Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia

Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in MalaysiaAuthor(s): Mohamad Abu BakarSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 10 (Oct., 1981), pp. 1040-1059Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643973 .

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ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN MALAYSIA

Mohamad Abu Bakar*

MALAYSIA IS AMONG SEVERAL Muslim countries affected by the current wave of Islamic resurgence. Revivalist organizations that sprang up some years ago now have nationwide appeal among the Malays, and their impact is being felt throughout the country, particularly at the socio-political level. It is highly probable that the trend towards Islamic orthodoxy could steer this multi-racial country' on to a new political course.

Several factors account for this latest upsurge in religious feeling. Essentially this phenomenon results from the re-education in Islam amongst an increasing number of Muslim Malays. Other factors such as the "back to the Koran" movement in vogue in certain Muslim countries have only aided the Islamization process. Similarly, the secularization of Malay society is only a contributory factor responsible for the crystallization of Islamic orthodoxy among these Muslims.

The Origins of Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia

The change in the present direction of Islam in Malaysia began to take place rather perceptibly in the latter part of the 1970s. Two groups were directly involved in this movement. The first was the Arabic- and religious-educated group, which began to espouse Islam and urged the Malay populace to uphold the teachings of the Koran and the Hadith (Prophetic Tradition) in the years soon after Merdeka

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Malay Studies, Kuala Lumpur, September 8, 1979.

1 There are three major ethnic groups in this country, the Malays, the Chinese, and the Indians, and several minor groups such as the Ibans, the Muruts, and the Kadazans.

1040

? 1981 by The Regents of the University of California 0004-4687/8 1 / 101040 + 20$00.50



ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AND POLITICS IN MALAYSIA 1041

(independence). Its members worked not only for the purification of Islam from superstitious beliefs or practices but also for a total liberation of Muslim Malays from an unislamic "mental bondage." Receiv- ing neither salary nor other monetary rewards from the society they served, these religious teachers regularly organized kuliah subuh (early morning lectures) in mosques and surau (smaller prayer houses). They were also active in institutions of higher learning where they gave talks on the practicality of Islam as a way of life and gained popularity among the students. In the long run various segments of Malay society became infused with Islamic precepts.

This Arabic- and religious-educated group included many people who operated through Islamic organizations, prominent among which were the Jamaat Tabligh (Lecture Group), which had its headquarters in Delhi, India, and the Darul Arqam (the House of Arqam, named after a friend of Prophet Muhammad who gave away his house to be turned into a center of Islamic missionary activities), which was locally based. The former was initially dominated by Indian and Pakistani Muslims but later had a large Malay following as well. The latter was led by an ex-government religious teacher, Ustaz Ashaari, who first established the movement in Setapak in the state of Selangor. The society was subscribed by Malays only. Both the Jamaat Tabligh and the Darul Arqam were responsible at the beginning for the spread of fundamentalist ideas at the grass-roots level. However, of the two, the Darul Arqam was apparently more popular since the Jamaat Tabligh had earned scorn for itself from various segments of the Malay society because of the undiplomatic manner in which some of its members tried to propagate Islam.

The second group that worked for the purification of Islam con- sisted mainly of youths educated in English and Malay. They were active on two "fronts," in Malaysia and overseas. In Malaysia, they com- prised about 15% of the undergraduates and graduates of local universities whose knowledge of Islam was rudimentary in comparison to the Arabic- and religious-educated group, but who generally had a fair understanding of Islam as a din or system of life, To overcome this lack of knowledge, they read widely in Islamic subjects or regularly attended usrah (group discussions) conducted by their ustaz (learned Islamic teachers). Their attachment to Islam was comparable to that of the Arabic- and religious-educated group. Unlike them, however, they em- phasized the role of organizations in working out their plan for the re- Islamization of society. Among students involvement in Islamic work was through participation in their respective persatuan Islam (student Islamic societies).2 While their appeal for the reconstruction of Malay- sian society along fundamentalist lines won a limited following among the student population, the few who were converted to classical Islam later provided a hardcore for the various Islamic organizations. In 1971

2 See, for example, Sidek Baba, "Cahaya Islam Terus Bersinar Di Universiti Malaya," Suara Merdeka, September 28, 1976.



1042 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXI, No. 10, October 1981

several graduates from the University of Malaya and some other institutions of higher learning formed the Muslim Youth Organization or Angkatan Belia Islam (ABIM) "to provide a platform for the gradu- ating students from the respective universities and colleages who had been active lin dakwah [missionary] activities to continue their Islamic activities."3 Its objective, inter alia, was "to generate an Islamic movement as the path to Islamic revival in Malaysia."4 Students who had been active in Islamic work abroad also joined ABIM on their return. The society also managed to bring into its fold several youths from the Arabic- and religious-educated group including some Al-Azhar graduates who later became leaders in the organization. Since its inception ABIM has been most vociferous in propagating the ideal of the Shariah (Islamic laws), and its activities have greatly contributed to the nationwide Islamic awakening among the younger generation Malays.

The students who were involved in Islamic revivalism overseas were mainly undergraduate science students and graduate students who formed the biggest concentrations of Malays abroad. Most of them had been sent abroad to study after the 1969 race riots, in keeping with the government's policy of correcting the low Malay enrollment in the science and arts disciplines and increasing the output of Malay higher degree holders. Like their counterparts at home, they studied Islam, practiced the faith, and exhorted others to follow their example. While this group included those who had been actively involved in Islamic activities in Malaysia, the majority were new to the Islamic conception of life. They were joined by a few Islamic graduates from Middle Eastern universities who had gone to the West to obtain graduate de- grees.

It was not so much the circumstances of life in foreign lands as the influence of visiting lamas (religious scholars) and organized Is- lamic activities undertaken by Arabs and Pakistanis (students and non- students alike) that brought these young Malaysians into the revivalist stream. Coupled with this was the inspirational work undertaken by the Islamic Centre in Geneva, which helped them expand their understanding of Islam through the distribution of brochures and booklets and the publication of its periodical, Al-Muslimoon. In England, Scot- land, and Ireland, where thousands of Malay students converged to study at the various schools and universities, the Federation of the Stu- dents' Islamic Societies (FOSIS) was largely responsible for instilling in them a sense of Islamic consciousness. Many Islamic societies founded by Malay students and affiliated with FOSIS were involved in its activities. FOSIS' Annual Conferences and Winter Gatherings drew hun- dreds of students to such places as Swanwick and Manchester where

3 Cenderamata Muktamar Senawi ke 8 Ang/?atan Belia Islam Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), p. 4.

4 The Path to Islamic Revival in Malaysia (Kuala Lumipur: The Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1976), p. 1.




they were able "to enhance [their] spiritual understanding of Islam"5 through readings and discussions. It was at these and similar gatherings that the Malay students came into contact with Muslims from other parts of the world. Apart from that they were able to listen to religious talks given by guest speakers who had come from countries like Indo- nesia and South Africa. There were, however, a substantial number of Malays who did not participate in such activities but who nonetheless became staunch believers in fundamental Islam. This category included those who were won over to the fundamentalist way of thinking after studying translations of the Koran and the Hadith or reading Islamic books. In the United States and Canada, work similar to that undertaken by FOSIS was carried out by the Muslim Students' Association (MSA) of America. In Australia, Islamic activities for Muslim students including Malaysians were organized by the Australian Federation of Muslim Students Association (AFMSA).

A concomitant feature of this religious revival was the change in life style of these adherents of Islam. Where previously they had been engrossed in the material aspects of life, they now immunized themselves against Western ideas of progress and instead developed a nostal- gia for an Islamic past. These young Malay students also took an active interest in the activities of Ikhwanul Muslimoon and Jamaat Islami, the fundamentalist organizations that had been fighting for the establishment of the Shariah in the Arab countries and Pakistan, respectively. Ikwanul Muslimoon leaders such as Hassan Al-Bana, Abdul Kadir Audah, and Syed Qutub, and the Amir (supreme head) of Jamaat Is- lami, Abu Ala Maududi, became their spiritual fathers. The works of Syed Qutub-Maalim FP1 Tariq ("Milestone") and Fi Zilal Quran ("Under the Shade of the Koran"), for example-had an electrifying effect on their minds. In addition, as part of their dakwah activities, they devoted a good deal of their time to inculcating a full understanding of Islam among their fellow Malay students abroad. It was this sort of Islamic activity that began to make newspaper headlines in Malaysia in 1976.6 On their return to Malaysia, most of them joined local organizations to disseminate Islam to the Malay masses.

Dakwah activity had made a noticeable impact in Malaysia by 1974. Selangor and the newly created Federal Territory were the areas most affected by the re-emergence of Islam. Kuala Lumpur in particular was the scene of much dakwah activity. The conservative northeastern Malay state of Trengganu and the states of Perak and Johore were the least hit by the dakwah "onslaught." On the whole, traditional religious activities continued to be upheld there. This differential impact of

5 Kalim Siddique, "Fosis Tenth Annual Winter Gathering," in The Muslim, XI:2, December 1973-January 1974, p. 47.

6 A heated controversy relating to dakwah work abroad was carried in the columns of Malay dailies. See, for example, Mingguan Rakyal, May 15, 1976; Berita Minggu, May 2, 1976 and Utusan Melayu, June 7, 1976.



1044 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXI, No. 1 0, October 1981

dakwah activity in the different regions may be explained by the presence of a large number of young educated Malays-mostly civil servants and university students-in the urban centers of Selangor and the Fed- eral Territory where they constitute the groups within Malay society that are most receptive to dakwah teaching.

As a consequence of the spread of dakwah activity, an increasing number of Muslim Malays turned to the Koran and Hadith for guid- ance. Education in Islam too began to receive a tremendous impetus as a result. Many English-educated youths in particular became enmeshed in some form of Islamic learning or another. The three most popular tafsir (exegesis of the Koran) available in English that served as their basic reference texts were those written by Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, A. Yusuf Ali, and Abu Ala Maududi, respectively. Works by European and American Muslims such as Islam at the Crossroads by Leopold Weiss, Dimension of Islam by Frithjoh Schuon, and Islam Ver- sus the West by Margaret Marcus began to be found on their book- shelves. In addition, books by Al-Ghazali and Ibnu Taimiyah (all translations) or later Arab Muslim scholars like Said Ramadan, Abdul Rah- man Azam, and Sheikh Mohamad Ghazali found their way into their personal libraries. Also widely read were the works of non-Arab Mus- lims, especially those written by A. K. Brohi (a Pakistani), Syed Hussein Nasr (an Iranian), and Said Nursi (a Turk).

Contrary to popular belief, Islam has flourished better among those who lead relatively secure lives. Approximately 10% of the educated Malay professionals, which included doctors and engineers, and many graduate teachers and civil servants were among those who turned eagerly to Islam. For some it was an about-face in life. Where originally they repudiated Islam and regarded it as outdated, they now embraced it fully and decried the secularization of Malay society. Unlike some of their predecessors who generally seemed to have a predilection for all things Western, the revivalists were most critical of Western civilization. Even the Middle Eastern heroes of the earlier Islamic reformists such as Al-Afgani, Mohamad Abduh, and Rashid Redha were looked upon as apologists of Islam because of their compromising attitude towards Western civilization. Beyond that, like fundamentalists elsewhere, they protested against the old idea of Islam as a "partial view of things." Briefly stated, in attempting to fashion themselves into real Musllims, these people had begun to interpret the world around them in accordance with their newly cherished value preference.

The new approach to the study of Islam with its emphasis on Islam as a way of life and its recognition of Islam's political aspect was the greatest single factor that had brought about this transformation. The publications by the various authors mentioned above stress the position of Islam as a complete way of life with its political dimensions and the infallibility of the Shariah. The fundamentalists' disillusionment with the country's political system and the concomitant policy of laicism provided additional fuel to their growing interest in Islam. What was hap-




pending the world over-in Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, and even in countries in Europe, where Islam was making its presence felt-was seen as nothing less than the unfolding of Allah's self-revelation by these cham- pions of Islam. It can be seen thus that the new attitude towards Islam exhibited by these Malays was not a question of disdain for Western values. Such an argument has only surface plausibility. But it is also misleading to maintain, as some have done elsewhere, that the revival was due to a fresh interpretation of the Koran and the Hadith.

As a generation infused with ideals based on Islamic principles, the fundamentalist Malays began to work virtually round the clock towards the Islamization of the whole society. The following verse from the Koran was often mentioned as ground for their proselytization: "Let there arise out of you a band of people who invite to goodness, and enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong" (III: 104). As for their relationship with the non-Muslim Chinese and Indian communities, the fundamentalist Malays argued that they were enjoined to pros- elytize because it was written in the Koran that "Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency; and ye believe in God" (111:110). On this basis, they sought to bring the non-Muslim communities into the Islamic fold.

Gradually, the Muslim fundamentalists in Malaysia also turned their attention to politics. It was reported in September 1977 that "a growing number of Malay Muslims are putting pressure on [their] Gov- ernment to turn their country into a strict, theocratic state."7 The challenge as a matter of fact came principally from ABIM and to a certain extent from the Darul Arqam and the Jamaat Tabligh, which together offered themselves as rallying points for the fundamentalist change in the country. The role of other religious-oriented organizations such as Nasrul-Haq cannot be viewed in the same light. Nasrul-Haq, which trains its followers in the art of self-defense (bersilat), is more an ex- pression of Malay nationalism if not an embodiment of the political ambitions of its leaders. The same may be said of Perkim, a Muslim welfare organization, which works towards the propagation of Islam among the non-Malays. Although purely Islamic in content, Perkim makes no reference to the erection of an Islamic state as its goal, and its emergence was never associated with the current religious revivalism in the country. By trying to apply the teachings of Islam to political as well as social life, the respective Islamists encountered opposition from those who cherished the present idea of government with its separation of religion from politics. The Malay secularists viewed the work of the fundamentalists as an attempt to turn back the clock of progress. Since there were a substantial number of Malay officers within the government circle who showed contempt for Islam and what Islam stood for, the conflict between them and the fundamentalists became all the more serious.

7 "The Surge of Muslim Orthodoxy," The Times, Septemuber 1, 1977.




The Challenge of the Revivalist Movement

All three major revivalist organizations-ABIM, the Darul Arqam, and the Jamaat Tabligh-have as their objective the resurrection of classical Islam. Towards that end, all seek to convert Malaysians to the Islamic perspective. Thus although they have adopted different ap- proaches to the attainment of their goal, they can all be subsumed under the category "fundamentalist" in view of their Islamic orientation. However, ABIM has a more direct bearing on the nation's political process and is also much larger in its operational scope than the other two. ABIM has now burgeoned into a society with more than 35,000 registered members and thousands of sympathizers.8 More importantly, an impressive proportion of its leaders and followers are from among the educated Malay class. Over the years, many Arabic- and religious- educated youths have also joined the organization. This has toned down its image of being a society dominated by the English- and Malay- educated class.

Within scarcely a decade, ABIM has been able to establish its rep- utation successfully as a nationwide revivalist organization and has made its voice heard practically on all matters of public policy. Its comr prehensive plan to bring about an Islamic order in Malaysia can be gauged from the program set out in the Declaration of 6th Dzuihijjah 1395.9 Referring to social ills such as corruption, poverty, and the ex- ploitation of the weaker sex that are found in the country, ABIM cate- gorically notes that all these are due "to the choice and practice of life based not on divine morality but on sensuality and as such not accord- ing to truth and justice." On this basis, ABIM has called upon the government and the people of Malaysia to implement the Shariah fully because Islam "can solve human problems and create a truly just society."10 In emphasizing ukhwan Islamiyah (Islamic brotherhood), ABIM asserts its international nature as well. It stresses that there should be "close cooperation and association based on 'Islamic principles' between Muslims all over the world, and in this connection takes note of the 'suppression' of Muslim minorities in Thailand, the Philip- pines and Soviet Russia."

At its 1979 Muktamar Senawi (Annual Conference), ABIM passed a resolution urging the Malaysian government to adopt an Islamic solution to solve communal problems and to create unity among the people in spite of their differing religious beliefs.11 In this respect, ABIM has of late regarded race relations as one of its major problem areas and has made attempts to convince all sides, especially the ruling

8 See Cenderarnata AIuktamnar Senazvi he 8 Angkatan Belia Islain MIalaysia, p. 4. 19 Declaration of 6th Dzulhijah 1395 was issued by ABIM at its fourth annual

conference (muktamar Senazvi) held at the Muslim College, Klang, Selangor, from September 6-9, 1975.

lONew Straits Times, March 1, 1979. 11 See Anwar Ibrahim, Islam-Penyelesaian kepada Masalah Masyarakat Majmltk (Kuala Lumpur, n.d.), passim.




authority and the non-Muslim Chinese and Indians, of the superiority of the Islamic approach in overcoming the problem of communalism. First, ABIM reiterates that God has so created mankind that there exist various races-i.e., "have formed you into nations and tribes so that ye may know and be good to one another" (XLIX: 13) and on the basis of this Koranic reference, attempts to show that racial variety is not a problem as such but rather a means for the establishment of a better human society.

Second, its members constantly point out that under the Shariah, non-Muslims are given the right to practice their religions and to adopt their personal laws, since protection of freedom of belief and worship is enjoined by both the Koran and the Hadith. To quote an Islamic scholar who is highly respected within the circle of ABIM followers and whose writings on the subject of race relations are widely distributed in Malaysia, "as far as religion is concerned, the dhimmi, or non-believer in the Islamic state, or convenanter in the Pax Islamica, is acknowl- edged religiously in his unbelief and granted the rights to convince and be convinced of the truth." In addition, the non-Muslims (that is, the non-Malays in the context of Malaysia) are also allowed to hold public office or engage in economic activity, since Islam is averse to discrim- inatory laws. Consequently, race prejudice is eliminated and as a result communal tension disappears.

Third, ABIM also highlights Islam's historical past during which time non-Muslim citizens were granted special privileges under Muslim rule. The existence of Najran Christians during Muhammad's administration, Jews under Omar's caliphate, and Hrindus under Mughul domination are often cited as evidence of Islam being a "religion of peace." It is on this score that ABIM's leader Anwar Ibrahim has em- phatically noted that "Islam is the solution [to the racial problems of Malaysia] and Islam alone provides a workable alternative since all other alternatives have failed or are bound to fail. "12 Nevertheless, partly because of lack of exposure, this idea has not yet been accepted by the non-Muslim population. For the few in the know, such views on race relations only point to the need for the establishment of the Shariah, and as such are difficult to accept. Nationalism too has been reproached by ABIM in the name of Islam. As a philosophy it is regarded as disruptive to Islamic unity and is also held responsible for the disintegration of the Islamic ummah (community) in the past.

ABIM's manifold attempts at bringing about the establishment of Islam include such time-honored measures as the holding of talks, forums, symposiums, and seminars, and the publication of books and periodicals aimed at arousing Islamic consciousness among the people. Some of these activities are carried out with the cooperation of other Islamic organizations, including those set up by the government.

12 "Islam-Solution to the Problems of a Multi-Racial Society," Readings in Islam, No. 6, 1399/1979, p. 52.




ABIM's bi-monthly Risalah, which sometimes contains articles of a political nature, has a circulation of more than 30,000. ABIM also resorts to a systematic education of its members to augment their knowledge of Islam. Leadership training courses for its members are conducted at national, state, and district levels throughout the year.

The international acclaim for ABIM by several Muslim countries gives its position additional significance in national politics. ABIM has established relations with organizations such as the Islamic Foundation of the United Kingdom, the Aishah Bawany Wakaf of Pakistan, the Muhammadiah Youth of Indonesia, and the Rabitah Alam Islami of Saudi Arabia. ABIM's president, Anwar Ibrahim, is currently represen- tative for the Asia-Pacific region to the World Association of Muslim Youths (WAMY). Anwar, a former campus activist, was recently invited to Pakistan and Iran where he met with President Zia-ul-Haq and Aya- tollah Khomeini in their countries. Together with other world Muslim movements, ABIM observed March 16, 1979 as Solidarity Day to mark the "liberation" of Iran.13 This move was seen by some observers as an attempt to bring the Iranian revolution nearer to the doorstep of Ma- laysia.

As a movement, the Darul Arqam also attempts to address itself to many of the nation's problems, but the organization is less politically inclined than ABIM and poses only an indirect challenge to the ruling establishment. During the last five years, Sungai Penchala, a Malay village situated seventeen miles from Kuala Lumpur, has acted as .a focus of the Darul Arqam's activities. Like ABIM, the society has been able to draw its members from various sections of the Malay population. The Darul Arqam's ideals also go beyond seeing mosques full of congregationalists. Like ABIM, it is also interested in eradicating "elements of jahiliyah [ignorance] in Malay society" and the creation of "a society based on revealed religion.' '14

Darul Arqam has achieved noteworthy success in its dakwah work. Its Wednesday-night compulsory classes (kelas fardu ain) where courses in Koranic tafsir (exegesis), tauhid (theology), fiqh (jurisprudence), and the like are given are attended not only by the society's followers but also by others who come from all over Malaysia. An institution established for the furtherance of Islamic learning among its members is now being attended by children of parents who abhor modern secular education with its attendant emphasis on the utilitarian conception of life. The Darul Arqam has also widened the scope of its dakwah activities by holding mass meetings for government servants, members of the Royal Malaysian Navy, and school teachers.15 It also has its own newspaper, Al-Arqam, which periodically espouses Islamic fundamentalism as a way of life. Printed in Malay using Jawi (Arabic) script, the

13 New Straits Times, March 1, 1979. 14A1-Arqabm, Bil. 1, Tahun 1, July 1977. 15 See ibid., Bil. 15, Tahun 1, November 1977.




paper, like ABIM's Risalah, is gaining in popularity and is even sold door-to-door by group members.

Outwardly, the Darul Arqam is way ahead of other revivalist groups that desire to see the actualization of Islamic law in Malaysia. At Sun- gai Penchala, a miniature "Islamic society" is already in existence. On a piece of land only five acres in size, Darul Arqam followers have established an Islamic village with its own madrasah (school), mosque, and a shopping center that also attracts buyers from outside the area. Its members are conspicuously dressed in green or white robes and wear turbans. Darul Arqam's two branches, one in Kemaman, Trengganu, and the other in Yan, Kedah, exhibit the same pattern of life. The organization is also equipped with its own clinic, which is now in the process of being turned into a full-fledged hospital.',6 By undertaking these services, members of Darul Arqam believe that they are actually approximating the approach adopted by Prophet Mohammad at the time of the establishment of the first Islamic community. Whether this method will have a contagious effect upon the surrounding areas is yet to be seen. Darul Arqam followers, who are noted for their rigid disci- pline and sense of purpose, nonetheless are working hard towards realizing their Islamic goal. Ustaz Ashaari, who exercises his influence on his followers through his regular talks, seems determined to give his experi- rment a trial. It may even be said that Darul Arqam's model "society" personifies Ustaz Ashaari's criticism of the government for its failure to implement Islamic law. The Darul Arqam is equally critical of other dakwah groups for what it considers to be their lack of resolve in this matter.

The activities of the Jamaat Tabligh are nonpolitical in nature and some critics even regard this group as totally irrelevant to the political process. Although the organization has a substantial following of Malays, the bulk of its members are Indian and Pakistani Muslims. But the Jamaat Tabligh's constant stress on the need to strengthen one's iman (faith) in God has some implications for the society in which its members operate. The process of self-purification demanded of its followers has caused them to be least concerned with material well-being in the present world. Some of them refuse to participate in the administration of irreligious institutions. Their revulsion against the secular- ist attitude entails a total rejection of the existing political order, which in turn results in their non-participation in it. It is this abstention from politics that provides the organization with its political dimension. It is not surprising therefore that the Malaysian Indian-Muslim Congress (KIMMA), which competes with the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) for Indian support, has failed to get its backing.

Briefly, therefore, the cumulative effect of dakwah activity may be gauged from the responses shown by various groups. From the govern-

16 Ibid.




ment to the ordinary person in the street, Islamic revivalism has become a major talking point of late, especially among those who view the fundamentalist ideas as subversive to the established pattern of Malaysian life. A new context for political participation has also been created as a result of this development.

Government Policy Toward the "New" Islam

On the whole, the Malaysian government has an ambivalent attitude toward the rising tide of Islam in the country. On the one hand, it shows a greater deference to popular Islamic sentiments by concern- ing itself increasingly with Islamic projects. It even praises dakwah efforts in terms that can be considered tantamount to giving direct en- couragement to the revivalist demands for the revitalization of Islam itself. At the same time it has devised various means of combating the influence, including the erecting of barriers to control the movement's growth. In the eyes of the fundamentalists, the government has even contrived to give the impression that the fundamentalists are spreading dakwah songsang (false dakwah) in order to deter the people from be- coming too attracted to Islam.

It is fear of the fundamentalist ideas more than anything else that accounts for the mixed reactions exhibited by the ruling authority. By encouraging dakwah activity, it probably hopes to forestall any major undertakings in that direction by the non-government dakwah groups, thereby earning for itself credit for the effort. In line with this policy, the government has stepped up its own dakwah activities. It was in this spirit that it launched Bulan Dakwah (Missionary Month) in late 1978. Apart from the fact that Islam carries a lot of prestige, the government is aware of its importance as a device against communism and as a solution to several unresolved problems in the country, including drug addiction. A policy statement embodied in one of the government's publications reads: "Concerned about the threat of communist infiltra- tion and the taxing [sic] of moral standards among Malaysia's urban youths, the government as well as the Ministry of Education are seri- ously considering the improvement of Islamic and moral education at all levels, particularly in the country's higher institutions of learning."17

In the face of growing assertiveness of Muslim fundamentalists, the government is practically being forced to talk freely of the need for dakwah activity in society and for Muslims to adopt an Islamic way of life. Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn, in launching the nationwide Bulan Dakwah, encouraged Muslims to adhere strictly to Islamic precepts in propagating Islam and to follow the examples of the Prophet.'8 In a similar vein, the Minister of Law called for a revision of the national legal system so that it could be more in line with the Islamic

17 See Islamic Education in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 1979), p. 5.

18 See New Straits Times, December 2, 1978.




creed.19 The concept of national development is increasingly tempered with religious considerations. In this connection, efforts are also made to give a religious basis to many government ideas. Dr. Mahathir, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, on noting that his efforts to lure foreign investors had run into some difficulties because of opposition from some religious groups, pointed out that the promotion of invest- ment is in accordance with the teachings of Islam.20 Several government ministers too now prefer to preface their speeches with "Assalaamulaik- um"-Muslim greeting now very much in vogue. A greater number of Islamic programs have also been instituted on the radio, and the call to prayer (azan) is televised. Partly encouraged by the new religious consciousness and partly in response to the central government's call for greater dakwah activities, several state governments have also established their own Yayasan Islam (Islamic foundations) with the purpose of disseminating Islamic knowledge to the masses.21 Kedah, for example, has made several moves toward the realization of certain elements of Islamic law in the state.22

Notwithstanding these efforts, the government is aware that a re- laxed view of the fundamentalists' activities would spur them into more actions, hence generating a greater threat to the existing political system. In the first place, the idea of a pristine Islam is uncongenial to the secularists who make up the core of the country's leadership. The older generation of civil servants, who were reared on Western ideas of progress and virtue, are among the most disdainful of present Islamic trends. Second, the secular Malay nationalists fear that if Islam is fully established in the country, it is the Malays who will stand to lose the most because many of the rights and privileges given to them under the present political order will probably disappear in view of the anti- communalist stand for Islam. Coupled with this is government anxiety that a total adoption of Islam as a way of life could set back many of its efforts to modernize the nation. It will particularly hold back what little progress the Malays have achieved at a time they are trying hard to catch up with the more economically advanced Chinese. In addition, the government is also concerned that friction among the populace could arise with the implementation of Islamic laws since more than half of the population subscribes to other religions or ways of life. The question of racial harmony is therefore paramount in the government's stand.23 Because of the above perceptions, Islamic fundamentalism has become one of the biggest thorns in the side of the Malaysian government.

Thus far the government has also made several efforts to dislodge the fundamentalists from their present position of influence in Malay

19 See Watan, July 2, 1978. 20 The Star, April 20, 1979. 21 See Utusan Malaysia, December 1, 1978. 22 See Watan, April 17. 1979; The Star, June 19, 1979; and New Straits Times,

February 1, 1979. 2.3 See New Sunday Times, August 26, 1979.




society. These efforts range from indirect discouragement and tacit disapproval of dakwah activity to blatant condemnation and physical con- tainment of their religious activities. Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn, anxious to stop the groundswell of Islamic fundamentalism, told Muslim preachers "to understand fully the methods for the teaching of the religion so as to avoid disunity among Muslims, creating factions and new sects.' 24 Certain dakwah groups have been 'incriminated" in the name of true Islam. They are accused of being "fanatical" and "extremist"-characteristics considered by the government as not being in line with Islamic teaching, although to the fundamentalists a good Muslim is one who adheres fully and strictly to the precepts taught by the Koran and the Hadith. "As Muslims," noted the Prime Minister, "we must reject fanatical and wrong versions of the religion, for these will only bring disunity among us and the destruction of our religion." Their activities are frequently given the label dakwah songsang to in- dicate that their works, to say the least, are unislamic. Following the Kerling incident of 1978, when several followers of the dakwah movement desecrated a Hindu temple, the government used the incident to draw the attention of the country to the dangers of "religious intolerance." Similarly, the attack on the Batu Pahat police station by a group of Muslim fanatics provided the ruling authority with the ammunition it needed for the campaign against Islamic extremism in the country.

However, no instigations have been made to taint ABIM's or Darul Arqam's or Jamaat Tabligh's brand of Islam with violence. Quoting the Koran, government religious officials declared that "There shall be no coercion in religion" (11:256) and called upon dakwah activists to "invite (all) to the way of your Lord with wisdom and goodly exhortation and argue with them in the best possible manner" (XVI: 125). ABIM, for its part, also voiced its opposition to religious intolerance, and one of its members noted that the Koran has clearly spoken against such actions as the Kerling incident. "Revile not ye those whom they call upon besides Allah, lest they out of spite revile Allah in their ignorance" (VI: 108). However, the desecrators of the Hindu temples were not totally without sympathizers. Several Muslims privately condoned the act on the basis of ukhwah Islamiyah or Islamic brotherhood, stating that their action was carried out to avenge the loss suffered by Muslims in India.

The government has also sought to respond to Islamic revivalism by usurping the fundamentalists' role as champion of the Islamic cause in society. Its participation in dakwah activities through the works of such public bodies as the Pusat Islam (Islamic Centre) and the Yayasan Dakwah Islamiyah (Islamic Missionary Foundation) is equally geared to maintaining some control over the fundamentalist struggle. Under the sponsorship of these or similar organizations, several Muslim schol-

24 See Malaysia, A Mlonthly Review of Malaysian Affairs, April 1977.




ars, well versed in Islamic subjects and known for their uncritical attitude towards government policies (or apologetic towards unislamic ways of life, to use the description of the fundamentalists), have been called upon to preach over the radio and television or in places occasionally frequented by the other dakwah groups. However, they emphasize different aspects of Islam. The revolutionary (Jihad) aspect of Islam is hardly mentioned at all in their public discourses, while the position of Islam as a complete way of life is only spelled out in vague or general terms. Conversely, the teachings of Islam pertaining to the idea of tolerance, good behavior, moral uplift, and the like, which are judged to be uninimical to public interests, are constantly stressed. On the whole, they are more inclined to interpret religious rulings in a manner that makes them compatible with government policies. Reportedly, several government religious functionaries, whose speeches were regarded as tinted with a political character or inimical to the ruling party's interests, are disallowed from practicing their profession.

More recently, as a result of the outbreak of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the government seems to have become more paranoid about the influence of Islamic fundamentalism in the country. The revolution headed by Ayatollah Khomeini is seen as an unwelcome intrusion into Malay political life. The government has not voiced support for the Iranian people's struggle, possibly out of fear that such an action would unnecessarily whet the appetite of the fundamentalists. Instead it has tried to espouse the differences between Sunni Islam (subscribed to by the Malays) and Shi'a Islam (subscribed to by the majority of the Iranians), a move seen by the Islamists as an attempt to confuse the people. Nevertheless, interest in the Iranian Islamic Revolution among the Muslims in general continues to grow. It would be naive, nonetheless, to look upon Khomeini's fans as potential fomentors of an Islamic revolution in Malaysia.

The government has not toned down its condemnation of certain dakwah groups. Their activities that were hostile to government policies, in particular the severe criticism of the government's moves to sacrifice Islamic considerations on the altar of economic advancement, have brought quick rejoinders from the government. Pronouncements that insurance is unacceptable, interest on loans is haramn (forbidden), and the use of receipts from lotteries, for economic programs is opposed to the spirit of Islamic precepts, have been explained away by the government, which says that Islam does not advocate self-denial and that the religion allows adaptability to changing needs. Another area of concern is education. The government fears that the rising generation of Malays, once moved towards the rigidity of orthodox Islam, will reject any intrusion of Western secularism into their schools and make in- sistent demands for pure Islamic education. Consequently, the government has adopted a strategy to make schools eschew relationships with fundamentalist preachers. Since the government places a high premium




on Malay material progress, it quite understandably has made this issue a priority.

Furthermore, there are also government politicians and officers who believe that Malay students have been influenced by "false Islamic teachings" or that their religious life has been permeated with distor- tions. Some of them also believe that certain dakwah organizations are working for communism, and that these students were being used by "anti-national" elements intent on subverting the government's educa- tional policy. Therefore, with a view to neutralizing the teachings of the "extremist" dakwah members, special classes have been arranged for students selected to study abroad so that they will not go astray. Government officials who are highly conversant in Islam are frequently sent overseas to investigate the activities of students and to ascertain that there is no corruption of religion in their life. During his visit to England a certain cabinet minister even criticized the Iranian revolution in an attempt to "chastise" the students for their support of Is- lamic fundamentalism. A more conciliatory approach adopted by the government was to emphasize the importance of education to Malays by referring to the teachings of the Prophet himself who had made the acquisition of knowledge compulsory for all followers of Islam. During their trips abroad, government officials and religious teachers referred to Muslims of the past ages who, armed with Koranic instructions, had travelled far and wide in search of scientific knowledge. This of course was meant to be a reminder to those Malay students who reportedly had contemplated abandoning their studies after being involved in dakwah activities on the belief that Western education did not fit Islamic re- quirements.

If the government's counter-dakwah moves in the field of econom- ics result from fears that Islamic revivalism could have adverse effects on Malay economic development, its actions in the field of education are caused by a concern that Islamic resurgence might affect the government policy that is designed to strengthen the position of the Malays vis-a&-vis the other races. Politically, since ABIM has displayed far too keen an interest in Islam and has, moreover, commanded an important following, the government has of late paid more attention to that revivalist movement than before. In order to undermine its influence, the ruling authority has on certain occasions refused it permission to hold ceramah (talks). ABIM therefore has had to work within certain con- straints. The Registrar of Societies has also served an order on ABIM prohibiting it "from having any affiliation or relationship with any organisation or association that is established outside the Federation of Malaysia." Such a restriction is obviously intended to limit the growth of ABIM as an international dakwah body and in turn to curb its ability to exert an attraction on the Malay populace.

Briefly, therefore, the relationship between the government and the Muslim fundamentalists is marked by suspicion and distrust. The




latter is far from being appeased by Islamic reforms carried out by the government. The fact that Malaysia is constitutionally not an Islamic state has a lot to do with their unease. In their view, there is no convincing evidence as yet of a revival of a Muslim legal structure and practice. Even the Dakwah Month is seen not as an act of generosity on the side of the ruling authority by some Islamic groups. Moreover, a large majority of government religious officers and scholars are regarded as mere mercenaries of a secular system. To make matters worse, those in power, consciously or unconsciously, and despite their growing Is- lamic inclination, continue to proclaim Western values in public life. The government regards the fundamentalists as an anachronism in these modern times. Concerned with practical measures to raise the standard of living among the people, it finds the existing tide of Islam extremely obstructive. Since the government is very much at cross pur- poses with the fundamentalists, it has begun to place a higher premium on Islam as a threat to its position than ever before. Earlier, attempts were made to ban ABIM, but the matter was later shelved. How far the effort invested in trying to manage the new Islamic movement will produce expected results remains to be seen. But if central to its present dilemma is an anxiety related to anticipated political and social ten- sions to be generated by the resurgence, then the government (by taking such a stand) has committed itself to a long, drawn-out battle with the forces of Islam for the simple reason that these very forces are produced within a society that has partly evolved under its own administration. The government's interest in dakwah has also to a certain extent led to the rekindling of religious discussion and even to the reactivation of the shariah itself in the country.

Party Politics and Islamic Revivalism

The two major Malay political parties, the United Malays Na- tional Organisation (UMNO) and Parti Islam (PI), have been affected, though in different ways, by Islamic revivalism. In the wake of the resurgence, they have increasingly invoked Islam to justify many of their decisions on national and international matters. Evidently UMNO, which is dedicated to the nationalist cause (a position often considered in conflict with Islamic ideals), is forced to tread carefully in order to retain its influence. Thus far, many attempts have been made by the party to identify itself with the new Islamic sentiments. UMNO leaders such as Finance Minister Tengku Razaleigh, for example, even claim that the party is indeed striving for the establishment of Islam in the country.25 Perhaps realizing that the current Islamic resurgence is likely to have a destabilizing effect on the minds of UMNO members, Hussein Onn, the party president, has urged them to unite under the

25 5ee Utusan Malaysia, June 30, 1979 and New Straits Times, December 16, 1978.




ruling National Front2,6 (a coalition of several parties under the leadership of UMNO). Nevertheless, most of the party leaders are careful in spelling out their Islamic ideas, basically out of concern that an un- guarded admission of the importance of Islam could undermine the other partners in the National Front27 of UMNO's leadership. UMNO also probably feels politically unsafe to do more than that in view of its status as a Malay nationalist party. Therefore, with notable constraint Dr. Mahathir has stated that "we practice Islam within our means and it is not possible to practice it to the extent of 100 per cent when the country has a sizable non-Malay population."28 On another occasion, he explained that the reason for the non-implementation of all Islamic teachings in the administration of the country was simply the "several factors [which] prohibited such a policy" and pointed out at the same time that "even Saudi Arabia has not fully implemented Islamic teachings-."29 Speaking along the same line, UMNO Youth leader Haji Suhaimi stressed that it was not yet time to establish Islam fully, and any attempt in that direction would only bring confusion to the country.30 More importantly, the resurgence of the Islamic spirit has forced UMNO to be on its guard because of its belief that the revival is being translated into political benefit by its archrival, PI. Since the Malay population is too important to UMNO for it to remain indifferent, the party has to refer to Islam occasionally or otherwise risk losing votes among the Islamic-conscious members of that society. In other words, UMNO, which opposes Islamic fundamentalism but finds Islam a use- ful stick with which to beat its enemy, virtually approximates PI's concern for Islam.31 It is against this backdrop too that UMNO leaders have not toned down their criticism of PI policy, even though the latter has suffered several political setbacks in the recent past.

PI has become radicalized by the existence of this fundamentalist Islamic spirit. For one thing, it can easily look upon the followers of the "new" Islam as its potential followers if not outright supporters. Hence, after going into a decline some time ago, the party is presently taking steps to reorganize itself into a viable political organization again. However, PI too is not without its problems in trying to accom- modate itself to the revivalist mood. First, it is burdened by its past image as an Islamic-nationalist party. In the circumstance, the party finds it difficult to present itself as a full-fledged Islamic party. Second, a good number of its leaders have a tarnished image, that is to say, they

26 Utusan Malaysia, July 6, 1979. 27 The other components of the National Front (Barisan Nasional) were either

non-Malay or multi-racial parties. They were the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerak- an), and the People's Progressive Party (PPP).

28 The Star, April 20, 1979. 29 New Straits Times, June 1, 1979. 30 See Berita Minggu, January 7, 1979. 31 See "The Explosive Mix of Muhamad and Modernity," Far Eastern Economic

Review, February 9, 1979, p. 23.




are either former UMNO loyalists but have been sacked from the party or are those who have failed to show exemplary Islamic character in their everyday life. As a result, although PI remains a beneficiary of Islamic revivalism, the party has to labor under some difficulties, especially in relation to the demands made by certain fundamentalist groups. PI, however, takes the challenge in relatively good spirit. Basic- ally, it tries to exhibit to the fundamentalists in particular, and the public in general, that it in no way is riding on the bandwagon of Islamic resurgence. Its aim is to show that the party has been champion- ing the cause of true Islam through and through, and even long before Islamic revivalism came into vogue in the country.

Emboldened by the rising tide of Islam, PI has become more critical than ever before of UMNO's record in Islamic work and seems to believe that in spite of the latter's enunciation of various Islamic projects, its policy towards Islam has not changed fundamentally. PI has accused the government of attempting to stifle the people's desire for Islam, and sees government efforts as moves to deny "the political realm a religious dimension" (to borrow Robert Bellah's phrase). The party record lately shows that it is once again gaining popularity and is hard at work trying to pick up the pieces from the electoral debacles it suffered in the 1978 general election. In some areas such as Kelantan, PI has returned to great influence once more. The party perceives that the new Islamic revivalism has effectively dramatized a new allegiance among the youth so has begun to give greater attention to this group, but this leads UMNO to accuse PI of using Islam as a weapon to win votes. And as part of its image-making project, PI gave its support to the Islamic revolution in Iran.32 The party leader, Datuk Asri, tried to equate his party's struggle with that of Ayatollah Khomeini's,33 perhaps with the view to convincing the Malay masses of PI's Islamic character.

Berjasa, another Malay political party but not on the same scale as either UMNO or PI, is generally reticent on Islamic revivalism, even though it was originally conceived as an alternative Islamic party to PI. The statements made by its leader, Datuk Mohd. Nasir, now a government minister, are more reflective of the authority he serves than of the party he leads. However, in view of PI's growing popularity, Berjasa may be forced to exploit the Islamic sentiments of the people in order not to be left out of the race. The non-Malay parties understandably are unhappy over the new Islamic trend in the country although they seldom, if at all, exhibit their concern openly. Parti Keadilan Masya- rakat (Pekemas), for example, attacked Zia-ul-Haq's move to implement laws in Pakistan,34 an oblique reference to the PI attempt to bring the country to Islam. The Democratic Action Party (DAP) too shows its disapproval. Following an attempt by the Negeri Sembilan

32 Watan, February 3, 1979. 33 Ibid. 34Ibid., April 25, 1979.




state government to ban Malays from working in bars, the party raised the issue in protest.'m

The last, general elections witnessed a tussle between UMNO and PI in which the impact of Islamic revivalism was very much discern- able in the political process. Their competition took on a religious flavor at many levels. UMNO, fearing that the rival party would reap advantages from the ensuing Islamic resurgence, was driven into taking measures to ensure that PI would not be strengthened by it. UMNO cited many of its past achievements, such as the establishment of the Islamic center, the Islamic Missionary Foundation, and the mosques throughout the country as evidence of its Islamic efforts. Islam of course was a major issue for PI, which tried to drive home the point that the UMNO government had done very little for Islam. UMNO's answer was that the PI leaders were only using verses from the Koran to attract the voters, that religious issues were being used to mask the party's ambitions, and that the party had forged a tactical alliance with ABIM to topple UMNO.36 UMNO's stand in this regard stemmed from the belief that PI had found in that youth movement a dependable vehicle for the promotion of Islam and hence of PI political ideology. The fact that three of ABIM's national leaders-Fathil, Nakhaie, and Syed Ibrahim-resigned their posts in order to run on PI tickets in the election lent further credence to the charge that there was indeed collusion between ABIM and PI. PI, with its questionable record as far as its Islamic work was concerned (the party once ruled Kelantan for more than a decade), did not appear to thrive. Although it was able to util- ize the ambitions of young Muslim fundamentalists,37 the general populace apparently was not yet prepared to see the establishment of an Islamic government. The party now seems to realize that a lot more work remains to be done before it can speak with confidence on the establishment of the Shariah.

The Future of Islam in Malaysia

There is little doubt that the influence of Islam in Malaysia has become more pervasive than ever before. The younger generation will continue to romanticize the ideal of pristine Islam in spite of the ob- stacles placed in the way of Islamic revivalism. As such, Muslim funda- rnentalism will continue to agitate the minds of all groups: the govern-

ment, the political parties, and the general public, Malays and non- Malays alike.

At the same time, the forces against the "new" Islam may raise a greater challenge to it. Apart from the non-Muslim Malaysians who will object to the strict Islamization of society, the core of the Malay pop-

'35 Ibid., Apri'l 17, 1979. .36 See "ABIM dan Politik," Risalah, July-August 1978. 37 See "Generasi Muda dan Masa Depan Negara," Panji Masyarakat, July 1978.




ulace, still imbued with the old conception of religion, is likely to remain opposed to the current revivalism. The kampung folk in particular would abhor any move by the fundamentalists to marry Islam to politics. The ruling party, UMNO, already accustomed to the exercise of power, will continue to contain the forces of Islam, even though for political reasons it will also allow some of its programs to be influenced in the direction of religious orthodoxy. In conclusion, therefore, it is clear that the conflict between the two opposing streams is bound to persist in the future. Only time will tell whether Islam will hold the stage in the future political process or lose its present topical character.

MOHAMAD ABU BAKAR is Lecturer in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.



Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia

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