Revival of Islamic Heritage Society Bahrain based Doulatul

Bahrain, and Benevolence International Organisation registered with the NGO bureau

raises funds for Bin Laden. It is reported that ''no organization in Bangladesh received

any assistance from any of these without recommendation from Jamaat-Shibir."l44

The external funding which flows into Bangladesh is justified in the name of

social welfare activities like building madrassas, mosques and orphanages, but behind

140 Karlekar. Bangladesh. n. 107. pp. 138-140.

141 Ibid.

142 Zayadul Ahsan. "Inside the militant Groups: Foreign funding. Local Business keep them going'. The Daily Star online edition at htlp://www.thedailystar.netl22 August 2005.

143 Sources from Abu Sayeed, Aghashito Judher Blue Print (Blue print of an Undeclared war) 2nd ed. (Dhaka: Agami Publication. 2005). p. 253 as mentioned in Karlekar. Bangladesh. n. 107. p. 156.

144 Karlekar. Bangladesh. n:107. p. 109.

149

the mask of humanitarian efforts the agenda of the Islamists are deeply parochial. The

funds are utilised to produce a band of fanatical youths to carry forward the ideals of a

militant Islamic revolution.145 With a 35 percent unemployment rate in Bangladesh it is

relatively easy for Islamists empowered with good fmancial resources to attract young

blood to their fold. 146 The succeeding Chapter on Bangladesh deals exhaustively as to

how Jamaat has invested its profits wisely over income generating projects and

institutions like fisheries, clinics, schools, industries plazas, real estate, shopping

complexes, transport, hospitality etc. and has become a self sufficient organization.

Foreign money combined with a strong economic base of heir own helps them to fund

political organization, spend on expanding existing institutions and creating new

institutions.147 Professor Abul Barkat estimated the annual net profit from Jamaat's

organizations to be $200 million which is equivalent to 6 percent of the government's

annual development budget. 148

Social base of Jamaat

Jamaat-e-Islami began its work in East Bengal with the help of a few full time

members sent by Maududi in the early fifties and expanded its membership to 425 full

time members and 40,000 associate Members by 1968_69.149 By 1987 their number rose

to 2000 full members and 200,000 associate members.150 ***In a detailed study of the

Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, Razia Akter Banu suggests the demographic characteristics

of the party elite, its central leaders and even its women wing members. She collected

Samples in the year 1981 and later in 1987 and made an interesting survey about the

party. She found that while in 1981 as high as 71 percent of the party elite of the Jamaat

constituted of leaders who were in their 40s and in 1987, 68 percent of their leaders

145 Ahsan, "Inside the Militant groups", n. 142.

146 "Rise of Fanatical Extremism", Awami League News Letter, p. 13.

147 Abul Barkat, Economics of Fundamentalism in Bangladesh, Conference on Religious and social fragmentation and Economic Development in South Asia, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 15-16 October, 2005), p. 15-16.

148 Abul Barkat, "Political Economy of Fundamentalism in Bangladesh", Social Science Review (Dhaka University), Vol. 23, No.2, 2006, p. 1.

149 Akter Banu, "lamaat-e-Islami", in Mutalib and Hashmi, Islam, Muslims, n. 99, p. 86.

150 Ibid., p. 86.

150

belonged to this group. In 1981 67 percent of its top leaders had college or university

education and in 1987 71 percent of its top ranking leaders had access to college or

university education. The scholar found out that 90 per cent of its members and associate

members came from a common social background - the lower middle class. Jamaat has a

vibrant Islami Chattri Sangstha (Islamic girl student organization) and the women wing

of the party is fairly educated. According to the 1987 survey 79 percent of the women

party elite were matriculates. Thus, Jamaat commanded support and allegiance from

younger, recently educated lower middle class members of Bangladeshi society who

shared Jamaat's dream and efforts for an overwhelming revival ofIslamic ideology.

In the general elections of 1991, the Jamaat won 18 seats in the 300-seated

Parliament. Formation of a government by a party requires 151 seats in the Parliament.

Since none of the mainstream parties secured a majority in the 91 elections, Jamaat

turned to be a king maker by extending its support to BNP to form the government. The

political recognition of Jamaat as a legitimate force gave it an opportunity to expand its

support base and helped other militant organisations to flourish inside Bangladesh. The

2001 general elections also had a role cut out for the Jamaat and the Islamic Okiye Jote

(101). The BNP which already had a majority of 193 seats awarded two ministries to the

Jamaat to be a part of the government.151 Needless to mentio~ it was during the BNP-Ied

alliance government that Bangladesh witnessed a prolific expansion of militant

fundamentalist Islamic organisations and their activities shaking off the secular fabric of

the country and raising the spectre of Talibanisation of the polity. For, Jamaat's presence

in the government emboldened the Islamists groups and freed them from official

harassments. 152

Meanwhile, the Jamaat-e-Islami, earlier opposed to the creation of Bangladesh

fracturing the Muslim fraternity had become a systemic political force by joining the anti­

Ershad agitation along side the Awami League and BNP and participating in the national

elections. Critics attribute the Jamaat's conciliatory approach to its receding political

salience in an increasingly polarised Bangladeshi polity. Thus, its deliberate silence on

151 The 2006 general eJections also saw a repeative political dominance of the BNP and Jamaat alliance. See Election Commission Website. www.bd.ec.org/stat/parliament

152 See Ali Riaz. Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh; A Complex web (New York: Routledge. 2008). Chap. I.

151

charges of corruption and graft against BNP and electoral alliance with the BNP were

part of lammat's long-term strategy of becoming a politically potent force at the national

level while making inroads in rural Bangladesh to expand their sphere of influence. "In

doing so, they began to utilise local traditional institutions to further their particular

interpretation of Islamic practices. The sudden increase of salish (village arbitration) and

latwa (religious edicts) at the beginning of 1991 through out the decade bears testimony

to the fact.,,153 It was the latwa issued by a group called Shahaba Sainik Parishad from

shyllet against author Tasleema Nasreen in 1993 that drew international attention to the

controversial phenomenon of latwas in Bangladesh. The year 1993-94 saw hundreds of

latwas issued against the activities of the NGO's, especially the Bangladesh Rural

Advancement Committee (BRAC) - a leading agency supported by international and

private donors. Likewise, the Grameen Bank became the primary targets for its campaign

for women emancipation and empowerment. Smaller NGO's like Friends in Village

Development of Bangladesh (FIVDB), Proshika and Nigera Kori also came under

attacks. There are reports of schools run by the NGOs being set on fire, teachers being

attacked and teaching aids destroyed. The rise in the incidence of such attacks against

NGO activity has been highlighted by the Amnesty International. In 2002, it reported

that parents of nearly 700,000 children attending schools run by BRAC were asked to

withdraw their wards or face latwas. I54

The latwas have become a potent source of mobilising popular support for the

islamists in Bangladesh. Predictably, the lamaat in Bangladesh have organized political

protest whenever the judicial system tried to put a brake on it. I55 "The lamaat-i-Islam,

the largest orthodox Islamic party in Bangladesh was blamed for instigating conservative

IS3 Riaz Ali, "Traditional Institutions as Tools of political Islam in Bangladesh", Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 40, No.3, 2005, p. 176.

IS4 "Fundamental Rights of Women violated with virtual impunity", The Amnesty International on Bangladesh (London: 1997) at http://www.amnesty.orgiailib/aipub/1994/Asal130994.ASA.txt Also, see "violence against women", iin 0 Salish Kendro (ASK). 2002 at www.ret.for/alindexlasklwv/ole.htm

ISS Jamaat leader, Delwar Hussaini Sayedee, an MP and ally of BNP is quoted in Daily Janakartha as warning that "the courts won't be allowed to control fatwas. instead fatwas would control courts", Daily Janakartha, January 4, 2001.

152

forces against certain NGO'S".156 The Islamist tirade is not confmed to the NGOs or the

judiciary alone; they have successfully campaigned in January 2001 for imposing a ban

on films made on liberation war themes, or even those in which Islamic themes are

reviewed critically. The director of the movie "Ekatturer jishu" whose film faced stiff

resistance to being screened is quoted as saying, "I have had the honour of participating

in the liberation war - - - I can in no way demean the great war of liberation in the

film".157 Other movies which failed to get the official sanction include Nadir, Madhumati

and Dhusara Jatra. Recently Matir Moina was banned by BNP under Jamaat's pressure

for its critical portrayal of Islamic education in the madrassas.158

The Tablighi Jamaat in Bangladesh

If Jamaat-e-Islami of Bangladesh is the strong face of political Islam, Tablighi

Jamaat (TJ) is an apolitical organisation, which represents Islam from below.

Nevertheless, the TJ influences the social support base of the political Islamists. The

Tablighi movement is one of the most widespread Islamic movements in the world and in

Bangladesh it has made the most rapid expansion. While the Jamaat-e-Islam and other

Islamist groups required political patronage from unstable illegitimate rulers to establish

themselves, Tablighi Jamaatis did not evoke any hostility for its role in 1971, by isolating

themselves from the political involvement in the course of the liberation struggle. "Even

at the peak of fighting, Jamaats carried on with their preaching tours and in their speeches

made no reference to the dramatic happenings around them except to exhort Muslims to

follow the path of Allah in this time of crisis - - - This seems to have made a lasting

impression on the minds of many Bangladeshis, an impression that lasts till this very

day". 159

The Tablighis make a distinction between din (religion) and duniya (worldly

activity) and are basically Islamic preachers involved in the ethical and moral aspect of

156 M. Rashiduzzaman, "The LiberaIsand Religious Right in Bangladesh", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. II, November 1994, p. 975.

157 Mahdud AI Faisal, "Censor Board Crucifies Ek a-tturer Jishu", Dhaka Courier, Vol. 9, No. 40, (May 7, 1993).

158 See, Jai Jai Din (Dhaka), January 15,2002.

159 Yoginder S. Sikand, "The Tablighi Jamaat in Bangladesh", South Asia, VoL XXII, No.1 (1999), p. 114.

153

their faith. The reason for the growth of TJ is said to be the solace and peace it offered

amidst the ravages of a war and extremely challenging conditions after the war in

1971.160 The· importance of Islam in public life which increased after 1975 coincided

with the increased popularity of TJ in Bangladesh and thus the two factors must have

influenced each other.161

Tablighis have a rich oral tradition and stories of miracles saints, the pleasures of

Zannat (heaven), and tales of hell, easily transmits knowledge about their religion among

ruraI folks with little or no educational exposure. Other activities of the Tablighi Jamaat

include holdings of the alami iftema (annual gathering) every year before Ramadan on

the banks of river Tir at Tongi. The Tongi gathering is considered to be the largest

gathering of Muslims after the haj pilgrimage at Mecca.162 Such congregations and

religious functions organised by the Tablighi Jamaat and numerous other Islamic

revivalist groups in East Bengal have impacted Bengali Muslim customs, rituals and

institutions, sharpening religious consciousness at popular level.163 No Bangladeshi

governments, whether BNP or the Awami League, would afford to ignore the political

importance of the gathering at Tongi. Accordingly, authorities make elaborate

arrangements for health camps, transport, sanitation, drinking water and better roads and

bridges to make the ijetma a success. 1M The Tablighi Jamaat with its reformist agenda

aimed at purifying Islamist practices came into being in response to the aggressive

reformist agenda of the Arya Samaj of Hindus.165 With no threat from any quarters

today, the Tablighis who work for effective implementation of Islamic practices has

increased religiosity among the Muslim masses in Bangladesh. It is worth mentioning

160 Ibid.

161 B.K. Jahangir, Violence and consent is a peasant society and other Essays (Dhaka, 1990), p. 58 quoted in Sikand, "The Tablighi", n. 159, p. 116.

162 It is reported that the Tongi ijtema gathered 2.5 milJion Muslims from 70 different countries in the year 1994. Every year the numbers register an increase.

163 For details, see Peter J. Bertocci, "Islam and Social Construction of Bangladesh Countryside" in R. Ahmed (ed.), Understanding Bengal Muslim, n. 6p. 71-85.

164 The Bangladesh Observer, Dhaka, January 15 and January 18, 1994.

165 Md. Rashiduzzaman, "Islam Muslim Identity and Nationalism in Bangladesh", Journal of South Asia and M.E. Studies, Vol. 18, No.1, 1994, pp. 36-60.

154

that in view of the political nature of the religion, the thin line separating religiosity and

extremism in Islam often gets blurred.

Popular Islam

The growth of popular Islam in Bangladesh is evident from the number of Waz

Mahjils (religious gatherings) and religious debates called bahas in the country. Waz

Mahjils are a regular feature in small towns and villages through out Bangladesh. These

religious gatherings invite baktas or Islamic orators who help in the spread of Islamic

values. One such popular bakta who came to limelight in the 1980s was Maulana Delwar

Hossain Saydee, a member of the lamaat-e-Islami's central committee and Member of

Parliament. His retrogressive public speeches and video tapes with titles like "Purdah.

and Women's right in Islam", "Rights of Husbands and wives", "Women and Non­

Muslims in Islam" are available both within and outside Bangladesh.166

The Muslim orators are often "invited one-or two nights long waz mahjils in the

dry season during November to February. They cast a magical spell on their audiences,

mostly arousing a fear of hell, in conformity with the popular culture which glorifies

death and the hereafter. The Baktas invariably portray women as the main source of evil

and corruption and justify beating of wives in accordance with the Sharia law.,,167 The

contribution of these religious meetings to the spread of Islamic values in society is duly

acknowledged by politicians.168 The reason behind waz mahjils is to bring back deviant

Muslims to the core ideology of Islam and awaken the spiritual consciousness of the

Muslim masses. The subject matter of the speeches, in the gathering is not the existing

economic, social or political problems but the glory and supremacy of Islam and the

prophet.169

The religious debates or bahas which began way back in 1860's are still popular

practices in Bangladesh. Originally, the purpose of bahas tradition was to address

166 Taj Hashmi, "Popular Islam and Misogyny: A case study of Bangladesh", A Social Science Journal, Vol. 2, No.1, 2006, p. 34.

167 Ibid., p. 35.

168 Golam Azam, Bangladeshe Islami Andolon (The Islamic Movement in Bangladesh), 3rd edi (Dhaka: Islamic Publication, 1981), p. 14. \

169 A.S. Huque and M.Y. Akhter, The Ubiquity of Islam, p.216.

155

misconceptions about various Islamic practices. The bahas were generally not about lost

glory or injustices inflicted on Muslims but to teach the faithful correct norms of Islamic

behaviour. It is true that many debates ended into ugly quarrels, but it gave the Bengali

Muslims a chance for social interaction with Muslims beyond their village border, led to

greater mobilisation and gave them a better understanding of their religious identity.17o

Rafiuddin Ahmed in an exhaustive study of Bengal Muslims (1871-1906) traces these

religious meetings to the traditional practices of earlier reformists of Bengal and argues

that these waz mahfils united the Muslim masses, enlightened them to be better Muslims,

but often alienated the non-Muslims of the villages, and thus undermined the syncretic

cultural traditions in Bengal. l7l The present fate of Bangladesh's minorities (discussed in

detail in the succeeding chapter) also indicates their socio-cultural isolation from the

majority community. The enhanced religious consciousness of the Muslims have

coincided with the rise of orthodox Islam and the corresponding mental and physical

oppressions of Hindus at various levels.

Madrassas, Mosques and Shrines

As already discussed, madrassas are Islamic seminaries or educational institutions

which imparts religious based knowledge in particular. The students from these

seminaries are largely brain-washed with a kind of world view incompatible with and

markedly different from those pass outs from secular educational institutions. The

ideological indoctrination makes them fit recruits for extremist organisations fighting for

the establishment of an Islamic state. The products of madrassas outside government

control often harbour a dogmatic mindset and act as cultural policemen. l72 The

torchbearers of political Islam in Bangladesh are financed from multiple external sources

and the government has no control over the channeling of money and resources for

charitable and religious purposes. Religious education seems to have made great

progress with the suppression of secular education. It is reported that "In 84,000 villages

170 Asim Roy, "Impact ofIslamic Revival and Refonn in Colonial Bengal and Bengal Muslim Identity", in Asim Roy, n. 46, Islam in History, p. 66.

171 Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, n.2, pp. 103-104.

172 It may be noted that the_dreaded Taliban was born in similar Madrassas in Pakistan. See "Refonning Madrassas" Bangladesh Observer, February 28, 2006.

156

of Bangladesh the number of madrassas is 74,000. While students in the primary schools

have doubled in the last decade, the number has multiplied by thirteen times in

madrassas.,,173 There are 3,312 government approved madrassas.174 Unofficial statistics

show that there are 8,000 private madrassas under the Bangladesh Qawmi madrassa

Education Board and thousands more which are beyond governmental control and thus

are not registered nor have their curriculum approved by the state.175 Scholars working

on madrassas and the pattern of education point out that nearly 3.34 million students are

now studying at Bangladesh's thousands of madrassas, which is five times higher as

compared to Pakistan. 176 It may be noted that Bangladesh has the highest ratio of

mosques per kilometers. It is reported that there are over 200, 000 mosques spread over

approximately 55,26 sq. miles of territory. 177

Apart from mosques, there also exist a number of socio-culturallreligious

organisations, which work for popularizing Islamic ideals. Prominent among them are

the Islamic Foundation, Bangladesh Islamic Centre, Islam Prachar Samity, Koranic

School society, world Islam Mission, Bangladesh Jamaitul Mudorresiz Itlehadul Ummah

and the Council for Islamic Socio-cultural Organisation. The above organisations have

varied roles like preaching Islam, pUblication and research of Islamic literature, study of

Koran and Hadith etc. The Islamic Foundation, for instance, imparts training and co­

ordinates the functioning of the Imams. It sponsors and encourages discussions, seminars

and workshops and carries out research on aspects of Islam. It's most significant work

being the publication of the Islamic Encyclopedia. The Bangladesh Masjid mission works

to transform mosques into centres of socio religious aWakening. The Islam Prachar

Samitis work in the field of conversion to Islam among non-believers, and helps deviant

Muslim youth in rehabilitation and vocational trainings. The Koranic schools stresses on

173 Asim Roy, "Introduction" in Is/am in History, n. 46, p. 12.

174 Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh 1984-85: Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1985).

175 "lehadi Terror in Bengladesh", Asian Centre for Human Rights, September 7, 2005.

176 K.M. Mohsin, "Trends ofIslam in Bangladesh" in S.R. Chakravarthy and V. Naraina, (ed.), Bangladesh History and Culture Vol. 1, (New Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1986), p. 35.

177 Salahiddin Ahmed, Bangladesh: Past and Present (Delhi: A. P. H. Publishing Corporation, 2004), p. 315.

157

character building and inculcating moral values and the Bangladesh Islamic centre

undertakes translation works from foreign language to Bengali, and extends financial

support to those working in this field. The Bangladesh Jamaitul Muddare has a Wide

network of teachers and students of various madrassas as its members and uses their

services for promotion of ideals of Islamic way of life. The world Islam Mission has a

humanistic mission of helping the poor, orphans and disabled, whereas the Ittehadul

Ummah and the Council of Islamic Socio-cultural Organisation try to coordinate and

bring about unity among Islamic bodies in Bangiadesh.178

Saints and Shrines

There are numerous tales of holy men who brought Islam to Bengal from West

Asia. It is reported that manuscripts as old as 17th century tell the story of Saint Shah

Jalal of Sylhet. The saint is believed to be a Yemeni Arab who brought with him a

sample of soil from his land to search and settle in a region that had the same soil quality.

The story needs mentioning owing to its popularity through oral traditions in Bangladesh,

regarding the advent of Islam.179 There are numerous shrines to Shah Jalal along with

other Saints allover Bangladesh. The commonality found from the oral traditions about

the saints is the supernatural powers associated with clearing the tiger, snakes and

crocodile infested forests and the power to breathe life into another or travel great

distance with lightening speed.180 It is the devoted followers of saints who build Mazars

and mosques and the sites soon acquire a mystical aura and attracts pious Muslims for

Ziyarat (visitations). Bangladesh has a rich Sufi cultural tradition of respecting a roving

mendicant or the pirs. The Shrines and Dargahs of the pirs are places of venerations.

God-fearing Bangladeshis throng these sites to be helped by the saints, ''to receive

training as well as knowledge through Tareeqat (mystic procedures and practices), at the

feet of divine, well versed and well accomplished in the knowledge and practices of

178 Ibid .• pp. 35-36.

179 S. Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh, n. 5, pp. 146-148.

180 Ibid.

158

Sharia who is capable of imparting the same to those who approach him desiring such

knowledge and discipline".lsl

With the growth ofWahhabism and Islamist parties, the sufi practices have come

under attack. ls2 There are sign boards, which remind visitors not to indulge in forbidden

practices like prostrating and performing vows at shrines. IS3 Despite the protests from

fundamentalists, sufi traditions remain indelible aspects of Bengali Islam. Chittagong in

the South Eastern part of Bangladesh has a rich history of sufi practices and mystical

orders, and thus has not been a comfortable place for Tablighi activists who insist on a

rigid sharia-centered Islam. No wonder, there are often media reports about the Tablighi

preachers being prevented from entering the area and even physically assaulted by the

local people. l84

Other Islamic Traditions

The analysis of popular Islam in Bangladesh today would remain incomplete

without a mention of the liberal traditions and practices of rural Bengal. Notable among

them are the buffalo sacrifices, music and songs and dikr (chanting of God'~ name),

which persist even today despite the fundamentalist upsurge. Such traditions represented

by the better known maijbhandari sufi brotherhood, which commands one of the largest

spiritual groupings in Bangladesh today. ISS The maijbhandari cult reveres the memory of

Hazrat Shah Sufi Syed Golamur Rahman, who was popularly known as Baba Bhandari.

Hazrat Shah's teachings along with that of five other holy saints form the spiritual basis

of the Maijbhandari tariqa (order). To mark Baba's birthday commemoration, lakhs of

people visit the forty odd shrines and fmally, the main centre to be a part of the ritual

ceremonies.186 The celebrations begin with the chanting of the names of the saints, the

181 Nafeesuddin Siddiqui, Mystic procedures and Practices in Proceedings of the Islamic Cultural Studies Conference, August 11-12, 1979. North Brisbane, Vol. II, p. 70.

182 Wahhabis do not believe in sainthood and the role of a saint as a mediator on ·their behalf and God. They totally surrender to the five pillars of Islamic faith only.

183 Sufia Uddin, Constructing Bangladesh, n. 5, p. 148.

184 Sikand, "The Tablighi", n.159, p. 118.

185 Peter J. Bertocci, "A Sufi Movement in Bangladesh: The Maijbhandari Tariqa and Its Followers", Contributions to Indian Sociology, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2006), p. 1.

186 Ibid., pp. 6-8

159

utterances of the Kalima and Allah's name and finally seeking blessings from the Pir in

the form of touching his feet. The gatherings witness initiation ceremonies where a

faithful approaches the pir to become his disciple (murid). The commemoration ends

with the distribution of tabarruk (blessed food).187

Musical performances constitute the core of maijbhandari mahphils. The mystical

outpourings are accompanied by the dhol and ektara (musical instruments also used by

the Bauls of Bengal) and differ from Qawwali (Sufi musical traditions in north India and

Pakistan, due to its spontaneity and collective participation. 188 Bengali Islam's mysticism

also has pir worship in its fold. Pir is a Persian word meaning ancient or elderly. In

Bengal it implies a Muslim spiritual guru/guide. Pirs have had no mean contribution to

the increase of Islamic values in Bangladesh socieity. Apart from spiritual guidance,

people visit them to ask them to pray for general well being, to be free from illness, to

secure material benefits and for the fulfillment of their wishes. Pirs observe urs annual

festivals and even the head of the state visits them for his blessings.189 Pir adulation has

been subjected to severe criticism and considered shirk by the Wahhabis. Maulana

Akram Khan in his journal Masik Mohammadi has condemned the reverence to "social

customs like chehlun, matan or siyam. These were social gatherings where prayers were

offered for the peace of departed souls, but which were not based on scriptural authority.

The building of mausoleums over graves, the offering of prayers by the graveside,

making manta or vows at shrines was similarly considered haram. Man's desire to seek

intercession between himself and God through holy men like pirs and sanyasis was

condemned because he believed that Islam recognised no intermediary between man and

God.,,190 Bengali Islam has thrived in spite of the lack of consensus on such matters and

pirs in Bangladesh continue to command great respect and social acceptance. Although

popular Islam has survived the relentless opposition from the orthodoxy, its saliency and

187 There is a striking similarity with the Hindu rituals of buffalo sacrifice during the Durga Puja celebrations, which brings the entire village together. See Madeleine Biardeau, "The Sani tree and the Sacrificial Buffalo", Contributions to Indian Sociology, Vol. 18, No.1, pp. 1-12.

188 Bertocci, "A Sufi Movement", n. 185, p. 6.

189 President H.M. Ershad often visited the pir of Alrosi, who was widely believed to have healing powers.

190 Tazeen M. Murshid, The Sacred and the Secular Bengal Muslim Discourses, /871-1977 (Calcutta: Oxford University press, 1995), p. 399.

160

appeal is waning due to the rise of political Islam since the lifting of ban on religion­

oriented parties in 1976.

Peasant Islam

In explaining the peasant factor in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in

contemporary Bangladesh, some analysts have underlined the role played by the rural-

based pedantry from historical perspective. A leading Bangladeshi scholar has, for

instance, tried to locate Islam in the peasant society where Islam has not only provided an

identity but also constitutes their ''moral economy." In other words, Islam is considered

as integral part of Bangladesh, which is primarily agrarian with more than 80 percent of

people being rural-based having no access no modern method of cultivation. A majority

of them are landless or semi-landless and traditionally "known for their unpredictability,

their vacillating and non-committal nature and their propensity for violence, anarchy and

factiousness typical of most peasant societies.,,191 It is perhaps the raw and strong

emotion in them that help in the mobilisation of peasant by various groups, from Islamic

reformists through secular nationalists to fundamentalist and orthodox ullemas. The

peasants with their historical proclivity towards participatory means of protest have

played significant role even in the Faraizi and Wahhabi movements in the early 19th

century, the Pakistan movement of the 1940s and later, the Bangladeshi nationalist

struggle and in the upsurge of orthodoxy in Bangladeshi society.

To begin with, the 1947 partition of India and the emergence of Pakistan saw

massive peasant mobilisation against the exploitative and oppressive Hindu Zamindars,

bhadrolok-Mahajan triumvirate. In the struggle for existence Hindus and Muslims were

seen as separate entities.192 The Islamists got the opportunity to win away the peasantry

and created a support base for themselves in the countryside. Birth of Pakistan and

Islamic fraternity did very little to pull them from despair and the only change noticeable

was the replacement of the competitive Hindus with the West-wing elites. The

disenchantment with Muslim League politicians after partition gave way to nationalist

191 Hashmi, "Islam in Bangladesh Politics", n. 51, p. 101.

192 The social consciousness of the Bengal Muslims was high especially due to revivalist movements, spread of education political mobilization/activism and Muslim solidarity against Hindus. See, Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, n. 2, p.160.

161

movement for the separation of East Bengal from its West wing. In this struggle, the

ethnic identity of the Bengali Muslims proved to be a unifying factor and which led to the

installation of a secular regime and initiation of a secular ideology for governing the new

nation. The secular experiment soon became defunct with the imposition of statist Islam.

With an extended social network, Islam in Bangladesh gained wider acceptance in the

wake of the state failure to deliver welfare measures. The resultant poverty and insecurity

of the people of Bangladesh turned them towards religion. ''Their religiosity and inherent

peasant culture are conducive to the growth of fatalism as well." 193

It is thus argued that Islamic fundamentalism has relatively strong societal roots,

which provides the staying power and cannot be contained by force, without making

serious attempt at the transformation of society. It is the societal Islam in Bangladesh

which has played a significant role in providing legitimacy to the Islamists and

influencing both the state policy and official discourses, particularly concerning national

identity.

Anti-Indianism and Political Islam

Anti-Indianism among Bangladeshis is another important factor that has

contributed in no mean way to the rise of political Islam. Historically, the "Hindu phobia"

of Bengali M~lims, a legacy of the British colonial days, transforming into "Indophobia"

during the Pakistani period remained embedded in the psyche of the average Bengali

Muslims even though India acted as midwife in the birth of the new nation. The close

proximity of the nationalists with New Delhi became a political liability for the Mujib

government, so much so that its failure to deliver was attributed to interference and

pressure of India. The secular measures of the new government such as the constitutional

ban on religious parties and neutrality of the state in matters of faith were seen as

attempts to please the rulers in Delhi. "Bengali nationalist sentiment", according to an

193 Taj-ul Islam Rashmi, "Islamic Resurgence in Bangladesh: Genesis, Dynamics and Implications" in S. P. Limaye, M. Malik and R. G. Wirsing (eds.), Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu Hawaii: Asia Pacific Centre of Security Studies, 2004), p. 71

162

observer, was ''too strong to tolerate a high level of Indian influence in Bangladesh

affairs .,,194

The traditional social divisions in Bangladesh are heavily influenced by the spirit

of nationalism based on religion and culture. In other words, either of the one is evoked

to mobilize the masses whenever the people have feIt threatened from outside.195 When

the Mujib government came down heavily against the collaborators during the first few

years of its rule, pro-Islamic people who sere otherwise known as devout Muslims were

brought under the state's surveillance and ''the reaction went deep down to the grass-root

level having a corroding effect. The propaganda that it was all done against the

"believers" at the instigation of Hindu India was taken to be true by a large section of the

rural population. This also led to the thought of establishing a Muslim Bengal from then

on, consciously or unconsciously.,,196

The direct intervention of the Indian military, doubtless, brought an end to

Bangladeshi suffering, but it robbed the Mukti Bahini of its pride of liberating the

country in their own terms. Maulana Bhashani, the old man of Bangladesh politics talked

of the necessity of Islamic socialism and was part of the anti-Mujib campaign.197

Bhashani in his public speeches was rhetorical about the greedy Marwari traders and

their economic manipUlative activities in Bengal. The nascent capitalist class had every

reason to feel inhibited by these threats. Small Bengali traders felt that the secular

policies of the Awami League would motivate the wily Hindu businessmen to return and

reclaim their abandoned property.198 Rise of communal tensions between Hindus and

Muslims in the later half of 19th century was due to the similar perceived economic and

social competition between the two main communities. The highly orthodox Wahabi and

194 Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First Decade (New Delhi: S.A. Publishers, 1982), p. 67.

195 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Group interests and Political Changes: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi: SA Publishers, 1982), pp. 215-17.

196 Ahmad Moudud, Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1999), p.52.

197 Islamic socialism highlights the egalitarianism of Islam. It makes no distinction between men on the basis of birth. It preaches Zakat and believes that the wealth of the society should not be monopolised by a particular section of society.

198 Basant Chatterjee, Inside Bangladesh Today: An Eye-witness Account (New Delhi: 1973), p. 43.

163

Faraizi movements were a result of communal tensions and responsible for the growth of

a coherent Muslim religious identity and heightened Muslim activism. l99

The anti-India sentiments found its favourite flogging horse in the Indo­

Bangladesh friendship Treaty signed by the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and

Mujibur Rahman on March 19, 1972. The treaty was meant to promote mutual friendship,

cooperation and peace in the region for a period of twenty five years. The Joint

Declaration signed in Dhaka sought ''to give concrete expression to the similarity of

views, ideals and interest" between India and Bangladesh.2OO The treaty was claimed to

be "inspired by common deals of peace, secularism, democracy, socialism and

nationalism".201 The treaty of friendship was badly misinterpreted. Weird images of

India using Bangladeshi territory in case of a war with China were drawn. The entire

propaganda mills created an Indian phobia and whipped the pathological hatred of

Muslims against Hindu India The fear of being dubbed an Indian agent was great among

political parties and even mainstream parties. This explains why the A wami League

chose to maintain silence in the face of various criticism and clarifications on renewing

the Indo-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty.

Finally, the Bangladesh economy faced great challenges and the nationalist

fervour triggered during the liberation war was not enough to wish away problems of

hunger, famine and rehabilitation. India along with numerous other countries provided

assistance, but the vilifying campaign did not stop.202 The increased smuggling between

India and Bangladesh made India look like a country with hegemonistic designs, out to

dominate economy of small neighbours?03 The obsession of Bangladesh with the Indian

state strengthened the Islamists and led towards ideological polarisation within the

country. In a show of open defiance towards India, the junta rulers after the 1975 coup

undertook corrective measures to set right all that had gone wrong during Mujib's tenure.

199 Gopal Krishna "Islamisation in Nineteenth century Bengal" in Gopal Krishna (ed.), Contribution to South Asian Studies, (New Delhi: Vikas Publication, 1979), pp. 88-10.

200 See the Text of the Treaty in Foreign Affairs Record, March 1972, pp. 61-63.

201 Ibid., p. 63.

202 Total $ 850 million was given to Bangladesh in addition to food assistance worth $ 173 million and multilateral aid worth $ 350 million. Bangladesh Observer, March 26, 1974.

203 Ziring, Bangladesh from Mujib to Ershad, n. 7, p. 91.

164

President Ziaur Rahman, for instance, envisaged an independent foreign policy, which

made Bangladesh less dependent on India and drew Muslim countries closer to feel

connected with the Islamic Umma and meet the aspirations of the majority community in

the country. 204

Likewise, in the domestic plane Zia introduced linguistic-territorial-Islamic

nationalism, which he called "Bangladesh nationalism" in the place of linguistic­

territorial-secular nationalism as it was felt that recognition of Islam was necessary to

counteract Indian influence. The imposition of a Bangladeshi Islamic identity as different

from its earlier Bengali identity assured his people that their country's identity would not

to be swamped with the Bengali identity, which explained the status of their ethnic

cousins in the Indian side of the border.

Islam Oriented parties

As noted, political isolation of the religion-based parties in Bangladesh ended

with the lifting of the ban in 1976. In the following decades, their number rose steadily

with almost identical goal of turning Bangladesh an Islamic state. The Government

intelligence sources in the later half of the 1970s revealed the existence of about 100

Islamic parties and organizations since the lifting of the ban.2os However, only 30

Islamic parties contested elections after the withdrawal of restrictions on them, which

include the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, Bangladesh Islami Front, Bangladesh ](hilafat

Andolon, Bangladesh Krishak Raj Islami Party, Bangladesh Muslim League (Jamir Ali),

Bangladesh Tanjimul Islam, Islami Al Zihad Dal, Islami Oikya Jote, Islami

Shashantantro Andolon, Islamic Dal, Zaker Party, Jamiate ulumaye Islami Bangladesh,

Islami Dal (Saifur), Bangladesh Inquilab Party, Bangladesh Islami Republican Party,

Muslim People Party, Bangladesh Khelafat Party, Muslim League (Yousuf), Muslim

League (Matin), Muslim league (Quader) and Jamayate Ulamaye Islami Front.

The Muslim League is one of those political parties in Bangladesh today that

traces its roots to Pakistani Muslim League in Bangladesh. It continues to nurture the

204 J.N. Dixit, Liberation and Beyond (Dhaka: University Press limited 1996), pp. 280-282.

205 Shakhawat Liton, "Islamic Parties Boom After the 1976 Ban Lifting", at http://www.thedailystar.net

165

dream that Bangladesh should be an Islamic state and campaign for changing the flag and

national anthem. Hostile to towards India, the Muslim League of Bangladesh has often

accused the government of being subservient to India.206 Committed to similar ideas and

goal, the Islamic Democratic League, the Justice Party and Nizam-e-Islam advocate the

principles of Islamic justice and talk of bringing present legal procedures and codes in

accordance with holy Koran and sunnah. They support closer ties with all the Islamic

countries. The Bangladesh Khilafat Andolan (BKA) is a new political outfit, which also

stresses on the introduction of Koranic instructions in education, reorganisation of Zakat

and wakfs. It needs mentioning that the BKA put up its candidate for the 1981

Presidential election and secured third largest share ofvotes.207

The mushrooming of Islam-based parties and organisations could be partly

attributed to the oil boom of the 1970s in West Asia, which enhanced the role and status

of Muslim states in global politics. The oil-led prosperity and its impact on the global

economy encouraged the Muslim groups to throw up an alternative political order based

on Islamic precepts and ideals. Highly dependent on the largesse from these oil rich

Islamic countries, Bangladesh remains susceptible to the policy directives of the Islamic

donors from outside.

To sum up, a variety of factors discussed above accounts for the Islamisation in

Bangladesh notwithstanding its local syncretistic cultural practices and unique historical

experiences including its emergence as an independent entity in defiance of a national

identity defined by Islam. While the failure of post-independence leadership prompted

Mujib's dictator-successors to sponsor Islamisation from above, the activities of the

Tabligh Jamaat • a grassroots-based puritan movement together with attempts at whipping

up Indophobia and mobilising the "peasant Islam" facilitated the process in Bangladesh

from below. Capping them all was the spread of Wahhabi school of thought through

thousands of Islamic seminaries (madrasas), which together with the culture of Jatwas

206 See Bangladesh Islamic parties at www.country-data.com!cgi-biniQuery/r-1199.html

207 The election manifestos of these parties were published in Bangladesh Times, December 25, 1979 cited in Emazuddin Ahamad and D. R. J. A. Nazneen, "Islam in Bangladesh: Revivalism or Power Politics?", Asian Survey, Vol. XXX, No.8, August 1990, p. 796.

166

and the delivery of Islamic justice by the rural ulema through traditional local institutions

like salish (village arbitration) underpinned the fundamentalist challenge in Bangladesh.

With the growing clout of the Islamist political parties and the disproportionate

influence they wielded in the 1990s onwards, the government failed to combat Islamic

extremism effectively, setting off the region-wide fear of Bangladesh as the "next

Afghanistan." The chapter IV makes an attempt to identify the factors that contributed to

the surge of Islamic extremism since the restoration of civilian rule in 1991 and brings to

the fore its baleful consequences on the society, particularly on the minority, women,

NGOs and the intelligentsia.

167