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ISIG JOURNAL Quarterly of International Sociology

Trimestrale di Sociologia Internazionale

volume XVIII – 1/2 – 2009

SUMMARY Presentazione, Alberto Gasparini ………………………..………...………………….. STRATEGIES FOR COMPARISONS AND GLOBALISM Scenarios of governance in Mediterranean failed states, small states and micro-states. Main

variables to build predictions for the Balkan-Danube area, Alberto Gasparini …..…… Managing the Adriatic common space. A study on the Adriatic Seaways, Daniele Del

Bianco ………………..………………………………………………………………….. Bridging the security divide: New concepts from two Mediterranean communities, Amanda

McAllister Wilson ………………..……………………..….……………………………. POINTS OF CONJUNCTION, POINTS OF DIVISION The “crossings” along the divide: The Cypriot experience, Maria Hadjipavlou ……..…….. The case of Kosovo: International statebuilding from a pending final political status to an

independent country, Labinot Greiçevci ……………..…………..…………………….. BORDER FOR THE INTEGRATION Europa-Libano: integrazione con, integrazione in, Elie Kallas ….………………………….. Building euroregions in South Eastern Europe, Vasile Puşcaş ……………….…………….. Recensioni …………………………………………………………………………………

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Editorial Board Edgar F. Borgatta, University of Washington Vincenzo Cesareo, Catholic University of Milan Jürgen Friedrichs, University of Cologne Renzo Gubert, University of Trento Max Haller, University of Graz John Hume, Peace Nobel Prize Giuseppe O. Longo, University of Trieste Zdravko Mlinar, University of Ljubljana Antonio Papisca, University of Padua Riccardo Petrella, University of Louvain Vasile Puşcaş, Babes Bolyai University of Cluj Napoca Bruno Tellia, University of Udine Danilo Turk, University of Ljubljana Antonio Zanardi Landi, Italian Ambassador Tatyana Zaslavkaya, Academy of Sciences of Russian Federation Director Clemente Borando Scientific Director Alberto Gasparini Editorial Executive Board Anna Maria Boileau, Luciana Cominotto, Daniele Del Bianco (editor in chief), Maura Del Zotto, Giulio Tarlao ISIG JOURNAL is the quarterly journal of the Institute of International Sociology (ISIG) The Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia was created on the initial project of its founder, Franco Demarchi, which aimed at joining together rigorous scientific activity and a proactive effort in the international cooperation filed, to promote sustainable development and the peaceful coexistence of peoples. Located in Gorizia, a town on the border between two countries of then-divided Europe, in 1968 ISIG became an international centre of excellence for research and an original laboratory elaborating solutions to the needs of local, national and international societies. Thus, ISIG contributed to the scientific development of new methodologies and theories. Today, the originality of ISIG stands out in the numerous research activities carried out by the institute and in its commitment within the international academic and cultural networks in which it operates, in its constant publishing and academic dissemination and training activities. ISIG is thus rooted in the regional context but is also dynamically turned towards the international context, within which it operates and is recognised as a centre of excellence in the fields of international relations and cross-border cooperation studies, of ethnic relations and minorities studies, of peace studies and conflict resolution, of society and social policy, of economics and local development, of democracy and civil society, of futures and forecasting techniques, of territorial and environmental risk management. © Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia (ISIG) Printed in: Grafica Goriziana - Gorizia 2009 Quarterly journal registered at the Court of Gorizia, no. 229 of 26.03.1991

PRESENTAZIONE Alberto Gasparini

ISIG Journal dedica questo numero a una prospettiva dei confini che non è quella della stretta contiguità,

ma piuttosto delle relazioni tra gli stati e le società (nella loro globalità), che passano per i confini. Ovviamente tale passaggio concreto ed operativo è sviluppato da attori specifici, costituiti da gruppi sociali (devianti o integranti), da organizzazioni nazionali e internazionali, da politiche provenienti dal centro che si confrontano eventualmente con altre politiche provenienti da altri centri. Da questa prospettiva il confine è costituito da una cesura consistente (ma anche perché sfugge ai controlli locali) che nasce dal confronto tra due entità societarie e/o statali. Ci rendiamo conto di ciò quando confrontiamo i paesi per livello di ricchezza (e povertà) o per altri indicatori significativi. È evidente che in queste condizioni vi saranno gruppi sociali (se non statali) che tendono a rendere sempre più virtuali i confini per espandersi, soprattutto se hanno da esportare differenze di povertà e/o disordine verso paesi ricchi od ordinati, oppure se vogliono difendersi da “invasioni”; oppure ancora se devono trovare soluzioni a problemi comuni con gli altri paesi.

In altri termini da tale punto di vista il confine non è considerato per popolazioni che vi abitano intorno e perciò come punto tra regioni contermini ma appartenenti a sistemi differenti; ma piuttosto il confine è analizzato come punto attraverso il quale passa l’integrazione o la disintegrazione di ogni singolo sistema sociale e statuale. Si tratta cioè di quel confine che la teoria generale dei sistemi ha definito come limite che divide l’in dall’out, l’identità del sistema dall’identità dell’extra-sistema, la sicurezza del sistema dall’incertezza del presente e del futuro.

Il presente numero di ISIG Journal è diviso in tre parti. La prima parte riguarda le “strategie tra confronti e globalismi”, dove in queste strategie vi sono

compresi i confronti di politiche e di azioni concertate ma anche i globalismi di chi tende ad espandere le proprio energie (positive o negative). Il primo articolo, di Alberto Gasparini, riguarda i confini, perforati o perforabili, fra paesi mediterranei a differente condizione di failed states. L’impostazione di scenari, ideale, catastrofico, realistico, permette di riflettere su situazioni contenenti elementi delle soluzioni. Segue l’articolo di Daniele Del Bianco che affronta le modalità di superare i confini da parte dei paesi dell’Adriatico per risolvere problemi da affrontare in comune, l’inquinamento e il terrorismo nel mare Adriatico. Infine l’articolo di Amanda McAllister Wilson mette a confronto due esempi di uso del territorio per ragioni di sicurezza Nato, come sono il grande Radar a Pecs e la base aeronautica del “Dal Molin” di Vicenza, e i movimenti civili di contrapposizione che generano.

La seconda parte della rivista l’abbiamo intitolata “Punti di congiunzione, punti di divisione”, poiché trattano di temi confinari di Cipro e del Kossovo. Maria Hadjipavlou analizza il confine cipriota-turco e cipriota-greco attraverso i contatti informali tra la gente, e conclude che i contatti informali difficilmente riescono a smantellare i confini culturali (composti soprattutto da pregiudizi) se non intervengono delle infrastrutture istituzionali locali, ma soprattutto del centro, a sostenerli. L’articolo di Labinot Greiçevci si pone il problema della costruzione dello stato del Kossovo, per la quale essenziale è l’appoggio che viene dalla Comunità internazionale. Questo fornisce legittimità allo stato nuovo verso l’esterno ma anche sicurezza nei rapporti interni tra le diverse entità etniche.

La terza parte di ISIG Journal infine riprende i confini fra macro parti del Mediterraneo e tra gli stati del Sud-Est europeo. Così Elie Kallas affronta il tema dei rapporti tra Libano e Unione Europea. In essi sono compresi senz’altro gli attuali programmi europei da rendere più efficaci, ma vi è tutta una serie di

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convenienze per l’Europa di enfatizzare i rapporti con il Libano, sia per la sua posizione strategica e il suo dinamismo economico che per contribuire alla stabilità politica e sociale dell’area. Infine l’articolo di Vasile Puşcaş affronta il tema classico dell’Euroregione dei paesi del Sud-Est europeo, ma ancorando l’efficacia dell’Euroregione al livello di intensità della cooperazione esistente, e in secondo luogo allo stadio di sviluppo dello stato membro dell’Unione Europea, ancorata a tante organizzazioni internazionali europee, e degli altri stati dell’Euroregione che non sono membri dell’Unione Europea.

SCENARIOS OF GOVERNANCE IN MEDITERRANEAN FAILED STATES, SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES.

MAIN VARIABLES TO BUILD PREDICTIONS FOR THE BALKAN-DANUBE AREA

Alberto Gasparini I.S.I.G. – Institute of International Sociology - Gorizia

Abstract: This paper concern itself with the definition of failed states, small states and micro-states, their standing in the Balkan-Danube area, their relationship with globalisation and international organis-ations, the definition of scenarios and the processes involved in building them, the delineation of present-day scenarios and those projected for 2020, and the identification of the process whereby alternative future scenarios may be built. Keywords: Failed states, small states, micro states, future scenario building

• − • − •

1. The complexity of the question

The question to be dealt with concerns predicting the future of non-simple societies whose statehood is made difficult by their small size. There is an assumption here that in order to function properly a society has to be large enough to contain resources sufficient for it to be a state, institutions complex enough to serve a large number of users efficiently, a number of inhabitants sufficient to ensure social heterogeneity, a civil society compatible with the many organisations that enable all the needs of a society – even a small one – to be sustained and satisfied, and so on.

Prediction in this case regards the future of small or even micro-societies, that is to say social entities which in themselves are difficult to transform into positive factors – though, as we shall see, there are features which may provide favourable prospects for such states.

This paper will concern itself with the definition of failed states, small states and micro-states, their standing in the Balkan-Danube area, their relationship with globalisation and international organisations, the definition of scenarios and the processes involved in building them, the delineation of present-day scenarios and those projected for 2020, and the identification of the process whereby alternative future scenarios may be built. 2. The nature of small and micro-states, and the reasons for maintaining them

The legal recognition and the ability to function of small and micro-states are influenced by a range of factors: the context in which they come into being, their ability to maintain themselves as “normal” states, their relations with other states, near and far, the globalised nature of the context, and so forth. We shall now briefly analyse some of these factors. 2.1. The feudal context from which small or micro-states were formed

Western medieval feudalism shattered territories and sovereignties, only to hold them together in a system of investitures which were renewed on the death of each earl, duke, lord or prince, and which derived from a central universalistic power – imperial, papal or royal. With the rise of somewhat larger

Alberto Gasparini 6

modern states from about 1500 these feudal fragments gradually disappeared, with the exception of a few micro-states. Another way in which independent entities came into being was the urbanisation which marked the late medieval period (1100-1300), producing a proliferation of city-states, notably in Italy, Germany and Flanders. It was this plurality of feudal states and/or city-states which begat, or rather conserved or moulded, the micro-states of western Europe. Those remaining are San Marino, Monaco, Andorra, Lichtenstein and Luxembourg (Grossman 2005; Ambrosetti 2007). Broadly speaking they survived because they were isolated, they had no strategic importance and it profited nobody to try to deprive them of what was little more than formal independence. Luxembourg is the residue of a system of buffer principalities between France and the Holy Roman Empire which included Alsace, Lorraine, Bourgogne, Belgium and Holland. It retained its independence because it was connected to a system of interdependent and independent entities centred on the Spanish and Austrian Netherlands located in what is now Benelux. The independence of these micro-states has remained more virtual than real, has been in the shadow of the (necessarily) nearby “protecting power” and is characterised by an economic independence based on the non-expense of an effectively independent state and on the tolerance of an economy with the dubious legality of tax havens.

The dissolution of the feudal states into much larger nation-states left micro-states which share western European culture, and whose protector states (large nation-states) tolerate some deviance on their part from the normal rules of the modern state in matters such as gambling, tax evasion by their own citizens and foreign tax exiles, and other micro-tourism businesses (such as the printing of stamps) in exchange for not providing protection for criminals coming from the large state (as used to be the case in Monaco) and supporting the policies of their neighbouring protectors. The legitimacy of these micro-states is not based on any ethnic or cultural specificity or identity, it is a result of a long history of independence and a lack of strategic importance in geographical terms.

And in terms of international organised crime, these small and micro-states – among which we may include Switzerland – do not constitute a threat to the area of Europe under examination. 2.2. Decolonisation as a context for the formation of small and micro-states

Against the colonial background, in the 1950s and 60s such states were typically the result of the division of colonies between France and Britain when one colonial power intruded in an area dominated by the other. This was the case with the Gambia, a small British colony wedged into Senegal. The former German colony of Togo was carved up between English-speaking Ghana and French-speaking Togo proper. The former British colony of Singapore was attached to the federation of Malaysia before gaining its independence in 1965. The former Portuguese colony of East Timor was separate from the rest of the island, once a Dutch possession and then (and now) part of Indonesia. Most of these states gained independence for a mixture of reasons. The first is the sphere of influence to which they belonged. The second ethnic specificity: Mandingo and Fula in the Gambia; Kabré and Ewe in Togo (De Agostini 2008); Chinese in Singapore. The third is religion: East Timor is a Catholic enclave on a Muslim island.

Island states in the Caribbean and Oceania are another product of the end of colonial rule. Some of these islands had been occupied by France, but most by Britain, on the principle that it was better to occupy them than leave them to colonial rivals. The Caribbean populations in question are mostly Afro-Caribbean with economic – rather than political – elites of European origin who have made many of the states tax havens. Most of the island states in Oceania have a mainly indigenous population and a constitutional monarchy, and are characterised by large-scale emigration to Australia and New Zealand. They are very remote and of little strategic importance; being of little interest they act as places to escape to, but as such generally develop a strong hold on immigrants. The mainstay of their economies is money sent home by emigrants and attempts to turn them into tourist centres, as in the case of the Seychelles and other island groups in the Indian Ocean (Pollard 1966; Briguglio et al. 2006; CARICOM 1999).

2.3. The formation of small and micro-states from imperial disintegration

These states are the result of a disappointment, that is to say of the failure of empires to turn them-selves into federations or at least confederations of states, and thus of the failure to give a national re-

Scenarios of governance in Mediterranean failed states, small states and micro-states….. 7

sponse to the populations making up those empires. It was the very rise of the idea of the nation-state, characterising the 18th and 19th centuries, that gave peoples the ambition of statehood, and to achieve that end it exalted to the utmost the “native characteristics” of every population and built around them the features of an ethnic group (Gasparini 1997). The state becomes an ethnic state because it is too small to be a “normal” one easily able to bear the costs of statehood. Under these circumstances ethnic identity is a powerful ideological resource for the legitimisation among the people of the sacrifices required of them to bear the costs of statehood.

In addition to the spawning of such expensive small states there is the fact that each ethnicised nation was scattered over the empire, varying between centres of high density in one place and a low concentration elsewhere. As a result, the state born from the ashes of the old empire is always smaller than the nation it represents. In political terms there is a small state that manages (or tries to) a larger nation, which engenders another difficulty for the small new state in the ideological construction of a great nation. In the Balkan-Danube area, therefore, the small Serbian state creates expectations of a greater Serbia, the small Albanian state of a greater Albania, the small Croatian state of a greater Croatia, and so on.

As a result, the difficulties in the domestic running of the small state are compounded by squabbling between neighbouring states and instability in relations with bordering states.

All this happened with the collapse of Danish power and the consequent formation of the small states of Sweden, Norway, present-day Denmark, Iceland and perhaps Greenland in the future. And it happened subsequently with the dissolution of the power of the Teutonic knights and the birth of the states of Prussia, Lithuania and Courland, and then Latvia and Estonia. In more recent times new small states have been produced by the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and the Yugoslav and Soviet federations, with long and violent periods of reorganisation which have made the area from the eastern shore of the Adriatic to the western shore of the Caspian Sea unstable and vulnerable to hotbeds of anti-state power.

Specifically, the gradual crumbling of the Ottoman empire spawned the small states of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Bulgaria. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire begat the small states of Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary and the larger ones of Romania and Yugoslavia. The dissolution of the USSR led to the formation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, followed by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, with the self-proclamation of others such as Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Even more violent has been the break-up of Yugoslavia and the formation of the small states of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the danger that the last of these may further divide into three more.

The difficulties facing these Balkan-Danube states in being “normal”, and in being able to support themselves, are even greater than the problems of those who resort to specialising in specific products or functions (including that of tax havens) and emphasising the ethnic component of their legitimising ideology. Such resources are insufficient, given that the states in question are in the aftermath of civil wars and may be subjected to international embargoes. Some of them therefore resort to organised crime, or at least give it their backing, in order to support themselves. They may thus facilitate, or at least turn a blind eye to, human trafficking, drug and arms trafficking (see ISIG 2001; ISIG 2002a), corruption and other forms of organised crime. This is particularly rife in Montenegro, Kossovo and Transnistria. Serbia also made recourse to such means of survival when it was placed under international embargo.

2.4. The weaknesses of small and micro-states

The abundant literature on the weaknesses of (above all) micro-states focuses on a number of factors (Gasparini 1994; Reid 1974; Nosella 2008; Harden 1985; Kohr 1973; Taylor 1969). In their 61st meeting, held in Washington on April 17th 2000, the World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat issued a Final Statement which identified eight characteristics of small and micro-states as development challenges. They are as follows (World Bank 2000: II, III; World Bank 2004). 1) Distance and isolation. This applies above all to island states, given that transport costs make it

difficult for them to enter world markets. The situation is compounded by the small size of their domestic markets.

Alberto Gasparini 8

2) Openness. Openness to the outside world brings benefits, but small economies are heavily exposed to the vagaries of global markets and developments in trading practices, over which they have little or no influence.

3) Susceptibility to natural disasters and climate change. These islands (in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Caribbean) are highly prone to hurricanes and typhoons, not to mention earthquakes, which affect their entire populations and local economies.

4) The scant diversification of their production and exports, a consequence of their small size. 5) Poverty levels. These tend to be higher and income distribution more unequal in small countries than

in larger ones, since there is less room for levelling. Poverty is thus a chronic problem and emigration rates are high.

6) The limited capacity of the public sector to provide goods and services, compounded by the fact that public sectors in these states tend to be larger than in more developed countries. Private sectors also display less diversification and internal competition than are required for successful development.

7) Income instability. When incomes and growth rates are similar in small and large states, the former are subject to greater costs and greater inequalities.

8) Access to foreign capital is crucial to small countries, but the private markets consider investment in small states to be a riskier proposition than investment in larger states. These indications provided by the World Bank add up to a web of factors producing the economic

weakness of small and micro-states. Yet it is possible to point to a potentially positive factor for small states, and micro-states in particular. It is to be found in globalisation. 2.5. Globalisation for small and micro-states

The weaknesses identified by the World Bank concern isolated states, the islands in Oceania and the Caribbean, and small states with low levels of modernity and economic development. Such states are also in direct or almost direct contact with other countries marked by traditional societies and economies. Under such circumstances globalisation can result in further marginalisation.

But the impact of globalisation on these states is not always harmful. In many cases a small (or even micro-) state may benefit by being able to put itself at the centre of a specialised role which is usually not available to medium-large states (Schumaker 1978; Riain 2000).

Medium-large states are unlikely to specialise radically in a single product or function because they have to pay close attention to the distribution of wealth in their societies and encourage a range of functions (tourism, industry, services, etc.) There are plentiful examples of successful small states, and such success stories are based on globalisation, that is to say on their worldwide attractiveness. Singapore is an exemplary case of how a strategic location, a trading tradition, a highly developed work ethic (predominantly Chinese in origin) and a society built around this function can produce wealth and a central position for a state and its society (Bonazzi 1996). Dubai has been able to create for itself and specialise in a managerial, financial, administrative and university (Knowledge Village) function serving not only the other United Arab Emirates but the rest of the world too. A medium-large state would not have been able to do this. The Maldive Islands and the Seychelles have been able to turn themselves into tourist attractions available all year round for people coming from countries with a temperate climate. To a lesser extent, even Nepal has opened up to the outside world through tourism (Novak 2007).

These examples show that globalisation can generate a worldwide centrality for countries with much simpler societies and economies than the larger states. This simplicity is even more marked in countries like the United Arab Emirates, because almost the entire society is concentrated in the medium-high income bracket. Such poor groups as there are do not enjoy citizenship, being made up of foreign workers who enter the country to work for a local company to which they hand over their passports until the expiry of their contracts, at which point they return home.

To sum up, the path of inclusion in the globalisation process seems to be the pathway to the situation enjoyed by the small and micro-states in Europe, particularly those which have had centuries of statehood.


2.6. The situation of the Adriatic states and those of the central-eastern Mediterranean

The Adriatic is a large gulf in the Mediterranean, acting as a centre of gravity for no fewer than eleven countries – more new ones than old (Italy, San Marino, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia and Greece). To these we may add eight states from the eastern Mediterranean (Malta, Egypt, Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Cyprus and Turkey) and the same number from the extension of the Mediterranean into the Black Sea (Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Transnistria (self-proclaimed), Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and Armenia). This makes a total of twenty-seven states, or would-be states, of which the majority have the surface area and population of a small state (fourteen: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Albania, Macedo-nia, Greece, Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Georgia and Armenia) or a micro-state (four: San Marino, Malta, Cyprus and Transnistria).

The majority of these small and micro-states are also of very recent constitution. Eleven arose out of the collapse of Communism (in 1991, 1995, 2005 and 2008), others from the end of the Second World War (Cyprus, Malta, Palestine and Israel) and two others from the break-up of the Ottoman empire (Lebanon and Albania). Which leaves only San Marino as a state with centuries of independence, left untouched even by the Papal States and the recurrent geo-strategic initiatives of Napoleon.

It may be concluded that such small and micro-states are prevalent in the region, with all the above-mentioned attendant problems, and that most of them have yet to consolidate and find internal legitimacy for their state structure. This leads to instability in that state structure and difficulty in configuring themselves as normal states in the sense defined above. This has to be taken into account in the identification of the present scenario and in building scenarios for the future. 3. Failed states

Successful states are usually those in which social groups are integrated, the state organisation is at the

service of the whole population and all the social groups of the state and citizens recognise the state’s legitimate role in managing the community. It might also be added that a state is more likely to succeed when it has devised a way of integrating the society represented by the nation, since it requires a strong cohesive force of belonging to a territory, a feeling which is given over time to a social group called a tribe, ethnic group or some other name, configured as indigenous. At the same time the nation represents a resource allowing for demands for sacrifice for the state (homeland) and as a source of identity and defence against those who belong to other nation-states.

If this does not happen, a state fails to achieve its aims, it is not supported by the whole of society and it tends to become known as a failed state. There are a number of factors which make a state likely to fail. Below we shall consider twelve groups of indicators, but at this juncture we may look at some which are related to the origin of the state, how it was formed, its ethnic structure and its social stratification. A deeper understanding of these factors will explain why a failed state will try to stay alive come what may, resorting to any means, legal or otherwise, under its own law and international law.

The first reason – a very common one – why a state fails derives from the origins of the state itself. A colonial power may for its own reasons decide what to include in, or exclude from, a state. Such decisions are often geo-strategic, in which case a border is drawn according to whether border defensibility or resources are desired in one state or another. Clearly such cases may subsequently lead to ethnic disputes, since parts of ethnic groups may be included in or excluded from the state and undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of some of its inhabitants. This in turn leads to the replacement of democracy and consensus with strong organised power groups, the first of which is the army (which often makes and unmakes gov-ernments and dictators). This is exemplified by a number of African countries, which had no experience of statehood before colonisation, only a community-based political and social organisation.

The second reason, also connected to origins, is the ethnic-religious purity desired for a state or for an artificial ethnic-religious heterogeneity. Such purity was pursued in the partition of the Indian sub-continent into India and Pakistan, resulting the large-scale uprooting and movement of millions of people from their homeland and, in Pakistan, the promotion of the army to legitimate guardian of the state and a

Alberto Gasparini 10

national aspiration to the purity of Wahabi Islam, developed and practised in Saudi Arabia. This combination of factors has not produced the development of a viable state in Pakistan, as a result of which in the long term it has failed. Other examples of ethnic purity preventing new states from becoming normal, indeed characterising their complete failure, are to be found in the Balkans. Bosnia and Serbia have been shown to have failed to the extent of 74.3% and 71.3% respectively – the calculation of these percentages will be explained below. The construction of a state on the basis of heterogeneity can also make it likely to fail, as illustrated by the case of Moldavia/Moldova. Stalin created it by putting together the Romanians of Bessarabia and the Russian-speakers and Ukrainians in Transnistria. After the collapse of communism, the attempt to turn the Soviet republic of Moldavia into the republic of Moldova produced a radical split in the state, which remains a long way from reunification (ISIG 2002a; ISIG 2002b; Bregantini 2004).

The third factor leading to failure from origins is the level of conflict from which the new state emerges. The new Balkan states are emblematic in this regard. They were born of violence, of the attempt by one ethnic group to overpower another or others. In such cases conflict ceases when ethnic purity is achieved or when it is realised that neither of the parties to the conflict is able to win. And the cessation of hostilities is brought about by the intervention of international peace-keeping forces through which international organisations then attempt to launch a peace-building process leading to the construction of a new normal state, if possible less of a failure than its predecessor (Gasparini, Radojkovic 1994).

The fourth factor stems from the idea that a state must coincide with a nation – the synthesis of a people's long common history, a single culture, a language perfected in explicit rules by a literary elite, and the perception of being the repository of a native ethos expressed by an ethnic group which has become a nation. This produces the emergence of small or micro-states which struggle to achieve economic and cultural autonomy, partly because of the costs involved. Under such conditions the state is less of a state, and has to reinforce its identity by measures which are very costly to its citizens. It is thus likely to fail because in order to preserve its normality it has either to “sell out” its sovereignty to an external power or support itself by recourse at an international level to actions typical of non-legal states, such as organised crime. Looking at the Mediterranean-Black Sea region, we may observe that of the thirty-five states on these seas or gravitating around them no fewer than fourteen are small (less than 100,000 square kilometres) and six are micro-states. Of the remaining fifteen, four are medium-small (Tu-nisia, Syria, Greece and Bulgaria), six are of medium size (Morocco, Ukraine, Romania, Italy, France and Spain), one is medium-large (Turkey) and four are large or very large (Algeria, Lybia, Egypt and Russia).

The fifth reason takes effect when a state is composed of citizens belonging to a single (high) social class with the lower classes acting as their neo-slaves, in the modern form of foreign workers admitted on the basis of a work contract at the end of which they return home. This configuration is similar to that of an ancient Greek city-state, with the difference that in the modern world a state is very unlikely to be composed of a single social class. It represents a temptation in countries subject to sudden waves of im-migration, but the immigrants are usually integrated gradually into the mainstream. It remains a temp-tation for certain political circles in Italy. But it is a reality in a number of Arab countries where economic forces have suddenly turned the state from a Bedouin society into one that has to manage oil revenues. In this regard the United Arab Emirates stands as an example of a situation that can easily lead to failure.

The sixth factor regards states born out of political entities which have not developed a sense of unity but find themselves united simply by virtue of shared language and culture. In this case political union in a state is very weak and may fall victim to creeping failure, at least in the first centuries of political unity. A striking example is Italy, which rapidly passed from being a “geographical expression” (to quote Metternich) to statehood. Italy thus equipped itself with highly centralised power to prevent failure, being threatened as it was by brigandry, by the upheaval of the latter part of the Second World War and later by Miglio’s repeated demands for radical autonomy and declared secession, and various assertions of radical federalism (Gasparini 1999). 3.1. The failed states index

The Failed States Index is published annually by the Fund for Peace 1. Applied to 177 formally

independent countries, it comprises 12 indicators, each of which is given a value from 0 to 10. The


maximum actual failure currently stands at 113.7 (out of 120) and is held by Sudan. The current minimum of 17.1 applies to Norway.

The twelve indicators cover three dimensions: society (four indicators), the economy (two) and political structures (six). The indicators are as follows:

(social): 1. Mounting Demographic Pressures2 2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian

Emergencies 3 3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia 4 4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight 5

(economic): 5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines 6 6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline 7

(political-institutional): 7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State 8 8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services 9 9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights 10 10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State”11 11. Rise of Factionalized Elites 12 12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors 13.

What is the weight of each of these indicators on the definition of a failed state? An attempt to answer

this question will look at the weight of 8 and above out of 10 in the indicators of the 57 countries with the highest scores in the Index (from 113.7 to 82.8). The reason for this procedure is that the higher the number of weights of 8 or more for each indicator, the greater the preponderance of that indicator over the others. The computation of the numbers of such weights produces the following results:

number of scores: Type of indicator: 8 9 10 Total % scores 8-9-10: (total: 57countries x 100) 7. Pol.: Criminalization of the state 27 20 4 51 89.5% 11. Pol.: Rise of factionalized élites 21 19 4 44 77.2% 1. Soc.: Demographic pressures 23 18 1 42 73.7% 5. Ec.: Uneven economic development 18 23 - 41 71.9% 10. Pol.: State within a state 18 12 6 36 63.2% 8. Pol.: Deterioration of public services 19 14 2 35 61.4% 9. Pol.: Violation of human rights 15 11 6 32 56.1% 6. Ec.: Sharp and/or severe economic decline 23 5 2 30 52.6% 3. Soc.: Intergroup hatred 11 13 4 28 49.1% 2. Soc.: Displaced p. and refugees 9 12 1 22 38.6% 4. Soc.: Brain drain 17 4 - 21 36.8% 12. Pol.: Intervention of other states 7 7 7 21 36.8% Total 208 158 37 403 58.9% Average 17,3 13,2 3,1 33,6 58.9%

The indicators selected according to the weights (scores) of 8 or more of the 57 most failed states form a very clear sequence. In almost ninety percent of cases (89.5%) failure coincides with the crimin-alisation and/or delegitimisation of the state. What does this criminalisation entail? A state is criminalised and/or delegitimised when it is marked by widespread and endemic corruption or elite patronage, the refusal of the elite to accept accountability and political representation, a widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes (expressed by contested or boycotted elections, large-scale public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to conscription, armed revolt), and the growth of criminal gangs connected to the governing elite.


An indicator of 8 or more applying to about 80% of the most failed states (77.2% of the 57) is the emergence of sectarian elites. Such sectarianism is expressed by government elites and state institutions run by specific groups, and by the use of nationalistic political rhetoric on the part of the governing elite, often in terms of common irredentism (“greater Serbia”) or common solidarity (ethnic cleansing or defence of the faith).

Other indicators of a social and economic nature have scores of 8 or more in over 70% of the 57 most failed states. These are growing demographic pressure on available resources (73.7%) and unbalanced economic development in favour of particular groups (71.9%). The remaining indicators display a de-creasing frequency of high weights (8 or more) among the 57 countries, but remain related to the social, economic and political factors outlined above.

The last point here is that of the 57 most failed states of the 177 examined, there are twelve which score eight or more out of ten in all twelve indicators. Most of them (eight) are in Africa (in descending order: Sudan, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea and the Central African Republic), three are in Asia (Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan) and one is in the Caribbean (Haiti). It may be observed that most of these countries, in Africa and Asia alike, form regions of contiguous countries – one in Africa with Sudan as its epicentre, the other in the region of Asia torn by civil and international wars. 3.2. The characteristics of failed states in the Mediterranean region

On or around the Mediterranean Sea are 35 countries. The maximum failure score goes to Lebanon (92.4), but the majority of the countries on its African and Asian shores, on the Black Sea and in the Balkans are not far behind. By contrast, the countries on the European shore to the north have relatively low scores: France is at 34.1, Italy 37.1 and Spain 39.2, to which are added countries such as Slovenia (37.5), Greece (43.5), Hungary (51.2) and Montenegro (55.6).

Table 1 provides an illustration of the scores for the twelve indicators registered for each country. Those most prevalent in contributing to failure are: unbalanced economic development in favour of particular groups (No. 5, affecting 18 of the 31 Mediterranean countries examined), the criminalisation or delegitimisation of the state (No. 7, 16 countries), hatred between opposing groups and factions (No. 3, 12 countries), the advent of factious elites (No. 11, 11 countries) and humanitarian emergencies caused by domestic evacuees or refugees (No. 2, 10 countries). By contrast, the least frequent failure indicators are: the deterioration of public services (No. 8, in no countries), projected demographic expansion (No. 1, one country), security services operating as a state within the state (No. 10, 2 countries), rapid and/or serious economic decline (No. 6, in 3 out of the 31 Mediterranean countries).

It may be seen that the main reasons for failure seem to be acute class differences, state crime, hatred between social groups and large population movements within countries. Little damage appears to be done by factors which are negative but undifferentiated (that is to say affecting the whole population) across a country.

Looking at the highest weights (eight or more out of ten), we may add that states fail above all in the presence of factious elites (in seven cases), hatred between opposed groups or factions (five), humanitarian emergencies involving evacuees, suspension of the rule of law and violations of human rights, and interven-tions by other states (four cases for each of the last three indicators). If these are the indicators which denote failed states, it is clear that the higher their concentration, the greater the degree of a state’s failure. On this basis we may observe that Lebanon and Syria are the most failed states, since they have the greatest weight (≥ 8) in five indicators; they are followed by Egypt, Russia and Cyprus with the greatest weight in three indicators; Libya and Serbia have the greatest weight in two; with the greatest weight in one indicator (see ISIG 2002a; ISIG 2002b; Bregantini 2004) are Israel (hatred between groups, see Kallas 1996), Turkey (un-balanced economic development) Georgia (foreign intervention) and Moldova (emigration and brain-drain).

This is neither the time nor the place for further discussion of the reasons why these eleven states in various ways configure high levels (also differentiated) of failure. Suffice it to say that Lebanon and Syria, for instance, are marked by violent conflicts between their component groups and by the delegitimisation of the state by organisations acting as a state within the state. And in the other nine states there are clearly identifiable factors which prevent the achievement of consensus among the groups and resident populations in them.

Table 1 – Index of failed states in the Mediterranean region Mean score of each indicator:

Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Italy + 37.1 3.6 3.5 3.5 3 4.5 3.8 3.7 2 1.8 2.5 3.2 2 France + 34.1 4.1 3.6 5.8 2 4.8 2.9 1.5 1.4 3.2 1 1.8 2 Spain + 39.2 3.7 1.8 5.7 1.6 5 3.4 1.4 1.9 2.8 4.3 5.6 2 Morocco + 7.6 6.6 7.5 6.8 6.2 7.3 6.6 7.8 6 6.6 5.2 5.4 4 Algeria +++ 75.9 6.1 6.7 7 5.6 7.3 3.5 7.3 7 7.4 6.4 5.9 5.7 Tunisia + - 65.6 5.6 3.4 5.1 5.1 7.4 4.3 6.4 5.9 7.3 5.9 6.2 3 Libya +++ 69.3 6.2 2.6 5.6 4 7.3 5.3 7.4 4.5 8.1 5.3 8 5 Malta - - 48.5 3.8 6.1 3.9 4.8 4.5 3.5 4.5 3.3 3.5 4.5 1.6 4.5 Egypt +++ 89.2 7.7 6.5 7.8 6.2 7.8 7 9 6.7 8.5 6.1 8.3 7.6 Palestine-Israel - 79.6 7 7.9 9 3.5 6.9 3.7 7.3 7 7.4 5.3 7.2 7.4 Lebanon - 92.4 6.9 8.6 9 7 7.1 6.3 7.3 6.4 7 9 8.8 9 Jordan - 76.6 6.2 6.8 6.5 5 7.7 6.6 6.2 5.6 6.2 6.4 6.5 6.9 Syria + - 88.6 6.5 8.9 8 6.8 8.1 6.8 8.5 5.3 8.5 7.4 7.5 6.3 Cyprus - - 70.2 5.1 4.2 8.3 5.7 7.5 4.8 5.5 3.8 3.5 4.2 8.4 9.2 Turkey ++ 74.9 6.9 5.8 7.4 5 8.7 4.7 6.1 5.4 5.1 6.7 7.1 6 Armenia - 70.3 6.8 7.6 5 6.9 6 5 6.5 6.2 5.5 4.5 5.8 5.5 Georgia - 82.3 6.3 6.8 7.6 5.7 7 5.7 7.9 6.1 5.4 7.8 7.8 8.2 Russia +++ 81.2 7.5 5.9 7.7 6.5 8.2 3.9 7.6 6.2 8.5 6.8 8.5 3.9 Ukraine + 71.4 6.5 3.6 7 7.5 7 5 7.5 4.5 5.9 3 7.9 6 Moldova - 85.7 7 4.7 7.3 8.4 7.5 7.5 7.9 7.1 6.8 6.3 7.5 7.7 Rumania + 60.9 5.5 3.8 5.2 5.2 6.1 5.7 6.1 5.2 4.8 3.4 4.5 5.4 Bulgaria + - 60.3 5.4 4.1 4.2 5.9 6.2 4.3 5.7 5 4.7 5.4 3.9 5.5 Greece + - 43.5 4.7 2 3.5 5.4 5 3.5 4 3.1 3.9 3.1 1.6 3.7 Albania - 70.5 6.5 2.7 5.4 7.5 6.1 6.8 7.4 6.2 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.6 Macedonia - 74.1 5.4 4.7 7.1 7 7.4 5.9 7.3 5.1 5.3 6.1 6.4 6.4 Serbia Kosovo - 81.1 6 8 7.7 5.5 7.7 6.5 7.5 5 6.1 6.3 8 6.8 Montenegro - 55.6 5.4 4.1 5.8 2.5 4.3 4 4.5 3.6 5.6 4.8 6 5 Bosnia Herz. - 84.5 6.1 8 8.3 6 7.2 6 7.6 5.6 5.3 7.3 8.3 8.8 Croatia - 60.5 5.3 6.5 6 5 5.7 5.7 4.2 4.1 4.5 3.9 3.9 5.7 Hungary - 51.2 3.7 3.6 3 5 6.3 4.1 6 3.8 4 2.1 5.5 4.1 Slovenia - 37.5 4 1.7 3.4 3.5 5.4 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.5 3 1.1 2 Max 1 10 12 6 18 3 16 - 8 2 11 8 Min - 11 2 7 - 4 2 11 3 7 6 5 Sudan (max) +++ 113.7 9.2 9.8 10 9 9.1 7.7 10 95 10 9.9 9.7 9.8 Norway (min) + 17.1 2 1.6 1 1.1 2 2.1 1 1.3 1.5 1 1 1.5 Legend: type of state: micro --, small -, medium-small +-, medium +, medium-large ++, large +++; index score by country: high: in bold; low: in italics


4. Scenarios of governance for the Balkan-Danube states with varying degrees of failure 4.1. Descriptive and predictive potential of scenarios

The scenario is a methodological tool which is highly versatile (Gasparini 2004a) because 1) it may be used to construct the extrapolation into the future of a present situation and to identify a desired normative future to be achieved by modifying the present situation; 2) it may be built using qualitative and quantitative techniques; 3) it may draw on objective data and opinions. A scenario may thus be expressed in discourse and by recourse to logical models and measurements.

Alongside this versatility a scenario comprises the most scientific conception of prediction. It includes the reconstruction of the current situation (present scenario) and the construction of possible situations in desired conditions in the short-term, medium-term and long-term future. In general terms a scenario entails the reconstruction of a present scenario and the construction of a future scenario. But the most important thing, what makes the scenario useful, if not indispensable, is that the two scenarios (present and future) are linked by a process within which a strategy (or several strategies) of action is elaborated to enable a future scenario to be achieved through a system of actions performed on the present scenario.

A scenario is therefore composed of three essential parts. Science lies at the basis of the definition of the initial situation, since it explains the relations between the variables making up the initial and present situation of a phenomenon, and it plays a part in the sequence of actions (the process) which enable the present scenario to evolve into the extrapolative and/or normative future scenario.

The three components of scenario-building are thus the present scenario, the future scenario and the process of actions which provide for passage from the present to the future scenario.

The complex exercise of scenario-building is now going to be applied to the Balkan, Danube and eastern countries in Europe which emerged from communism just over fifteen years ago, particularly from the break-up of the Soviet Union and Titoist Yugoslavia. The scenarios will be centred on the negative features which may arise in a state and characterise it as failed. These are above all organised crime, the criminalisation of broad areas of private life, corruption and the use of criminal practices in the public sector.

Cutting across the three parts of scenario-building (present scenario, future scenario, process of actions between the two) is an equal number of operations to be carried out: 1) describing the situation, 2) identifying the actors, 3) specifying the actions.

The present scenario has to be described in a situation, the future scenario is made up of a situation desired or obtained through projection, and the intermediate process of actions produces a sequence of situations in constant change, moving progressively (if all goes well) towards the desired future situation.

The same applies to the actors. They are the ones who dominate the present scenario, those who happen to do so in the future scenario, and above all those who manage the strategies and actions involved in the transformation.

Lastly, in all three parts there are actions. In the present scenario they are indicated in the causal relations between the components of the current situation (see Gasparini 2004b), in the future scenario they are indicated in the (new or stable) causal relations between the components of the situation desired or obtained. While the actions of the two scenarios (present and future) keep the situation stable, however, in the process connecting the present scenario to the future scenario actions are designed to produce change of the situation at time t0 (present scenario) into the situation at time t1 (desired and possible future scenario). These take the form of policies and checks which describe the strategies for change. The actions themselves may be subjected to changes, attenuation or reinforcement at various times during the above-mentioned process. An action initially deemed necessary may evolve into something different or even be replaced altogether. As will become clear, one effective technique for studying and developing the strategies and actions in the process is known as SWOT analysis.

To conclude these remarks on the procedure of and justification for the scenario-building method used to analyse the Balkan and Danube countries, it has to be said that while there should be only one present scenario, the future scenario is a desired hypothesis, so it may be necessary to express it in a number of hypotheses – a clearly positive one (ideal scenario), a clearly negative one (catastrophic scenario) and an intermediate one involving positive and negative features (realistic scenario).


4.2. The present failed state scenario

We shall now attempt to identify the situation, the actors and possible actions in the Adriatic and Danube states, according to their degree of failure. 4.2.1. The situation in the present scenario

Two major events have characterised the Balkan-Danube region and south-eastern Europe. The first is the fall of communism and the consequent liberation of resources no longer held together by communist ideology, now orientated towards the assertion of the nation and the ethnic group. The second – more important – event is the break-up of two federative bodies, the Soviet Union and socialist Yugoslavia.

In addition to the regaining of independence for the former states which had made up the Soviet Union, one by-product of the break-up of the Soviet empire was demands for independence made by regions within the new states. The most striking case was the proclamation of independence from Moldova by Transnistria, but similar demands have been made by South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and by Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Chechnya in Russia. These situations have produced a high level of conflict within the states and represent a threat to the integration of Moldova, Georgia and even Russia. Apart from an obvious refusal to countenance any discussion of their territorial integrity, the governments in question have reacted strongly against such demands to prevent other small entities trying to follow suit and claim independence for themselves (Various Authors 1994; Bestuzhev-Lada, Bregantini 1995).

The areas proclaiming their independence are characterised by 1) a form of integration radically different from that prevalent in the rest of the state (Russian-speaking in the case of Transnistria, indigenous in the other cases), 2) a system of self-support closely connected to illegal international commerce (drugs, prostitution, children-trafficking) but also to the presence of foreign soldiers and peace-keepers which generates an economy centred on hotels, catering, services for foreigners and prostitution, 3) development which is socially highly unbalanced and based mostly on corruption.

The break-up of Titoist Yugoslavia produced processes similar to those just described, but more acute, more violent, with the progressive formation of ever-smaller states and on the basis of ethnic groups which have grown increasingly into nations. The federation first split into the old republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Macedonia, which was followed by the ethnic cleansing pursued by Croatia and in turn by the three components of Bosnia, after which Serbia was partly dismembered by the breakaway of Montenegro and Kosovo.

In more general terms the break-up of Yugoslavia was followed by a sequence of situations which favoured the formation of failed states. 1) Many states have taken on a markedly ragged form: Montenegro, Kosovo, three-headed Bosnia. Each

of these would like, or is attempting to, include within it the greatest possible number of members of its ethnic group but is unable to, so in the face of the idea of the greater nation the state remains small. But what happens when “the small have dreams of greatness” (Gasparini 1994)? This is often the beginning of instability, domestically and in international relations.

2) The economy is heavily doped by the presence of foreign troops and international experts, particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo.

3) The western (and UN) economic sanctions imposed in the past produced a state economy which resorted to illegal practices to procure food, fuel and weapons, becoming active in the trafficking of drugs and arms. This happened in Milosevic’s Serbia and the consequences have remained since his departure, especially the state’s weakness against organised crime.

4) Even without an economic embargo, but desirous of making itself an independent state, a small country like Montenegro has resorted to organised smuggling rings.

5) The ethnicisation of states has resulted in the division of the former Yugoslavia into a number of small states, following a 19th-century ideology which rested on the native identity of the ethnic group. This pro-cess of disintegration may also not be confined to the present situation – might something similar happen with Vojvodina in present-day Serbia? Could the disintegration surrounding Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the birth of Montenegro, Kosovo and Transnistria, drive its three component groups – Serbs, Croats and Bosnians – to proclaim their own independence? Could the Albanians in present-day Macedonia demand independence or, better still, union with their Albanian homeland? The answer to these questions may be

Table 2 – Indicator weights, by country and by single indicators

Balkan-Adriatic countries Danube countries Mediterranean countries

BiH SRB MK AL CRO MNE GR SLO I MD TR RO BG CY M Mean score: 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 3 3 7 6 5 5 6 4

Social indicator: 1 6 6 5 6.5 5 5 5 4 4 7 7 5.5 5 5 4 2 8 8 5 3 6.5 4 2 2 3.5 5 6 4 4 4 6 3 8 8 7 5 6 6 3.5 3 3.5 7 7 5 4 8 4 4 6 5.5 7 7.5 5 2.5 5 3.5 3 8 5 5 6 6 5

Economic indicator: 5 7 8 7 6 6 4 5 5 4.5 7.5 9 6 6 7.5 4.5 6 6 6.5 6 7 6 4 3.5 3 4 7.5 5 6 4 5 3.5

Political indicator: 7 8 7.5 7 7 4 4.5 4 3 4 8 6 6 6 5 4.5 8 6 5 5 6 4 4 3 3.5 2 7 5 5 5 4 3 9 5 6 5 5 4.5 6 4 3.5 2 7 5 5 5 3.5 3.5

10 7 6 6 5.5 4 5 3 3 2.5 6 7 3 5 4 4.5 11 8 8 6 5 4 6 2 1 3 7.5 7 4.5 4 8 2 12 9 7 6 6 6 5 4 2 2 8 6 5 5.5 9 4.5

Weight = 6 4 4 4 4 5 3 -- -- -- 1 3 3 3 1 1 Weight = 7 2 2 4 3 -- -- -- -- -- 7 4 -- -- 1 -- Weight = 8-9 5 4 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3 1 -- -- 3 -- N. of weights ≥6 11 10 8 7 5 3 -- -- -- 11 8 3 3 5 1

Table 2 (continuation)

Black sea countries no. scores ≥ 6 UA RU GE AM Total of scores

≥ 6 Mean score: 6 7 7 6 6 7 8-9 (no.)

Social indicators: 1 6.5 7.5 6 6 6 3 -- 9 2 4 6 7 8 4 1 3 8 3 7 8 8 5 2 4 5 11 4 7.5 6.5 6 7 5 4 1 10

Economic indicators: 5 7 8 7 6 5 6 3 14 6 5 4 6 5 6 2 -- 8

Political indicators: 7 7.5 8 8 6.5 4 4 4 12 8 4.5 6 6 6.5 5 1 -- 6 9 6 8.5 5 5.5 3 1 1 5

10 3 7 8 4.5 3 3 1 7 11 8 8.5 8 6 3 2 6 11 12 6 4 8 5.5 5 1 4 10

Weights = 6 3 3 4 5 Weights = 7 4 2 2 1 Weights = 8-9 1 5 5 1 N. of weights ≥ 6 8 10 11 7 111

Alberto Gasparini

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negative, which in turn may be a limit to the formation of failed states, but the precedents of Kosovo and Transnistria may act as a stimulus for further disintegration in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union.

Now comes the matter of quantifying the failure levels of the nineteen countries – Balkan-Adriatic, Danube-Soviet and Mediterranean islands. As seen above, these data include twelve indicators, each of which is given a weight between 0 and 10 to indicate the degree of failure of a state. Obviously the failure degree becomes significant when the weight is 6 or more (out of 10), and highly significant when it is 8 or more.

Table 2 shows (ringed) the weights of 6 or more for each indicator, with those of 7, 8 and 9 also signal-led. It transpires that the most failed countries, with average weights of 7 or more, are Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia in the Balkans and Moldova, Russia and Georgia in the former Soviet Union. The situation is barely positive (weight ≥ 6) in terms of the degree of failure in Macedonia, Albania, Turkey, the Ukraine and Armenia. The remaining countries (eight) have a negative failure weight, with Slovenia and Italy (together with France and Spain) as highly negative.

Table 2 is even more instructive when we observe the weights of 8 or more for the single indicators. It thus transpires that Bosnia’s categorisation as a failed state is due particularly to social indicators such as the humanitarian emergency stemming from evacuees and refugees in the country (weight 8) and hatred between ethnic groups (8), but also the advent of factious elites (8) and the intervention of foreign states and international organisations (9). These factors are well known. The other Balkan country, Serbia, is characterised by the social problems of evacuees and refugees (8) and hatred between opposing groups (8), but also by economic factors such as socially unbalanced economic development (8) and the political factor of divisive elites.

The characteristics of failure are substantially the same in the former Soviet empire. The question of Transnistria has brought international forces into Moldova (8), which is also afflicted by the criminalisation of the state (8) and above all sustained emigration and a brain-drain (8). Georgia has had to deal with foreign intervention and the presence of international forces (8), factious elites in power (8), security services operating as a state within the state (8), economic imbalances between social groups (8) and hatred between opposing groups and factions (8). Russia's characteristics of failure are similar, with the difference that it has had no foreign intervention (4), but more serious human rights violations (8.5).

The situations thus described are very close to the reality experienced by these former communist countries in terms of the formation of new classes in the transition from communism to capitalism (Del Bianco, Sterpini 2007), the collapse of the original state, the acute hostility between ethnic and/or religious groups, the brain-drain and so on.

Behind these countries with a high weight of failure (8 or more out 10) are others experiencing similar situations but with lower scores, that is to say with a prevalence of 7. They are Macedonia and Albania in the Balkans, and Turkey, the Ukraine and Armenia in the Black Sea area.

We may conclude from this that there is a thread of instability and countries tending to fail, running from southern Italy and the strength of Mafia organisations to the Balkans, with Albania, Bosnia and Serbia, which are connected through Romania to Moldova/Transnistria, the Ukraine, Caucasian Russia, Georgia and Armenia. Along this thread is a mix of organised crime, social conflict between groups and oligarchs, security services configured as states within the state and the emigration of elites.

It is clear from the above that policy decisions will be required to effect the change from this present scenario in the future, as is also pointed out in Xavier Solana’s paper. And the growing tendency of states to fail, characterised by a weakening of the state and social structures (Vacca 2004: 273), is confirmed by events in the “integrated” area running from southern Italy to the Caucasus. 3 4 5 6 7 0 1,00

GR

MN

E

BG

C

RO

RO

MK TR

SLO I

AM

A

L

UA

MD

BiH

SRB

R

U

Scenarios of governance in failed states, small states and micro-states…

19

4.2.2. Actors in the present scenario

The are a great many actors in the present scenario, considered from the standpoint of insecurity and state weakness, who expose states to international organised crime. The following are the most significant. 1) Political elites. For the most part they have been decanted from the old state to the new, from communist

regimes to liberal democratic systems. They wish to stay in power after the collapse of the old regime but at the same time have a sincere desire to build a new legality. They are highly adaptable to change but have little experience of it, so the change attempted is more often an interpretation than a real knowledge of the mechanisms involved or how to predict the consequences of their interpretations.

2) Public administrations and civil servants. This category is a particularly frustrated actor, because they have seen the absolute power they enjoyed under the communist regimes diminished by new local administrations and they are compelled to share what power they have in the interests of accountability. In the light of a new elitist and centralised vision, this frustration is harmful to the construction of a new society centred on the inclusion of the population in social responsibility. This actor will therefore take a long time to change – at least the time required for the present civil servants to retire.

3) New entrepreneurs. The new post-communist society is founded upon privatisation and the construction of a market economy, two tasks which have to be improvised from scratch and cannot be completed in a short time – the vast literature on this subject includes the edition of Futuribili (No. 3/2007) devoted to transition. The new entrepreneurs thrown up by privatisation start out as pirates and become captains, under a mechanism of “received grace” for parts of what used to be publicly-owned companies, and within a process of social Darwinism by which the new entrepreneurs are selected. This social Darwinism (Gasparini 2007) results in the formation of companies owned by oligarchs, and the soul of their relational networks and the coin of trade in those relations is corruption. What is more, the new companies – unestablished and obtained on the basis of no real merit, hence “received grace” – feel the need not only to corrupt but to be protected (see Satarov), a service provided by Mafia organisations.

4) Organised crime. The above process gives rise to the proliferation of organisations modelled on the Mafia, engaged in systemically harmful protection and illegal activities connected with the trafficking of arms, drugs and illegal immigrants. By their very nature such organisations are anti- – the law, politics, enterprise, public administration – and appear in the worst cases of states within the state, where we have seen them in the discussion of the Failed States Index. Organised crime is rife in all the countries in the area under examination, and it is known to be deeply rooted in southern Italy in the form of the Camorra, the Sacra Corona Unita, the N’drangheta and the Sicilian Mafia.

5) The European Union and international organisations. The European Union attempts to draw individual post-communist countries into a new legality, by means of which it intends to check a country for its fitness to enter the Union and so allow it accession. The Union's financial and economic role is essential – EU projects and the INTAS programme are designed both for new entrants to the EU and its new neighbours. An important role is also (and has been) played by the international organisations, whether in the form of government agencies or NGOs. An important role has been (and is) played by UN peace-keeping and peace-building forces, the World Bank and the EBRD in financial matters, the OSCE in monitoring elections and NATO in armed interventions. Fostering the development of civil society and the monitoring of legality in individual countries is a role played above all by NGOs, to favour the weak-est social groups, to provide humanitarian aid in everyday life and to foster respect for human rights.

6) People, which does not mean the population but individuals. Far from being passive, lethargic and amorphous, individuals in these countries are highly active and know what they want – they have seen it on television broadcasts from Italy and elsewhere in the west and want to build it for themselves. They no longer have social capital in the sense of a system of connections and relational networks which they can use to fulfil themselves in the most appropriate way, but they still wish to emerge and create a new one (if necessary through corruption, clandestine immigration and illegal business activities).

We are thus dealing with individuals who 1) want to change lifestyle, come what may, and quickly (in a context of social anarchy); 2) are disillusioned with socialism and with homeland rhetoric which no longer makes any sense; 3) remain unmoved by any patriotic action (whether in the name of the for-mer Yugoslavia or the Soviet Socialist Republics of Moldavia, Georgia, Russia, Armenia or Ukraine);

Alberto Gasparini

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4) in globalisation see themselves in lifestyles and in local life see themselves in ethnic groups and their immediate homeland, which unhinges the old states and asserts new ones. Thus were born Montenegro and Kosovo, and in the not-too-distant future similar births may result from the break-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Russia and perhaps even the Ukraine; 5) perceive the opportunity of fulfilling themselves by means of the above-mentioned social Darwinism, but with no need for the state, or perhaps taking it over to pursue their own interests, so contributing to the privatisation of the state.

4.2.3. Actions in the present scenario

In the situation and with the actors described there are clearly many possible actions, but they are conflictual, and any convergence between them may be dangerous, precisely because they coordinate and reinforce the characteristics of failure outlined above.

The actions put into effect by the actors may thus be summarised in the following types. 1) The political elites act to achieve a legality in conformity with the criteria of the European Union,

founded on the development of policies favouring privatisation based on small businesses and thus with the maximum possible involvement of the general population.

2) The political elites are often sensitive to particular and interconnected economic elites and tend to support them in policy-making, thus facilitating the emergence of a few powerful oligarchies.

3) For the period in which the old rules no longer count but new ones are not yet tried and tested, the economic elites act in accordance with the principles of social Darwinism.

4) The European Union acts to create the conditions under which social Darwinism can be replaced as soon as possible by a new set of rules.

5) The criminal organisations in each country form connections, very often at an international level, because operations were carried out with a kind of division of labour whereby human trafficking, for instance (women, children, emigrants, gypsies), was organised with recruitment in the Balkan-Danube and former Soviet countries and placement in western countries such as Italy and Spain.

6) The individuals in these countries act to set up money-making activities, or at least those which will provide self-fulfilment, at home. If they do not succeed they shift such activities abroad through illegal migration and spread their relations with organised crime into the countries of arrival. The effects of the six types of action undertaken by the actors described will obviously vary according

to whether they remain isolated from one another or overlap and work in the same direction. In the former case domestic public policies in concert with international policies may limit and deal with the crime, even organised crime, perpetrated by private sectors of the state. By contrast, when social deviance and crime find practical or declared support in the public realm, the features of state failure become highly explicit, profound and durable. 4.3. Future scenarios for 2020 4.3.1. Introduction

In the introduction to future scenarios we have to describe the future to which we want to push the scenario, and also what scenarios it would be appropriate to make explicit, although they will have to be configured as targets to which prediction should be orientated.

The period which seems manageable for a sufficiently realistic prediction is ten years, so to translate it into terms of decades we may set the target year as 2020, twelve years from the time of writing.

Secondly, for a future scenario it is appropriate to describe what may happen in a range of hypotheses, which in this case we may translate into an extremely positive projection (ideal future scenario), an extremely negative projection (catastrophic future scenario) and an intermediate projection (realistic future scenario) – which we expect to be close to the ideal scenario. This is realistic, because the achieve-ment of the ideal scenario is often too costly (shock therapy) in terms of the sacrifices required of the population. It therefore becomes necessary to fall back on reality, that is to say on the realistic scenario as the result of a body of policies with different impacts on costs and gains.


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4.3.2. Ideal future scenario

In discursive terms this scenario is made up of the following factors. 1) These countries are integrated into the European Union, with the dissemination of its rules and an end

to social Darwinism with its highly personal interpretation of social rules. 2) Certain illegal actors have disappeared or are highly marginalised by a public which identifies with

the rules society has set itself. 3) Certain highly illegal practices have disappeared or are prosecuted and severely punished. 4) The small states sign cooperation agreements especially in border areas, creating Euroregions, EGTCs

or other forms of cross-border cooperation. The result is a decentralisation of the powers and offices of the public administration structure.

5) The small states strengthen their economies and political and military functions by establishing cooperation treaties between neighbouring states (as in the case of the Višegrad Agreement), or even confederations, in which the contracting parties retain their independence while undertaking to reinforce each others’ economies, defence forces and political decisions according to the principles of joint ventures or even coalitions.

6) Globalisation favours the invention and performance of original and specific functions on the part of the small states, if not the micro-states, in the Balkan-Danube area and on the Black Sea shore.

4.3.3. Catastrophic future scenario

In discursive terms this scenario centres on the following features. 1) The political state (if it still exists) is marked by the formation of criminal mini-states or organisations.

This is aggravated by the formation of a continuous operational thread from (Spain and) Italy to the Balkans, through the Black Sea region as far as the Caucasus, composed of weak, mostly failed states, permeated by organised crime.

2) The principal actors are illegal, and enjoy the support of legal public actors. 3) Their actions are consequently illegal. 4) Globalisation produces nothing but the subjection of small weak states to large strong ones. But it also

allows room to the creativeness and innovation of criminal organisations and the shadow states they manage to establish. The combination of legal state power and the Mafia-like family/organisation located in the state generates a central position for criminal innovation in the base country, from which it spreads outwards.

4.3.4. Realistic future scenario

As stated above, the ideal and catastrophic scenarios have been used as ideal types, which means that they do not come about but give an idea of what might theoretically happen in extreme cases if certain policies are pursued, or not pursued, to the fullest extent, and above all if the environment remains stable and there are no significant changes in the external context.

In point of fact what will come about in twelve years (in 2020) is something between the two extreme scenarios, or rather 1) the result of the actions undertaken by the actors indicated (with varying degrees of determination and intelligence), 2) corrected by, and better adapted to, outside forces, 3) allowed by the actions of the actors operating in other states or even internally, but who are competing between each other, 4) adjusted to suit the new situations that an internal or external catastrophe (a revolution, a war, a terrorist attack) may produce.

The realistic scenario is thus the product of actions and forces in continual flux, in interactive evolution. The question regarding actions and the processes they trigger is to find decision making and decision makers able to act, correct, adjust and rethink so as to achieve a scenario which is realistically as close as possible to the ideal future scenario. And that scenario is one of a normal state, a state able to support itself, to be socially and economically integrated, to have its objectives shared by all the people living in it, and to have the characteristics of a failed state at the lowest possible level.

The realistic future scenario is the product of the process which the actions and the decision makers who decide them succeed in launching and controlling in the twelve years between 2008 and 2020.

Alberto Gasparini

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4.4. The process

The process taking place between the present scenario and the future (2020) scenario is governed by a series of actions, decisions and corrections designed to reach the objective fixed for 2020.

To achieve these results a number of criteria have to be followed, of which we draw attention to the following. 1) Specification of causal relationships. This is important because a knowledge of the cause-and-effect

relationships between the variables describing the present scenario gives us sufficient confidence that intervening on an independent variable will produce a (desired) effect on a dependent variable, and consequently that the adoption of certain policies may produce results conducive to the achievement of the desired objectives (Gasparini 2004b).

2) The redefinition of the current situation (present scenario) in terms of SWOT variables – Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. The strengths and weaknesses (SW) are intrinsic to the situation under examination, and the opportunities and threats (OT) are external to it and regard the context. The strengths and opportunities (SO) are obviously positive, and it is towards their reinforce-ment that the policies involved in the process must aim. The weaknesses and threats (WT) are negative elements, and the policies adopted must aim to attenuate them. In a way SWOT variables are the tip of an iceberg in a broader situation containing non-SWOT variables which constitute a circle within which they are located and operate. The example provided below applies SWOT analysis to the case of organised crime in Albania (Gasparini 2008).

3) Elites. In the process under examination it is necessary to identify the elites who may be best relied upon to achieve change, and consequently identify the actors to be favoured in order to reach the desired future scenario, just as it is necessary to identify the actors who may obstruct policy initiatives so as to neutralise such actors.

4) Strategies and actions. It is also necessary to outline strategies and the consequent actions to be pursued and to attribute them to the elites so that they are effectively pursued. Among the many strategies to be identified, two are of particular importance. The first is suited to a situation with many positive SWOT variables (SO) and few negative ones (WT). In this case maximum attention should be given to the positive variables, while the negative ones may be neglected. The second strategy is suited to a situation with few positive SWOT variables (SO) and many negative ones (WT), in which case action should be taken to attenuate the negative factors and if possible use the positive variables to the same end.

5) The multi-dimensional character of reality. In the process to be pursued it is also necessary to define the complex mix of dimensions characterising the situation to be acted upon, and if possible decide on which dimension to give operational priority. In all the Balkan-Danube and Black Sea countries the following main dimensions may be identified: - the economy and forms of entrepreneurship, - legality, - social and cultural integration, - personal happiness (important for building an integrated society), - the quality of the environment, - the fight against crime. Although all of the above dimensions are of basic importance, in order to achieve a lesser degree of

failure for the states we are dealing with in our scenarios it is clear that we must develop the SWOT analysis and translate its results into strategies and actions orientated towards the fight against crime.


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NOTES

1. The Fund for Peace is an independent Washington, D.C. – based nonprofit research and education-al organization. Since its founding in 1957 by investment banker Randolph Compton, The Fund for Peace has been dedicated to preventing war and alleviating the conditions that cause war. Recently, research at The Fund for Peace has focused predominantly on identifying and reducing conflict stemming from weak or failed states. The Fund for peace publishes The Failed States Index, which rates nations’ relative stabil-ity based on social, economic, and political indicators such as demographic pressures, presence of refugees, uneven economic development or severe economic decline, and rise of factionalized elites, among others.

2. “Mounting Demographic Pressures”, is composed of the following information: • Pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining

resources • Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in common

forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, travel, social interaction, religious worship

• Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards

• Pressures from skewed population distributions, such as a “youth or age bulge”, or from divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups.

3. “Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies”, is composed of the following information:

• Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries.

4. “Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia”, is composed of the following information:

• History of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries

• Patterns of atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups • Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or

repression • Institutionalized political exclusion • Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in

the emergence of “hate” radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric. 5. “Chronic and Sustained Human Flight”, is composed of the following information: • “Brain drain” of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents fearing persecution or re-

pression • Voluntary emigration of “the middle class”, particularly economically productive segments of the

population, such as entrepreneurs, business people, artisans and traders, due to economic deterio-ration

• Growth of exile communities. 6. “Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines” , is composed of the following information: • Group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status • Group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education

levels • Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities”.

7. “Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline”, is composed of the following information: • A pattern of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income,

GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures, and other economic measures

Alberto Gasparini

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• Sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, foreign investment or debt payments • Collapse or devaluation of the national currency • Extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programs • Growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight • Increase in levels of corruption and illicit transactions among the general populace • Failure of the state to pay salaries of government employees and armed forces or to meet other

financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments. 8. “Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State”, is composed of the following information: • Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites • Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation • Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or

contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies

• Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites. 9. “Progressive Deterioration of Public Services”, is composed of the following information: • Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens

from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation

• State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies.

10. “Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights”, is composed of the following information:

• Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated

• Outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians • Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with

international norms and practices • Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups or

cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution).

11. “Security Apparatus Operates as a ‘State Within a State’ ”, is composed of the following information: • Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity • Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents,

suspected “enemies”, or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition • Emergence of an “army within an army” that serves the interests of the dominant military or polit-

ical clique • Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted

violent campaigns against state security forces. 12. “Rise of Factionalized Elites”, is composed of the following information: • Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines • Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g., a

“greater Serbia”) or of communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing” or “defending the faith”). 13. “Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors”, is composed of the following

information: • Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies,

states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict • Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or

peacekeeping missions.


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World Bank/Joint Task Force on Small States, Washington, DC.

MANAGING THE ADRIATIC COMMON SPACE. A STUDY ON THE ADRIATIC SEAWAYS

Daniele Del Bianco I.S.I.G. − Institute of International Sociology - Gorizia

Abstract: Although the Adriatic space is not commonly though to be on the very fore-front of terrorist threats, from a security point of view, the Adriatic space has proved to be an area interested by a number of serious criticalities, particularly linked to the aftermath of the Yugoslavian wars. Moreover, the Adriatic Seaway represents a crucial infrastructural and logistic support to the European development. Despite the relatively small dimension of the Adriatic Sea Basin, it is characterised by an important momentum of traffic (both commercial and leisure) growth. The paper, based on the results of the ProAdrias Project co-financed by the EC under the ECIP programme in 2007, analyses the safety and security context of the Adriatic Sea Region, by providing an operational definition of regional CIs and exploring the level of transnational, inter-regional cooperation among, EU and non-EU, actors directly managing safety and security threats and their consequences. Keywords: Maritime safety/security, cross-border cooperation, Critical Infrastructures

• − • − •

Introduction

Since its “pacification” under the Roman rule, the Adriatic sea was an area characterised by the strong cultural, social and economic ties of the populations inhabiting its coasts and hinterland(s). The modern interpretation of the Adriatic Sea, consequent to the creation of the Nation-State, as a divided but fixed and solid space, implied the disintegration of its original unity and the socio-economic and relational comparative advantages. However, the fall of the Eastern European totalitarian regimes and the European integration process, on the one hand, and civil society growth, on the other, call for a new non-dichotomist interpretation of the area based on the past, fluid and integrated multilateral approach.

Although the Adriatic space is not commonly though to be on the very fore-front of terrorist threats, from a security point of view, the Adriatic space has proved to be an area interested by a number of serious criticalities, particularly linked to the aftermath of the Yugoslavian wars. Illegal trafficking, poor level of cross-border cooperation, an uneven European integration process, the unresolved institutional frameset of Kosovo are but a few examples of the weakness and threats incumbent on the area. The relatively fragile structure of the Adriatic Sea region safety/security integrated framework calls for original analysis maximising the joint efforts of international and national actors, who operate both at the global and local level, in fields which (only apparently) are different and distant from one another.

The Adriatic Seaway represents a crucial infrastructural and logistic support to the European development. Despite the relatively small dimension of the Adriatic Sea Basin, it is characterised by an important momentum of traffic (both commercial and leisure) growth. The port of Trieste alone in 2006 recorded a total turnover of ferry traffic with the Balkans and Turkey for more than 4.5 millions of tons, 166.000 trucks and 50.000 passengers. The practice of carrying lorries by ferries increased consistently during the 1990s for the Yugoslav wars that produced harder border control with long waiting period, bad road connections, safety concerns. This also made the Eastern Adriatic harbours critical EU border points. Moreover, commercial traffic routes of the Adriatic are crossed by a consistent number of international

Daniele Del Bianco

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tourists and pilgrims during the summer season. In spite of the complexity and intensity of these flows, there is no specific coordinated and cooperative approach to infrastructure protection and civil defence in the region. Moreover, for the high militarisation of the area (multinational NATO forces, US forces, national armies, special police forces) the risk of overlapping procedures, contestable reactions and lack of coordination is high. Planning of terrorist activities has been repeatedly reported in the area: to sink oil-tankers, hijack ferries, exploit illegal migrations to smuggle explosives/terrorists to the EU. This shows, on the one hand, the developing connections between institutional instability, organised crime, political radicalism and religious fundamentalism and, on the other, the stringent need for a regional (i.e. international) cooperative approach in the integrated management of such phenomena.

This paper aims at proposing a set of recommendation tackling the above mentioned scenario with a specific focus on the Adriatic Sea Basin safety and security dimensions. To this end, the paper illustrates the salient results of the ProAdrias research project, an international study carried out by ISIG in 2007-2008 with the co-financing of the European Commission, DG Freedom, Justice and Security under the European Programme for Critical Infrastructures (EPCI 2007) 1.

The paper, after briefly illustrating the main methodological aspects of the ProAdrias research project, introduces the concept of critical infrastructure with reference to the Adriatic Sea Basin, it analyses the propensity to cooperation of relevant stakeholders on safety and security issues and, finally, presents the key recommendations elaborated to improve the present scenario. 1. ProAdrias – Protecting the Adriatic Sea Ways

In 2007, the International Sociology Institute of Gorizia – ISIG successfully applied by the European Commission to undertake a through study on the Adriatic Seaways with a specific interest for the preparedness of relevant stakeholders to prevent and manage safety and security risk endangering passengers and cargo maritime corridors. The Adriatic Seaways are conceptualised as vital nodes for the integrated and sustainable economic development of the whole area and their management as a key catalyser of the political and social integration process between the EU and the Western Balkans. The project, coordinated by ISIG, was based on the partnership with local and international actors: Central European Initiative (Trieste, Italy), European Maritime Partnership (Trieste, Italy), International Relations Institute (Zagreb, Croatia) and Hellenberg Ltd (Finland).

Project activities were designed so to challenge the above-mentioned scenario and were developed in three-tiers research system: First, a risk analysis of the Adriatic seaway, pointing out critical points and weaknesses of the institutional assets, of the infrastructure systems and their vulnerability to terrorism; Second, a tabletop exercise with practitioners/experts, where terrorism scenarios in the Adriatic are simulated within a transnational and cross-border framework of action; and third, a scenario analysis and recommendation on regional and EU CIP with a specific focus on the principles indicated.

In fact, as pilot study directed at promoting and supporting common operational measures in the elaboration of operative strategic plans and contingency plans in the Adriatic cross-border context, the research applied multidisciplinary and cross-sector research to tabletop exercise. Its final aim was to develop the European framework for critical infrastructures protection and to organise responses to alerts

1. The present paper is an excerpt from the final report of the ProAdrias project: PROtecting the ADRIAtic

Seaway PRO-ADRIAS (N° JLS/2007/EPCIP/003). The project falls within the EU program of “Critical Infrastructure Protection”. Co-financed by the DG Freedom, Security and Justice in the call 2007: “Pilot project containing a set of preparatory actions with a view to strengthening the fight against terrorism”. The ProAdrias project was carried out by the following partners: ISIG – Istituto di Sociologia Internazionale di Gorizia (lead partner), Hellenberg.org, CEI – Central European Initiative, IMO – Institute of International Relation (Zagreb), EMP – European Maritime Partnership. The report was based on the integrated results of the research activities carried out by the partners and their contribution, as follows: Alberto Gasparini, ISIG; Daniele Del Bianco, ISIG (Editor); Giulio Tarlao, ISIG; Emilio Cocco, ISIG; Timo Hellenberg, Hellen-ber.org; Zvonimir Mahecic, IMO.

Managing the Adriatic common space. A study on the Adriatic Seaways 29

on potential safety and security risks in the Adriatic basin. In concrete terms, the research brought together both military/civil issues, private/public interests, R&D/institutional approaches, connected the terrestrial/maritime dimensions of CIP and, finally, challenged the topic of regional and cross-border cooperation in the field of security when national antagonism is still intense. 2. Critical infrastructures in the Adriatic Sea Basin

Defining critical infrastructures (CIs) is anything but an easy task. Any attempt towards the formu-lation of a general definition is, moreover, frustrated by the need to make it operational and applicable to a given context.

Let us first look at the European dimension of CIs. The EU Commission adopted a broad definition of CI in its first main policy document, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight Against Terrorism, produced in the year 2004: «Critical infrastructures consist of those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of governments in the member states. Critical infrastructures extend across many sectors of the economy, including banking and finance, transport and distribution, energy, utilities, health, food supply and communications, as well as key government services. Some critical elements in these sectors are not strictly speaking ‘infrastructure’, but are in fact, networks or supply chains that support the delivery of an essential product or service» (Commission 2004: 3-4).

When the EU started to develop its own European Programme on CIP (EPCIP), it had to detail and specify its definition of CI. The European Commission definition offered in the 2006 Directive Proposal states that: «Critical Infrastructure means those assets or parts thereof which are essential for the maintenance of critical societal functions, including the supply chain, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people» (Commission 2006: 15). This definition is added with a specification of the sectors concerned.

National Member States definitions do not appear to differ substantially. In France, CIS are «those activities that are indispensable to the public’s essential needs and the maintenance of the security and defence capabilities of the country: food, water, energy, transport, financial institutions, information and communications systems, and command and decision centres» (source: Governmental White Paper on Domestic Security in the Face of Terrorism). Similarly in Germany, Critical infrastructures are those «facilities and organisations of major importance to the community whose failure or impairment would cause a sustained shortage of supplies, significant disruptions to public order or other dramatic consequences» (source: KRITIS Task Force of the Ministry of Interior). Further, in the UK CIs comprises «those assets, services and systems that support the economic, political and social life of the United Kingdom whose importance is such that its loss could: cause large-scale loss of life; have a serious impact on the national economy; have other grave social consequences for the community; or be of immediate concern to the national government». (source: Parliamentary Commission Communication: Critical Infrastructure Protection in the fight against terrorism, 20 October 2004).

The notion of CIs, however, dos not differ widely outside the EU context. In the USA, for instance, CIs as define in the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L.107-56) are «systems and assets (…) so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health and safety, or any combination of those matters». There are currently 12 sectors of the economy and 5 groups of key resources (dams, commercial assets, government facilities, national monuments, nuclear facilities) that the Department of Homeland Security considers as possessing systems or assets that, if lost, may have a critical impact on the United States.

All the above instances converge in providing very encompassing definitions mainly focusing on infrastructures of transport (airports, ports, etc.); strategic facilities of public bodies (government seats, the Army, etc.); power supply structures (pipelines, etc.); information and communication systems.

The research focus being on the Adriatic Seaways, definitions of CIs were made operational by analysing the Adriatic Sea basing in terms of cities and ports which could more likely be set under stress by safety or security hazards.

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Taken as a whole, the Adriatic Sea has a total surface area of about 60,000 square miles (160.000 km2). From the political point of view, its coasts are divided amongst Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania. It extends northwest from 40° to 45° 45’ N., with an extreme length of about 770 km (415 nautical miles, 480 miles). It has a mean breadth of about 160 km (85 nm, 100 mi), although the Strait of Otranto, which connects with the Ionian Sea, is only 45-55 nautical miles wide (85-100 km). The west, Italian coast is generally low and sandy, rich of marshes and lagoons, whereas the east coast is bold and rocky, with many islands. Many rivers end their flow into the Adriatic Sea. The most important one is the Italian river Po (652 km). Its delta has historically pushed forward (and eastward) the coastline. Albeit the presence especially in winter of the strong northeast wind called Bora (Bura in Croatian), the tidal movement is slight. This is true especially for the North part of the Adriatic Sea, being quite shallow. Between Venice and the Croatian peninsula of Istria the depth rarely exceeds 46 m (25 fathoms), whereas in the Southern part of the sea, between Bari (I) and Dubrovnik (HR), it reaches around 900 m (500 fathoms). The maximum depth is 1460 m (800 fathoms), and the mean depth is 240 m.

Placed on islands within one of the lagoons of the North Adriatic, Venice has its unique situation. Other notable cities on the Italian coast are Trieste, Ravenna, Rimini, Ancona, Pescara, Bari and Brindisi. Major cities on the eastern coast include Izola, Koper, Piran and Portorož in Slovenia; Poreč, Rovinj, Pula, Opatija, Rijeka, Senj, Zadar, Šibenik, Trogir, Split, Makarska, Ploče and Dubrovnik in Croatia; Neum in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Herceg Novi, Kotor, Bar, Budva and Ulcinj in Montenegro; and Durrës in Albania.

What turns an infrastructure into a CI is its strategic positioning with economic, social and political functional network. Therefore, it is necessary to present some background data on the nature and the scope of maritime activities in the area with special reference to the largest ports active across the three countries concerned: Italy, Slovenia and Croatia

The activities of the port of Venice are experiencing a positive trend. Both the containers and pas-sengers traffics have reached their historical maximum. In the year 2006 around 5000 vessels reached Venice: 1377 passengers ships for a total of almost one million and half tourists, and 3655 commercial ships for a total of over 30 millions of tons of goods. Significant for our safety issues are the data about oil: last year over 11 millions of tons of oil products have been treated in the port of this historical and unique city, so breaching the Special Law for Venice 41 of 1973, that mandates to move the commercial maritime traffic out of the lagoon, and to place it in the open sea, off shore. Such provision has never been enforced, and so the oil harbour of San Leonardo, situated right in the middle of the lagoon of Venice, is still functioning.

All in all, the port of Trieste is a smaller centre of traffic compared to the Venice case. The holds true especially for the passengers sectors. But if we focus on oil traffic, we have to say that, as confirmed also by the stakeholders and experts we met and interviewed, in the recent years the port of Trieste has overcome the traditional position of Venice as leading centre of the Mediterranean in this field, and this is due in particular to the oil pipeline to Germany that starts from the surroundings of the town. Actually Trieste is almost only an oil port. To give an image, thirty-seven millions of ton of oil treated in the 2006 means having an oil tanker loaded with 100,000 tons that reaches the docks of Trieste every single day of the year. And this huge traffic has obviously a bearing on the following discussion on the oil spills risks.

The port of Koper is the most important in Slovenia. The port of Koper is gaining a growing import-ance year after year, especially thanks to the traffic of goods to Germany. The total traffic in the year 2006 has reached beyond 12 millions tons of goods treated, especially from dry bulk cargoes.

The amount of traffic activities developed in the port of Rijeka is of a lesser magnitude, but it is reaching the figures treated in the port of Koper. In fact in the year 2006 the total amount of goods treated has been almost 11 millions of ton, the majority from liquid bulk cargoes.

The main, so-to-speak, common CIs in the Adriatic Sea region illustrated, and having analysed the country-specific CIs framework (Austria, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Turkey), the research results were elaborated as to produce a map of the key CIs for the Adriatic Seaways.

It should be noted here, that even the mere request of lists of CIs to the competent national authorities have been considered touching “sensitive” data. If we add the already underlined very broad nature of any definition of CI available, the reader should be warned that the following are only very partial repertoires


of the CIs of the Adriatic area. As stated above, many material and immaterial assets can fall within the definition of CI; we forcefully decided to concentrate on CI that are directly connected with the issues of transport, energy and mobility as a whole. However, an all-hazard approach is progressively imposing itself on the debate on CIs, and the inter-locking nature of most infrastructural systems makes it almost impossible to decide what is and what is not a CI. Figure 1 - Key CIs for the Adriatic Seaways

The map display the following list of Critical Infrastructures identified as the main CIs in the event of an environmental disasters (i.e. oil leakage) or terrorist attack in the Adriatic Sea. ITALY: Venice his-torical town; Venice port and petro-chemical complex (Marghera); Trieste port; Oil pipeline Trieste to Germany; Ravenna refinery; Anco-na port; Bari port; Brindisi LNG implant. SLOVENIA: Koper port; Nuclear implant of Krsko. CROATIA: Rijeka port; Dubrovnik historical town. MONTENEGRO: Bar port. ALBANIA: Durres port. BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA: Ploče port.

Source: ProAdrias TableTop Exercise www.proadrias.isig.it 3. Responding to safety and security threats: The actors cooperation in the Adriatic Sea Basin

What are the OSP and contingency plans in place for the Adriatic context? What are the main strengths and weaknesses inherent to the cross-border area? To what extent existing OSP and contingency plan are prepared to accommodate for the new terrorists threats? What degree of interaction exists between MS and regional mechanisms and communities routines? What degree of complementarily exists between early warning prevention routines and mechanisms for such threats and the common EPCIP framework? What are the protocols developed by MS authorities to provide leadership and coordination in developing and implementing a nationally consistent approach to CIP in terms of cooperation among stakeholder? How would local authorities and private sector stakeholder practically interact in terms of communication and cooperation? These are but a few of the questions raised by the ProAdrias project. The data use to formulate solid answers to these question were mainly gathered during the two table-top exercises (TTX) organised within the project activities. «This type of activity involves a simulated response to a hypothetical natural or man-made disaster. These exercises are easier and faster to plan and execute than full scale exercises, which involve the mobilization of resources to a remote location or the use of actors as victims. Table top exercises are especially helpful in testing emergency response procedures and enabling communications and coordination between personnel who typically do not work together. The focus of a table top exercise should always be on identifying and eliminating emergency response deficiencies before an actual emergency occurs. The focus of a table top exercise is not actually on solving the problem, but on working through the steps to respond to the problem. In some table top exercise, no solution is clearly attainable. In others, the components of the solution are provided to the participants as the table top exercise progresses. However, participants can: Test and validate organiza-

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tional operational and policy level response plans in problem identification, interagency coordination, in-tegration of resources and crisis resolution; Help representatives of various departments and organizations become more familiar with one another’s personnel, capabilities and vulnerabilities; Develop and refine internal and external communications, cooperation, teamwork and confidence; Improve understanding and familiarity with the Incident Command System and the Unified Command System; Identify gaps in plans and resources; Train personnel and clarify roles and responsibilities in emergency situations» 2.

The table top exercises focused on two scenarios in the Adriatic Sea: an oil spill from a tanker cruising in international waters; and a terrorist attack to a ferry also cruising in international waters. A moderator facilitated the interactions among participants whilst ISIG staff graphically elaborated the development of the scenarios and took record of your contributions. Participants were asked to describe the actions their organisation/institution would undertake in the event of each type of disaster taking into consideration the interactions with other stakeholders. Moreover, participants were encouraged to bring to our attention potential CIs and actors which might had been left out when the exercise were planned. The next paragraphs gather the results of the simulations.

3.1. Simulation 1: Simulating an oil-spill in the Adriatic

3.1.1. t0 - Early warning

An oil tanker traveling along the Adriatic Sea is experiencing grounding or collision, with the risk of

oil leakage. It was decided on purpose to fix neither a precise position of the vessel nor its flag, and this for 2 reasons: on the hand to get from the participants to the table top exercise as much information as possible, and on the other hand not to exclude any of them as possible actor of the simulation. Thus our tanker is on international waters, and we figure out that its early warning would be received by more than one Country.

The scenario in fact is organized in two main phases: this so called t0 phase, and the following t1. This twofold scenario has been drawn on the base of the fieldwork we carried out so far within the

project. The t0 is then the opening phase, in which we figure out that the proper recipients, according to

national contingency plans and international regulations (Coast Guard, Maritime rescue coordination cen-ters, Port Authorities, etc.), get the early warning message from the oil tanker.

3.1.2. t1 - Oil spill

We are now in the second and most crucial phase of our simulation. After the dispatching of the early warning to the proper recipients, and the consequential reactions of

all relevant actors seen in the previous slides, in the phase t1 we are not anymore dealing with an alert for an unclear threat, but it is ascertained that an oil spill has occurred out of the tanker.

The risk of oil pollution of the maritime area around the tanker is then clear and present. In the same time, operators have to face the even more threatening menace of the occurring of a fire on board of the tanker, and even of the potential final devastating explosion of the vessel itself. The menace is then in the same time to human lives, the environment, and economic assets.

Having made clear this scenario, we now ask to all participants what their institution would do to react to such crisis. 3.2. Simulation 2: Simulating an oil-spill in the Adriatic 3.2.1. t0 - Hijacking alert

In this second part of the table top exercise, we have developed a scenario of terrorist attack, with weapons or explosive, to a ferry on route across two Adriatic States (for example Zadar-Ancona).

2. And for further info: http://www.infragardmembers.org.


As in the previous exercise, we decided however to leave open departure, destination and flag State of the ferry, for the reasons already mentioned.

We have again a 2 level scenario. In this case the early warning to safety and security actors of the Adriatic basin is not given by a specific communication form the ferry, but on the contrary by the absence of communication.

Obviously the ferry cannot disappear from the radar of the local Coast Guard, but we figure out that such misbehavior of the ferry originates the reaction of the security and safety actors, and so the beginning of our exercise. 3.2.2. t1 - Intervention

The hijacking has been ascertained, hostages are kept, negotiations begin. We are now in the following phase of our scenario of terrorist attack. We can sum up the first phase (t0), by saying that the attempts to restore channel of communication

with the ferry had met success, insofar now it has been ascertained that a terrorist commando is in action, and that therefore we are not dealing with a maritime traffic control anymore, but with a national, and international crisis.

The flag State of the ferry, as key actor in the crisis, has decided to move forward according to na-tional contingency plans and international cooperation procedures.

The steps of data collection and consultancy with neighbouring States are over. Now plans of inter-vention on the ferry are being considered. 3.3. Cross-border cooperation among actors directly involved in the protection of the Adriatic Seaways

A trans-national, inter-regional cooperative approach was preferred in the elaboration of the TTX

since: first previous analysis clearly showed that joint safety and security interventions rely, at least in equal measure, on official protocols and international charts and on actor social capital and propensity to cooperate in a cross-border (CBC) fashion; second, that the Adriatic Sea region has a very stringent cross-border nature and that its safety, security and opportunities for integrated development are directly proportional to the level, intensity and diffusion of CBC actions undertaken.

The CBC scenario developed depicts a highly heterogeneous cross-border context which varies from area to area, delineating both challenges and opportunities for the future integrated development of the Adriatic Sea region. Within such background, however, despite the proactive or hindering role of context-specific variables, the actors directly dealing with the protection of the Adriatic seaways have developed different approaches to cooperation. Within the scope of the research a questionnaire was distributed to more than 40 relevant stakeholders from all countries in the Adriatic basin aiming at gathering data on the level(s) of cooperation among institutional [International bodies (i.e. NATO, EU, etc.); National author-ities (i.e. National Ministries); Regional authorities (i.e. Regional government)], operative (Civil protec-tion, Army/Navy, Coast Guard, etc.), economic-trade (Commercial/Civil Shipping companies, etc.) and socio-cultural (Research Institutes/Universities, Media, etc.) actors.

The definition of cross-border co-operation as joint action undertaken by actors engaged in the daily life of a border area across the border holds valid even within the scope of an analysis focusing more on the relational aspects of cooperation among actors. However, in order to narrow down its meaning and to highlight its importance within the following analysis, it is useful to consider its external and internal di-mensions (with and within the actors’ relational space) in order to evaluate its present characteristics and to design strategies for its future prospects.

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3.3.1. Internal dimensions and indicators

The internal dimension refers to forms of cooperation among actors based on the active examples of collaboration already in place. The reference here is to that bottom-up process which is essential to any further structuring of cross-border cooperation. The two dimensions directly dealing with this aspects are:

1. Propensity toward cross-border cooperation of CBC actors. This is defined by indicators which refer to (1) institutional actors, (2) operative actors, (3) economic-trade actors, (4) socio-cultural actors. In short, a high propensity for cross-border cooperation in all four types of actors implies that there are realistic opportunities to develop not only stable cooperation but also, and more importantly, innovative, efficient and integrated.

3. Cross-border relations in each activity sector. These relations are expressed by the indicators of relations of (9) institutions on maritime-related issues, (10) intelligence services, (11) combating illegal immigration/ illegal trafficking, (12) maritime environment protection, (13) sea rescue, (14) promoting tourism, (15) education and culture, (16) everyday services.

Given the matter at hand, namely the collaborative process necessary to the protection of the Adriatic seaways, there is another internal dimension which is held essential and it concerns those characteristics specific to the relational space which can play a proactive or hindering role on both previous dimensions. This refers to the 2. Level of coordination of (5) institutional actors, (6) operative actors, (7) economic-trade actors, (8) socio-cultural actors. 3.3.2. External dimensions and indicators

The external dimension of cooperation in the actors’ relational space concern agency specific, national, European and international conditions which may play a proactive or hindering role on the development of cooperative relations among actors directly dealing with the protection of the Adriatic Sea ways. There are four external dimension which are thought to have a progressively lower gradient of direct influence on the cooperative process itself. An efficient and integrated cooperative process, nevertheless, requires the interplay of all the following dimensions. These are based on unbalances or equilibrium between the differ-ent contexts of action of the relevant stakeholders.

4. Institutional factors inhibiting or prompting co-operation. The selected indicators are: (17) high prioritisation of protecting the Adriatic seaways in the policy agenda, (18) state centralisation, (19) credibility of co-operation agencies, (20) different competencies of institutional actors, (21) official definition of the border area, (22) level of mutual knowledge and trust, (23) level of financial resources, (24) EU membership, (25) NATO membership, (26) political stability, (27) participation in international treaties/agreements.

5. Operative factors inhibiting or prompting co-operation. The selected indicators are: (28) high prioritisation of protecting the Adriatic seaways in the policy agenda, (29) different competencies of opera-tive actors, (30) different technological levels, (31) level of mutual knowledge and trust, (32) level of fi-nancial resources, (33) level of autonomy from institutional/management actors, (34) adequate compet-encies in matter of international relations, (35) good administrative capability, (36) different procedures, (37) linguistic barriers, (38) participation to international drills, (39) non-existent or very weak reaction to collaboration proposals.

6. Economic factors inhibiting or prompting co-operation. The selected indicators are: (40) high

Box 1 - Dimensions with operational implications 1. Level of propensity toward cross-border cooperation of CBC actors 2. Level of coordination of CBC actors 3. Level of relations in each activity sector 4. Incisiveness of institutional factors inhibiting or prompting cooperation 5. Incisiveness of operative factors inhibiting or prompting co-operation 6. Incisiveness of economic factors inhibiting or prompting co-operation 7. Incisiveness of cultural factors inhibiting or prompting co-operation


prioritisation of protecting the Adriatic seaways in the policy agenda, (41) high competition inhibiting co-operation, (42) adequate resources devoted to safety/security, (43) coordination with relevant stake-holders, (44) adequate competencies of managerial staff, (45) adequate competencies of workers, (46) good administrative capability, (47) linguistic barriers, (48) non-existent or very weak reaction to collaboration proposals.

7. Socio-cultural factors inhibiting or prompting co-operation. The selected indicators are: (49) high prioritisation of protecting the Adriatic seaways in the policy agenda, (50) coordination with relevant stakeholders, (51) negative national and/or regional stereotypes, (52) linguistic barriers, (53) non-existent or very weak reaction to collaboration proposals, (54) history of cooperation.

Box 2 – SWOT analysis indicators, according to conceptual dimensions

1. Level of propensity toward CBC in protecting the Adriatic seaways 1. of institutional actors 2. of operative actors 3. of economic-trade actors 4. of socio-cultural actors

2. Level of coordination between 5. institutional actors 6. operative actors 7. economic-trade actors 8. socio-cultural actors

3. Level of relations in each activity sector 9. institutional relations on maritime-related issues

10. intelligence services 11. combating illegal immigration/ illegal trafficking 12. maritime environment protection 13. sea rescue 14. promoting tourism 15. education and culture 16. everyday services

4. Incisiveness of institutional factors inhibiting or prompting co-operation 17. agenda 18. state centralisation 19. credibility of co-operation agencies 20. different competencies of institutional actors 21. official definition of the border area 22. level of mutual knowledge and trust 23. level of financial resources 24. EU membership 25. NATO membership 26. political stability 27. participation in international treaties/agreements

5. Incisiveness of operative factors inhibiting or prompting co-operation 28. agenda 29. different competencies of operative actors 30. different technological levels

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31. level of mutual knowledge and trust 32. level of financial resources 33. level of autonomy from institutional/management actors 34. adequate competencies in matter of international relations 35. good administrative capability 36. different procedures 37. linguistic barriers 38. participation to international drills 39. non-existent or very weak reaction to collaboration proposals

6. Incisiveness of economic factors inhibiting or prompting co-operation 40. agenda 41. high competition inhibiting cooperation 42. adequate resources devoted to safety/security 43. coordination with relevant stakeholders 44. adequate competencies of managerial staff 45. adequate competencies of workers 46. good administrative capability 47. linguistic barriers 48. non-existent or very weak reaction to collaboration proposals

7. Incisiveness of socio-cultural factors inhibiting or prompting co-operation 49. agenda 50. coordination with relevant stakeholders 51. negative national and/or regional stereotypes 52. linguistic barriers 53. non-existent or very weak reaction to collaboration proposals 54. history of cooperation

3.3.3. Overview of actors cooperation in the Adriatic

The data gathered through the questionnaire distributed to relevant stakeholders have been analysed by means of SWOT analysis. The methodological aspects on the measurement of indicators and the SWOT analysis methodological process applied have already been described elsewhere (see 2.1.4 and 2.1.5 in this chapter).

The seven conceptual dimension scored the following average marks

Internal External 1° 2° 3° 4° 5° 6° 7° 6.4 5.1 6.9 6.7 4.8 3.3 3.6

The 54 indicators on the level of cooperation among actors in the protection of the Adriatic seaways

configure themselves as follows:

n % - SWOT variables indicators 29 53.7 - Halo effect indicators positive 12 22 40.7 negative 10 - non-relevant indicators 3 5.6 54 100.0


SWOT variables then are configured as follows: Internal to

the area (SW)

External to the area

(OT) Total %

Positive (SO) 7 5 12 41.4 Negative (WT) 4 13 17 58.6

Total 11 18 29 % 37.9 62.1 100.0

Finally, SWOT variables have the following denominations:

Indicator relev-ance

dimen-sion S W O T

Internal 1 Of institutional actors +++ 1 x 2 Of operative actors +++ 1 x 5 Institutional actors ++ 2 x 7 Economic-trade actors ++ 2 x 8 Socio-cultural actors ++ 2 x 9 Institutional relation on maritime-related issues + 3 x

11 Combating illegal immigration + 3 x 12 Maritime environmental protection + 3 x 13 Sea rescue + 3 x 14 Promoting tourism + 3 x 15 Education and culture + 3 x External 17 Prioritisation of protecting the Adriatic sea

ways in the policy agenda +++ 4 x

18 State centralisation +++ 4 x 20 Different competencies of institutional actors +++ 4 x 24 EU membership +++ 4 x 25 NATO membership +++ 4 x 30 Different technological levels ++ 5 x 32 Level of financial resources ++ 5 x 33 Level of autonomy from institutional actors ++ 5 x 34 Adequate competencies in matters of

international relations ++ 5 x

35 Good administrative capability ++ 5 x 38 Participation to international drills ++ 5 x 40 Prioritisation of protecting the Adriatic sea

ways in the policy agenda + 6 x

41 High competition inhibiting cooperation + 6 x 43 Coordination with relevant stakeholders + 6 x 45 Adequate competencies of workers + 6 x 49 Prioritisation of protecting the Adriatic

seaways in the policy agenda + 7 x

51 Negative national and/or regional stereotypes + 7 x 52 Linguistic barriers + 7 x

7 4 5 13 As far as the protection of the Adriatic seaways is concerned, the cross-border cooperation among

actors in the Adriatic Sea Region, as depicted by the SWOT analyses, does not appear particularly posi-tive but highly heterogeneous depending on the type of actors involved. Although, when considering the

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internal relational space, there are more positive SWOT variables (7 strength vs. 4 weakness points), there is a considerably high number of threats incumbent on the positive development of cooperation among actors in the area (13 threat vs. 5 opportunity points). Moreover, when comparing average scores per dimensions it appears clear that the cooperation in the area, when it comes to identifying and implementing policies on the protection of the Adriatic seaways, is confined almost exclusively to institutional and operative actors (dimension 1, indicators 1 and 2), carried out by means of institutional relations (dimension 4) within sectors dominated by institutional relations. The prevalence of the institutional sphere in the relational space of the relevant actors may be easily explained by the very nature of the framework within which policies aiming at the protection of the Adriatic seaways are design and implemented. International agreements, national and international definitions of Critical Infrastructures and Operative Contingency Plans, and national safety/security protocol do carry an intrinsically predominant institutional nature and, thus, national (and/or regional) institutions tend to play the lion share in the coordination of cooperative approaches in the Adriatic Sea Region. However, given the nature and typology of risks which the Adriatic seaways are more likely to face, it appears clear that an innovative approach to cooperation should take the lead in order to guarantee both the safety/security of the area and its integrated control necessary to its socio-economic development.

Cooperation trajectories still linger in a blurry phase where the integrated approach characterising effec-tive cross-border cooperation play a minor role (such as the cooperation among economic-trade and socio-cultural actors and their level of coordination with other relevant actors).

Given this scenario, the fourth strategy, a strategy aiming at controlling negative factors, seems to be the most adequate.

The actions necessary to implement such strategy are highly complex and embrace several aspects of the framework within which this research was carried out. Although specific recommendations of a more holistic nature were elaborated and are presented in the next chapter, it is useful to consider the following as trajectories towards positive future prospects:

(1) Favouring the creation of new actors facilitating the interconnection among the institutional, operative, economic and socio-cultural sectors in the whole area;

(2) Promoting diversified international drill aiming to the involvement of all relevant actors; (3) Promoting a sense of responsibility for the safety/security in the Adriatic space; (4) Raising funds for the competitive participation of socio-cultural actors in disseminating a safe-

ty/security culture in the area;

T 45%

O 14%

S 24%

O 14%

S 24%

W 14% W 14%

T 45%


(5) Operating at the international level for the harmonisation of local and regional agencies dealing directly or indirectly with the protection of the Adriatic seaways. Conclusive remarks

The situation in the Adriatic region with reference to the protection of the Adriatic Seaways can be

described as a condition of national readiness towards maritime adversity and reciprocal benevolence to international cooperation. The threats to the Adriatic Seaway can be extremely serious and full of severe consequences for their multiple impacts on different national level, infrastructural assets, type of actors, degrees of responsibilities and, last but not least, orientations of the local public opinions. Eventually, the protection of a complex transnational system cannot rely on too bureaucratic and participatory methods. It is necessary for the Adriatic countries to provide themselves with a flexible and highly performing regional agency to tackle the issue of protection of the Adriatic seaway from an all-hazard standpoint.

The protection of the Adriatic Seaways, as part of a larger European strategy of Critical Infrastructure Protection, would particularly benefit from the further development of an inter-regional frame of safety practices. Although, the Adriatic region is a seemingly safe and protected environment, a few problems are detected and need to be tackled in an original way. Most of the problems have to do with the national based approach to homeland security. Thus, CIP and security policies have to include a regional trans-national dimension, to contrast efficiently some specific problems, like the ones of international terrorism or a natural disaster in international waters. These are uneasy, vague and unpredictable scenarios that can be approached consistently only through politically shared and technically dynamic operative tools. The risk of serious damages to the Adriatic Seaways it is very high because the region at stake has progressively entered in the realm of the safe place, opening thus to tourism, foreign investments, international business. Maritime infrastructures are critical because they are “transitional places” that shape the business and polit-ical environments but actually connect national systems that too often conceive themselves quite separately. Some are EU members, some are about to join, some others are candidates and further countries are not even sure if their candidature will be ever considered seriously.

The Adriatic region has been the target of many security operations in the 1990s, many of them sponsored by the EU and with the involvement of many European countries. The integration within the EU still represents a valuable and crucial target for all of the Western Balkans countries. At the same time, the region is still suffering for the difficulties of law enforcement, the persistence of transnational criminal networks and the popularity of ethnic upheavals that slow down the regional reconciliation process.

Terrorist actions and natural catastrophes can be disruptive right for their effect to dismantle quite organized interactions and sophisticated systems, which did not develop a proper self-protection mechanism. In this regards, the Adriatic Seaways represent a vulnerable transnational set of interlocking transport systems that already work together to move goods and people, within and through the Adriatic region. Such system is multi-national, multi-level and multi-functional but its protection is not performed at the same level and is left to the national contingency plans, to the multi-national NATO sponsored exercise and to the good-will of the operative working in the field.

REFERENCES

Commission of the European Communities (2006), Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament to the European economic and social Committee and to the Committee of the regions, Cooperation in the field of accidental or deliberate marine pollution after 2007, Brussels.

Del Bianco D. (ed.) (2008), Protecting the Adriatic Seaways, Isig, Gorizia. Gasparini A. (2003), “Progetto per le istituzioni di Euradia?”, Isig. Trimestrale di sociologia internazionale,

XII, 3-4. Gasparini A., D. Del Bianco (2008), L’Europa centrale dei confini. Governance della cooperazione

transfrontaliera (Quaderno di Futuribili n. 14), Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Uomo-Isig, Gorizia.

BRIDGING THE SECURITY DIVIDE: NEW CONCEPTS FROM TWO MEDITERRANEAN

COMMUNITIES Amanda McAllister Wilson

I.S.I.G. – Institute of International Sociology - Gorizia Abstract: The author examines two Mediterranean civilian movements in two different countries which have organized around a common effort to challenge increased military defence infrastructure in their communities. While these civil groups have not been considered key players in shaping new contemporary concepts of security, the author argues that their very existence, as well as their strikingly similar definitions of well-being within their communities, represent a new context for analysing security, a clue to addressing insecurity and a pathway for eventually crossing a conceptual ‘security divide’ in the Mediterranean. Keywords: Civil society, local community, local democracy, security divide

• − • − •

Introduction

«Analysts can either reproduce the discourse that legitimises and justifies environmental degradation, often at the cost of others, or challenge the discourse and call for reflection on our place in the broader process as producers of knowledge and accomplices in the production of our own insecurity» (Smith 2001: 1)

The rolling, verdant Mecsek hills near Pécs, Hungary, a favourite destination for weekend excursion-ists, may one day host a solitary NATO radar. In 2007 in Vicenza, Italy, thousands of civilians marched in opposition to the major expansion of a U.S. military base. An examination of security from the per-spective of two civilian movements in these cities − though their relationships and commonalities cross geopolitical borders − may deepen and contextualize the framework for the dynamic field of critical security studies in the Mediterranean.

This examination has urgent importance as security becomes a major discussion point in public and political discourse and as its definitions change and expand, influencing policies which affect lives, communities and environments.

This paper examines insecurities specifically and paradoxically created by security infrastructure itself in the cities of Pécs, Hungary and Vicenza, Italy and argues that these civilian movements are significant because their concepts of security contrast dramatically with powerful “security actors” in the Mediter-ranean. These powerful security actors justify the continued expansion of military-security infrastructure based on premises arising from a distinct security paradigm. This security paradigm can be examined - and contrasted with that of the civilian movements - from a critical perspective.

Infrastructure being constructed in the Mediterranean under the umbrella of security institutions such as NATO is still largely influenced by a traditionalist, perhaps ageing, 1990’s security framework highlighted later in the paper. This framework considers threats to security within a dualistic model of “hard issues,” such as WMDs, and “soft issues” (Larrabee et al. 1998) such as economic, political and social challenges. These dualities may be becoming irrelevant in a context of food shortages, climate

Amanda McAllister Wilson 42

change and economic crises which cross traditional geopolitical boundaries and have proven to be debilitating.

While many of the challenges relevant to the contemporary security discourse are the ‘border-less’ bi-products of globalization, traditional security actors still address problems of security within a framework characterized predominantly by delineated national security agendas and individual nation-state actors.

Plans for a controversial NATO radar slated for construction in the city of Pécs, Hungary were set in motion at the Madrid Summit in 1997. The Madrid Summit took place over ten years before issues which NATO formerly considered “soft” issues − climate change, food shortages, migration and economic crises − would take centre stage, assuming a central role in public dialogue which still has not reached its apogee. Civilian movements organizing around shared values and concepts about well-being in their communities can be considered powerful protagonists in a changing security paradigm with valuable insight for those willing to examine and dissect conceptual constructions of security. This paper aims to examine the meaning of the word security itself from different conceptual frameworks, highlight the context of some main security actors in the Mediterranean from a critical perspective, and lastly, introduce two civilian movements and new concepts on the theme. 1. Approach

The initial research presented here was undertaken from a journalistic perspective from within the communities featured in this paper: Pécs, Hungary and Vicenza, Italy. Although the central European country of Hungary is not traditionally considered part of the region of the Mediterranean, the NATO radar scheduled to be built in the city of Pécs places it squarely in the context of the so-called Mediter-ranean strategic dialogue.

No doubt, national and international defence agendas often contrast sharply with the everyday needs of individual communities. This is true in case of war when civilian refugees flee from wars they did not create and to which they did not consent. The conflicts I examine in this paper represent conflict between national defence agendas and local community movements vying for self-determination and the autonomy to define their own terms of well-being. These are low-level, non-violent conflicts, though not insignificant.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to have the information needed to perfectly judge the legitimacy of an expanded military base in Vicenza, for example, or a radar on the hills above Pécs, Hungary. In both Pécs and Vicenza case studies, this paper presents only the perspectives of the cities’ civilian movements. I began thinking about this subject when I was living in Pécs. At the time, the city’s NATO radar controversy was creating great tension in the community. It remains an issue today, especially as the city prepares to accept the title of “Cultural Capital of Europe” in 2010. 2. Why security?

On Wednesday 30 July, 2008, the front page of the Italian daily newspaper La Repubblica featured a story about the controversial Italian initiative to fingerprint Roma children, proposed by Italy’s Interior Minister Roberto Maroni 1 and carried out by local police and “forze dell'ordine” 2. An additional front-page story announced the death of seven African migrants who were attempting to cross the Canal of Sicily in a rickety boat. In another front-page column, writer Carlo Petrini addressed the subject of the July, 2008 failure of the Doha Round of World Trade Organization global trade talks (Petrini 2008: 1).

Inside, another story chronicled the dispatch of 3,000 military soldiers to patrol the streets of Italy for a preliminary six-month period (Polchi 2008: 7). According to the agreement arranged by Defence Minister Ignazio La Russa and Interior Minister Roberto Maroni, the soldiers would patrol points of national interest, public spaces and streets in an effort to “improve security”.

1. Leader of the Northern League party in Italy. 2. The initiative has been condemned by the Council of Europe.

Bridging the security divide: New concepts from two Mediterranean communities 43

On page thirteen, a large photograph of mounds of trash accompanied a story about an inquest concerning the problem of waste collection in the southern Italian city of Naples where trash piles in public streets have soured the cityscape for years (Del Porto 2008: 13). The facing page featured a story about a protest in Vicenza where citizens rallied in response to news from the Italian Minister of Defence that, according to a consensus between Rome and the United States, controversial expansion of the U.S. military base in Vicenza would continue (Tosatto 2008: 12).

These news stories represent new challenges and issues which are redefining security discussions in Italy, the Mediterranean and the world. While as little as ten years ago, a traditionalist security dialogue may have overlooked these issues, their importance in expanding definitions of security are becoming more and more palpable. While Bicchi considers migration to have become a “securitised” 3 issue by the early 1990’s (Bicchi 2001: 9), the important issue is still largely addressed from a defensive, reactionary framework of national security and addressed with measures such as wall-building and border militarization.

Walls and fences have not stopped the growing number of deaths as migrants continue to attempt the treacherous journey from Northern Africa to Europe’s Mediterranean shores. Alternatively, environ-mental and human security frameworks present a paradigm in which it is possible to consider the root causes of human migration as a global pattern with specific, trans-national environmental, social and economic causes that could be addressed preventively (Dabelko 2008: 34-45).

Because these economic, environmental and resource-related issues are so complex, it is difficult to address them within a traditional security framework. Proponents of environmental and human security sustain that they must be considered through a multi-faceted lens which considers their root causes, effects and interconnections.

Illegal dumping, incineration and trash trafficking in Europe endanger shared ecologies and oceans. In addition to the risk of extreme environmental degradation, the issue also has deep and complex eco-nomic roots. Increased trash production is related to a flourishing consumer culture in which the values of individually packaged goods − portability, convenience and packaging as a vehicle for brand recogni-tion − overshadow the external costs of mountains of disposable wrappers, bottles, bags, boxes and cups. Will plastic candy wrappers ever become securitised? As definitions and conceptions of security continue to change, it is indeed possible.

The word “security” is surfacing more and more frequently in the public dialogue, not only within a traditional context of national security and defence, but within the context of everyday life and civil society. One example arose in Italy where military soldiers, for six months in 2008, patrolled the streets of Italian cities.

Silvio Berlusconi's administration in Italy has emphasized a security policy characterized by strong alignment with NATO and participation in the U.S.-led War in Iraq 4. Mr. Berlusconi built his 2008 campaign on promises to fight crime and deploy soldiers to patrol Italian cities. But perhaps more inter-estingly, public debate, media stories and political rhetoric in Italy are increasingly characterized by more frequent use of the word “security” itself in regard to domestic issues.

In build-up to a request for approval of a new pacchetto sicurezza [security package] including additional funding for the police and the judicial system, Silvio Berlusconi implemented a “Security Day” − so named in English 5 – in Rome in 1999 (Dino 1999). Since that time, discussion of security in Italian society has only increased.

Although critical theorists have considered the concept for many decades, a sharp rise in the use of the word “security” in public and political forums represents a change at a fundamental level and deserves closer consideration, even if it is not the main objective of this paper. This paper will examine concepts of

3. A widely-used term which describes the process of how issues become accepted and understood as existential security focal points through a complex public and political process called “securitisation.”

4. Sedgwick M.E. (2005, Mar), “Italian Security in the Berlusconi Era: Business As Usual”. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii Online <.PDF> Retrieved 2008-08-09 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71163_index.html.

5. The reasons the Berlusconi administration chose to name the event “Security Day”, an English phrase, are unclear. Perhaps it is because, according to Sedgwick's work, the Berlusconi administration's security policies are closely tied to those of the United States, or simply for emphasis.


security in tension communities where insecurity is characterized by a vast divide between two paradigms: the concept as conceived by traditional security actors such as defence organizations and state foreign policy-makers, and, on the other hand, as conceived by those who feel collective insecurity is actually heightened by defence infrastructure. By presenting case studies of two ‘tension communities’ in the Mediterranean, Pécs, Hungary, often called “The Mediterranean City”, and Vicenza, Italy, the paper will examine a Mediterranean security divide, its global significance and its economic and political contexts. 3. Critical perspectives

Undoubtedly, there are sharp contrasts in the way security is defined at the personal, community, national and trans-national levels. Finding a common definition for security is problematic in many ways. Traditional power-holders and trans-national security organizations, such as NATO and the U.S. Military, continue to create infrastructure and, as some theorists might say, “perceive risks”, which are compatible with their own security agendas. Since the end of the Cold War, this infrastructure has, in part, been largely focused on the Mediterranean, a region where conflicts have flared up and receded in the foreground of international and national security consciousness.

Critical theorists offer various frameworks from which to examine security: realists, constructivists, avantguarde theorists, humanists and post-modernists, to name a few. All offer valuable perspectives from which to analyse security. Within the context of environmental security, traditional environmental security, global environmental security and comprehensive/human security all offer slightly different contexts for analysis (Smith 2001: 2). This paper does not view the case studies through a specific critical framework, but rather contrasts the state-centric militaristic paradigm of security with new security concepts from specific, Mediterranean communities.

It is first important to note how the field of security studies has diversified and changed in the Post-Cold-War era. In the 1990's, the end of the Cold War defined a period which forced a reconsideration of prior assumptions and understandings about the world (Bicchi 2001: 2). As Jessica T. Mathews foresaw in the landmark article “Power Shift” (Mathews 1997: 51), one of those assumptions would concern the role of the state and the rise of non-state actors.

The certainty of the state-versus-state landscape that marked the Cold War era is in decline as policy-makers, according to Bicchi, face a “vulnerability of borders” and great difficulty in «defining the type of threats and the structure of the new security game» (Bicchi 2001: 1). Bicchi presents evidence that, even after the Madrid metro (2004) and London bus bombings (2005), the EU and the European-Mediterranean partnership still have not agreed on a unified approach to address contemporary trans-national terrorism (Bicchi 2006: 189-207).

While identifying enemies remains elusive, certain taken-for-granted concepts about the sanctity of the nation-state itself within the traditional security paradigm continue to be ubiquitous. There are many cases in which conflicts arise from “within” the state instead of from “without”. Southern Sudan, Kosovo, China’s western Xinjiang region, Southeast Anatolia and northern Iraq, Israel and Palestine and now, the South Ossetia province between Russia and Georgia, are just a few of the sub-national regions where conflicts over geopolitical borders, national identity, and resources have led to violence.

These conflicts represent the complex Post Cold-War security environment where disputes are just as likely to flare up within states as between states. Again, many of these are conflicts in which the so-call-ed lines of demarcation are extremely difficult to identify. However, even in a conflict environment characterized by multiple non-state actors, the traditional state-based security paradigms are often the framework through which threats are viewed, even when the framework does not apply.

To highlight an example from the United States, there is new information about the deadly anthrax letters which killed five people in the U.S. in 2001 and sent a second shock waves of paranoia and insecurity through U.S. society shortly after the 11 September attacks. Although powerful leaders initially implicated Iraq, new reports reveal that the attacks may have originated from within the United States. The FBI listed as a prime suspect a government scientist at a military bio-defence research lab at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Still, U.S. leaders initially laid culpability on the Middle East. Senator John McCain,


speaking as a guest on the “David Letterman Show” in 2001, said he believed the spores may have come from Iraq: «There is some indication, and I don’t have the conclusions, but some of this anthrax may − and I emphasize “may” − have come in from − come from Iraq» 6.

George W. Bush Administration officials in the White House officials reportedly tried to 'link the (anthrax) attacks to Al Qaeda' and the U.S.-led War On Terror 7.

This short example demonstrates the main tenant of constructivist theory: that the meaning of what constitutes “threat” is constructed by complex power structures and processes. Even though we can pre-sume that Iraq did not mail anthrax to victims in the United States, leaders at the highest level of govern-ment constructed a connection between “Iraq” and “anthrax attacks,” thereby creating an imagined risk.

I do not believe Sen. John McCain was intentionally fabricating a case for war, but I do believe he, a decorated war veteran, was making conclusions and speculations within the comfortable framework of a deeply entrenched, state-based security paradigm.

Two main ideas support a movement toward a definition of security which goes beyond the limited paradigm of national security, military defence strategy and what Smith has called the “artificiality of geopolitical borders” (Smith 2001: 7). First, in many contemporary conflicts, individuals or non-state actors within traditional geopolitical borders may feel that their security is decoupled from their nation's security (Mathews 1997: 51). Secondly, increasingly complex and urgent environmental challenges such as climate change – predicted to continue to have a debilitating effect on economics, agriculture, ecology and society around the world - easily transcend geopolitical boundaries.

Why are issues of security still discussed and presented overwhelmingly from this state-based framework? Perhaps because political elites, powerful security policy-makers and national actors still agree that the only “rational” security strategies are those which place overall fundamental importance on the survival of the state. M.E. Sedgwick outlines this perspective: « ... the drive for state survival − the goal of any rational security strategy − is the primary agent animating policies concerned with defence» 8.

Perhaps the base expansion in Vicenza, Italy and the radar proposed for construction in the hills above Pécs, Hungary are constructed as justified based on this premise. But who is defining security? Is it really rational to prioritize state survival above all else? This view is very state-centric and, with the increasing vulnerability of the state to challenges that transcend geopolitical borders, may be losing credibility at the level of practical policy. Alternative concepts of security are gaining increasing recognition, bringing into sharp relief the profound legitimacy of citizen concerns in tension cities where new, high-impact defence infrastructure has been proposed.

Security/defence infrastructure − bases, radars, border walls and various defence technology − is often constructed on the basis of assumptions about those things which constitute existential security risks. However, critical theorists offer a valuable model of thought in which the very meaning of security is ex-amined as a function of variable factors and a product of specific social, political and environmental con-texts 9. Many scholars believe that these “existential threats” in fact, should be examined as definitions which are, in many ways, subjective and largely influenced by political power structures (Bicchi 2001: 2-3). For this reason, it is important to continue examining the word itself and those responsible for shaping its definition.

As constructivist theorists sustain, risks defined as “existential threats” are often constructions of complex political systems and hierarchies. If this is so, it can be assumed that actions taken in the name of security do not necessarily always lead to better “actual security”.

6. Sourced from this radio broadcast: “Anthrax Mystery: Questions Raised over Whether Government

Is Framing Dead Army Scientist for 2001 Attacks,” August 04, 2008 Democracy Now War and Peace Report: Retrieved 2008-08-10 from http://www.democracynow.org/2008/8/4/anthrax.

7. “Former FBI Official: After 9/11, White House told FBI to blame Anthrax Attacks on Al Qaeda,” Think Progress. Retrieved 2008-08-10 from http://thinkprogress.org/2008/08/04/al-qaeda-anthrax/.

8. See note 4. 9. This approach, with a principle view toward the role of language in the meaning of security, is a

tenant of post-modernist security studies theory.


Let’s look at an example from everyday life to underline this. Many home-owners place “security lights” around their homes in an effort to increase home security. These lights are usually turned on at night and flood the exterior of the home with light in order to deter intruders. Cities have embraced “lighting policies” in efforts to increase safety on public streets and deter crime. But a study published by the London Home Office Crime Prevention Unit concluded that, in one specific case, the idea that better or more lighting corresponds to improved “real security” was an illusion. The Office conducted a study examining the criminological impact of 3,500 brighter street lights in the Borough of Wandsworth, London. Researchers from University of Southampton, examining a database of 100,000 crimes reported to the police in the “before” and “after” stages, concluded that the lighting initiative had “little or no effect on crime”10.

Despite the fact that lighting had little or no effect on reducing crime, the study determined that a portion of the public still derived a significant sense of safety from increased lighting. According to the results of the study, there was an improved sense of security even though pedestrians walking in better-lit areas were not actually better protected from crime.

New initiatives in the name of security continue to sustain public support through what some might label an accelerating process of “securitisation.” In the above example, the issue of dark streets in London was securitised even though level of lighting was proven to have no real connection to crime. The Copenhagen school of security studies identifies three main characteristics of securitisation: first, the presumed risks justify the use of special force, second, rules are broken because of the emergency, and third, the public consents to such actions 11.

In Italy’s case, soldiers are patrolling the streets and Roma children are being fingerprinted. Italian leaders have justified the fingerprinting initiative, aimed at both Italian citizens and foreign-born Roma, with the argument that it will help integrate the children. However, it is highly symbolic that the fingerprinting is being enforced not by social workers, but by police and “forze dell’ordine”.

Have Italy’s Roma children become securitised? If so, what are the consequences and implications for the future? These questions do not have easy answers, but they highlight the importance of a critical examination of how security is defined and the powers and dynamics that define it.

4. A familiar player in the “Mediterranean security game”

Policy-makers for NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, began more seriously focusing on the Mediterranean region as a critical strategic area after the end of the Cold War. Since then, the organization has maintained a considerable physical presence in the northern Mediterranean, deploying peacekeeping forces in the Balkans, for example, and establishing radar networks. The background of the organization’s strategy in the Mediterranean is also valuable in understanding the context for the NATO radar planned for construction in Pécs, Hungary. In Vicenza, Italy, the U.S. Military is the force acting to expand infrastructure.

In 1993, NATO policy consultant RAND Corporation began researching an extensive report entitled NATO’s Mediterranean initiative: Policy issues and dilemmas (Larrabee et al. 1998) which outlined a role for the security organization in the region. This document is very helpful in understanding the conceptual framework through which influential and powerful security organizations approach the region. In many ways, the conceptual framework represented in the NATO document, soundly rooted in the traditional state-based, militaristic security paradigm, is not unlike that of the United States in terms of its view toward the region: paternalistic and characterized by broad assumptions and judgements about which issues constitute “real” threats and risks.

Here, the report’s authors outline the significance of the Mediterranean from a strategy perspective: «… Mediterranean security is likely to be an increasingly useful organizing principle for governments

10. Atkins S., S. Husain and A. Storey (1991, London), “The influence of street lighting on crime and

fear of crime”. Crime Prevention Paper No. 28, London Home Office. Retrieved 2008-08-09 from http://-www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/fcpu28.pdf.

11. For further reading on “securitization” see: Buzan, Waever, deWilde (1998).


and institutions seeking to improve the overall security climate. As NATO itself becomes more actively engaged in addressing functional security issues (e.g., proliferation, terrorism, crisis management) that cut across traditional geographic divides, the importance of the Mediterranean will be reinforced as a natural sphere for action on Europe’s doorstep» (ibidem: 3).

The language of the report, in which the Mediterranean is referred to as “Europe’s doorstep,” indicates a specific point of geographic reference: northern Europe. Use of phrases such as “doorstep” and “fault line” (ibidem: 5) to describe the Mediterranean belie a perspective in which the Mediterranean is perceived as a fringe region, a gateway or transition between two entirely separate worlds: the Middle East and Europe. The Mediterranean is presented as a nether region of strategic interest, valuable only in its relationship to other zones. In fact, the reality is much more complicated. Transitions between regions – cultural and geopolitical – are much more irregular and do not fit neatly into the dualistic view reflected here. The Mediterranean itself encompasses vast cultural, ecological and political diversity.

Although the report does highlight problematic and complex issues such as inequality of wealth distribution and poverty as clues to the origins of insecurity, it fails to propose a policy framework to address them. Through use of the words “hard” and “soft” to describe security issues, the language of the document itself creates a presumed hierarchy of more important and less important issues with specific emphasis on “hard” military threats from other states.

The RAND report also reports risk within a context of the state-centred security paradigm. It does this by representing states, specifically in the Middle East, as the main antagonists and producers of threat within a context of state-versus-state strategy and identifies risks of confrontation between Morocco and Algeria, Libya and Egypt, Egypt and Sudan, and Spain and Morocco (ibidem: 5-6). These pairings are interesting because they neatly and systematically classify threat within a state-versus-state framework. However, this framework does not always apply when applied to many contemporary conflicts.

The RAND report highlights the risks of large-scale conventional arsenals, Europe’s “looming ex-posure of Europe to longer-range weapons deployed around the Mediterranean” (ibidem: 5), weapons of mass destruction and twice mentions Europe’s vulnerability to long-range ballistic missiles deployed from the countries of Iraq, Iran and Syria (ibidem: 15-16). More than ten years later, no such attacks have occurred and Bicchi sustains that only differing views of what constitutes risk can explain how, «though no real military threat exists, NATO officials can consider the Mediterranean as a fault line».

NATO’s policy and infrastructure in the Mediterranean is still carried out within a 1990’s risk assess-ment and security framework. It is within this framework that the country of Hungary promised NATO it would build three radars in exchange for membership to the organization at the Madrid Summit in 1997. More than a decade later, Hungary’s struggle to complete the third and final radar to fulfil a 10-year-old promise to NATO has deeply unseated one peaceful little city: Pécs, Hungary.


5. Two divided concepts: National vs. Local security interests?

5.1. Unrest in “the Mediterranean city” The first major mountain to come into sight on the

train ride from Budapest to Pécs, Hungary is Jàcob hegy 12, an ancient mountain rising in the distance beyond several quaint villages, now annexed neigh-bourhoods of Pécs. Then, Golden Mountain, Aràny hegy, a flaming pyre of leaves in autumn, undulates gently towards the dramatic Misina peak with its familiar television towers pointing into the sky above the historic city centre city. In the centre city, pede-strian streets, temperate climates and a mix of Roman, Ottoman, Hapsburg and modernist influences create a rich and textured urban atmosphere.

Jókai square- Pécs, Hungary (Image: author collection)

A mosque anchors the main square and an early Christian necropolis from the 3rd century has been

designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site 13. The city has won awards as a City of Peace, named an official Quality of Life City by the Hungarian government and won the European Capital of Culture designation from the European Council for the year 2010. The municipality won this honour with an application entitled “The Border-less City”.

Though steeped in historic heritage, the Pécs cityscape is also changing. The McDonald’s in the centre square, the three English Tesco superstores that border the town and the city’s leviathan Árkád shopping centre – bright, shiny motifs of post-communist development – offer a consumer paradise of infinite choices. These new structures symbolize a new, West-facing economic and political model defined by membership to pan-European institutions such as the European Union and NATO.

But as with memberships to any powerful groups, these have not come without their obligations. One such NATO obligation, a military radar slated for construction above the city, has raised a formidable controversy and challenged perceptions about environmental safety and democracy in the public consciousness. A civil movement in Pécs has organized in opposition to the construction of the defence radar which thousands of residents believe could alter the city’s skyline, and quality of life, forever.

The history of the radar and civilian movements reaches back to 2003 when demonstrators successfully deterred the Hungarian Defence Department from building the massive radar in a primeval forest in the Western Mecsek Mountains called the Zengő forest not far from Pécs. The move to prevent the radar from being constructed in the Zengő forest found advocates in the political forum where László Sólyom, at the time a Hungarian Constitution Court member and current President of Hungary, lobbied the Defence Department to repeal its plan because of the risk it presented to a specific protected flower species [see image] found only in the contested area of the Mecsek mountain range 14. They were successful. In Hungary, the delicate flower reached an unforeseen level of botanical celebrity. But the story continues.

12. The trail to the top of Jacob Mountain winds past the ruins of a medieval monastery and, on some

days, the lookout tower offers a glimpse of rays of sunlight, called Isten ujjai, God’s fingers, in Hungarian, which filter through the clouds to graze the valley floor.

13. For more information, see UNESCO’s online reference: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/853. Retriev-ed 2008-08-13.

14. Szakács, J., “Hungary: Radar Stations vs. Wildflowers.” Transitions Online, Issue 04/27/2004. Retrieved 2008-08-13 from http://www.ceeol.com.


The Defence Department looked elsewhere to locate the radar and settled on a site on a hill in the Western Mecsek mountain range called Tubes hill on the border of Pécs’ city limits. The hill is just four kilometres from the main square and located above a principal aquifer supplying a portion of the city’s drinking water. In December 2005, just one month after the government’s announcement, citizens of the city met for the first

meeting of the Civil Movement for the Mecsek 15. The group highlighted two major areas of concern and uncertainty: the effect of the radar’s construction on the city’s water supply and the unknown effects of the radar’s non-ionizing radiation on humans, plants and animals near the city. Civil activists maintain that when they tried to contact the Department of Defence in Hungary about their concerns, they were told to contact NATO officials. They say NATO officials then, in turn, redirected them to the Hungarian Department of De-fence. The distinct lack of official accountability surrounding the radar’s construction compounded a sense of insecurity about both the science and the process of the radar’s con-struction.

“Bazsa Rozsa” Latin: Paeonia Banatica (Image: author collection)

Activists’ say they found several errors in official environmental impact reports, commissioned by the Hungarian Department of Defence, which compounded their worries. WATER

Levente Ronczyk was a research fellow in the Pécs University Department of Geology when he says he discovered errors in an environmental assessment report on the Tubes hill geology and the Tettye limestone aquifer 16. The aquifer encompasses an area of 8.6 square kilometres and has an output of 500 to 70,000 square meters of water per day 17. It is the only aquifer which Pécs can source without a pump and the Tubes hill is located near the centre point of that aquifer. Ronczyk said he discovered that the hydrology section of the report wrongly classified the hydrology of the radar site as a Class B aquifer, repeating the error twice, despite the fact that the aquifer’s true classification is “Class A” 18. Classific-ation refers to filter time required for water travelling from the surface to the water supply: for “Class B,” the time is 50 years and for “Class A,” filter time is five years: a dramatic difference. The classification system is also meant to help understand how surface soil layer disruptions will effect the water supply.

The effect of surface disruption and construction projects on water supply quality in Pécs had become a subject of attention in recent years, and the debate about construction of a radar directly over a delicate aquifer amplified this dialogue 19. Ronczyk said that, according to the Environmental Impact Assessment Report, construction of the radar would require traffic of 2,200 lorries weighing more than 10 tons and the removal of over 3,000 cubic meters of surface soil and 6,150 cubic meters of sub-surface rock. Structur-al addition would entail an addition of more than 10,000 cubic meters of stone material and concrete 20.

15. (Hun) Civilek a Mecsekért Mozgalom. 16. Information based on interview with Mr. Ronczyk at the Department of Geology at the University

of Pécs, Hungary, March, 2007. 17. “A Tettye-forràs” (1999 June) From a publication of the Pécs Waterworks in honour of the

anniversary of the inauguration of the city’s water supply. 18. According to regulation 4719-162006-4948 of the Southern Transdanubian Environmental Protec-

tion and Water Agency. 19. Source: author interview with Levente Ronczyk, Pécs, March 2007. 20. “Tubes” 3D Lokàtoràllomàs épitése Környezeti Hatàsvizsgàlat” (2006, June) Budapest. Építéster-

vező és Mérnöki Tanácsadó Iroda Kft. Munkaszàm: 16/2006.


Height of Proposed Radar: 651-653 meters Image: CMM website Oil and gas for the radar’s power supply would also be stored on-site – something which CMM (Civil Movement for the Mecsek) lawyers point out is in abject breach of laws protecting Class A hydrological caches 21. Ronczyk said that when he called the authors of the report to inquire about the errors, a representative from the Hungarian environmental consultancy institute contracted to carry out the assessment told him the errors were “editing mistakes”. When I visited the Department of Geology to talk with Levente Ronczyk in 2007, Dr. Gyula Konràd, Director of the Department of

Geology and an expert on the geology of the Western Mecsek said he believed the report was “full of errors” and that he got the impression that the report’s authors had “not even visited Pécs,” yet the erroneous environmental impact assessment report had already been submitted to local governmental bodies, Defence Department leaders and the Hungarian Parliament as a basis upon which to make important decisions about the radar’s suitability to the site.

A supplementary impact environmental impact report 22 also contained a serious mistake, radar oppo-

nents say. A viewshed analysis 23 was shown from a perspective 2.3 kilometres distance from the actual proposed radar site on Tubes hill. The viewshed analysis showed that the city was not in the “view” of the radar nor, therefore, its radiation. In actuality, CMM says, the city is squarely in the viewshed of the proposed radar.

Dr. Lóránd Kellényi, a biophysicist at the University of Pécs studying the effects of mobile phones on brain function, has been an outspoken critic of the proposed radar. He emphasizes that the effects of con-tinuous exposure to non-ionizing radiation, such as the radiation that would be emitted by the NATO radar, on human beings is not yet known. He said that the World Health Organization even advises against placing cellular phone towers near high-density population zones, and their radiation is not nearly as strong as that of military radars 24.

Dr. Kellényi was just one of many scientists in a widening circle of psychologists, physicists, electrical engineers, geologists and biologists joining the Civil Movement for the Mecsek (CMM) in que-stioning the planned radar, its proximity to the city, its seemingly arbitrary proposed location and its po-tential risks.

Economists, realtors and home-owners raised questions about the risk of falling home prices in the neighbourhoods near the radar. Mothers from a specific neighbourhood near the site attended marches and organized petitions on behalf of their children, pointing out that children would be developmentally more vulnerable to potentially harmful radiation. CMM held rallies, marches and hosted weekly hikes to Tubes hill to encourage citizens to get to know the hill and its surroundings.

21. According to Hungarian Government Order 123/1997. 22. “Frédéric Joliot-Curie” Radiation Research Institute (Országos “Frédéric Joliot-Curie” Sugárbio-

lógiai és Sugáregészségügyi Kutató Intézet), official viewshed analysis commissioned by the Hungarian Defence Department, page 3.

23. A view of a specific geographic area, imaged by GIS software, which is calculated from a specific geographic point.

24. Source: author interview with Dr. Lóránd Kellényi, Pécs, Hungary, June, 2007. Dr. Kellényi is a widely-published author of reports on the effects of radiation on brain and heart function, specifically in regards to mobile telephones.


A LEGAL QUAGMIRE With a growing cache of letters, reports, documents, studies and statements from experts raising

serious questions about the radar’s potential risks, the scientific documents and reports collected and ar-chived by the Civil Movement for the Mecsek became even more extensive – perhaps even more thorough and accurate – than that of the Defence Department. The information proved convincing. Over 15,000 residents of Pécs signed a petition organized by CMM requesting a referendum to ratify a building code, thereby placing absolute restriction on the radar’s construction. The referendum was preceded by intense information campaigns by both the Defence Department and the Civil Movement for the Mecsek.

In the public referendum, held on March 4, 2007, approximately one third of the electorate particip-ated and 38,870 residents voted to ratify the building code and stop construction of the radar: 95% of those who voted. The voter turnout was unprecedented – higher than voter turnout for the previous two mayoral elections and previous votes about accession to NATO and accession to the European Union, according to CMM lawyers. However, because voter turnout was below 51%, the minimum percentage re-quired for a referendum to be valid in Hungary, the results of the referendum were deemed legally invalid.

Within the local government, the situation of representative democracy quickly degenerated. On several occasions, entire groups of politicians and council representatives virtually boycotted votes by simply not attending meetings regarding the ratification of the building code – a move that could have placed restrictions on the radar construction 25. Whether they were intimidated, even pressured, not to come to the meetings is not clear, but one thing is certain: democracy faltered.

The breakdown of democratic processes at the local level was symbolic of a dramatic tension between local and national interests as civilian and Defence Department voices vied relentlessly for allies in the public and political spheres. Local civilians outlined very clear objections to the radar’s construction. The Defence Department, on the other hand, was beholden to NATO, under a deadline to complete the radar and in need of the organization’s funding to carry out its own national security agenda.

In letters to the Hungarian Defence Department and NATO, Dr. Csilla Vicze, spokeswoman for CMM and a lawyer, emphasized several important legal points. She highlighted the fact that the proposed site of the NATO radar, the Tubes hill, is located within an area designated as a “European Union Natura 2000” 26 protected zone because of its rare plant and insect species 27. She also repeatedly requested that Hungarian Defence Department and NATO leaders respect values of democratic transparency in the decision-making processes involving the radar’s planning, abide by civil rather than military law, respect international environmental law and adhere to the tenants of the Aarhus Convention 28.

The Aarhus Convention is an environmental agreement 29 which links human rights to environmental rights and proposes that sustainable development should involve all stakeholders through governmental transparency and informational access in the implementation of international agreements 30. Although Hungary is a signatory to the Aarhus Convention, civilians of Pécs, Hungary and CMM lawyers contest that they were repeatedly denied access to information regarding plans for the radar’s use and information about its radiation levels because, according to the Defence Department, the information was “classified.”

25. Source: author interview with Levente Ronczyk, Pécs, March 2007. 26. The buffer zone of the NATURA 2000 Zemplén Regional Landscape Protection Area. 27. In her letter to NATO, Dr. Csilla Vicze, a lawyer, cites the following legal reference: «According

to paragraph 6.(4) of the 92/43/EEC European Union Habitat Principle, the interests of high priority Natura 2000 areas, to ensure advantageous positions of high priority species, can only be overruled by a high community priority such as the protection of safety, life and health. In such cases it must be proven that there are no other alternatives and the European Committee must give their opinion before the final decision. Defense interests in general do not belong to these issues».

28. Vicze, Dr. Csilla. “A letter to the NATO” (Pécs, May 5, 2008). Sourced from the website of the Civil Movement for the Mecsek on 2008-8-13 from http://www.cmm.hu/?cat=szov&id=213.

29. The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted on June 25, 1998 in Aarhus, Denmark at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in the “Environment for Europe” process.

30. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe website. Retrieved 2008-08-14 from: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/.


Although CMM leaders acknowledged that confidentiality agreements between NATO and its member states are legally binding, they lobbied for public access to radar information and plans based on the argument that 160,000 Pécs residents could be affected by the constant radiation emitted by the radar. They also argued that residents, dependent on the Tettye Aquifer for the public water supply, could be effected by the radar’s close proximity to the Tettye Aquifer, and therefore had a right to detailed infor-mation about the radar's construction. SECURITY ON THEIR OWN TERMS

The Civil Movement for the Mecsek’s Statement of Purpose 31 offers insight into how local Pécs citizens define their own well-being, possibly lending credence to alternative definitions and paradigms of security. The group’s founding principles are also interesting because of their striking similarity to those of other civilian movements such as the one in Vicenza, Italy.

The group, in its statement of purpose, states a desire to: preserve the forest surrounding the city; avoid the militarization of the city; protect the city’s drinking water; and avoid exposure to a constant electro-magnetic field. The desire to maintain the health and safety of the local ecosystem is stressed repeatedly. The group also emphasizes the way in which the radar’s constant and commanding presence on the skyline could negatively shape the city’s identity and redefine the “consciousness” of its residents. It is also important to notice how Civil Movement for the Mecsek emphasizes a belief in a profound connection between the health of the environment and all other aspects of life in the city of Pécs: civil so-ciety, health, leisure, psychological well-being, economics, and even the dignity of the city’s architectural heritage. Also interesting is the fact that the group clearly identifies the proposed radar and a process of “securitisation” in the city (a process which they unanimously reject) with the collective psychological health and well-being of the community. The group also requests participative governance and a right to influence the decisions which effect the health and well-being of the community.

5.2. Concerns in Vicenza, Italy

Residents of the city of Vicenza, Italy first heard rumours about a potential expansion of the city's 50-year-old U.S. military base sometime around 2004. That’s when Vicenza activist Guido LaNaro 32 first started attending meetings of a group of political representatives, unions and others which had organized an interest group to keep track of news from the U.S. base. Then, in 2006, the group confirmed the base expansion. However, the group learned that the base would not be expanded to-ward an undeveloped area away from the city, as they had expected, but toward the city itself and a green area called Dal Molin.

Vicenza, Italy (Image: author collection)

The group joined other neighbourhood groups, urban initiatives and community committees and formed what would become known as the civil movement “No Dal Molin”. When then-President Romano Prodi gave his official consent to the U.S. military base expansion on 17 May, 2007, the group decided to begin meeting once a week to discuss the issue.

Concerns about the base were immediately raised, and Vicenza civilians involved in “No Dal Molin” began to ask serious questions about how the enlarged base would impact the city. LaNaro said the issue

31. Civil Movement for the Mecsek. “Statement of Purpose”. Http://cmm.hu/?cat=szov&id=54. Web.

5 November 2009. 32. Source: Author interview with Guido LaNaro, June, 2008, Vicenza, Italy.


of the infrastructural impact on air quality became a primary concern. Vicenza is surrounded by hills to the south and urban areas border the city on all other sides except for the channel of open space, called the “ecological door” of the city: Dal Molin. According to LaNaro, citizens worried that construction in the zone could block the only critical air current that cleans the city’s air and removes pollution.

To LaNaro and his fellow civil activists, the argument that the expanded military base could benefit the local economy also seemed weak. LaNaro said that according to 1954 bilateral accords governing military alliance between the United States and Italy and an agreement called Peso Condiviso, Italy would be required to pay 41 percent of the costs of the infrastructure construction. Even though the utilities of the expanded U.S. Base − energy, water and fuel - would be paid by the United States, public infrastructure would be taxed with the obligation of providing resources to the base and the external cost of increased resource use would be borne by the citizens of the city. LaNaro said that one estimate placed the daily water use of an expanded base at the same daily water consumption level of 30,000 civilians. With the issue of water access becoming a growing issue of contention around the world, residents were worried.

The question of water access and resources extended to another important issue as well: the large aquifer directly underneath Dal Molin. It is one of the largest aquifers in northern Italy. The aquifer supplies drinking water to thousands of citizens and is a critical hydrological source for agriculture in the region. Could massive military infrastructure pose a risk to the aquifer? To civilian activists, it seemed possible, as they believe the base expansion will contribute to a massive surface disruption and therefore impact hydrogeology. Activists asked officials for specific scientific information and environmental impact reports, but they say no one could answer their questions and residents could only speculate. LaNaro said no clear information about the details of the base expansion had been released to the public. He said most people understood the often-secretive nature of military proceedings, yet no one could explain the mysterious absence of any sort of environmental impact report. Many wondered: who would be accountable for the base’s environmental impact? As of June, 2008, LaNaro said an official environ-mental impact report still had not been produced.

LaNaro said an accident in the spring of 2008 also drew attention to the vulnerable state of local environmental resources. According to activists, a 50-year-old pipeline carrying oil from La Spezia in the region of Liguria to a U.S. military base in Aviano broke. The pipeline, which broke somewhere north of Vicenza, leaked an unknown amount of oil into a nearby river producing a strong smell – evidence of environmental damage that was never quantified. All documents referring to the accident are considered classified and the local media, perhaps because of its contentious nature, didn’t touch the story. Because the amount of oil spilled is not known, Guido LaNaro said he, and many others, worry that the aquifer under Vicenza could have been affected.

It is perhaps incidents like these that form the basis for the perennial worry among many local Vicenza residents that the U.S. military base expansion will not necessarily come hand in hand with environmental accountability. Although a group of engineers once proposed ideas for an alternative uses for Dal Molin, LaNaro said, which included ideas to use the space as an educative or cultural centre for the city or as dedicated open space, he said the ideas were never considered or implemented by authorities.

Although local leaders requested a public referendum on the issue of the base expansion in 2008, the public referendum was not granted and construction of the base will continue as planned. 6. The role of gender

I would like to briefly bring attention to the topic of gender in civilian movements in the Mediterra-nean. Women have played a central role in civil movements, both in Pécs and Vicenza, as leaders, nego-tiators, mediators and emissaries to the world. According to Zalewski, re-framing issues in international relations through the lens of gender can be a valuable tool in rethinking conventional knowledge and understandings (Zalewski 1995: 341).

In Pécs, Hungary, Dr. Csilla Vicza’s strong leadership and the gender balance in the civil movement contrasts greatly with what Zalewski highlights as a dramatic decline in the number of women in roles as parliamentary representatives in Hungary beginning in the early 1990’s (ibidem: 343). But while repres-


entation of women may have declined in parliament, women in Pécs have emerged as leaders in CMM. In Vicenza, women were key founders of No Dal Molin and, with their peers and allies, organized a rally in the city which drew thousands of demonstrators from around the world in 2007.

The inquiry into the role that gender plays will continue to be important in conflict and security studies as women continue to bear the suffering of war and disproportionately suffer displacement. Zalewski sustains that understanding of the world and international relations can be deepened by asking the question “what is happening to women” (ibidem: 341). Of course, an understanding of the Mediter-ranean can also be deepened by asking the complimentary question ‘what are women doing’? In Pécs and Vicenza, women are part of actively creating new definitions of security in the Mediterranean: a security which is egalitarian, deeply connected to local economies and environments, and focused on human well-being, collaborations and solidarity.

Recognizing and examining the role of gender in conflict as well as peace will continue to be important in the work to examine and transcend the limits of traditional, state-based military security paradigms. 6.1. The economy of securitisation and popular culture

The RAT 31 radar proposed for the hill above Pécs, Hungary is produced by the company SELEX 33, a subsidiary of the Italian company Finmeccanica, one of Europe’s largest defence industry conglo-merates. While members of the group Civil Movement for the Mecsek have a concept of culture which decisively excludes a SELEX radar, Finmeccanica is an active patron of the high arts. The conglomerate has sponsored the Spoleto festival for many years, sponsored publishing projects, concerts, musical events, urban redevelopment and exhibitions in the figurative and visual arts.

Although there is not enough room or space to broach the question here, an examination of security paradigms would be greatly deepened through a study of economic powerhouses in the defence industry and their role as creators of two spheres of culture – security culture and aesthetic culture. This balance, or veritable reconciliation, of war industries and fine arts represents the entrenchment of the traditionalist security paradigm within the very fabric of society. It is relevant to ask the question: is securitisation profitable? The answer is a resounding “yes”, but perhaps with some unseen costs. An examination of securitisation and its role in popular culture is critical: the beneficiary may be the museum next door. Conclusion − Common definitions which cross borders

The motivating factors behind the organization of grass-roots civilian movements such as those in Pécs, Hungary and Vicenza, Italy are strikingly similar. Because these groups agree that the construction of additional or new military infrastructure in their cities would contribute to a collective increase in insecurity, the alternatives which they present provide us with a clear definition for the way in which they define security.

Though such civilian movements are often viewed as mechanisms of resistance acting within accepted and predominant security paradigms, the rules of which are defined by groups such as NATO and the U.S. Military, perhaps these movements instead should be viewed as presenting an alternative paradigm. This locally-based, environmentally conscious concept of security perhaps could also be considered “positive” rather than “negative” because these civilian movements do not define their communities’ security in reference to constant and ever-present threats (except for the military infrastructure they resist), but in reference to existing positives: resources such as air, water, green areas, healthy local eco-nomies and the unique relationships which define their cities.

The groups, Civil Movement for the Mecsek and No Dal Molin, also share a common insecurity: uncertainty. Their experiences and struggles are characterized by a lack of information about how major infrastructural projects will affect their lives, their environments and their health and a distinct inability to use democratic measures to express their collective will. In both cases, civilian inquiries are met with

33. Personal correspondence by email with NATO library, April 16, 2007.


secrecy in the name of security. Attempts at public referendums failed in both cities. Channels which normally permit the transparent distribution of information and participative citizen feedback are closed and void. Again, according to the Copenhagen School theorists, the very process of securitisation itself creates an environment in which rules are broken and civil values such as public accountability and de-mocratic citizen participation can be compromised without justification.

Defence infrastructure such as a military radar in Pécs, Hungary or an expanded military base in Vicenza, Italy, built in the name of national security, can not help resolve food shortages, environmental pollution etc., and may, in fact, compound these insecurities by deviating attention, energy and resources from the resolution or prevention of urgent social, economic and environmental problems. Major security actors continue an agenda characterized by massive defence infrastructure-building in the Mediterranean, even though this policy framework often fails to address new and developing concepts of security and is formed through closed processes which exclude local populations.

Civil groups have recognized their common insecurities and created strong networks around a common alternative vision. Their vision is one which involves an awareness of resources and vital needs for transparent democracy and healthy civil society. Their vision also contains a common world view in which the health of the environmental is strongly and intrinsically linked to human security. They also use similar tools to achieve their objectives.

The groups have attempted to use channels of representative democracy, such as referendums, as a tool, but implement complimentary strategies as well such as petitions, trans-national networking and symbolic demonstrations of solidarity. The Internet has also served as an important networking tool for these civil groups and acted as a medium for distributing information, rallying support and exerting pressure through increased physical and virtual presence.

According to the lessons from Pécs and Vicenza, one thing is clear: a new vocabulary and framework for defining security in the Mediterranean is present. Dominant policy-makers and leaders have an oppor-tunity to explore this framework of security that emphasizes environmental and economic sustainability, democracy, and inclusion, and grants civil populations representation in decision-making.

With the failure of the traditional security paradigm, based on armament and military defence, to address new challenges such as rising tides, food shortages, and climate change, comes an opportunity for paradigm shift in conceptualizations of security. The Mediterranean region has a critical investment in mitigating the devastating effects of new challenges such as water shortages and pollution. These chal-lenges also cross geopolitical borders and boundaries, so their solutions will increasingly require a critical examination of borders and their human and environmental contexts. Future security will depend on local and regional approaches and a new model could also implement bottom-up instead of top-down security definitions.

With its diverse communities each seeking to cultivate human, economic and environmental security, the Mediterranean could emerge as a model region as, increasingly, global leaders seek to cross the “security divide”.

REFERENCES

Bicchi F. (2001), “European security perceptions vis à vis the Mediterranean: Theoretical and empirical considerations from the 1990’s”, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics (n. 39), Department of Political Studies, Catania.

Bicchi F. (2006), “Talking tough or talking together? European security discourses toward the Mediterranean”, Mediterranean Politics, 2, 2.

Buzan B., O. Waever, J. deWilde (1998), Security: A new framework for analysis, Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London.

Dabelko G.D. (2008), “An uncommon peace: Environment, development, and the global security agenda”, Environment, 50, 3.


Del Porto D. (2008), “Inchiesta sui rifiuti, a Napoli si spacca la procura”, La Repubblica, July 30. Dino M. (1999), “E Silvio Berlusconi lancia il ‘Security day’; Paissan: ‘Norme isteriche’ “ [Electronic

version] Corriere della Sera, September 21. Larrabee S.F. et al. (1998), NATO’s Mediterranean initiative: Policy issues and dilemmas, RAND

Monograph Report-957-IMD. Mathews J.T. (1997), “Power shift”, Foreign Affairs, 76, 1. Petrini C. (2008), “Il complesso di superiorità”, La Repubblica, July 30. Polchi V. (2008), “A piedi e armati di pistola le pattuglie dei soldati in città: così da lunedì saranno

schierati 3,000 militari”, La Repubblica, , July 30. Smith H.A. (2001), “Facing environmental security”, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 4, 1. Tosatto F. (2008), “Vicenza, via libera alla base Usa corteo di protesta dei ‘No dal Molin’ ”, La

Repubblica (30 luglio). Zalewski M. (1995), “Well, what is the feminist perspective on Bosnia?”, International Affairs, 71, 2.

THE “CROSSINGS” ALONG THE DIVIDE: THE CYPRIOT EXPERIENCE

Maria Hadjipavlou Department of Social and Political Science

University of Cyprus

Abstract: This article discusses the dynamics of ‘crossings’ by citizens across the Green Line in Cyprus. The socio-psychological and reconciliation perspective is privileged. The article presents a number of individual stories of people reconciliation after thirty year of “mutual quarantine” on both side of the island. The data is collected from individual interviews, from direct observation and media reports. In divided societies, maintaining contact across ethnic, religious, or geographical barriers is paramount for two significant reasons: first, it helps soften stereotypes and misperceptions and gradually complicates the “enemy image;” and second, without institutional support these contacts can reconfirm old stereo-types or misperceptions (Allport 1954). It is argued that whereas individual contacts form part of un-official reconciliation process and constitute an element of informal peace education, they are not suf-ficient processes unless the decision-making levels both legitimate these processes and provide adequate institutional infrastructures. Keywords: Border-crossing, “enemy image”, reconciliation

• − • − •

Introduction «A day after our Easter in 2003 I crossed to the other side and visited my house in Lapythos. The Turkish Cypriot woman who has been living in my house invited us in and offered us coffee and not only that, she asked us to stay for lunch. I was emotionally drained. I almost collapsed. Looking at the house I felt so sad: they had not even put a brush of paint on it. It looked so aged. Our orchard was dry, not a drop of water on the trees. They had sold it to some foreign couple to build a villa. How could I bear it? I left feeling sick and weak… could not stand on my own legs… » (Eleni, Greek Cypriot refugee, 2006).

I heard the above experience in a doctor’s waiting room where the woman speaking, Eleni, had met another refugee from the nearby village Karavas who recalled: «I, too, crossed but only once and went to my village. The people in my house were nice and clean but my pain was so big, my heart started beating fast and my daughter had to carry me to the car and decided not to go again. The village looked different … I called my neighbors’ names but they were not there... ».

What struck me, as I listened to these women in the doctor’s waiting room, was that the Greek Cypriot refugees’ story has changed since the opening of the Green Line on April 23, 2003. They now include the presence of the Other who has been inhabiting the homes of their memories and their ‘personal sovereign space’. These “visits” have a striking physical impact on their bodies and invoke an unparalleled intensi-ty of feelings as they see their house not cared for (not a brush of paint on it) and must acknowledge the break up of their neighborhood (I called out the names of my neighbors but they were not there). The realization that even if they did return to their villages, the community would not be the same as the one they remembered from thirty years ago.

Despite the pain, however, both women saw the humanity and kindness in the Turkish Cypriots who

Maria Hadjipavlou 58

live in their houses, allowing a transcendence of rigid, historical ethno-religious identities. All Cypriots who have crossed and who I have met all talked about the coffee offering (coffee in Cyprus is a symbol both of welcome but also of consolation after a sad event, such as a loss or death) and the ritual that this entails.

This element of mutual humanization despite the pain is indeed part of the reconciliation processes that thousands of Cypriots − Greek, Turkish, Armenian, Maronite, Latin and others − have experienced in the last five years. Statistics inform us that the first six months (April to October 2003) about one and a half million Greek Cypriots crossed to the North and 700,000 Turkish Cypriots to the South. The United Nations office in Cyprus estimates that a total of nine million people have crossed in the first three years from the 2003 to 2006. If we were to merely to base our analysis on these mere statistics one would have concluded that ‘reconciliation’ has been, to some extent, achieved at the grass root level since no violence has occurred. However, this has not been the case. A high percentage of Greek and Turkish Cypriots have not yet crossed to the other side.

Many who crossed and saw their old homes and properties returned with new re-constructed memories, experiences, stories and feelings. The past was recalled and re-lived by those who owned the houses and properties and those who listened to the memories of the past owners in their current ex-perience. Both felt embodied in a past and both desired a future different from the present which sits on the past. But neither dared clearly articulate as yet this future and how it is to be imagined. Some felt, after a few trips, that it was time to “say goodbye” to what used to be theirs but felt it was no longer so, since they have constructed “new attachments” and some have grown old with grandchildren on the other side (Papadakis 2005). Some analysts, international journalists and academics spoke about a new history being made in the early days of the crossings which connected people who were former “enemies” or invisible, nameless ‘others’. The young generation which had learned only mediated information about the “other side, the fearful other”, has been given an opportunity to experience the other and the “occupied lands” and they learned at school ‘not to forget’. Often the young became the witnesses of their parents’ recollection of their past which was kept alive through family stories.

The article is structured as follows: I will first give a brief background to the Cyprus conflict and partial opening of the Line in April 23, 2003. I then provide a general discussion on reconciliation follow-ed by an analysis of the stories and experiences of Cypriots − Greek, Turkish, Armenian, Maronite and Latin − when crossing the Line from both sides. The data come from interviews I conducted from 2003 until now, and from Greek and Turkish Cypriot press articles and television programs. What are the implications from these findings regarding the reconciliation processes in general? I contend that these contacts by themselves are not sufficient dynamic unless they are supported institutionally and legitim-ated at the macro level. I conclude with some policy recommendations regarding the inclusion of these narratives to the master narrative.

1. Cyprus: History of the conflict

The geo-strategic location of Cyprus in the easternmost part of the Mediterranean has made it vulnerable to outside conquests and interference. Whichever power dominated the region also controlled Cyprus. The Achean Greeks settled on the island in the 2nd millennium B.C., formed city-kingdoms on the Minoan model, and introduced the Greek language and culture. To this day the Greek Cypriots refer to this period to stress the Hellenic heritage and its continuity to the present. The Turkish Cypriots stress the three centuries of the Ottoman presence (1571-1878) which determined the inter-ethnic character of the island. When Cyprus obtained its independence in 1960 the Turkish Cypriots comprised 18% of the population and Greeks 80%. The demographics were cited as 82% Greek Cypriots, however, as the1960 constitution forced the Armenian, Maronite and Latin 2 percent of the population to choose one of the two major communities to belong to, all of them chose to belong to the Greek Cypriot majority.

In 1878 the British took control of the island and Cyprus became a British colony in 1925. During the anti-colonial struggle in 1955-59 the Greeks of Cyprus fought the British for “enosis” (union) with “motherland” Greece, whereas the Turks of Cyprus demanded “taxim”, partition, or a union of part of the island with “motherland” Turkey. The 1950s was a period of intense inter-ethnic mistrust, fears and vio-lence. According to Turkish Cypriot writers (Salih 1968; Nedjatigil 1997), the Turkish Cypriot leadership

The “crossings” along the divide: The Cypriot experience 59

expected that eventually the Greek fighters would terrorize the Turkish Cypriot community. As a result, by 1957 the “Turkish Resistance Organization” (TMT) had been formed in an effort to counteract the E.O.K.A (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).

The British politicized intra-communal differences as a tool to serve their colonial interests in the Middle East (Pollis 1998) and reinforced the rise of the two antagonistic nationalisms and competing visions based on each group’s “primordial attachments” to their respective motherlands. A compromise settlement was worked out by outside stakeholders − Greece, Turkey and Britain − which led to the creation in 1960 of the Cyprus Republic (Xydis 1973).

Cyprus is a case of an imposed settlement which ignored prevailing local realities (culture of intolerance, inter-ethnic violence) and micro level concerns (Kitromilides 1977). The imposed accom-modation and constitutional arrangements remained fragile and inter-ethnic violence broke out in December 1963 and later in 1967 (Kyriakides 1968). This resulted in the creation of a “Green line,” that is, a dividing line in the capital Nicosia to keep the two warring factions apart. This line was drawn by the British commander and was later patrolled by the United Nations Peace Keeping Force. Turkish Cypriot enclaves were set up in the major cities of the island where Turkish Cypriots moved for security reasons. Since then the Cyprus Republic has been run exclusively by the Greek Cypriots.

The period between 1963 and 1974 was a time of unequal social and economic development, another factor that drew the two communities further apart. Greek Cypriots experienced economic prosperity and modernization, whereas Turkish Cypriots entered a period of economic and cultural dependency on Turkey, which they regarded as their “protector” from Greek Cypriot domination. In the early 1970s extremist groups in both communities with the help of outside parties − the Greek junta (supported by the American administration) − launched a coup d’état in July 1974, followed by the Turkish military inter-vention on July 20 and August 14, respectively. This led to de facto partition of the island followed by massive displacement of both communities, hundreds were killed, thousands became missing persons and an economic catastrophe ensued. In 1983 the Turkish Cypriot leadership, Rauf Denktash with the full support of the Ankara declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) but failed to gain recognition by any other country but Turkey, which meant international isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and increased dependency on Turkey. Over the years the demographic composition in the north has changed with the influx of people from poor Turkish regions. This created what became known as “the settlers problem”. There are estimated to be 200,000 Turkish settlers living in Northern Cyprus and often the Turkish Cypriots say they feel a minority in their own side.

A long series of inter-communal high-level negotiations have been conducted on and off since 1975 under the United Nations auspices, but to this day no mutually acceptable agreement has been reached.

2. The opening of the green line

The Line that splits the island into two is about 112 miles long separating North and South. This Line carries different names according to one’s positioning in politics, ideology and history. It is referred to as the green line, – as it was first called in 1963 after the first interethnic violence-the ceasefire line, the dead zone, the demarcation line, the partitioning line, the Attila line, the no-man’s land or the border, designated after the 1974 events (Hadjipavlou 2006; Cockburn 2004). It has been partially opened on April 23, 2003, in five sites – three in the Nicosia district, one in the Famagusta area, and one in Larnaca.

Prior to the opening, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, had submitted a Plan for a com-prehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem to the leaders of the two communities. This latest initiative which became known as the “Annan Plan” was defeated in joint referenda whereby the Greek Cypriots voted by 76%. ‘No’ to the Plan and 67% of the Turkish Cypriots voted ‘Yes’, supporting reunification with entry to the European Union of the whole of the island. A week later, May 1, 2004 the Republic of Cyprus became a member of the European Union.

This marked a new turning point in the recent history of Cyprus. Some Greek Cypriot politicians referred to the ‘Europeanization’ of the conflict. The EU has always supported the UN efforts for a lasting settlement which would guarantee the basic needs, civil, political and cultural rights of all the Cypriot citizens (Bryant 2004a, 2004b; Tocci 2004; Joseph 1997).


Prior to the referenda there occurred many changes in the Turkish Cypriot community, namely massive mobilization and public demonstrations led by the left and the center-left , the youth, women and NGOs, all supporting a change of leadership and of the status quo. This “revolution from below” led the military and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to open some ‘gates’ across the Green Line with the subsequent “crossings”. There followed a change in leadership. Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat who comes from the left, the Turkish Republican Party, succeeded Mr. Rauf Denktash, as the leader of the community. Thus the pro solution forces came to power in the North. In the Greek Cypriot side Tassos Papadopoulos from the center-right became the president backed by the communist party AKEL and the socialist party, EDEK. He promoted the view that the Annan Plan was pro Turkish, and that it did not respond to the Greek Cypriots’ need for security and full human rights. In his view accepting the plan would have meant the dissolution of the Cyprus Republic without any guarantee that the agreement could have been implemented, given Turkey’s untrustworthiness. These different and competing interpretations of the Plan deepened the divisions.

Despite the “crossings” which helped, as I will argue below, smooth out many old stereotypes and misperceptions while at the same time creating new and different ones, the post referenda climate was one of renewed mistrust and feelings of betrayal especially among the Turkish Cypriot left (Republican Turkish Party PRT) who expected the Greek Cypriot left (AKEL) to vote ‘yes’ to the Plan which, instead cha-racterized it as an “Anglo-American”, which they claimed did not serve the interests of the Cypriot people.

The adversarial discourse at the official levels created frustration among the pro solution people in both communities as well as weakening the engagement in the rapprochement work. The international community and the European Union were surprised by the Greek Cypriot negative vote. The international attention then focused on how to help the Turkish Cypriots get out of their political and economic isolation and did not give enough attention to the fact that a change of leadership in the Greek Cypriot community meant a different philosophy and understanding of the solution from the previous Clerides’ administration. There followed a period of frustration, lack of empathy and reinforcement of mispercep-tions (‘the Greeks do not wants us” attitude). A recycle of the conflict culture re-emerged with the con-sequences still lurking nowadays.

In recent election in the Republic of Cyprus Mr. Demetris Christofias, the secretary general of the left party AKEL, was elected president. He and Mr. Talat have known each other for many years and have both committed to a “Cypriot solution for the Cypriots and by the Cypriots”. They soon agreed to the opening of the Ledra Street/Locmaci which was closed by barbed wire since 1963. The latest UN initiative was a meeting between the leaders of the two communities in March 2008 in which both leaders agreed to the establishment of working groups and technical committees to discuss both day-today issues and of substance. The two leaders also agreed to start official negotiations in September 2008. There is a renewed hope in both communities and a new challenge for civil society.

3. Reconciliation – the concept, the goal and the process

«There is no handy roadmap to reconciliation. There is no short cut or simple prescription for healing the wounds and divisions of a society in the aftermath of sustained violence. Creating trust and understanding between former enemies is an extremely difficult challenge. It is, however, an essential one to address in the process of building a lasting peace. Examining the painful past, acknowledging it and understanding it, and above all transcending it together is the best way to guarantee that it does not-and cannot-happen again» (Tutu 2003).

Desmond Tutu of South Africa in the above quote highlights the importance of coming to terms with

the painful past as a goal to guarantee that it will not happen again. This is of particular importance in the case of deep-rooted and protracted conflicts like the Cyprus one (Bar-Tal 2000; Burton 1990; Azar 1985). Key concepts here are “acknowledgement, understanding and transcending” the past together. All three processes are complex and involve acts of willingness, courage and risk. Both the leadership and civil organizations can play a crucial role in such processes as it did in South Africa, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, East Timor and elsewhere.


The issue of reconciliation in conflict societies needs to be understood both in the pre-and-post solution period. In Cyprus the efforts for a solution at the macro level have created, as mentioned earlier, a further polarization as this was expressed during and after the referenda without any mention of reconciliation, or of coming to terms with the painful past..

If we accept that much of the hatred, fears, negative stereotyping, misperceptions, competing inter-pretations of historical events, contested identities and ambiguities, victimhood, silencing of the other and enemy images are part of the conflict culture in Cyprus and are constructed and thus learned and often reproduced and transferred inter-generationally in formal and informal education, then we can, with the appropriate interventions, de-construct them and transform this conflict system (Lederah 1997). One of such interventions has been the people’s “crossings” during the last three years. I have spoken to many people from both sides who have crossed: the new personal stories and feelings that emerge are complex and point to the need for reconciliation and empathy building across the Line. A new human community is being created whose stories are based on direct personal experiences that often challenge the official pronouncements and past collective narratives.

It is well understood that when one group has victimized another or when there has been mutual victimization by two groups, if the groups continue to live near each other, reconciliation is essential to stop potential violence and to facilitate healing (Staub 1989, 2002). There is a positive cyclical relation-ship between healing and reconciliation for as reconciliation begins it increases security and makes healing possible which as it progresses, makes reconciliation become more possible. This is a cycle in which progress in one realm fosters progress in the other. As Staub informs us, being the victim is often a psychologically comforting position. Victims are absolved from the need to accept r responsibility for their role in the conflict. They are, furthermore, preoccupied with the distant and recent past of the conflict and cannot attend to the possibility of a future co-existence. Victims are conscious exclusively of their own pain and cannot empathize with the suffering of the Other party : This is what Montville coined as “egoism of victimhood” (Montville 1987). Conflicts become even more intractable when each side views itself as the only legitimate victim. Reconciliation is a process that redesigns our relationships so that a society can move from a divided past to a shared future (Bloomfield 2003). To engage in this process especially in protracted conflicts we need to understand that it takes years if not decades (Azar 1990; Kriesberg 1999).

Reconciliation is more than co-existence or formerly hostile groups living near each other. It is even more than formerly hostile groups interacting and working together, although working together for shared goals is one important avenue to overcome hostility and negative views of the other (Allport 1954; Staub 1989, 2000; Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis 1998, 2002; Hadjipavlou 2003, 2004) and move toward reconcilia-tion. I view reconciliation as the capacity to reach to the other, feel empathy for their suffering and engage in shared social activities. This means mutual acceptance and trust-building preceded by the task of forgiveness whereby victims and perpetrators come to acknowledge past hurts. They come to see the humanity of one another, and see the possibility of a new constructive relationship.

Apart from entailing the healing of relationships, the underpinnings of reconciliation include economic justice, power-sharing, equality and recognition of separate and multiple identities, and the fulfillment of basic human needs (Sisk 1997; Kelman 1990). According to Kriesberg (1999) processes of reconciliation are complex and unending and whatever kind of reconciliation is attained is not permanent. He supports the view that reconciliation achieved between peoples takes years, decades or even centuries after an inter-communal accommodation will be reached. He cites the example of the relationship be-tween the Native Americans and the dominant ethnic groups in the United States which has undergone many transformations. Other examples of this multi-generational process of reconciliation include the Spanish acknowledgment that the expulsion of Jews in 1492 was wrong and the Canadian and Australian governments’ apologies for denying basic rights to indigenous people. More recently, the establishment of various ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commissions’, such as in South Africa, in Rwanda, Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere constituted tools in the healing processes. Thus reconciliation is multi-faceted and the domestic context as well as the readiness factor must be considered before any intervention is considered.

One of the reconciliation interventions aims at the formation of new belief systems, worldviews, attitudes, motivations, goals and emotions that would form the backbone of peaceful relations. Reconcil-iation is not a natural process but one that requires active efforts to overcome its obstacles. Thus re-


conciliation does not occur spontaneously, but requires guidance, policies and initiated acts in establish-ing new institutions. The process requires the participation of leadership, elites, institutions, non-gov-ernmental organizations, the media and peace education programs, and society as a whole. The “cros-sings” in Cyprus as I will argue constitute only a small part of public reconciliation and informal peace education processes in which all interested sectors have yet to participate.

Solomon (2002) proposed four kinds of inter-related dispositional outcomes which he believes will help institute a systematic reconciliation process, which is a capacity that can be developed and learned. It is assumed that the collective historical memories and narrative each side holds about the conflict affects the views and attitudes of individuals and communities.

Another important connection of reconciliation relates to the prevalence of a democratic governance and implementation of human rights in the post conflict period. This is so because a well-balanced democracy is a form of governance that has the capacity not only to manage conflicts and contradictions, containing recourse to violence but also to bring out differences and allow them to exist without threaten-ing the whole system. Thus the development of a “democratic culture” goes side by side with recon-ciliation processes based on new relationship building both at the governing elites and polities’ levels.

4. The Cyprus context The person-to-person encounters constitute part of the much needed reconciliation processes in

Cyprus as well as part of the public peace education which aim to de-escalate misperceptions, address past fears and build new spaces for connection. It must be noted that although there was mention of a Reconciliation Commission in the Anan Plan (See: www.un.org/cyprus/annan) no political leader or Party or NGO addressed this issue in either community during the public information campaign prior to the referendum. This shows that the issue of reconciliation is politically sensitive. The use of the past still constitutes a political capital for each side to promote selectively its own “chosen traumas and chosen glories” and continue living in ‘half truths’ (Volkan 1978).

As thousands of people from all Cypriot communities have been crossing the Green Line since 2003, new relationships have been formed based on direct face-to-face experiences with the Other. Many of these stories reveal, at first, the presence of the past as was experienced by each community. The Turkish Cypriots recall the “bloody noel” in 1963 and 1967 which meant death, expulsion, fear and deprivation of human rights. The Greek Cypriots recall the consequences of the 1974 Turkish invasion which again meant death of beloveds, fears, displacement and loss of economic well-being. They do not, however, stay there because through the direct meeting with the Other, i.e. the Turkish Cypriot or the Greek Cypriot who has been living in the landscape and home of the Others’ memories for over thirty years, they discover the human being who has also suffered and has been imagining a different life. In some cases the transformation is deep and mutual caring develops a new possibility for a human community to emerge, a necessary condition for reconciliation in order to sustain any political solution.

If I could only meet you one day, I’d be so happy, ever so happy I’m keeping all your photographs, little girl: -Here is your birthday -Under the mandarin tree, the cake with three candles -you, in the sea with Donald Duck -you, waving from the car-your parents smiling at you and now you are smiling at me I’ll give these pictures back to you, little girl, But from time to time All this weighs heavily on me. I’m anguished What, if they killed you during that war? ……………………………………… (M. Yashin, Do’t Go Back to Kyrenia, 2000).


What prophetically the Turkish Cypriot poet desired in his poem written in 1990s has actually

happened in April 23, 2003 and many photographs left behind by the original owners were kept and saved by the ‘new owners’ and were given to their real owners when they knocked at the door of their homes. The poet through these left objects enters the lifestyle of the family and also the fearful thought in case war killed them created regret and anguish. Those early days of the crossing the newspapers and the television stations carried stories of Greek Cypriot people returning with photo albums, wedding dresses, valuable silver and gold artifacts and old traditional embroideries which the Turkish Cypriots kept as if they knew the owner will come to claim them one day.. The old memories were reconstructed in the acquisition of these material objects. These objects became the symbolic connections of the real owners to their place as well as indications of their social status. The Turkish Cypriots who were given the Greek Cypriot homes knew well enough the emotional and historical value of these objects and made sure to safeguard them until they hoped one day the real owners would return to receive them. Through the ‘crossings’ the enemy not only acquired a face, a name, and a new possibility, but also, to the surprise of both sides, they discovered that the Other honored the same elements of shared Cypriot culture, hospitality and traditions. Many Greek Cypriots admitted that they never expected “that after so many years the Turks would keep our family valuables”. These gestures have had a humanizing effect on both sides.

5. Deconstructing stereotypes and cry for help In protracted conflicts the issue of stereotypes and misperceptions form part of the intractable culture

and need to be addressed (Allport 1957; Hadjipavlou 2004). In the following quote, a Greek Cypriot family that “visited” their house in the north after twenty-nine years although pleasantly surprised at the way they were received still they could not hide their pain and sadness. (A distinction is made between the Cypriot Turks and the Turks from Turkey who are called ‘the settlers’, or “xeni” (foreigners) and are given Greek Cypriot homes, an issue that would complicate father the property settlement):

The people who now live in our house are very nice. They kept these photographs of my family and some valuables, like embroideries and have now given them to us (she shows these to me). I wonder if they knew that one day we shall return. The family who lives in my parents’ house comes from Ayios Nikolaos of Paphos (meaning they are Cypriots) are very clean and kept in good condition the house and the garden,. But I still felt a lot of pain and cried witnessing my parents’ grief … seeing the house I understood what my parents were talking about for so many years… (interview September, 2003).

This story by a young university student reveals, among other things, a number of assumptions about the other which were transmitted to her from her parents. It is interesting to note that she refers to “our house” though she never lived there herself and has had no memories. The fact that those ‘others’ were ‘nice, clean and considerate’ breaks down the ethnic stereotypes which the Greek Cypriots hold of the Turks and by extension of the Turkish Cypriots (Hadjipavlou 2003). This positive realization was not enough, however, to alleviate the injustice they felt nor their pain and grief .in seeing someone else living in their family’s home. The Turkish Cypriots who came from the villages in the Paphos district (west of the island) spoke the Cypriot dialect which was another surprise for many young Greek Cypriots. Thus the language barrier was not an issue in such cases which made the interaction easier and brought the people closer to each other.

Reconciliation, as was mentioned earlier, is a long-term process and both grieving and coming to terms with loss requires a well-designed support system which is not yet in place in Cyprus. In fact, the state has undermined the importance of reconciliation insisting that there can be no reconciliation prior to a solution. From my research I find that reconciliation processes need to start in parallel to the official negotiations. People need to be socialized in a culture of safety, trust and confidence in the future so that they can invest in the implementation of the political solution when it comes. Societal needs and fears need to be addressed and incorporated in the future guidelines for a lasting solution. The citizens’ “crossings” provide ample evidence for this need.

One of the “dispositional outcomes” in peace learning according to Solomon 2002, refers to the Legitimation of the Other’s Collective Narrative .which means focusing on the conflict as defined be-tween collectives and not between individuals, i.e. the enemy is neither Ahmet nor Eleni but govern-


ments, and institutions of which the individual is a product of. To accept the other’s narrative means that events, past and present can be seen from both lenses. A Turkish Cypriot woman in her forties living on the northern side of divided Nicosia told me her recollection when her father was killed in 1974 by the Greek Cypriot nationalists and how this pain and loss defined her life in the last thirty years. Through her personal story she held an entire community responsible and at fault. She regretted that to this day no reconciliation process has been instituted to offer psychological or other support and allow their grievances and story be heard. No forum for the victim/survivor groups has been developed by any NGO unlike the case of Northern Ireland (White 2003). This lack of any support and psychological services has been the complaint and need of many Cypriots I spoke to.

Another prevailing theme and emotion amongst the Turkish Cypriots was ‘fear’, ‘anger’ and the desire for justice. This displaced young woman thirty years later cannot “forgive the Greeks” since no Greek has either acknowledged or apologized for her father’s unjust death and her own suffering as a survivor. She easily reconstructed the event which brought memories of fear and defined her unwilling-ness to live with the Greeks. Despite the fear and bad memories she still had a yearning and a desire to see her birthplace, Limassol, in the south. A few days after our interview, she went and found that Greek Cypriot refugees from the north were living in her house in the south. This visit softened somehow her anger realizing that war had its toll on both sides. Thus, momentarily, she overcame the culture of fear and separation and was able to see the other in a different context.

Reconciliation is not only a need between the communities but within each community as well. A Turkish Cypriot man spoke about the perpetrators who live in his own community and the kind of reconciliation he wants so that justice can be done. He feels no institution has yet to address his need for justice. The political and social implications of the lack of ‘justice’ allows for the perpetuation of a social order which is unsafe since the ‘criminals’ are out free. He criticizes the political system that overlooks such serious matters. This person has the evidence but there is no legal infrastructure in place to hear such cases. The state silences such voices in order to keep social cohesion and sustain the “enemy image”.

I know who killed my relative’s brother. It was not the Greeks but the Turks in our community. They did it because they just felt like it. These criminals are free and live around us. Who is going to arrest them and bring them before justice?”.

Another prevalent theme evolved around issues of the past and specifically about history learning and teaching. For instance, a male academic in the north spoke about the power of symbols and the need for reconciliation with history and national narratives. The burden of history and the competing commemora-tions perpetuate the conflict system in Cyprus whereby the heroes of one community become the villains of the other and the nationalist symbols of the other constitute a threat to the Other’s identity.

I believe we need reconciliation. The problem in Cyprus is that the symbols are all wrong. The Republic of Cyprus does not resonate with Turkish Cypriots …for some it does but it resonates as the old republic of Cyprus … there are national symbols, the EU symbols which until recently are associated with the Greek Cyprus… then there are these Greek and Turkish nationalist symbols everywhere as well as statues that honor EOKA and TMT…. In the case of Cyprus symbols are maintained to sustain particular way of thought and give it legitimacy… . I think over time symbols can change but it requires recon-ciliation with history… (Interview 2005).

Moreover, by legitimating the other’s narrative as much as one’s own, a space is then opened for dialogue and trust building, a necessary ingredient for Solomon’s second disposition which refers to a critical examination of our side’s contribution to the conflict. This means that the suffering, which each side has inflicted on the Other is acknowledged together with the guilt and denial that usually accompany such avoidance. In conflict resolution workshops among the Greek and Turkish Cypriots this skill was learned and often we note that after a mutual apology, a shared narrative emerges based on a new ex-perience which liberates both sides from their “egoism of victim-hood” as well as from fear of how they will be perceived when they revealed their own “badness”(Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis 1998). Genuine voices of apologies were heard in those inter-communal encounters and the dignity of the survivors felt restored. Thus symbolic forms of healing can include the elimination of those symbols and provocative militaristic statues whose sole aim has been to point in a generalized way to the aggression and badness of the other. The past history of hostility can be transcended through joint peace monuments as forms of symbolic remembrance of the suffering of all sides to the conflict.


6. Whose house is it? I was present when a Greek Cypriot owner visited her home inhabited by a young Turkish Cypriot

family. The village is Peristerona in the south which prior to 1963 was a mixed village (before the conflict there had been 300 mixed villages around the island which were gradually reduced to 63 during the inter-communal clashes in the 1960s and after the Turkish intervention in 1974 there exist only two mixed villages, Pyla and Potamia). This was part of the exchange between two men:

GC: This is my home (eine to spiti mou). I was born and I lived here until 1974 when I was twenty three. I want to return and have my property back.

TC: This is my house too. I was born here thirty years ago and I want to live here on this side. I feel it my home too.

The property issue is the most complex and significant one in the Cyprus conflict because of its

connection to identity, justice and family history. This complexity emerged during the ‘crossings.’ This is an example where the same space, a family house, provides for and symbolizes past and present memories and realities. Each legitimately claims it to be his own. These individuals shared personal stories related to the same piece of land which violence and war deprived the real owner of his home and passed it to a stranger. They both experienced dislocation and fear. How can they each come to terms with this mutual loss? Can a judicial process reach a satisfactory settlement and if so of what kind?

The issue of memory in person-to-person reconciliation processes plays a crucial role. It can both enhance and hinder reconciliation processes. As Andrew Rigby, 2003, states, “too great a concern with remembering the past can mean that the divisions and conflict of old never die, the wounds are never healed. In such circumstances the past continues to dominate the present, and hence to some degree determine the future.” On the other hand, “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’ Memory is selective and can be easily manipulated. Part of the official historiography in the Greek Cypriot community promotes the view of a shared past with the Turkish Cypriots going back to the Ot-toman period in order to show that socially at the grass root level there were not real differences between the two communities and it is the ‘foreign other’ who caused all the violence and separation between the two sides. In the Turkish Cypriot historiography the view that the Greeks always dominated the Turks and wanted to harm them prevails (Joint efforts to address these issues have recently been undertaken).

The two men above have constructed their identity with what happened in the past and each tries to locate the self within the different experiences each has had within this same house. A process is needed to help them acknowledges the fragmentation of their identities and though legally there is a difference, psychologically and ontologically each claims it to be part of his personal history. How can we renego-tiate legal with ontological issues?

Out of such human relationships a new social history is in the making though it still does not consti-tute part of the official narrative since the top-down policies have not legitimated the importance of such processes. The state needs to acknowledge that there are different and competing narratives. Each under-stands its own truth but needs to understand that the construction of knowledge occurs within a complex set of power relations (Foucault 1980) that need to bring out the heterogeneous cultures that exist across the divide. Also it is important to acknowledge that a new history is being created with experiences of people’s crossings.

Some concluding remarks The issue of reconciliation is a recognition that conflict resolution, that is, the mutually accepted

negotiated agreement at the macro level is not by itself adequate to create a culture of peace, that is a comprehensive society-wide system of values, beliefs, attitudes to help people in their daily lives put a premium on peace, to desire peace, to seek peace and to stand for peace after the solution. It has also been observed that sometimes formal agreements fall apart or fall short in establishing peaceful and trusting relationships between former rivalries. This is where the process of reconciliation needs to penetrate deep into the societal fabric and include all the segments of the population in order for trust and cooperation to


begin evolving as well as a consideration of each party’s concerns, fears, grievances, needs and interests. The discussion and analysis of narratives of Cypriots’ crossings have revealed the need for a

reconciliation process and a complexity of themes and issues that need to be studied systematically and addressed both prior to, during and after a solution . Geographical and psychological separation as well as lack of institutional structures to get to know each other’s culture, achievements and concerns has kept the citizens of both communities ignorant of each other. The consequences of failing to cultivate a pro-solution culture, or instituting a peace socializing process, manifest in the failure of the 2004 referendum which caused further polarization both intra- and inter-communally.

Reconciliation requires the formation of new beliefs, attitudes, motivations, goals and emotions that support peaceful relations and this is where an integrated curriculum can play a significant role. Recon-ciliation is not a natural process, but one that requires active efforts to overcome past obstacles. Although in Cyprus since 2003 public reconciliation occurred spontaneously and on an individual, voluntary basis with differing motivation, the predominant one being the desire to see one’s home and meet the “invisible Other”, yet the analysis has shown that there exists the need for a well-designed process that would require guidance, expertise, policies and initiated political acts. The figure of nine million “crossings” by themselves has not changed the macro level policies thus the bottom up dynamic needs to be reinforced and legitimated as part of the broader peace building and official processes. This process would require the participation of leadership, elites, institutions, non-governmental organizations, the media, the church, the family and of course, education both formal and informal.

These new realities as they unfold come to challenge formal history teaching and learning as well as mainstream media and politicians’ rhetoric which is based on an adversarial model. The alternative is the cooperative model. Through these contacts there arises the need for trust building, acknowledgment of past grievances as well as empathy and psychological healing. The impact of the conflict and the de facto partition on the physical and psychological health of primarily female informants indicates the need for the establishment of trauma centers to address the long-term consequences of war and loss as well as the gendered conflict impact (Hynes 2004).

A form of empathy includes learning the Other’s language and way of life. Many individuals have already started to learn Greek and Turkish despite the lack of any state support. It would help enormously if the ministries of education introduce officially Greek and Turkish languages learning in all levels of formal education. I believe this would contribute to the reconciliation process and would symbolize mutual respect and appreciation of differences as well as recognition of similarities.

The state has done very little to foster reconciliation and to transform the citizens’ “crossings” into new political initiatives through which people would feel empowered to deal with both the past and the future and to stop wondering whether it is “politically correct” to cross! The state and international organizations should allocate resources for the establishment of reconciliation centers where citizens can have access for their own personal need for healing and legitimation of their loss, grievances, hurts and pain. Legal action should also be taken against perpetrators who as my informants mentioned are out free and people know who these are.

One sometimes wonders if the “crossings” have become, as often has been the case in Cyprus, part of the status quo. Or is the dynamic still there and is the people-to-people reconciliation taking place in a quiet way? I have shown that this is not by itself an adequate process. The “crossings” have also reveal-ed the intra-communal differences and unspoken stories. Since the “us and them” dichotomy has become more complex it is possible to establish many inter-ethnic coalitions which can help prepare the environ-ment for co-existence and future collaboration. After all, reconciliation is a complex process and a learned skill and capacity which Cypriots are in need of. The state needs to join in engaging in dialogue with the grass roots and local communities and start integrating much of this new social history in the official narrative as well as through the preparation of new teaching materials whereby the “citizens’ crossings” can become part of the peace culture efforts. Television programs, the media , the intellectuals and the universities on both sides can promote the socio-cultural importance of “crossings” and publicize the complexity of these experiences so as to create the culture of mutual acceptance, a prerequisite to any political solution and long-term peacebuilding. These “crossings” have also revealed that a “humanistic infrastructure” and attitude toward the Other is still deeply ingrained in the Cypriot culture and awaits to be politically utilized in all its manifestations and further research would be needed to discuss this further.


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THE CASE OF KOSOVO: INTERNATIONAL STATEBUILDING FROM A PENDING FINAL POLITICAL STATUS

TO AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY Labinot Greiçevci

Research Institute on Statebuilding in Kosovo (RISK) Abstract: This article is concerned with the case of Kosovo, where the international community had and to some extent is still having the main role of state-builder. It builds on the conceptual literature on international statebuilding theories by exploring the achievements and successes on the one side, and the failures and limits on the other side of this process. Thus, the article analysed and scrutinized the role that international community played from its earlier beginnings until nowadays in this complex process of statebuilding, notably on the issue of institution-building and economic reconstruction and development. Hence, the article attempts to sheds light on the stage that international community reached till now on this statebuilding process. Moreover, the article analyses in a theoretically-informed manner the possible ways forward, and if this process can lead to the viable State or to the failed one, in the case of Kosovo. Keywords: Kosovo, international community, state building, failed states

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Introduction

Statebuilding by the international community, as opposed to indigenous statebuilding, has its genesis from the beginning of the 20th century. This mode of acting begins from the missions of the League of Nations through the ‘mandate system’ which had as its aim the reallocation of colonial possessions of the defeated Powers which continued until the Second World War. After the Second World War this mode of statebuilding continued by the trusteeship missions of UN and the endeavour of the colonial powers to strengthen the capacities of their colonies in order to transfer sovereignty to the local authorities.

Moreover, this practice has been carried out after the Second World War in the reconstruction of the Germany and Japan by US and its allies. Nowadays, this practice is carried out in most of the cases by the UN organization or by US and its allies (evident in the Iraq case). But, not all these missions have been suc-cessful. Some of them have produced failed or weak States (e.g. Somalia, Rwanda) and in the case of Iraq we do not know yet how it will end up. This illustrates that the international community has not reached its goals in some of these cases and left the situation how it has found it, or rather worse than it was. Therefore, this contradiction in practice between different cases raises the importance for dealing with this topic.

This article is chiefly concerned with the role that international community played and it is playing in the process of statebuilding in Kosovo. This article will cover notably two main elements of this process: institution-building and economic reconstruction and development of Kosovo. The first part of the article sets the conceptual context. Then, it will present a brief review of the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the agreement that shaped the legal and political base for the international community to play the role of the state-builder in this case. Finally, the third part will highlight the achievements and failures of the international community in this process of statebuilding.

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1. State and statebuilding concepts

The concern of this article is the process of statebuilding and we consider that it should start by defining the concept of the State and statebuilding as well.

Certainly, the most distinguished definition about the State is the definition of Max Weber, who «conceived the State as possessing a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a specific territory» (Collins 2002: 91). Moreover, as Eriksen claims, «States are responsible for protecting the security of their society» (Eriksen 2005: 398). Then, he continues claiming that this has two main aspects. The first one is that «the State is expected to protect its territory and its population from other states - that is, from external threats (…) the second one is that the State is also responsible for protecting its inhabitants from threats to their security originating internally, from persons or groups operating within its territory» (ibidem). In this streamline of conceptualizing the State is the Ottaway’s definition, asserting that «State enjoys international recognition and exercises control over people and territory through formal and strong, preferably democratic institutions − this is a State de jure as well as de facto [and] it has an effective administrative apparatus and is characterized by the rule of law» (Ottaway 2002: 1003).

On the other hand, Ghani et al., suggests a more comprehensive definition of the State or for the core functions of the State. Therefore, they assert that these are the ten functions of the State: 1) legitimate monopoly on the means of violence; 2) administrative control; 3) management of public finances; 4) investment in human capital; 5) delineation of citizenship rights and duties; 6) provision of infrastructure services; 7) formation of the market; 8) management of the State’s assets (including the environment, natural resources, and cultural assets); 9) international relations (including entering into international contracts and public borrowing) 10) rule of law (Ghani et al. 2005: 6).

According to this short explanation, we might draw some points for the concept of the State: that State in its let say ‘narrow definition’ involves the legitimate monopoly in using the means of violence within specific territory and the right to defend its territory from external attacks. Second definition or let say the ‘broader definition’ of the State emphasises elements of the first definition and highlights some tasks or responsibilities to the State in the field of public finances and international relations. This article considers that the aim of the international community is to build-up the State in the certain post-conflict society that is in compliance with the above definitions of the State.

Whilst it was defined the concept of State or the way that this article understands the concept of the State, we have to move onto the concept of statebuilding and its implications. Perhaps, most of the authors that dealt with the concept of statebuilding notably paid much attention to the process of building the new institutions or strengthening the existing ones. For instance, Chesterman shows that «the term statebuilding refers to extended international involvement (…) and is directed at constructing or recon-structing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security» (Chesterman 2004: 5). Similarly, Francis Fukuyama points out that «statebuilding is the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones» (Fukuyama 2004: ix). Furthermore, Inter-national Peace Academy suggests that «statebuilding covers a wide range of international involvement that goes beyond traditional peace-keeping and peace-building mandates, and is directed at stabilizing a state or (re)building the institutions of a State» (IPA 2004: 2).

According to these definitions about statebuilding we might draw the following conclusion about the concept of statebuilding. Statebuilding involves building new or strengthening the existing institutions which aims in ensuring and fulfilling the needs of the citizens of the certain country. Thus, from the above discussion we might draw the following two questions for a further analysis: Did the international community reach to establish a State in Kosovo that is in compliance with the ‘narrow’ or ‘broader’ definition of the State that this article highlighted above? Did the international community reach to build-up those kinds of institutions with the above description of statebuilding? The next parts of the article will try to answer these questions.

The case of Kosovo: International statebuilding from a pending final political status to…

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2. Brief review of the NATO war in Kosovo and Resolution 1244/1999

In order to understand better the political context the article will look a little bit in historical background of this process. 24th of March 1999 was the first day of NATO bombing against one of the last totalitarian regimes in the Europe. This was the regime of Slobodan Miloševic. After the wars and carnages that this regime arranged in other parts of ex-Yugoslavia such as Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, his last endeavour was to implement his policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo as well. Nonetheless, in his endeavour he was stopped by the Western civilization. The Western countries could not let him to repeat his policies as he did previously in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The war of NATO against the Miloševic aggression and policy of ethnic cleansing was the first war of the NATO against a State for the ethical and human rights issues and this clearly made a history. The NATO campaign continued for more than 70 days. As the Gheciu claims «after a bombing campaign carried out by NATO in response to (…) policies of ethnic cleansing, the Kosovo conflict finally came to an end in early June 1999» (Gheciu 2005: 125). Then, it continues claiming that «at that time, the Miloševic gov-ernment agreed to the Peace Plan brought to Belgrade by Finland’s President Martti Ahtisaari, repress-enting the European Union, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, the Russian President’s special representative» (ibidem). «In essence, the plan provided for an immediate end to human rights violations in Kosovo, the rapid withdrawal of military, police and paramilitary forces; an international civil and security presence; and an international interim administration …» (ibidem).

This agreement that has been reached afterwards has been legitimized by Resolution 1244/1999 of the United Nations. The main principles of this resolution have been: «promoting the establishment, of (…) self-government in Kosovo, pending a final settlement, and taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648)» (Resolution 1244, 1999: 3).

Therefore, «the central tasks of UNMIK were: (1) to establish a functioning interim administration, including the maintenance of law and order; (2) to promote the establishment (...) and self-government, including the holding of elections; (3) to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status, KFOR was asked to assist in this process through the establishment of a secure environment» (Yannis 2004: 67).

For this aim the UNMIK established a structure of four pillars which are: Pillar I: Police and Justice, under the direct leadership of the United Nations Pillar II: Civil Administration, under the direct leadership of the United Nations Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building, led by the Organization for Security and Co-

operation in Europe (OSCE) Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union (EU) (UNMIK,

2001). It should be noted that the international community reached considerable success in the issues such as:

re-establishing security and the immediate post-war economic reconstruction in the case of Kosovo. In the beginning of the new UN mission, the new special representative of the UN Secretary General

Mr. Bernard Kouchner started to issue regulations based on the Resolution 1244/1999 of the UN. Thus, as Ruffert claims «according to these regulations all powers: legislative, executive and judiciary − are vested in UNMIK and (…) have to be exercised by the Special Representative» (Ruffert 2001: 622). Con-sequently, this policy gave to the Special Representative similar powers to that of an absolute monarch. In brief, this was the aim of UNMIK and this was the ambiguity of the Resolution 1244/1999 that as the sections below will maintain caused a lot of problems in this mission and sometimes blocked very important processes such as the privatisation process. However, in the following parts of this article we will discuss and analyse the job done by the international community in all these issues.

3. Institution-building in Kosovo

Elections were the main tool in building the new institutions of governance in Kosovo. Hence, after the end of the war and after the UN mission has been established in Kosovo, some joint structure of governance between the local and international structures has been established.

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Afterwards, UNMIK decided to organise the first free and democratic elections in the history of Kosovo for the municipal assemblies in October 2000. «The outcome of the municipal elections was that the LDK 1 gained 58% of the vote, the PDK 2 31% and the AAK 3 8%» (Corrin 2002: 106-07). The significance of this peaceful transfer of power in the municipalities is important not just for the process but as a precedent for future electoral development (ibidem). Therefore, as results show the winner of elections has been LDK in majority of municipalities of Kosovo and the parties that have been successors of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) lost these elections. Afterwards, by approving the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) the roads for building the central institutions of Kosovo has been opened. According to Stahn «the document lays the foundations for the holding of Kosovo-wide elections (…) by determining the institutional structure and the powers of Kosovo’s political organs under United Nations administration, as required by paragraph 11(c) of Resolution 1244» (Stahn 2001: 542).

In the parliamentary elections on November 2001 no one party won the majority of votes and the three major parties established a big coalition between them. But, as Goldstone claims, «the parliament that the Kosovars were allowed to elect has only limited authority» (Goldstone 2002: 145). In all matters of importance, including the budget, the real power was in the hands of the United Nations and the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)… (ibidem). This is some kind of ‘authoritarian statebuilding’4 as Knaus and Cox claim (Knaus, Cox 2005: 40).

Nevertheless, the nascent institutions except that had limited authority moreover they lacked in some aspects the expertise. The rationale for this lacking of expertise as Saltmarshe rightly emphasise is that «during the latter half of the twentieth century the institutional history of the majority group in Kosovo, the Albanians has essentially been one of marginalization by the Serbs which created a vicious circle of lack of trust, ethnic division and exclusion» (Saltmarshe 2002: 189). But, after 9 years of the process of international statebuilding the situation in this realm has changed positively.

Moreover, to transfer some power to the new-build-up institutions and to promote the principles of good governance, UNMIK promoted in 2001 the new policy ‘standards before status’. These standards have been in the following issues: functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, sustainable Returns and the Rights of Communities and their members, economy, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the Kosovo Protection Corps (Kosovo Prime Minister’s Website, 2005).In the next two years it has been some progress in some of these fields, but in March 2004, the riots alerted that the actual structure in political and economic realm it lacks to fulfil the needs of Kosovars.

Afterwards, by the initiative of the American under-secretary Mr. Mark Grossman the plan for “standards before status” has been operationalized. Therefore, it has been required that the institutions of Kosovo should fulfil some requests and obligations from this plan and afterwards in June 2005 the comprehensive review of this plan will be done in order to proceed with the negotiations for the future status of Kosovo. In November 2004 the new elections for the central institutions of Kosovo have been organized and the results of these elections created that kind of the political framework that for the first time in its history in Kosovo has been established a division between power and opposition. Clearly, this has been a further step towards democratization in Kosovo. However, it should be mentioned that all these elections have been organized and supervised by the OSCE: at the municipal level in 2000 and 2002 and at the central level in 2001 and 2004 (OSCE 2008). Similarly, the central and local elections of November 2007 have been organized by the OSCE.

1. Democratic League of Kosovo. 2. Democratic Party of Kosovo. 3. Alliance for the Future of Kosovo. 4. The first, authoritarian statebuilding, is being applied in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. It seeks

to foster institutional development by creating international structures that assume extensive, undemocrat-ic, and generally unaccountable powers within the domestic constitutional sphere (Knaus, Cox 2005: 40).


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In parallel, OSCE has also helped to create local election institutions, the Central Election Commis-sion (CEC) and its Secretariat (CECS) (ibidem). Nowadays, in the post-independence period the main responsibility in organizing the elections belongs to these institutions in full accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.

In brief, as Cohen claims, «UNMIK proved successful at creating a modicum of political stability and economic reconstruction, and also organizing competitive elections at the municipal level (October 2000 and October 2002) and for the central Legislature (November 2001 and October 2004)» (Cohen 2006: 4). Kosovo created its parliament, government (even that this government did not have the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Defence Ministry, until the post-independence period). Similarly, the Kosovo Police Service that has been created from the scratch was a successful story of the work of the international community. Similarly, could be said for the Kosovo Customs, even that there is still space for improvement and notably in the northern borders with our neighbour, Serbia. On the other side, the judge system in Kosovo was very weak in the last 9 years and it continues to be still like that. There are thousands of claims and cases that have not been solved yet. This situation created lot of problems on the issue of rule of law in Kosovo and this is a further argument for the new EU mission (EULEX)5 in post-independent Kosovo in the field of the “rule of law”.

Nevertheless, the Kosovar institutions had limited power that created a lot of confusion in all sides about division of power between UNMIK and the Kosovar institutions. Moreover, their efficiency holding in regard these limits and sometimes lack of experience and expertise from the people that led these institutions have been limited. Nonetheless, progress has been reached mainly in the plan of ‘Standards for Kosovo’ which has been assessed positively once and again from the Security Council of the UN.

On the other side, the attention of the international community to the issue of civil society was mainly concerned in building-up local NGOs. Clearly, this kind of policy produced bunch of NGO’s but it did not had any positive effects for the local community and its needs. The only effect of this policy has been large quantity of NGO’s and the missed quality of their projects. In short, that’s the work done on the issue of institution-building in the case of Kosovo and the following section it will move onto the issue of Kosovo’s economy.

4. Economic reconstruction and development of Kosovo According to the World Bank in its aftermath of the war «through indigenous enterprise, assisted by

donor support, the Kosovar economy appears to have made a strong start in recovering from the contrac-tion in output per head seen over the past two decades and then the ravages of the spring 1999 conflict» (World Bank 2001: 3). «No official statistics of output or investment exist, but the repair of housing, the tilling of farmland, burgeoning services in urban areas, and even the revival of some enterprises provide testament to the industry of the population and its determination to make up for lost time» (ibidem). Similarly, the policy of the international community oriented Kosovar economy towards a free market economy.

The first steps on this orientation as Korovilas emphasise have been «to privatise state-owned enter-prises, removing restrictions upon the free flow of capital, removing trade restrictions and establishing the DM (Euro) as the official currency» (Korovilas 2002: 110). Furthermore, in reaching its aims in establish-ing a free market economy the international community started to create a legal and institutional frame-work for this.

Therefore, on the institutional side as Dobbins claims «they included the creation of the Central Fiscal Authority, a nascent finance ministry, a new tax system and tax administration, and a new trade regime and customs department» (Dobbins 2003: 123). «The EU supervised the creation of the Banking and Payments Authority (BPAK) and the reform of the payment system» (ibidem: 124). In addition «7 banks and 7 insurance companies [have been established] (…) in addition, there were 14 micro financial

5. EULEX, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, http://www.eupt-kosovo.eu/new/-

index.php?id=19&nw=31. See also EU Joint actions on EULEX, 4 February 2008.

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institutions [which provide small loans to the non-bankable sector]» (European Commission 2004: 85). Similarly, an inter-bank payments system has been established. Therefore, this shows that international community reached to build-up a capable banking system in Kosovo. But this is not enough to establish the free market economy.

On the other side, the process of privatisation which is a key tool in transforming the socialist economy in a free market economy it has encountered many problems before it has commenced for some legal problems which afterwards have been solved. Eviatar illustrates this in the best way: «The United Nations authority over Kosovo (…) hesitated to privatize what was in essence seized State property, but it decided the economic future of Kosovo was too important to wait for a final peace settlement that would fix Kosovo’s legal status» (Eviatar 2004: 1-2).

The solution of this problem is best illustrated in the words of Korovilas: «The solution to this problem has been to lease Socially Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to private sector investors, therefore enabling private investors to take over control of an SOE while avoiding the need to determine true ownership of the SOE. The initial phase of privatisation offered SOEs to private investors under a ten year Lease. This proved to be unsuccessful, attracting insufficient interest from private investors and was resisted by the incumbent management of SOEs. The second phase of privatisation using 99 year Leases has been more successful» (Korovilas 2006: 326).

Then, the Kosovo Trust Agency has been established to preserve or enhance the value, viability, and corporate governance of socially owned and public enterprises in Kosovo (KTA 2006).

Nevertheless except that the privatisation process has taken place with these problems, some other problems have been encountered in the middle of this process. Thus, in the second half of 2003 this process has been blocked for more than a year holding in regards some legal claims by the Serbian government. Afterwards, when these issues have been solved the process of privatisation has continued and it is ongoing process at the moment and except that have been some claims from the media for a corruption to this process, nothing has been factually declared on this issue.

In this period of time, it should be mentioned that in the poll conducted by the UNDP «already 50% of Kosovars were not satisfied with the privatisation process» (ECIKS 2006). Moreover, the corruption problem has been tackled by this poll as well and the outcome was that KEK (Kosovo Energy Corporation), KTA and health services has been identified as a most corrupted institutions.

Clearly, this demonstrates the dissatisfaction with international policies and local too in the economic issues. On the other hand, economic growth gives the following landscape: 1.2% (2002), 3.1% (2003), 3.2% (2004), 3.5% (2005 projection) (European Commission, 2004) and in 2007 reached 6%. Clearly, this shows to us that in every year it is some progress in these indicators but this progress does not fulfil the needs of the Kosovars and further improvement and progress is needful on this field.

5. Picture of the post-independent Kosovo The process of finding a political settlement for Kosovo has started after the comprehensive review of

the plan “Standards before Status” and Ambassador Kai Eide has been appointed as a Special Envoy of Secretary-General of UN to carry out this job. In this review Eide suggested that an overall assessment leads to the conclusion that time has come to commence the process of resolving the future status of Kosovo (UN 2005: 18).Then, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his intention to appoint Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, as his Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo, and Mr. Albert Rohan (Austria) as Deputy to the Special Envoy (UNOSEK 2006). Afterwards, this process started by direct negotiations in Vienna between Kosovar and Serbian delegations. In the same period , in one of the reports of International Crisis Group (ICG) in the suggestions that they give to the international community about the political status of Kosovo are the following ones: «Imposition of an independence package, if it should come to that, would be a better bet than attempting to finesse Pristina and Belgrade’s differences with an ambiguous solution, or one in which the resolution of key elements is deferred: it would be more diplomatically painful in the short term but pay longer-term dividends» (ICG 2006: 30). The negotiations in Vienna continued for more than 15 months under the direction of Mr. Ahtisaari. He came into the conclusion that between these two parties


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(Pristina and Belgrade) can not be reached any agreement and he made his proposal in accordance with the negotiations that has been done in Vienna. In his proposal he recommended supervised independence for Kosovo with fully respected rights for minorities and notably for the Serb minority. Nonetheless, this proposal has been rejected by Serbia and further she had the support of the Russia in the Security Council of the UN. This rejection engaged international community in the second half of 2007 in the new round of negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade. Similarly, no solution has been found during these negotiations. Two months after the negotiations has been finished (December 2007), Kosovo in coordina-tion with the Western countries declared its independence on 17th of February 2008, by declaring in the same time that Kosovo Government will fully respect the Ahtisaari’s package. This act has created a new reality in the Western Balkans and in Europe in general. The newest State in the world (Republic of Kosovo) has been recognized in few months by more than 50 countries including here US, major EU countries, Canada and Australia. Moreover, a new Constitution6 has entered into force. The new consti-tution reflects the new reality in Kosovo, which means that Kosovo belongs to its citizens autonomously from their ethnic or religious background. Furthermore, Kosovo Government has compiled and Kosovo parliament has approved more than 40 new laws which are related to the new structures and institutions of Kosovo’s statehood, including here the laws that are related to the decentralization and minority rights and their religious institutions and heritage. The new Constitution and the 40 laws that have been passed on are in a full compliance with Ahtisaari’s proposal. Similarly, Kosovo has its new anthem, flag and its arms and in all these features its multi-ethnic character is reflected. This fact has been confirmed by the International Civilian Office in Kosovo whose role is to supervise the implementation of Ahtisaari’s package. Furthermore, Kosovo Government has approved its economic policies for a mid-term period that intends to soften the unemployment and poverty in Kosovo. In this respect, it should be mentioned that in the first part of July 2008 the international donor’s conference for Kosovo that took place in Brussels promised to Kosovo 1.2 billion Euros to support and facilitate the economic development of the Republic of Kosovo.

Conclusion This article pointed out the most important developments of the process of statebuilding in Kosovo led

by the international community in the past nine years. The first part addressed a brief review of the NATO war in Kosovo and UN Resolution 1244 as a main political and legal document in the post-war Kosovo. It should be emphasised that in the case of Kosovo the undefined political status of Kosovo and the ambiguity of Resolution 1244/1999 were the main limits to the process of international statebuilding. Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that UNMIK (with the help of Kosovo people) was quite successful in reconstruction process of the Kosovo in the immediate post-war period and re-establishing security in general in Kosovo.

Then, the second part analysed the main features of the process of institution-building. Hence, from free elections the international community reached to build-up new institutions, but their efficiency has been limited holding in regards their limited power. Yet, this process can be considered as a successful story by bearing in mind that in the post-independence period these institutions are more or less the main actor on this process. Nonetheless, there is still space for improvement in this component and notably in the field of the ‘rule of law’.

On the other side, on the issue of transforming Kosovar economy, international community encountered different legal problems that made very difficult this process. Moreover, the dissatisfaction of the citizens with social and economic situation shows to us that the success that has been reached in this field from the international community is not enough to fulfil the needs of citizens. In Kosovo they reached to establish capable banking sector, but in the privatisation process they encountered a lot of problems and notably those of legal nature that postponed this process for few years. In short, it might be highlighted that international community managed to establish fundamentals for the free market

6 . The full text of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo is available on: http://www.kushtetuta-

kosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf

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economy, but failed to create the long-term policies on this issue and to establish a culture of free market economy from the citizens.

Some considerable progress, as it has been mentioned above in Kosovo, has been done as well after the Declaration of Independence. To sum up: it could be said that the institution-building process in Kosovo could be considered as successful, but having in regard the inefficiency of UNMIK in some fields (such as the rule of law and the low economic development) there is a need to address still some of these issues.

Similarly, if we go back to the questions that we draw from the conceptual framework of this article about the concepts of State and Statebuilding we could draw the following conclusions in the case of Kosovo: The meaning of the State in the Kosovo as it was defined in the beginning of this article (‘narrow’ and ‘broader’ definition) is taking its shape slowly but carefully and notably after the Declara-tion of Independence. Similarly, it could be said for the statebuilding process in general and notably the ambitious and progressive shape that this process took after the Declaration of Independence.

Thus, with the new EU mission in Kosovo and with the help and support of the international community, and determination of its people, Kosovo in a mid-term future could be a viable and self-sustaining State which means that it will move onto the end of the process of statebuilding. This is a must for the political elite of Kosovo and the international community as well. If they will fail to reach this, the future of Kosovo will be much closer to the failed State and mission, and the level of stability that has been reached till now in the Western Balkans could be jeopardized. This should not be allowed to happen, (notably from the EU and US) regardless from Russian obstructions and threats.

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wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/03/26/000094946_01030905493282/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (pp. 1-130).

EUROPA-LIBANO: INTEGRAZION CON, INTEGRAZIONE IN Elie Kallas

Università di Trieste

Abstract: Questo intervento si prefigge di analizzare le strategie di cooperazione multilaterali adottate dall’Unione Europea nei confronti dei nuovi vicini ad Est e a Sud-Est, per focalizzare poi sui rapporti bilaterali euro-libanesi. Dopo aver esposto, sinteticamente, i giudizi e le raccomandazioni emessi dalla Commissione Europea circa i singoli progetti di cooperazione e di associazione euro-libanesi, l’inter-vento si conclude con una valutazione della filosofia che è alla base di questi progetti, auspicando un maggiore impegno per consolidare prima la pace, la sovranità e la stabilità del paese, prerequisiti senza i quali i fondi emanati dall’Unione Europea per armonizzare le condizioni commerciali, finanziarie e sociali, rischiano di andare in fumo in qualsiasi momento. Keywords: Allargamento EU, Programma Meda, Libano

• − • − •

Poco importa alla realpolitik se il nome Europa fosse originariamente il nome di una principessa fenicia, rapita da Zeus, travestito da toro bianco e portato nell’isola di Creta 1. Poco importa se l’alfabeto greco, poi latino provenisse dalla Fenicia. Vi risparmio dunque i discorsi storici e romantici, sorvolerò pure su tutte le vestigia archeologiche che i fenici hanno seminato sulle coste euro-mediterranee. I legami che la realpolitik considera degni di valutazione sono nell’immediato finanziari e commerciali e di conseguenza politico-sociali.

Mi limito dunque ad analizzare le strategie di cooperazione adottate dall’Unione Europea nei confron-ti dei nuovi vicini, per focalizzare l’attenzione poi sui rapporti bilaterali euro-libanesi. Dopo aver esposto sinteticamente i giudizi e le raccomandazioni emessi dalla Commissione Europea circa i singoli progetti di cooperazione e di associazione euro-libanesi, l’intervento si concluderà con una valutazione della filo-sofia che è alla base di questi progetti, auspicando un maggiore impegno per consolidare prima la pace, la sovranità e la stabilità del paese, prerequisiti senza i quali i fondi emanati dall’Unione Europea a favore del Libano rischiano di andare in fumo in qualsiasi momento.

1. Εύρώπη: figlia di Agenore (re di Tiro) e di Telefassa. Zeus la rapì e la portò a Creta. Dalla loro

unione nacquero Minosse, Radamanto e Sarpedone. Secondo gli antichi greci da lei deriva il nome geografico omonimo citato nel VII secolo a.C. nell’inno omerico ad Apollo 3251 come designazione della Grecia centro-settentrionale. Secondo Mosco (2, 14-15), all’origine, tale nome indicava il continente in rapporto al Peloponneso e alle isole, poi il loro insieme in rapporto all’Asia Minore e alla Libia. Per Lewy (1895: 14, 17) la radice del nome è semitica e indica chiaramente “laddove tramonta il sole”. Altre ipotesi sono avanzate da Frisk (1973: 593), riprese da Chantraine (1990: 388), che si domandano se il nome geografico non sia indipendente dal nome mitologico e deriva dall’aggettivo greco Εύρωπός, Εύρύς “paese ampio”. Per il nome mitologico, si veda H. Von Geisau, Der Kleine Pauly, Band 2, col. 446-448; per il toponimo, H. Treidler, Idem, col. 448-449.

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1. Meccanismi e strategie di adesione all’Unione Europea I meccanismi e le strategie di adesione all’Unione Europea procedevano tra il 1957-1995 a macchia di

leopardo 2, come lo indicava un logo lanciato dall’Isig (Delli Zotti, Pocecco 1998), poi a forma di cerchi che si toccano e si includono, come rivede il logo di questo convegno.

Questo logo lo interpreto così: quando nuovi membri entrano a far parte dell’Unione Europea, i confini si spostano e l’Unione Europea rielabora in base alle nuove convenienze una strategia tridimen-sionale: cerca di rendere più stabile un primo gruppo di paesi, propone nuovi accordi di buon vicinato e di associazione con un secondo gruppo e avvia il processo di integrazione con un terzo gruppo. La filosofia è quella di rendere i confini una opportunità di dialogo e di cooperazione transfrontaliera, rafforzare le strutture sociali e liberalizzare i rapporti economici, innescare un dialogo politico e culturale, stabilire una soglia di intesa e di interessi comuni, promuovere sicurezza e pace e prosperità. L’obiettivo ultimo resta quello di circondarsi da un mercato tampone stabile e manovrabile.

2. Dal Progetto di cooperazione Meda al Programma di associazione Enpi Dopo la riunione dei ministri degli esteri a Barcellona, il 27-28 novembre 1995, si è innescato un

processo di cooperazione Euro-Med (Meda). Il programma Meda mirava a stabilire una cooperazione multilaterale, soprattutto economica e commerciale, tra l’Unione Europea e la sponda sud-est del Mediter-raneo. Ma l’adesione definitiva all’Unione Europea di dieci nuovi paesi (2004) e la candidatura reale o potenziale di altri otto paesi (Albania, Bosnia-Erzegovina, Croazia, Kossovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia e Turchia) hanno reso necessari nuovi accordi bilaterali nell’ambito della Politica europea di buon vicinato (Enp) 3 con i paesi che sarebbero divenuti successivamente paesi confinanti 4. Fanno parte di questo progetto Enp, a est (Bielorussia, Ucraina, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), a sud-est (Siria, Libano, Israele, Territori palestinesi e Giordania) e a sud (Egitto, Libia, Tunisia, Algeria e Maroc-co). Una pianificazione effettiva, chiamata Strumento europeo di buon vicinato e di associazione (Enpi) 5,

2. Il nucleo originario formatosi nel 1957 comprende sei paesi (Francia, Germania, Italia, Belgio,

Lussemburgo e Paesi Bassi). Il primo allargamento ha visto, nel 1973, l’adesione del Regno Unito, Irlanda e Danimarca. Aderirono in seguito Grecia e Spagna (1981), Portogallo (1986), Austria, Finlandia e Svezia (1995). Il 1° maggio 2004 il numero degli aderenti raggiunse i 25 membri, con l’adesione di Ci-pro, Estonia, Lettonia, Lituania, Malta, Polonia, Repubblica Ceca, Slovacchia, Slovenia e Ungheria. Il 1° gennaio 2007, altri due paesi (Bulgaria e Romania) entrano a far parte dell’Unione Europea, facendo salire così il numero degli stati membri a 27. Altri tre paesi sono ora candidati all’adesione: la Croazia, l’ex-Repubblica jugoslava di Macedonia e la Turchia.

3. Nella riunione dei ministri degli esteri dell’area Euro-Med (maggio 2003) la Commissione ha pre-sentato un nuovo quadro di rapporti bilaterali di buon vicinato (Enp) (si veda il rapporto della Commissione: COM, 2003, 0104). Ogni piano d’azione Enp è fatto a misura del paese aderente. Tuttavia la sua struttura resta identica: a) riforme e dialogo politico; b) sviluppo economico e cooperazione sociale; c) riforme legislative commerciali; d) cooperazione in campo legislativo, sulla libertà e la sicurezza; e) questioni settoriali: trasporto, energia, informazione, ambiente, ricerca e sviluppo; f) dimensione umana: contatti interpersonali, società civile, educazione, sanità pubblica.

4. I criteri geografici sono importanti ma non vincolanti nella Pev. A questo proposito ricordiamo che il 19 gennaio 2006, il Parlamento europeo ha accolto con favore i passi compiuti dalla Pev, sollecitando una sua maggiore flessibilità e determinazione, invitandola ad elaborare progetti più ambiziosi che vanno oltre i criteri geografici e verso l’affinità culturale.

5. Dal prossimo bilancio finanziario europeo (2007-2013), il contributo finanziario alla Politica europea di buon vicinato sarà rafforzato e gestito dall’Enpi che sostituirà altri strumenti attuali come i programmi Meda e Tacis. Con l’Enpi, l’Unione Europea intende finanziare sia gli interventi di emergenza (aiuti umanitari, ecc.), sia le politiche di adesione, di buon vicinato e di sviluppo economico, sia le inizia-tive di sicurezza pubblica, nucleari e di cooperazione con i paesi industrializzati. Con il nuovo bilancio fi-

Europa-Libano: integrazione con, integrazione in 81

è stata adottata il 14 novembre 2006. Fra i compiti dell’Enpi, figura quello di preparare i paesi aderenti alla partecipazione progressiva al mercato interno europeo e alla cooperazione transfrontaliera 6. L’Enpi è una proposta che sta tra l’associazione e l’adesione all’Unione Europea 7, ma non è suo compito nego-ziare nessuna prassi di adesione. Sembra trattarsi di una integrazione di seconda classe, un’associazione con l’Europa e non di un’associazione (istituzionale) in Europa.

I fondi e le agevolazioni che l’Unione Europea mette a disposizione dei paesi che aderiscono alla Politica europea di buon vicinato sono, tuttavia, vincolati dalle misure che i paesi beneficiari mettono in atto per adeguarsi alle norme del mercato interno europeo, a quelle di sicurezza dei confini, al rispetto dei diritti umani, al progresso del processo di liberalizzazione e di lotta alla criminalità organizzata. Tale Piano di azione garantisce all’Unione Europea nuovi strumenti di pressione e una voce più autorevole per trattare la pace. Grazie a tale autorevolezza l’Unione Europea ha partecipato attivamente al piano di co-operazione commerciale tra Giordania ed Israele, al dialogo tra Israele e le autorità palestinesi e ha as-sunto il comando delle forze Unifil (Un Interim Force in Lebanon), ha esercitato forti pressioni sulla Siria per rispettare le risoluzioni Onu e moderare le sue ingerenze negli affari interni libanesi.

3. Rapporti Libano-Unione Europea Nel 1977, il Libano ha firmato con la Comunità europea un accordo di cooperazione che è entrato in

vigore l’anno successivo. Tra il 1977 ed il 1992 sono stati siglati quattro protocolli di cooperazione finan-ziaria. Il processo di cooperazione Meda 8 si trasformò nel 2002 in un Accordo di associazione e venne integrato (27 gennaio 2005) da una Politica di buon vicinato (Enp) e dal 2007 da uno Strumento di asso-ciazione e buon vicinato (Enpi).

La nuova strategia di buon vicinato, progettata dalla National Indicative Programme (2002-2004) 9, offriva al Libano l’occasione di perfezionare gli obiettivi del progetto Meda, incrementare i rapporti trans-frontalieri ed il gemellaggio istituzionale e agevolare l’integrazione del Libano nel mercato interno euro-peo di trasporto, energia, telecomunicazione e ricerca scientifica 10. Il nuovo Strumento europeo di buon

nanziario europeo (2007-2013), il sostegno finanziario alla Politica di buon vicinato sarà di circa 15 mi-liardi di euro.

6. Il gemellaggio permetterebbe ai rappresentanti delle amministrazioni degli stati membri dell’Unio-ne Europea di lavorare ed assistere i loro omologhi dei paesi membri, per realizzare i requisiti comunitari necessari.

7. Per aderire all’Unione Europea un paese deve presentare una domanda ufficiale al Consiglio del-l’Unione Europea chiedendo alla Commissione di valutare la compatibilità della sua candidatura con i principi fondanti dell’Unione, comuni a tutti i paesi membri, ovvero: democrazia, rispetto dei diritti umani, delle libertà essenziali e dello stato di diritto, ecc. e la Commissione europea si pronuncia favore-volmente, ed il Consiglio all’unanimità accetta di negoziare, si apre un tavolo di negoziazione tra tutti i paesi membri dell’Unione Europea ed il candidato dovrà conformarsi ai criteri di Copenhagen. I pre-supposti vengono esaminati punto per punto, scadenze di adeguamento vengono fissate e solo dopo aver soddisfatto i requisiti di tutti i paesi membri, soddisfatto lo status giuridico, ricevuto il nulla osta della Commissione europea e del Parlamento europeo, il trattato di adesione viene firmato da ogni singolo paese membro e ratificato dai paesi membri e dal paese candidato e depositato a Roma.

8. Il progetto Meda I (1995-1999) focalizzava la sua cooperazione sulle riforme economiche, sulla ria-bilitazione delle istituzioni e la modernizzazione industriale, introducendo per la prima volta un sistema di tassazione (Vat). Il progetto Meda II (2000-2006) mirava a superare l’Accordo di cooperazione verso un Accordo di associazione e a perfezionare gli obiettivi del progetto Meda I, ma puntualizzava maggior-mente sullo sviluppo sociale e umano, sulla protezione dell’ambiente ed il rispetto dei diritti umani. Si veda il preambolo dell’accordo euro-mediterraneo tra lo stato libanese e l’Unione Europea (Bruxelles, 128 aprile 2002 (Or.) 7293/02).

9. Un memorandum Nip (2000-2004) è stato firmato tra le parti il 4 marzo 2002. 10. L’Unione Europea offre assistenza per mettere in atto una strategia di riforme governative, di

provvedimenti per qualificare il mercato del lavoro, promette inoltre l’adesione del Libano al programma

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vicinato e di associazione (Enpi) ha proposto (il 5 luglio 2006) di incentivare i rapporti transfrontalieri e gli investimenti infrastrutturali. L’accordo bilaterale è stato approvato dal Parlamento libanese e adottato dal suo governo nel gennaio 2007, aprendo la strada verso una integrazione economica più impegnata.

4. Commenti e raccomandazioni del Rapporto (2004) dell’Unione Europea Il Rapporto del 2004 emesso dall’Unione Europea 11 giudica: 1. alto il costo dell’amministrazione pubblica (circa il 38% del prodotto interno lordo) 12; 2. lento, poco efficiente e poco indipendente il sistema giudiziario 13; 3. insufficiente la protezione dei diritti dei lavoratori immigrati; 4. solide le libertà pubbliche e religiose di espressione e di associazione; tuttavia i diritti dei non

credenti non sono ancora regolati da un quadro legislativo 14; 5. positiva la tutela giuridica della donna che gode degli stessi diritti dell’uomo presso i tribunali

civili 15, ma insoddisfacente il numero delle deputate donna in Parlamento 16; 6. molto attiva la società civile 17; 7. bassa l’adesione ad un sindacato 18; 8. fallimentari gli sforzi delle autorità a disarmare Hezbollah; 9. privi di molti diritti sociali e politici i profughi presenti in dodici campi palestinesi; 10. efficiente la lotta antidroga ma quasi inesistenti i centri di disintossicazione; 11. ricca l’offerta del settore privato nei settori educativo e sanitario, ma caro il costo di questi

servizi vitali per il cittadino e carente l’offerta pubblica; 12. carente pure il carattere innovativo della ricerca scientifica nonostante la presenza attiva di una

comunità scientifica multiculturale (università francesi, inglesi, tedesche, ecc.) 19; 13. assente la rete ferroviaria, deregolamentati traffico e sicurezza stradale; 14. quasi totalmente precaria la situazione energetica, nonostante la posizione privilegiata del paese

circa il transito di petrolio e gas dall’Arabia Saudita e dall’Iraq e rispetto alle sue alte risorse

Tempus e al sesto e settimo Programma quadro di ricerca e sviluppo tecnologico (Rst), nonché l’addestra-mento di quadri professionali in loco a partire dal 2007.

11. http://ec.europa.eu/externa _relations/lebanon/intro/index.htm #1. 12. Si veda Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (2004). 13. Da una parte, il diritto civile (commerciale e criminale) che si ispira al diritto francese, gestito da

quattro corti di cassazione i cui giudici sono dipendenti dal ministero della giustizia; dall’altro, il diritto personale (matrimoni, divorzi, eredità, affidamento dei figli) è gestito dai singoli tribunali delle comunità religiose cristiane e musulmane.

14. Nel sistema politico libanese, l’individuo è ipotecato dalla sua confessione: la sua appartenenza comunitaria è spesso vincolante. Esso unisce i libanesi, ma li lascia divisi; favorisce una unità nazionale bicefala che soddisfa i musulmani per l’adesione alla Lega araba, e rassicura i cristiani per l’apertura al-l’Occidente, rimanendo però con una faccia araba e un’altra occidentale, ma senza una vera sintesi libanese. Quelli che non appartenevano ad una comunità o desideravano abbandonare la loro comunità nativa, avrebbero potuto, in principio, aderire al diritto civile e laico, sollecitato dalla Costituzione (de-creto 60 LR. Del 13 marzo 19036), ma mai applicato, per non urtare il potere accumulato dalle autorità religiose e l’intransigenza della legge islamica in materia.

15. Tuttavia il diritto alleggerisce la pena per una violenza subita e motivata dal codice d’onore. 16. Nel Parlamento eletto nel 2000 erano presenti solo tre donne. 17. Circa quattromila Ngo esercitano un servizio notevole su tutto il territorio libanese. Grazie ad un

codice commerciale molto ampio le Ngo possono costituirsi con un semplice atto notarile come compa-gnia privata non-profit.

18. Circa il 14% della mano d’opera libanese. 19. Ventitré enti libanesi furono coinvolti in tredici contratti di ricerca in ambito Inco-Med gestito dal

Quinto programma quadro (5th Framework Programme 1998-2002). Nel Sesto programma quadro (6th Framework Programme 2003-2004) sono giunte sessanta richieste, di cui diciotto sono state finanziate.


energetiche alternative in acqua, vento ed energia solare; 15. dinamica l’economia libanese, ma altamente dipendente da servizi fragili, tipo servizi finanziari,

commercio, costruzione e turismo; 16. promettente il controllo sul riciclaggio di denaro sporco, applicato dal 2002; 17. alto il deficit del bilancio commerciale e seria la politica di liberalizzazione e di collaborazione

commerciale euro-libanese 20; 18. liberale il settore audiovisivo e radiofonico 21; 19. liberale il settore degli investimenti stranieri 22 .

5. Bollettino della Direzione generale per l’economia e gli affari finanziari dell’Unione Europea (2007) La Direzione generale per l’economia e gli affari finanziari dell’Unione Europea (nel suo Bollettino n.

30 – giugno 2007) giudica: 1. preoccupanti l’indebitamento pubblico libanese 23 e l’incremento dell’inflazione 24; 2. dinamica e liberale l’economia libanese 25, capace di ottenere crediti molto cospicui, ma stagnante

l’economia del 2006, colpa anche dei seri danni alle infrastrutture in seguito al conflitto con Israele; 3. forte il settore bancario nonostante la fragilità della pubblica sicurezza; 4. migliorabile la flessibilità del mercato del lavoro e la protezione legale degli investimenti; 5. ostacoli per lo sviluppo aziendale: l’alto costo dei finanziamenti, la corruzione e l’alto prezzo della

corrente elettrica; 6. inaffidabili le statistiche in ambito sociale e circa gli introiti da tasse amministrative; 7. iniqua la distribuzione della ricchezza tra regioni; 8. molto disuguale la condizione lavorativa e assicurativa tra i dipendenti del settore pubblico e quelli

del settore privato 26.

6. Enpi prima o la sicurezza? Il 12 luglio 2006 è stata una svolta mediterranea. Il Programma di buon vicinato (Enp) era da poco

concluso (maggio 2006) ed il commissario europeo, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, si reca a Beirut (7 luglio

20. Nel triennio 2001-2003, il deficit del bilancio commerciale si aggirava attorno ai 5 miliardi di

euro. Per il Libano, l’Unione Europea è il primo partner commerciale (circa il 50% dell’importo totale, nel 2003). Da marzo 2003, i prodotti industriali e agricoli libanesi hanno libero accesso nel mercato dell’Unione Europea, l’esenzione quasi totale delle tariffe doganali per i prodotti importati dall’Unione Europea sono previsti tra il 2008-2015.

21. Il settore audiovisivo conta sei televisioni e trentasette stazioni radiofoniche di cui solo una stazione per ogni settore è pubblica. La censura è applicata agli argomenti osceni, aggressivi o lesivi alla convivenza multietnica e interreligiosa.

22. I diritti degli investitori son garantiti per l’adesione del Libano al Multilateral Investment Gua-rantee Agency. Salvo per alcuni settori (compravendita di terreni, banche straniere e attività mediatiche), non ci sono restrizioni per gli investimenti stranieri in Libano.

23. In quel periodo l’indebitamento pubblico libanese era pari ai 40.4 miliardi di dollari (cioè al 176% del prodotto interno lordo).

24. L’incremento dell’inflazione fu notevole tra il 2005 (-0.7%) ed il 2006 (5.6%). Parte di questa inflazione è da attribuire al prezzo dell’euro, in un momento in cui il Libano importava circa il 50% del suo fabbisogno alimentare dalla zona euro.

25. Il rapporto in questione cita a questo riguardo la Economic Freedom of the Arab World Report 2006 del Fraser Institute.

26. Il rapporto fa notare che solo il 26% della forza lavorativa è coperta da uno schema pensionistico (inclusi i 6% dei dipendenti pubblici).

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2006) per celebrare il successo di questo programma e annunciare un nuovo Strumento di buon vicinato e di associazione (Enpi). Cinque giorni dopo, il conflitto (Hezbollah-Israele) lascia sul terreno centinaia di morti, distrugge molti risultati raggiunti dopo quattordici anni di ricostruzione, il cui costo è ancora tutto da pagare, brucia più di quanto l’Unione Europea ha dedicato in dieci anni alla cooperazione euro-libanese.

Nell’ambito del suo nuovo piano quinquennale di buon vicinato e di associazione Enpi 27 (2007-2013), l’Unione Europea offre il suo sostegno triennale (2007-2010) che ammonta a 187 milioni di euro per sostenere: a) le riforme politiche (democrazia, diritti umani, governabilità, sicurezza e giustizia); b) le riforme sociali ed economiche (settore energetico, assicurazioni sociali, condizione di vita dei rifugiati palestinesi, riforme commerciali, finanziarie e doganali, protezione ambientale); c) la ricostruzione del paese (infrastrutture e sminamento).

La priorità della sicurezza sulle altre iniziative economiche e finanziarie sono da tempo evidenti per l’Unione Europea ed è pura ipocrisia affermare il contrario, ignorando l’egemonia esercitata da Siria ed Iran sul Libano, ignorando gli sforzi diplomatici che ha esercitato per strappare all’Onu numerose risolu-zioni 28 per liberarlo da questa egemonia e ignorando il suo impegno massiccio nelle forze Unifil per far rispettare tali risoluzioni. Ma la Siria è davvero uscita dal Libano?

7. Il Libano è un ostaggio Il sistema politico libanese è associativo 29: parlamento, governo, alte cariche civili e militari sono

condivise a metà tra le diciotto comunità religiose cristiane e musulmane, in modo equo, ovvero in base alla loro consistenza numerica. Per concretizzare questo “modo equo” fu raggiunto, nel 1943, un patto na-zionale, nel quale ai maroniti fu riservata la Presidenza della Repubblica, ai sunniti quella del governo e agli sciiti quella del Parlamento. Su questi criteri il Libano ha completato la sua indipendenza, forte della sua economia liberale, della sua libertà di stampa, delle sue istituzioni rappresentative, dell’imprendito-rialità e del multilinguismo dei suoi cittadini, trasformandosi nel rifugio dei capitali dei paesi arabi pro-duttori di petrolio, di cui è stato il banchiere ed il luogo di vacanza privilegiato fino allo scoppio della sua guerra anti-civile nel 1975. Quando la guerra è scoppiata, la Guerra fredda ed il conflitto arabo-israeliano erano roventi. Da allora, Israele e Siria non si sono mai più confrontati sul loro territorio, ma solo su quello libanese, trasformandolo in un campo per la resa dei conti tra filo-sovietici e filo-americani.

Durante la guerra Iran-Iraq, il regime di Khomeini si allea con la Siria di Hàfez el-Assad. Nel 1982, grazie a questa alleanza, la Siria permette l’insediamento a Baalbek, sotto uno stretto controllo, di circa quattrocento membri della “guardia della rivoluzione” iraniana che formano il nucleo originario di Hez-bollah. L’invasione israeliana del Libano rende indispensabile per i siriani il ruolo militare di Hezbollah. Da Baalbek Hezbollah si dirama (1983-1984) nella periferia meridionale di Beirut e nel sud del Libano. Finita la guerra, la Siria disarma tutte le milizie libanesi, ma continua ad addestrare il suo alleato privile-giato Hezbollah e a fornirgli armi comprate con soldi iraniani. Nel 1992, Hezbollah, con il beneplacito si-riano, si fa eleggere numerosi deputati in Parlamento, guadagnandosi maggior legittimità e visibilità. Alla sua resistenza vengono attribuiti i meriti del ritiro dell’esercito israeliano, nel 2000, e la sua ritirata dopo l’invasione del luglio 2006. Dopo questi successi, Hezbollah si guadagna una popolarità enorme e assume

27. http://ec.europa.eu/world/emp/pdf/country/empi_csp_nip_lebanon_fr.pdf. 28. Il 2 settembre 2004, il Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite adotta la Risoluzione 1559 che

raccomanda il ritiro delle truppe siriane dal Libano e chiede al Parlamento di non emendare la Costituzio-ne per prolungare il mandato del presidente della Repubblica, imposto dai siriani e contestato dall’ex-pri-mo ministro Rafiq Hariri. Il 14 febbraio 2005, Hariri muore a seguito di un gigantesco attentato. La rivo-luzione anti-siriana di Beirut comincia in stile “arancione”, l’Onu condanna l’attentato (15 febbraio 2005) ed il Consiglio di sicurezza adotta (il 7 aprile 2005) la Risoluzione 1595 che costituisce una commissione di inchiesta sull’assassinio di Hariri, presieduta da Deltev Mehlis. Sottoposta alle pressioni internazionali, la Siria si ritira a fine aprile. In seguito alla guerra Israele-Hezbollah, la risoluzione Onu 1701 (del 12 agosto 2006) chiede una piena cessazione delle ostilità e prevede in seguito l’invio di forze in una missione congiunta nel sud del Libano.

29. Sulla storia contemporanea del Libano consiglio vivamente la lettura di Corm (2003).


un secondo nome tattico di “Resistenza nazionale”. Dopo il ritiro forzato della Siria, Hezbollah gode dell’appoggio del presidente della Repubblica libanese Emile Lahoud, imposto dai siriani e dagli apparati di sicurezza ufficiali a loro fedeli. Il 23 novembre 2007, giungendo alla scadenza del suo mandato, La-houd lascia il palazzo presidenziale. L’opposizione capeggiata da Hezbollah continua ad ostacolare le ele-zioni del nuovo presidente. Il Libano è ancora una volta ostaggio dei contrasti internazionali: il nucleare iraniano, la commissione di inchiesta circa l’assassinio di Hariri osteggiata dalla Siria e il disarmo di Hezbollah. Disarmare Hezbollah con la forza significa frantumare l’esercito stesso e far sollevare contro le istituzioni l’ampia base popolare di cui gode.

Conclusioni È ben noto a chi scrive che la stessa Unione Europea deve affrontare grossi problemi al suo interno pri-

ma di addossarsi nuovi grattacapi. È pure noto a chi scrive che l’ultima massiccia adesione all’Unione Euro-pea (del maggio 2004) ha messo a dura prova le istituzioni dell’Unione Europea e che l’ultimo problema che vorrebbe affrontare è quello di ammansire un Partito di Dio. Però, l’Unione Europea non può ignorare il pe-ricolo che rappresenta per la sua sicurezza una tale ideologia confinante. Eppure, esercitando forti pressioni diplomatiche ed economiche sulla Siria e sull’Iran, si potrebbe neutralizzare relativamente l’apparato mili-tare di Hezbollah, rendere inutili le sue armi e convertirlo gradualmente al rispetto del gioco parlamentare.

Nonostante il suo aspetto esterno di un rapporto tra pari, la Politica di buon vicinato pari non è. Ma quale alternativa migliore hanno i paesi Pev del Mediterraneo (che hanno perso mille occasioni per creare un’unione plurale, democratica, forte da trasformarsi in policy-maker): ricevere fondi statunitensi e con-sumarli in armamenti o riceverne la metà e spenderli per rafforzare la prosperità sociale ed il dialogo cul-turale? Se l’integrazione in una grande Siria o in una Nazione pan-araba, per alcuni sembrava il destino naturale per il Libano, ora tali aspirazioni sembrano più lontane che mai. Nel caso libanese, l’Unione Europea è il rifugio più vicino che potrebbe salvaguardare nell’immediato la democrazia e il pluralismo, frenare le ingerenze straniere, razionalizzare lo stato sociale e garantire le libertà.

D’altro canto, si è visto che prima di soddisfare lo standard dell’Unione Europea, il Libano ha ancora un lungo cammino da compiere, e se i rapporti della Commissione europea alludono timidamente ai pro-blemi confessionali di questo paese, il confessionalismo istituzionale è tra i primi ostacoli dalla confor-mità del Libano alla filosofia europea.

Se la cooperazione con l’Unione Europea, le riforme economiche e commerciali hanno la priorità, nel caso libanese questa visione non funziona, come non ha funzionato così nel caso della stessa Unione Europea. Infatti l’Unione Europea non sarebbe quella che è adesso se non avesse costruito le sue riforme economiche e commerciali forte di una sicurezza garantita dalla Nato.

È troppo presto per pensare alla nuova alternativa di Unione Mediterranea proposta ultimamente da Sarkozy30, visto che nessuno dei paesi Pev del Mediterraneo assomiglia minimamente al sistema politico libanese.

Il Libano potrebbe rendersi utile all’Unione Europea e al mondo arabo. A nessuno sfugge il dinami-smo finanziario, bancario e imprenditoriale dell’uomo di affari libanese. A nessuno sfugge il dinamismo editoriale e l’alto livello di alfabetismo e multilinguismo dei suoi cittadini, la sua ampia rete di amicizie internazionali e inter-arabe. Ma tutti questi vantaggi che potrebbero tornare utili al Libano, al mondo arabo e all’Unione Europea, servono a poco senza sicurezza e sovranità. Pace, sovranità e stabilità inco-raggeranno i cervelli e i capitali libanesi ed arabi in fuga a rientrare, e permetterà agli oleodotti di Zahrani e Tripoli di funzionare di nuovo per fornire di energia saudita e irachena il Libano e l’Unione Europea. Se dopo questo, l’integrazione nell’Unione Europea si renderà favorevole, ci penserà il Parlamento libanese e quello europeo a verificarne l’opportunità.

30. Si veda Roberto Aliboni, 05.07.2007, “sarko-Med: un “nouveau souffleu” o un “nouveau soufflé”,

www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=575.

Elie Kallas 86

RIFERIMENTI BIBLIOGRAFICI

Chantraine P. (1990), Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, vol. I, Éditions Klincksieck, Paris. Cormor G. (2003), Le Liban contemporain, Editions la Découverte [Ediz. it.: Il Libano contemporaneo,

Jaca Book, Milano, 2006]. Delli Zotti G., A. Pocecco (cur.) (1998), “Governi a macchia di leopardo e sovranità balcaniche”,

Futuribili, 2-3. Frisk H. (1973), Greichisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, Heidelberg. Lewy H. (1895), Die semitischen Fremdwörter im Griechischen, Berlin.

BUILDING EUROREGIONS IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

Vasile Puşcaş Chairman of the Institute for International Studies

Babes Bolyai University – Cluj Napoca

Abstract: The European preoccupation for reducing the gaps in development among the regions is dated ever since the Treaty of Rome, and its constant evaluation by European, national institutions and also NGO’s and academics is one of the main instruments for improving this European policy, in the benefit of all citizens. The paper is dedicated not so much to the construction of the Euroregions in the SE Europe, but to their current state of functionality and development. We consider functionality to depend on the intensity of the cooperation between the states in the area (SE Europe) and also on the development stage of Member State cooperation in the EU. The data used to asses this status are collected from the reports submitted to the Council of Europe in the last years, activities reports of the regional authorities or NGO’s and reports concerning the transfrontier cooperation in the area. The success or the failure of the European regional policy in the SE Europe is marked by the fact that countries that are part of the Euro regions are under the influence of various international institutions (Council of Europe, EU, CEI etc). That state of play, along with the fact that some of the countries in the area are member states of the EU and some are not, leads to significant differences between their financial capabilities and their results in regional cooperation. All these above and many other reasons determine the level of cohesion in the area, functionality of the regional cooperation, etc. Keywords: Euroregions, South-East Europe, EU regional policy, EU external relations

• − • − •

The countries signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957 established regional cooperation for strengthening the unity of their economies and ensuring their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing among the various regions and the backwardness of the less-favoured regions.

Different from the European Union regions of Europe, the co-operation for future development in Europe can also take the form of trans-national co-operation or cross-border co-operation.

Euro-regions are forms of transnational co-cooperation structure between two (or more) territories located in different European countries, with the aim to promote common interests across the border and cooperate fro the common good of the border populations. Some say that the border regions are more economically and culturally diverse than a country’s central regions and in the cases where the cross-border co-operation is more developed, this affirmation is not only accurate but, most important, promoted in a way that benefits all.

Euroregions have proved, over the years, to be an effective tool for building local capacity for development. They are not meant to replace administrative or political local institutions, but to mediate associations between local, regional institutions from different countries.

The main and most important patron of this initiative is the Council of Europe and the legal status of the euro-regions varies from a community of interest without legal personality (Euroregion Neisse, Euroregion Elbe-Labe), a European Economic Interest Grouping (Euroregion Transcanal), a non-profit-making association (for example; the Euregio Saar-Lor-Lux Rhine, under the private law of Luxem-

Vasile Puşcaş 88

bourg), a working community without a legal personality (Euregio Bayerischer Wald-Böhmerwald/-Sumava) or a public body (Rhine-Waal Euregio).

Certain cases show that the status of one Euregio can be interpreted differently in different countries. For example, the Euregio Maas-Rhine is a foundation under Dutch law, but is equivalent to an ASBL (non-profit-making organisation) in Belgian law.

The council of Europe developed a strategy regarding the transfrontier co-operation in South Eastern Europe, within the framework of the European Charter of Local Self Government, and based on the Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between territorial authorities (Madrid Convention 1980).

Also, most of the euroregions are beneficiaries of European funds through several programs (Phare Cross-border co-operation, Interreg, etc.).

Although used successfully in the last 50 years among Western European states, the transnational co-operation needed to help improving lives of all Europeans had a rather slow progress I n the south-eastern Europe.

According to the Council of Europe 1, in the recent years has been a «steady increase in trans-frontier co-operation bodies which are increasingly known by the term “Euro-regions”, particularly in central and eastern European countries. The name given to a trans-frontier co-operation body, “Euroregion”, suggests simply a feeling of belonging to Europe and a willingness to participate in the process of European integration and therefore, encourages the frontier local and regional authorities to co-operate for the common good».

Despite the optimistic tone of the Council of Europe website’s presentation, the co-operation listed in the same framework doesn’t look that encouraging.

The south eastern part of Europe is composed of member states of the EU, a candidate state and non-EU states. More, this part of Europe was, not long ago, the scene of violent conflicts in the Balkans that leaded to the apparition of new states.

The cross-border co-operation in this are was established since the 1991, and the SE Europe countries lack the experience of co-operation based on instruments of the current Europe.

The varied composition of the euroregions in the are, the geographical and demographical extension, the economic capacities and institutional performances – all these have a consistent influence on the functionality of the trans-national co-operation 2 and the results are at least average compared to the opportunities for Euroregional development in the area.

In simple figures, there are 11 euroregions listed at the Council of Europe for South-Eastern Europe; 12 countries that are involved in the trans-frontier co-operation in this area. 7 of them are EU member sates (Bulgaria, France, Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, Spain), one is a candidate country (Croatia), and the others are neither.

The Adriatic Euroregion was founded on June 30, 2006 in the Region of Istria, Croatia 3. It represented a model of cooperation that includes trans-national and inter-regional cooperation

between regions of the Adriatic coastline and is the institutional framework for jointly defining and solving important issues in the Adriatic area. It consists of 23 members – Regional and local government from Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania.

1. www.coe.int. 2. Vasile Puşcaş, Cross border co-operation in the Balkan-Danube Area (2002-2005); Romania, Bul-

garia, Hungary, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro; Report for the Council of Europe conference “Rethinking cross-border cooperation in the Balkan-Danube area”, Sofia, 29-30 September 2005.

3. Http://www.adriaticeuroregion.org/en/.

Building euroregions in South Eastern Europe 89

Euro-regions in the South-Eastern Europe 4

Countries participating in the mentioned cooperation

Founded in

Adriatic Euroregion 5 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Italy, Montenegro, Slovenia

2006

Alps-Mediterranean Euroregion France, Italy 2007 Belasica euroregion Bulgaria, Greece, Republic of Macedonia 2003 Black Sea euroregion Bulgaria, Romania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,

Greece, Moldova, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine September

2008 Danube 21 euroregion Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia 1992 Danube – Kris – Murs – Risza euroregion

Romania, Hungary, Serbia 1997

Drina-Sava-Majevica euroregion Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia 2003 Eurobalkans Bulgaria, Republic of Macedonia, Serbia October

2002 Mesta-Nestos euroregion Bulgaria, Greece 1997 Prespa/Ohrid euroregion Albania, Republic of Macedonia, Greece 2005 Euregio Steiermark Slovenia Eurorégion Languedoc-Roussil-lon/Midi-Pyrénées/Comunidad Autónona de Catalunya

Spain

Giurgiu-Russe Euroregion Bulgaria, Romania 2001 Danubius Euroregion Bulgaria, Romania 2002 The list is not exhaustive; some of the euroregions presented above have not made public their activities, or not on the web

The aims 6 of this region are to form an area of peace, stability and cooperation, protection of the cultural heritage, protection of the environment, sustainable economic development in particular of tourism, fishery and agriculture, solution of transport and other infrastructure issues.

It is comprised of 20 regions, municipalities and counties 7 and its members work aiming at the following goals: - establishment and development of relations of inhabitants and institutions of the area as premises for a

more knowledge, better understanding and collaboration, - creation of premises for the development of economy in harmony with the environment, definition of

common development interests, preparation, definition, and coordination of a joint development strategy,

- creation of the programme of cultural exchange, - securing premises for a successful flow of experience and its application on the Eu programmes.

One of the main ongoing projects of The Adriatic Euroregion is Adri-Eur.O.P. – aimed to offer operational support (in technical-administrative terms) to the political process for the establishment of an institutional body of the Adriatic Euroregion (AE), created in order to promote development to be coordinated and integrated in territories in the Adriatic regions.

Adri.Eur.O.P. is an integrated project 8 financed by the Adriatic New Neighbourdhood Programme Interreg/Cards-Phare 2000-2006 under Priority 3 (Action of Strengthening of Cooperation), Measure 3.2 (“Cooperation and Strengthening in Communications, Research and Systems Harmonization between Institutions”) for the creation of service structures in order to promote activities between Adriatic partners

4. www.coe.int. 5. Http://www.adriaticeuroregion.org/en/. 6. Http://www.adriaticeuroregion.org/en/index.aspx?cID=151. 7. Http://www.adriaticeuroregion.org/hr/maps/ae-map.htm. 8. Http://www.adriaticeuroregion.org/en/index.aspx?cID=57.

Vasile Puşcaş 90

of the AE and encourage the relationships between the latter and the European Union and establish a network of local bodied (municipalities, Chambers of Commerce, local bodies, universities, research centres, etc.).

The project involves 9 partners: the 7 Adriatic Italian Regions, the Istria Region and the Municipality of Kotor and the indirect beneficiaries of the project are all the local bodies and the organizations presents in all the territories of the AE which can benefit of the project’s results.

Belasica Euroregion was established in 2003 at the borders between Bulgaria, Greece, republic of

Macedonia as a unity of three non-profit cross border organisations which are in fact networks of Local Authorities, Entrepreneurial and Social Partners of the common border between Bulgaria, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and Greece.

The Danube 21 euro-region (the exact name being “The Association for Cross-border Cooperation Danube 21”) 9 was established in 18 January 2002 at Vidin, by the mayors of the towns Calafat (Romania), Vidin (Bulgaria) and Zaicear (Serbia and Montenegro). This cross-border association involves urban and rural localities of the three countries, not larger administrative units. Its activity is based on working committees aiming to investigate the strategic development of the region, culture and education, economic development, sport, tourism and youth activities, ecology, agriculture, health and social protection. The trilateral committees analyze some shared problems of these areas, among which: they are relatively remote from the administrative centres, lacking economic and transport infrastructure.

Ongoing or provisioned projects: Construction of a gas pipe linking Calafat, Vidin and Zaicear; Environmental projects: Openings of business information centres; Establishment of a free trade area; Organisations of exhibition; Rehabilitation of streets, thermal energy supply systems, sewerage and water supply systems of the localities involved in the Euro-region.

Black Sea euroregion 10 will be legally established on September 29, 2008, in Varna (Bulgaria) and it will be the result of the commitments of the Congress of Local and regional Authorities of the Council of Europe for issues related to the Adriatic, Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas. The main steps for founding the Black Sea Euroregion were taken through the International Conference on Interregional Cooperation in the Black Sea (Constanta, Romania, March 2006), as well as the 2nd Conference on Black Sea Cooperation that was held in Samsun (Turkey) in November 2006.

Although not entirely in the SE Europe this new-born Euroregion is worth mentioned because of is members. Three member states of the Eu, three states that emerged from the former URSS, Russia, a transcontinental country at the juncture of Eastern Europe and Western Asia and one the (former) oil reserves of the former Urss – at least, an interesting collaboration.

Within this euroregion there are two projects that are provisioned to be launched soon: Black Sea Regional Expertise Network 11, which is meant to create a network of expertise centers a the level of every partner involved in the project coordinated by a connection and coordination center established in Constanta (Romania); and Black Sea Tradition and Culture 12with the main goal to preserve, promote the cultural heritage, observe cultural diversity in the Black Sea basin by making a documentary that will comprise a detailed presentation of the history of the region, the geographical area, as well as the specific customs and traditions of every zone and by organizing a folk festival (traditional music and dance).

Danube-Kris-Mures-Tisza euroregion (DKMT) was established in 1997 and is based upon the

Cooperation Protocol between nine counties from Romania, Hungary and Serbia. The Euro-regional centre is situated in Timisoara (Romania) since 2003 and it is named The Euro-

regional Centre for Democracy. In 2002 a number of NGOs from the region signed a petition in Timisoara claiming the following:

9. Vasile Puşcaş, Cross-border co-operation in the Balkan- Danube area 2007; Romania-Bulgaria,

Hungary, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, Update Report; ISI – Babes-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, Romania, Isig, University of Trieste- Italy.

10. www.bser.eu. 11. Http://www.bser.eu/sectiune.php?s=19. 12. Http://www.bser.eu/sectiune.php?s=18.


1. To include representatives of non-governmental organizations, designated by the civil sector, in the decision-making bodies of the DKMT euro-region.

2. To set up a DKMT euro-regional fund to support cross-border cooperation, including civic organizations initiatives 13.

Ongoing projects 14 : - the building of the infrastructure of the frontier crossing-point Cenad-Kiszombor (the Romanian

Hungarian frontier); - the rehabilitation of the Bega Channel; - the rehabilitation of the railroad Szeged (Hungary) – Kikinda (Serbia and Montenegro) –

Timisoara (Romania); - the environmental protection in the Surduc Lake area, the rural rehabilitation and the introduction

of the area in the tourist international circuit; - the rehabilitation of the centre for watering pleasure and treatment Buzias; - the auto road Lugoj-Timisoara-Nadlac-Szeged, connecting Western Romania to the Pan-European

Corridor IV; - approaches for the opening of a new frontier crossing-point at Triplex Confinium – location in

which the frontiers of Romania, Hungary and Serbia-Montenegro meet. Drina-Sava-Majevica euroregion was established in 2003 as a form of cooperation among border

municipalities from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. Some of the projects developed withn its frame concern transportation and water infrastructure.

Eurobalkans 15 is a form of cross-border cooperation established in October 2002 between municipal-

ities from the border regions in Bulgaria, Serbia and republic of Macedonia. Based on the people’s desire for peace in an instability and conflict area, in time grew as means for transformation of the border from a line of separation into a place of communication and cooperation between neighbours.

The objectives set for the Eurobalkans Euro-region are various: overcoming of mutual animosities and prejudices between peoples of border regions which result from historical heritage; strengthening of democracy and the development of operation al regional/local administrative structures; overcoming of national peripherality and isolation; promotion of economic growth and the development and improve-ment of living standards; rapid approach towards and integrated Europe, etc.

Within this frame of cooperation now activates a Chamber of Commerce, a Tv station and a inancning fund for the projects developed in the region.

The Euroregion Mesta-Nestos 16 is located in the Balkan Peninsula at the border between Bulgaria and

Greece and was agreed upon in 1997. It started as a NGO’s cooperation project which later involved eco-nomic organizations, regional and local government and individual corporations.

Beyond the information exchange agreement (regarding the state of their economies, commerce, eco-nomic legislation and commercial practices in their countries) with the aim of helping the development of the relations between their members, other objectives of the euroregion regard promoting cooperation of the local government, NGOs, associations, cultural clubs, sporting clubs, joint ventures and technical co-operation of their members in the fields of small and medium – seize enterprises, trade, tourism, culture, arts, sports, etc.

Among the many activities 17 carried on with the financial support of the EU through the Interreg and Phare Cbc framework, there are several that are worth mentioning:

13. Http://dkmt1.regionalbnet.org/petitionE.html. 14. Http://www.mae.ro. 15. Http://www.eurobalkans.net/enstrane/introduction.htm. 16. Http:/www.euroregion.gr. 17. Http:/www.euroregion.gr/action.htm.

Vasile Puşcaş 92

- Humanitarian Assistance to the Needy: when the people of the Bulgarian side faced the predicament of famine due the economic and financial crisis in their country, four trucks loaded with food, medicine, clothes and other necessities left from Drama as assistance to the needy po-pulation of the Mesta region;

- Business Forum: a collaboration of Greek and Bulgarian companies that took the form of the organization of a Greek-Bulgarian Business Forum at the annual exhibition of Gotze Delchev; today, about 25 entrepreneurs and business people from the area of Drama are actively engaged in economic activity in the neighbouring region of Bulgaria; the Euroregion has played a pivotal role in the creation and promotion of the new business opportunities across the borders;

- Language Training: the Business Center of Razlog, with support from the ILO and UNDP has organized courses to train young executives on cross border business practices including training in Greek language; on the other hand, the vocational centers of Drama introduces similar training courses including the teaching of Bulgarian language.

- Mass Media Associations of the two Regions: two Media Associations, the “Mass Medial Link” from the Greek side and the “Pirin Media Association” from the Bulgarian side established com-mon structures and operations with the sole aim of informing the public opinion of the whole Euroregion about the activities of cross border cooperation nature.

The Council of the Prespa/Ohrid Euroregion first meeting was in June 2005, and consisted of

members of the local border communities from Albania, Greece and Republic of Macedonia, a Commerce Chamber, development agencies, local and regional authorities.

Following this meeting in which it was made public the regional development priorities of the three sides, a set of objectives 18 were drawn: road infrastructure between all municipalities and prefectures; support to small and medium enterprises in the region; cooperation and improvement on health infra-structure; joint environmental protection initiatives; tourism development; higher education co-operation.

Among the completed and ongoing projects undertaken in the frame of this euroregion are: Economic body, Prespa, promotion of sustainable economic development in the cross-border region; Info point, establishing information base between SMEs and the institutions for support in R. Macedonia; Development of the common activities between Technological Education institute from Florina, Greece and Technical Faculty from Bitola, Macedonia, etc.

Giurgiu – Russe Euroregion was established in 2001 between Romania and Bulgaria; an important

element linking the Euro-region is the existing bridge over the Danube between the two localities. It involves 19 the local government of the two cities plus a non-governmental organization and

addresses more limited objectives such as the environmental protection and community health, having as subsequent objective the sustainable development of the region.

One of their advertised project was Creation and Promotion of Cross-Border Cultural Itinerary: «From the Mediaeval Monastery Complex of Ivanovo Village and the Rocky Monastery “St. Dimitar Basar-bovsky” through the Orthodox Temples of Rousse and Giurgiu to the Monastery of Komana Village” – which was targeted for local administrations and tour-operators, priests and museum specialist and young people from the area.

18. Trans-frontier institution building project for the Prespa/Ohrid Euroregion 2003-2005. Towards

the establishment of the region; http://www.iews.org/pdf/WG%20Report%201st%20Council%20Meet-ing%20Florina%202005.pdf.

19. Vasile Puşcaş, Cross border co-operation in the Balkan-Danube Area 2007; Romania-Bulgaria, Hungary, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro; Update Report; ISI – Babes-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, Romania, Isig, University of Trieste- Italy.


Conclusions The main credit for the creation of the euroregions in SE Europe goes to the international community

that made possible for countries with internal and external difficulties to overcome the differences and to look for the common interests.

Functionality of those forms of associations is however, another matter: In the case of SE Europe euroregions it depends on the geographical, politic, economic, social, military characteristics of the area.

Many of the states in the SE Europe are young democracies, so the internal transformation (new institutions based on democracy and rule of law, etc.) is enforced by the cross-border cooperation, which is an essential feature for the mutual relations between the countries.

Also, the differences regarding the association of theses states to various international, regional or sub-regional organisations are, as well, among those things that shape the cooperation and the euroregions.

At some point, several elements can be identified, that can show the existing strengths and opportun-ities that ought to be exploited and threats that can be avoided:

- the size of the states and their resources for cross-border cooperation; - the level of development of the state institutions; the level of the state maturity and the policies

regarding development; - cultural diversity and the state’s history of internal cooperation or the history of its conflicts;

linguistic factors; - the degree of economical and social development and the potential for the expansion of the local

market; - access to the political, financial, market resources of the EU; - the level of administrative decentralisation and the degree of its influence on the public policies; - the level of development of the civil society and the influence of the local administration. In 2004, the Council of Europe issued a report on trans-border cooperation in the SE Europe and

recommended five different strategies for approaching the euroregions in the area, according to the level of cooperation and efficiency.

Those strategies regarded, one by one, the cross-border cooperation between the countries in the SE Europe, and while assessing their efficiency, it also searched new means to enhance it.

Also, it pointed out that the AEBR 20 could play an essential role in facilitating the exchange of experience and know-how between existing and would-be Euroregions.

AEBR was an initiative from 1965, when took place the “International Conference on Regional Planning” at Basel. Following this conference, in 1971 at Anholt Castle, a Standing Committee of Euro-pean Border Regions was set up.

Its Statute stipulate that AEBR is acting for the benefit of all European border and cross-border regions and that it has as its aims: • to make their particular problems, opportunities, tasks and projects intelligible; • to represent their overall interests to national and international parliaments, organs,

authorities and institutions; • to initiate, support and co-ordinate their cooperation throughout Europe (creation of a

network); • to exchange know-how and information in order to formulate and coordinate common

interests on the basis of the various cross-border problems and opportunities, and to offer adequate solutions.

Cooperation between the Council of Europe and the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR)

was established as early as in the end of the 1960s and thus the joining together of border regions was encouraged even prior to the official foundation of AEBR in 1917.

20. The Association of European Border Regions – http://www.aebr.net/.

Vasile Puşcaş 94

Also, a new EU initiative for enhancing cross-border cooperation appeared a new perspective has risen in 2006 for enhancing cooperation at the borders, not only in the South-Eastern Europe, but also in the Mediterranean area and everywhere else is needed.

The European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC ) 21 is a Community level cooperation

instrument with legal personality created on July 5th, 2006 under EU Council Regulation 1082/2006. An EGTC must have members from at least two member states and members can include local or

regional authorities, bodies “governed by public law within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18/EC” (any body having legal personality), or Member States.

When an EGTC is formed its convention has to define the objectives and powers of the entity and it is limited by the respective powers of its members under their national law. The law applicable to the interpretation and enforcement of the convention is the law of the Member State where the EGTC has its registered office. The assembly of an EGTC approves an annual budget containing a component on running costs and, if necessary, an operational component. The EGTC or its Members are liable for any debts incurred. An EGTC cannot exercise police and regulatory powers or powers in justice and foreign policy. According to the regulation if an EGTC carries out any activity violating a Member State’s provisions on public policy, public security, public health or public morality, or violates the public interest of a Member State, a competent body of that Member State may prohibit such activity on its territory or require those members which have been formed under its law to withdraw from the EGTC unless the EGTC ceases the activity in question. Such prohibitions cannot be used as an arbitrary means to limit cooperation under the regulation and are subject to judicial review 22.

21. http://ec.europa.eu/regional policy/sources/docoffic/official/regulation/pdt/2007/gect/ce 1082(2006)

en-pdf. 22. http://ec.europa.eu/regional policy/sources/docoffic/official/regulation/pdt/2007/gect/ce 1082(2006)

en-pdf.

RECENSIONI

Sospesi tra due rive. Migrazioni e insediamenti di albanesi e marocchini

Anna Paternò, Salvatore Strozza e Laura Terzera (cur.) Franco Angeli, Milano, 2006

Il “transnazionalismo”, concetto ormai affermato negli studi di antropologia delle migrazioni, si va lentamente affermando anche nelle ricerche condotte da demografi, sociologi, economisti che si occupano dell’analisi dei movimenti migratori e delle loro implicazioni. Come sottolinea Riccio 1, il neologismo esprime quello che sembra essere una nuova modalità di vivere le identità culturali e le esperienze migratorie, superando i limiti delle teorie esclusivamente centrate sui contesti di approdo e celebrando invece la capacità dell’attuale immigrato di essere “qui” e “lì” contemporaneamente.

Il volume curato da Paternò, Strozza e Terzera affronta la problematica della presenza straniera in Italia inserendosi nella tradizione – peraltro non abbondante – di contributi che, come si legge nell’introduzione, cercano di cogliere i migranti in un’ottica appunto transnazionale, considerandoli nella loro natura di esseri umani “sospesi” tra due mondi. Due le collettività prese in considerazione, accomunate dal fatto di provenire da paesi geograficamente vicini, confinati o separati solo dal Mediterraneo. Oltre ad essere tra le più importanti, le comunità di albanesi e marocchini in Italia sono caratterizzate da un elevato livello di dispersione sul territorio, circostanza che consente di fotografare i caratteri dell’insediamento in ambiti territoriali molto differenziati.

I contributi nella prima parte del volume affrontano problematiche inerenti l’evoluzione dei flussi e le caratteristiche delle collettività migranti, l’evoluzione demografica nel paese di origine ed in Italia e le sue interrelazioni con la società di accoglimento. Ciascuna sezione tratta noti e meno noti aspetti della transizione demografica nei paesi di origine, collocando la vicenda migratoria italiana all’interno di quella generale che ha interessato gli individui in spostamento in Albania e Marocco, paesi giunti ad affacciarsi sulle rive del Mediterraneo con storie diverse e soprattutto differenti implicazioni sulle popolazioni di origine in termini demografici, sociali ed economici. Particolarmente curata la parte dedicata alle fonti che gli autori del volume trattano con organicità e completezza, riuscendo a porgere al lettore in modo conciso ma sistematico gli strumenti per orientarsi.

Sfruttando poi un ricco materiale messo a disposizione da alcune indagini sul campo, nei capitoli successivi gli autori approfondiscono la conoscenza della presenza albanese e marocchina in Italia considerando alcuni temi e problematiche che evocano quel senso di sospensione che costituisce il motivo di fondo del testo. Ci si sofferma dunque su forme familiari, caratteristiche riproduttive, condizione abitativa, stato di salute degli immigrati. È opportuno ricordare che le indagini campionarie dalle quali è

1. Cfr. Bruno Riccio (1999-2000), “Pregi e limiti dell’approccio transnazionale al fenomeno migrato-rio”, Etnoantropologia (numero speciale: “Migrazioni e dinamiche dei contatti interculturali”): 253-262.

96

tratta la documentazione, condotte in differenti ambiti territoriali (Bari, Roma e Lombardia) e in un periodo di tempo circoscritto (il biennio 2001-2002) – sfruttano un medesimo disegno campionario (il campionamento per centri proposto alcuni anni fa da Blangiardo), una strategia che indiscutibilmente ha fornito gli esiti migliori con riferimento alla problematica, colma di insidie, dell’individuazione di un gruppo rappresentativo di intervistati in una realtà fluida e sfuggente come quella migratoria. In sostanza, le quasi tremila interviste raccolte costituiscono un notevole e affidabile corpus informativo che permette di approfondire opportunamente temi e aspetti della presenza marocchina ed albanese nel nostro Paese, aprendo problematiche specifiche e adombrando ipotesi teoriche anche nuove che possono essere senza troppe forzature estese al di là delle specifiche situazioni osservate.

Gli ultimi tre capitoli affrontano tematiche più direttamente connesse al mercato del lavoro, alla costruzione del reddito, alle modalità di risparmio e invio di rimesse all’estero, tema che – sottolineano i tre curatori – costituisce il segno forse più tangibile dell’essere sospesi tra la “riva” in cui si è nati e quella in cui, per scelta o costrizione, si trascorre un periodo più o meno lungo della propria vita. L’analisi dei trasferimenti monetari in patria risulta particolarmente interessante perché testimonianza dell’esistenza o meno di un comportamento “forte” nei riguardi della strategia di inserimento nel paese di arrivo: molti immigrati manifestano una elevata propensione al risparmio, dal quale deriva la capacità di “fare rimesse” al punto di spingerli a rendere precario il loro stile di vita nel paese di accoglimento.

Nel volume spesso si propongono confronti tra la situazione italiana e la realtà migratoria delle due collettività osservate in altri paesi nei quali la loro presenza è consistente, sostanzialmente Grecia per gli albanesi, Francia, Belgio e Olanda per i marocchini. Si tratta di confronti quanto mai interessanti e opportuni, soprattutto alla luce del fatto che consentono di ricondurre quella che appare essere una intollerabile eterogeneità e specificità del comportamento dei migranti a pochi e sicuri paradigmi interpretativi. Se si esclude infatti l’analisi del comportamento economico (ci si riferisce qui soprattutto alle modalità nella costruzione del reddito e dell’invio delle rimesse), ambito nel quale i riferimenti teorici appaiono maggiormente consolidati e vengono più agevolmente recuperati e discussi dagli autori, il volume acquisisce maggior respiro proprio quando il comportamento dei migranti viene collocato alla luce di quanto avviene in altre realtà: se è vero che il processo di costruzione di una teoria interpretativa delle migrazioni internazionali è ancora da costruire o, come sostengono alcuni, costituisce operazione improba, che sia almeno di consolazione poter osservare modelli o almeno regolarità empiriche nell’analisi del comportamento delle popolazioni immigrate nel nostro Paese, alla luce dei quali scegliere se quanto sta accadendo in Italia costituisca un ulteriore segno dell’allargamento dei sistemi migratori internazionali o viceversa indichi un limitato esperimento nel processo di consolidamento delle collettività straniere.

Oliviero Casacchia Dipartimento di Scienze demografiche, Facoltà di Scienze statistiche, Università “La Sapienza” di Roma, [email protected]

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