Islam Democracy and the Secularist State - CSID

7/27/2019 Islam Democracy and the Secularist State - CSID

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Center for the Study of Islam & DemocracyP. O. Box 864, Burtonsville, MD, 20866

Phone: 202-251-3036Fax: 704-846-0629

Dr. Radwan A. Masm oud iExecu tive Director

Board of DirectorsChair: Ali A. Mazrui

Vice-Chair: Joh n L. Esposito

Abdu lwah ab Alkebsi , Taha Jab er Alalwan i , Lai la Al-Mara yati , Jam al al-Ba rzinj i , Cha rlesBut terwor th , Louis Can tor i , Joh n En te li s, Muqtedar Kha n , Radwan Masm ou di , Al i Mem on ,

F a th i O sm a n , a n d Ta m a r a S o n n

www.islam-democracy.org

2001, Center for the Study of Islam & Democracy (CSID)

MISSION STATEMENT

T h e C e n t e r fo r t h e S t u d y o f I s la m & D e m o c r a c y ( C S I D) i s a m e m b e rT h e C e n t e r fo r t h e S t u d y o f I s la m & D e m o c r a c y ( C S I D) i s a m e m b e rT h e C e n t e r fo r t h e S t u d y o f I s la m & D e m o c r a c y ( C S I D) i s a m e m b e rT h e C e n t e r fo r t h e S t u d y o f I s la m & D e m o c r a c y ( C S I D) i s a m e m b e rT h e C e n t e r fo r t h e S t u d y o f I s la m & D e m o c r a c y ( C S I D) i s a m e m b e r-----

s h i p - b a s e d n o n - p r o fi t ( 5 0 1 - c - 3 ) r e se a r c h o r g a n i z a t io n b a s ed i n Ws h i p - b a s e d n o n - p r o fi t ( 5 0 1 - c - 3 ) r e se a r c h o r g a n i z a t io n b a s ed i n Ws h i p - b a s e d n o n - p r o fi t ( 5 0 1 - c - 3 ) r e se a r c h o r g a n i z a t io n b a s ed i n Ws h i p - b a s e d n o n - p r o fi t ( 5 0 1 - c - 3 ) r e se a r c h o r g a n i z a t io n b a s ed i n Ws h i p - b a s e d n o n - p r o fi t ( 5 0 1 - c - 3 ) r e se a r c h o r g a n i z a t i o n b a s ed i n Wa s h -a s h -a s h -a s h -a s h -

i n g t o n D C. C SI D i s d e d i c a t e d t o t h e s t u d y o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e ni n g t o n D C . C SI D i s d e d i c a t e d t o t h e s t u d y o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e ni n g t o n D C. C SI D i s d e d i c a t e d t o t h e s t u d y o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e ni n g t o n D C . C SI D i s d e d i c a t e d t o t h e s t u d y o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e ni n g t o n D C . C SI D i s d e d i c a t e d t o t h e s t u d y o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e nI sl a m a n d d e m o c r a cyI sl a m a n d d em o cr a c yI sl a m a n d d e m o c r a cyI sl a m a n d d em o cr a c yI sl a m a n d d em o cr a c y, e sp e c i a l l y h o w t h e y c o n t r i b u t e t o th e r e a l i z a t i o n o f , e sp e c i a l l y h o w t h e y c o n t r i b u t e t o th e r e a l i z a t i o n o f , e sp e c i a l l y h o w t h e y c o n t r i b u t e t o th e r e a l i z a t i o n o f , e sp e c i a l l y h o w t h e y c o n t r i b u t e t o th e r e a l i z a t i o n o f , e sp e c i a l l y h o w t h e y co n t r i b u t e t o t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f

ju st a n d p r u d en t g o ve r n m en t . CS I D p r o p o ses to sp o n so r m e e t in g s,j u st a n d p r u d en t g o ve r n m en t . CS I D p r o p o ses to sp o n so r m ee t in g s,ju st a n d p r u d en t g o ve r n m en t . CS I D p r o p o ses to sp o n so r m e e t in g s,j u st a n d p r u d en t g o ve r n m en t . CS I D p r o p o ses to sp o n so r m ee t in g s,j u st a n d p r u d en t g o ve r n m e n t . CS I D p r o p o ses to sp o n so r m ee t in g s,

s em i n a r s , c o n f e r en c e s , a n d w o r k sh o p s t h a t w i l l b e o p e n t o a n y o n e i n t e rs e m i n a r s , c o n f er e n c e s , a n d w o r k sh o p s t h a t w i l l b e o p e n t o a n y o n e i n t e rs em i n a r s , c o n f e r en c e s , a n d w o r k sh o p s t h a t w i l l b e o p e n t o a n y o n e i n t e rs e m i n a r s , c o n f er e n c e s , a n d w o r k sh o p s t h a t w i l l b e o p e n t o a n y o n e i n t e rs em i n a r s , c o n f e re n c e s , a n d w o r k sh o p s t h a t w i l l b e o p e n t o a n yo n e i n t e r-----

e s t ed a n d q u a l i f i ed t o ex p l o r e t h e s e t h e m e s . C SI D wi l l a l s o p u b l i s he s t ed a n d q u a l i f i ed t o ex p l o r e t h e s e th e m e s . C SI D wi l l a l s o p u b l i s he s t ed a n d q u a l i f i ed t o ex p l o r e t h e s e t h e m e s . C SI D wi l l a l s o p u b l i s he s t ed a n d q u a l i f i ed t o ex p l o r e t h e s e th e m e s . C SI D wi l l a l s o p u b l i s he s t ed a n d q u a l i fi e d to e x p l o r e th e s e t h e m e s . C SI D w il l a l s o p u b l i s h

p e r io d i c a l s r e la t i n g t o t h e fo u n d a t i o n s o f so u n d g o v er n m e n t : Co n f l ic tp e r i o di c a l s r e l a t in g t o t h e fo u n d a t i o n s o f s o u n d g o v er n m e n t : Co n f l ic tp e r io d i c a l s r e la t i n g t o t h e fo u n d a t i o n s o f so u n d g o v er n m e n t : Co n f l ic tp e r i o di c a l s r e l a t in g t o t h e fo u n d a t i o n s o f s o u n d g o v er n m e n t : Co n f l ic tp e r io d i c a l s r e l a t in g t o t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f so u n d g o ve r n m e n t : C o n fl i ct

r e s o l u t i o n , p o l i ti c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a n d a s t r o n g c i vi l so c i e t yr e s o l u t i o n , p o l i ti c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a n d a s t r o n g c i vi l so c i e t yr e s o l u t i o n , p o l i ti c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a n d a s t r o n g c i vi l so c i e t yr e s o l u t i o n , p o l i ti c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a n d a s t r o n g c i vi l so c i e t yr e s o l u t i o n , p o l i ti c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a n d a s t r o n g c i vi l so c i e t y. I t s m e m -. I ts m e m -. I t s m e m -. I ts m e m -. I ts m e m -

b e r sh i p is o p en t o M u s l i m s a n d n o n - M u s l im s a l ik e .b e r sh i p is o p en t o M u s l i m s a n d n o n - M u s l im s a l ik e .b e r sh i p is o p en t o M u s l i m s a n d n o n - M u s l im s a l ik e .b e r sh i p is o p en t o M u s l i m s a n d n o n - M u s l im s a l ik e .b e r sh i p i s o p e n t o M u s l im s a n d n o n - M u s li m s a l ik e .


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INTR INTR INTR INTR INTR ODUCTION ODUCTION ODUCTION ODUCTION ODUCTION

The CSID Second Annual Conference was highly successful in every respect. We wereblessed with an overwhelming number of excellent paper proposals, twenty of which wereaccepted for presentation at the conference on Apri l 7. These were organized into five panels offour papers each. The conference opened with a plenary session, Islam and Democracy. The

first four papers in the proceedings that follow were presented at this plenary session. Those byAvis Asiye Allman and Louay Safi were presented in the second morning panel, The SecularState. Parallel to it was the panel Elements of Democracy with respect to Islam, and the

papers by Ermin Sinanovic, Mohammed. Moniruzzaman, and Talib M. Aziz were presented atthat panel.

We were especially pleased that Abdolkarim Soroush accepted our invitation to present a

key-note luncheon address. Unfortunately, it was not possible to include his presentationamong these conference proceedings.

Conference participants urged that the two panels scheduled to run in parallel during theafternoon, Post-modernity and Islam and Democracy in Practice and Islam in Context. becombined to form one large panel. The papers below by Ihsan Yilmaz, Fred R Dallmayr, and

Bekir L. Yildirim are from the first of these two panels, while those by Neil Hicks, MohamedNimer, Kamran Asghar Bokhari, and Nadeem Kazmi are from the second.

In keeping with the principle that these are conference proceedings, none of the papershas been edited by the conference organizers. Our goal in publishing them has merely been to

make them available, as work in progress, to interested members and friends of CSID. Oursincere hope is that readers may learn more about the conference and the research promoted bythe efforts of this fledgling organization.

Prof. Charles ButterworthChair, Program Committee*

* The CSID 2001 Program Committee consisted of Charles Butterworth (Chair), Lou Cantori, JohnEntelis, Abdulwahab Alkebsi, and Jamal al-Barzinji.


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ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY:

IN SEARCH OF A RELATIONSHIP

By Ali A. MazruiChair, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy

Washington, DC

More than eighty years after the collapse of the Caliphate (the Khilafa), and on the eve of

the Third Millennium Meeladiyya, a Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy was formedby American Muslims and their friends. In much of the Muslim world itself, there had alreadybeen an agonizing re-appraisal about the precise relationship between Islam and democracy.

Those who believed in the secular state as a basis of democracy regarded Islam as a potentialthreat to democratic processes.

However, there have been others who have insisted that the seed of democracy wereinherent in the original Islamic state in Medina during the time of the Prophet Muhammad

(PBUH) and the succeeding four caliphs sacred democratic precepts which now need to finda new appropriate expression in the twenty-first century meeladiyya.

The CSID was created partly in response to this latter conviction, and partly out of the

belief that a dialogue is needed between those who have faith in the compatibility of Islam withdemocracy and those who have reservations about the appropriateness of such a discourse. Moreand more Muslims and an increasing number of friends of Islam are convinced that Islamicvalues are not just about duties; they are also about rights. Islam is not merely about the sacredobligations of the believer; it is also about human entitlements and civil liberties of every citizen.

Islamic jurisprudence and Fiqh have been dominated by those who believe in a sacredBill of Duties. Should such a Bill be accompanied by a civil Bill of Rights?Are both dutiesand rights indispensable for a more balanced and more healthy moral order?

The CSID has promoted discussion and dialogue through a variety of methods. Those

methods have included relevant public lectures by prominent speakers; panel discussions atconventions like those of the Middle Eastern Studies Association; advisory part icipation to helpMuslims in the American political process; the annual conferences organized by the CSID itself,

and through the CSID Newsletter, THE MUSLIM DEMOCRAT. In addition the CSID is


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seeking a greater consultative role in the Muslim world on issues of democratization and theIslamic approach to human rights. With this volume of conference-proceedings, the CSID is alsolaunching its series of occasional books and studies on democracy and the Muslim experience.

Clarifying the democratic relevance of Islam and the Islamic meaning of democracy arenoble goals. But the pursuit of such noble objectives requires resources. The CSID needs help in

establishing a basic endowment for its survival as an organization. Such help is needed from notonly Muslims who are committed to the continuing relevance of Islam, but also from non-Muslims who are committed to the expanding boundaries of democracy.

Kenyans have a Swahili slogan which proclaims HARAMBEE meaning Let us pulltogether. It is a demand for solidarity and cooperation. For Muslims in Kenya the Roman letterH is not only for the Hijra, the Hajj and what is Halal. The letter H is also for HARAMBEE let us all pull together.

Dear Friends of CSID: It is time to embrace this fourth H of Harambee, and initiate anendowment fund in the name of Islam and democracy.

We should await with gratitude your contribution at the following address:

Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy

Att. Dr. Radwan A. Masmoudi, Exec. Dir.

P.O. Box 864, Burtonsville, MD 20866

E-mail: [email protected]

Telephone: (202) 251-3036Fax: (704) 846-0629


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CONTENTS

Islam and De mo cracy in Jo rdan: The Limits o f Polit ical Inclus io n .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 8

Timothy J. Piro

Islam, De mo cracy, and the Yem en i State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0

Jillian Schwedler

Dem ocracy and Islam i n Indon es ia: NU as an Agen t o f Civil So ciety.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Robin Bush

Islam, Ethnicity, Pluralism and Dem ocracy: Malaysias Unique Experie nce .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 4 8

Osman Bakar

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE DEMOCRATIC MUSLIM ID ENTITY IN TURKEY .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 4

Avis Asiye Allman

ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE .... .... .... ... .... .... .... .... ... .... .... .... .... ... .... .... .... ... .... .... .... .... 6 1

Louay M. Safi

THE MAJORITY PRINCIPLE IN ISLAMIC LEGAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 7 2

Ermin Sinanovic

Islam and Democracy: The Underlying Philosophy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1

Md. Moni ruzzaman

Popu lar Sovere ignty in Co ntem po rary Shii Polit ical Tho ught .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 1 0 6

Talib M. Aziz

POSTMOD ERN MUSLIM LEGALITY IN A SECULAR STATE: THE TURKISH EXPERIENCE .. 1 2 3 Ihsan Yilmaz

ISLAM AND D EMOCRACY: REFLECTIONS ON ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 3 2

Fred Dallmayr


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Pos t-Mo de rn Secularism : The Turkis h Vers io n .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 1 4 5

Bekir L. Yildirim

The Crisis o f Human Rights Imple me ntatio n in the Middle East: Doe s Islam ic Human

Rights Activism Offer a Rem ed y? .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 3

Neil Hicks

Dem o cracy in Practice: The Ame rican Musli m Expe rien ce .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 9

Mohamed Nimer

Islamis t Attitudes Toward Dem ocracy .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 3

Kamran A. Bokhari

Islamic Res po nse s to Racism A Fo llo w-up Paper .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 6

Sayyed Nadeem Kazmi


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I sl a m a n d De m o cr a c y in Jo r d a n :I sl a m a n d Dem o cr a c y in Jo r d a n :I sl a m a n d De m o cr a c y in Jo r d a n :I sl a m a n d Dem o cr a c y in Jo r d a n :I sl a m a n d De m o cr a c y in Jo r d a n :

T h e Li m i ts o f P o l i ti ca l I n c lu si o nT h e Li m i ts o f P o l i t ic a l I n c lu si o nT h e Li m i ts o f P o l i ti ca l I n c lu si o nT h e Li m i ts o f P o l i t ic a l I n c lu si o nT h e Li m i ts o f P o l i t ic a l I n c lu si o n

by Timothy J. Piro

[email protected]

Paper prepared for presentation at the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracys annual conference at George-

town University, 7 April 2001.1

Jordan s decade o ld exper ience wi th a m ore l ibera l a nd open pol i tica l p rocess ha s no t p rodu ced the

dynam ic dem ocracy so m an y in te l lec tua ls an d pol i tic ian s had h oped for fo l lowing i t s fi r st par l iam enta ry

elect ion in Novem ber 1989 . Wh ile Jordan ha s m ain ta in ed the veneer of a s tab le an d m oderate pro-Western

sta te in a sea of au th or i tar ian reg im es, the goal o f a m ore open an d p lura l ist po l ity h as rem ain ed e lu sive .

Hai led by m an y in the Arab wor ld a s a m odel of po l i tica l inc lusion , Jordan s po l it ica l system rem ain s an

ex clu s ivi st o n e wh ere th e ru le s of th e g a m e l im i t th e m o d e an d d yn a m ic o f p a r t ic ip a t io n an d a r t i cu la t io n .

This paper explores the po l i t ica l l im i ts o f dem ocrat iza t ion in Jordan a nd a rgu es u n derstan ding th e sta tes

h is tor ica l ly dom ineer ing ro le in po l i t ica l a n d econom ic developm ent best expla ins th e coun trys dem ocrat i -za t ion exper im ent . In o th er words, Jordan s exper im ent h ad bu i l t- in l im i ts as to how far th e sta te could

actu ally divest i tself of polit ical an d econom ic power. Th e case of Jorda n s Islam ic activist pa rties the

Musl im Brotherh ood an d i t s po l i tica l arm , th e I slam ic Act ion Fron t ( IAF) provides an in terest ing s tudy of

those l im i ts an d how far po l i tica l inc lusion cou ld evolve . Jordan s I slam ic ac t ivis t m ovem ent h as n o t

a t ta in ed a posi tion of au tonom ou s pol i tica l power n o t so lely becau se i t is represen ta t ive of a weak c ivi l

society, or becau se of the Mach iavellian wa ys of th e rulin g polit ical eli te. Th ese explan ation s, while im por-

tan t in the i r own r igh t in expla in ing th e l im i ts o f po l i tica l inc lusion , do not go far en ough in a ddressing

why th e coun try h as m ade on ly l im i ted in roads in to the dem ocrat iza t ion process .

Jordan h as exper ienced only l im i ted po l i t ica l inc lu sion becau se th e coun trys po l it ica l econ om y of developm ent h as n o t crea ted one of th e necessary prerequ isi tes for the t ran si tion to a n open a n d com pet it ive

pol i tica l p rocess; m ain ly, po li t ica l barga in in g between the s ta te an in dependen t opposi t ion . The com m ercia l

an d fina n cia l bourgeois ie , which is o ften the pr im ary m over behind ca l ls for po l i tica l an d econom ic reform ,

was a l ready dependen t on th e sta te for i t s l ive l ih ood . Those t ies un dercu t i t s barga in in g power an d indepen -

dence . The a bsence of an indepen dent bou rgeoisie or p r ivate sector ha s severe ly lim i ted the n atu re of po l i ti -

ca l barga in in g between the s ta te and th e opposi t ion . Cal ls for g reater po li t ica l inc lusion in 1989 , an d the


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pol i tica l bargain ing th at fo l lowed, cam e not from the I s lam ists bu t from the East Ban kers who fe lt the brun t

of th e coun trys IMF-backed a u sterity. Th e political inclu sion h as ben efited th ose who a ccepted the ru les of

the gam e; na m ely, the business c lass. The s ta te cont inu es to com m an d, as i t a lways ha s , the preem inen t

pol i tica l an d econom ic ro le in socie ty leav in g l i tt le space for un au thor ized au tonom ous pol i t ica l ac t ion .

This po l it ica l -econom y m odel provides the m ost com pel ling explan at ion for the Hash em ite Kingdom of

Jordan s l im i ted po l i tica l in c lusion .

This paper wi ll fi r st explore a l ternat ive explan at ion s for dem ocrat iza t ion n ot on ly in Jordan , bu t th rou gh -

ou t the developin g wor ld and form er coun tr ies of the Sovie t Union an d Eastern Europe s ince the m id-1980s.

I t wil l a rgue th at the two m ost p revalen t explan at ion s, the c ivi l socie ty approa ch a n d the ru l ing e l i te ap-

proach , are powerfu l in expla in in g cer ta in aspects o f the t ran sit ion to dem ocrat ic form s of govern m ent .

However, th ese approa ches l im i t an u n derstan ding of why cer ta in cou n tr ies dem ocrat ize an d o thers do not .

The pa per wil l d iscuss a po l i t ica l econom y m odel of dem ocrat iza t ion for Jordan . This m odel takes in to

acco u n t th e u n iq u e d eve lo p m en t o f t h e s ta t e an d h o w th a t h as an im p ac t o n n o t o n ly o n wh en co u n t r ie s

t ran si tion to a m ore dem ocrat ic form of governm ent bu t wh y. The essence of tha t tran sit ion , in the case of

Jordan , was craf ting a n ew socia l contrac t tha t p rovided for regular e lec t ion s to par l iam ent a m ong d i f fer ingpol i tica l par t ies. The d iscussion of Jordan s l im i ted dem ocrat iza t ion wi l l cen ter on the cou ntrys I slam ic

par t ies and why they ha ve m et with on ly par t ia l success in th e coun trys th ree par l iam entary e lect ions in

1989, 1993 , an d 1997. Final ly, th e paper explores the po l i tica l im pedim ents to greater dem ocrat iza t ion an d

argu es tha t Jordan s dem ocrat ic exper im ent ha d bui l t - in l im i ts from the very beginn ing an d could on ly

evolve so far . The pa per does no t conclu de tha t a fu l l -b lown, western s tyle dem ocracy in Jordan an d o ther

societies is im possible becau se of the cou n trys un iqu e polit ical-econ om y of developm ent. However, it does

argu e tha t un derstan ding th e l im i ts o f a coun trys po l it ica l system is the f i r st s tep toward kno wing wha t i s

an d is no t possible politically.

M e t h o d o l o g i c a l A p p r o a c h e s t o D e m o c r a t i z a t i o nM e t h o d o l o g i c a l A p p r o a c h e s t o D e m o c r a t i z a t i o nM e t h o d o l o g i c a l A p p r o a c h e s t o D e m o c r a t i z a t i o nM e t h o d o l o g i c a l A p p r o a c h e s t o D e m o c r a t i z a t i o nM e t h o d o l o g i c a l A p p r o a c h e s t o D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n

Understandin g why som e coun tr ies develop dem ocrat ic system s of governa n ce an d why som e do not h ave

perp lexed pol i t ica l ph i losoph ers and sc ien t is ts from Pla to a n d Ar isto t le to Lipset , Dah l , an d Hun t ing ton . The

l i tera tu re provides nu m erous exam ples of en l igh tened ru lers , benevolen t despots, an d com plex power sh ar in g

ar ra n gem ents am ong d i f feren t socia l g roupin gs. The l i tera tu re is d iverse in m ethodology bu t a lso in i t s

concept ion of dem ocrat iza t ion . For som e, dem ocrat iza t ion is the process by which a pea cefu l and com -

petit ive polit ical process takes place at regularly scheduled intervals to transfer power from one polit ical actor

to an other . St il l o thers view th e process as on e where the in d ividua l c i tizen un der takes a greater po l i t ica l ro lein socie ty regard in g h ow one a r t icu la tes needs an d in terests e ither form al ly or in form al ly. For the purposes

of th is paper, we wi ll define dem ocrat iza t ion as th e process by c it izens pa r t icipate m ore fu l ly in a coun trys

form al a nd in form al po l i t ica l p rocess . The c i t izen m ay use po l it ica l par t ies or associa t ions to ach ieve m ore

m ean ingfu l par t ic ipat ion . In o th er words, dem ocrat iza t ion is the process by which th e sta te an d socie ty

bui ld and susta in those mechanisms to ach ieve meaningfu l ly re levant po l i t ica l par t ic ipat ion .

Pol i t ica l sc ien t ists an d pol icy m akers h ave showed a ren ewed in terest in the s tudy of dem ocrat iza t ion


10/17810

since the 1980s. The co l lapse of the Sovie t Union an d the r ise of l ibera l iz ing m arket reform s in Eastern

Eu rope, Asia, Latin Am erica, Africa a n d the Middle East accelera ted this interest in th e creation of dem ocra tic

inst i tu t ions. In th e Middle East, schola rs an d pol icy m akers ha ve poin ted to the death s of long serving

m on arch s, the r ise of t ran sna t iona l cap i ta l , an d the explosion of in form at ion techn ology as ha sten in g a

m ore dem ocrat ic po li t ica l d iscourse . Yet a t the begin n ing of th e 21 st cen tu ry, m i l ita ry an d pol i t ica l o l igarch s

cont in u e to ru le Egypt , Tu rkey, Syr ia , Tu n isia , an d Alger ia . Hered i tary m on arch s govern as th ey a lways ha ve

in th e Persian Gulf and Jordan , a n d Leban ese po l i tic ian s cont inu e to figh t a bou t pre-civi l war con fessiona l

power sh ar in g ar ra n gem ents . Wh y is i t th a t dem ocrat iz ing forces ha ve taken hold in Asia , Lat in Am er ica ,

an d Eastern Europe, bu t n o t th e Middle East? Two schools of thou gh t predom ina te am on g pol it ica l sc ien t is ts

who s tudy the Middle East for expla in ing the a bsence of democra t iza t ion : th e c ivi l socie ty school a nd the

ru l ing e l i te school .

With in m u l t ire l ig ious Th ird Wor ld socie ties dem ocracy m ay som et im es precip i ta te con fl ict ra th er tha n

m edia te i t . The Ivory Coast [ Cote dIvoire] in West Afr ica h as m ore Musl im s tha n Chr ist ian s . Musl im s ha ve

been u n der- represen ted in the po l i t ica l in st itu t ions th rou gh ou t the postco lon ia l per iod . However, the Mu slim s

were better o ff wh en the Ivory Coast was a on e-par ty sta te u n der a par t icu la r Chr is tian leader ( FelixHouph ou et-Boigny) th an they are now tha t the Ivory Coast i s a m ul t ipar ty system with Chr is t ians m ore

ter r ified of Musl im n um er ica l s t ren gth a t the po l ls. Under a on e-par ty s ta te , a Mu slim leader (Alassane

Oua t tara) rose as h igh as Pr im e Minis ter o f the coun try. Un der a m u l t ipar ty system the sam e m an is p re-

ven ted fro m ru n n in g even fo r a sea t i n p a r l iam en t .

Civil Society. The stu dy of civil society in th e Middle East an d North Africa h as focused on th e growth ofn on -governm enta l o rganizat ion s an d inst itu t ions ou ts ide the purv iew of the s ta te . The n orm al vehic les of

po l i tica l ar t icu la t ion an d aggrega t ion h ave lost m u ch of the i r effec t iveness , an d n ew m ethods of po l i tica l

ar t icu la t ion a n d aggregat ion a re ci rcum vent ing th e norm al m ethods of po l i tica l expression . Specifica l ly,

po l i tica l scien t ists and socio logists have h igh l igh ted the ro le of wom ens groups, non -governm enta l o rga n i-za t ions such as ch ar i t ies an d bu siness associa t ion s, and grass roo ts m ovem ents as the n ew vehic les of po li t i-

ca l par t ic ipat ion . This approach argu es tha t the s trength or weakness of these m ovem ents or g roups wil l

expla in the ex ten t o f dem ocrat iza t ion . For m an y, the developm ent of a v ibran t c ivi l society is a p rerequis i te

for dem ocra tization . Civil society can b e defin ed as:

the arena where manifold social movements and civic organizations from all classesattempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they canexpress themselves and advance their interest. The concept denotes the emergence of

groups independent of state tutelage and control.

Wh i le th is approa ch h as f il led a m u ch n eeded inform at ion ga p regard ing Middle East po l i tica l l ife , it

does no t te l l the wh ole s tory. I t ha s t raced an d docu m ented h ow socie ta l a c tors respon d to s ta te ac t ivi t ies .

However, m an y of the societa l ac tors are ha rd ly au tonom ou s an d h ave concre te an d t raceable l in ks to s ta te

actors an d inst i tu t ion s b lu r r ing th e d ist inc t ion between s ta te an d socie ty. I t does n o t expla in dem ocrat iza-

t ion as m uch as i t expla ins cer ta in dem ocrat iz in g tendencies in th e body pol i tic . Nonetheless, the l i tera tu re

h as dem on stra ted tha t a v ibran t associa t iona l l ife i s p resen t in th e Middle East tha t i s far f rom m ean ingless.


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Ruling Elite. Anoth er school of th oug ht expla in s th e process of dem ocrat iza t ion a s a resu l t o f the a c t ion sof the ru l ing e l ite and th e bargain ing th at goes on am ong a ctors wi th in th a t e l ite . I t i s the e l i te s wi l ling-

n ess, o r need , to gran t m ore po l i tica l freedom s to socie ta l a c tors tha t p reserves the reg im e an d creates dem oc-

ra t iz ing processes. Wh en faced with popu lar g rou nd swel ls again st par t icu la r ly ha rsh po l ic ies , the reg im e

ban ds together an d provides the popu la t ion wi th the t rappings of a m ore m odern , dem ocrat ic li fe in ex-

cha n ge for order an d s tab i l i ty.

Wh ile th is school cer ta in ly provides a rea son for dem ocrat iza t ions shor t te rm cha l len ges, i t does no t cu t

to the deeper issu e of why the t ran sit ion to dem ocracy evolves a long a cer ta in path . I t i s u sefu l in expla in in g

the a c t ion s of par t icu la r leaders or o f fic ia ls fac ing socie ta l ch al lenges l ike m ass dem on stra t ion s, r io ts, o r

calls for th e passage of certain legislation . Like the civil society m odel, i t provides the stu den t with o n e side

of the issue between state an d society. Despite i ts l im itation s, th is ap proa ch h as provided in terestin g stu dies

of the activit ies of polit ical leaders and the cost-benefit calculus they employ when faced with polit ical ,

econ o m ic an d so c ia l ch a l l en g es .

This br ief t rea tm ent of these two sch ools of thou gh t does n o t do just ice to the r ich deta i l bo th a pproach es

h ave brough t to the s tudy of the Middle East po l i tica l l ife . Both a pproach es, whi le usefu l , expla in cha n ge inth e sh o r t - te rm an d n o t t h e lo n g - t erm p ro cess o f i n s ti tu t io n a l ch an g e . Un d er st an d in g th e d yn a m ic in t e r ac -

t ion of po l it ica l a nd econom ic li fe in th e Middle East expla in s tha t p rocess of inst i tu t ional ch an ge. A th i rd

school ha s ar isen in th e past few years to expla in the process of dem ocrat iza t ion in th e Middle East. This

pol i tica l -econom y school of thou gh t takes accoun t of the socia l bases of s ta te power an d of th e un ique l inks

between th e sta te an d the econom y, par t icu lar ly in th e case of Jordan . Understan ding th ose links provides the

stu dent wi th a m ore focused explana t ion for the process of dem ocrat iza t ion in th e Middle East, an d the

l im i ts o f po l i tica l inc lusion in Jordan .

T h e P o l i ti c a l E c o n o m y o f D e m o c r a t i za t i o nT h e P o l i ti c a l E c o n o m y o f D e m o c r a t i za t i o nT h e P o l i ti c a l E c o n o m y o f D e m o c r a t i za t i o nT h e P o l i ti c a l E c o n o m y o f D e m o c r a t i za t i o nT h e P o l i ti c a l E c o n o m y o f D e m o c r a t i za t i o n

Eco n o m ics h a s p lay ed a m a jo r r o le am o n g sch o la r s a s an im p o r tan t exp lan a to ry fac to r in th e t r an s i ti o n

from au thor i tar ian ru le to dem ocracy. Seym ou r Mar t in Lipset ind ica ted in h is 1959 sem ina l work th at a

m odern econom y p layed an ind ispensable ro le in h ow we un derstan d the prerequis ites for dem ocrat ic ru le .

From the 1960s to th e 1980s, scholars bel ieved tha t econ om ic m odern iza t ion wa s th e m ost im por tan t de ter-

m ina n t o f a cou ntrys pred i lec t ion toward dem ocrat ic ru le . In Sam u el Hun t ing tons The Third Wave, h e

n oted that th ose cou n tr ies m ost like ly to becom e dem ocrat ic were those tha t a t ta in ed a cer ta in level o f per

capita GNP.

Econom ics is cer ta in ly an im por tan t fac tor in th e t ransi t ion to dem ocrat ic ru le bu t i t is no t necessar i ly a

determ inin g fac tor. The econom ic var iab le i s an im por tan t par t o f the puzzle of dem ocrat iza t ion . Cer ta in ly,

th e p e r cap it a GNP o f m an y Per si an Gu l f co u n t r ie s, an d Jo rd an d u r in g th e 1 9 7 0 s an d 1 9 8 0 s ma d e th em

cou n tries r ipe for the tran sit ion to dem ocra tic ru le if we refer to econ om ic va riable on ly. However, an im por-

tan t coro l lary var iab le tha t goes a long wi th level o f econom ic developm ent i s c lass.

Barr ing ton Moores sem ina l work , Th e Socia l Or ig ins of Dic ta torsh ip a nd Dem ocracy: Lord an d Pea san t


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in th e Making of the Modern World , po in ts to the im por tan ce of c lass in developing dem ocrat ic sta tes. Moore

n oted th at the developm ent of a m odern bou rgeoisie was a n ecessi ty for the developm ent of a dem ocracy. He

argu ed tha t these bourgeois ies developed the s ta te , an d were reflec ted in i t . Th is i s key for Jordan an d th e

ent i re Middle East because a bou rgeoisie c lass does no t ex ist as i t d id in Eu rope or Nor th Am er ica . In Jordan ,

a n eo-patr im onia l po l it ica l system exists wh ere th e ru l in g pol i tica l e l ite o f the m on arch y, the u pper echelons

of the civil service bu reau cracy, an d the m ili tary h old power. Un like the developm ent of dem ocra cy in

Europe wh ere the bou rgeoisie helped to crea te the s ta te , the s ta te crea ted th e bou rgeoisie in th e Middle East .

This i s a m ost im por tan t po in t in u nderstan ding why Jordan s exper im ent in dem ocrat iza t ion ha s resu l ted in

on ly l im i ted po l i tica l inc lusion . The l inks the bou rgeoisie m ain ta ins to the s ta te appara tus g ives it l it t le

independence.

A secon d fac tor in th is po l i t ica l econom y m odel regards the n atu re of th e s ta te i t se l f. Most o f th e cur ren t

l i te ra ture on dem ocrat iza t ion h ighl igh ts the ro le of the s ta te as a pr im e m over behind th e reform process .

The t ran si tion to dem ocracy involves barga in in g and n egot ia t ion s am on g poli t ica l and socia l ac tors. This

barga in in g a r ises because th e s ta te i s n o t u n ified over h ow to proceed , o r becau se the s ta te i s trying to pre-

em pt pressures for po l i tica l reform . One of the pr im e inst iga tors of th is barga in in g is u sua l ly bu sinessgrou ps or e lem ents of the bou rgeoisie . These groups appear less th rea ten in g to th e estab l ished order an d are

able to enga ge in n egot ia t ions wi th the s ta te to in i t ia te cer ta in types of dem ocrat ic reform . So , the grea ter

the in dependen ce of th e bou rgeoisie or p r ivate sec tor, the grea ter the l ike lihood tha t a dem ocrat ic t ransi t ion

wo u ld be m ean in g fu l .

Democratization in JorDemocratization in JorDemocratization in JorDemocratization in JorDemocratization in Jordandandandandan

By m ost accou nts , the depth of dem ocrat iza t ion in Jordan h as been l im i ted . Scholars ha ve descr ibed the

p ro cess a s co n t ro l led p lu r a l i sm , m an ag ed l ib er a l i za t io n , d e fen s ive d em o cra t iza t io n , an d facad edem ocracy. Al l agree tha t the s tab i l ity of th e reg im e was, an d is , the goa l o f dem ocrat iza t ion process. Glenn

R o b in so n n o ted th a t a c r i si s wi th in th e s ta t e p ro m p ted Jo rd an ian l ead e r s to em b ark o n a p ro g ram o f lim i ted

dem ocrat iza t ion . A fisca l cr isis wi th in th e s ta te , in th is case fa l l ing rem it tan ces an d fore ign a id , he lps to

expla in th e l im i ted n atu re of Jordan s exper im ent in dem ocrat iza t ion . He ident i fies one of the key var iab les

bu t h is explan at ion of fi sca l cr isis expla ins m ore the t im ing of dem ocrat ic tenden cies ra ther tha n the reason

for the l im i ted na ture of dem ocrat iza t ion in Jordan . The n atu re of the cr isis wi th in th e sta te expla in s why

Jordan s dem ocrat iza t ion exper imen t resu l ts in l im i ted po l i tica l inc lusion . Tha t cr is is h as to do with th e

pol i tica l an d socia l fou n dat ion s of Jordan s semi- ren t ier econom y.

The dom estic coal i t ion h o ld ing Jordan s po li t ica l an d econom ic system togeth er dur in g the 1970s an d

1980s inc luded the s ta tes publ ic sector m an agers , the com m ercia l a n d f in an cia l e l i tes o f the pr ivate sec tor,

Jordan ian an d Pa lest in ian expatr ia te workers in th e o i l -r ich s ta tes of the Persian Gulf , an d the s ta tes m i l i-

tary an d secur i ty organ s, inc lud in g th e m ona rchy. This dom estic coal i t ion m ain ta ined s tab i l i ty th rou gh an

extrem e re l ian ce on im por ts and labor rem it tan ces. This network of the pu bl ic-pr ivate sector an d the s ta tes

secu r i ty organ s co llapsed in th e 1980s. As a resu l t , the socia l con trac t be tween th ose govern in g a nd those

being governed sha t tered . Accord ing to the ren t ier m odel o f developm ent , i f there was n o dem ocrat ic repre-


13/17813

sen ta t ion , th ere was no taxa t ion . The s ta te provided goods an d services to i t s c i tizens a t su bsid ized pr ices .

This a l lowed the s ta te to m ain ta in order .

The n egot ia t ion s tha t ha ve proceeded since then con t inu e to leave the s ta te in i t s m ost dom ina n t posi t ion ,

wi th l i tt le po l i tica l space for o ther grou ps un will ing to p lay by th e ru les of the ga m e. The th ree par l iam en-

tary e lec t ion s since 1989 a re exam ples of the s ta te renegot ia t ing th is po li t ica l an d socia l con trac t , bu t no t

n ecessar i ly wi th th e I slam ists . Understan ding Jordan s dem ocrat iza t ion in th is contex t he lps expla in th el im i ted n atu re of the cou n trys po l it ica l in c lusion .

T h e R o o t s o f I s la m i c P o l i ti c a l I n c l u s i onT h e R o o t s o f I s la m i c P o l i ti c a l I n c l u s io nT h e R o o t s o f I s la m i c P o l i ti c a l I n c l u s i onT h e R o o t s o f I s la m i c P o l i ti c a l I n c l u s io nT h e R o o t s o f I s la m i c P o l i t ic a l I n c l u s i o n

Wh en King Hussein ou t lawed pol it ica l pa r t ies in th e la te 1950s, he tu rn ed toward the Mu slim Brother-

h ood as a cou n terweight to the coun trys rad ica l Arab n at ion al is ts an d left i sts . As he ha d don e with so m an y

players in Jordan s po l i tica l system , Hussein co-opted th e grou p . In excha n ge for i ts suppor t , Hussein a l lowed

the Musl im Brotherh ood to ex ist as the coun trys on ly legal po li t ica l o rgan izat ion . Other po l it ica l g roupin gs

were forced to go un dergroun d.

The f ir s t s igns of a growing Is lam ic m ovem ent in Jordan a ppeared form al ly in March 1984 wi th th e

reestab l ishm ent of par l iam entary l i fe . King Hu ssein ca l led an e lec t ion to fi l l e igh t vacan t sets in the lower

h ou se of pa rliam en t. Th e con stitu tion reserved two of th ose seats for Ch ristian s. Islam ic activists, h owever,

contested the rem ain ing s ix an d won three of them . The power of the I s lam ic m ovem ent in Jordan pr ior to

the 1989 e lect ions was worr isom e to m an y governm ent of fic ia ls who bel ieved the m ovem ent would em u late

the I ran ian exam ple of governm ent . Most an alysts regarded the e lec tora l success of the I s lam ists as th rea t -

en in g King Hu sseins ru le becau se th ey appea red to be a t odds wi th the k in gs m ore m odera te views on socia l

an d foreign policy.

Wh en the governm ent ca l led for e lec tions in 1988 , the Musl im Brotherhood h ad the organ izat ional

s tru cture in p lace to condu ct a grass- roo ts cam paign , un l ike m ore secu lar g rou ps. Seen in th is l igh t , the

electoral success of Jorda n s Islam ists in Novem ber 1989 is n ot surprisin g. Jorda n s Islam ic activists cap tu red

34 of 80 seats in th ose elect ions cam paign ing on the s logan , Islam Huwa al-Hal, ( I s l am i s th e So lu t io n ) .The Mu slim Broth erhood, led by i t s po l i tica l arm the I s lam ic Act ion Front , dem an ded s tr ic ter adh erence to

Is lam ic tenets an d a m ore pan-Is lam ic s tan d concern in g the confl ict wi th I srae l . Som e even took issue with

King Hu sseins 1988 d isenga gem ent f rom the West Bank, a rgu ing th at leav ing the P alestin ia n s to fen d for

them selves wou ld crea te fi ssures in the I s lam ic fron t a r rayed aga inst I srae l .

Fur th erm ore , the inc lu sion of five m em bers of the Musl im Brotherh ood in Mu dar Badran s new govern-ment following the 1989 elections and the election of Muslim Brotherhood leader, Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat as

speaker of the lower hou se , appea red to sh ow that th e palace was losing i t s g r ip on power. But t ressin g th is

argu m ent was the success of I s lam ic candida tes a t th e University of Jordan . They won 82 of 85 seats on a

com m it tee to es tab l ish a s tu dent federa t ion a t the sch ool .

There were im por tan t po l it ica l a n d legal developm ents in Jordan between 1989 an d 1993 but Jordan s

Is lam ists were no t responsib le for them . Som e of these in c luded th e po l i tica l par t ies law, a press law, an d th e


14/17814

l i ft ing of m ar t ia l law. However, these reform s could n o t ha ve been don e wi th ou t the power an d prestige of

the m on arch y ra th er tha n the par l iam ent . The par l iam ent d id no t possess the expert ise , m oney, o r su ppor t

s taff to becom e an indepen dent locus of power ou ts ide the m ore powerfu l o rgan s of the s ta te . The m ost

im por tan t docum ent to ar ise ou t o f th is per iod , however, was th e Nat iona l Cha r ter.

T h e N a t i o n a l C h a r t e rT h e N a t i o n a l C h a r t e rT h e N a t i o n a l C h a r t e rT h e N a t i o n a l C h a r t e rT h e N a t i o n a l Ch a r t e r

With the reestab l ishm ent of po li t ica l par ty li fe in Jordan , the k ing a ppoin ted a 60 m em ber royal com m is-

s ion in Apr i l 1990 to draf t a Nat ion al Cha r ter (al-Mithaq al-Watani). I n Jan u a ry 1 9 9 1 , t h e ro ya l co mm is-s io n h a n d ed to th e k in g th e Na t ion a l Ch a r t er t h a t o u t l in ed , inter alia, the role of polit ical parties in Jorda nan d the ba sic pr incip les of Jordan s dom estic an d fore ign pol ic ies . The ch ar ter d id no t supersede th e 1952

const i tu t ion . I t gave th e execu t ive bran ch th e power to in tervene in the e lec tora l p rocess i f the k in g deem ed

i t necessary. The estab l ish m ent of tha t cha r ter led by the ear ly 1990s to the growth of a lm ost 100 pol it ica l

par t ies of vary ing s izes . Leading m em bers of the Musl im Brotherh ood par t ic ipated in the dra ft ing of th e

charter including Ishaq al-Farhan, Yusuf al-Azm, Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, Majid Khalifa, and AhmadQu taysh a l-Azayida.

Accord in g to the ch ar ter, Jordan ian s ha ve the r igh t to estab l ish po l i tica l par t ies provided that th e i r m eth-

ods are pea cefu l an d thei r s ta tu tes do n ot vio la te the provis ions of the Con st itu t ion . Addi t ion al ly, there sha l l

be no s t ructura l o r fina ncia l af fi l ia t ion of an y Jordan ian pol i tica l par ty wi th m em bers of an y o ther par ty th a t

is n on -Jordan ian , o r o f an y fore ign s ta te . The par t ies are a lso no t a l lowed to recru i t from m em bers of the

arm ed forces. The ch ar ter i s an in terest ing docum ent becau se i t reflects the u n easy re la t ionsh ip between

sta te an d socie ty. The cha r ter carefu l ly del in eates wha t po li t ica l par t ies can an d can n ot do . The cha r ter i s

n o t so m uch a s t r ic t gu idel in e bu t i s m ore a s ta tem ent of p r incip le regard ing th e re la t ionsh ip between th e

sta te and the govern ed . The ch ar ter reflects th e type of reg im e- indu ced tran sit ion tha t the s ta te wan ts tofo s te r. I n su ch a r eg im e- in d u ced t r an s i ti o n , t h e ru l e s o f t h e g am e ema n a te fr o m th e r eg im e an d n o t f ro m

society. In oth er words, th e cha rter gives the state au tho rity to con trol even ts as i t sees fi t .

1 9 9 3 P a r l i a m e n t a r y E l ec t io n1 9 9 3 P a r l i a m e n t a r y E l ec t io n1 9 9 3 P a r l i a m e n t a r y E l ec t io n1 9 9 3 P a r l i a m e n t a r y E l ec t io n1 9 9 3 P a r l ia m e n t a r y E l ec t io n

The 1993 par l iam enta ry e lect ion was a setback for Jordan s Is lam ic movem ent . The s ing le m ost im por-

tan t event occurred pr ior to the e lec t ion s wi th th e cha n ging of the e lectora l law. Instead of a propor t iona l

represen ta t ion system , the govern m ent ch an ged the e lec tora l law to a on e-person , one-vote e lec tora l p rocess .

The ef fec t o f th is cha n ge was to weaken the power of u rban d is tr ic ts where Musl im Brotherh ood can didatesen joyed m ost o f the i r suppor t . The resu l t was an e lectora l p rocess tha t favored par t ies tha t were s trong in th e

ru ra l area a n d where su ppor t for the m on arch y was trad i t iona l ly h igh . As Robin son n oted , the d is tr ic ts

system widely favored sou thern an d cen tra l t r iba l area s a t the expense of m ore densely popu la ted (a nd

Pa le s tin i an ) a r eas , p a r t i cu la r ly th e Am m an -Zarq a r eg io n . Even th o se in g o ve rn m en t ad m i tt ed th a t t h e g o a l

of the cha n ge was to un dercu t the popula r i ty of the Musl im Brotherh ood. Robinson term ed th is defen sive

dem ocrat iza t ion where the s ta te seeks to pre-em pt an t icipated pressure for po l i tica l reform . On 4 Au gu st,


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the k in g d isso lved par l iam ent an d ca l led for e lec t ion s th a t Novem ber. Later in Au gu st , the govern m ent

an n oun ced it s decis ion to adopt the on-person , on e-vote system with ou t an y cha n ges in d is t ric ts . The resu l t

was a m ajor cha l len ge for Jordan s I s lam ic m ovem ent .

The con ten t ious issues deal t wi th th e 1986 Electora l Law an d the am endm ent in 1989 th at p rovided for a

propor t ional represen ta t ion system . Offic ia l ly, th e governm ent cha n ged the law to ach ieve a m ore dem o-

cra t ic and m odern e lec tora l law. The decid in g fac tor in the co l lapse of the opposi tion to the law was tha tth e IAF acceded to th e revision o f th e law. The Jordan ian Ara b Socialist Bath P ar ty, the Jorda n ian Peop les

Dem ocrat ic Par ty, the Socia l ist Dem ocrat ic Par ty, the Arab Dem ocrat ic Par ty, an d th e Jordan ian Dem ocrat ic

Pop u lar Un ity Pa rty a ll opposed the revision of th e law. However, once th e IAF gave in, opposition to th e law

collapsed.

Man y in terpret th is chan ge in th e e lec tora l law as s im ply a Ma chia vel lian p loy to reduce the power of the

Is lam ic m ovem ent in Jordan . The evidence is cer ta in ly overwhelm ing bu t th ere were o th er fac tors th a t went

in to th is decis ion besides the I s lam ic one . Most im por tan t ly, 1993 was an ex trem ely im por tan t t im e for

m ovem ent in the Middle East peace process . The k ing proba bly assessed tha t ha ving a pa r l iam ent wi th a

sm al ler I slam ic represen ta t ion wou ld m ake i t easier for h im dom estica l ly to m ove ah ead on a peace t rea tywith I srae l . Tha t Septem ber, I srae l an d the PLO signed the Declara t ion of Pr incip les an d the convent iona l

wisdom was th e Jordan would soon m ove ah ead wi th i t s own pea ce agenda wi th I srae l .

I s lam ic p a r t ie s red u ced th e i r r ep re sen ta t io n in th e 1 9 9 3 p a r l i am en t fr o m 3 4 to 2 2 1 6 fro m th e IAF an d

6 indepen dent I s lam ists . There were som e dom estic fac tors as wel l th a t cou ld expla in the loss of sea ts for

Jorda n s Islam ists. Jorda n wa s sti l l reeling from the effects of th e Gulf War, m ost im porta n tly th e loss of

rem it tan ces an d fore ign a id f rom o ther Arab governm ents . An ecdota l repor t in g from the t im e poin ted to the

ina bi l ity of Jordan s I slam ic par t ies to del iver on wha t th ey h ad prom ised . Thou gh on e could argu e th at

there were beh ind th e scenes p lo ts to un dercu t the I s lam ists a t every s tep , m an y can didates d id n o t de l iver a ta t im e when Jordan s econ om y was per form ing poor ly.

The per form an ce of Jordan s I slam ic par t ies in the 1993 e lec tions dem on stra ted the inh eren t weakness of

po l i tica l par t ies in th e par l iam ent a s an independen t locus of power. An d there l ies a pa r t ia l an swer for the

l im i ted n atu re of Jordan s po l it ica l in c lusion . While severa l scholars ha ve ind ica ted tha t there were nu m er-

ou s exam ples of g rou ps, associa t ions, an d fam il ies organ iz ing on th ei r own ou ts ide the estab l ished norm s of

power, the m ach inery of the s ta te rem ain ed dom ina n t . In ef fec t, the s ta te es tab l ished the ru les of the po l i t i-

ca l gam e an d could ch an ge them as i t saw f it . Dur in g the 1997 e lec tions, Jordan s I slam ists boycot ted the

elec t ion s and lost even m ore groun d. Pro-govern m ent independ ents won 62 of the 80 seats in the lower

h ou se of par l iam ent . I s lam ist can didates took only 8 sea ts and left i st an d na t iona l ist can didates d ivid ing therem ain ing 10 . Voter tu rn ou t was 54 .6 percent .

With e lec tions schedu led for 2001 , there i s a d i f feren t po l i t ica l lan dscape in Jordan . King Hussein h as

passed from the scene a n d Jordan h as been p ar t ia l ly su ccessfu l in re in tegra t ing i t sel f in to th e good graces of

Pers ian Gulf coun tr ies . The coun try ha s avoided the dom estic u ph eaval and in stab i li ty tha t m an y were

predicting following the 1991 P ersian Gulf War. Th e coun try h as also tr ied to set i tself on th e road to eco-

n om ic reform with th e help of the Wor ld Ban k an d the In tern at ion al Monetary Fun d. However, po li t ica l


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inc lu sion rem ain s l im i ted wi th few, i f an y, rea l independen t sources of power ou ts ide of th e s ta te . The

m ovem ent towards greater inc lusion is l ike ly to rem ain increm enta l a t best becau se of Jordan s un ique

pol i tica l econom y of developm ent .

J o r d a n J o r d a n J o r d a n J o r d a n J o r d a n s P o l it i ca l E c o n o m ys P o l it i ca l E c o n o m ys P o l it i ca l E c o n o m ys P o l it i ca l E c o n o m ys P o l it i ca l E c o n o m y

The predom ina nt para d igm for Jordan s po l it ica l econ om y is the ren t ier s ta te or, m ore precise ly, the sem i-

ren tier state. A ren tier state is on e tha t is extrem ely depen den t on a single resource, l ike oil , for revenu e. Th e

incom e der ived from those ex tern al ly genera ted ren ts are avai lab le because of th e gap between the cost o f

p rodu ct ion an d the pr ice of the com m odi ty. The f ina ncia l resou rces genera ted are d i rec t ly acqu ired by

extern al ly produced ren ts ra ther tha n th rough dom estic m ean s like taxa t ion . A ren t ier econom y is one where

ren t does n o t accrue d i rec t ly to th e cen tra l governm ent . The s ta te h as a m u ch sm al ler ro le as a recip ien t an d

dispen ser of ren t incom e. Rent ier an d semi- ren t ier econom ies in th e Middle East an d Nor th Afr ica inc lude

Jordan , Egypt , Yem en, Tu nis ia , an d Morocco . Unl ike the Arab econ om ies of the P ersian Gulf an d Libya, these

coun tr ies do n ot depend pr im ar i ly on on e sing le resou rce for revenu e. A com bina t ion of fore ign a id a n dlabor rem it tan ces h ave helped these econom ies develop from the 1970s un t i l today. Beblawi and Lu cian i

n oted that th ese s ta tes cont in u ing re l ian ce on ex terna l ren ts resu l ted in a fa i lu re to develop the produ ct ive

bases of the i r econom ies. Tha t re l ian ce thu s rendered them susceptib le to the vo la t i l ity of th e Arab pol i t ica l

an d reg ional system . As a resu l t o f tha t econ om ic pred icam ent , m an y of the s ta tes of the Middle East an d

Nor th Afr ica , in c lud in g Jordan , ha ve re l ied on a uster i ty program s to m ake th ei r na t ion al bu dgets an d debt

obl igat ions more responsive to in ternat ional ac tors and agencies l ike the In ternat ional Monetary Fund and

the Wor ld Ban k.

This po l i tica l econom y mod el argu es th a t th e s ta tes inab i l i ty to cede power in th e po l i tica l rea lm is m u ch

l ike it s ina b i l ity to cede power in the econom ic rea lm . I t i s a resu l t o f th e s tructu ra l fea tu res of the s ta te . Atr ipar t i te a l l iance was crea ted in Jordan du r ing th e 1970s an d 1980s am on g the s ta tes publ ic sec tor burea u -

cra ts , the pr ivate sec tor, an d expatr ia te labor rem it tan ces. Arab ca p i ta l was fu nn eled in to Jordan an d re in-

forced the para si tic ties between th e s ta te an d the pr ivate sec tor. Much of th e m on ey went in to con stru ct ion

an d rea l esta te specula t ion a n d not in to the m an u factur in g sectors of the econom y. Therefore , the phen om -

ena l g rowth ra tes the coun try exper ience ha d l i tt le to do wi th produ ct ion but wi th an increase in the

consu m ers purch asing power. Jordan avoided ex trac t ing resou rces from the socie ty becau se of the cou ntrys

access to large ren ts . In o th er words, the s ta te cou ld provide resources to i t s popu la t ion wi thou t dem an ding

m u ch in th e way of r even u e in r e tu rn .

Wha t developed over t im e was a para si tic p r ivate sec tor th a t becam e dependen t u pon s ta te largesse for i t s

l ive l ih ood . One d id no t h ave a bou rgeoisie develop in an y indepen dent sense bu t a bourgeois ie t ied to the

state. Moores book is instru ctive becau se h e argu es th at the developm en t of the bou rgeoisie is a prerequ isite

for the developm ent of dem ocrat ic processes . This i s the m ost powerfu l reason for th e absence of rea l dem o-

cra t ic reform in Jordan . Withou t a dynam ic and en trepren eur ia l bou rgeoisie to help lead the way, one is le ft

wi th a s ta te tha t can dole ou t favors to wh om ever i t wish es.

Tran sit ions to m ore dem ocrat ic ru le in o th er coun tr ies ha ve usu al ly wi tn essed som e cal l fo r po l i tica l an d


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econom ic reform from the busin ess c lass. Once th is ha ppens, barga in in g proceeds am on g var iou s ac tors for

a m ore equi tab le d is tr ibu t ion of power. Robinson ca l led th is a s ta te cr is is wh ere fac t ions of the s ta te e l ite

lose conf iden ce in the prevai ling po l i t ica l , econom ic an d socia l o rder an d seek n ew ru les of the ga m e.

These new ru les are u sua l ly m asked un der dem ocrat ic reform . This dem ocrat iza t ion n eed not involve e li te

conf l ic t . For Robinson , th is i s how defensive dem ocrat iza t ion a rose wh ere the s ta te sough t to pre-em pt

an t icipated pressure for po li t ica l reform . This s ta te cr isis is norm al ly fisca l in conten t , an d can take p lace

with ou t c lass res t ru ctur ing , econom ic growth , a v ibran t c ivi l society or o ther socie ta l phen om ena . In o th er

words, the s ta tes s tra tegy was to m ain ta in the dom ina n t po l i tica l o rder in th e face of a severe fisca l cr is is .

Such fisca l cr ises are on ly loosely re la ted to genera l econ om ic problem s in th e coun try.

R o b in son d o es a m as ter fu l j o b o f ex p la in in g so m e o f th e r easo n s b eh in d th e m o vem en t to ward d em o -

cra t ic reform in Jordan . His explan at ion s are powerfu l an d testab le no t on ly for Jordan bu t for a n um ber of

o ther coun tr ies th rou ghou t th e Third Wor ld . However, h is assessm ent expla ins m ore th e tim ing of dem o-

cra t ic reform s from the e l i te , an d not so m uch as why th e dem ocrat iza t ion is l im i ted . I t is here where we

m u st delve in to th e un ique power sha r ing ar ra n gem ents of the s ta te to un derstan d the l im i ts o f Jordan s

d em o cra t ic ex p e r im en t .The rea son for tha t l im i ted po l i tica l inc lusion is tha t t ran sit ions to dem ocrat ic reform usu al ly involve

som e type negot ia t ion wi th a n in dependen t opposi t ion . The ca l ls for dem ocrat ic reform , or a t least the

reform tha t the s ta te viewed ser iously, cam e n ot from the I s lam ists bu t f rom the bu sin ess c lass. Usu al ly, there

is som e type of pol it ica l space between th ose ca l ling for reform an d the s ta te . As Bran d n oted , there was

re la t ive ly l i tt le po li t ica l space between th ose two actors m akin g the n atu re of the ba rgain ing for an y tran si-

t ion l im i ted . In o ther words, the dom ina nce of s ta te inst i tu t ions over a l l aspects o f po l i tica l l i fe in Jordan

precluded m ore ex tensive po l i tica l inc lusion . Jordan s I slam ists fou n d them selves ca l l in g for g reater inc lu -

s ion in the weak s ta te inst i tu t ion of par l iam ent . As tim e wen t on f rom th e 1989 e lec tion , the I s lam ists foun d

them selves on m u ch of the per iphery regard in g pol i tica l barga in in g wi th s ta te e l ites. This i s no t to su ggesttha t the I s lam ic m ovem ent was un in terested in gain ing a b igger sl ice of po l i tica l power. This i s on ly to

suggest tha t Jordan s un ique s ta te st ructure precluded there ever bein g an yth ing m ore than l im i ted po l i tica l

inc lusion . An d the increm enta l reform tha t d id occur was on the s ta tes te rm s only. Seen in th is ligh t , the

Is lam ic m ovem ents weak showing in severa l par l iam enta ry an d local elect ions, as wi th m an y o ther secu la r

an d na t iona l ist po l i tica l par t ies , i s un derstan dable . Robinson a n d Bran d ha ve poin ted the way toward our

u nd erstan ding of when , wh y, an d how the sta te pre-em pted greater dem ocrat ic reform in Jordan . The

lim ited na tu re of th e reform itself, however, was doom ed from the start beca u se of Jorda n s state power

s h a r in g a r r a n g e m e n t s.

P o l i t ic a l I m p e d i m e n t s t o Gr e a t e r I n c l u s i o n o f I sl a m i c Gr o u p sP o l i t ic a l I m p e d i m e n t s t o Gr e a t e r I n c l u s i o n o f I sl a m i c Gr o u p sP o l i t ic a l I m p e d i m e n t s t o Gr e a t e r I n c l u s i o n o f I sl a m i c Gr o u p sP o l i t ic a l I m p e d i m e n t s t o Gr e a t e r I n c l u s i o n o f I sl a m i c Gr o u p sP o l i t ic a l I m p e d i m e n t s t o G re a t e r I n c l u s i o n o f I sl a m i c Gr o u p s

Jordan s I slam ists were im por tan t p layers wi th in the s ta te bu t on ly to the ex ten t tha t they helped m ain ta in

an im p o r tan t l in k b e tween th e m o n a rch y an d th e b ed o u in t r ibes. Th e g ro wth o f Is lam ic ac t ivi sm in th e

u rban area s of Am m an -Zarqa an d I rb id is a re la t ive ly n ew ph enom enon . These groups ties to th e sta te were

always less s t ron g than the t rad i t ion al form of I s lam ic ac t ivism tha t th e k ing em braced . I s lam ic ac t ivism in


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t h e u rb a n a r eas b ecam e an im p o r tan t r a l lyin g p o in t fo r m u ch o f th e d i sen f ran ch i sed Pa le st in i an p o p u la t ion .

The m ona rchy an d the m il ita ry viewed that type of ac t ivism as a destab i l iz ing e lem ent in socie ty. Havin g

n ever been c lear ly associa ted wi th the s ta te , these po l it ica l I s lam ists were on m u ch of the po l i t ica l f r in ge

with in Jordan du r ing th e 1980s an d 1990s. So , the h istor ica l l ink to the s ta te of these groups was never tha t

s t rong .

A secon d fac tor im peding greater inc lusion of these I slam ic groups involved the par l iam ent i t sel f. Theinst i tu t ion was no t se t u p to be an indepen dent check on the power of the execut ive bran ch . Even i f these

g ro u p s m an ag ed to m a in ta in an im p o r tan t b lo c wi th in th e p a r l iam en t , th e in s t it u t ion i tsel f l ack ed th e

resources to ch al lenge s ta te au thor i ty. The par l iam ent dur in g the 1990s m ade i t s m ark in a ser ies of cor rup-

t ion inqu ir ies of governm ent an d form er governm ent of fic ia ls . Th ese inqu ir ies a lm ost led to the ind ic tm ent

of form er Pr im e Minis ter Zayd a l -Rifa i bu t h e escaped of fic ia l in jun ct ion . The grea ter in sti tu t ion of the

m on arch y and a n y cr i tic ism of the k ing wa s off l im i ts to those inqu ir ies .

A th i rd fac tor tha t led a lso to greater inc lusion of I slam ic groups ha d to do with th e I slam ic m ovem ent

itself . Robin son deftly poin ted out th at Jorda n s Islam ic Action Fron t was divided between social an d polit ical

I s lam ist s. Th e so cia l I sl am ist s were o n es wh o m a in ta in ed g o o d re la t io n s with th e Hash em i te m o n a rch y an dp u sh ed p r im ar i ly a so c ia l a g en d a in p a r l i am en t su ch a s b an n in g a l co h o l an d e st ab l ish in g s in g le sex sch o o l s .

They were often East Ban kers and l ike ly to ha ve som e type of form al re l ig iou s t ra in ing . The pol i t ica l I s lam -

i st s pu sh ed a m u ch m o re co mp reh en s ive ag en d a su ch a s o p p o si tio n to a n y n o rm a l i za t io n o f t ie s wi th I sr ae l .

They were predom ina n t ly Pa lest in ian an d were l ike ly to be co l lege educa ted in techn ical fie lds l ike en gineer-

ing a n d m edicine . So , the I s lam ic m ovem ent i t se l f in Jordan was never a m on ol i th ic en t i ty.

A fou r th fac tor was the weakn ess of th e po l i tica l par ty system in Jordan . Wh ile Jordan dem on stra ted

du r ing th e 1990s tha t non -governm enta l o rgan izat ions could organ ize on a g rass- roo ts level , i t was the

pol i tica l par ty th a t rem ain ed a t the cen ter o f dem ocrat ic reform in Jordan . As a resu l t o f tha t par ty weakn ess,can d id a tes fo r p a r l i am en t r a r e ly r e li ed o n p a r t ie s d u r in g cam p a ig n in g an d were n o t b eh o ld en to th em o n ce

in of fice. In 1997 , the m ajor opposi t ion par t ies in Jordan boycot ted th e par l iam enta ry e lect ions to pro test

governm ent cor ru pt ion , the peace t rea ty wi th I srae l , an d fur th er revis ion s to the coun trys e lec tora l law.

Most im por tan t ly however i s th e dom ina nce of the s ta te a lm ost over a l l inst i tu t ions with in Jordan , bo th

form al an d inform al . As Lau r ie Bran d noted in a co l lec tion of works deal ing wi th the developm ent of civi l

socie ty in the Middle East , In the begin n ing was the s ta te In th is work , Bran d out l ined how externa l

fac tors sh aped th e Jordan ian s ta te in to a n a lm ost m on ol i th ic en t i ty wi th l i t tle room for a vibran t c ivi l society

o r au to n o m o u s p o l it ica l g ro u p in g s . Jo rd an was u sed a s an a n ch o r in B ri ti sh im p er ia l p o l icy an d b ecam e a

p ivota l p layer in the Arab-Israe l i conf lic t. The ex terna l th rea ts to the s ta te an d th e reg im e created l it t lepol i tica l space between th ose who ru led a n d those who fo l lowed.

Tha t sm al l po l i t ica l space provides a key fac tor in why pol i tica l inc lusion h as been so l im i ted in Jordan .

The coa l i tion of s ta te ac tors mu st fee l som e type of th rea t for there to be po l i t ica l ba rgain ing goin g wi th a n

indepen dent opposi tion . The rea l th rea t to the reg im e in 1989 d id no t com e from Jordan s I slam ic m ove-

m ent bu t from the n orm al ly suppor t ive East Bankers . Most o f the dom estic d is tu rban ces s in ce then , p r im a-

r i ly the 1996 bread r io ts in Kerak , h ave a l l been f rom th is s tau n chly pro-Hashem ite sec tor of socie ty. The


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I sl am ic m o vem en t in Jo rd an d id n o t o rg an ize in a way to co n fro n t t h e ru l in g au th o r i ti es . Th e b a rg a in in g

tha t p roceeded between ru l ing e l i tes an d th e d isgrun t led sec tors of society d id n o t inc lu de the issue of I slam ic

act ivism . The ba rgain ing th at d id proceed ended in a series of e lec tora l reform s th at were advan tageou s to

East Ban ker t r ibes, an d u l t im ate ly the s ta te .

T h e Q u e s t fo rT h e Q u e s t fo rT h e Q u e s t fo rT h e Q u e s t fo rT h e Q u e s t fo r TTTTTaaddudiyyaaaddudiyyaaaddudiyyaaaddudiyyaaaddudiyya

Thou gh severa l po l i t ica l cu r ren ts ex ist in Jordan ian pol i tica l l i fe , from left i sts to na t iona l ist to I s lam ic

act ivist , au tonom ous pol i t ica l power ou ts ide of the s ta te rem ain s e lu sive . Man y of the professional a ssocia-

t ions, like po l it ica l pa r t ies , con t inu e to base the i r m em bersh ip an d pol ic ies on k in sh ip an d fam ily t ies .

There is m ore freedom of expression of d iverse po in ts v iew, bu t th a t a u tonom y of expression h as n o t t ran s-

form ed i t se l f in to a u tonom y of ac t ion . Taaddudiyya, o r p lu ra l ism , ex ists on the level o f expression an d insom e instances ac t ion . However, the s ta te con t inu es to com m an d the preem inen t ro le with in socie ty. As long

as n o indepen dent opposi t ion evolves , the po l i t ica l barga in in g tha t the socia l science l ite ra ture on dem o-

cra t ic t ran si tions argu es is so crucia l for dem ocracy wi ll rem ain one-sided . Thu s, the m ovem ent towardgreater dem ocrat ic reform s an d wider po l i tica l inc lusion wi l l be increm enta l .

This i s no t to suggest tha t a l l i s lost po l it ica l ly for Jordan an d o th er coun tr ies in th e Middle East where

au thor i tar ian ru le appears so en trench ed . The fac t tha t there i s g rea ter freedom of po l i tica l expression is a

positive developm en t over the pa st decade in Jordan . However, assessing th e possibil i t ies for greater polit ical

in c lu s io n sh o u ld b eg in wi th an u n d e r st an d in g o f th e d o m in an t r o le o f th e s t a t e n o t o n ly in Jo rd an b u t

throu gh out the Middle East . In the econ om ic rea lm , the m ovem ent toward greater p r ivat iza t ion ha s pro-

ceeded ha ltingly. In several coun tries, polit ical scientists h ave catalogu ed the ina bili ty of Middle Eastern

states to divest them selves of econ om ic power. A sim ilar con clusion is not far from reality in th e polit ical

rea lm . Four h un dred years of Ot tom an ru le , 50 years of war prepara t ion by so-cal led f ron t- l ine s ta tes, and25 years of recycled petrodol lars ha ve taken thei r to l l on the a b i l ity of these sta tes to cha n ge overn ight .

Pol i t ica l inc lu sion in Jordan is like ly to be on ly increm enta l an d s ta te-dr iven wi th such a h istor ica l legacy.

1To be qu oted only with th e au thors perm ission .


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I sl a m , De m o cr a c yI sl a m , De m o cr a c yI sla m , De m o cr a c yI sl a m , De m o cr a c yI sla m , De m o cr a c y, a n d th e Y, a n d th e Y, a n d th e Y, a n d th e Y, a n d th e Ye m e n i St a t ee m e n i S ta tee m e n i St a t ee m e n i S ta tee m e n i St a t e

Dr. Jillian Schwedler

University of Maryland

[email protected]

Since the 1994 c iv il war in Yem en, th e coun trys ra th er rem arka ble foray in to dem ocrat ic po l it ics ha s , to

say the lea st , stalled. 1 F rom th e 1 9 9 3 e lec tio n s th a t b ro u g h t a m u l t ipa r ty a ssem b ly d o m in a ted b y n o s in g le

par ty, the qu al i ty of dem ocrat ic par t icipat ion h ad deter iora ted to such a po in t tha t publ ic debate openly

ack n owledges th e groom ing o f Presiden t Ali Abdu llah Salih s son for th e presidency. Salih led Yem en s

t ra n si tion for a decade before beginn ing h is fi r s t e lec ted presiden t ia l te rm in 20 00; in February 2001, a

popu lar referendu m exten ded the term from five to seven years (wi th th e two- term l im i t rem ain ing in

effec t ) , thu s ex tendin g h is legal an d const i tu t iona l ru le un t i l 2014 , when h is son wi l l be of e l ig ib le age to

ru n for the posit ion .

Wh ile the lan gu age of s ta l led dem ocracy accura te ly descr ibes cer ta in e lem ents of Yem ens a t tem pted

tra n sit ion , i t fa i l s to cap tu re the fu l l ex ten t o f socia l an d pol i t ica l cha n ge tha t the coun try ha s exper ienced

in the past decade. This inc ludes no t on ly the in t rodu ct ion of m ul t ipar ty po l i tics an d the langu age of

dem ocracy as the source of governm ent leg i tim acy, bu t the em ergence of a dyna m ic if const ra ined pu bl icsphere an d the evolu t ion of a ra n ge of socia l an d pol i tica l forces in to n ew in sti tu t iona l form s. With in th is

contex t , th e I slam ist- t r iba l coal i tion po l i t ica l par ty Taja m m a ca l -Yam an i l i a l - I sl ah ( th e I sl ah p a r ty) h as

p layed a prom inen t bu t d ram at ica l ly cha n ging ro le on th e po li t ica l scene . This paper wi ll exam ine the

pol i tica l cha nges in Yem en over the past decade wi th par t icu la r a t ten t ion to cha n ges wi th in th e I slah par ty

as well as i ts relation to the h igh est power eli tes in th e coun try.

In the f i r st sect ion , I exa m ine Yem ens in i t ia l fo ray in to dem ocrat ic po l i tics as an e l ite -dr iven pacted

tran sit ion . Next I exam ine the ro le of the I s lah pa r ty in th e conf igura t ion of th e Nor thern po l i tica l e li te,

pay ing pa r t icu la r a t ten t ion to in t ra-par ty conf lic ts an d Is lah s evolu t ion a s a po l i tica l par ty. Final ly I exam -

ine th e cur ren t s ta te of Yem ens dem ocracy an d the ro le of I slah .

YYYYYe m e n i U n i fi c a t io n a n d P a c t e d P o l i ti c a l Li b e r a l iz a t i o ne m e n i U n i fi c a t io n a n d P a c t e d P o l i t ic a l L ib e r a l i za t i o ne m e n i U n i fi c a t io n a n d P a c t e d P o l i ti c a l Li b e r a l iz a t i o ne m e n i U n i fi c a t io n a n d P a c t e d P o l i t ic a l L ib e r a l i za t i o ne m e n i U n i fi c a t io n a n d P a c t ed P o l it i ca l L i b er a l i z a t io n

Yem ens process of po li t ica l l ibera l iza t ion form al ly began in 1990 a s par t o f a n egot ia ted u n ifica t ion of

Nor th an d South Yem en, n ei ther of wh ich h ad a s tron g h is tory of dem ocrat ic or e lec tora l po l it ics . The

Yem en Arab Repu bl ic (YAR, or Nor th Yem en) was estab l ished in 1962 throu gh a m i l ita ry coup a gain st th e


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ru lers o f th e Muta wakki l i te Kingdom of Yem en, a theocra t ic s ta te ru le by a h ered itary l in e of Zaydi Im am s.

Wh en Im am Yah ya wh o h ad ru l ed fro m th e t im e o f h i s fa th e r s d ea th in 1 9 4 8 d ied , th e r evo lu t io n a ry

officers drove a tan k in to th e cen tra l squa re of the n or thern p la teau c i ty of San a ca a n d declared the estab l ish -

m ent of a republ ic in p lace of the m on arch y. The m ove s tar ted a c ivi l war th a t las ted m ost o f the decade,

wi th Egypt ian t roops backing th e republ ican s and Sa u di Arabia su ppor t ing the royal ists . Gradu al ly, th e war

evolved in to a s t ruggle between a n u m ber of Western-ba cked m on arch ies of the Arabia n P enin su la a n d Arab

n ation alists (ba cked by Egypts President Gam al Abd a l-Nasser) . After Egypt withdrew its forces in 1967, th e

republ ic surv ived severa l f in a l pu shes by royal is ts , an d a sp li t wi th in the repu bl ican s resu l ted in the defeat o f

the n ow-divided left i st e lem ents by t r iba l -backed con servat ives , who led the n ew governm ent .

South Yem en a lso u n derwen t a revolu t ion in th e 1960s, bu t on e of a very d i fferen t cha racter. The por t o f

Aden h ad been pa r t o f the Br it i sh Em pire since 1839 , th ou gh var iou s na t iona l ist g roups gain ed s trength in

thei r opposi tion to Br i ti sh presen ce on th e penin su la fo l lowing World War I I . These groups ran ged from

leftist revolu tion ar ies inspired by Marxist an d Ara b Socialist ideologies to conservative tr iba l eli tes, each of

which held a m bi t ion s of contro l l ing an y fu ture indepen dent s ta te . After the Nor ths 1962 revolu t ion , sou th -

e rn n a t io n a l i st s fo u n d r ead y a l l ie s am o n g th e n o r th e rn r ep u b l ican s , wh o a lo n g with Eg yp t ian t r o op s wereeager to a id fe llow Arabs in the i r s t ruggle aga inst the Br it i sh . The n at ion al is ts fina l ly won in dependen ce

from Great Br i ta in in Novem ber 1967 . Conservat ive t r iba l e li tes, m ercha n ts, an d pol i t ic ian s who h ad cooper-

a ted wi th Br ita in fled the coun try (Sch m itz 1997: 14-15) , leaving th e new sta te in the h an ds of the v ictor ious

socia l is ts, who form al ly estab l ished a s the Peoples Republ ic of South Yem en, la ter rena m ed th e Peoples

Dem ocratic Repu blic of Yem en ( PDRY, or Sou th Yem en) .2

No rth a n d So u th Yem en m ig h t h a ve m o ved to ward u n i f ica t io n a t t h a t t im e , h ad i t n o t b een th a t co n se r-

vat ives an d t r iba l ists em erged vic tor ious in the Nor th whi le left i sts tr ium ph ed in th e south . Over the n ext few

years, relations between the two countries were characterized largely by the efforts of each to support opposi-

t ion grou ps wi th in th e o ther. Left ists from the Nor th foun d refu ge an d suppor t in th e South , whi le somesouth ern con servat ives fled to the Nor th . This led to two wars between Nor th an d South Yem en. In 1972 ,

south ern ex i les based in th e Nor th sou gh t to over throw the South s socia l ist reg im e, bu t fa i led . In 1979 , th e

n or thern reg im e was a t tacked by a sou thern -suppor ted group of left i sts wh o cal led them selves the Na t ional

Dem ocrat ic Front , wi th f igh t ing located pr im ar i ly in th e sou thern lan ds of the Nor th . As Hal l iday argues,

th is h is tory of figh t ing n ot on ly m akes 1990s un ifica t ion seem rem arka ble , bu t i t ma kes the 1994 c iv il war

(d iscussed below) seem al l the m ore in evi tab le (1995) . In term s of a l l ian ces am on g var iou s el i te - level

actors, these processes of state development prove essential for understanding post-unif ication polit ics.

The 1980s m arked a per iod of reflect ion an d l im i ted reorgan izat ion for bo th reg im es. In th e Nor th ,

Presiden t Al i Abd Al lah Sal ih , who ha d ru led since 1978 , sough t to provide an a l terna t ive to m u l t i-par ty

pol i tics by crea t ing a n at ion al assem bly ca l led th e Gen era l Popu lar Congress3( GPC) , which f i r st m et i t 1982 .

In i t ia l ly com pr ised of 700 e lec ted an d 300 appoin ted represen ta t ives , th e GPC brough t together v i r tua l ly every

prom inen t in d ividua l wh o ha d supp or ted the reg im e, thu s gath er ing in on e form al assem bly the e l ite from

diverse h ierarch ies of power. Man y of these ind ividua ls had even taken u p arm s to defend th e reg ime du r ing

i ts on going s t ruggles aga inst th e Nat ion al Dem ocrat ic Front in the 1970s. Fol lowing un ifica t ion , m an y of

the n or thern -based pol it ica l e l ites em erged , u n surpr is in g ly, from the ran ks of the GPC. The estab l ish m ent of


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the GPC thu s in pa r t set the s tage for un ifica t ion by inst i tu t ional ly l in k ing th e m ost powerfu l po l i t ica l forces

u n d e r o n e u m b re ll a o rg an iza t io n , r e in fo r cin g a n d fo rm a l i zin g p a t ron a g e t ie s an d o f fe r in g g o ve rn m en t

posi tions to in f luent ia l suppor ters . For the South , the 1980s were a t im e of s t ru ggle am on g a nu m ber of

shif t ing faction s. Th e resu lt was considera ble bloodshed, with the victoriou s leaders often n ot su rvivin g to see

victory (Halliday 1990).

Th e m o u n t in g p o l it ica l an d eco n o m ic p rob lem s in b o th No r th a n d So u th Yem en l ed th e l ead e rs o f t h etwo reg im es to explore the possib il i ty of u n ifica t ion . The opt ion was a t t rac t ive in pa r t becau se each s ide

bel ieved i t cou ld secure s ign ifican t su ppor t am ong the popu la t ions of the o th er. The leaders of the South s

ru l ing pa r ty, the Yem eni Socia l ist Pa r ty ( YSP) , a lso recognized tha t the decreasing rem it tan ces from the

Sovie t Union n ecessi ta ted a fun dam enta l re th in k ing of the i r econ om ic po lic ies , as i t s s ta te-cen tered econ om y

h ad long been re l ian t on ex terna l ren ts tha t were n o longer for thcom ing . In m an y ways, the Nor th s vast

r e so u rces an d th e So u th s m o d ern m ark e t i n fr a s tru c tu r e4m ade un ifica t ion a log ica l choice . An d with the

discovery of oil in lan ds stradd ling a b order of th e two cou n tries, th e stak es in creased for both sides. Th e idea

of polit ical l iberalization itself, however, was en tirely u n preceden ted (Cara pico 1998: 135) .

The qu estion of why governm ents in i t ia te processes of po l i tica l l ibera l iza t ion ha s been cen tra l to process-or ien ted an alyses of po l i tica l t ran si tions. As fi r s t ou t l ined by Ru stow (1970) , th is type of approach h as

dom ina ted stud ies of dem ocrat ic t ran sit ion par t icu la r ly s in ce th e m id-1980s. Wh ereas ear l ier stud ies of

dem ocrat iza t ion tended to focu s on wh ether socie t ies ha d ach ieved cer ta in prerequis i tes ( inst i tu t iona l ,

cu l tu ra l , an d/or econ om ic) , p rocess-or ien ted an alyses em ph asize th e cont ingen t choices faced by e li te- level

ac tors . In th is view, po l i tica l l ibera l iza t ion m ay be an effec t ive m ean s of defla t ing pol i tica l d issen t by cha n-

n el in g opposi t ion m ovem ents in to s ta te-contro l led in sti tu t ions a s an a l terna t ive to repression by force .

Al thou gh the po l i t ica l e l i te m ay view th is st ra tegy as a m echa n ism of po li t ica l contro l , i t ma rks the begin-

n ing of l ibera l iza t ion a n d the expan sion of space for po l i tica l o rgan izat ion , where non -sta te po l i tica l ac tors

are to lera ted as long as th ey p la y by the ru les estab l ished by sta te ac tors . These ru les are of ten a d justedu n til they produ ce th e desired resu lts. As Przeworski argu es,

Pro jec ts o f l ibera l iza t ion lau n ched by forces from with in th e au thor i tar ian power estab l ish m ent are

invar iab ly in tend ed as con tro l led openin gs of po l it ica l spa ce .. .In the l igh t o f th is p ro ject , l ibera l iza t ion is to

be cont inu al ly cont in gent on the com pat ib i l ity of it s ou tcom es wi th the in terests o r va lu es of the a u th or i tar-

i an b lo c (1 9 9 1 : 5 7 ) .

This approa ch con ceptu al izes tran si tions as th e product o f the in terest- an d value-dr iven beh avior of e l ite -

level ac tors fac in g const ra in ts on a nd cha l len ges to the i r power.

In this type of tran sit ion , one of the key ch allen ges is for th e polit ical elite to streng then their power by

re inforcing ex is t ing a l l ian ces an d pat ron age n etworks wh i le br ing in g o ther e l i tes in to the m ix . This i s o ften

accom plish ed th rough the estab l ish m ent of pacts , n egot ia ted com prom ises in which con tending forces

agree to forego thei r capaci ty to ha rm each o ther by ex tending g ua ran tees no t t

Islam Democracy and the Secularist State - CSID

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