Is Iraq Democratizing? (May 2009)

TO: Professor Eusebio Mujal-Leon

FROM: Ben Turner

SUBJECT: Final Paper, "Is Iraq Democratizing?"

I. Introduction

Iraq has launched from a "rogue state" to a major international geopolitical

issue in six years as a result of American occupation. Despite political setbacks

such as the Sunni parties withdrawing from past elections, a full-blown insurgency,

a massively contracting economy, and lack of representation by key figures in Iraqi

politics; Iraq has reduced violence, held a recent election and referendum, has

signed a new Status of Forces Agreement, and appears to be on the path towards

building a sustainable democracy. Is Iraq on this path to democratization now?

How are the elite parties in Iraq structuring themselves and how well is this

predicted by democratization theories? Will Iraq choose democracy or

authoritarianism? Does it have a choice about its future, or will it be responding to

geopolitical and regional pressures?

It will be argued in this paper that Iraq is on a path towards being a

longterm buffer state for stronger regional neighbors. Iraq will attempt to

extricate itself from foreign influences that seek to use it as a buffer state against

other players. The pressures will be strong for Iraq to seek national and internal

stability as its paramount national interest, and thus an authoritarian government

will rise up under the mantle of Shi'ite nationalism in order to protect itself and the

Iraqi borders. Under threat of fractionalization, the authoritarian government will

attempt to strictly prevent the Kurds and Sunnis from separating or disengaging

from the nation.

As an extension, Iraqi democratization is a long way off. Iraq must achieve

autonomous security of its borders before it can hope to build the civil society

complex and secure enough to formalize and consolidate democracy. While Iraq

currently holds national and provincial elections, this is maintained primarily

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under the aegis of the American military -- under the veil, the Shi'ite-led

government is consolidating its power and waiting for American forces to leave.

All this said, there are also ways in which Iraq could avoid slipping back into

authoritarianism, consisting of major regional security agreements, reconciliation

among the major ethnic factions in Iraq, and leadership that desires true

democratization, pluralism, and representation for the national interest.

II. A History of Mastery and Occupation of Three Ethnic Cities

The region of Iraq has long suffered from foreign occupation, since after the

Sumerians of Mesopotamia lost their rule. It was the Persians who brought Islam,

and the Turks and Safavids traded the territory for a while. Eventually after rule

by both the Mamluks and the Ottomans, the UK came in in the modern era to

demarcate the borders of Iraq. Iraq has traditionally been made up of mainly two

cities, Baghdad in mid-Iraq and Basra in the southern tip of Iraq, a gateway to

Iraq's only sea port of Umm Qasr. But the UK added Mosul, a city-state up in the

north that had previously existed as a separate tribal region.

The result is that in today's Iraq, the borders are arbitrary and there are

three primary city-states within Iraq: Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. Basra has

always been in a heavily Shi'ite-dominated area to the south (below the Shi'ite holy

cities of Najaf and Karbala), while Mosul is the gateway to the Turkoman and

Kurdish Sunni northern region of Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein's rule, Baghdad

was firmly Ba'athist, representing more of a bureaucratic totalitarian city than

anything else.

II.a. The Disruption of US Occupation

In 2003, the US invaded Iraq and remained there, and has since sloppily

occupied the country for 6 years under the auspices of democracy promotion. Eva

Bellin writes, in an article about American support of political reform in the Middle

East, of 25

"In short, the ideal of democracy promotion will, at times, conflict

with the United States' core interests. Some inconsistency and

halfheartedness is thus an inevitable part of democracy promotion.

Recognition of this fact ought to recommend retreat to a more modest

agenda than that suggested by the Bush administration's rhetoric."1

Did the US even know what its core interests in Iraq were? Democratic

rule? A non-nuclear state? A non-failed state? After many foibles, such as

removing any Ba'ath members from government administration, installing

unknown politicians into the highest Iraqi government positions, and sanctioning

Shi'ite consolidation of power over the government and security forces, the US has

been presented with a series of "lesser-of-two-evils" choices in its pursuit of

democracy promotion, democratization, stability, and security.

The first major choice the US had to make was whether to support the

Shi'ite-dominated government, led by Nouri Al-Maliki, or try to break it down. The

official US policy was to support an Iraqi nationalist government so it stuck with

Maliki, even after he was found to have routinely rounded up Sunnis, allowed

sectarian conflict to clear Sunnis out of Shi'ite neighborhoods, and imprisoned and

tortured competitors in prisons to retain power.

The US also decided to arm and pay the Sunnis to stop attacking Americans,

a decision implemented by General David Petraeus and his senior advisors. This,

more than the Surge, led to a massive dropoff in violence to achieve Petraeus' goal

of building a security space to allow for political progress. As Thomas Ricks wrote

in his excellent book "The Gamble" about the years 2006-2008 in the Iraq War:

"Petraeus laid the groundwork for that approach in the letter he

issued to the troops as he left Iraq. While the initiative had been retaken, he

expressed disappointment about the political state of Iraq. “Many of us had

hoped this summer would be a time of tangible political progress at the

national level,” he wrote. “One of the justifications for the surge, after all,

was that it would help create the space for Iraqi leaders to tackle the tough

questions and agree on key pieces of ‘national reconciliation’ legislation. It

1 Bellin, Eva. "Democratization and Its Discontents", Foreign Affairs, July/August 2008. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64462/eva-bellin/democratization-and-its-discontents?page=show

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has not worked out as we had hoped.” It would be hard to charge that he was

being rosy about Iraq."2

It is unfortunate, however, that the US, by virtue of its occupation, has put

Iraq on a track far from democratic consolidation, as now Iraq is a weak nation

with little economic output and many outsiders hoping to carve out influence

within its borders. The US, occupying a land where tribal relations dominate, is

the strongest tribe, as Bing West titled his book about the American occupation of

Iraq.

But the US has had to ratchet back its plans in Iraq, seeking stability instead

of democratization for the time being. Tom Ricks:

"There was good reason for this quiet ratcheting down. As Steven

Metz, an astute strategic analyst, put it, encouraging democracy was at odds

with the larger goal of stability: “Our current strategy is based on the

delusion that we can have stable, or modulated democratization,” he said.

“Few things are more destabilizing and prone to chaos than democratization.

I think we can have either democratization or stabilization. The issue is

whether we can tolerate several decades of often-violent instability ..."3

There seems to be acceptance among the senior leaders on the Iraq mission

that democratization does not play well with stability, and so the emphasis for

American forces in Iraq has significantly changed.

II.b. Maelstrom of Forces Awaiting American Departure

At the same time, both the Americans and other foreigners understand that

the American military protection of Iraq is drawing down soon under President

Obama. This has manifested itself in several interesting ways. For starters,

Americans have changed from a counter-terrorist, quick-strike policy to one of

counter-insurgency, or protecting the population to convince it to work with them.

2 Ricks, Thomas. "The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008", Penguin Press HC, 2009, Kindle version, highlight location 4812-4816.

3 Ricks, Kindle version, highlight location 3257-3260. of 25

Al-Qaeda for its part has refocused its efforts onto Pakistan and the FATA

provinces in Afghanistan/Pakistan as the US has taken measures to ruin Al-Qaeda's

operations in Iraq. But there is still a vast power vacuum in Iraq, and in

particularly a paranoia and sense of fear among Iraqi Sunnis about Shi'ite

domination, so Al-Qaeda will probably be able to safely re-enter the country once

American support leaves; the Iraqi security services are just too weak to catch

them.

The Iranians have a large stake in the future of Iraq. While they are content

to let the US worry about securing Iraq, Iran certainly has a stake in making sure

Iraq does not fall apart as well. Iran was a former enemy of Iraq's during the days

of Saddam Hussein. While both countries were predominantly Shi'ite, Iran is

Persian and Iraq is Arab, and the twain shall never meet. Furthermore, Hussein

was a secular Ba'athist who acted Sunni in order to keep his influence with the

Iraqi elites. This pseudo-Sunni/Ba'athist elite was extremely rich and was given all

the nicest property and resources that Hussein could offer. In Hussein's absence

(and indeed during his hanging), the Shi'ites have emerged as the strongarm

majority party in Iraq.

Iran, for its desires, has long sought to co-opt Iraq. It has sent agents, spies,

ambassadors, and more to provide support, intelligence, EFPs (explosively-formed

penetrators, and weapons to the Iraqis for resisting outside influence and to

consolidate Shi'ite power. Iran, knowing it can cow its now primarily Shi'ite

neighbor into working with it, if not fully becoming clientelist, now has a buffer

against possible competitors to Iranian power.

Iran has downplayed its Persianness and has advocated to Iraq its

Shi'iteness against threatening Wahhabist violent terrorists under the flag of Al-

Qaeda. This is a policy in direct contrast to Saudi's diminishing influence in Iraq.

Juan Cole, who writes a superb blog as a University of Michigan history professor

and expert in Middle Eastern politics and affairs, said in a blog post:

"Al-Maliki, a Shiite, was snubbed by Saudi King Abdullah, who refused

to meet him on the grounds that he had reneged on his pledge to reconcile

with the Sunni Arabs of Iraq. Al-Maliki's Da`wa Party had angered the Saudis

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a couple of years ago by launching a protest movement against Wahhabism,

the established branch of Islam in the Saudi kingdom."4

Its soft and covert power has brought it many seats in the Iraqi Parliament,

a pliant Maliki government, the ability to tell Muqtada Al-Sadr what to do, and

economic opportunity for Iraqi goods to win over the business elite. The US is

playing right into Iran's hands.

Muqtada Al-Sadr, a constant thorn in the US's side, has told his militias to

stand down for the time being in the northeast neighborhoods of Baghdad (to

include the slum, Sadr City) and in Basra and to some degree the other Shi'ite

cities of Karbala and Najaf. Al-Sadr, not a cleric of religious erudition, exists as a

populist strongman whose Shi'ite militias have been able to infiltrate Iraqi security

forces and foster a nationalist, anti-American agenda. But what is most interesting

is this sense of nationalism Al-Sadr has, which can be used to fight off Persian

influence, or as Tom Ricks explains:

"Indeed, given that Sadr is more of an Iraqi nationalist than many of

the people the U.S. government has supported in Iraq, it isn’t clear why the

U.S. government holds that diminishing him will restrain Iranian influence in

Iraq. “That’s the million-dollar question,” said Capt. Jeanne Hull, a military

intelligence veteran who during 2008 was on her third tour in Iraq, all of

them working for Petraeus. She also was almost certainly the only soldier

serving in Iraq who was simultaneously doing research for a doctoral

dissertation for Princeton University. She had been assigned to work on

Sadrist issues on this most recent tour. “I don’t think we’ve looked at it

deeply enough to know if backing the GOI [government of Iraq] is the same

as backing Iranian interests.”5

Juan Cole tried to explain the sensitivity of Iranians and Iraqis in

determining their differences and similarities:

4 Cole, Juan. "Fadl Still Blockaded; Truck Bomb in Mosul; Doha Summit Fails to Unify Arab voices", Informed Comment blog, 31 Mar 09. http://www.juancole.com/2009/03/fadl-still-blockaded-truck-bomb-in.html


"The Arab League Conference in Doha, Qatar has wrapped up,

and it too had implications for Sunni-Shiite reconciliation (or lack

thereof) inside Iraq.

Al-Zaman reports in Arabic that the Arab League had initially

planned to hold its next meeting in Baghdad, but the continued poor

security in that city has dissuaded the organization, which will meet in

Libya instead. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki protested the

switch. (It is likely that the move came at least in part in response to

the identification among member states with the Sunni Arab

population of Fadl District, which was being besieged by Shiite Iraqi

troops as the conference unfolded. Most Arab League member states

are strongly Sunni and many see Shiite Islam as Persian rather than

Arab--which is untrue and unfair.) "6

III. Is Iraq Any Longer a State?

This paper argues that Iraq is losing its coherence as a state. While the

appearances of Iraq are those of Wolfgang Merkel's "defective democracy", in

which the country has elections but remains illiberal (with few institutions) and

delegative, pressures on Iraq threaten to rip it apart once the American forces

leave. It can be said that these cleavages have already begun.

Robert Baer, a former CIA officer, argues that Iraq is already no more:

"Between March 20 and April 9, 2003, allied forces obliterated

the state of Iraq, a nation that will never be put back together in any

form resembling the old Iraq. What the war planners didn’t

understand was that Iraq was an army rather than a country. In

destroying the Iraqi army, the allies destroyed Iraq."7


7 Baer, Robert. "The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower", Crown, 2008. Kindle version, highlight location 503-505.

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III.a. Iraq as a Buffer State

Geopolitically, Iraq is the focus point for the Middle East. This strategic

position must have played a role in why the architects of the American invasion

chose Iraq: if Iraq could democratize, it would provide a beacon of freedom to the

rest of the Middle East. 8

But Iraq also is a buffer between two very competitive ideological states,

Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both are the primary funders and advocates for Sunni and

Shi'ite religions, respectively. Iraq has been unleashed from its quasi-Sunni rule to

become a majority Shi'ite country, and this will threaten the Saudis who also feel

pressure within the failing state of Pakistan and a trapped pseudo-Kurdistan.

Iraq has no natural borders and thus is prone to smuggling, refugees

leaving, and other setbacks of an extremely porous border.

It is in Iran's best interest to keep Iraq functioning to give Iran a healthy

block of space to its western flank. The Saudis are worried about their position as

the chief oil supplier:

"The American backers of the war claimed that with massive

investment Iraq’s production could be taken to 6 million barrels a day. If

they’re right, and if Iran proceeds with its de facto annexation of Iraq and its

oil, the combination of Iran’s current production of 4.21 million barrels a day

with Iraq’s 6 million would put Iran within range of becoming the world’s

largest producer, ahead of Saudi Arabia."9

III.b. Will the Kurds and Sunnis Remain Part of Iraq?

The northern tip of Iraq, Kurdistan, is made up of Sunni Kurds who seek

autonomy of their own while being trapped within the national borders of Iraq. To

8 CNN.com. "Bush, in Europe, to urge support for Iraq", CNN.com, 21 Feb 05. http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/02/20/bush.europe/index.html

9 Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 419-422. of 25

some degree this means that Kurdistan falls under American protection, as the

Americans see Kurdistan as the only truly successful and pacified area of Iraq. But

because of tribal conflicts, Kurdistan is also a target for Turkish oppression and

Iraqi governmental desire for Kurdistan's vast oil resources.

Explains an article on Kurdistan:

"Saddam had placed Kirkuk outside the Kurdish region of northern

Iraq, which has enjoyed wide-ranging autonomy since 1991. But Iraqi Kurds,

many of whom see Kirkuk's oil wealth as vital to the future viability of their

region, have called for the province to be part of their autonomous region.

Iraq's parliament has proposed evenly dividing powers in the local

parliament between Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen but the Kurds bitterly oppose

the plan, pointing to their superior numbers. Under the Iraqi constitution, a

referendum was to have been held on the future status of the city but the

vote has been repeatedly delayed in recent years amid ongoing demographic

concerns."10

Kurds aside, General Petraeus' gamble to buy off the Sunnis has worked.

The Sunnis now protect themselves against Al-Qaeda and have cash to provide for

their internal stability. But the Sunnis clearly aren't happy with their standing in

Iraq, now that they are not only the weaker party now, but on top of that a

demographic minority (estimates put it at about 65% Shi'ite, 35% Sunni in Iraq11).

Some disagreed with this plan, as Tom Ricks writes:

"Not all American military officials were comfortable with the

approach, worrying that the short-term security gain obtained would create

long-term political problems. “What we’re doing is creating a secessionist

state out west,” said a senior U.S. military intelligence official. “The Anbar

tribes will be capable of keeping order, and also of keeping a Shiite-

dominated army out of Anbar.” In other words, argued retired Army Col.

10 Associated Press. "Iraq MPs request more time for Kirkuk vote report", google.com/hostednews, 15 Apr 09. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jC4rIrpGTvgIPZXqJf5eefVV3JXw

11 CIA World Factbook. "Iraq", 23 Apr 09. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html

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Andrew Bacevich, the Americans were avoiding military defeat by embracing

political failure."12

And not everyone thinks this will solely be political failure:

"John McCreary, a veteran analyst for the Defense Intelligence

Agency, predicted in September 2008 that the arrangement imposed by the

U.S. government on Iraqi factions would unravel, likely with a Shiite attack

on the U.S. presence. The Americans have imposed power sharing on Iraq’s

factions, he said, and that should worry us for several reasons. First, it

produces what looks like peace but isn’t. Second, in such situations

eventually one of the factions seeks to break out of the arrangement. “Thus,”

McCreary wrote, “power sharing is always a prelude to violence,” usually

after the force imposing it withdraws."13

The United States, now a paymaster both for the Sunnis and for the Shi'ite

government, is playing both sides off against each other, hoping for peaceful

reconciliation. But Maliki's government has already been jailing Sunni political

challengers and installing Shi'ites in every level of government. The Sunnis, for

their part, will turn on the Americans if their pay stops coming in, and the Saudis,

seeking to re-establish their own buffer, will certainly invest a lot of money into

arming the Sunnis and destabilizing the increasingly centralized Shi'ite Maliki

government in Iraq. The Sunnis feel marginalized with little sway on the Shi'ite

government. Indeed, Maliki has taken steps to retain a policy of excluding

"Ba'athists", code for Sunnis.14

And, lastly, will the Shi'ites remain part of Iraq, for that matter? Robert

Baer pessimistically adds:

"Yet Basra and its surrounding area are not really part of Iraq

anymore. Quietly, without firing a single shot, the Iranians have effectively

annexed the entire south, fully one-third of Iraq. In Basra today, the

12 Ricks, Kindle version, highlight location 4074-4077.


14 Dagher, Sam. "Iraq Resists Pleas by U.S. to Placate Baath Party", NYTimes.com, 25 Apr 09. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/26/world/middleeast/26baathists.html?_r=3&ref=world

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preferred currency is the Iranian rial. The Iraqi police, the military, and at

least one of its intelligence services answer not to Baghdad, but to the

Iranian-backed political parties, SCIRI, Da’wa, and other Shia groups under

Tehran’s control. But it’s not just the police; the same Iranian proxies run the

universities, the hospitals, and the social welfare organizations. They exert

more control over daily life in Basra than the central government does—and

clearly more than Britain or the United States."15

III.c. Ability to Retain Security and Autonomy

Thus, Iraq's best hopes might be to split apart into different areas. If the

Sunnis manage to take Al-Anbar and some of the ethnically Sunni areas to the

north of Baghdad, while the Shi'ites take the south and the Kurds take the north,

then the regional geopolitics may stabilize faster. What would be less predictable

would be a continued nationalist government in Iraq that binds together the Kurds,

Sunnis, and Shi'ites. Regional influences and desires for autonomy weigh heavily

upon the fledgling government in Iraq.

Such outcomes may not seem so realistic at this point, but this is because

the US is currently acting as the regional balancer (albeit not very well) with its

130,000+ troops in Iraq. Once the US withdraws, the security situation in the

Middle East will quickly unravel and will need to be re-balanced. This will occur

whether the US leaves now or leaves in one hundred years as some have

suggested, because Iraq is too weak to protect itself and not geographically

blessed to have natural border protection. The prize of massive oil resources in

Iraq is too much to pass up for most countries, and the incentives to keep Iraq a

buffer state for various nations is too great for its neighbors to allow it to

consolidate its autonomy.


IV. The National Iraqi Regime

IV.a. The Current Regime

It is difficult to define Iraq's current regime type. Much of the apparatus is

dominated by American influence to include a large American military presence.

Iraq has had fairly successful elections and referendums, but they were dominated

by Shi'ites and Kurds; the Sunni minority boycotted the first election, but it

participated in the latest election after it realized it was only hurting its cause by

avoiding the vote. If there was voting fraud, it was only to confirm a growing

presence of the Shi'ites within government positions, as a direct result of Al-Maliki,

a Shi'ite, being the president of Iraq.

The latest governorate elections in 2009 consisted of 75% parties that were

newly formed, an encouraging sign for the complexification of the political elite

within Iraq.16 Parties who appealed for a strong central government did very well

within 51% total participation (a drop from previous numbers), which was a

negative piece of news for Kurdistani separatists.17

Wolfgang Merkel talks of the regime type "defective democracy", which he

breaks up into "exclusive", "domain", "illiberal", and "delegative".18 Iraq exhibits

universal electoral rights, so it is not "exclusive". However, it could be argued that

Iraq does have elements of the other classifications: Maliki does not have control

of the military (the US influences the Iraqi military more than Maliki does, and he

will have to successfully usurp it once the Americans leave), but he does control

militias, access to Iran, and other "veto powers", as Merkel calls them. Iraq also is

not limited by the judiciary very much at all (as defined by "illiberal" and

"delegative"), and constitutional norms are constantly violated, so much that

figures like Ayatollah Sistani (see below) speak of the norms' viability as if they

were near non-existent and never followed. As Merkel defines it, "the principle of

16 Wikipedia.org. "Iraqi governorate elections, 2009", Wikipedia.org. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_governorate_elections,_2009

17 Cole, Juan. "Centralizing Parties advancing in Iraq's Provincial Election Results", Informed Comment blog, 02 Feb 09. http://www.juancole.com/2009/02/centralizing-parties-advancing-in-iraqs.html

18 Merkel, Wolfgang. "Embedded and Defective Democracies," Democratization, Dec 04. pp. 33-58. of 25

the rule of law is damaged, affecting the core of liberal self-understanding, namely

the equal freedom of all individuals."19 Iraq is, if nothing else, firmly in the hands

of Shi'ites.

IV.a.i. Government Composition

While elections have been fairly okay, this has been under the watchful eye

of the US military and international observers. Behind the scenes, as noted before,

al-Maliki has been consolidating his power, as Juan Cole describes:

"Al-Zaman writing in Arabic says that Iraqi troops continued for a

third straight day their siege of the Sunni Fadl distrinct [sic]. The paper

alleged that diseases are starting to spread among women and children

because of the blockade and curfew. The Sunni Arab Awakening Council in

Fadl was accused of trying to revive the banned Baath Party, and its leader

was arested [sic], provoking an uprising. But the Iraqi government's

crackdown on the Fadl district raised fears or provoked protests among other

Sunni Arabs. The Awakening Council leader in Baquba, Diyala province to

the east, said that he would stop fighting extremists for the government if

Adil Mashhadani,the Fadl Council leader, was not released. Meanwhile, US

officers were frantically calling their Sunni contacts and reassuring them

that the US would go to bat for them and they would not be left to the mercy

of the Shiite militias."20

Maliki's executive branch dominates Iraqi politics on the national level.

Sectarian and ethnic based parties dominate governorate politics. Rumors of

government crackdowns on non-Shi'ites continue to circulate, although it is now

not as bad as in 2005-2006 in Iraq, when the militias and local police were very

brazenly operating as one outfit, and when prisons were unveiled through

investigative journalism to show systematic torture of political prisoners much like

Abu Ghraib or Saddam Hussein's totalitarian political oppression practices.

19 Merkel, p. 49.


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That all said, there are signs that Maliki may be changing his colors as he

becomes more experienced in his position. Tom Ricks fairly gives Maliki praise for

taking on militias in a large battle in Basra to bring it back into Baghdad's orbit:

“Basra was a colossal failure in execution, but the decision to attack

was a key step forward for the government of Iraq,” concluded Brig. Gen.

Dan Allyn, Gen. Austin’s chief of staff at the American military headquarters

for day-to-day operations in Iraq. “They chose to take on Shia militias for the

first time. That was a courageous decision not properly prepared for.”21

...

"In military terms, the outcome was ambiguous. “It was totally

unclear who won or lost on the ground,” said Lemons, the Marine sergeant.

But in political terms, Basra was a clear victory for Maliki and his army, he

and others said. 'Every Iraqi I have spoken to since then about how the prime

minister did claims Maliki proved he is a strong leader willing to crack JAM.'”

This was a remarkable change because Maliki was between a rock and a

hard place, having to deal with an increasingly autonomous Basra that threatened

his national government, using military force against Shi'ites, many influenced by

or birthed by Iranians whose parent government would prefer Maliki not intervene.

This move hints that Maliki has more ambitions than simply being an Iranian

proxy, but where do his interests lie, in toto? Was he trying to impress American

military masters, retain a hold of his sole port city for personal or national

ambitions, or do his preferences vary?

At any rate, it was an unprecedented victory for the new Iraq, from a central

government's point of view:

"In June 2008, Austin, the new corps commander, noted that, “For the

first time, the government has positive control of the three strategic nodes—

Basra, Mosul, and Baghdad.” It was indeed an accomplishment, even if it

came during the sixth year of the war. At Umm Qasr, Iraq’s only port, just


south of Basra, the amount of cargo arriving daily tripled from the spring to

the summer."22

Maliki may have succeeded in unifying the country under a centralized

government. What will he do next, though? Maliki's roots were in below-average

politics before he was thrust into the national political system. He is also not

tremendously popular within Iraq. He has a tenuous hold on the various armed

forces within Iraq, despite his purging of non-Shi'ites from the government. It is

likely he will be voted out and quickly forgotten.

On Thomas Ricks' blog, he quotes an American Capitol Hill staffer in 2009.

"Maliki got votes because people saw him as a strong leader (justice

and security) and because he's done a reasonable job spreading money

around through tribal support councils, hand-picked ministers with buckets

of cash to spend after certain conflicts (Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, couple other

places). ISCI currently holds the keys to future funds because they control

the Finance Ministry (Bayan Jabr, a lovely sociopath-not sure if you've ever

had the pleasure of meeting him. He was the Interior Minister who had

torture chambers in the basement. He got punished by being promoted to

Finance Minister) and we are already seeing signs that, ostensibly due to

budget cuts, support for Maliki's tribal councils and a couple other initiatives

is being reduced. (By the way, a fun side effect of this is that the budget cuts

have also provided an excuse to not absorb more SOI into the security forces.

Not that huge numbers were going in already, but that trickle has generally

stopped)."23

Despite all this, it is wise to keep Michael McFaul's humble words in

mind when thinking about Maliki's and the government's future in Iraq:

"Whether leaders seize greatness or have it thrust upon them by

circumstance is not a question that these cases [former Soviet states

discussed by McFaul] will settle."24 "After the breakthrough, it seems as if


23 Ricks, Thomas. "Iraq, the unraveling (VI): looming intra-Shia violence?", The Best Defense blog, 24 Apr 09. http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/24/iraq_the_unraveling_vi_looming_intra_shia_violence

24 McFaul, Michael. "Transitions from Post-Communism", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, #3, July 05, p. 17. of 25

no other leader could have united the opposition and toppled the regime.

But this 'fact' only seems obvious after success."

IV.a.ii. Opposition Parties

Once again, politics are dominated by Shi'ite-Kurdish-Sunni divides. The

Kurds seek an autonomous state to the north and have considered themselves to

be independent for quite a while now, as 60 Minutes reported, "The Kurds are very

big on the trappings of statehood. It’s as if they’re eager to prove that they exist.

They have their own 175,000-man Army, the pesh merga, which means "those who

face death." When you arrive in Erbil, immigration officers give your passport a

Kurdish stamp. And if you want to see the Iraqi flag, don’t come to Kurdistan. It

has been banned."

Once again, foreign influences step in, as 60 Minutes continues:

"The Kurds have a saying: no friends but the mountains. There are 30

million Kurds in the world, the largest nation without a state. But only five

million reside inside Iraq’s borders. The rest are in Iran, Syria and primarily

Turkey. There are so many Kurds in Turkey that the Turks are afraid that an

independent Kurdish state would lead to unrest; they are dead set against it.

"So Kurdish leaders believe that, at least for the time being, the

answer is federalism, a soft partition of Iraq into three parts. Kurdistan in the

north, a Sunni state in the middle and a Shiite region to the south, with

Baghdad as only a nominal capital.

"While Barzani and Kurdistan may be paving the way for such a

division, the American government doesn’t want partition of any kind, no

matter what it’s called. The Bush administration and the U.S. military see

Kurdistan not as a shining new nation but as a shining example to the rest of

a united Iraq."25

25 Schorn, Daniel. "Kurdistan: The Other Iraq", 60 Minutes, 05 Aug 07. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/16/60minutes/main2486679.shtml

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American policy dictates national unity for Iraq and retaining its

current borders, while Turkey sees Kurdistan as a potential destabilizer for

their own country, and it has often "violated" Kurdistan's border with the

US's permission (since it sees Kurdistan as Iraqi territory) to go after

terrorists.

The Kurds have oil, which is a trump card because everyone wants them at

the table. The Sunnis out west do not enjoy such a benefit since much of Al-Anbar

is desert, even though some oil reserves have recently been discovered.26 The

Sunnis are in a bind because they are outnumbered and have little leverage

without external financing from Saudi and the US.

What the Sunnis fear most has yet to happen: ethnic cleansing once

American forces leave. This is a legitimate concern that will be covered more

later.

IV.a.iii. The Military

The Iraqi military is more closely-aligned with the US military at this point,

although Maliki has nominal control over them. The US funds and trains the Iraqi

military and has done a fairly good job of professionalizing it. But such a process

is not sustainable and once Americans leave, the Iraqi military will be in disarray.

Maliki's priority will be to try to assume control of it immediately. However,

"Maliki's problem is that he really only directly controls a couple

things-the Special Forces (CTB) and the Operations Cells that have been set

up in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and I think one or two other places. But really,

at the end of the day, he only controls the Special Forces and two, maybe

three, Army divisions who's commanders he has on speed dial on his cell

phone. The rest of the Army is Kurd or has heavy levels of former Badr

Brigade folks or whatever, and the Interior Minister is developing into a

political rival. So, his main avenues of response are likely to be to try to

leverage US aid (and the embassy and MNF-I are being a little leery of this

so as not to seem to be picking winners) or to go after some of his opponents.

26 Roggio, Bill. "Oil, Anbar and the Insurgency", The Long War Journal blog, 21 Feb 07. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/02/oil_anbar_and_the_in.php

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There have been a couple raids and heavy handed use of Iraqi Special

Forces, and some of it seems to have been aimed at Maliki's political

opponents, including ISCI supporters/officials (it's a little unclear)."27

IV.a.iv. Missing Players

Most striking about the political system in Iraq is that the most influential

people within Iraq are not represented within the current government. If one

traveled to Iraq and talked to people on the street in 2005-2006 (when this author

was there), the Iraqi Shi'ites, soldiers and civilians, would ask you whether you

knew who Sistani was and how great he was. Posters of Sadr would line the walls

of souks in Sadr City, the slum of Baghdad. Sunni tribal leaders would often stay

hidden among their people to avoid targeting by American military and Al-Qaeda

alike. Ba'athists have been blackballed completely.

How can Iraq make a serious claim at being a consolidating democracy

when so many of the key figures involved in shaping Iraqi identity and opinion are

ignored or boycotting participation? The reality is a bit more nuanced.

"Al-Zaman [The Times of Baghdad] reports in Arabic that that Grand

Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the spiritual leader of Iraq's Shiites, was asked by

Agence France Presse if he supported the return of members of the former

Baath party to public life. He is said to have replied that this matter is

governed by the Iraqi Constitution, which must be obeyed. (The constitution

outlaws the Baath Party). The AFP question was prompted by statements

made by Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa after his meeting with

Sistani a couple of weeks ago. Moussa implied that Sistani favored national

reconciliation with all Iraqis. Sistani in his reply appeared to repudiate

Moussa's report of their conversation and to underline his own commitment

to continued debaathification."

"At the same time, the Islamic Mission Party (Da`wa) led by Prime

Minister Nuri al-Maliki called for the criminalization of the Baath Party, on

the grounds that it issued a law in 1980 making it a capital crime to belong to

27 Ricks, Thomas. "Iraq, the unraveling (VI): looming intra-Shia violence?", The Best Defense blog, 24 Apr 09. http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/24/iraq_the_unraveling_vi_looming_intra_shia_violence

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the Da'wa, and carried out numerous pogroms against Da'wa members. This

call appears to envision going beyond firing Baathists and forbidding them to

hold political office to actually prosecuting them for party membership. Since

Sunnis were disproportionately present in the Baath Party (though there

were plenty of Shiites in it, too), any such step would lay an especially heavy

burden on the Sunni Arabs."28

It is interesting that Sistani takes the constitutional viewpoint. However, him

being an Iranian Shi'ite, it would be in his best interest to continue a policy of de-

Ba'athication. The US has attempted to make overtures to him but he has avoided

any contact with the Americans on Iraqi nationalism and anti-occupational

grounds:

"Ayatollah Ali Sistani is very roughly the pope of Shia Islam. This is by

virtue of the fact that Sistani has the most followers among Shia Islam’s

largest subsect, “Twelver Shia,” so called because of its tenet that the

prophet was followed by twelve divinely chosen successors. About 80 percent

of Shia follow Sistani’s spiritual guidance. Generally viewed as apolitical, a

moderate, and a rival to the Iranian clerics—a “quietist” cleric—he was the

man the United States and Britain had pinned their hopes on to line up Iraq’s

Shia behind the occupation and shepherd them into building a modern,

secular, democratic Iraqi state. Our ayatollah on our white horse."29

So Sistani, surprisingly, has not proven as useful as initially thought.

"Having had almost no contact with average Iraqis, Sistani comes

across as cloistered, aloof, and elitist—in other words, little better than an

exile. He may be more credible than Ahmed Chalabi, but the Iraqis can’t help

but look at Sistani as a foreigner. Sistani isn’t as powerful as the raw number

of his followers suggests."30


29 Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 686-691.


Underneath the hood of Iraq, force and violence still reign. Cosmetically,

there are elections and politicians speak of democracy, but citizens on the street

recognize militias, tribal loyalties, and sectarian neighborhood divides.

"Washington and London had been encouraged when Sistani

supported Iraq’s constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections.

(Then again, Iran and Iran’s proxies did the same. With the Shia a majority in

Iraq, this wasn’t a surprise.) But democracy wasn’t what was at stake in Iraq;

armed force was. Without a militia, Sistani couldn’t control the street. He

was unable to stop intra-Shia violence or Shia assassination squads, or

influence the Shia government in Baghdad. Several of his assistants were

assassinated. And so today—little different from Saddam’s era—Sistani rarely

leaves his house in Najaf. He is no more capable of controlling Iraq than

Karbalai was Karbala."31

IV.b. Iraq's Defective Democracy

Wolfgang Merkel helpfully continues his analysis of defective democracies

by listing causes of such a regime. The causes most pertinent to Iraq are Merkel's

"level of modernization", "social capital", civil society and national identity, and

"type of authoritarian predecessor regime".

IV.b.i. Level of Modernization

Merkel talks about the "more unequal the distribution of societal resources"

being a core component of a defective democracy -- within Iraq, almost no one gets

any electricity or water every day. Infrastructure is not only damaged from war

and from looting, but it is siphoned to pro-Shi'ite neighborhoods before Sunni

neighborhoods. The Shi'ites do not get much access to resources compared to a

developed nation, but there is clearly still routing of resources based on ethnicity

and religious creed. Electricity is mainly produced through gasoline generators,

making gasoline a particularly sensitive topic for Iraqis who now pay black market


rates instead of the pennies they paid before American occupation. Again, Shi'ites

have co-opted that resource as well. Merkel aptly describes this situation as

"further [complicating] the enforcement of constitutional and democratic

standards against the rational self-interest of the powerful and endangers

marginalized groups' loyalty to the regime, even after democratic institutions are

formally established."32

IV.b.ii. Social Capital

Merkel talks about defective democracies being more likely if "social capital

is accumulated along ethnic and religious lines".33 Many of Iraqi's white collar

talent has already fled the country after the sectarian conflict in 2006. Iraq, which

previously consisted of a sultanistic regime where all parties sought influence and

employment with the Ba'athist government as it was the only employer in town,

has now turned into a regime dominated by ethnic and religious politics. This has

only worsened with time, as Tom Ricks explains in the 2005 elections:

"In the 9 primarily Shiite provinces, the leading Shiite party, the

United Iraqi Alliance, won 70 of 81 seats. The Kurds swept the 35 seats in

their region, and Sunni parties won 15 of 17 seats in al Anbar and

Salahuddin provinces. The election results in Baghdad, Nineveh, Diyala, and

Kirkuk also resembled the sectarian makeup of each province. This may have

helped light the fuse of the small civil war that exploded in Baghdad months

after. As Petraeus himself would put it much later, 'The elections hardened

sectarian positions as Iraqis voted largely based on ethnic and sectarian

group identity.'”34

IV.b.iii. Civil Society, Autonomous Space, and National Identity

32 Merkel, p. 53.

33 Merkel, p. 53.


There is little interpersonal trust within Iraq anymore. Checkpoints still

exist to check sectarian identity between neighborhoods. "Ethnically mobilized

civil societies often reveal the 'dark side' of 'civic' mobilization against other

communities," according to Merkel, perfectly describing the Iraq situation.35

Likewise, there is no autonomous space within Iraq to encourage active

dialogue outside the space of the defective democratic government. The Muslim

world is an interesting counterpoint to Catholic countries because Islam is near-

required to be integral with government, as Muslims mostly believe that the

teachings of Muhammad must be followed within the government, to varying

degrees. Whereas in Catholic populations, they could relate to an international

message of social justice and equality, there is no conduit to an international

Muslim faith that is productive towards democratization -- in fact what is more

powerful is the international call for a stricter form of Muslim rule under shari'a

law. For the time being, this is the case, but perhaps Islam will eventually push

downward a more democratic message.

The closest Iraq has to an autonomous space is satellite television. This

trend is affecting the rest of the Muslim world as well -- there are now many

different satellite channels for Muslims to watch internationally which project not

only a Muslim point of view, but an Arab or Persian point of view, and also more

liberal Muslim views able to debate against more conservative Muslim views, as

typified by Al-Jazeera, the most successful liberalizing and investigating TV station,

with its slogan, "the opinion...and the other opinion". Satellite TV has had

magnificent effects in distributing far more information to viewers across the

Muslim world such that now Muslims are extremely sensitive to global events and

are well-informed of large debates, despite many of these satellite stations being

state-run.

Despite all this, there is indeed Iraqi national identity, part of a memory of

their vicious war against Iran. Prior to that war, Iraq was a fairly successful

country, proud of its high levels of literacy and education, rivaling the Egyptians

for intellectual clout. While Iraq's borders are somewhat arbitrary, its identity is

35 Merkel, p. 53. of 25

still relevant even with sectarian and tribal conflict both competing for the hearts

and minds of Iraqis.

IV.b.iv. Type of Authoritarian Predecessor Regime

Merkel says that the longer-entrenched a totalitarian and sultanistic regime,

the more institutionalized the electoral rewards for circumvention of democratic

checks and balances in the post-totalitarian transition. Certainly Hussein was

sultanistic and controlled all apparatuses within Iraq, and while the former regime

has been completely replaced, the opposition has filled that power vacuum with

similar practices.

V. Conclusion: A Future Regime

Within American journalism, where the most serious discussion of the future

of Iraq is occurring, the picture being painted is one of nervous anticipation of the

worst. Tom Ricks, who gives a more fair interpretation of what's going on in Iraq,

cannot help but conclude at the end of his book "The Gamble" that the odds of Iraq

democratizing and consolidating is not good:

"McCain’s grand vision was not only at odds with the more restrained

goals in Petraeus’s campaign plan—simply of “sustainable security”—but

verged on fantasy. It resembled President Bush’s 2003 rhetoric, but flew in

the face of five additional years of painful evidence about the imprudence of

that grandiose approach. It was unlikely that Iraq would wind up a strong or

genuinely democratic nation, with not only elections but also rule of law and

respect for the rights of its minorities. There was even less chance that Iraq

would be an ally against Iran, given that the Shiite politicians that the United

States had helped to power had taken refuge in Iran during Saddam’s time,

and had maintained close ties even during the U.S. occupation. Rather, the

best case scenario was that in the long run, Iraq would calm down, be mildly

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authoritarian, and probably become an ally of Iran, but, with luck, not one

that threatened the rest of the Arab world."36

Some military officers were even less optimistic:

"Marine Col. Tom Greenwood, who had been a member of the critical

“council of colonels” that in the fall of 2006 had pushed the Pentagon toward

recognizing some hard truths about Iraq, said the surge essentially had

papered over the problems of Iraq without solving them. “I still think that the

Maliki government is riddled with sectarianism and is dysfunctional,” he said

in mid-2008, and “that we have de facto partition between the Kurds, Shia

and Sunni, that Iraq is little more than an Iranian proxy, that we have

destabilized the region worse than Saddam Hussein ever did, that the

downward trend in U.S. casualties will be short-lived.” What’s more, some of

the country’s political tensions were worsening, most notably between Arabs

and Kurds over oil and the status of Kirkuk. “As Nouri al-Maliki has become

more capable and more confident, he’s actually become less inclined to reach

out to those he most needs to reconcile with,” said Colin Kahl of the Center

for a New American Security, a Washington think tank. Masoud Barzani, the

president of the Kurdish region, charged the Baghdad government with

forgetting its commitments and acting like 'a totalitarian regime.'”37

It is unlikely that Iraq will consolidate its democracy without many stages of

political turmoil in the interim. Regionally, the Muslim world is undergoing a

massive upheaval, with the advent of radical Salafism and Wahhabism originating

out of Sunni states and a reinvigorated Shi'ite base taking advantage of an

unleashed Shi'ite Iraqi population and the weakening of the Saudis and Pakistanis.

At the heart of this is Iran, which has many fingers in Iraq's pie. Iraq is being torn

apart from the north from Turkey and Kurdistan, from the southwest in Saudi, and

from the south and east by Iran.

Iraq's best course of action from its own point of view is to consolidate its

government and hunker itself down from outsiders, which is what Maliki seems to

be doing in strengthening his central government. The temptation will be great for



Maliki to eschew pluralist democratization, since the major parties outside of his

Shi'ite parties, in the Kurds and Sunnis, are not as intent on remaining part of Iraq.

If Maliki wishes to retain Iraqi unity, he will need Iranian and American financial

and military support, one of which is intent on leaving (the US) and one which aims

to use Iraq as a buffer state (Iran).

Still, Maliki and subsequent governments may defy extremely poor

circumstances and predictions for the future of Iraq. Bold leadership and shrewd

diplomacy with neighbors to enhance regional security may reduce temptations to

consolidate power in one central government. But the trend is towards Iraq

becoming an authoritarian state using nationalism and centralization to convince

its people that it is needed to protect national integrity. After that, Iraq would be

unlikely to democratize until a broad move towards democratization successfully

dominoes across the Middle East.

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Is Iraq Democratizing? (May 2009)

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