Irons -Descartes & Modern Theories of Emotion

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    hilosophical Review

    Descartes and Modern Theories of EmotionAuthor(s): David IronsSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (May, 1895), pp. 291-302Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2175567 .Accessed: 06/09/2014 08:13

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    DESCARTES AND MODERN THEORIES OF

    EMOTION.

    HE publication of Descartes' treatise Les passions delame deserves to rank as a noteworthy event in the

    history of Psychology. Though written in the earliest days

    of modern science, this work will bear comparison with any-thing that has been produced in recent years. It will bedifficult, indeed, to find any treatment of the emotions muchsuperior to it in originality, thoroughness, and suggestiveness.The position maintained is similar to that now held by Pro-fessor James, but Descartes does not content himself with de-fending in a general way the assertion that emotion is caused by

    physical change. After coming to the conclusion that there aresix passions from which all the others are derived, he attemptsto show that a special set of organic effects is concerned inthe production of each of these primary states. He maintains,further, that the bodily changes in each case are of such anature that they might naturally be expected to cause theemotion with which they are associated. He strives to prove,therefore, not only that there is a definite physical cause foreach emotion, but also that there is a natural fitness in thefact that a particular emotion is dependent on a particular sumof conditions. The organic changes, it may be added, are notconfusedly massed together in an undifferentiated whole. Theinternal disturbance is sharply opposed to the purposive actionof the bodily members, and incidental effects, such as weeping,reddening, and trembling, are treated separately. It is evident,therefore, that the theory advanced is worked out with a com-pleteness which is not to be found in the modern presentationsof the same general point of view.

    In other points, not so closely connected with the main con-tention, the same acuteness and thoroughness are manifest.It is clearly recognized that objects do not cause emotion by

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    292 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. IV.

    means of their particular differences, but only by virtue of thedifferent ways in which they are important to us. (GEuvres,

    vol. IV, p. 86, Cousin's ed.) The strength and relative per-manence of the passions are explained and the question ofcontrol is discussed. Emotion is regarded as having a definitefunction,' and a constant attempt is made to show how it canplay its part, and yet be subservient to the purposes of a well-regulated life. Cases of morbid terror, aversion, etc., are ex-plained in an interesting way by means of experiences in

    infancy, which have left their mark on the psychical constitu-tion of the individual, although they have lapsed from memory(PP. I47, I48). Reference is made to those states which seemto come into being without any definite cause. Some of these areaccounted for as effects of the accidentally determined courseof ideas (p. 86). The distinction between emotion proper andmere intellectual attitude and mode of behavior, is emphasized.

    Respect and Contempt, for instance, are stated to be at timesmerely our opinions of the value of objects (p. i63). Courageis classed as an emotion, but not when it is simply a habit ora natural disposition of the individual (p. I82). Gratitude, weare told, has no opposite, for Ingratitude is a vice merely, i.e.,a mode of behavior (p. 197). The almost unvarying consis-tency with which this distinction is adhered to, is in markedcontrast to modern carelessness in this respect.

    The remarkable subtlety of the author is not least appar-ent when he comes to deal with the individual concrete states.He describes Pity as a species of sadness mingled with loveor good-will towards those whom we see suffering some evilwhich, in our opinion, they do not deserve (p. i9i). Thedefinitions of Disdain, Hope, Jealousy (pp. I76, I77, I 78),though not equally good, are still much superior to anythingthat has been written on those emotions in recent years. Asomewhat interesting account is given of 'Love,' in the com-mon acceptation of that term. Nature, according to Descartes,causes us to feel at a certain period of our life that we are incom-plete and require an alter ego as a supplement. The individual

    1fifuvres, IV,

    pp.7i, 86, 98, 148. Cousin's ed.

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    No. 3.] DESCARTES' THEORY OF EMOTION. 293

    whom we regard as fitted to this end, is that one of the othersex who has, from our point of view, some advantage over the

    others. ' Love' is simply the desire for possession which fol-lows when the particular individual has been chosen, and, sinceNature represents the attainment of the end in question as thehighest possible good, our whole soul is concentrated in thisdesire (pp. I II, I I 2). Though quaintly expressed, this con-ception embodies an aspect of the truth. Many minor pointsgive evidence of careful and acute observation on the part of

    the writer. Fear as opposed to Hope, for instance, is distin-guished from the fear of some impending danger, and thepresence of Surprise in the state of Terror is noted (pp. I77,I85). Desire is asserted to have no contrary, for it is alwaysthe same movement of the soul which impels it to seek a goodor avoid an evil (p. i09).

    Enough has been said to show that Descartes' contributionto the theory of emotion deserves more attention than it hashitherto received. It is important both intrinsically and byreason of its relation to modern thought on the same subject.It is not by any means a perfectly consistent whole. Thisis the case, however, mainly because Descartes submits every-thing to an absolutely impartial investigation, and in this wayarrives at conclusions which do not always harmonize with hisown theory. Just because it is inconsistent, therefore, it hasall the more significance for friends and foes alike of the pointof view adopted.

    To understand how Descartes came to regard emotion as theresult of physical conditions, it is necessary to bear in mindhis position with reference to the nature of body and soul andthe bond between them. The body, he states expressly, issimply a machine, and all its movements can be explained bythe mechanical interaction of its parts. Motion is due to thefact that the heat of the heart keeps the blood circulating, andcauses it to give off those quick-moving subtle particles whichcompose the 'animal spirits' (pp. 43-46). Since the blood iscontinually passing from the heart to the brain, the process ofseparating the animal spirits from the grosser elements of the

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    294 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [VOL. IV.

    blood is performed in a very simple way. The former enterthose parts of the brain lying near the pineal gland, while the

    latter are prevented from doing so by the fineness of the pores.As the animal spirits are never at rest, they immediately findtheir way out of the brain, and, by acting on the muscles,cause movements in different parts of the body.