Islamic Republic of Mauritania: Nouakchott City (Aftout...
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Islamic Republic of Mauritania: Nouakchott City (Aftout Essahli) Drinking Water Supply Project AfDB/IsDB Joint Interim Project Performance Evaluation Report June 2013 AfDB OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT (OPEV) IsDB OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT (GOE) AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT ISLAMIC DEVELOPPEMENT BANK GROUP BANK GROUP
Transcript of Islamic Republic of Mauritania: Nouakchott City (Aftout...
Islamic Republic of Mauritania:
Nouakchott City (Aftout Essahli)
Drinking Water Supply Project
AfDB/IsDB Joint Interim Project Performance
Evaluation Report
June 2013
AfDB OPERATIONS EVALUATION
DEPARTMENT (OPEV)
IsDB OPERATIONS EVALUATION
DEPARTMENT (GOE)
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT ISLAMIC DEVELOPPEMENT BANK GROUP BANK GROUP
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS AND ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................... i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................... ii
PROJECT BASELINE PROJECT DATA ............................................................................................. iii
EVALUATION SUMMARY ............................................................................................................... vi
I. THE PROJECT 1
1.1. Country and Strategic Context ............................................................................................... 1
1.2. Description of the Nouakchott City (Aftout-Essahli) DWS Project ........................................ 1
1.3. Financing of the Nouakchott City (Aftout Essahli) DWS Project ........................................... 2
II. EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY .............................................................. 3
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION ................................................................................................. 4
3.1 Relevance ............................................................................................................................... 4
3.1.1 Relevance of Objectives ............................................................................................... 4
3.1.2 Relevance of Project Design .......................................................................................... 5
3.2 Effectiveness (Achievement of Outcomes) ............................................................................. 7
3.2.1 Achievement of Outputs .............................................................................................. 7
3.2.2 Achievement of Direct Impacts .................................................................................... 7
3.2.3 Achievement of Indirect Impacts ................................................................................ 11
3.2.4 Contribution to Improvement of the Living Conditions of the Population ................ 12
3.3 Effectiveness ......................................................................................................................... 12
3.4 Sustainability ......................................................................................................................... 12
3.5 Overall Project Performance ................................................................................................ 17
IV. OTHER EVALUATIONS ............................................................................................................ 17
4.1 Institutional Development Impact ......................................................................................... 17
4.2 Borrower Performance ......................................................................................................... 18
4.3 AfDB and IsDB Preformance ............................................................................................... 19
4.4 Factors that affected Project Implementation and Outcomes ............................................. 199
V. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................... 20
5.1. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 20
5.2. Key Lessons .......................................................................................................................... 20
5.3. Key Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 20
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ANNEXES .............................................................................................................................................. 0
Annex 1. Logical Intervention Model .............................................................................................. I
Annex 2. Evaluation Criteria .......................................................................................................... II
Annex 3. Institutional Organization of the Water and Sanitation Sector ...................................... III
Annex 4. SNDE Network Coverage in Nouakchott ........................................................................ V
Annex 5. Summary of Ex-Post Environmental Impact Assessment............................................... VI
Annex 6. Diagram of Envisaged Post-Aftout Network ................................................................ VIII
Annex 7. Key Tables ...................................................................................................................... IX
Annex 8. Cost-Benefit Analysis .................................................................................................... XI
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. XI
2. Assumpions and Outcomes of Drinking Water Production Estimates ......................... XI
3. Assumptions and Outcomes of Cost Assessment ..................................................... XIII
4. Assumptions and Outcomes of Income Assessment (AFTOUT) ............................... XVI
5. Calculation of Financial Rate of Return ................................................................... XVIII
6. Calculation of Economic Rate of Return .................................................................... XIX
Annex 9 – Diagnosis of SNDE’s Key Functions ......................................................................... XXII
Annex 10 – Bibliography............................................................................................................. XXV
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS AND ABBREVIATIONS
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency
Unity
Evaluation
(August 2003)
Re-Evaluation
(November 2007)
Completion
(March-2011)
Post-Evaluation
(December-2012)
UA 1 MRO 435.382 MRO 400.332 MRO 434.189 MRO 45.8701
UA 1 EUR 1.15966 EUR 1.08804 EUR 1.137 EUR 1.182
UA 1 USD USD 1.624 USD 1.573 USD 1.535
FISCAL YEAR
(1 January – 31 December)
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
Metric System
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AfDB : African Development Bank
FD : Final Design
CSP : Country Strategy Paper
DWS : Drinking Water Supply
DWSS : Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation
EIRR : Economic Internal Rate of Return
EIS : Environmental Impact Statement
ESIA : Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
ESMP : Environmental and Social Management Plan
FIRR : Financial Internal Rate of Return
ID : Islamic Dinar
IsDB : Islamic Development Bank
MDG : Millennium Development Goal
MICS : Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
ONAS : National Sanitation Authority
ONEP : National Drinking Water Authority
OPEV : Operations Evaluation Department of AfDB
PCR : Project Completion Report
PMU : Project Management Unit
PPAR : Project Performance Evaluation Report
PRSP : Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SNDE : Société nationale de l’eau (National Water Corporation)
SONEDE
: Société nationale d'exploitation et de distribution des eaux (National
Water Development and Distribution Corporation)
UA : Unit of Account
USA : United States of America
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This Interim Evaluation Report was prepared by
a joint team from the Operations Evaluation
Department of the African Development Bank
Group (AfDB) and the Islamic Development
Bank (IsDB) Group comprising:
Anasse Aissami, Manager, Project and
Special Evaluation Division,
IsDB/GOE;
Ahmed Ag Aboubacrine, Senior
Evaluation Specialist, IsDB/GOE;
Joseph Mouanda, Senior Evaluation
Officer, AfDB/ OPEV and
Clément T. Bansé, Evaluation Officer,
AfDB/OPEV.
The team received sound technical guidance and
advice from Manaï Hédi Mohamed, Division
Manager (AfDB/OPEV).
The report was drafted on the basis of technical
notes prepared by Babacar Dieng (International
Consultant - Water and Sanitation Specialist),
Sidna Ndah Mohamed-Saleh (Local Consultant
- Socio-Economist/Statistician) and Mohamed
Abdellahi Ould Selme (Local Consultant -
Environmentalist), as well as on the basis of the
findings of missions to Mauritania from 22 to 27
September 2012 and from 7 to 22 December
2012.
The evaluation also includes comments from
Operational Departments of AfDB and IsDB,
provided particularly by Chanda Osward
Mulenga, Losa Fabio Beniamino, Moumni
Monia, Bensassi Belgacem and El-Ouahabi
Mohamed from AfDB, and Idrissa Dia, Papa
Abdoulaye Sy and Sohail Mitha from IsDB.
Administrative management and secretarial
support were provided by Ms. Diop Myrtha, Ms.
Ruby Adzobu and Ms. Imen Trabelsi from
AfDB, as well as Messrs. Sidi Aziz El-Hilali and
Viqaruddin Ansari from IsDB.
The evaluation team would like to sincerely
thanks to the authorities of the Islamic Republic
of Mauritania and to all those we met during the
field missions, in particular Mr. Mohamed
Lemine Ould Dhehbi – Director-General of
Investment Projects and Programmes, Dr.
Mohamed Ould Lemrabott - Director of
Resource Mobilization and External Aid
Coordination (DMRCAE), Oumar Ould
Moulaye Idriss - IsDB Project Portfolio Officer,
Sidi Ould Mohamed Lamine – Manager - Aftout
Essahli Project Management Unit, Abdallahi
Ould Hedyetti – PMU Administrative and
Financial Director, Mohamed Khalifa Ould
Biyah – SNDE General Manager, Zechariah
Heyine – SNDE Cooperation and Development
Advisor, Ahmed Salem Ould Abderraouf -
SNDE Chief Operating Officer at Aftout, and
Zeini Sidi Mohamed - IsDB Representative in
Mauritania.
We also wish to thank the development partners
based in Nouakchott for kindly sharing their
experience with us.
Rakesh Nangia Director,
Operations Evaluation Department,
African Development Bank (AfDB/OPEV).
Mohameden M. Sidiya Director,
Operations Evaluation Department, Islamic
Development Bank Group (IsDB/GOE).
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PROJECT BASELINE DATA
A- Preliminary Data
1. Country : Islamic Republic of Mauritania
2. Projet Name : Nouakchott City (Aftout-Essahli) Drinking Water Supply Project
3. Sector/Theme : Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation
4. Borrower : Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
5. Beneficiaries : Population of Nouakchott and rural areas along the aqueduct
6. Executing
Agency : National Water Distribution Corporation (SNDE)
B- Project Financial Data
Table 1: Dates and Amounts of Loans and Grants
Loan/Grant No.
AfDB IsDB
P-MR-EA0-
004 P-MR-EA0-007 P-MR-EA0-008 2MAU96 2MAU0112
Type (Loan/Grant) Initial Loan Suppl. Loan Grant Initial Loan Suppl. Loan
Approval date 24/09/2003 28/05/2008 14/05/2010 01/09/2003 08/09/2007
Signature date 16/12/2003 12/11/2008 27/05/2010 15/10/2003 05/12/2007
Effectiveness date 08/03/2004 07/05/2009 27/05/2010 14/08/2004 07/06/2008
Loan closing date
31/12/2009
carried forward
to 31/12/2010
31/12/2010 31/12/2010 14/08/2008 18/10/2010
First disbursement
date 25/05/2006 25/05/2009 16/08/2010 16/06/2008 27/10/2009
Loan/Grant
amount: UA 10 million UA 9.46 million UA 3.59 million
ID 7 million
(equiv. to USD
9.66 million)
ID 4.17 million
(equiv. to USD
6.25 million)
Disbursed amount: UA 22 946 733.19 ID 11.17 million (equiv. to USD
16.75 million)
% Disbursed: 99.50% 100% (in terms of ID)
Cancelled amount
(in UA)
UA 102 266.81 or 0.5 % of the overall loan financing
amount N.A.
Table 2: Breakdown of the Initial Project Financing
Sources In MRO million In UA million % of
Total F.E. L.C Total F.E. L.C Total
AFESD 23.59 0.98 24.57 67.54 2.81 70.35 45.16%
KFAED 7.26 0.86 8.12 20.78 2.46 23.24 14.92%
SFD 6.52 0.86 7.38 18.66 2.46 21.12 13.56%
IsDB 2.34 - 2.34 6.69 - 6.69 4.29%
ADF 3.49 - 3.49 10 - 10 6.42%
Mauritanian
Govt 8.51 8.51 24.4 24.37
15.64%
Total 43.2 11.2 54.41 123.67 32.1 155.8 100.00% Source: Supplementary Loan Evaluation Report, OWAS/AfDB, May 2008.
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Table 3: Breakdown in Project Financing Revised in 2007, by Source (UA)
Sources 2003 Evaluation 2007 Re-evaluation % of
Total F.E. L.C. Total F.E. L.C. Total
AFESD 67.54 2.81 70.35 150.34 2.81 153.15 46.36%
KFAED 20.78 2.46 23.24 45.98 2.46 48.44 14.66%
SFD 18.66 2.46 21.13 36.75 2.46 39.21 11.87%
IsDB 6.69 6.69 11.90 0.00 11.90 3.60%
ADF 10.00 10.00 25.01 0.99 26.00 7.87%
OPEC - 5.40 0.00 5.40 1.63%
Mauritanian
Gvt - 24.37 24.37 10.91 35.34 46.25 14.00%
Total 123.67 32.10 155.78 286.29 44.06 330.35 100% Source: Supplementary Loan Evaluation Report, OWAS/AfDB, May 2008.
Table 4: Breakdown of the Revised Financing in line with the Various Project Phases
Financing
Sources
2003 Estimates
(in UA million)
Cost re-evaluated in
2007
(in UA million) %
Increase
F.E. L.C. Total F.E. L.C. Total
A
Intake structure and
pumping station
(Lot 2)
SFD & IRM 7.95 1.73 9.68 20.9 9.05 29.95 209.40%
B Water treatment structure
(Lot 1) KFAED & IRM 12.86 2.86 15.72 40.66 2.27 42.93 173.09%
C Raw water pipes
(Lot 4)
AFESD - KFAED
-SDF-OPEC &
IRM
79.88 19.9 99.78 178.89 24.2 203.1 103.53%
D Pre-treated water reservoir
Nouakchott (Lot 3) IsDB & IRM 6.69 2.49 9.18 14.42 2.41 16.83 83.33%
E
Treated water transfer pipe
and Nouakchott reservoir
(Lot 5)
AfDB & IRM 9.16 3 12.16 24.17 3.99 28.16 131.58%
F Consultancies, works
inspection and supervision
AFESD - KFAED
-SFD & IRM 4.55 0.39 4.94 4.62 0.4 5.02 1.62%
G Institutional support and
project management AFESD & IRM 2.59 1.73 4.32 2.63 1.76 4.39 1.62%
Total 123.68 32.1 155.8 286.29 44.1 330.4 112.07%
Source: Supplementary Loan Evaluation Report, OWAS/ AfDB, May 2008.
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Table 5: Actual Project Costs by Component
Lot
# Component
Amount in USD million Variation
(Evaluation
vs Current)
Evaluation
(2003)
Re-Evaluation -
(2007)
Current
Amount
1
Water treatment structure
22.32 58 57.56 158%
2 Water intake structure and
pumping station
13.75 43.7 39.04 184%
3
Pre-treated water
reservoir at Nouakchott
PK 17
13.03 22.6 22.60 74%
4
Pipes for conveying
drinking water from
Aftout to the reservoir
(PK 17)
141.68 272.6 273.31 93%
5
Transport of water to the
existing distribution
network
17.27 38.2 37.93 120%
6 Land expropriation 0.45 13.6 0.75 67%
7 Consultancies 1.00 1.00 0%
8 Works supervision 5.50 10.70 95%
9 Institutional support 3.50 3.50 0%
10 Project management 1.50 5.00 233%
TOTAL 220.00 448.7 451.39 105%
Tableau 6: Estimated and Actual Project Costs by Source
Financing Source
Amount of Financing in USD million
(% of Total)
Estimate Actual
IsDB (Lot # 3) 9.66 (4.4%) 16.75 (3.7%)
AFESD (Lots # 1,3, 4,7,8 & 9)* 99.90 (45.4%) 215.11 (47.7%)
SFD (Lots # 2. 4 & 8) 30.00 (13.6%) 55.19 (12.2%)
KFAED (Lots # 1, 4 & 8) 33.00 (15%) 68.19 (15.0%)
OPEC (Lot # 4) 6.60 (3%) 14.8 (3.3%)
AfDB (Lot # 5) 13.00 (5.9%) 33.66 (7.5%)
Mauritanian Govt (Lots #1-6,8 & 10)* 27.84 (12.7%) 47.69 (10.6%)
Source: IsDB Project Completion Report– 2012
*It should be noted that AFESD also supported the Government in financing part of lots 1 and 3
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C- Rate of Return
Return AfDB IsDB Joint
Evaluation
(AfDB/IsDB) Evaluation Completion Evaluation Completion
Economic rate of
return
EIRR (2008): 16.4%
EIRR (2003): 17.4% - - EIRR: 15.9%
Financial rate of return FIRR (2008): 3.9%
FIRR (2003): 4.2% - - FIRR: 0.33%
D- Performance Rating
Evaluation Criteria
AfDB IsDB Joint Evaluation
(AfDB/IsDB) PCR PCR Review PCR PCR Review
A PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
1 Relevance and quality
at entry Satisfactory Satisfactory
Very
satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory
2 Effectiveness
(Achievement of
objectives)
Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Very
satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory
3 Efficiency Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
4 Sustainability Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Very
satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Very
unsatisfactory
B Overall Performance Unsatisfactory
OTHER EVALUATIONS
5 Institutional impact
Very
unsatisfactory
6 Borrower performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Very
satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory
7 Bank performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Very
satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory
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EVALUATION SUMMARY
THE PROJECT
This interim evaluation concerns the performance of the Nouakchott City (Aftout Essahli)
Drinking Water Supply Project, which comprises a production phase and a distribution phase.
These two phases were originally scheduled to take place simultaneously but, for various
reasons, the distribution has been considerably delayed. This production-distribution gap
justifies the interim nature of this evaluation, especially as the project’s full result chain will
not be finally known until after completion of the distribution phase scheduled for 2014. This
interim evaluation reviews, in particular, the extent to which the expected project outcomes are
likely to be achieved. It seeks to take stock of what works well or what does not work so well
and why, so as to draw lessons and make appropriate recommendations for the benefit of the
beneficiary populations.
As regards direct impacts of the project, the expected improvements concern: (i) SNDE’s
operational capacity so as to enhance the quality of services provided; (ii) SNDE’s drinking
water production capacity; (iii) sustainable access to a drinking water supply system for both
network subscribers and non-subscribers, as well as the rural population along the aqueduct.
The project’s initial total cost was estimated at nearly USD 220 million, to be jointly provided
by the Government of Mauritania and development partners, including the African
Development Fund (ADF) and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)1. However, due to delays
after the project started in 2004 and substantial increases in the price of materials, sea freight
rates and currency fluctuations, the cost rose to USD 451 million.
EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
The evaluation was conducted in four key phases2. As regards methodology, the evaluation was
based on: (i) a literature review; (ii) interviews with key stakeholders; (iii) field visits to project
areas; (iv) direct observation of the infrastructure built; and (v) a mini-survey among the
population and group discussions to assess the effects and impacts of the project.
The user survey was conducted on a sample of about 500 households. The quota sampling
method3 was preferred. The environmental impact was assessed through: (i) an analysis of the
environmental impact statement conducted before project start-up in 2001; (ii) a review of the
environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) which focused on the performance testing
and operation phase in 2010; and (iii) an assessment of project actual impacts after two years
of operation. The analysis combines both the before/after and with/without the project methods.
One of the drawbacks of the methodology remains the difficulty of having an appropriate
comparator group.
1 The other partners include: Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic
Development (KFAED), Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) and OPEC Fund. 2 (i) Preparation of a guideline document; (ii) collection of preliminary data on project effects and impacts; (iii) field
missions; and (iv) analysis of the collected data for preparation of the initial and final PPER. 3 The quota sample was based on available data and information for segmenting the population. The data were obtained from
MICS 2011 on the breakdown of Nouakchott households according to drinking water supply method.
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KEY FINDINGS
Finding 1: The relevance of project objectives is deemed satisfactory. The project is in line
not only with Mauritanian Government policies and strategies but also with AfDB and IsDB
priorities. It also responds to a specific need of the people of Nouakchott City and rural areas
along the aqueduct.
The project is fully consistent with the country’s policies and strategies,
particularly as set out in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework (PRSF) and
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In addition, through sustainable
water supply and capacity building for actors of the water and sanitation sector,
the project will help improve the living conditions of the populations concerned,
which the AfDB and IsDB consider a priority in their respective country
assistance strategies.
The project responds to a specific need of the people of Nouakchott City and
rural areas along the aqueduct. Indeed, the inhabitants of Nouakchott had been
facing a critical water shortage problem due to lack of water production and the
fact that the existing network was antiquated and inadequate. The villages along
the aqueduct were previously using untreated river water, with high risks of
contracting waterborne diseases.
Finding 2: The relevance of the project design is deemed satisfactory. The assumptions/risks
and mitigation measures were well identified at project design. The technical choices made
seemed appropriate, although they have impacts on costs, as well as operating and
maintenance requirements.
The key assumptions and risks identified concerned: (i) the lack of or inadequate
investments for the rehabilitation and extension of drinking water distribution
networks in Nouakchott; (ii) delays in resource mobilization and construction of
wastewater treatment networks in Nouakchott; (iii) SNDE’s weak institutional
and organizational capacity; and (iv) insufficient or lack of ownership of project
outputs by the stakeholders. The proposed mitigation measures had not been
properly analysed.
There are obvious advantages in the technical choices made for the use of
advanced technology, high quality structures and equipment, high-level
treatment processes and management systems, and an appropriate level of
security. However, they have consequences in terms of costs, as well as
operation, maintenance and staff quality requirements. SNDE’s resources,
efficiency and current organization fall short of these conditions. In addition, for
the Aftout project, SNDE did not benefit from the shared experiences of IsDB
and AfDB in terms of support from water corporations (for instance, the cases
of Burkina Faso and Cameroon).
Finding 3: Project effectiveness is deemed satisfactory on the whole. The project has achieved
high quality physical outputs which helped to significantly raise drinking water production
capacity. However, the institutional support component did not produce satisfactory results.
The project has achieved functional physical outputs (stations, reservoirs, aqueducts,
remote management system, power supply, etc.) in compliance with the rules of the trade.
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Satisfactory completion of physical facilities enabled the project to significantly improve
SNDE’s drinking water production capacity since water is now available in sufficient
quantity. The capacity of the designed system is large enough to meet additional demand
up to end-2030, with reserves available for the installation of additional equipment to
further increase production capacity.
In contrast, the institutional support component did not produce satisfactory results. Indeed,
although a detailed diagnostic study of SNDE was conducted, very few institution building
activities were undertaken during the production phase. Furthermore, the current measures
being implemented by SONEDE (Tunisia) and ONEP (Morocco) to build SNDE’s capacity
seem to be at variance with the Mauritanian operator’s current needs.
However, project impacts are still limited in terms of improving drinking water access for the
beneficiary populations due, in particular, to: (i) the gap between the production and
distribution phases; (ii) the existence of a functional antiquated network; (iii) poor management
of drinking water services by SNDE, coupled with low technical and financial returns, which
the institutional support provided could not overcome; and (iv) the lack of an appropriate
sanitation network.
Overall, the people of Nouakchott are gradually gaining sustainable access to
drinking water, but the access remains limited due to lack of an appropriate
distribution system. Average consumption in Nouakchott City is still below the
50 litres/day/person recommended by some experts as the standard. Some
Nouakchott households still face difficulties in accessing drinking water,
especially in areas that are not yet connected to the network and where private
actors continue to speculate. In rural areas, only the villages of Keur Macène and
Béni Nadji, located near the water intake facility, enjoy permanent drinking
water access.
Although the new PK17 treatment station provides an additional amount of
nearly 84 000 m3 of water per day, a good portion (about 58%) of the water is
lost due to leaks in the old distribution network. The increase in drinking water
production, coupled with high pressure in the distribution network and the poor
quality of the old network, has worsened leakage, thereby causing flooding in
low-lying areas of the city. Furthermore, nearly 80% of the drinking water
consumed (about 11 million litres) becomes wastewater which, in the case of
Nouakchott, is partly released into the sub-soil by standalone sewage networks.
Finding 4: Project efficiency is deemed unsatisfactory. Although the project’s economic
return is unquestionable, its financial return is negatively impacted by the exceptional level of
investments. Similarly, the scope of the project makes it difficult to conduct a cost-effectiveness
analysis since comparisons are not appropriate.
The project is economically profitable, although its financial viability is limited
by the exceptional level of investment costs. A mix of at least the following
options is necessary to obtain a financial rate of return of about 3%: a 20%
increase in the price of water, an 80% maximum network performance, and the
possibility of subsidizing investments by more than 10%, as well as any other
initiative aimed at reducing SNDE operating expenses.
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The cost-effectiveness ratios cannot easily be compared. The investment cost,
for example, is USD 282 per capita or USD 2 274 per cubic metre of water
produced per day. It is not easy to compare these ratios with those of other
projects in countries of the sub-region due to the huge disparities observed in the
nature of projects (technical solutions, consistency, etc.) and their financing
arrangements.
Finding 5: The overall project sustainability is deemed very unlikely. The project
sustainability is currently compromised by its environmental, financial and technical viability.
The evaluation has revealed the need to: (i) further strengthen the commitment of the
Government of Mauritania and socio-political support; (ii) overcome the enormous challenges
faced by SNDE in independently ensuring the maintenance and optimal functioning of
structures inherited from the Aftout project; and (iii) urgently find appropriate solutions to
sanitation problems in the City of Nouakchott.
The technical viability of the project is enhanced by a satisfactory level of conservation of
the production source, low risk of conflict related to the use of water from the Senegal
River and the quality of the technology adopted for structures and equipment, as well as
for the management system. However, SNDE is facing enormous challenges related to the
operation and maintenance of these facilities.
The reservoir installed at PK17 ensures Nouakchott’s drinking water supply autonomy for
48 hours, in the event of a breakdown of the infrastructure located upstream. However, the
use of maintenance procedures that do not meet the manufacturer’s standards may cause
prolonged production interruptions. Such an eventuality would present enormous risks of
drinking water shortage in Nouakchott.
The current weaknesses in terms of preventive maintenance may result in damage to basic
equipment. SNDE has contracted the maintenance of the new facilities to the private
companies that installed the equipment in order to temporarily overcome this situation
which undermines the medium and long-term sustainability of the new facilities. The
sustainability of these facilities will remain a challenge if there is no real skills transfer
through appropriate training for SNDE staff. Besides the distribution capacity that is still
very limited, SNDE is also facing difficulties at the commercial level stemming from its
inability to control billing rates and stem the tide of illegal connections.
Long-term Government commitment is reflected in the existence of a legal framework
comprising mainly laws and decrees relating to the water code, the relevant powers of the
Minister in charge of Water and Sanitation, and the duration and conditions of exercise of
the delegated drinking water distribution functions to SNDE. However, there is a
programme contract between the State of Mauritania and SNDE, dating back to 1996 and
covering a three-year period, which lays down the drinking water supply management
framework, but it has not yet been renewed. Hence, a priori, the contractual basis for
cooperation between the State and SNDE no longer exists.
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Considering that Nouakchott lacks an appropriate sanitation system, the project will have
significant environmental impacts on the city. Given the increase in drinking water
production, the high pressure in the distribution network and the poor quality of the old
network, water leaks have escalated and led to flooding in some low-lying areas of the city.
Finding 5a: In light of the foregoing, the overall project performance at this stage is deemed
unsatisfactory. This is mainly due to the production-distribution gap, which delayed the
manifestation of expected outcomes and created risks relating to the operation and maintenance
of infrastructure by SNDE. The construction of production infrastructure and the ongoing
construction of distribution facilities will significantly improve the induced effects on the
population’s living conditions. However, this improvement is contingent on the streamlining of
appropriate measures to mitigate sustainability risks related to SNDE’s operational
inefficiency as well as the City of Nouakchott’s poor liquid and solid waste management system.
Finding 6: The impact on institutional development is deemed unsatisfactory. Although the
project has helped to strengthen the private sector by creating opportunities for direct
intervention in partnership with foreign enterprises, the institutional development impact is still
limited, especially since the project has not started providing enough capacity building to
SNDE which is a key player of the system.
The project has helped to strengthen the private sector by helping to create a very
favourable environment for the establishment of small enterprises in the water
and sanitation sector (network installation works, plumbing and various
services).
On the other hand, the project has not provided enough capacity building to
SNDE, a key player in the water sector institutional framework. The impacts of
institutional support measures are still very limited. Although there are
increasingly visible outcomes at the physical level, the situation is different with
respect to the organizational and institutional level at SNDE.
LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Key Lessons
Lesson 1: In the quest for greater efficiency, a holistic approach incorporating the different
project components (water production and distribution, restructuring the management of water
services, sanitation and change in user behaviour by raising awareness) is required for the
design, but will remain inadequate unless the implementation conditions are met.
Lesson 2: In formulating projects of such magnitude, it is essential to define clear financing and
management provisions for the operation and maintenance of facilities and equipment, and to
ensure greater private sector involvement in the water sector.
Lesson 3: Government leadership and commitment in mobilizing development partners is
needed in this type of large-scale project.
Lesson 4: A single consultant should be maintained to oversee the entire project in order to
enhance consistency in work implementation and improve performance quality.
xii
Lesson 5: Using a project management unit that is independent from the structure responsible
for the operation of the system can certainly help ensure successful implementation, but does
not guarantee strengthening of the structure’s operational capacity.
xiii
Key Recommendations
Government of Mauritania
As part of the reform, SNDE and its support structures should be transformed,
taking all appropriate measures and revising the SNDE-State programme-
contract.
Speed up the implementation of the Nouakchott sanitation system in order to
provide a healthy environment for the city’s inhabitants, and thus mitigate the
negative environmental impacts caused especially by the amount of wastewater
discharged into the environment.
Rethink the water pricing policy in order to ensure proper functioning and
sustainability of equipment without penalizing the people.
SNDE
Develop a new strategic plan and undertake a comprehensive reform of the
corporation to ensure its operational efficiency and availability of resources
required for operation and maintenance. The support it currently receives from
the State and development partners is an important asset.
Conduct a technical audit of the corporation’s main functions and develop a
risk management action plan, which should be implemented and monitored to
gradually reduce bottlenecks affecting SNDE.
Negotiate a programme-contract with the supervisory authority based on clear
objectives, quantified targets and the allocation of corresponding resources. The
most recent programme-contract between the State and SNDE dates back to the
late 1990s.
Development Partners (especially AfDB and IsDB)
Consider concrete actions to address the risk associated with SNDE’s actual
capacity to maintain infrastructure that is vital for the country, given that
prolonged water shortage in Nouakchott may impinge on social peace.
Support the Mauritanian Government’s efforts to quickly improve liquid and
solid waste management in the City of Nouakchott, particularly by granting
constant technical and financial assistance for the project to achieve its ultimate
goal of improving the living conditions of the beneficiary population.
1
I. THE PROJECT
1.1. Country and Strategic Context
1. Mauritania is a country with a population estimated at 3.5 million inhabitants in 2011.
It covers an area of 1,030,700 km2, of which 90% is desert. Recurrent droughts have contributed
to massive rural exodus to urban centres across the country, particularly the capital, resulting in
uncontrolled and unplanned urban sprawl and high pressure on existing drinking water and
sanitation infrastructure.
2. The capital City of Nouakchott has experienced exceptional population growth, from
5 500 inhabitants in 1960 to 558 195 in 2000 and about 870 073 in 2012. The surface area of
the capital rose from 1 800 hectares in 1970 to 100 000 hectares, with uncontrolled land
occupation. The city’s water needs have been on a steady rise in recent years; the needs were
estimated at more than 100 000 m³/d in 2010, 170 000 m³/d in 2020 and 226 000 m³/d in 2030.
This trend has resulted in a sharp increase in water access inequalities (80% of the population
relies on sources outside the network for its water supply).
3. Consequently, the Iddini well field, which has a maximum capacity of 55 000 m³/day,
is sustained by the Trarza water table and was the only available water resource that supplied
Nouakchott until then, was no longer able to meet the city’s needs. The Nouakchott water
supply network also has a limited coverage (730 km for an area of 100 000 ha, that is, less than
8m of pipeline per inhabitant) and pipes of small diameter (less than or equal to 63mm)4. These
characteristics account for the unavailability of water for households connected to the network
of the National Water Corporation (SNDE) and users of the services provided by a variety of
private actors (standpipe operators and standpipe attendants, carter pushers and SNDE
subscribers who resell water), leading to speculation and soaring water prices.
4. The final problem facing the Nouakchott drinking water supply network relates to
water quality degradation, resulting from two phenomena:
The poor sealing of drinking water supply network is likely to expose the
network to external faecal pollution from inadequate sanitation systems (lack of
sewerage network);
The high number of stakeholders in the long distribution chain, especially for
households not connected to the distribution network: this situation leads to the
involvement of too many operators in water handling and poor storage
conditions, thereby increasing the risk of contamination of water from the
network.
1.2. Description of the Nouakchott City (Aftout-Essahli) DWS Project
5. The Government of Mauritania decided in 2001 to conduct a study aimed at satisfying
the drinking water needs of the City of Nouakchott until 2030 from the Senegal River (Aftout
Essahli Project) in an effort to solve all the above-mentioned water problems that undermine
the capital city’s economic and social development. The project’s sector goal was to enhance
drinking water access and improve the living conditions of the population through: (i) reduced
4 Ebaye Ould Dah Ould Sidi M'Bey, “Analysis of the process of accessing drinking water in Nouakchott”
(http://www.cridem.org/imprimable.php?article=48146 ).
2
health expenditure; (ii) an increase in income; (iii) job creation in industry and tourism; and (iv)
improved school attendance.
6. As regards the direct project impacts, improvements were expected at the following
levels: (i) SNDE’s operational capacity, thereby improving the quality of services provided; (ii)
SNDE’s drinking water production capacity; (iii) sustainable access to a drinking water system
for network subscribers and people supplied through carters or living along the aqueduct.
7. In the medium term, these direct impacts would help to: (i) improve the management
of groundwater resources; (ii) reduce the drudgery of fetching drinking water; (iii) develop the
industry and tourism sectors; and (iv) reduce the incidence of waterborne diseases.
8. The physical facilities needed to achieve the above objectives and impacts include: (i)
raw water intake and pumping facilities from the Senegal River to Aftout (more than 170 km
from Nouakchott); (ii) two parallel raw water pipelines with a diameter of 1 100 mm and a
length of 6 km; (iii) pre-treatment facilities at the Béni Nadji site; (iv) a 1400 mm pipeline over
a distance of 170 km; (v) a pre-treated water storage reservoir of 129 000 m3 at PK17 along the
Nouakchott-Rosso road; (vi) five anti-hammer reservoirs; (vii) treatment structures (pumping
station, sand filter, chlorinated water production network) at PK17; (viii) a pipe with a diameter
of 1 200 mm and a length of 19 km; and (ix) an elevated reservoir with a capacity of 1 000 m3
at PK17 and a semi-buried reservoir with a capacity of 5 000 m3 at a location known as
“Nouakchott water tower system”. The general diagram of the project output is shown in the
figure below (see also the project diagram in Annex 3).
Figure 1: General Diagram of Project Outputs
9. The outputs will benefit from SNDE institutional support comprising: (i) the provision
of equipment and tools; (ii) conduct of an organizational study which, after validation, will be
coupled with an implementation plan.
1.3. Financing of the Nouakchott City (Aftout Essahli) DWS Project
10. The Aftout Essahli Project was financed by the African Development Fund (ADF), the
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), the Kuwait Fund for Arab
Economic Development (KFAED), the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD), the Islamic
Development Bank (IsDB), and the OPEC Fund. The total initial project cost estimate was USD
220 million, to which should be added the supplementary financing supported by donors during
their meeting in Nouakchott on 22 and 23 July 2007. The current total financing amounts to
approximately USD 451 million, jointly provided by donors and the Mauritanian Government
as follows:
Senegal
Aftout Intake
Structure
Diallo Beni Nadji Tiguent Nouakchott PK14 Nouakchott
Water Tower
Raw Water Clarified Water Drinking Water
Intake Structure
Drainage Pump Pre-treatment
Pump
Booster
Treatment
Pumping Reserve
3
Table 1: Project Sources of Financing
Sources Initial Funding
USD M
Final Funding
USD M
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) 99.9 215.11
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) 33 68.19
Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) 9.66 16.75
African Development Bank (AfDB) 13 33.66
Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) 30 55.19
OPEC Fund 6.6 14.80
Islamic Republic of Mauritania (IRM) 27.84 47.69
TOTAL 220.0 451.39
Source: SNDE-UGPA, Progress Report, August 2007 – IsDB Completion Report, 2010.
11. After the project start-up in 2004, its implementation was delayed for the following
main reasons:
delays in the establishment of the project management unit, particularly in the
recruitment of staff to operate it;
significant delays in the procurement of goods and services, mainly in the stages
leading to the selection of contractors to carry out the works (preparation of
bidding documents, launching and award of contracts, etc.);
significant increase in costs, which rose from UA 155.78 million (USD 220
million), at initial appraisal, to UA 330.35 million (USD 451 million), mainly
due to an escalation of the prices of materials, shipping rates (rising costs of oil)
and exchange rate fluctuations.
II. EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
12. The evaluation is intended to contribute to improving the current or future policies,
strategies and operations of the two institutions, drawing lessons, and making
recommendations. It is based on internationally accepted criteria for assessing development
assistance activities: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Other
project impacts on development as well as the performance of the Borrower, AfDB and IsDB
are also considered. The evaluation also draws on Good Practice Standards for the Evaluation
of Public Sector Operations5, as adopted by the Evaluation Cooperation Group of the
Multilateral Development Banks.
13. The evaluation was conducted in four main phases6. From a methodological
standpoint, it was based on: (i) a literature review; (ii) interviews with key stakeholders; (iii)
field trips to the project areas during the fact-finding and evaluation missions; (iv) structured
direct observation of the infrastructure built; and (v) a mini-survey among residents and group
discussions to assess project effects and impacts.
14. The user survey was conducted on a sample of about 500 households7. The quota
sampling method was used. The quota sample was based on available data that helped to
segment the population and corresponded to the MICS 2011 survey data on the breakdown of
households in Nouakchott by mode of drinking water supply.
5 Good Practice Standards for the Evaluation of Public Sector Operations, Revised Edition, 2012. 6 (i) The preparation of a guideline document; (ii) collection of preliminary data on project effects and impacts; (iii) field
missions; and (iv) analysis of the data collected for the preparation of the initial and final PPER. 7 A total of 496 households, including 429 from Nouakchott, distributed among the various moughataa, and 27 households
from the localities of Keur Macène, Mbario and Béni Nadji that the project supplies with drinking water.
4
15. The environmental impact was assessed through: (i) an analysis of the environmental
impact statement issued prior to the start of the project in 2001; (ii) a review of the ESIA which
focused on the performance testing and operation phase in 2010; and (iii) an evaluation of the
project’s actual impacts after two years of operation.
16. The analysis combines the before/after and with/without project methods. The
before/after method is particularly reinforced by the fact that the project is the largest
investment made to overcome water shortage in the City of Nouakchott. This methodology is
limited by the difficulty of having an appropriate comparator group.
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
3.1 Relevance
3.1.1 Relevance of Objectives
17. These objectives are fully consistent with the country’s development policies and
strategies, as set out particularly in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework (PRSF)
and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The various Poverty Reduction Strategy
Framework papers - PRSF I, II, and III – define the country’s broad strategic development
guidelines in the various sectors, including water supply and sanitation, while the water sector
policy statement provides more details on the water supply and sanitation sector guidelines.
18. Two significant actions were undertaken in this respect. First, in 2002, Mauritania
ratified the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and pledged “to halve, by 2015, the
proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic
sanitation”. Secondly, since 2005, consultation with the various stakeholders involved in the
water sector was initiated to ensure better visibility of the sector and enhanced coordination.
19. The main objective of water sector development as stated in the PRSF is to
“sustainably improve access to water and sanitation in terms of quantity, quality and affordable
prices for all”. Achieving this objective requires action in the following areas: (i) broader access
to drinking water; (ii) knowledge and protection of water resources; (iii) better sanitation
conditions, (iv) closer public-private partnership; and (v) capacity building for the sector’s
stakeholders.
20. As regards the urban water sector, the objectives could be achieved mainly by: (i)
strengthening SNDE’s production and distribution capacity; (ii) undertaking the rehabilitation
and extension of the Nouakchott public drinking water distribution network in order to cope
with the increasing demand for water and improve the water supply access rate; (iii) improving
service level in the outskirts and slums through the promotion of direct access to the public
drinking water network (private connections); (iv) seeking financial equilibrium in the urban
water sector, while maintaining a pro-poor pricing policy; (v) choosing a public-private
partnership institutional option to manage the operation of drinking water in urban areas; and
(vi) strengthening the reliability of electric power supply in large cities with a view to ensuring
drinking water production.
5
21. With respect to sanitation, the goal was to achieve a wastewater disposal rate of about
65% in urban areas (especially in Nouakchott). Following the establishment of the institutional
framework through the creation of the Directorate of Sanitation and the National Office for
Sanitation, the following actions were identified: (i) finalizing the urban planning and sanitation
master plans as well as studies on sanitation technologies already initiated; (ii) seeking funding
to rehabilitate and expand the existing public sewerage network and implement other policy
measures regarding wastewater disposal in Nouakchott. As for rural water supply, the objective
was to increase the drinking water access rate from 49% in 2004 to 70% in 2015.
22. By ensuring sustainable water supply and building the capacity of the sector’s
stakeholders, the project aims to improve the living conditions of the populations
concerned, which the AfDB and IsDB consider a priority in their respective country
assistance strategies. Furthermore, the Aftout project directly concerns the drinking water
supply sector and, by extension, the living conditions of the population, including those in
suburban and rural areas. This sector has been identified as a priority, and remains so for
Mauritania, AfDB and IsDB. In addition, the project includes capacity building for a key
stakeholder of the drinking water sector in Mauritania, namely SNDE, as well as private sector
operators. This dimension is recognized as an important development lever by the AfDB, IsDB
and Mauritanian authorities.
23. The project meets a specific need of the population of Nouakchott and rural areas
along the pipelines. The political authorities and the population had shown great concern about
the critical situation of drinking water in Nouakchott, marked by water production shortage and
an antiquated and inadequate network. This situation caused, in 2005 for example, some cases
of cholera, because the wastewater infiltrated into the drinking water network that was leaking
and without pressure (for lack of water). Map 1 in Annex 4 indicates the level of water supply
in different areas of the city and shows that the part of the city properly supplied lies in the
centre and a little south in the municipalities of Ryad and Arafat. Before the Aftout project,
some 73% of the urban population were not supplied directly through the SNDE network. This
population segment was therefore using water tanks, drums and barrels, with all the attendant
risks.
24. The increase in production capacity and the rehabilitation and extension of the drinking
water supply network should help to adequately address the water needs of the population of
Nouakchott and localities along the aqueduct. In the past, these villages consumed untreated
surface water from the river and were therefore at high risk of contracting waterborne diseases.
3.1.2 Relevance of Project Design
25. Under the Aftout project, SNDE did not benefit from the shared experiences
accumulated by IsDB and AfDB from supporting other water corporations that had
previously undertaken similar projects. The country’s partners pooled their efforts to
contribute to the effective and sustainable resolution of a big problem that one partner could
not address. AfDB and IsDB have jointly contributed to this project, in addition to other
development partners. The value added of the partnership involved in a project of this scope,
implemented in the same area and in the same sub-region, definitely consists in the manner in
which the project was implemented.
6
26. The establishment of an entity that is independent from SNDE, the future operator, to
control the facilities, is deemed effective, given the scale and complexity of the project and
SNDE’s weak capacity. However, the project did not sufficiently take into account the need to
build the capacity of SNDE to enable it to fully play its role in the management of project
infrastructure. The experiences accumulated by AfDB and IsDB in supporting water
corporations in previous projects (in Burkina Faso and Cameroon) were beneficial to SNDE in
the Aftout project mainly because AfDB was not involved in the second phase of the project
(network extension and rehabilitation) to demand SNDE restructuring. Indeed, the other
institutions involved (with the exception of IsDB) did not make such a demand.
27. The assumptions, risks and mitigation measures were well identified at project
appraisal. The key assumptions and risks identified at project appraisal concerned: (i) absence
or inadequate investment for the rehabilitation and extension of drinking water distribution
networks in Nouakchott; (ii) delays in resource mobilization and construction of wastewater
sanitation networks in Nouakchott; (iii) weak institutional and organizational capacity of
SNDE, which needs to be strengthened; and (iv) inadequate or lack of ownership of project
facilities by the various stakeholders (Government, SNDE and beneficiaries).
28. As regards risk mitigation measures, the Mauritanian Government had promised to
guarantee the financing of studies and works on the rehabilitation and expansion of the
distribution network and sanitary facilities. Some partners, such as AfDB, had required that the
submission of evidence of financing should be one of the conditions precedent to the loan
agreement. Regarding risks relating to SNDE’s institutional and organizational capacity, it was
envisaged that, under the project, an organizational study will be financed defining the medium
and long-term support for the corporation, and that other studies will be carried out and
technical assistance and equipment provided.
29. In order to mitigate the risk of illegal connections to the network, it was decided that
water taps would be connected to the network to serve inhabitants of areas crossed by water
lines. The project included a study on the supply of drinking water to these populations from
these connection points.
30. SNDE’s weaknesses, considered as a project risk, were not satisfactorily taken into
account during project design and implementation.
31. The technical choices made had unquestionable advantages, but also entailed
consequences in terms of costs and imposed requirements pertaining to operation and
maintenance. The simplified preliminary draft (SPD) report on the project presents some
possible alternatives that particularly affect the route of the headrace structure carrying water
towards Nouakchott, the nature of this structure (pipelines or aqueduct), and the geographical
location of wastewater pre-treatment and treatment facilities. The justification of the choice of
the first three points is perfectly acceptable. However, this is not generally the case for the
choice of the location of treatment facilities. Two main arguments were put forward to justify
this choice. First, the time it takes to transfer water from Béni Nadji to Nouakchott, which is
nearly three days on average. Since this time is relatively long, additional treatment would be
necessary in Nouakchott due to the degradation of water quality - after three days’ journey in
the pipelines - if the treatment plant were located in Béni Nadji. Then, the reduced operating
costs of the PK17 station because it is closer to Nouakchott than the Béni Nadji station, which
is nearly 170 km away. However, the SPD did not adequately consider the potential benefits
(including reducing investment costs) of having a single station in Béni Nadji and possibly a
secondary treatment facility in Nouakchott, as well as drinking water along the aqueduct for
future supply of neighbouring localities.
7
32. All in all, it appears that the final solution adopted and subsequently outlined in the
final design (FD) has a number of advantages (advanced technology, high-quality structures
and facilities, quality implementation, high level treatment processes and management systems,
and a satisfactory security level). However, this solution has an impact on the project cost,
which is relatively high. Furthermore, the project infrastructure and equipment will entail
relatively high requirements regarding the operation, maintenance and staff quality which
cannot be met by SNDE given its resources, as well as efficiency and current organization
levels.
33. Increased project costs which cannot be justified solely by the above-mentioned
reasons. In view of the cost estimates and high cost of the project at completion, it was found
that the initial costs had been underestimated, compounding the effects induced by project start-
up delays as well as the escalation of the price of materials and shipping rates, as earlier
mentioned.
34. Relevance is deemed satisfactory overall.
3.2 Effectiveness (Achievement of Outcomes)
3.2.1 Achievement of Outputs
35. Functional physical outputs constructed in compliance with the trade rules. All
physical outputs expected from the project (stations, reservoirs, pipes, remote management
system, power supply, etc.) have been completed within the contractual deadlines and in
accordance with the requirements in the FD study. Moreover, they are functioning properly.
36. However, with regard to the institutional support component, the SNDE organizational
study was conducted in collaboration with the Moroccan water corporation (ONEP) and in
association with experts from other water corporations (Tunisia, France and Burkina Faso). It
conducted a detailed diagnosis and prepared a draft quantified action plan that was not
implemented. Furthermore, the DWS study of the inhabitants of villages along the aqueduct
was also conducted. SNDE also received a set of IT equipment to enhance the sales department,
and a set of equipment for water networks repair and maintenance. It was also planned to
procure a crane truck for maintenance of hydraulic pumps, but the plan was subsequently
cancelled. Overall, the implementation of the SNDE capacity building component jointly
financed by AfDB and AFESD was not satisfactory.
3.2.2 Achievement of Direct Impacts
37. Since the physical structures were satisfactorily completed, the project was able
to significantly improve SNDE’s drinking water producing capacity. The project enabled
the corporation to produce, for Nouakchott, 55 000 m3/day in 20078, the maximum allowed by
the Iddini well field; and more than 90 000
m3/day in 20129. SNDE expects to produce
150 000 m3/day in 2020 and 190 000 m3/day
in 2030. The project has helped solve the
problem of water availability, since water is
now available in sufficient quantity.
Essentially, the production of the Iddini well
field has been maintained to safeguard its equipment and infrastructure.
8 ADB (2008), Proposal for Supplementary Financing (ADF/BD/WP/2008/49 and ADF/BD/WP/2008/49/Add.1). 9 The production level stood at 3 017 209 m3 in July 2012, that is more than 97 000 m3/day on average.
“In the past, because of water scarcity, a household
could be connected to several different points of the
neighbourhood’s network in order to meet its water
needs. That problem has now been solved”.
Senior Staff, Tevragh Zeina
8
38. As regards adjusting to demand, the system is designed to largely meet additional
demand up to end-2030 (226 000 m3/day for a population estimated to reach 1.6 million by that
date. This implies availability of more than 100 litres per capita per day). Reserves are now
available for the installation of additional equipment to step up production and meet the
increased drinking water demand.
39. The low level of institutional support for SNDE has not allowed the project to
significantly improve the corporation’s operational capacity. Although the project has
helped to greatly enhance the operational capacity of SNDE to produce drinking water - with a
water production output of about 98% for the Aftout - PK17 facility - it is clear that the
corporation’s water distribution capacity is still very limited because of the antiquated state of
the network and delays in the expansion and rehabilitation works. Moreover, the corporation
has not increased its capacity to keep up and maintain the drinking water network in order to
adapt to the technical level of the new structures and equipment. The recommendations
contained in the FD study have not been fully complied with (a crane truck was not available,
technical staff with certain profiles were not recruited, and a number of additional training
courses were not organized). Finally, SNDE received IT equipment to improve its commercial
and technical management capacity, but the desired results are yet to be visible. Current SNDE
capacity building activities undertaken by SONEDE (Tunisia) and ONEP (Morocco) do not
adequately meet the project’s operational needs, particularly with regard to the maintenance
capacity required and the reforms necessary to improve network efficiency and resource
mobilization. Besides, SNDE’s human resources, deemed rather over-bloated, will be difficult
to retrain. Therefore, to strengthen its staff, SNDE will need to recruit a highly qualified
workforce, even if that means competing on the labour market with mining companies and the
private sector that offer more attractive working conditions.
40. Since water availability in Nouakchott and the rehabilitation and extension of the
distribution network entail new operational demands, SNDE needs to remedy its
weaknesses in the management of drinking water services. Drinking water production
infrastructure built under the project supply a former distribution network (with all its
imperfections) and a new network in construction. Since the old network is defective, the
relatively good pressure from the new production facility causes considerable water leaks. The
result is that certain areas of the city where the network is still poor (El Mina and Sebkha) are
almost disconnected and therefore poorly supplied. Industrial areas located at the extreme end
of the network are not well served.
41. As concerns the overall network output (water volume billed/volume produced), there
has been a downward trend since 2008 - from 56% to 49% in 2010 and 42% in 2011 - mainly
due to the high pressure caused by the commissioning of the network project. The situation
seemed to be stabilizing - though the level still remained low (41%) - during the first three
quarters of 2012 (see table 7.5 in Annex 7). Still, much of the water produced is lost to leaks in
the old supply network.
42. At the commercial level, there has been some progress in the recovery of amounts for
water bills; the State currently pays all its water bills, but the total amount of arrears remains
high (6244 million Ouguiyas10 in 2011, including 53% for the administration and the army).
SNDE’s recovery rate, which was slightly less than 80% between 2008 and 2011, was virtually
90%, which may look like good performance, even if the billing rate (households receiving
bills) and that of illicit connections (and other forms of water theft) remain unknown. According
to the sales department, the main difficulties relate to recovery of disputed bills, given that
10 SNDE, Progress Report 2011.
9
meter readings are not always accurate - the metres are often inaccessible (especially those
buried underground).
43. The quality of the network under rehabilitation and extension limits the quality of
SNDE services. Thus, more than half of respondents (57%) complained of occasional water
shortages.
44. There have been improvements in SNDE services, especially regarding water cuts and
the processing of complaints, which were more numerous before the commissioning of the
Aftout project. However, the survey findings show that just over half of SNDE subscribers
(51.2%) admit to having filed a
complaint with SNDE. The
reasons cited concern billing (36%
of cases), meters (29.3%), the
network (14.7%) or water
availability (14.7%). Water quality
accounts for only 2.7% of the
grounds for complaint. Regarding
the outcome of complaints, 67.8%
of respondents are not satisfied. However, the majority (85.4%) of Nouakchott users who
participated in the survey consider that water cuts have become less frequent than before the
commissioning of the project, and when they occur, they are of shorter duration (86.5%).
45. In short, in comparison to a number of water corporations in the sub-region (see Table
7.1 in Annex 7), SNDE should strive to improve the efficiency of its human resources and
increase productivity (output, number of subscribers and turnover).
46. Nearly two years after the commissioning of the project infrastructure, access to
drinking water for Nouakchott inhabitants is gradually increasing, though still limited
due to lack of an adequate distribution network. Specific consumption per capita, calculated
from SNDE production data and estimates by inhabitants, rose from less than 40 litres11 prior
to the Aftout project to more than 50 litres currently, and should easily reach the goal of 60-80
litres thanks to the rehabilitation and extension of the network. The survey, however, makes it
possible to situate average household water consumption at 262 litres per day (approximately
45 litres/day/person12), given that 79.4% of households consume less than 400 litres per day
(approximately 70 litres/day/person). In short, the level of per capita consumption in
Nouakchott City exceeds the 40 litres of drinking water per day per person (including water
needed for drinking, cooking, hygiene and cleaning) required for city dwellers13. However, it
falls short of the standard of 50 litres/day/person recommended by some experts14.
47. The average water consumption per rural household,
estimated at 283.5 litres (about 49 litres/day/person) is
slightly higher than that of urban households living in
Nouakchott. This probably reflects the difficulties still faced
by some Nouakchott households in having access to safe
drinking water, especially in areas that are not yet connected
to the network and where there is still speculation by private
actors. In this respect, users have differing opinions on water price trends.
11 Obviously, the average conceals huge disparities. 12 For average size households with 5.8 inhabitants. 13 UNEP: Agenda 21, UNCED, 1992. para. 18.58a http://www.un.org/french/events/rio92/agenda21/index.html 14 The American expert P. Gleick is an example.
“The Association and its SNDE-subscribed members have filed
many complaints, but our demands have not been met. We are
not satisfied with SNDE”.
Consumer Protection Association
“Before the advent of the project, it
took a lot of time to fill the bucket at
the tap”.
Gardener, Sebkha
10
48. Increased drinking water consumption
was made possible by the introduction of the
water distribution network in areas formerly
deprived of water as well as the development of
new residential areas following the improvement
in water supply conditions - resettlement areas,
for example (see map in Annex 5 on the network
currently undergoing expansion and
rehabilitation). SNDE acknowledges having
recovered inactive subscribers (about 1,000 subscribers per month, on average) – since their
network was without water.
49. As regards modes of supplying drinking water in Nouakchott City, although there is a
shift in favour of taps, carts are still widely used to provide water. Indeed, since the
commissioning of the Aftout Essahli project, water supply in carts has dropped only from 61.5%
to 50.3%, while the proportion of households using functional interior faucets rose from 11.2%
to 24.2%. There has been a general improvement in the tap supply mode (inside and outside),
while the mode requiring water transportation has declined. Thus, 38.5% of subscribed users
reported having used carts in the past, but since the commissioning of the Aftout project, they
now have access to tap water. With respect to distance, there is hardly any meaningful change
for those who buy water from a standpipe, since about 17% of households are more than one
kilometre from the nearest public standpipe.
50. There is indeed a significant gap between the production component - which ended in
2010 - and the distribution component, given that the network rehabilitation and extension
works forming part of the latter component were still on-going during the evaluation mission
and will be completed only in 201415. This gap is an obstacle to the efforts to improve
sustainable access to drinking water for the beneficiary populations. Moreover, even if the new
PK17 treatment station provides the city some additional 84 000 m3 of water per day, a good
portion (about 58%) of this water is lost to leaks in the old distribution network.
51. In rural areas, some villages along the Aftout water supply line (Keur Macène and
Béni Nadji) benefited most from improved
sustainable access to drinking water services.
The survey revealed that most of the 67
households surveyed in rural areas are SNDE
subscribers, that is, 95.5% compared to 4.5%
of non-subscribers. The other villages along
the supply line that have not yet been
connected due to the change in State’s village
water policy (encouragement of grouping)
have not witnessed any improvement in their situation in terms of drinking water access.
52. Regarding water quality at the consumption point, the household survey showed a
sharp decline in the proportion of consumers who say the water is polluted: 47.5% prior to the
commissioning of the Aftout project; the rate has dropped to 22.8%.
15 According to the Project Management Unit, this gap could be mainly justified by the fact that given the technological
challenges posed by the Aftout project, the authorities opted for a cautious approach by deciding to postpone the
mobilization of the resources required for the distribution phase until the production phase would be at least 60% completed.
“Sometimes, cart water vendors refuse selling us
water and prefer neighbourhoods that are far
away from taps, such as Tarhil and Mellah, in
order to make more money. That is a form of
speculation”.
Head of household, Arafat
“Our quarter is supplied water from the network. The
dilapidated state of the network makes tap water dirty
for a few seconds before it assumes its normal
colour”.
Member of the Consumer Protection Association
11
53. Some 44.9% of users in the first group attribute the pollution to the obsolescence of
the network, lack of maintenance or negligence by SNDE services, and 17.3% accuse water
transportation conditions, while 16.2% found that the pollution had affected the water
consumed only up to October 2010. As for the perception of the quality of the water distributed
by Aftout, 50.6% of users aware of some pollution said they had detected a taste of bleach and
other products used as well as an abnormal colour or taste. Similarly, 21% of them attribute the
alleged pollution to carts and neglect by retailers, who do not comply with hygiene best
practices. Some 9.9% of users also blame the water quality on the obsolescence of the network
and poor storage facilities. While the rural populations were for the most part dissatisfied with
their water access situation prior to the advent of the Aftout project (76.1%), almost all those
we visited are now satisfied (97%).
3.2.3 Achievement of Indirect Impacts
54. The project has helped to improve the management of groundwater resources by
optimizing the use of surface water. By building its production facilities, the project has made it
possible to reduce the share of the Trarza water table in the production of drinking water for Nouakchott
from 55 000 to 36 000 m3/day, with the possibility of further reduction, if necessary. Indeed, SNDE
officials agreed to continue operating the well field to maintain this production structure. Hence, this
production facility eliminates the risk of saltwater infiltration into this aquifer and maintains its resource,
which is hardly renewable (fossil aquifer). For example, in July 2012, SNDE statistics showed that the
total volume of drinking water stood at 3.01 million m3, with surface water accounting for 2.5 million
m3 (nearly 84 %).
55. The difficulty of fetching drinking water has been reduced, especially in rural
areas. The time spent fetching water has significantly reduced, especially in Keur Macène and
Béni Nadji villages. The survey revealed that for more than 98% of the rural respondents, the
time required to fetch water has decreased by
about 2½ hours per day since the commissioning
of the Aftout facility. For neighbourhoods of
Nouakchott previously not served or with a non-
functional network, the time spent fetching water
has dropped in line with progress in the
rehabilitation and extension of the distribution
network. A total of 24,000 subscribers in the City
of Nouakchott are involved. The expected improvement will be achieved only upon completion
of works on the distribution network.
56. As regards the other villages along the aqueduct of the Aftout project, water supply
conditions have not changed, given that the proposed works are yet to be completed. Due to the
high pressure of water from the network and the poor quality of the network, some parts of the
city have been disconnected (Sabkha, El Mina and part of Teyerat), and their needs will be met
only upon completion of the network rehabilitation works.
57. Significant reduction in the incidence of waterborne diseases to the benefit of both
villages (Keur Macène and Béni Nadji) located along the riverbank. Available statistics
(statistical yearbook) do not provide quantitative information for 2009 to 2011. Discussions
with health workers, schools or components of the population indicate that the proportion of
waterborne diseases has fallen sharply, especially in both villages (Keur Macène and Béni
Nadji) located along the riverbank. The inhabitants of these villages mainly consumed water
drawn directly from the river.
“In the past, we sometimes left home around 7
a.m. to fetch water and wash our clothes in the
river and returned at 11 a.m. with a few jerry
cans of water.”
Head of rural household
12
58. For the City of Nouakchott, 19.7% of consumers reported possible waterborne diseases
in 2009 compared to 7.2% in 2012. One-third of the respondents reported that their medical
expenses had not decreased, whereas 30.6% said they had spent less since the commissioning
of the Aftout Essahli Project. The types of diseases presumably linked to water consumption
are for the most part diarrhoea (69.8% in 2009 and 63.6% in 2012). At the current stage, it is
difficult to credit the project with having a significant impact on waterborne diseases. On the
other hand, the people surveyed particularly reported the outbreak of a cholera epidemic in
Nouakchott in 2005, following the intrusion of sewage from septic tanks into the non-watertight
pipes of the old SNDE network.
3.2.4 Contribution to Improving the Living Conditions of the Population
59. Failure to complete the distribution component and the lack of proper sanitation
limit the project's impact in terms of improving the living conditions of the population of
Nouakchott. The risks related to water supply and sanitation systems limit the project's impact
with respect to improving the living conditions of households. Available statistics have failed
to demonstrate, in quantitative terms, the positive impact in terms of increasing beneficiaries'
income, school attendance, health spending, and job creation.
3.3 Effectiveness
60. The financial internal rate of return (FIRR) of the project (production component) is
relatively low and stands at 0.33%; this ratio was estimated at 4.16% in the AfDB appraisal
report (2003) and 3.9% at re-
appraisal (2008). This change is due
to the fact that several components
relating to expenses (such as wages,
rental fees, etc.) were not factored in
the initial calculation. For IsDB, the
FIRR stood at 6.9% in 2003.
61. However, the economic
internal rate of return stands at
15.9%, whereas it was 17.4% and
16.4% in the 2003 and 2008
evaluations respectively. These
almost identical values are deemed acceptable.
62. In terms of cost-effectiveness, the investment cost stands at USD 282 per capita or
USD 2,274 per m3 of water produced per day (see Table 2 opposite). It is not easy to compare
these ratios with those of other projects in countries of the sub-region, given that such projects
are significantly different (technical solutions, consistency, etc.), and so too are their financial
arrangements.
63. The project’s efficiency is generally deemed unsatisfactory due to the high cost of
investment.
3.4 Sustainability
3.4.1 Technical Viability
64. With respect to the conservation of the production source (quantity and quality), the
volume of water extracted from the source (Senegal River) for Nouakchott’s drinking water
supply system is insignificant compared to the river’s water flow volume (1.8% of Senegal
Table 2: Unit Costs of the Aftout Project
Production Project Investment in USD 451 890 000
Distribution Project Investment in USD 134 000 000
Total Investment Cost (production + distribution) in
USD 545 393 734
Population served by 2030 1 600 000
Production Capacity in m3/day by 2030 198 720
Investment Cost by population served (in USD/inh) 282
Production Project Investment Cost (in USD /m3/d) 2 274
Total Investment Cost per m3 produced per day (in
USD/m3/d) 2 948
13
River’s water flow volume). Hence, it does not entail any risk in the short, medium and long
term. Water quality at source was subjected to a thorough physical, chemical and
bacteriological study during the pre-project period. The suspended matter content is relatively
significant during high water periods (June to October-November), which may increase the risk
of consumption of coagulants during operation. Bacteriological analyses reveal a high germ
count and hence a great likelihood of contamination of this section of the river located
downstream major cities (Richard Toll and Rosso)16. Activities carried out along the river are
not risk factors that could lead to significant deterioration of the physical, chemical and
bacteriological quality of water from the river.
65. Risks of conflict associated with the use of Senegal River are very low, given that the
water is managed in an organized and consensual manner under OMVS, which is a leading
institution in the field. Moreover, in Senegal, on the other side of the river, the river also serves
as a source of drinking water supply.
66. The technology adopted for the structures and equipment, as well as the management
system is advanced. For the moment, these structures and equipment are in proper working
order. The adoption of high technology raises the issue of availability of the necessary expertise
and spare parts, which, two years into the operation, may become more acute. The availability
of reagents and energy for the operation of the system is, for the moment, fairly well assured,
so too is the procurement of reagents by financial partners. Arrangements should be made as
soon as possible to ensure continuity by SNDE.
67. The water intake structures are powered by hydroelectricity generated by the Manatali
dam (OMVS), while those of PK17 are powered by SOMALEC network (which has various
sources). Having a single source of power supply for water intake structures may carry a risk.
During operation, this risk appeared to be low, given that electric power outages are rare and
short-lived. Moreover, the system’s water storage capacity provides a potential for coping with
such eventualities.
68. The reservoir installed at PK17 ensures Nouakchott’s drinking water supply autonomy
for 48 hours in the event of failure of infrastructure installed upstream. However, the use of
maintenance procedures that do not meet the manufacturer’s standards may cause prolonged
production interruptions. Such an eventuality would pose enormous risks of drinking water
shortage in Nouakchott. Already, the lack of effective preventive maintenance may lead to the
damage of basic equipment. While it is true that the staff hired by the station is for the most
part employees of the enterprises responsible for the works of the station, it is also worth
mentioning that these employees are not adequately qualified to perform preventive and
curative maintenance. To temporarily remedy this situation that may jeopardize the
sustainability of new infrastructure, SNDE, upon expiry of the warranty period, sub-contracted
the maintenance of new facilities for a 3-year period to the private enterprises that had installed
basic equipment17. The medium and long-term sustainability of this system will be problematic
if it does not allow for effective transfer of knowledge and expertise to SNDE through
appropriate training.
69. The structures at PK17 and Béni Nadji have a surveillance system established by
security services. Water transport pipelines are buried; ancillary structures (manhole, balance
tanks, etc.) are made of concrete and are closed, and therefore less at risk of deterioration.
16 Some Keur Macène villagers reported that they were previously drinking this water directly. 17 At evaluation, negotiations were underway to extend the said contracts
14
3.4.2 Sustainable Borrower Commitment (Legal/Regulatory Framework Included):
70. The legal framework mainly comprises Law No. 2005-030 of 02/02/2005 instituting
the Water Code and Decree No. 2008-187 of 19 October 2008 defining the duties of the Minister
of Water and Sanitation and 9 other implementing decrees, including Decree No. 2008-070
relating to the duration and conditions for delegating the exercise of drinking water distribution
functions to SNDE. The institutional organization of the water and sanitation sector is shown
in Annex 3.
71. In 1996, a three-year programme-contract defining the drinking water supply
management framework was signed between the Government of Mauritania and SNDE.
However, it still has not been renewed. Hence, a priori, the contractual basis for cooperation
between the Government and SNDE no longer exists. SNDE seems to have no obligation to
produce results in terms of addressing the challenges and problems of the water and sanitation
sector. Hence, questions may legitimately be raised regarding the effectiveness of this
institutional mechanism or at least the effectiveness of the institutions responsible for water and
sanitation management.
72. With regard to private sector participation in the water sector, it is provided for in the
institutional arrangements. A number of local enterprises were involved in the implementation
of project works, as well as the ongoing network rehabilitation and expansion.
3.4.3 Socio-Political Support
73. Support to strengthen operation and maintenance functions: As regards training
resource persons responsible for the operation and maintenance of Nouakchott’s drinking water
structures and facilities, the following initiatives are being considered or developed:
maintenance contracts with suppliers of equipment for the Aftout Project, on-the-job training
for SNDE staff responsible for operating the production infrastructure, the future establishment
of a trades training centre and ad hoc training operations were also carried out. All these
initiatives need to be activated for speedy implementation.
74. Roles and responsibilities of various unknown distribution stakeholders: The
drinking water sector has the peculiarity of depending on many stakeholders, and to be
effective, it requires organization and division of labour. The key stakeholders in the drinking
water sector in the City of Nouakchott are: State structures (directorates, corporations and
authorities in charge of water and sanitation including SNDE), the Nouakchott urban
community, municipality mayors’ offices, standpipe managers and attendants, managers of
water tankers, water retailers, water cart pushers, SNDE network subscribers, civil society
organizations, private operators and development partners operating in the water and sanitation
sector.
75. The roles and responsibilities of SNDE, urban community, communes and standpipe
managers (through contracts between them and the City Council) are well defined, but the same
cannot be said of the other stakeholders in the water distribution network (standpipe operators,
managers of tankers, water retailers, and cart pushers). There are associations that deal mainly
with drinking water and sanitation, and the urban community has even published a directory of
such associations. At evaluation, there were no registered or truly active water user associations
in Nouakchott.
15
3.4.4 Financial Sustainability
76. The current water pricing structure provides for three consumption segments, and
prices charged by SNDE are relatively consistent with those applied in some countries in the
sub-region (see Table 7.2 of Annex 7).
77. When returns are re-calculated ex-post by incorporating costs not initially taken into
account, a much lower financial rate of return (0.33%) is obtained. More details on this
calculation are provided in Annex 8 of the report. The small financial internal rate of return is
due either to low income from the sale of water (water pricing) or heavy costs (especially of
energy, processing of reagents and wages). Proceeds from water sales should be able to finance
the operation and maintenance of structures and equipment, but incomes are not fully recovered
in time and require support measures from SNDE. The current pricing system takes into account
two factors: the population's ability to pay and concern for proper functioning and sustainability
of facilities and equipment.
78. In 2011, the procurement of reagents was covered by financial partners; in its progress
report for the second quarter of 2012, the management reported red tape in the procurement of
reagents and spare parts. These constraints clearly show that securing the operation of
production infrastructure entails risks for which a speedy response should be sought. Thus, upon
analysis, it appears that the current pricing structure makes it impossible to finance other
investments or meet operating and maintenance expenses.
3.4.5 Economic Sustainability
79. The sensitivity analysis of key parameters (average water prices and investment costs)
on financial and economic returns indicates that these parameters have a relatively small impact
on rates of return, given their variation in reality. For all the scenarios studied, the economic
rate of return is acceptable, since the economic value of water is relatively high.
80. On the other hand, in order to have a financial rate of return of about 3% (a more or
less acceptable value), a mix of at least the following options is required: a 20% increase in the
price of water, maximum network output of 80%, and the possibility of subsidizing investments
at more than 10%. Of course, any other SNDE initiative aimed at reducing operating expenses
would help to enhance the financial rate of return.
3.4.6 Socio-Environmental Sustainability
81. As regards community and consumer involvement, it is necessary to distinguish the
following scenarios: the two villages of Keur Macène and Béni Nadji, whose water supply
network management is entrusted by the local government to a delegated authority; peripheral
areas of Nouakchott where several
stakeholders are present (SNDE, urban
community councils, managers of standpipes
or water tankers, water retailers, residents,
etc.), and the rest of the city, which is supplied
by individual connections. Installation types
and the manner of their use by beneficiary
populations differ from one place to another,
just as these populations do not have the same
degree of satisfaction. Overall, 70.6% of the
population is satisfied with the water supply solutions that are applied in the City of Nouakchott,
as well as the initial results obtained. On the other hand, some people believe that the
populations have not been adequately alerted to their role in water management and measures
"A general awareness campaign should be
conducted to explain the importance of the
project to beneficiaries. This exercise may use
direct contact, SMS, posters, TV and radio to
achieve the maximum possible project
outcomes."- Mokhtar (member of a focus
group in Nouakchott)
16
to combat fraud and those to be taken within households to mitigate possible incidents
stemming from the new network (pipe rupture due to water pressure).
82. Due to the absence of an appropriate sanitation system, the project will have a
significant environmental impact on Nouakchott, a coastal city with relatively low altitudes
(in general, a few metres above sea level). As a coastal city, Nouakchott has a shallow water
table and lacks an appropriate public sanitation system, given that the existing one only covers
a small part of the city centre, and its operating condition leaves much to be desired18. The rest
of the city disposes of its sewage through septic systems, cesspools and tankers that extract the
water for disposal at various locations in city. All this sewage ends up in the aquifer, which
rises to the surface all over the city.
83. Given the increase in drinking water production as a result of the Aftout Essahli
facility, coupled with the high pressure observed in the distribution network and the poor quality
of the old distribution system, water leaks have increased. Therefore, even in the dry season,
some low-lying areas of the city are prone to floods. In addition, several neighbourhoods of the
City of Nouakchott have been flooded since the commissioning of the of Aftout Essahli water
supply project19. It is expected that the ongoing rehabilitation of the drinking water distribution
system will curb the water leakage, even though wastewater discharges are expected to increase.
84. Indeed, it is acknowledged that nearly 80% of the drinking water consumed ended up
as sewage, or nearly 11 million m3 in 2011. In the case of Nouakchott, much of the wastewater
is discharged into the subsoil through on-site sewage disposal systems. The survey also revealed
that in Nouakchott, wastewater is discharged largely into the streets (59.7%) or into septic tanks
in 36.6% of cases. In short, network leaks and sewage accounted for almost 23 million m3 of
the water discharged into the subsoil in 2011. As regards the sanitation network, it is virtually
non-existent. Hence, the risk of over-replenishment of the already shallow water table will be
ever looming, so too will the risk of flooding, particularly in low-lying areas.
85. Ongoing climate change should also help to reduce the possibility of groundwater
flowing into the sea, thereby increasing the underground water level and heightening the risk
of flooding. All in all, floods (particularly due in part to wastewater) exacerbate the
deterioration of residents’ living conditions and constitute the source of waterborne diseases
that should be avoided as much as possible.
86. The project had minor impacts on the receiving environment. An Environmental
Impact Statement on the project was prepared prior to its start-up in 2001, whereas
implementation works started only in 2007. In addition, an Environmental and Social Impact
Assessment (ESIA) of the project was conducted in 2010, just after the completion of structures
and equipment. The ESIA covered the performance testing and operating phase. However, the
environmental regulations in force in Mauritania were not complied with, given that it was
necessary to obtain prior authorization from the Ministry of Environment and a notice of
environmental feasibility. However, mitigation/compensation measures have greatly helped to
maintain the impact on the receiving environment at a tolerable or even minimal threshold (see
Annex 5).
87. However, there are still a number of risks that must be addressed in the future. Firstly,
a number of stakeholders in environmental monitoring are not involved in the project, even
though they were assigned roles in the Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP).
This was the case of the Department of Environmental Monitoring and Civil Defence.
18 With a sewage treatment plant whose laboratory is not operational, and a treatment system that is limited to a surface
sewage lagoon without the use of reagents. 19 The case of “SOCOGIM" city some of whose houses were abandoned by their owners is a good illustration.
17
Furthermore, the civil society and NGOs dealing with environmental protection were not also
involved.
88. Secondly, there is a risk of siltation of structures and equipment as well as socio-
economic infrastructure (RN2 linking the cities of Nouakchott and Rosso to other built-up
areas). Indeed, some of them are provided with anti-hammering inspection windows and
reservoirs in areas with mobile sand dunes.
89. Thirdly, it is feared that the groundwater may be polluted by the infiltration of
contaminants contained in dried sludge. Indeed, this sludge is buried 5 km from the Béni Nadji
site, whereas it should have been enhanced and distributed to market gardeners and farmers
who were supposed to operate in the PK17 site, as recommended by the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) and the Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP).
90. Lastly, there are potential consequences of exposing staff working at water intake sites
(Aftout Béni Nadji and PK17) to loud noise from pumping stations, with the risk being
especially high for the Aftout water intake site. Details on other environmental impacts are
outlined in Annex 5.
91. On the whole, project sustainability is deemed to be very unsatisfactory.
3.5 Overall Project Performance
92. In light of the foregoing, overall project performance is deemed unsatisfactory. In full
compliance with the policies and strategies of the Bank and development partners, the project
responded appropriately to a real need of the population of Nouakchott, in the throes of an acute
water crisis. The building of production infrastructure and the ongoing establishment of
distribution facilities will significantly improve the currently limited impacts on the living
conditions of Nouakchott residents. However, this improvement is contingent on the adoption
of appropriate measures to mitigate the risks stemming from SNDE's operational inefficiency
and those related to the city’s poor liquid and solid waste disposal system.
IV. OTHER EVALUATIONS
4.1 Institutional Development Impact
93. The project helped to strengthen the private sector by creating opportunities for them
to intervene directly or in partnership with foreign enterprises. Consequently, it created a very
conducive environment for the establishment of small enterprises in the water and sanitation
sector (network installation works, plumbing, various services, etc.). This afforded SNDE and
some local private operators an opportunity to work with highly renowned enterprises and
contractors which transferred skills and engaged in capacity building. However, these
externalities are secondary in light of the central issue facing SNDE.
18
94. Indeed, it should be acknowledged that the project has not sufficiently contributed to
building the capacity of SNDE, a key player in the institutional framework of the water sector.
The impacts of institutional support measures are still very limited. While it is true that the
efforts are producing increasingly visible results at the physical level, it is worth mentioning
also that the situation is different with respect to SNDE’s organizational and institutional levels.
It is therefore deemed unsatisfactory.
4.2 Borrower Performance
4.2.1 Design and Readiness Performance
95. The Borrower was able to mobilize several partners for the financial structuring of a
large-scale project, which Mauritanians affectionately referred to as “Project of the Century”.
At design, the project took into account both the production and distribution phases. Given the
financial constraints, the Borrower had to prioritize its objectives by focusing first on the
production aspect in order to respond to the water crisis threatening the nation's capital.
96. However, the sanitation component remains the poor relation of the project. The
Government blamed the delay in effective inclusion of this component on technical constraints
subjecting the start-up of any works to prior knowledge of the soil characteristics. Given the
negative impacts of this situation, there is urgent need to resolve the issue, or else the project’s
positive impact may be undermined.
4.2.2 Implementation Performance
97. The initial project costs were underestimated, making it necessary to carry out a
revision acceptable to all stakeholders. In the wake of the price revision following changes in
oil prices and the value of the dollar, planned activities were carried out almost as scheduled
(see Figure 2 and Table 5 for project baseline data). The procurement process and project
financial management are deemed satisfactory. The voluntary quest for transparency even
caused delays in the award of certain contracts, but not to the point of undermining the
implementation schedule.
98. The efficiency of the procurement process resulted in the selection of enterprises
capable of properly carrying out the works in a timely manner and at lower costs compared to
the revised budget. Delays of several months (three for some works and six for others) were
observed, but overall, they did not significantly impact the timely execution of project works -
the project was completed in July 2010 (date of priming of the structures). The establishment
of a Management Unit to control project works helped to achieve normal project outputs. The
Borrower’s commitment led to timely disbursement of the counterpart contribution.
99. The Government established no mechanisms for coordinating the activities of partners
involved in project implementation, but whenever the need arose, the partners responded
promptly and even anticipated in case of problems. In this regard, AFESD often played a
leading role.
100. Overall, the Borrower performance is deemed satisfactory.
19
4.3 AfDB and IsDB Performance
4.3.1 At Preparation and Design
101. Project preparation and design phase was marked by harmonization and coordination,
and even during this evaluation - which is prepared and conducted in a concerted manner by
both partners. The purpose of coordination is to ensure the complementarity of partners’
initiatives in support of Mauritania’s development. Furthermore, the country’s key
development priorities were approved by both partners.
102. Nevertheless, a number of weaknesses in the project preparation need to be pointed
out. Not only were the financial resources required for the project implementation
underestimated, but the poor coordination of the various project components (drinking water
production and distribution) also delayed the manifestation of real outcomes, even after
completion of the production project. Moreover, components related to water supply in villages
along the Aftout-PK17 aqueduct and sanitation in the City of Nouakchott have not been
properly integrated, nor has the SNDE capacity building component.
4.3.2 At Implementation
103. Apart from the early years of the project when disbursements were low, no major
problems were reported in this regard, particularly with respect to the level of disbursement of
funds for activities financed by AfDB and IsDB. The project’s financial performance was
deemed fairly satisfactory in the 2009 Portfolio Review. Supervision missions constantly drew
the Government's attention to the fact that the manifestation of the key risks identified was
highly probable
104. However, it is worth noting that AfDB did not participate in the second phase of the
project (network extension and rehabilitation), so it could not require that SNDE, the
corporation responsible for operating the facilities, be restructured. The other institutions
involved (apart from IsDB) had no such requirements. Overall, the performance of AfDB and
IsDB is deemed satisfactory.
4.4 Factors Affecting Project Implementation and Outcomes
4.4.1 Factors Positively Affecting Project Implementation and Outcomes
105. Key success factors include: (i) the great number of Mauritania's partners and their
willingness to come together to solve a widespread problem; (ii) strong commitment of the
country's political authorities; (iii) current political and economic context of Mauritania; and
(iv) establishment of a unit with real autonomy to manage project contracting activities.
4.4.2 Factors Adversely Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
106. The key factors that adversely impacted the project relate to changes in the cost of oil
per barrel and the dollar exchange rate. These changes led to an upsurge in investment cost,
which almost doubled between the first evaluation and the start of implementation. Next, the
fact that the project was managed more or less independently of SNDE - albeit efficiently in
terms of implementation and physical achievements – did not allow for a judicious transfer of
the equipment provided to the operator under the project. In addition, the discrepancy between
production, distribution and sanitation undermines the potential positive impacts of the project.
20
V. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1. Conclusion
107. The project has helped increase SNDE's drinking water production capacity to meet
the basic needs of Nouakchott residents. However, the project has not significantly improved
sustainable drinking water access for the population of Nouakchott and the rural areas along
the aqueduct, due to delays in the completion of the distribution network. Furthermore, the
failure to build a sewerage network could have huge environmental impacts, given the amount
of wastewater discharged into the environment.
108. Lastly, there are lingering concerns about SNDE’s short, medium and long-term
capacity to ensure optimal management of the structures made available to it by the project.
There are still significant risks relating to the operationalization of facilities and sustainability
of project impacts. Therefore, far-reaching measures are required to make the most of this
project dubbed “Project of the Century”, for the good of the beneficiaries. These measures
concern aspects related to: (i) securing production; (ii) enhancing distribution and marketing;
and (iii) improving sanitary conditions of the City of Nouakchott.
5.2. Key Lessons
109. The key lessons learned from this evaluation are as follows:
Lesson 1: For greater effectiveness, a holistic approach to integrating various project
components (water production and distribution, restructuring water service management,
sanitation and changing user behaviour through awareness initiatives) is necessary at design,
but will be inadequate if implementation conditions are not met.
Lesson 2: The formulation of projects of this magnitude should contain clear provisions
regarding not only the financing and management of the operation as well as the maintenance
of the structures and equipment, but also increased involvement of the private sector in the
water sector.
Lesson 3: The Government's leadership and commitment to mobilizing development partners
is needed in this kind of large-scale project.
Lesson 4: Maintaining a single consultant to supervise the entire project strengthens consistency
in works execution and helps to improve output quality.
Lesson 5: Using a Project Management Unit that is independent of the structure responsible for
operating the system may certainly help to ensure successful implementation, but does not
guarantee the building of the structure’s operational capacity.
5.3. Key Recommendations
5.3.1 Government of Mauritania
As part of reforms, undertake the transformation of SNDE and its support
structures, particularly by taking appropriate measures through a review of the
SNDE-Government programme-contract.
21
Speed up the implementation of the Nouakchott sewerage system in order to
provide a healthy environment for the city’s population and mitigate the adverse
impacts of the wastewater discharged into the environment. Actions to be
considered may include:
i.) finalizing on-going studies and the quest for funding from partners who
supported the production and distribution phase in order to implement the
Nouakchott sanitation (wastewater and rainwater) project;
ii.) revitalizing the functioning of entities in charge of sanitation (Directorate
of Sanitation and ONAS); and
iii.) establishing appropriate and sustainable mechanisms for the management
of the financial resources required to run the sanitation sector.
Conduct further brainstorming on water pricing policy, which may both ensure
the proper operation and sustainability of facilities without penalizing the
population. Modern equipment provided by the project generates higher
operating expenses.
Assist in building the capacity of small and medium-sized enterprises to enable
them to take advantage of new market opportunities opening up in the drinking
water and sanitation sector (network construction and maintenance,
maintenance, production of reagents and spare parts, etc.).
5.3.2 SNDE
Develop a new strategic plan and undertake a comprehensive reform of the
corporation, with a view to ensuring operational efficiency and availability of
resources to finance the operation and maintenance of facilities and equipment.
The support it currently receives from the Government and development partners
is a significant advantage.
Conduct a technical audit of the key functions of the corporation and develop a
risk management action plan, which should be implemented and monitored to
gradually reduce red tape affecting SNDE.
Negotiate a programme-contract with the supervisory authority, which clearly
defines objectives, identifies quantitative targets and allocates corresponding
resources. Furthermore, the most recent programme-contract between the State
and SNDE dates back to the late 1990s.
5.3.3 Development Partners (Particularly AfDB and IsDB)
Consider concrete actions to mitigate any risk associated with SNDE’s actual
capacity to maintain vital infrastructure for the country; any prolonged water
shortage in Nouakchott may indeed affect social peace.
22
Support efforts by the Government of Mauritania to improve, as soon as
possible, liquid and solid waste management in the City of Nouakchott through
ongoing technical and financial assistance, which should enable the project to
achieve its ultimate goal of improving the living conditions of the beneficiary
population.
ANNEXES
I
Annex 1. Logical Intervention Model
Mauritania - Nouakchott City “Aftout Essahli” Drinking Water Supply Project
ASSUMPTIONS:
Rehabilitation/extension of distribution networks of Nouakchott and villages located along aqueducts
Completion of Nouakchott’s sewerage network
Adoption of proper behaviour by households
Maintenance of infrastructure.
Sustainable access to an improved
drinking water supply system increased
PRODUCTION
Activities Outputs Direct Effects Intermediairy Effects
Impacts
CONSTRUCTION OF
DWS INFRASTRUCTURE
Intake structures and pumping stations
Treatment structures
Water transport aqueducts
Nouakchott Reserve
Conduct of RDWSS study
Effective electric power supply to structures
Tele-management system established.
Rehabilitation and extension of distribution network
Aftout Water Intake & raw water pumping
station constructed on the Senegal River and
are operational (SDF/AFESD)
SNDE’s operational capacity
increased
Pre-treatment Station (KFAED/ AFESD) and
Pumping Station (SDF/ AFESD) constructed
at Béni Nadji and are operational
Improved Living
conditions of
Nouakchott and rural
populations located
along the aqueduct
Do the populations
believe that their
standard of living has
improved as a result
of the project?
Reduction in health
expenses associated
with waterborne
diseases
Increase in income
(particularly for active
women)
Jobs created in the
industry and tourism
sectors
Increased school
attendance
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT
FOR SNDE
Provision of equipment
and tools
Conduct of an
organizational review
Access to drinking water services by
SNDE network subscribers in Nouakchott
(households and businesses)
SNDE organizational review validated
and action plan implemented (AfDB)
Pre-treated water Reserve (IsDB/ AFESD),
Pre-treatment Station (KFAED/ AFESD) and
Pumping Station (SDF/ AFESD) constructed
at Nouakchott (PK17) and are operational
Incidence of waterborne and
sanitation-related diseases
reduced in Nouakchott
A drinking water reservoir on the ground in
Nouakchott constructed and operational
(AfDB)
SNDE provided with operational
equipment and tools (AfDB)
Standpipe connected to SNDE network
"Potence"/ TankerTrucks
SNDE distribution network in
Nouakchott rehabilitated and
expanded
Development of industry and
tourism sectors
Storage Ponds Water Cart
Pushers
Improved access to drinking water services
by consumers not subscribed to SNDE
network in Nouakchott
Improved access to drinking water
services by rural populations
located along aqueducts
SNDE’s service quality improved
SNDE’s drinking water
production capacity
improved
Underground water resource
management improved
DISTRIBUTION
Difficulties in fetching water
reduced (in rural areas)
Transport line aqueducts between Aftout and Béni Nadji – 6km (AFESD/KF)
Pre-treated water aqueduct between Béni Nadji and PK17 – 170 km (DEA/SDF/OPEC)
Treated water aqueduct between PK17 and Water Tower – 19.6 km (AfDB)
II
Annex 2 – Evaluation Criteria
The purpose of this exercise was to conduct an independent project evaluation based on the
undermentioned criteria, lessons learned and recommendations for future similar
interventions. The exercise was based on the undermentioned evaluation criteria adopted by
the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (DAC - OECD). Generally, these criteria are used by donors in such exercises:
(a) Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of development intervention are
consistent with the expectations of beneficiaries, the country’s needs, global
priorities, and policy of partners and donors. In retrospect, the issue of relevance
often requires verification of whether the objectives or design of the intervention
are still appropriate, given the changing circumstances;
(b) Effectiveness: The extent to which the objectives of the development intervention
have been, or are being, achieved, taking into account their relative importance;
(c) Efficiency: The extent to which resources (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are
economically converted into results; and
(d) Sustainability: The continuation of benefits derived from a development
intervention after it has ended. The likelihood of obtaining long-term benefits. A
situation whereby the net benefits are likely to be risk-resistant.
III
Annex 3 - Project Map: Institutional Organization of the Water and Sanitation Sector.
Source: SNDE-UGPA, Progress Report, August 2007.
Institutional Organization of the Water and Sanitation Sector
At the central level, water sector entities comprise the following:
Department of Water, Department of Sanitation and Department of Hydrology and Dams;
National Water Council comprising representatives of 12 Members of Government, the
Commissioner for Human Rights, multi-sector regulatory authority, national elected officials,
civil society organizations, as well as resource persons in the areas of water, sanitation and the
environment;
National Water Resources Centre (CNRE), established in 200; it was responsible for the
operation, monitoring- evaluation and protection of water resources;
National Water Corporation (SNDE), also established in 2001 following the split of the former
SONELEC into 2 corporations;
National Boreholes and Wells Corporation (SNFP) was established in 2004 to strengthen the
national capacity to build boreholes and wells and regulate construction costs;
National Sanitation Board, established in 2009; and
National Drinking Water and Sanitation Agency (ANEPA), established in 2001, transformed
into the National Rural Water Services Authority (ONSER): public institution with corporate
and legal personality and financial autonomy to better respond to urgent needs and recurrent
IV
expenses related to maintenance and replacement of the water supply network fleet in both
areas.
The other stakeholders in the water sector are: the Ministry of Rural Development (MDR); the
Commissioner for Food Security (CFS); the Commissioner for Human Rights and the Fight
against Poverty and civil society (CDHLCPSC); APAUS; AMEXTIPE; communes; private sector
(enterprises, consulting firms); and NGOs (national and international).
V
Annex 4 - SNDE Network Coverage in Nouakchott
Only the dark blue area has a high-pressure network; the other areas are supplied by a network
that operates alternately (red), or are poorly served or underserved (yellow), or are served only
at night (purple), or are not supplied (no network - gray).
VI
Annex 5 – Summary Ex-Post Environmental Impact Assessment
The environmental assessment of the Aftout Project is based on the Environmental Impact
Statement and the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) that were conducted. It will assess
the effectiveness of mitigation/compensation measures implemented under the Environmental
Management Plan (EMP). The purpose is to assess the extent to which the EMP has achieved
the EIA objectives, namely maintaining the environmental impacts of the project at a threshold
acceptable to the receiving environment.
The environment in Mauritania is governed by Law No. 2000-045 of 26 July 2000 instituting
the Environmental Code. It is the subject of two decrees relating to EIA (Decree No. 2004-094
and Decree No. 2007-015). Drinking water supply projects are subject to EIA regulations and
must therefore adhere to the EIA procedure in force in Mauritania. Such projects therefore
require an environmental feasibility advice issued by the Ministry in charge of the Environment
prior to the project start-up.
The project area is part of the Mauritanian coastline between the mouth of the Senegal River
and the south and Cap Blanc to the north, and covers a distance of over 720 km. This coastline
covers a distance of 900 km if the numerous islands and islets are taken into account. The
project is located in the southern part of the coast, between Nouakchott and the Senegal River
delta. The project impact area includes, from north to south, the City of Nouakchott, and the
whole stretch of coastline between Nouakchott and the Senegal River delta.
The Aftout project doubled Nouakchott’s water consumption, but did not contribute to the
sanitation of the city. Indeed, the sewerage system covers only a small part of the city, and is
limited to applying the lagooning technique without use of reagents.
The rest of the city discharges its sewage through septic systems, cesspools and tankers that
extract the sewage for disposal at various locations in the city. All this sewage ends up in the
aquifer that rises to the surface all over the city. Several neighbourhoods of Nouakchott have
been under water since the arrival of water from the Aftout Essahli facility.
The residual impacts of the Aftout project, deemed average or major after implementation of
the recommended mitigation measures are:
Clearing and grading (destabilization of dunes): The length of silted sites adds up to
a distance of about 20 km. The recommended measure is dune fixation in these areas. It
has not been implemented.
Contamination of the aquifer by sewage sludge discharge: The sludge is first poured
into evaporation lagoons. Once dry, it is buried 5 km from the Béni Nadji site, which
could create a risk of contamination of the aquifer through infiltration if the sludge
contains toxic substances (waste treatment chemical residues).
Noise pollution: The lack of ear-muffs in pumping stations (especially in the pumping
stations of the water intake site) constitutes a risk for the staff monitoring the motor
pumps.
Sanitation in the City of Nouakchott: Although the water distribution system of the
city is being renovated to reduce leaks and water wastage, the sanitation problem
VII
remains unresolved, given that generated (waste or drinking) water ends up in the
aquifer that rises to the surface all over the city.
The impacts were deemed average or major, but their significance was reduced to a level
acceptable to the receiving environment by means of the following appropriate adaptation
measures:
River flow modification: Culverts were made on the arm of the Senegal River known
as “Diallo”, thereby restoring normal water flow.
Destruction of homes, gas stations and farmland: A system of compensation has been
worked out, and the issue settled amicably. Indeed, local coordination committees and a
national coordination committee assessed and compensated victims of expropriations.
Some impacts were deemed minor and did not require any measures, whereas others called for
such measures:
Pumping of water from the river: This impact was considered minor because the
water extracted from Aftout is negligible in relation to the flow of the Senegal River,
and therefore no mitigation measures were taken.
Wind and water erosion: This involves siltation of the Béni Nadji and PK 17 sites. For
these sites, a double hedge and windbreaks were constructed, although the scope of the
impact was deemed minor. This measure helped to embellish these sites. Regarding
water erosion, the Aftout aqueducts run through areas of depression which may cause
their corrosion. These areas already suffer from rainwater stagnation during the rainy
season. No measures were taken concerning this impact deemed of minor significance.
Typha (colonization): This impact was deemed minor, even though this invasive plant
abounds on the banks and arms of the Senegal River, posing enormous ecological and
socio-economic problems in the region. No mitigation measures were applied to this
impact which, once again, represents a risk for the Aftout Project and not the contrary.
Visual pollution (presence of radio relay masts and buildings): This impact was
deemed minor and the architectural treatment of buildings was recommended as a
mitigation measure.
Sampling of materials (borrowing): This impact was deemed minor and no mitigation
measure was recommended.
VIII
Annex 6: Diagram of the Envisaged Post-Aftout Network
IX
Annex 7 – Key Tables
Table 7.1: Comparative indicators of water corporations in the sub-region
Water
Corporation
Production
m3/year
Turnover in
CFAF billion
Length of
network
in km
Staff
Strength
Number of
Subscribers
Recovery
Rate
Network
Performance
ONEA Burkina
Faso 60 000 000 26 6 175 714 182 400 96% 0.81
SNDE
Mauritania 43 517 000 10 3232 1493 100 000 ? 0.48
SDE Senegal 147 000 000 73 1140 519 756 97% 0.79
(*) 850 of whom are permanent staff and 643 contract employees.
Table 7.2: Cost of Water in UM in a number of countries of the sub-region
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4
Mauritania 99 283 367
Senegal (2003) 110 362 453
Burkina Faso (2008) 108 247 293 598
Benin 121 276
Côte d'Ivoire (2007) 135 211 337 393
Mali 65 173
Source: Senegal (http://www.sde.sn/h2otarif.htm); Burkina (http://www.oneabf.com/tarifs-de-leau--la-
politique-tarifaire-de-lonea.html)
Table 7.3: Estimated Average Consumption (litre/day)
Year Population
Production in millions of m3/year
Network
Output
Specific
Consumption in
litre/day Total Iddini Aftout
Estimates by
the FD
2007 676 374 19.74 19.74 0.56 45
2008 696 260 20.75 20.75 0.56 46
2009 716 730 22.30 22.30 0.52 44
2010 737371 23.72 23.72 31.03 0.49 43
2011 757 907 26.14 3.99 22.15 32.84 0.42 40
2012 779 014 33.78 6.45 27.34 34.85 0.50 59 DPD = FEED – Front-End Engineering Design (Translator’s note)-
X
Table 7.5: Production and Overall Output
Year
Water Production (in m3/year or per
day) Billed Volume in m3
Overall Output
(billed volume
/volume
produced)
Recovery Rate
(amount received/amount
billed) Aftout Plant Iddini Resources Social Block Block 2 Block 3
Standpipes/
Water Tankers Others
2007 19 736 136 2 928 843 1 368 267 3 180 834 1 783 830 1 790 462 56 91
2008 20 746 816 3 078 827 1 438 335 3 343 723 1 875 180 1 882 151 56 79
2009 20 305 912 2 798155 1 307213 3 038 902 1 704 234 1 710 570 52 78
2010 23 717 282 3 079 689 1 438 737 3 344 658 1 875 705 1 882 678 49 113
2011 22 151 506 3 990 438 2909 487 1 359 224 3 159 813 1 772 042 1 778 630 42 77
2012
(first 3
quarters)
20 501 629 4 836 470 2 752 984 1 286 111 2 989 845 1 676 723 1 682 956 41 89
Source: SNDE
XI
Annex 8: Cost-Benefit Analysis
1. Introduction
Cost-benefit analysis compares the costs required to implement and operate a project with the income
and profits generated during the selected operation period in order to assess the project’s profitability
(capacity to generate income and profits that exceed costs and expenses).
As regards the Nouakchott (Aftout Es Saheli) drinking water supply project, the costs and expenses are
as follows:
- Initial investment provided partly by partners and partly by the Government of Mauritania;
- Costs of replace of certain equipment whose operational lifespan is shorter than the project
duration; and
- Operating expenses (wages, energy, reagents and cost of chemical analysis, maintenance,
OMVS charges, rental of premises and sundry consumables).
Income is derived essentially from the sale of water and from other SNDE activities (installation of
connections, for example). The project also generates positive impacts with economic benefits (shorter
water-fetching time with the possibility of freeing up more time for income-generating activities,
reduced cost of water, especially for residents of previously underserved areas, reduced incidence of
water-borne diseases and health expenses, improved learning conditions for youth, lower electricity bills
thanks to the improved water pressure and the discontinued use of suppressors).
The assessment of these costs and benefits requires actual data not only from baseline studies and the
project management, but also from SNDE operating results.
2. Assumptions and Outcomes of Drinking Water Production Estimates
Drinking water production by the Aftout project may be assessed on the basis of the following data and
assumptions:
- The available population data and the
growth rates they reflect were thus used
to estimate the population in the years
ahead. These data were provided by the
Socio-economist Expert, who obtained
them from the National Statistics
Authority (ONS).
- The output of SNDE network as
reflected by the data provided for the
period 2007-2011; and assumptions are made for the period up to the end of the current and
future network rehabilitation works (for which we have retained a 75% rate of return). The
following figure shows the data and assumptions on network output.
Evolution des rendements de réseau
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
0,70
0,80
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Année
ren
dem
en
t
Trends in network performance
Year
Perfo
rm
an
ce
XII
- Data on the specific drinking water consumption for the 2007-2011 period were assessed on
the basis of data provided by SNDE and for the period thereafter from the development goals
identified. The idea is to ensure that the per
capita water consumption is brought back to
80 litres per day. The following figure shows
the specific consumption trend.
- The production level adopted for the old
equipment of the Iddini intake facility which
we maintained throughout the project
duration at the 2012 level.
The following table presents the results of the drinking water production assessment, which we
compared to those of the final design (shown below) that appear over-estimated since it fails to take into
account details such as the significant drop in network output after the rehabilitation works.
Year Population
Production in Million m3/year
Network Output
Specific
Consumption in
litre/day Total Iddini Aftout
Final Design
Estimates
2007 676 374 19.74 19.74 0.56 45
2008 696 260 20.75 20.75 0.56 46
2009 716 730 22.30 22.30 0.52 44
2010 737371 23.72 23.72 31.03 0.49 43
2011 757 907 26.14 3.99 22.15 32.84 0.42 40
2012 779 014 33.78 6.45 27.34 34.85 0.50 59
2013 800 710 33.09 6.45 26.64 36.79 0.53 60
2014 823 010 33.67 6.45 27.22 38.94 0.58 65
2015 845961 31.86 6.45 25.41 41.21 0.63 65
2016 869 775 32.68 6.45 26.23 43.74 0.68 70
2017 894 259 31.30 6.45 24.85 46.17 0.73 70
Evolution comparée de la production annuelle d'eau
10,00
20,00
30,00
40,00
50,00
60,00
70,00
80,00
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Année
Prod
en
m3/
an
Production estimée à
partir des données SNDE
Production estimée par
étude APD
Evolution de la consommation spécif ique en l/jour
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Année
co
ns l/jo
ur
----Production estimates from
SNDE data
----Production estimates from the
detailed design
Pro
du
ction
Year
Comparison in water production trends
Trends in specific consumption in l/d
Year
Co
nsu
mp
tio
n in
l/d
XIII
Year Population
Production in Million m3/year
Network Output
Specific
Consumption in
litre/day Total Iddini Aftout
Final Design
Estimates
2018 919 432 33.56 6.45 27.11 48.87 0.75 75
2019 945 314 34.50 6.45 28.06 51.73 0.75 75
2020 971 925 37.84 6.45 31.39 54.90 0.75 80
2021 999 625 38.92 6.45 32.47 56.15 0.75 80
2022 1 028 114 40.03 6.45 33.58 57.58 0.75 80
2023 1 057 415 41.17 6.45 34.72 59.05 0.75 80
2024 1 087 552 42.34 6.45 35.89 60.72 0.75 80
2025 1 118 547 43.55 6.45 37.10 62.10 0.75 80
2026 1 150 817 44.81 6.45 38.36 63.66 0.75 80
2027 1 184 018 46.10 6.45 39.65 65.31 0.75 80
2028 1 218 177 47.43 6.45 40.98 67.17 0.75 80
2029 1 253 321 48.80 6.45 42.35 68.69 0.75 80
2030 1 289 480 50.20 6.45 43.76 70.45 0.75 80
2031 1 327 133 51.67 6.45 45.22 70.45 0.75 80
2032 1 365 885 53.18 6.45 46.73 70.64 0.75 80
2033 1 405 769 54.73 6.45 48.28 70.45 0.75 80
2034 1 446 817 56.33 6.45 49.88 70.45 0.75 80
3. Assumptions and Outcomes of Costs Assessment
3.1. Investment and Renewal of Equipment
We took into account only the investments of the drinking water production project, whereas those
relating to the on-going rehabilitation and extension of the distribution network were not considered.
Year Nature of Investment Amount in UM
2008 Initial Investment 15 353 200 000
2009 Initial Investment 55 387 800 000
2010 Initial Investment 50 723 000 000
2020 Equipment Renewal 9 984 017 228
2031 Equipment Renewal 9 984 017 228
3.2. Operating Costs
In the cost-benefit analysis and calculation of rates of return, we took into account only the operating
costs of the Afout Es Saheli facility. To that end, we distinguished:
- Completely charged specific costs relating to Aftout facility; these costs are proportional to the
water volume produced by the Aftout facility, and their trend over time follows that production:
o energy costs related to the production of Aftout facility,
o costs relating to the purchase of reagents and water analysis by the quality control
laboratory of the Ministry of Health,
o specific maintenance costs of Aftout facility, and
o water rates paid to OMVS.
XIV
- Common costs for the entire Nouakchott water supply system to which a percentage
corresponding to the production of Aftout facility is charged. These costs are sometimes
proportional to the volume of water produced (cost of energy and maintenance of the water
distribution system, and expenses on sundry consumables). Other costs under this heading
(wages of permanent and temporary staff, rental of SNDE premises) are determined by the
relevant SNDE policy. We worked on the assumptions of SNDE’s autonomy at end-2014 in
terms of ownership of its own premises, a 2% increase in the salaries of permanent staff starting
from 2013 and stabilization of temporary staff-related expenses as from 2013. These
assumptions may be adjusted by SNDE.
The following
table shows the
assessment of
operating costs
based on the
above data and
assumptions.
The figure
below
illustrates the
trends over
time of the
main expenses.
It also shows that the main expenses, by order of magnitude, relate to energy, reagents and analysis, and
wages. A strategy for reducing or bringing these expenses under control can have a significant impact
on the profitability of the Aftout project, as well as on the financial stability of the water supply system
of the City of Nouakchott.
Evolution des charges
0
200 000 000
400 000 000
600 000 000
800 000 000
1 000 000 000
1 200 000 000
1 400 000 000
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Année
ch
arg
es U
M U
M
Energie
Réactifs et analyses
Maintenance
Redevance OMVS
Salaires
-----Energy
-----Reagents and
analyses
-----Maintenance
-----OMVS rates
----
Exp
en
ses
in U
M
Trends in Expenses
Year
XV
Year
Energy
Chemical
Analysed
Maintenance Wages
Rental of
Premises
Sundry
Supplies Total
Production
Aftout Distribution Total Aftout Distribution Total
OMVS
Rates Permanent Temporary Total
2011 612 052 440 4 739 409 616 791 849 6 202 310 6 202 310 228 206 621 45 643 132 273 849 753 21 221 158 10 576 645 928 641 715
2012 707 068 512 3 887 121 710 955 633 444 800 042 5 151 600 6 173 573 11 325 173 23 394 879 318 007 496 47 281 633 365 289 128 20 263 667 9 954 991 1 585 983 513
2013 689 008 946 3 787 838 692 796 785 433 439 197 5 020 021 6 015 891 11 035 912 28 869 858 324 367 646 45 000 000 369 367 646 21 000 000 9 700 725 1 566 210 123
2014 703 996 277 3 870 231 707 866 508 442 867 372 5 129 216 6 146 749 11 275 965 28 132 480 330 854 999 45 000 000 375 854 999 21 000 000 9 911 736 1 596 909 059
2015 657 241 862 3 613 198 660 855 060 413 455 277 4 788 570 5 738 526 10 527 096 28 744 418 337 472 099 45 000 000 382 472 099 0 9 253 469 1 505 307 418
2016 678 521 866 3 730 185 682 252 051 426 842 024 4 943 613 5 924 326 10 867 939 26 835 418 344 221 541 45 000 000 389 221 541 0 9 553 075 1 545 572 049
2017 642 788 978 3 533 743 646 322 721 404 363 311 4 683 269 5 612 334 10 295 603 27 704 289 351 105 971 45 000 000 396 105 971 0 9 049 983 1 493 841 878
2018 701 252 444 3 855 147 705 107 591 441 141 292 5 109 225 6 122 792 11 232 017 26 245 302 358 128 091 45 000 000 403 128 091 0 9 873 105 1 596 727 397
2019 725 688 181 3 989 483 729 677 664 456 513 234 5 287 260 6 336 146 11 623 406 28 632 386 365 290 653 45 000 000 410 290 653 0 10 217 141 1 646 954 484
2020 811 986 045 4 463 907 816 449 952 510 801 175 5 916 014 7 089 632 13 005 646 29 630 106 372 596 466 45 000 000 417 596 466 0 11 432 150 1 798 915 495
2021 839 881 508 4 617 263 844 498 771 528 349 550 6 119 256 7 333 193 13 452 450 33 153 678 380 048 395 45 000 000 425 048 395 0 11 824 897 1 856 327 742
2022 868 571 993 4 774 989 873 346 982 546 398 054 6 328 291 7 583 696 13 911 987 34 292 660 387 649 363 45 000 000 432 649 363 0 12 228 838 1 912 827 883
2023 898 080 155 4 937 211 903 017 366 564 960 940 6 543 284 7 841 339 14 384 622 35 464 103 395 402 350 45 000 000 440 402 350 0 12 644 290 1 970 873 671
2024 928 429 301 5 104 056 933 533 357 584 052 868 6 764 403 8 106 324 14 870 727 36 668 932 403 310 397 45 000 000 448 310 397 0 13 071 583 2 030 507 863
2025 959 643 397 5 275 656 964 919 053 603 688 916 6 991 824 8 378 861 15 370 685 37 908 098 411 376 605 45 000 000 456 376 605 0 13 511 054 2 091 774 411
2026 992 141 351 5 454 314 997 595 665 624 132 608 7 228 600 8 662 608 15 891 208 39 182 581 419 604 137 45 000 000 464 604 137 0 13 968 601 2 155 374 799
2027 1 025 576 871 5 638 126 1 031 214 997 645 166 101 7 472 206 8 954 541 16 426 747 40 509 484 427 996 220 45 000 000 472 996 220 0 14 439 348 2 220 752 896
2028 1 059 977 005 5 827 241 1 065 804 247 666 806 410 7 722 841 9 254 896 16 977 737 41 874 668 436 556 144 45 000 000 481 556 144 0 14 923 675 2 287 942 882
2029 1 095 369 584 6 021 813 1 101 391 396 689 071 043 7 980 706 9 563 917 17 544 623 43 279 237 445 287 267 45 000 000 490 287 267 0 15 421 976 2 356 995 543
2030 1 131 783 238 6 221 997 1 138 005 235 711 978 010 8 246 011 9 881 852 18 127 863 44 724 329 454 193 013 45 000 000 499 193 013 0 15 934 653 2 427 963 103
2031 1 169 701 931 6 430 456 1 176 132 387 735 831 761 8 522 281 10 212 929 18 735 210 46 211 111 463 276 873 45 000 000 508 276 873 0 16 468 520 2 501 655 861
2032 1 208 727 850 6 645 002 1 215 372 852 760 382 041 8 806 618 10 553 673 19 360 291 47 759 345 472 542 410 45 000 000 517 542 410 0 17 017 975 2 577 434 915
2033 1 248 893 326 6 865 812 1 255 759 138 785 649 190 9 099 258 10 904 367 20 003 625 49 352 787 481 993 259 45 000 000 526 993 259 0 17 583 475 2 655 341 473
2034 1 290 231 633 7 093 070 1 297 324 704 811 654 140 9 400 443 11 265 301 20 665 744 50 992 758 491 633 124 45 000 000 536 633 124 0 18 165 487 2 735 435 955
XVI
4. Assumptions and Outcomes of Income Assessment (AFTOUT)
According to data provided by SNDE for 2011 and 2012 covering the operation of the Aftout facility, the facility derives
its income mainly from selling water as well as from such sources as connecting users to the water supply network. The
assumptions are based on various key parameters on income obtained from SNDE and presented below:
Year
Annual Volume of Water Billed by Type in m3
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 Public Standpipes and Tankers Others
2 007 2 928 843 1 368 267 3 180 834 1 783 830 1 790 462
2 008 3 078 827 1 438 335 3 343 723 1 875 180 1 882 151
2 009 2 798 155 1 307 213 3 038 902 1 704 234 1 710 570
2 010 3 079 689 1 438 737 3 344 658 1 875 705 182 678
2 011 2 909 487 1 359 224 3 159 813 1 772 042 1 778 630
2012 (1st 3 quarters) 2 752 984 1 286 111 2 989 845 1 676 723 1 682 956
Water Production (in m3/year)
Overall
Output
Billed
Volume in
m3/year
Recovery Rate
Income in UM
Year Aftout Plant
Iddini
Resources
Water Sale Others Total
2 007 19 736 136 0.56 11 052 236 0.91
2 008 20 746 816 0.56 11 618216 0.79
2 009 20 305 912 0.52 10 559 074 0.78
2 010 23 717 282 0.49 9 921 467 1.13
2 011 22 151 506 3 990 438 0.42 10 979 196 0.77 3 828 726 588 535 316 081 4 354 042 669
2012 (1st 3
quarters) 20 501 629 4 836 470
0.41
13 851 492
0.89
3 119 919 532
93 251 400
3 213 170 932
It was difficult to reconstitute the income derived from the sale of water for the various segments. We thus determined
an average water price from SNDE's income and the volume of water billed. This price is as follows:
Year
Income in UM
Billed Volume
in m3
Average Water Price in UM
Water Sale Others Total Recovery Rate
Water Income Total Income
2011 3 828 726 588 535 316 081 4 364 042 669 10 979 196 0.77 392 516
2012 (1st 3
quarters) 3 119 919 532 93 251 400 3 213 170 932 13 851 492 0.89
293
261
388
In light of these various factors, we calculated the financial rate of return from an average water price of UM 350 per
m3. On this basis, the following table shows the income trend.
To calculate the economic internal rate of return, we set the economic value of water at UM 1 500 /m3 from the following
considerations:
- The water price charged at public standpipes is UM 10 for a 20-litre drum, or UM 500 per m3;
- The retail price is UM 30-40 per 20 litres or UM 1 500-2 000 per m3.
XVII
Income Trend (generated by Aftout network)
Year
Production in Million m3/year
Output of the
Network
Specific
Consumption in
litre/day Recovery Rate
Calculated Sold
Volume of Water
SNDE Sold
Volume
Aftout’s Share of Sold
Volume
Income from
Aftout Network
(average price of
UM 350) Total Iddini Aftout
2011 26.14 3.99 22.15 0.42 40 0.77 8.45 10.979196 9.303276224 3 256 146 678
2012 33.78 6.45 27.34 0.50 59 0.89 15.03 13.851492 11.20755547 3 922 644 415
2013 33.09 6.45 26.64 0.53 60 0.90 15.78 15.78 12.70599996 4 447 099 987
2014 33.67 6.45 27.22 0.58 65 0.90 17.57 17.57 14.20713394 4 972 496 879
2015 31.86 6.45 25.41 0.63 65 0.90 18.06 18.06 14.40701093 5 042 453 826
2016 32.68 6.45 26.23 0.68 70 0.90 20.00 20.00 16.05391206 5 618 869 219
2017 31.30 6.45 24.85 0.73 70 0.90 20.56 20.56 16.32673713 5 714 357 996
2018 33.56 6.45 27.11 0.75 75 0.90 22.65 22.65 18.29969159 6 404 892 056
2019 34.50 6.45 28.06 0.75 75 0.90 23.29 23.29 18.93735987 6 628 075 956
2020 37.84 6.45 31.39 0.75 80 0.90 25.54 25.54 21.18936529 7 416 277 851
2021 38.92 6.45 32.47 0.75 80 0.90 26.27 26.27 21.91731766 7 671 061 180
2022 40.03 6.45 33.58 0.75 80 0.90 27.02 27.02 22.66601666 7 933 105 833
2023 41.17 6.45 34.72 0.75 80 0.90 27.79 27.79 23.4360536 8 202 618 758
2024 42.34 6.45 35.89 0.75 80 0.90 28.58 28.58 24.22803658 8 479 812 802
2025 43.55 6.45 37.10 0.75 80 0.90 29.40 29.40 25.04259108 8 764 906 877
2026 44.81 6.45 38.36 0.75 80 0.90 30.24 30.24 25.89064877 9 061 727 070
2027 46.10 6.45 39.65 0.75 80 0.90 31.12 31.12 26.76317293 9 367 110 526
2028 47.43 6.45 40.98 0.75 80 0.90 32.01 32.01 27.66086942 9 681 304 295
2029 48.80 6.45 42.35 0.75 80 0.90 32.94 32.94 28.58446444 10 004 562 555
2030 50.20 6.45 43.76 0.75 80 0.90 33.89 33.89 29.53470518 10 337 146 814
2031 51.67 6.45 45.22 0.75 80 0.90 34.88 34.88 30.52422101 10 683 477 353
2032 53.18 6.45 46.73 0.75 80 0.90 35.90 35.90 31.54263069 11 039 920 742
2033 54.73 6.45 48.28 0.75 80 0.90 36.94 36.94 32.59077794 11 406 772 279
2034 56.33 6.45 49.88 0.75 80 0.90 38.02 38.02 33.66953109 11 784 335 881
XVIII
5. Calculation of Financial Rate of Return
Year
Production in Million m3/year
Investment
Total Expenses of
Aftout Network
Total Income of Aftout Network
(average price of UM 350 per
m3) Cash-flow
Calculation of Financial
Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) Total Iddini Aftout
1 2008 15 353 200 000 -15 353 200 000 -15 303 921 373
2 2009 55 387 800 000 -55 387 800 000 -55 032 818 049
3 2010 50 723 000 000 -50 723 000 000 -50 236 154 465
4 2011 26.14 3.99 22.15 928 641 715 3 256 146 678 2 327 504 964 2 297 766 479
5 2012 33.78 6.45 27.34 1 585 983 513 3 922 644 415 2 336 660 902 2 299 401 360
6 2013 33.09 6.45 26.64 1 566 210 123 4 447 099 987 2 880 889 863 2 825 852 998
7 2014 33.67 6.45 27.22 1 596 909 059 4 972 496 879 3 375 587 820 3 300 472 664
8 2015 31.86 6.45 25.41 1 505 307 418 5 042 453 826 3 537 146 408 3 447 335 754
9 2016 32.68 6.45 26.23 1 545 572 049 5 618 869 219 4 073 297 171 3 957 131 306
10 2017 31.30 6.45 24.85 1 493 841 878 5 714 357 996 4 220 516 118 4 086 991 621
11 2018 33.56 6.45 27.11 1 596 727 397 6 404 892 056 4 808 164 658 4 641 104 364
12 2019 34.50 6.45 28.06 1 646 954 484 6 628 075 956 4 981 121 471 4 792 619 536
13 2020 37.84 6.45 31.39 9 984 017 228 1 798 915 495 7 416 277 851 -4 366 654 872 -4 187 921 257
14 2021 38.92 6.45 32.47 1 856 327 742 7 671 061 180 5 814 733 438 5 558 828 407
15 2022 40.03 6.45 33.58 1 912 827 883 7 933 105 833 6 020 277 949 5 736 854 282
16 2023 41.17 6.45 34.72 1 970 873 671 8 202 618 758 6 231 745 087 5 919 305 770
17 2024 42.34 6.45 35.89 2 030 507 863 8 479 812 802 6 449 304 939 6 106 295 611
18 2025 43.55 6.45 37.10 2 091 774 411 8 764 906 877 6 673 132 465 6 297 939 400
19 2026 44.81 6.45 38.36 2 155 374 799 9 061 727 070 6 906 352 271 6 497 125 809
20 2027 46.10 6.45 39.65 2 220 752 896 9 367 110 526 7 146 357 630 6 701 331 691
21 2028 47.43 6.45 40.98 2 287 942 882 9 681 304 295 7 393 361 414 6 910 701 322
22 2029 48.80 6.45 42.35 2 356 995 543 10 004 562 555 7 647 567 012 7 125 367 956
23 2030 50.20 6.45 43.76 2 427 963 103 10 337 146 814 7 909 183 712 7 345 468 267
24 2031 51.67 6.45 45.22 9 984 017 228 2 501 655 861 10 683 477 353 -1 802 195 737 -1 668 374 718
25 2032 53.18 6.45 46.73 2 577 434 915 11 039 920 742 8 462 485 828 7 808 963 894
26 2033 54.73 6.45 48.28 2 655 341 473 11 406 772 279 8 751 430 806 8 049 674 922
27 2034 56.33 6.45 49.88 -6 988 812 060 2 735 435 955 11 784 335 881 16 037 711 985 14 704 339 019
-18 317 431
Value of FIRR in % 0.330
XIX
6. Calculation of Economic Rate of Return
Year
Production in Million m3/year
Investment
Total Expenses
of Aftout
Network
Total Income (Economic
Value of Water Stands at UM
1,500 per m3) Cash-flow
Calculation of Economic
Internal Rate of Return
(EIRR) Total Iddini Aftout
1 2008 15 353 200 000 -15 353 200 000 -13 246 937 015
2 2009 55 387 800 000 -55 387 800 000 -41 233 219 259
3 2010 50 723 000 000 -50 723 000 000 -32 580 265 867
4 2011 26.14 3.99 22.15 928 641 715 13 954 914 336 13 026 272 621 7 219 155 877
5 2012 33.78 6.45 27.34 1 585 983 513 16 811 333 207 15 225 349 694 7 280 313 758
6 2013 33.09 6.45 26.64 1 566 210 123 19 058 999 943 17 492 789 820 7 217 029 196
7 2014 33.67 6.45 27.22 1 596 909 059 21 310 700 909 19 713 791 850 7 017 559 684
8 2015 31.86 6.45 25.41 1 505 307 418 21 610 516 399 20 105 208 980 6 175 058 893
9 2016 32.68 6.45 26.23 1 545 572 049 24 080 868 083 22 535 296 034 5 971 897 484
10 2017 31.30 6.45 24.85 1 493 841 878 24 490 105 695 22 996 263 817 5 258 028 341
11 2018 33.56 6.45 27.11 1 596 727 397 27 449 537 382 25 852 809 985 5 100 232 315
12 2019 34.50 6.45 28.06 1 646 954 484 28 406 039 811 26 759 085 326 4 554 807 560
13 2020 37.84 6.45 31.39 9 984 017 228 1 798 915 495 31 784 047 935 20 001 115 211 2 937 443 649
14 2021 38.92 6.45 32.47 1 856 327 742 32 875 976 484 31 019 648 742 3 930 689 804
15 2022 40.03 6.45 33.58 1 912 827 883 33 999 024 997 32 086 197 113 3 508 057 536
16 2023 41.17 6.45 34.72 1 970 873 671 35 154 080 393 33 183 206 722 3 130 281 375
17 2024 42.34 6.45 35.89 2 030 507 863 36 342 054 867 34 311 547 004 2 792 684 587
18 2025 43.55 6.45 37.10 2 091 774 411 37 563 886 614 35 472 112 203 2 491 065 816
19 2026 44.81 6.45 38.36 2 155 374 799 38 835 973 158 36 680 598 359 2 222 547 893
20 2027 46.10 6.45 39.65 2 220 752 896 40 144 759 399 37 924 006 503 1 982 647 438
21 2028 47.43 6.45 40.98 2 287 942 882 41 491 304 123 39 203 361 241 1 768 361 900
22 2029 48.80 6.45 42.35 2 356 995 543 42 876 696 662 40 519 701 120 1 576 996 183
23 2030 50.20 6.45 43.76 2 427 963 103 44 302 057 776 41 874 094 674 1 406 133 009
24 2031 51.67 6.45 45.22 9 984 017 228 2 501 655 861 45 786 331 511 33 300 658 421 964 829 019
25 2032 53.18 6.45 46.73 2 577 434 915 47 313 946 038 44 736 511 124 1 118 346 061
26 2033 54.73 6.45 48.28 2 655 341 473 48 886 166 910 46 230 825 437 997 154 177
27 2034 56.33 6.45 49.88 -6 988 812 060 2 735 435 955 50 504 296 631 54 757 672 736 1 019 042 298
579 941 713
Value of EIRR in % 15.90
XX
Sensitivity Analysis
This trend analysis is intended firstly to determine the sensitivity of a number of parameters on such indicators as the
financial rate of return and the economic rate of return and, secondly, to determine measures that should be taken to
bring these indicators to acceptable levels.
In this regard, in addition to the baseline scenario characterized by an average water price of UM 350, an economic
value of water of UM 1 500, a maximum output of 75% and network load levels corresponding to those currently
indicated by SNDE, resulting in a financial rate of return of 0.33% (deemed low) and an economic rate of return of
15.9% (deemed acceptable), we tested a number of scenarios.
- A few optimistic scenarios:
o OP Scenario 1: a 10% increase in water price as from 2015, improvement of up to 80% in network
output as from 2019, with expenses remaining at the same level as those of the baseline scenario;
o OP Scenario 2: a 20% increase in water price as from 2015, with the expenses remaining at the same
level as for the baseline scenario;
o OP Scenario 3: a 20% increase in water price and a 10% reduction in power consumption as from 2015,
with the expenses remaining at the same level as for the baseline scenario. This scenario seemed realistic
to us, given Mauritania’s new energy situation;
This scenario assumes a 10% reduction in investment costs in the calculation of the rates of return,
given that the Government of Mauritania’s share in the investment already stands at 14%.
- A pessimistic (PE) scenario: assumes a 10% increase in all expenses as from 2015, with incomes being
considered as those of the baseline scenario.
The results derived from calculating the rates of return of the various scenarios may be summarized as follows:
Scenario Characteristics of the scenario FIRR in % EIRR in %
Baseline Scenario Average water price: UM 350
Maximum system output: 75%
Economic value of water: UM 1500
0.33 15.9
OP Scenario 1 Average water price: UM 385 from 2015
Maximum system output: 80%
Economic value of water: UM 1500
1.07 15.9
OP Scenario 2 Average water price: UM 420 from 2015
Maximum system output: 80%
Economic value of water: UM 1500
1.8 15.9
OP Scenario 3 Average water price: UM 420 and 10% reduction of
of electricity expenses from 2015
Maximum system output: 80%
Economic value of water UM 1500
1.95 15.9
OP Scenario 4 Average water price: UM 350
Maximum system output: 75%
10% reduction (subsidy) in the investment
Economic value of water: UM 1500
1 17.35
PE Scenario Average water price: UM 350
Maximum system output: 75%
10% increase in total expenses from 2015
Economic value of water: UM 1500
0.11 15.9
XXI
The conclusions from this analysis are mainly as follows:
- The variations in the studied parameters, which we decided to keep within acceptable proportions compared
to reality, have a relatively small impact on the rate of return.
- For all the scenarios studied, the economic rate of return remains acceptable due to the relatively high
economic value of water.
- However, to achieve a financial rate of return of around 3% (which is more or less acceptable), it will be
necessary to have a mix of at the least the following options: a 20% increase in water price, a maximum
network output of around 80%, and a possible investment subsidy of more than 10%.
- Of course, any SNDE initiative aimed at reducing operating costs would enhance the financial rate of
return.
XXII
Annex 9: Diagnosis of SNDE's Key Functions20
1. Production and Operation
1.1 Current Status:
Structures and equipment in good working condition (high production capacity);
Partners still responsible for providing reagents and stocks of spare parts; and
Staff recruited primarily from the enterprises carrying out the works.
1.2 Short-term Trend and Potential Problems:
Depletion of the stocks of reagents and spare parts;
More frequent and constant need for (preventive and curative) maintenance;
Securing and building the capacity of production and operation staff; slow and cumbersome ordering
procedures in terms of response timeframes; and
Unavailability of skills on the local market (contractors and suppliers).
2. Distribution
2.1 Current Status (Problems Encountered):
Overlap of distribution and marketing functions;
Inadequate knowledge of the antiquated network currently undergoing rehabilitation and expansion (no
network plans and specification nodes);
Huge losses, fraud (low output - 42%);
Lack of a guide or reference for the installation and management of connections;
Long delays in responding to leakage repair and connection installation requests;
Lack of a metrology structure and a meter-selection procedure;
Failure to monitor indicators (network output, number of leaks per km, etc.); and
Lack of such vital details as staff strength (including permanent and contract employees) and staff
supervision rate.
2.2 Short-term Trend (of Opportunities)
High production capacity to be upgraded;
Network in good condition and having a wider coverage (significant reduction of leaks); and
High demand for new connections (staff redeployment and employment opportunities).
3. Commercial Function
3.1 Connection:
Slow file review and processing procedures;
Poor quality of works and inadequate involvement of applicants;
Gap between the installation of meters and the securing of connections (which leaves room for fraud); and
Failure to make periodic updates of the price list.
3.2 Metering and Reading:
Lack of systematic rotation and assignment of meter readers; and
Buried or poorly placed meters (estimates, disputes, and collection difficulties).
20 Culled from the ONEP Organizational Study Report
XXIII
3.3 Billing, Recovery:
Billing on a prorata basis (blocked or broken meters);
Late payment of bills by private individuals in the absence of coercive measures;
Accumulation of arrears owed by the Government, unaccountability of services in terms of bill payments
at central level, and water wastage;
Inadequate IT support; and
Communication and user awareness.
4. Supplementary Diagnosis: Elements of comparison between SNDE and other water supply corporations
Headings ONEA Burkina Faso SDE Senegal SNDE Mauritania
Annual Production in m3/year 60 000 000 147 000 000 44 000 000
Number of subscribers 182.000 519.800 75 000 to 100 000
Length of network (km) 6.175 ? 3.200 ?
Saff strength 714 1140 850+643=1493
Turnover in USD million 52 146 20
Network output (billed volume/produced volume) 81% 79% 48%
Recovery rate 96% 97 ?
Source: ONEA and SDE Websites, and 2011 Progress Report.
Change is possible: water supply corporations in the sub-region have achieved it or are very close to doing so, and yet:
In comparison to these corporations, SNDE has significant advantages:
The Nouakchott production facility is much more efficient than the facilities of these corporations;
The Nouakchott water supply system will soon (after completion of the works in progress) be just as
efficient as that of these corporations, if not more; and
Real support from donors, political authorities and a number of technical partners (ONEP, SONED, etc.).
Conclusion: It is important to meet the challenges of change
5. How should change be triggered?
Driving it from the top: This has the advantage of solving common problems in one fell swoop and taking
steps to introduce sector-based changes by:
Promoting productivity, excellence, merit, etc.;
Establishing and ensuring the enforcement of procedures and rules; and
Establishing evaluation mechanisms.
Triggering it in priority sectors: which?
6. Secure production (future sensitive point of the system):
- Conclude maintenance contracts with works contractors;
- Prepare and provide on-the-job training for production staff in their future tasks;
- Control demand downstream (reduce leaks and fraud) to optimize production costs;
- Retain senior staff, especially production technicians (what benefits to offer them, for example); and
- Promote the emergence of local providers of certain production services (maintenance, spare parts, reagents,
etc.).
Failure to secure production (vital for the proper functioning of the system) may lead to adoption of measures with far-
reaching consequences (creation of an autonomous production structure, for example).
XXIV
Improvement of Distribution and Marketing
- Completely abandon the old network in favour of the new one as soon as the latter is completed in order to
significantly reduce leakage and combat fraud;
- Control the new network (by dividing it into sectors);
- Tackle the challenge posed by the increasing number of subscribers by improving the network and production
(staff redeployment, support towards establishment of small enterprises in this sector);
- Establish performance criteria (response time for network operations, responding to clients, network output,
recovery rate), and take steps to monitor their implementation;
- Regarding communication, it should be used to prepare clients to make better use of the network (give details);
contribute to user organization (association); establish a hotline.
Drinking-Water Sanitation Relationship:
Due to the increased drinking water production and consumption in Nouakchott, improving the city’s sanitary conditions
is becoming a priority.
Special attention should be paid to:
- The general public’s impression of SNDE (role of communication);
- Compliance with water pricing;
- Environmental protection (link between water and sanitation) and protection of water resources; and
- Strategic planning.
XXV
Annex 10 – Bibliography
AfDB/IsDD Bibliographical References
République Islamique de Mauritanie: Évaluation conjointe BAD/BID de la performance du projet d’alimentation en eau potable de
la ville de Nouakchott (Aftout Essahli) – Département de l’évaluation des opérations (OPEV BAD) et Département de l’évaluation
des opérations du groupe de la BID (GOE BID) - Document d’orientation, août 2012. (Islamic Republic of Mauritania: AfDB/IsDB
Joint Evaluation of the Performance of the Nouakchott City (Aftout Essahli) Drinking Water Supply Project - Department of
Operations Evaluation (OPEV AfDB) and Department of Operations Evaluation of IsDB Group (GOE IsDB) – Approach Paper,
August 2012.)
Mission exploratoire sur l’évaluation conjointe BAD/BID de la performance du projet d’alimentation en eau potable de la ville de
Nouakchott (Aftout Essahli), Mauritanie. Principales constations préliminaires par MM. Anasse Aissami (chef de Division des
évaluations spéciales et projets BID/GOE), Ahmed Aboubacrine (spécialiste en évaluation BID/GOE), Joseph Mouanda (chargé
d’évaluation BAD/OPEV) et Clément Bansé (assistant de recherche BAD-OPEV). (Exploratory Mission on AfDB/IsDB Joint
Evaluation of the Performance of the Nouakchott City (Aftout Essahli), Mauritania, Drinking Water Supply Project. Key
Preliminary Findings by Messrs. Anasse Aissami (Manager, Project and Special Evaluation Division, IsDB/GOE), Ahmed
Aboubacrine (Evaluation Specialist, IsDB/GOE), Joseph Mouanda (Evaluation Officer, AfDB/OPEV) and Clément Bansé
(Research Assistant, AfDB-OPEV)).
République Islamique de Mauritanie : Rapport d’achèvement du projet d’approvisionnement en eau potable de la ville de
Nouakchott « Aftout Essahli », Département de l’eau et de l’assainissement – OWAS, Régions Nord, Est et Sud, BAD, mars 2011.
(Islamic Republic of Mauritania: Completion Report: Nouakchott City “Aftout Essahli” Drinking Water Supply Project, Water and
Sanitation Department - OWAS, North, East and South Regions, AfDB, March 2011.
Mauritanie: Mission préparatoire du rapport d’achèvement du projet d’approvisionnement en eau potable de la ville de Nouakchott
Aftout Essahli, Aide-mémoire BAD (Mauritania: Advance Mission: Nouakchott City “Aftout Essahli” Drinking Water Supply
Project, AfDB Aide-mémoire) 04-13 December 2010.
République Islamique de Mauritanie : Rapport de revue de portefeuille, Département régional Nord 2 – ORNB, BAD (Islamic
Republic of Mauritania: Portfolio Review Report, Regional North 2 Department - ORNB, AfDB), December 2009.
Mauritanie: Projet d’approvisionnement en eau potable et d’assainissement en milieu rural dans la zone méridionale et Projet
d’approvisionnement en eau potable de la ville de Nouakchott « Aftout Essahli », Mission de supervision des projets BAD
(Mauritania: Rural Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Project in the Southern Region and the Nouakchott City "Aftout Essahli"
Drinking Water Supply Project, AfDB Supervision Mission), Nouakchott, 5-14 April 2009.
Rapport préliminaire d’audit interne N°PR/2007/40 sur la vérification de la gestion des projets financés par la Banque africaine
de développement en République islamique de Mauritanie, (Preliminary Internal Audit Report No. PR/2007/40 on the audit of the
management of Projects Financed by the African Development Bank, in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania), Office of the Auditor
General, June 2008.
Supplementary Loan Evaluation Report, Water and Sanitation Department (OWAS, North, East and South Regions), May 2008.
République islamique de Mauritanie: Rapport d’achèvement de la stratégie par pays 2006-2007 (Islamic Republic of Mauritania:
Country Strategy Completion Report, 2006-2007), Regional Department North 2, ORNB, AfDB, February, 2008.
Mauritanie: Projet d’approvisionnement en eau potable de la ville de Nouakchott à partir du fleuve Sénégal « Aftout Essahli »,
Mission de réévaluation du projet BAD (28 août – 04 septembre 2007). (Mauritania: Project to Supply Drinking Water to Nouakchott
City "Aftout Essah from the River Senegal, AfDB Project Revaluation Mission (August 28-September 4, 2007)).
République islamique de Mauritanie: Document de stratégie par pays (DSP 2006-2007) (Islamic Republic of Mauritania: Country
Strategy Paper (CSP 2006-2007)), Regional Department North 2, ORNB, AfDB, August 2006.
Islamic Development Bank Group: Project Completion Report and Evaluation Note (PCR-EN), Nouakchott Water Supply Aftout
Essahli Project - Project and Special Evaluation Division, Group Operations Evaluation Department, September 2012.
Islamic Development Bank: Project Completion Report, Nouakchott Water Supply Aftout Essahli Project, December 2011.
XXVI
Islamic Development Bank Group: Member Country Partnership Strategy of the IDB Group for Mauritania 2011-2015 G/ 1432 –
1436 H Rabi Thani 1432 H (March 2011).
Islamic Development Bank: No. IDB/BED/274/1432/()/8.2 Report and recommendations of the President of the IDB on the
proposed combination of a loan and Istisna’a a financing for Nouakchott water distribution network upgrading project, IRM.
Islamic Development Bank: No. IDB/BED/1428/ (8-12) Report and recommendations of the President to the considerations of a
proposed additional financing under ordinary loan operation for the “Nouakchott water supply project, IRM.
Islamic Development Bank: No. IDB/BED/1424H/167( ) 10 Report and recommendations of the President to the considerations of
a proposed technical assistance for the feasibility study and preliminary design of “Nouakchott water supply project, IRM.
Various Bibliographical References from Mauritania
Journal officiel de la République islamique de Mauritanie, Ordonnance N° 85-144 du 4 juillet 1986 portant Code de l’eau. (Official
Gazette of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania), Ordinance No. 85-144 of 4 July 1986: Water Code
Analyse du cadre institutionnel communication (Analysis of the Institutional Framework), paper presented by Youssouf Diakite
(IG/MHA), Barrister Barahim Fall Boubacar CAJ/MHA and Saleh Ould Sidi Mohamed DAAF/MHA at the Seminar on the Status
and Perspectives of the Water and Sanitation Sector, February 2012
République islamique de Mauritanie, Ministère des Affaires économiques et du développement, Cadre stratégique de lutte contre
la pauvreté, Volume 1, Bilan de la mise en œuvre du CSLP, 2006-2010.
(Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Volume 1,
Review of the implementation of the PRSP 2006-2010).
République islamique de Mauritanie, Ministère des Affaires économiques et du développement, Cadre stratégique de lutte contre
la pauvreté, Volume 2, Plan d’actions 2011-2015 (Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development,
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Volume 2, Action Plan 2011-2015).
République islamique de Mauritanie, Ministère de l’Hydraulique, de l’Énergie et des TIC, Déclaration de politique sectorielle
relative au secteur de l’eau en 2006 (Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Ministry of Water, Energy and ICT, Sector Policy Statement
on the Water Sector in 2006).
République islamique de Mauritanie, Ministère de l’Hydraulique, de l’Énergie et des TIC, Direction de l’assainissement,
Réactualisation de l’étude du Plan directeur de l’assainissement de la ville de Nouakchott – Phase 2 : Avant-projet détaillé de la
première phase des travaux, Rapport provisoire CID è SCET (Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Ministry of Water, Energy and ICT,
Directorate of Sanitation, Update of the Study of Sanitation Maser Plan of the City of Nouakchott - Phase 2: Detailed Design of the
First Phase of Works, CID è SCET Interim Report).
République islamique de Mauritanie, Ministère de l’Hydraulique, de l’Énergie et des TIC, Direction de l’assainissement,
Réactualisation de l’étude du Plan directeur de l’assainissement de la ville de Nouakchott - Redéfinition du projet en tenant compte
des nouvelles données et des objectifs de l’État, qui souhaite réaliser une première tranche plus consistante des travaux, Rapport
en version définitive CID è SCET. (Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Ministry of Water, Energy and ICT, Directorate of Sanitation,
Update of the Study on the Sanitation Maser Plan of the City of Nouakchott - Redefinition of the project taking into account the
new data and objectives of the State, which strives to achieve a more effective implementation of the first phase of the works, CID
è SCET Final Version of the Report).
République islamique de Mauritanie, Ministère des Affaires économiques et du développement, Office national de la statistique,
Annuaire statistique 2011 (Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development, National Office of
Statistics, Statistical Yearbook 2011).
République Islamique de Mauritanie, Ministère des Affaires économiques et du développement, Office national de la statistique,
Données de population de la ville de Nouakchott 2000 (Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Development, National Statistical Office, Data on the Population of Nouakchott City, 2000).
XXVII
Profil de pauvreté, Rapport de l’Office national de la statistique, 2008 (Poverty Profile, Report of the National Office of Statistics,
2008).
République islamique de Mauritanie, Office national de la statistique – Fonds arabe pour le développement économique et social,
Enquête annuelle auprès des entreprises modernes du secteur des bâtiments et travaux publics (BTP) en Mauritanie, 2011 (Islamic
Republic of Mauritania, National Statistical Office - Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Annual Survey of Modern
Enterprises of the Construction and Public Works (BTP) Sector in Mauritania, 2011).
République islamique de Mauritanie, Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, Office national de la statistique, Recensement
national des entreprises du secteur moderne en Mauritanie (avril 2007) (Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Ministry of Economy and
Finance, National Office of Statistics, National Census of the Modern Sector Enterprises in Mauritania (April 2007).
La distribution d’eau potable dans la ville de Nouakchott, Mauritanie, Analyse des points de vente d’eau par CHATEAU Bénédicte,
PERRIN Nicolas et Demba Oud SAMBA Tidiane DIARRA GRET. Pôles Développement institutionnel, Acteurs, territoires/Accès
aux services essentiels, octobre 2007 (Drinking Water Distribution in the City of Nouakchott, Mauritania, Analysis of Water Point-
of-Sale by CHATEAU Bénédicte, PERRIN Nicolas and Demba Oud SAMBA Tidiane DIARRA GRET. Institutional Development
Clusters, Actors, Territories/ Access to Essential Services, October 2007).
Various SNDE and UGPA Reports
Société nationale de l’eau (SNDE), Rapport d’activité 2011 (National Water Corporation (SNDE), 2011 Progress Report).
Tableaux de bord d’activité commerciale de la SNDE pour les années 2010 à 2012 (Scorecards of SNDE Commercial Activity for
2010-2012).
Société nationale de l’eau (SNDE), Unité de gestion du Projet Aftout (UGPA), Projet d’alimentation en eau potable de la ville de
Nouakchott à partir de l’Aftout Essahli – Rapport d’état d’avancement, août 2007 (National Water Corporation (SNDE), Aftout
Project Management Unit (UGPA), Water Supply Project of the City of Nouakchott (Aftout Essahli) - Progress Report, August
2007).
République islamique de Mauritanie, Ministère de l’Hydraulique et de l’Assainissement, Société nationale de l’eau (SNDE), Unité
de gestion du Projet Aftout (UGPA). Manuel d’introduction à l’étude d’impact environnemental et social (Islamic Republic of
Mauritania, Ministry of Water and Sanitation, National Water Corporation (SNDE), Aftout Project Management Unit (UGPA).
Introduction to Environmental and Social Impact Assessment), Bécaye Sidy Diop, April 2009.
République islamique de Mauritanie, Ministère de l’Hydraulique et de l’Assainissement, Société nationale de l’eau (SNDE) Unité
de Gestion du Projet Aftout (UGPA). Etude d’impact environnemental et social, Rapport final. (Islamic Republic of Mauritania,
Ministry of Water and Sanitation, National Water Corporation (SNDE), Aftout Project Management Unit (UGPA). Environmental
and Social Impact Assessment, Final Report), Bécaye Sidy DIOP, October 2010.
République islamique de Mauritanie, Ministère de l’Hydraulique et de l’Assainissement, Société nationale de l’eau (SNDE), Unité
de gestion du Projet Aftout (UGPA. Évaluation de la mise en œuvre du plan de gestion environnemental, Rapport final (Islamic
Republic of Mauritania, Ministry of Water and Sanitation, National Water Corporation (SNDE), Aftout Project Management Unit
(UGPA). Assessment of the Implementation of the Environmental Management Plan, Final Report), Bécaye Sidy Diop, November
2010.
République islamique de Mauritanie, Ministère de l’Hydraulique et de l’Assainissement, Société nationale de l’eau (SNDE), Unité
de gestion du Projet Aftout (UGPA)
Compte rendu de la session de formation organisée à l’attention des cadres de la SNDE et de l’UGPA, Rapport final, (Islamic
Republic of Mauritania, Ministry of Water and Sanitation, National Water Corporation (SNDE), Aftout Project Management Unit
(UGPA). Report of the Training Session Organized for SNDE and UGPA Senior Staff, Final Report.
Société nationale de l’eau (SNDE) et Office national de l’eau (ONEP Maroc), Projet de modernisation de la Société nationale de
l’eau de la Mauritanie, Diagnostic des fonctions de la SNDE et Plan d’action, décembre 2010. (National Water Corporation (SNDE)
and the National Water Authority (ONEP Morocco), Mauritania National Water Corporation Modernization Project, Diagnosis of
SNDE's Functions and Action Plan, December 2010).
Présentation de la SNDE au séminaire sur l’état des lieux et perspectives du secteur de l’eau et de l’assainissement (SNDE
Presentation at the Seminar on the Status and Outlook of Water and Sanitation), February 2012.
XXVIII
République islamique de Mauritanie, Ministère de l’Hydraulique et de l’Assainissement, Société nationale de l’eau (SNDE),
Direction de l’exploitation des ouvrages d’Aftout Essahli, Rapport d’activité, deuxième trimestre 2012. (Islamic Republic of
Mauritania, Ministry of Water and Sanitation, National Water Corporation (SNDE) Directorate of Operations at the Aftout Essahli
facilities, Progress Report, second quarter of 2012).
Étude AEP Nouakchott (Aftout Es Saheli) – Tâche 5 Rapport APD comprenant les sous-rapports suivants : Note de synthèse ;
Prise d’eau à Aftout ; Ouvrages de la liaison Aftout – Béni Nadji ; Traitement primaire à Béni Nadji ; Station de pompage de Béni
Nadji, Conduite d’adduction Béni Nadji – Nouakchott ; Station de pompage d’eau traitée du PK17 ; Conduites d’interconnexion
d’eau potable ; Réservoirs et châteaux d’eau ; Système de télégestion ; Piste d’accès de la prise à la route nationale ; Ligne
électrique moyenne tension ; Modélisation du champ de captage d’Iddini ; Notice d’impact environnemental ; Devis (coût
d’investissement et organisation des travaux) ; Etude financière ; Le personnel pour l’exploitation et la maintenance. (Study on
Nouakchott (Aftout Es Saheli) DWS - Task 5 - Detailed Design Report including the following sub-reports: Policy Brief; Aftout
Water Intake Facility; Aftout- Béni Nadji connecting structures; Water Pre-treatment at Béni Naji; Béni Nadji Pumping Station;
the Béni Nadji – Nouakchott Water Supply Line; PK17 Treated Water Pumping Station; Drinking Water Interconnection Pipeline;
Water Tanks and Towers; Remote Management System; Intake Access to the National Road; Medium Voltage Power Line;
Modeling the Iddini Well Field; Environmental Impact Statement; Estimates (cost of investment and work organization); Financial
Study; Operation and Maintenance Staff).
Étude AEP Nouakchott (Aftout Es Saheli) – Rapport APS (Study on the Nouakchott (Aftout Es Saheli) DWS - APS Report)
Etude de l’alimentation en eau des villages situés le long de la conduite d’amenée d’eau vers Nouakchott
(Study on the Water Supply for Villages along the Nouakchott Water Supply Line)
