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IS YI MORE BASIC THAN REN IN THETEACHINGS OF CONFUCIUS?

I. Introduction

There is a general agreement among the translators and/or commen-tators of the Analects that ren is the central concept in the teachingsof Confucius, although they disagree on how the term ren should betranslated. A frequently cited list of the translations of ren includesthe following: “benevolence, love, altruism, kindness, charity, compas-sion, magnanimity, perfect virtue, goodness, true manhood, manhoodat its best, human-heartedness, humanness, humanity, ‘hominity,’ [and]man-to-manness.”1 These renditions can be classified into two catego-ries reflective of different understandings of ren: 1. ren as a first-order,particular virtue, in which sense it is one virtue among many. 2. ren asthe higher-order, general virtue, in which sense it is an umbrella termused to cover a variety of virtues. While “benevolence,” “love,” “altru-ism,” “kindness,” “charity,” “compassion,” and “magnanimity,” all ofwhich I call the “first-order renditions,” belong to the first category, allthe rest (“the higher-order renditions”) go into the second category.Scholars who view ren as a specific, first-order virtue and consistentlytranslate ren using one of the first-order renditions may be called“particularists,” whereas those who see ren as the general, higher-order virtue and uniformly translate ren using one of the higher-orderrenditions are called “generalists.”According to the above definitions,D. C. Lau is a particularist because he consistently translates ren as“benevolence” throughout the Analects,2 while Arthur Waley is ageneralist due to the fact that he uniformly translates ren as “Good-ness” wherever it appears in the Analects.3 Both the generalist posi-tion and particularist position are problematic, for what Confuciusdoes not do is to use the term ren uniformly in one sense or the other.On some occasions, he uses it in the particular sense, whereas on otheroccasions he uses it in the general or holistic sense. For example, inpassages 6: 30, 12: 22, 17: 8, Confucius uses ren in the narrow sense, but

SHIRONG LUO, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Simmons College.Specialties: Chinese philosophy in Pre-Qin period, ethics, comparative philosophy, andreligion. E-mail: shirong.luo@simmons.edu

Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38:3 (September 2011) 427–443© 2011 Journal of Chinese Philosophy

in passages 17: 6, he uses the term in the holistic sense.We should keepin mind the fact that Confucius himself uses ren (at least) in twosenses to avoid the mistake of interpreting Confucius’s ren as if it hadonly one sense. Consistency is not always a merit.

How to translate the term ren is not simply a matter of linguistic/translational interest, as the choice of word here has some far-reaching philosophical implications.4 A case in point is D. C. Lau’sview on Confucius’s “moral system.” According to Lau, “no moralsystem can be solely based on moral virtues, and Confucius’ system isno exception.”5 He also claims that the rightness of acts depends ontheir being morally fitting in the circumstances and has little to dowith the disposition or motive of the agent.6 Within the confines ofthis article, I will not deal with Lau’s two general claims that no moralsystem can be solely based on moral virtues and that the rightness ofacts has little to do with the disposition or motive of the agent, for hedoes not support them with arguments. Instead, I will focus on hismore restricted thesis that Confucius’s moral system is based on yirather than on ren. I argue that Lau’s claim is inconclusive as he failsto take the general sense of ren into consideration. Although thegeneralist’s position has its share of problems, no generalists, to myknowledge, have made a similar claim. So my discussion will focus onLau’s particularist position.

Even a very brief survey of some translations of the Analects seemsto indicate that the majority of translators are generalists, for theyuniformly translate ren into a second-order rendition. Arthur Waley,for example, translates ren as “Goodness.” He explains, “Jen [ren], inthe Analects, means ‘good’ in an extremely wide and general sense.”7

Raymond Dawson remarks that ren “embraces all the social virtues.”8

According to Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr. “ren is one’sentire person: one’s cultivated cognitive, aesthetic, moral, and reli-gious sensibilities. . . .”9 Simon Leys translates ren as “humanity.”10

Lau, as a particularist, consistently renders ren as “benevolence.” Theterm “benevolence” comes from Latin bene volent, meaning “wellwishing.” Lau uses benevolence as a synonym for love.“Following thefootsteps of the Duke of Chou, Confucius made the natural love andobligations obtaining between members of the family the basis of ageneral morality.”11 “Love for people outside one’s family is lookedupon as an extension of the love for members of one’s own family.”12

Although there is some textual support for this interpretive emphasison love, I believe that this emphasis is misplaced, perhaps due to theinfluence of Mencius whose understanding of ren differs fromConfucius’s. What Confucius explicitly emphasizes is respect forrather than love of one’s parents. “Those today who are filial areconsidered so because they are able to provide for their parent. But

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even dogs and horses are given that much care. If you do not respectyour parents, what is the difference?”13

When I say “there is some textual support” for interpreting ren aslove, what I have in mind is Confucius’s reply to a question about renposed by his disciple Fan Chi in passage 12: 22, which is mostfrequently cited by those who see Confucius’s ren as love or benevo-lence.14 But if we draw the conclusion that ren is love or benevolenceon the basis of the few passages in which Confucius uses the term inthe particular sense without questioning whether that is the onlysense in which ren is used, we can easily arrive at the implication thatren cannot be the basis of moral evaluation as ren itself does not carryits moral guarantee, as Lau claims. But in many passages, Confuciuspresents a variety of particular virtues as a group. Sometimes hesubsumes them under the heading of ren, thereby indicating that heuses ren in the general sense, but other times, he groups them togetheras the qualities a gentleperson should cultivate and possess. Since inthe contexts where ren is used in the general sense, it can be treated asa synonym of the term “gentleperson” ( junzi ), we may take allthe virtues included in Confucius’s various listings as constituentvirtues of ren or junzi and therefore come to understand that love orbenevolence is only one constituent virtue among many, as the fol-lowing quotations clearly demonstrate:

The way (dao ) to lead a thousand chariot state effectively is tocarry out your official duties respectfully ( jing ) and make good onyour word (xin ); be frugal in your expenditure ( ) and loveyour peers ( ); and put the common people to work only at theproper time of year.15

As a younger brother and son, be filial (xiao ) at home and defer-ential (di ) in the community; be cautious in what you say ( jin )and then make good on your word (xin ); love the multitudebroadly (ai zhong ) and be intimate with the virtuous (qin ren

). If in so behaving you still have energy left, use it to improveyourself through study.16

It seems that in the above remarks, love (ai ), regardless of itsobjects, is only one virtue among many. The most straightforwardenumeration of virtues under the name of ren can be found in passage17: 6 in which ren is used as an umbrella term to cover five virtues:respect (gong ), tolerance (kuan ), trustworthiness (xin ), dili-gence (min ), and kindness (hui ). In passage 16: 10, Confuciuspresents a list of nine virtues that a gentleperson should cultivate:

A gentleman ( junzi ) always keeps nine things in mind: inlooking they think about clarity (ming ), in hearing they thinkabout acuity (cong ), in countenance they think about cordiality(wen ), in bearing and attitude they think about deference (gong

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), in speaking they think about doing their utmost (zhong ), inconducting affairs they think about due respect ( jing ), in enter-taining doubts they think about the proper questions to ask(wen ),in anger they think about regret (nan ), in sight of gain they thinkabout yi ( ).17

Notice that this list not only includes some typical social virtuessuch as deference (gong), respect ( jing), or doing one’s utmost(zhong), it also contains some intellectual virtues such as clarity(ming), and acuity (cong). In addition, we should keep in mind thatthe virtues listed by Confucius do not always conform to the Aristo-telian sense of the term, that is, an excellent habit or disposition to actin a certain way, for managing one’s facial expression or countenanceis not exactly an “action.” Furthermore, if we compare Confucius’slists of virtues with those of Plato and Aristotle, we can see that thereare some salient differences. For example, a number of virtues empha-sized by Confucius such as love (ai), loyalty (zhong), respect (gong orjing), and trustworthiness (xin) are conspicuously absent from the listof the Four Cardinal Virtues, namely, wisdom, justice, temperance, andcourage. It seems to reflect a deeper disagreement on what counts asan excellent quality of a human being. While wisdom has pride ofplace on the Greek list, for Confucius, the intellectual virtue is depen-dent upon the moral virtue of benevolence (ren), as evidence by hisfamous rhetorical question in passage 4: 1, “How can you be calledwise if you don’t choose to reside in benevolence?” This differenceseems to suggest that the idea of virtue is, to some extent, culturallyrelative. Also noteworthy is the fact that in 17: 6, there is no mentionof love. The virtue that can be deemed close to love is kindness(hui ). In 16: 10, however, nothing similar to love is even listed. Thisobservation suggests that there may be room for debate as to whatparticular virtue should be identified as the most central of Con-fucius’s moral system and we should not take it for granted that loveor benevolence is the “undisputed champion.”

A final point I wish to make here is that in 16: 10, yi is listed alongwith some paradigmatic virtues such as loyalty and respect as a con-stituent of the gentleperson’s moral character. It seems to indicatethat yi is a virtue just as loyalty or benevolence is a virtue. But theproblem is that according to Lau’s stringent definition of yi, it is avirtue impossible for anyone to obtain because in order to be called“righteous” (yi), one must consistently does what is right.18 But noone, not even a moral virtuoso, can always do what is right. So beingrighteous is a goal impossible to achieve. In Confucius’s lexicon ofmoral approbation and the ethical ideal, there are such epithets assage (sheng ren ), ren person (ren ren ), xian person (xian ren

), gentleperson ( junzi ), and shan person (shan ren ),

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but there is no such a moral honorific as “righteous person” (yi ren). Not only is such a phrase not found in the teachings of Con-

fucius, it is not even an entry in my Chinese dictionary. In passage 4:4, Confucius urges his disciples to set their hearts on ren; he has neversaid that they should set their hearts on yi. For Confucius, what’simportant and feasible is the ability to correct one’s mistakes, ratherthan moral infallibility, as shown in many passages such as 1: 8. Moralinfallibility is something that Confucius does not preach. It has noplace in his moral system. This point leads us to Lau’s curious idea of“moral guarantee” to which we now turn.

II. Is There Such a Thing as “Moral Guarantee”?

Is there such a thing as “moral guarantee,” that is, a quality or prin-ciple, once obtained, enables you to always do the right thing andnever the wrong thing? I doubt it. But according to Lau, one of thereasons that ren is not the basis of Confucius’s moral system is that it“does not carry its own moral guarantee.”19 That is to say, being a kindor benevolent person does not guarantee that you will always do theright thing. He cites passage 17: 8, in support of his claim. In thatpassage Confucius remarks that being fond of ren without love oflearning (hao xue ) is liable to lead to stupidity.20 Unfortunately,the passage to which Lau appeals happens to be one of those in whichConfucius uses ren in the particular sense, that is, ren as benevolenceor love. Needless to say, such a passage cannot conclusively establishthe claim that ren does not carry its own moral guarantee, for thepassages in which ren is used in the general sense can be used tosupport the opposite conclusion. In 17: 8, all Confucius is saying isthat ren as the particular moral virtue of benevolence needs to becomplemented by an intellectual virtue, that is, the love of learning(hao xue). It can be conceded that when ren is used in the particularsense, it does not carry its moral guarantee, but the point is that, whenused in the general sense, it does to a substantial degree.

Lau’s thesis may also be dealt with using a different line of argu-ment. In the passage that Lau quotes as supporting evidence for hisclaim, Confucius does not say that possessing the virtue of ren withoutlove of learning is likely to lead to immorality, for the key phrase inConfucius’s remarks is “being fond of ren.” There is a distinctionbetween being fond of ren and being in possession of ren because renis a stable and entrenched disposition or character trait which cannotbe acquired by liking or being fond of it alone. The cultivation of renrequires a lifelong commitment.To be sure, in passage 7: 30 Confuciusdoes say metaphorically that ren is not far away; as soon as one wants

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it, it will come. But there is a possibility that what Confucius has inmind is the initial stage of moral cultivation. As Youzi observesin passage 1: 2, filial piety and respect for elder brothers are thenatural basis from which a full-fledged virtue of ren can be developed.In the beginning, it does not seem to be a challenging task for youngpeople to help their family members out of love—(ai ). The hardthing is, however, to develop the natural affection for one’s kin into amulti-faceted and multi-dimensional virtue of ren whose scope andapplication transcend the family.The process demands a lifelong com-mitment. As Confucius points out in passage 6: 7, dedicating one’sheart to ren for three months is an outstanding feat of which very feware capable. So while liking or being fond of ren may suffice to initiatethe process of moral self-cultivation, it is not enough to sustain thedevelopment of a good character and it does not guarantee the actualattainment of of ren.

The difference between being fond of ren and being in possessionof ren is this: Possessing ren implies a passion for ren without whichthe self-cultivation cannot be sustained, but the converse is not true.Ren is a virtue, but is a fondness for ren also a virtue? It is hard to say.Even if it were, it would be a virtue of a different kind. If I say, “I lovejazz,” that does not necessarily mean that I am a jazz musician excel-ling at improvisation, syncopation, etc. Similarly, “I love ren” does notentail that the speaker is a possessor of ren. This point is borne out bythe fact that when Confucius makes the remark, he is talking to hisdisciples, none of whom has attained the virtue of ren in the full senseof the term. If this is correct, his statement “Being fond of ren butwithout love of learning is likely to lead to foolishness” should not beconstrued as being identical to “Possessing ren yet without knowledgeis likely to lead to foolishness.” Given the distinction between beingfond of a virtue and having that virtue, it seems unwarranted to drawthe conclusion, as Lau does, that ren does not carry its own guarantee,from passage 17: 8. It would be more logically precise to say thatbeing fond of ren (in the narrow sense of the term) does not carry itsown moral guarantee.

Lau might respond to this objection by pointing out that the reasonConfucius emphasizes the importance of learning is that the object oflearning, for the most part, is ritual (li ); the rightness of the rules ofconduct in turn is determined by yi. If so, obviously ren alone is notsufficient to ensure the rightness of an act. If it were, then why botherwith the li? But this response seems to be based on an incompletemisunderstanding of ren, as noted earlier, for ren has two senses, notjust one. While Confucius occasionally defines ren in terms of love orbenevolence, he also defines it in terms ritual, as evidenced by passage12: 1 in which Confucius tells his disciple Yan Hui that ren

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consists in overcoming the self and observing ritual. But not all rulesof ritual are right all the time. If so, then don’t we need a standard bywhich the rules of ritual can be judged in order to assure their right-ness? The answer to this question is yes, but such a standard can onlybe located within the broad conceptual framework of ren, as Con-fucius and his disciples have never questioned the rightness of beinga gentleperson or a person of ren. It seems that to them, although therightness of ren as a particular moral quality can be called into ques-tion, as Confucius does in passage 17: 8, the rightness of ren in theholistic sense is “self-evident” or “properly basic,” and there is noneed to appeal to a mysterious standard (yi) independent of or aboveand beyond the ren framework. I will return to this point in SectionIII.

Although ren construed in the narrow sense is not inclusive ofother virtues, it can provide the necessary impetus for acquiring them.In many cases, having one virtue will lead to having other virtues. Weare told in passage 4: 25 that virtue is not solitary and it will surelyhave neighbors. This general point is illustrated in passage 14: 4 inwhich Confucius remarks that a person who possesses ren will cer-tainly have courage. In order to help the needy effectively, a true loverof benevolence needs to know exactly what they need and what is thebest way to help them. Perhaps this is the way for a benevolent personto become knowledgeable and wise. Those who claim to be fond ofbenevolence but never bother to augment their knowledge and expe-rience cannot be said to be genuinely so.They are indeed ignoramusesif they throw good things around or give them to the first person theyencounter.21 Their stupidity may also manifest itself in their beingtaken advantage of or falling prey to all sorts of machinations andfraudulent schemes. A wealthy person, for example, may be reducedto penury due to his ignorance and thereby loses his resources to helpothers. But someone who is genuinely fond of ren will come to realizethat there is much room for growth if she truly wants to help others.Perhaps it is in this sense that Chung-ying Cheng describes thisprocess of transformation from the natural benevolent desire (well-wishing) to the full-fledged multi-faceted and multi-dimensionalvirtue of ren as being “onto-generative.”22 According to Confucius,choosing ren as one’s lifelong pursuit is a hallmark of wisdom. “Ofneighborhoods benevolence is the most beautiful. How can the manbe considered wise who, when he has the choice, does not settle inbenevolence?”23 But some of his disciples seem to have failed tofathom this cognitive dimension of ren. In passage 6: 26, the discipleZai Wo poses a “clever” question that reveals his lack of under-standing of the relationship between ren and wisdom:“If a ren personwere told that another ren person has fallen into a well, would he

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jump right in after him?” Confucius’s reply is that you can send him torescue another, but you can’t make him jump in; you can deceive (qi

) him, but you can’t befuddle (wang ) him.Zai Wo appears to have erroneously assumed that a ren person

would embark on a rescue mission in a thoughtless manner. Confuciussets him straight by making it clear that ren and befuddlement (wang)are mutually exclusive. This is because a ren person is also, amongother things, a thinker. Studying is essential, but as Confucius suc-cinctly puts it in a memorable aphorism in passage 2: 15, “Studyingwithout thinking leads to befuddlement.” It seems that even theactions of a person with a fondness for ren combined with a passionfor learning cannot be always right. In other words, a fondness for renin combination with a love for learning does not carry its moralguarantee, either, because, as Confucius points out, studying withoutthinking leads to befuddlement, and the likelihood for a befuddledperson to do the right thing is not high. The only way to increase thelikelihood of always making right decisions or doing the right thing isto acquire a variety of virtues, that is to say, to achieve ren in thebroadest sense.

As I noted earlier, the question as to whether ren carries its ownmoral guarantee or not pivots on the sense of ren that is underconsideration. In the Analects, when the term ren is used in the narrowsense, it refers to the particular virtue of love or benevolence, whereasin the broad sense it denotes the general, multi-dimensional virtue. Ifren means the complete goodness, it should by definition include allother good qualities in addition to the particular virtue of benevo-lence.When Confucius remarks in passage 14: 4 that a ren person (renzhe ) is sure to possess courage, he is using the term ren in thebroad sense.There are other occasions on which Confucius uses ren inthe general sense as well. In passage 4: 6, for instance, he maintainsthat a person who truly loves ren cannot be surpassed. Only when renis understood as being used in the general sense can we make sense ofsuch a remark. In contrast, when he says that to love benevolencewithout loving learning is liable to lead to foolishness, he is using renin the narrow sense. Of course, when ren is considered in isolation, itsrightness or correctness cannot be determined by itself. According toLau, that is why there is a need for yi, which constitutes the ultimatebasis of Confucius’s moral system, and it is to this claim that I nowturn.

III. What is the Relationship between REN and YI?

Lau’s assertion that yi is the ultimate criterion by which all actions aswell as rules of conduct are to be evaluated is closely related to the

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claim that “ren does not carry its own moral guarantee” because if rendoes not possess intrinsic moral value, its worth must come fromsomething else that does. This “something else that does” is yi. Butwhat is yi? Is it a moral virtue? Is it a moral standard? How is yirelated to ren? According to Lau, human actions can be described asyi (right) and a moral agent can be called yi (righteous);24 yi alsopertains to moral fitness in which sense it does not refer to a charactertrait but a relationship between an action and the circumstancesunder which the action is performed. Lau maintains that yi as therelationship rather than the property of an action or the virtue of anagent is the criterion by which all actions are, in the last resort, to bemeasured.25 But what is the content of this ultimate, all-inclusivestandard? If yi is “moral fitness,” how do we know if an action ismorally fitting or not? Where do we find this “unmoved mover”?

It seems to me that Lau’s idea of yi is conceptually empty. Until wecan specify the conceptual content of yi, it is futile to say that it is thefinal arbiter of the rightness or wrongness of human actions andagents. Slavery was famously defended by Aristotle, and it used to beconsidered right by a large section of the population in America, butnot anymore. What has changed? Is it the moral standard yi? If themoral standard has changed, then the old standard must have beenwrong. If so, then what standard has been used to measure the oldstandard? The point here is that there does not seem to be such athing as eternal, timeless, universal, objective moral standard, if that iswhat Lau has in mind when he maintains that yi is the final moralstandard. But let’s leave this larger philosophical topic concerning thedebate between moral absolutism and relativism to focus on thespecific issue as to whether or how well Lau’s claim that yi isthe ultimate standard in Confucius’s moral system is supported by therelevant passages in the Analects. One passage Lau uses in support ofhis claim is 17: 23:

[The disciple] Zilu said, “Does the gentleperson ( junzi ) con-sider courage (yong ) a supreme quality?” The Master said, “Forthe gentleperson it is morality (yi ) that is supreme (shang ).Possessed of courage (yong) but devoid of morality (yi), a gentlep-erson will make trouble while a small man will be a brigand.”26

If the issue here is courage versus morality, most of us will agreethat morality takes precedence over courage. But the question is,should yi in this passage be translated as morality? It seems to me thatcomparing morality with courage is like comparing apples andoranges. Here a cross-linguistic analysis can be very helpful. TheEnglish word “supreme” typically means “highest in rank, authority,degree or quality,” whereas the Chinese word shang usually means“up” or “high” as opposed to “down” or “low.” Shang means “highest”

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only in the context where three comparative terms, namely high(shang ), middle (zhong ), and low (xia ) are in use. Thus,whether shang means “high” or “highest” hinges on the context underconsideration. Given that the contrast made in the dialogue involvesonly two qualities, namely yi and yong, it seems more appropriate tosay that yi is superior to yong in the hierarchy of values. In otherwords, yi is a superior quality in comparison with yong. Thus, it isapropos to translate shang in the passage as “superior” or “moreimportant,” rather than “supreme” or “the most important.” Further-more, in the above-cited text, yi appears to be a special quality thatone can possess, just as courage is a quality that one can have. Since“courage” (yong ) is a virtue, it is only natural to think that yi in thiscontext also refers to a virtue. If so, it is a character trait rather thanthe fitting relationship between an act and the circumstances. So, amore plausible reading of passage 17: 23 is that yi is more importantthan yong because when an aristocrat is possessed of yong but devoidof yi, he tends to commit the crime of rebellion or insubordination;when a commoner is possessed of yong but devoid of yi, he is prone tocommit theft. In both cases, it is quite natural for Confucius to insiston the importance of yi as a regulatory and balancing character traitthat restrains, informs, and tempers yong, which some of his youngdisciples have a tendency to exercise excessively.

The translation of a simple term like shang seems to be inconse-quential, but it is not. Whether to translate shang as “supreme” or“superior” has important implications. If yi were supreme, it would besuperior to ren. But if yi is only superior to yong, its relation to ren canhardly be determined by implication since in the dialogue there is nomention of ren. In passage 14: 4, Confucius teaches that if one pos-sesses ren, he must possess yong, while what he says here in 17: 23implies that one can have courage without having yi. Thus, nothingconcerning the relation between ren and yi seems to follow fromeither passage or the conjunction of the two. Nevertheless, from whathas been said thus far we may draw the following conclusions. First,what Lau quotes as a textual support for his claim that yi is theultimate moral standard becomes immaterial when the translation ofshang is changed from “supreme” to what it should be, “superior.”Second, even if we grant that yi means “supreme” in this passage,Lau’s assertion cannot be substantiated, because yi in the contextclearly refers to a moral virtue rather than morality, and according toLau, no moral virtue can be the ultimate standard.

While Confucius does not explicitly spell out the relationshipbetween ren and yi, we may infer a great deal about their relationshipby carefully examining some relevant passages in the Analects. Inpassage 2: 24, Confucius says, “Faced with what is right, to leave it

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undone shows a lack of courage.”27 If one perceives what is the rightthing to do in a given situation, and yet fails to do it because of certainrisks involved in such an undertaking, one cannot be said to possesscourage. In this context “courage” (yong) is to be understood as thedisposition to do what is perceived to be right, so it means courage ina more restricted sense, that is, moral courage,28 in contrast to otherkinds of courage such as the kind possessed by a daredevil or the kindpossessed by a soldier fighting for an unjust cause. But what doesmoral courage have to do with ren? To answer this question, considerConfucius’s dictum concerning the relationship between ren andyong. In passage 14: 4, Confucius remarks that while a person whopossesses courage (yong) does not necessarily possess ren, a personwho is ren must be courageous (yong). It seems clear that in thiscontext, the second “yong” refers to moral courage. We may inferfrom passages 14: 4 and 2: 24 that a ren person must possess yi. This isbecause the ren person must possess moral courage, and a morallycourageous person does not leave what is right undone. It follows thata ren person must consistently do what is right. According to Lau, aperson who consistently does what is right is a righteous person.29 Sowe must conclude that a ren person must be a righteous (yi) person. Ifthis reasoning is correct, the relationship between ren and yi has to bethat ren, when used in the general sense, is inclusive of yi, in whichcase the question as to which of the two is more basic in Confucius’smoral system simply does not arise.

However, Lau might respond along the following lines: The renperson must possess yong, but yong possessed by a ren person is notnecessarily moral courage. Remember that moral courage is under-stood as a disposition not to leave undone what is perceived or knownto be right.30 How do we know that a ren person is capable of per-ceiving or knowing what is right? If he cannot perceive or know whatis right, he cannot do it, even if he possesses courage. Lau’s responsecan be dealt with by drawing on the interchangeability of the twohonorifics “the ren person” (renren ) and “the gentleperson”( junzi ).31 According to Lau, the epithets “the ren person” and“the gentleperson” are sometimes interchangeable.32 This observationis indeed borne out directly or indirectly by many of Confucius’sremarks. In passage 12: 4, Confucius says that the gentleperson is freefrom worries and fears, and in passages 9: 29 and 14: 28, he remarksthat the ren person has no worries. To be sure, whether they areinterchangeable or not may vary with context. For example, Con-fucius in 17: 23 uses junzi and xiaoren (petty person ) to refer topeople of different social standings. However, when Confucius con-trasts the gentleperson who is conversant with rightness (yi ) withthe petty person who is conversant with profit (li ),33 it is clear that

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by those epithets he is referring to different character traits ratherthan social statuses. Therefore, it follows from 4: 16 and the inter-changeability of “the gentleperson” and “the ren person” that the renperson must be conversant with rightness. Since the ren person isconversant with what is right, and courageous, he will not leave whatis right undone. Thus, the ren person must be a righteous (yi) person.If this is correct, then ultimately it is ren that determines consistentlyright conduct, which in turn determines the righteous character. ToLau’s claim that “a man is righteous only in so far as he consistentlydoes what is right,” it should be added that he consistently does whatis right because he is conversant with what is right; what makes himconversant with what is right is the very fact that he is a ren person.34

If the above reasoning is correct, then Lau’s assertion that “the right-ness of acts has little to do with the disposition or motive of theagent”35 cannot be true, for ren construed as the general, second-order, and inclusive virtue, has everything to do with the rightness ofacts.

IV. Does Confucius Use YI as the UltimateMoral Standard?

Lau might say that my argument only touches on the relation betweenthe virtue of ren and the virtue of yi. He might argue, however, that, inaddition to “rightness” or “righteousness,” yi also pertains to morality.It is yi construed as morality that confers moral value to charactertraits, conduct, and rules. It is yi as morality that carries the moralguarantee not only of itself but also of every virtue, every act, andevery rule. That is what he means when he says that yi is the ultimateethical norm.

When used in a general sense, sometimes the only possible renderingis “moral” or “morality.” . . . Rightness is basically a character of actsand its application to agents is derivative.A man is righteous in so faras he consistently does what is right.The rightness of acts depends ontheir being morally fitting in the circumstances and has little to dowith the disposition or motive of the agent.36

As the ultimate moral standard, yi refers to the fitting relationshipbetween an action and the circumstances under which it is performedor omitted. Yet, how do we know whether an action is morally fittingor not? How do we know whether such a relationship obtains? Isthere an external, objective standard? It can be doubted that suchstandards exists. Otherwise, there would be little disagreement onmoral matters. But we do not have to go beyond the Analects to find

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counterexamples that make us doubtful of the existence of an objec-tive moral standard independent of all the moral qualities a humanbeing can possess. One such example is the disagreement betweenConfucius and his disciple Zilu on the issue of whether it is right(yi) for a virtuous person to seek public office under different circum-stances. Confucius maintains in passages 14: 1 and 15: 7 that if the Wayprevails in a state (bangyoudao ), then it is right for a virtuousperson to serve the ruler. But the disciple Zilu disagrees. In passage18: 7, Zilu makes it very clear that it is not right not to serve one’s ruler( ); seeking public office, according to Zilu, is one’s categori-cal moral duty.The question is: who is right on this issue? If there werean objective standard to appeal to, there would not be such a dispute.

One might also question the necessity of a single moral standard.Why can’t there be two moral standards—yi for action, ren for char-acter? The answer to the question is twofold. Theoretical simplicity isone of the considerations because a bifurcated standard of moralitytends to complicate moral assessment. But the main reason has to dowith how Confucius and his disciples see the relationship between theagent and her actions. It is the motive of the agent that determineswhat she does. Confucius and his disciples are preoccupied with thedevelopment of moral character, which for the most part is whatdistinguishes it from many forms of Western ethics.37 We have reasonto believe that Confucius’s preoccupation with character buildingrests on their belief that one’s character determines her actions. Thedisciple Youzi drives this point home when he says in 1: 2, “It israre for a man whose character is such that he is good as a son andobedient as a young man to have the inclination to transgress againsthis superiors; it is unheard of for one who has no such inclination to beinclined to start a rebellion.”38 He then goes on to say that the Con-fucian gentleperson devotes his efforts to the root (ben ).39 One’smoral character is the root that determines the value or the disvalueof her actions.

By way of conclusion, I would like to present a concrete example inthe Analects to illustrate the point that in Confucius’s moral system,not all moral judgments are framed in terms of yi. More often thannot, they are expressed in terms of ren. To call someone “buren ”amounts to a strong moral disapprobation, while calling someone renis considered an unusually high moral approbation. As the followingexchange shows, when Confucius calls someone “buren,” his disap-probation is based on the fact that the person in question has showna lack of love. It suggests that love or the lack thereof can be the basisof moral judgment. While this example does not settle the issue as towhether all moral judgments are based on one’s virtues or the lackthereof, it nevertheless indicates the implausibility of the thesis that in

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Confucius’s moral system, all moral judgments are ultimately basedon yi, as Lau claims, for in this example, Confucius does not mentionyi at all. Here is the conversation between Confucius and his discipleZai Wo :

Zai Wo asked:“Three years mourning for one’s parents—this is quitelong. If a gentleperson stops all ritual practices for three years, thepractices will decay; if he stops all musical performances for threeyears, music will be lost. As the old crop is consumed, a new cropgrows up, and for lighting the fire, a new lighter is used with eachseason. One year of mourning should be enough.” The Master said:“If after only one year, you were again to eat white rice and to wearsilk, would you feel at ease?”—“Absolutely.”—“In that case, goahead! The reason a gentleperson prolongs his mourning is simplythat, since fine food seems tasteless to him, and music offers him noenjoyment, and the comfort of his house makes him uneasy, heprefers to do without all these pleasures. But now, if you can enjoythem, go ahead!” Zai Wo left. The Master said: “Zai Wo is devoid ofhumanity. After a child is born, for the first three years of his life, hedoes not leave his parents’ bosom. Three years mourning is a customthat is observed everywhere in the world. Did Zai Wo never enjoy thelove of his parents, even for three years?”40

In this passage, Confucius concludes that Zai Wo lacks in affectionfor his parents (buren ) even though the disciple has not doneanything immoral. In fact, Confucius’s verdict concerning Zai Woamounts to a moral judgment, that is, a judgment about the disciple’smoral character. His disapprobation of Zai Wo is so scathing that hehas to articulate it in a tactful manner, that is, only after the disciplehas left the room. It is clear that in this passage Confucius not onlyuses the term ren in the restricted sense, namely, love, but also in amoral sense, that is, love as a moral duty. The question is, what isthe moral standard (yi) to which Confucius appeals as far as Zai Wo’smoral character is concerned? This seems to show that for Confucius,one’s emotional attitude rather than external action can be the basisof moral assessment. He comes to that conclusion by comparing thecoldness of heart manifested by the disciple Zai Wo against the idealmoral psychology that the gentleperson should exhibit under suchcircumstances. It seems clear that for Confucius, an infraction of theritual rule (li) is not the true basis for calling someone buren; a lack ofwarmth or compassion is. Emotional callousness may manifest itselfin a variety of ways. In Zai Wo’s case, it is his being able to enjoy finefood and clothing during a period of mourning that betrays a majordeficiency in his moral psychology.

Some commentators have cautioned against “psychologizing” Con-fucius, but I think that we have good reason to say that Confucius isnot an “accidental behaviorist” as they have taken him to be.41 Thetextual evidence in the Analects makes it abundantly clear that on

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many occasions, Confucius characterizes the gentleperson or theperson of ren in affective terms. The person of ren (or the gentleper-son) feels neither fear nor worry.”42 The gentleperson’s feeling neitherfear nor worry is attributed to his feeling no guilt ( jiu ) afterintrospection (neixing ).43 It seems that Confucius is more con-cerned with the gentleperson’s emotional attitudes than with anyother aspect of his life: the gentleperson loves others; he feels neitherfear nor worry; he feels no guilt; he should feel ashamed (chi ) if hewere to prosper as a result of serving a corrupt ruler.44 Not only doesConfucius characterize the gentleperson in affective terms such ascalmness and serenity, he also describes the petty person in termsof contrasting affects, as in passage 7: 37. It should be noted that theemotional attributes mentioned by Confucius are characteristic ofthe ideal Confucian gentleperson. In addition, we must realize thatConfucius is not saying that one should not have any worry or fear atall. It is a specific kind of worry or fear that he thinks the gentlepersonshould be free of: the worry or fear engendered by a guilty consci-ence. It is perhaps in this connection that we are told in passage 4: 4that Confucius enjoins his disciples to set their hearts on ren in asteadfast fashion, so they will be free from immorality, which is thekey to maintaining a guilt-free conscience. So we may say with con-fidence that for Confucius, certain emotional attitudes along with avariety of virtues both moral and intellectual constitute the standardof morality. Yi is not an abstract, isolated, independent moral standardabove and beyond ren construed as the higher-order, multi-faceted,and multi-dimensional virtue, but its integral part. If this is correct,then Confucius’s moral system is based on ren in the holistic sense,after all.

SIMMONS COLLEGEBoston, Massachusetts

Endnotes

I wish to thank Professors Wanda Torres-Gregory and Sue Stafford, and an anonymousreviewer, for their insightful comments and helpful suggestions. I am deeply grateful toDr. Linyu Gu, Managing Editor, for her extensive and meticulous editorial corrections. Iam especially indebted to Professor Chung-ying Cheng for his sagacious comments. I alsowish to express my gratitude to Professor Philip J. Ivanhoe for his comprehensive andperspicacious comments on earlier drafts of this article.

1. Wing-tsit Chan, “The Evolution of the Confucian Concept of Jen,” Philosophy Eastand West 4, no. 4 (1955): 295.

2. Din C. Lau, trans., The Analects (New York: Penguin Books, 1979).3. Arthur Waley, trans., The Analects of Confucius (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).4. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer of this article for pointing out to me an

ambiguity in my arguments against Lau’s position. I have come to realize that

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although my main argument relied on the holistic sense of ren, I did not make thisclear in the previous draft. The reviewer’s comments also prompted me to examineLau’s position more carefully, which has led to an important discovery that there is awidespread problem as far as the understanding of ren is concerned. The problem isthis: Almost all translations of The Analects treat ren as if it had only one sense (theholistic sense or the restricted sense). The only exception, to my knowledge, is JamesLegge’s. In my revision, I place my critique of Lau’s view on Confucius’s moral systemin this broader context by classifying his position as a particularist’s as opposed to thegeneralist’s. In this process, I have become more keenly aware of my own position,which combines the generalist’s with a particularist’s. I must add this caveat, though:a particularist is not someone who believes that a ren person has one and only oneparticular virtue, but someone who believes that one particular virtue among amultitude of virtues stands out as the most important or central, but not necessarilybasic. I, however, believe that ren, construed as a particular virtue, is the most basicbecause it is the basis upon which other virtues including yi are gradually built,although there is room for debate as to what this particular virtue is. On the otherhand, I also believe that ren, understood in the holistic sense, is the most important orcentral in Confucius’s moral system. Ren is a work in progress. To put it in a moresophisticated phrase, ren is “onto-generative.” I am very grateful to Professor Chung-ying Cheng for suggesting this point and the term to me. A major problem with Lau’sview is that he believes that yi lies outside of this onto-generative process. There ishardly anything in The Analects to suggest that Confucius holds that human beingshave an innate sense of right and wrong. It is Mencius who maintains that view, but thefocus of this article is Confucius’s ideas of ren and yi, that is why all the quotationsused in this article are from The Analects. For an insightful discussion of the differ-ences between Confucius and Mencius with respect to the relationship between renand yi, see Chung-ying Cheng, New Dimensions of Confucian and Neo-ConfucianPhilosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 233–245.

5. Lau, The Analects, 27.6. Ibid.7. Waley, The Analects of Confucius, 28.8. Raymond Dawson, trans., The Analects (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008),

xxi.9. Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr., trans., The Analects of Confucius: A Philo-

sophical Translation (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998), 49.10. Simon Leys, trans., The Analects of Confucius (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).11. Lau, The Analects, 18.12. Ibid.13. Ames and Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius, 77.14. See passage 12: 22 in Lau, The Analects.15. Ames and Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius, 72, modified.16. Ibid.17. Ibid., 199, modified.18. Lau, The Analects, 27.19. Ibid.20. Ibid., 144.21. Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001),

17–18.22. My thanks to Professor Chung-ying Cheng for suggesting the idea of “onto-

generativity” in his editorial comments.23. Lau, The Analects, 72.24. Ibid., 26.25. Ibid., 27.26. Ibid., 147–48, modified.27. Ibid., 66.28. Some scholars have written on the role of courage in early Confucian morality.

See Lee H. Yearly, Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions ofCourage (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); Xinyan Jiang, “Mencius

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on Human Nature and Courage,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 24, no. 3 (1997):265–89.

29. Lau, The Analects, 27.30. Ibid., 66.31. According to some commentators, Confucius consciously revalued the sense of junzi

and transformed it from a word used to designate hereditary rank to a notion of amorally excellent person, a paradigmatic individual who sets the tone and quality oflife for ordinary moral agents. See Philip J. Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Confucian Tradition,2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002).

32. Lau, The Analects, 15.33. Ibid., 74.34. Ibid., 27.35. Ibid.36. Ibid.37. Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett

Publishing, 2000), ix.38. Lau, The Analects, 59.39. Ibid.40. Leys, The Analects of Confucius, 88–89.41. Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (Long Grove: Waveland Press,

1998).42. See passages 9: 29, 12: 4, and 14: 28 in Lau, The Analects.43. Passage 12: 4 in Lau, The Analects.44. Passage 14: 1 in Lau, The Analects.

443is YI MORE BASIC THAN REN?