Iran’s Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction · John E. Jordan, Content Editor Lula...

AIR WAR COLLEGEAIR UNIVERSITY

Iran’s Strategic Culture andWeapons of Mass Destruction

Implications of US Policy

Anthony C. CainLieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War CollegeMaxwell Paper No. 26

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

April 2002

Air University

Donald A. Lamontagne, Lt Gen, Commander

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Bentley B. Rayburn, Maj Gen, CommandantStephen O. Fought, PhD, Dean

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Foreword

Since 1979 the relationship between the United Statesand the Islamic Republic of Iran has mirrored aspects ofthe ideological tensions that characterized the Cold War ofthe twentieth century’s latter half. The revolution thatejected the shah emerged from a consensus within theIranian community that favored social reform foundedupon Islamic values. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, thecharismatic imam whose vitriolic sermons helped to polar-ize relations between Tehran and Washington, establisheda theocracy in which the faithful could prosper.

In this study, Lt Col Anthony C. Cain, PhD, analyzes therelationship between Iran’s strategic culture and weaponsof mass destruction. Following the Iranian Revolution in1979, foreign policy experts in the West had trouble com-prehending the cleric’s politicized Shi’i ideology and reactedwith alarm when Khomeini, energized by the revolution’ssuccess, acted to export his ideology to other communitiesin the Middle East—sponsoring terrorism, if necessary, tocombat regimes that supported US policies and interests.Consequently, the United States focused on containingIran until the regime changed enough to allow for less ide-ologically charged dialogue to occur on the one hand while,at times, pursuing active measures to overthrow the revolu-tionary regime on the other. This range of policies resultedin economic sanctions and an arms embargo against Kho-meini’s Islamic republic. Moreover, when war broke out be-tween Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the United Statesopportunistically backed the Iraqi dictator in the hope thata military defeat would usher in moderate leaders inTehran. At times the relationship flared into military con-frontation. US forces bombed Iranian targets in the Per-sian Gulf, and Iranian leaders launched missile attacksagainst shipping in the same waters. Beneath the surfaceof Middle Eastern power politics, Iran became a touch-stone for religiously charged revolutionary movementsacross the Middle East. Perhaps the low point for US-Iran-ian relations occurred on 3 July 1988 when a US NavyAegis cruiser shot down an Iranian Airbus, killing all 290passengers aboard.

Colonel Cain describes how, in the aftermath of the1991 Gulf War, the United States adopted a one-size-fits-all policy toward Iran and Iraq, the twin rogue states of the

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Middle East, under the rubric of "dual containment." Sincethe landslide election of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami tothe presidency in 1997, however, signs emanating fromIran point to possibilities for altering the tension that hasplagued relations between the two states for more than 20years. This study concludes by analyzing options availableto US policy makers should they choose to help Iran’stransition from pariah state toward a more moderate rolein the Persian Gulf. President George W. Bush demandedin his January 2002 State of the Union Address that Iranabandon proliferation and terrorist-related activities as aprecondition for easing tensions with the United States.Colonel Cain argues that US decision makers must under-stand the social and economic challenges that confrontleaders in Tehran as they attempt to guide their nation to-ward the future. For its part, the Islamic republic must de-velop a consensus between its citizens and the ruling eliteregarding Iran’s legitimate role within the region and theworld.

As with all Maxwell Papers, this study is provided in thespirit of academic freedom, open debate, and serious con-sideration of the issues. We encourage your responses.

BENTLEY B. RAYBURNMajor General, USAFCommandant, Air War College

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About the Author

Lt Col Anthony C. Cain graduated from Georgia StateUniversity in 1980 and was commissioned upon complet-ing Officer Training School in 1981. After earning his nav-igator wings at Mather Air Force Base (AFB), California, in1982, he served as a B-52G navigator, radar navigator, in-structor, and evaluator at Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan; Barks-dale AFB, Louisiana; and Castle AFB, California. In 1984he won the William J. Crumm Linebacker Memorial Tro-phy for high-altitude bombardment during the StrategicAir Command’s (SAC) annual bombing and navigationcompetition. As the senior standardization and evaluationradar navigator at Barksdale AFB, he launched severalmissiles and helped draft crew procedures and tactics dur-ing the initial operational test and evaluation of the AGM142/A precision-guided munition weapon system. In 1991he deployed in support of Operation Desert Shield and flew26 combat missions in support of coalition objectives dur-ing Operation Desert Storm, earning the DistinguishedFlying Cross and two Air Medals. In 1992 his crew won theBartsch Memorial Trophy for electronic countermeasuresperformance during SAC’s last bombing and navigationcompetition. After graduating as a distinguished graduatefrom the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), he servedat ACSC as a faculty member and director for the TheaterAir Campaign Studies Course. In 1995 the commander, AirEducation and Training Command, selected Colonel Cainas the command’s Educator of the Year. He earned his doc-torate in military history at Ohio State University and re-turned to the faculty at ACSC where he served as the di-rector for the Airpower Studies Course before beingselected to attend Air War College. In May 2002 the Smith-sonian Institution will publish The Forgotten Air Force,Cain’s study of French airpower doctrine in the interwaryears. He is a Master Navigator with more than 3,000hours in the B-52. He and Mechieal, his wife of 21 years,have three children, Jessica, Micah, and Ryan.

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Iran’s Strategic Cultureand Decision Making

Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the subsequenthostage crisis, popular perceptions of a society dominatedby “irrational” Islamic fundamentalists have colored USpolicy toward Iran. Michael Eisenstadt notes:

Because Shi’ite religious doctrine exalts the suffering and martyrdomof the faithful, and because religion plays a central role in the officialideology of the Islamic Republic, Iran is sometimes portrayed as a“crazy” or “undeterrable” state driven by the absolute imperatives ofreligion, not the pragmatic concerns of statecraft. . . . Experience hasshown, however, that the perception of Iran as an irrational, unde-terrable state is wrong.1

Conflict will tend to characterize US policy toward Iran,in part, in proportion to the degree that US leaders fail tocomprehend the Islamic republic’s struggle to reconciletensions between the faith and the economic, diplomatic,and military functions of state power.2 Similarly, copingwith Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biologi-cal weapons, coupled with the potential proliferation ofthose weapons to other “rogue” states and terrorist organ-izations, requires a sophisticated understanding of Iraniandecision-making processes.3 The challenge to US policymakers will center on modifying the prevailing paradigmthat emphasizes the irrationality of the Iranian govern-ment in favor of one based on understanding the syner-gies—and the conflicts—between the various segments ofthe Iranian polity that help to shape relations between thetwo states.

The first step in developing a more sophisticated under-standing of Iranian decision-making processes requiresdistinguishing between the Shi’ism espoused by the clericswho share power in the Iranian government, the politicizedIslamism that threatens moderate Muslim regimes andtheir non-Muslim counterparts in the Middle East, and Is-lamic tenets to which most peaceful Muslims adhere.Shi’ism is, by definition, a millenarian sect of Islam that re-lies on imams, holy men, to mediate between God and theIslamic community.4 The basic distinction between Shi’iand Sunni branches of Islam derives from a conflict overthe right to govern the ummah, the community of the faith-

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ful. Sunni Muslims attempted to reconcile religious andsecular communities within the ummah by creating thecaliphate to provide political leadership while vesting spir-itual leadership in the clergy. Followers of Shi’i Islam be-lieve that political and religious leadership derives from theprophet’s bloodline (through his son-in-law Ali ibn AbiTalib). This doctrine worked well until the twelfth genera-tion (the Twelfth Imam) when, according to Shi’i doctrine,Allah caught up the imam (technically the imam was oc-culted or hidden from view)—unfortunately before he couldappoint a successor to govern the ummah. Iranian Shi’ismfollows the “Twelver’s” sect because of its anticipation ofthe Hidden Imam’s return.

Iranian religious leaders relied upon this doctrine to jus-tify their political ambitions in Iran as they found them-selves pushed to the margins of political authority underShah Reza Mohammad Pahlevi’s regime. The clergy resentedthis marginalization and developed a view that society—the ummah—would remain flawed as long as Iran’s leadersmaintained the separation between secular and religiouscommunities. They encouraged opposition groups to adoptincreasingly militant tactics designed to usher in a utopiain which the imamate would govern religious and politicalaspects of the community according to Koranic precepts.5

Shi’i religious doctrine produced a divided power struc-ture in post-revolutionary Iran. During the years when Ay-atollah Khomeini dominated the government (1979–89),the combination of his charisma, his religious authority asimam, and a brutally efficient internal security apparatusdiscouraged dissent and opposition. Additionally, Khomeini’sfocus on expanding Islamist influence struck a responsivechord spawning radical sects throughout the Middle East,North Africa, and elsewhere that came to rely on Iranianresources for ideological and logistical support.6 The viru-lent distrust with which Khomeini viewed the West con-tributed to the rise of Islamism in Iran and throughout theMuslim world as he consolidated his leadership and ex-ported his ideology within the context of the Iranian Revo-lution.7 Thus, the revolution’s apparent success encour-aged disenfranchised, pious, and militant individuals andgroups to campaign to overturn the status quo in such di-verse states as Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and

2 IRAN’S STRATEGIC CULTURE

the Philippines, often using terrorist tactics, in the name ofa brand of Islamism that has only existed for a brief timein Iran.8

One final doctrinal point figures significantly in the evo-lution of Shi’i belief toward radical Islamism—the doctrineof jihad. In the early years of the faith, jihad was necessaryboth to protect and to expand the community of the faith-ful. As long as the imams ruled the community, their au-thority to declare jihad remained a fundamental symbol oftheir right to rule in Allah’s name. Technically, until the re-turn of the Twelfth Imam, the authority to declare jihadhas lapsed. However, because the Iranian clerics derivetheir authority based upon the legitimacy of their imamate,they assumed the authority to declare jihad. The Iraniancommunity’s tacit recognition of this authority harborssignificant implications for conflict with the Islamic repub-lic and its surrogates. Competitors could face combatantsmotivated by religious fervor that stems from their antici-pation of rewards in paradise for their sacrifice (and corre-sponding torments in the afterlife should they fail) if theyanswer the imam’s call to wage holy war.9

It is impossible to separate the Iranian government’spolicy choices from its religious precepts. Religion governsevery aspect of social, political, and economic life for citi-zens of Iran in ways that rarely apply to most Western so-cieties.10 One analyst observes, “Islam also encompassesthe material and spiritual aspects of the followers’ livesfrom the time of birth, throughout life to death, and evenafter death throughout the spiritual experience.”11 Thus,for contemporary Iranian politics, reconciling the demandsof international statecraft and domestic consensus build-ing with the principles of religious dogma remains difficultand, at times, nearly impossible. Western society resolvedthe secular-religious dilemma over the course of severalcenturies of religious wars that culminated with the con-flicts that accompanied the Protestant Reformation. Islamhas yet to undergo a similar reconciliation—and Iran, inparticular, has erected institutional barriers to preventthis development by establishing an Islamic theocracy.12

Iran’s decision-making process remains clouded in mys-tery to most Western observers. The Islamic RevolutionaryCouncil vested supreme authority in the vali al faqih (a re-

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ligious leader who combines political and religious author-ity in the executive branch of government).13 Between 1979and 1989, the Ayatollah Khomeini steered the country andconsolidated the revolution. His nearly unimpeachable re-ligious authority constrained the boundaries of dissentand debate over economic and political issues. Economicstresses stemmed from Iran’s nearly total dependence onthe oil industry for foreign exchange. Thus, decisions byother petroleum-producing nations to regulate prices andsupplies severely constrained Iran’s economic potential.Moreover, the Iran-Iraq War, coupled with economic andpolitical sanctions sponsored by the United States and theUnited Nations, placed severe strains on the Iranian gov-ernment and population. Khomeini’s regime pushed asidemoderates like former President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr asit reacted to the war with Iraq and perceptions of politicaland economic attacks against the Islamic republic fromthe US-led international community.14 Since Khomeini’sdeath, tensions within a rising middle class and studentswho campaign for democratic reforms aimed at reconcilingIran with Western cultures have threatened to shatter thefragile unity that governs Iran.15

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor, wieldspower as the vali al faqih in the post-Khomeini era. Ratherthan following the archconservative policies of his prede-cessor, the tensions outlined above forced Khamenei to ac-commodate popular demands for reform. President SeyyedMohammad Khatami, who rose to office on the wings of alandslide victory in 1997, carefully pushed the conserva-tive clerics to implement moderate governmental and eco-nomic reforms. As one analyst notes, however, the signalsemanating from Tehran are often difficult to sort out:“Since Khatami’s election, there have been many signs thatIran has a complex political structure that is in the midstof an uncertain transition. . . . Moderates must talk likehard-liners to survive, and this helps explain why oneday’s new moderate initiative may be followed by the nextday’s hard-line speech.”16 Consequently, some nationshave reacted cautiously to Khatami’s influence by easingrestrictions on trade and diplomatic contacts with Iran.Also, Khatami has made public statements of regret to theUnited States for the hostage episode in an apparent at-


tempt to ease tensions between the two countries. Thus,those who seek to discern Iran’s propensity to pursuemoderate foreign and domestic policies must sort throughthe rivalries between Khamenei and the clerics and be-tween Khatami and the political elite.

The Iranian theocracy filters its interaction with the in-ternational community through the lens of Koranic law.This constitutional requirement means that the elite clergywill formulate moderate policies slowly, if at all. Despitethe mullahs’ inherently conservative approach, instancesof policy shifts have occurred that, on the surface, appearto contradict religious dogma. Perhaps the most signifi-cant, and ominous from a weapons of mass destruction(WMD) proliferation perspective, was the Ayatollah Khome-ini’s reversal of his policy, based upon the Koran’s prohi-bition against using poison, during the Iran-Iraq War thatcondemned the use of chemical weapons (and by exten-sion, nuclear and biological weapons). This decision cameafter Iranian forces suffered horrific losses from Iraqichemical weapons attacks.17 Significantly, however, thedecision emerged only after the international communityfailed to take action to condemn or curb Iraq’s use of suchweapons and after intense debates within Iran betweenKhomeini, the military, and the clerics. Thus, a funda-mentally secular decision based upon military effective-ness calculations had to pass through the filter of Islamiclaw to acquire the mantle of legitimacy. With the debatesettled, however, the republic’s leaders relied upon the newreligious precedent to justify future nuclear, chemical, andbiological weapons proliferation. This example illustratesthe difficulty that moderate leaders will encounter as theyattempt to reshape Iran’s foreign or domestic policies—without a catalyst to prompt clerical review of establishedpolicies, there will be little rationale for proposing new in-terpretations merely to justify liberal reforms.

The characterization of Iran as an “Islamic democracy”conceals serious flaws within the functioning and the fab-ric of the society. In the first place, the clerics jealouslyguard their prerogatives as the interpreters of the revolu-tionary agenda. In terms of governmental structure, thistranslates into a dual system of government with a weakpresidency that operates under the close supervision of the

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supreme leader (vali al faqih) and the Assembly of Experts.Second, the military operates within a dual chain of com-mand with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps servinga praetorian function as the protectors of the revolutionwhile the nominally “regular” armed forces act in reservecapacities. Finally, great personal risk accompanies dis-sent and freedom of expression for the average Iranian cit-izen. The clerics monitor media and press outlets to detectinstances of nascent counterrevolutionary thought. Evenwith these overarching controls, however, spontaneousdemonstrations have occurred that have forced the regimeto act decisively to prevent a replay of the mass uprisingsof the late 1970s as the public clamors for reform.18

The twin social upheavals of revolution and interstatewar exerted harsh effects on Iran’s social infrastructure.Presently in Iran, age groups cluster around the less than30-year-old and more than 50-year-old sectors as a resultof the flight of many citizens from the country in the im-mediate aftermath of the revolution and the tragic casual-ties sustained in the war with Iraq. This clustering meansthat few of Iran’s nearly 66 million citizens have memoriesof any but the present form of government. Those who re-member Shah Pahlevi’s regime likely do so with resent-ment stemming from the corruption and inequality thatcharacterized the regime in its waning days. Thus, the cur-rent regime in Tehran enjoys modest popular support thatdraws its strength from the population’s ignorance of viablealternatives on one hand and a determination not to re-turn to the monarchy’s flawed structures on the other.19

Despite the current regime’s popular revolutionaryagenda of establishing equality for all members of the so-ciety, urban and rural poverty continue to characterize lifein Iran. This stems in part from a 3 percent annual popu-lation growth that will outstrip the nation’s economy if leftunchecked. The government recently acted to stave off thepotentially disastrous effects that could occur from unsus-tainable population growth by relaxing its interpretation ofthe Koran’s encouragement of large families. The largeurban population has resulted in unequal and inefficientfood distribution reflected in a 20 percent malnourishmentrate for children under five years of age.20 These and other


demographic trends portend a troubling and challengingfuture for Iran’s leaders.

Iran’s isolation under the mantle of Islamic purity andthe wasteful 10-year war with Iraq left the nation’s infra-structure in decline. Rural areas remain isolated from gov-ernment services owing to the lack of serviceable roads.The airline and rail industries have also suffered profoundneglect from insufficient maintenance. Consequently, Iran’sleaders now must invest in concentrated infrastructure re-capitalization strategies to prevent further decay and itsnegative effects on the economy.

The economy Iran’s leaders will rely upon to pull theirnation into the twenty-first century is founded on a singlecommodity—oil. As a member of the Organization of Petro-leum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Iran’s economic for-tunes remain tied to the consensus of its partners. Since1997 those fortunes have fluctuated wildly as oil pricesranged between $10 and $35 per barrel. For the averageIranian, these fluctuations have translated into inflationrates that hover around 15 percent, an unreliable cur-rency, and an uncertain standard of living.21 Recent USState Department estimates place the Iranian gross do-mestic product at $413 billion—which translates into a percapita income of $1,500.22 One source quotes a disgruntledIranian citizen’s comment on the economy. “There are manywho remember the corrupt days of the Shah: ‘At least thenyou could get a chicken to put on the family table withouthaving to do three different jobs to pay for it.’”23

Although Western states continue to rely on MiddleEastern oil, OPEC does not enjoy the freedom to hold themhostage as it did in the early 1970s—nor is there a con-sensus among member-states that such a policy is consis-tent with their individual state’s economic and security in-terests. New oil sources coupled with dramatically alteredrelationships between the West and major Persian Gulf oilstates (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait)have dampened Iranian influence at OPEC price-settingcouncils.24 These developments have combined to causethe Iranian economy to stagnate. Debt stands near $12 bil-lion in an economy in which annual imports exceed ex-ports by approximately $1 billion.25 Therefore, the Iranianeconomy’s myopic concentration on vast oil and natural

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gas reserves has placed the country paradoxically in thrallto the demands of the global oil economy by preventing di-versification and modernization of other such vital sectorsas computing, banking, attracting foreign investment, andcommunications.

Iran presents a picture of a state with vast human andeconomic potential—possibly the preeminent leader amongthe Gulf states. The social and economic challenges out-lined above, however, dramatically constrain Iran’s lead-ers. Moreover, the apparent unyielding adherence to thetenets of Shi’i doctrine complicates foreign relations whilesimultaneously adding a layer of complexity to domesticpolicy making. The international community, led by theUnited States, has exacerbated some of Iran’s social andeconomic problems by treating the Islamic republic as apariah state. For its part, Iran has thumbed its nose at theinternational community by supporting extremist move-ments throughout the Muslim world. Perhaps the most se-rious policy barriers to improved relations between theUnited States and Iran, however, are Iran’s support of ter-rorism and its pursuit of chemical, biological, and nuclearweapons programs along with associated delivery systemstechnologies.

Iran’s Chemical andBiological Weapons Programs

As outlined earlier, advancing along the path toward dé-tente between the United States and Iran will require sig-nificant cultural accommodation from both parties. SinceKhatami’s election to the presidency in 1997 and again in2001, the message from Tehran has remained ambiguous—hard-line rhetoric often has followed conciliatory over-tures. Iran’s policies regarding terrorism, WMD, and mis-sile technologies give ample reason for US policy makers toremain cautious. But increasing trends toward globaliza-tion coupled with a temporary international consensuscentered on fighting terrorism may provide the leversneeded to ease tensions between the two countries. Whilethe challenges remain great for US policy makers, the ini-tiative and the paths to improving relations remain clear


for Iran. The mullahs have proven that they can reconciletheir religious ideology with the needs of internationalstatecraft—perhaps their egos and quest for personalpower present the only barriers to channeling their effortstoward improving relations with the West in the future.

Most observers agree that the Iran-Iraq War was the cat-alyst for Iran’s ambitions to acquire chemical and biologi-cal weapons. One analyst notes, “Iran was never a regionalleader in the effort to acquire biological and chemicalweapons until the Iran-Iraq War. . . . Iran only revitalizedits nuclear program and gave its chemical and biologicalprograms high priority after Iraq made extensive use ofchemical warfare against Iranian troops.”26 More recently,Tehran has intensified its efforts to develop an indigenouscapability to produce and weaponize chemical and biolog-ical agents. A 2001 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reportnoted that “Tehran was seeking production technology,training, expertise, equipment, and material that could beused as precursor agents—the ingredients for chemicalweapons—from Russia and China.”27 Thus, the Islamic re-public’s status with respect to chemical and biologicalweapons has shifted from one of reluctance or indifferenceto active and aggressive pursuit of chemical and biologicalweapons capabilities.28

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1989, the Iranianarmed forces have developed capabilities to produce a widerange of chemical agents including blood and blister agents.Additionally, the Iranian arsenal includes a limited ability toproduce nerve agents. Beyond this growing chemical stock-pile, Iranian scientists pursue research that focuses on de-veloping biological weapons that include mycotoxins, an-thrax, hoof-and-mouth disease, and botulinum toxin.Although Iran currently has a limited capability to employsuch weapons, analysts fear that ongoing efforts to acquirelong-range ballistic missiles could result in the ability tothreaten Asia, Europe, and most of Africa.29

Surveillance efforts can give a generally accurate pictureof the technical outlines of Iran’s chemical and biologicalweapons program, however, determining how and underwhat conditions the government would elect to employ itsarsenal is less clear. First, in the post-Khomeini era, powerrelationships within the government remain far from

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transparent. Second, interest groups within Iranian soci-ety appear to influence the government’s decision-makingprocesses, resulting in often contradictory signals thatcomplicate US policy formulation toward Iran. Finally, it isdifficult to distinguish how the Iranian military commandfunctions with respect to chemical and biological weaponsemployment doctrine.

The tension between religious and political leaders appar-ently does not extend to relations between the governmentand military commanders. One report concludes, “The mili-tary remains largely depoliticized since the mid-1990s.”30

Observers describe the military institutions as more inclinedto support conservative policies within the Iranian hierarchy,thus making the military a loyal servant to the Islamic re-public’s evolving revolutionary ideals. The requirement tobalance decisions to use chemical or biological weapons be-tween the government’s hard-line clerics, who control themilitary in a general sense, and the reform-minded moder-ates has produced a compartmentalized command structure.Conceivably, the government (represented by the vali al faqihand the military high command) could decide to launch achemical or biological strike without presidential knowledgeor approval.

The military’s operational composition and tactical abil-ities, however, create a dangerous mix owing to the generalweakness of its conventional forces. Chemical and biologi-cal weapons offer obvious force enhancement options thatbolster the Islamic republic’s brittle conventional weaponsinfrastructure. As the Iranians discovered in the Iran-IraqWar, chemical and biological weapons are remarkableequalizers when employed against massed groundtroops.31 Moreover, chemical and biological arsenals arecheaper to procure and maintain than the high-techweapons Iran would require in a confrontation with West-ern powers. The combination of weak conventional forces,hard-line political domination of military decision-makingprocesses, and an uncertain knowledge of Iranian chemi-cal-biological weapons doctrine complicates the problem ofassessing the likelihood of chemical-biological use by theIslamic republic.

Iranian doctrine is, perhaps, less opaque than other as-pects of the chemical-biological weapons problem. Two


likely scenarios suggest conditions in which the Iraniangovernment would resort to chemical-biological attack.One reflects the defensive posture that has characterizedmost Iranian military operations since the revolution. Thesecond is more intimidating and reflects the possibility ofoffensive operations designed to energize a global or, atleast, a regional Islamist bid for power.

Although Tehran has not abandoned Ayatollah Khome-ini’s vision of becoming the dominant force in the Muslimworld, domestic economic pressures and a generally infe-rior posture vis-à-vis regional competitors dictate a defen-sive strategy. The most likely conditions for Iranian chem-ical or biological weapons use against regional competitorswould conform to the pattern established in the Iran-IraqWar. In this role, “Iran views Iraq as the primary threat toits security, and is a key factor . . . in the development ofan indigenous WMD and missile capability.”32 The Iranianswould use chemicals in a tactical role, and probably onlyin retaliation against a first strike by their adversaries, toreinforce or stabilize conditions for troops in contact withthe enemy. This scenario conforms to the general view heldby Iranian leaders that chemical and biological weaponsare deterrent weapons with devastating combat potential.Viewed this way, chemical and biological weapons arsenalsbecome critical national security policy tools that supportthe constitutional mandate to “safeguard the complete in-dependence and integrity of the territory.”33

Barring state-sponsored threats to Iranian sovereignty,however, the revolutionary doctrine offers a rationale forIranian sponsorship and support of chemical or biologicalweapons attacks designed to further the Islamic republic’scause. Anthony Cordesman argues, “The possibility thatIran has biological weapons gives it an enhanced capabil-ity to deter and intimidate . . . it has incentives to makecovert use of biological weapons because they are particu-larly well-suited to unconventional warfare or ‘terrorism.’”34

The plausible deniability the veil of terrorism offers statesponsors affords the Iranians wide latitude in selectingmethods and targets for chemical or biological attacks ofthis nature. Trends toward moderation, the need to obtaineconomic assistance to bolster the sagging economy, andthe fear of overwhelming retaliation are likely to cause

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Iranian leaders to weigh their actions carefully beforechoosing this offensive option in the near future. Moreover,the overwhelming support for US actions following the 11September 2001 terrorist attacks may cause Iran’s leadersto shift their emphasis away from chemical and biologicalweapons because of their potential association with terror-ist strategies in favor of enhanced nuclear capabilities.

Iran’s Nuclear Program

The specter of a nuclear confrontation in the MiddleEast has replaced fears of a Cold War nuclear showdownbetween the United States and the Soviet Union. This viewhas emerged for several reasons. In the first place, deter-rence and positive control mechanisms that characterizedthe bipolar world are largely absent in the Middle East.Competing interests, weak state structures, a post-coloniallegacy of deep-seated mistrust of the West, and dramaticcultural differences heighten concerns over regional nu-clear proliferation. Second, some states pursue nuclear ac-quisition programs with overt intentions of radically alter-ing the regional balance of power. State-sponsored threatsagainst Israel usually reflect this aspect of the MiddleEastern security equation. Finally, Islamist movementsthat rely upon terrorism to advance politico-social agendascould acquire nuclear or radiological materials to useagainst regional and Western powers in attempts to eradi-cate unwanted influences, thereby, setting the stage for re-gional hegemony.

Iran figures prominently in each of the instances listedabove. Most assessments of the Iranian nuclear programcharacterize the Islamic republic as relatively far from de-veloping a credible nuclear threat.35 However, the Iranianshave, haltingly at times, pursued nuclear research and de-velopment since before the 1979 revolution that toppledthe shah’s regime and gave the reins of government to theultraconservative Shi’i clerics.36 One analyst notes Iran’simportance to regional stability, “Iran is the largest coun-try in the region and has the potential to play the most im-portant role there, for good or ill.”37 Tehran’s desire to re-store Iran to its rightful place within the larger Islamic


community and as a regional power coupled with its ro-bust intermediate-range missile resources makes Iran apotent nuclear “proliferator” that bears careful watching.38

The roots of the current Iranian nuclear program reachback to the shah’s regime. The United States supportedthe monarch’s ambitions to modernize the country by of-fering education for Iranian students and by supportinghis efforts to use nuclear power plants to electrify thecountry. With Pahlevi’s support, nuclear power and nu-clear research became a conspicuous symbol of modern-ization while they simultaneously bolstered his bid for re-gional hegemony.

The 1979 revolution curbed nuclear research for severalyears owing to the ruling Islamic council’s characterizationof nuclear (and chemical and biological) weapons as in-compatible with Islamic law. However, the war with Iraqforced Khomeini and his fellow clerics to alter their as-sessments of nuclear weapons. As tensions with the Iraqismoved from open war toward uneasy truce after the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian leaders concluded that they could ill af-ford to allow regional competitors to gain again the upperhand in the nuclear, chemical, or biological weaponsarena. Moreover, the ruling council of clerics retained a vi-sion of Iran as the bearer of Islamic purity. Michael Eisen-stadt concludes that the clerics “believe that the fate of theIslamic community at large depends on Iran’s ability totransform itself into a regional military power that can de-fend and advance the interests of that community.”39

Ayatollah Khomeini authorized nuclear research to com-mence in 1985 in violation of the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT) that the shah’s government had ratified in1970. This marked the renewal and acceleration of Iranianclandestine efforts to acquire nuclear weapons in violationof NPT terms.40 In the late 1990s, such events as the armsrace between Pakistan and India, which came to a head inMay 1998 with the detonation of Pakistani and Indian nu-clear devices, compelled Iran’s leaders to move to balanceseveral emerging security challenges.41

The Iran-Iraq War left a lasting imprint on Iranian for-eign policy that provided added impetus to violate the NPT.On one hand, Iraq’s aggressive pursuit of nuclear capabil-ity coupled with the US-led coalition’s apparent difficulty

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in dismantling the Iraqi program during and after Opera-tion Desert Storm left the Iranians with little confidence ininternational collective security mechanisms. The conspic-uous failure of the international community to act againstIraq’s overt use of chemical weapons in the war served asa catalyst for the Iranian chemical and biological weaponsprogram.42 The net result of this unfortunate failure on thepart of the international community was to convince theIranians that they could not look to others for support ordefense where weapons of mass destruction were con-cerned. On the other hand, Iranian leaders do not trust theinternational community to act in accord with their coun-try’s interests. In other words, “The lessons of interna-tional sanctions imposed on Iran during the Iran-Iraq Warsuggest that self-reliance must be one of Iran’s long-termgoals, if only to avoid future humiliations. This objectivewould entail increased domestic production of arms andsupport items and decreased dependency on foreign sup-plies.”43 Thus, the foreign policy legacy of the tragic warwith Iraq was a strengthening of the Iranian’s leaders ten-dency to view themselves as martyrs in a global conflict be-tween Islam and the rest of the world.

Although the nuclear program’s details are difficult todiscern, Iranian scientists apparently conduct researchand weapons development at eight known facilities scat-tered throughout the country. Agreements signed withRussian officials in 1992 to provide two 440 megawatt re-actors in 1992 form the foundation for current weaponsresearch programs.44 Other countries, such as China,North Korea, France, Germany, and Great Britain, havecontributed specific and dual-use technologies to the bur-geoning Iranian nuclear capability.45 For such countries asChina and North Korea, trade with Iran bolsters domesticarms industries and provides much-needed oil while si-multaneously equipping an emerging counter to Westerninfluence in the Middle East. Western countries acquiretangible foreign trade benefits coupled with increased ac-cess to Iranian oil and natural gas resources by dealing inthe shadowy world of nuclear and dual-use technologytrade. Between 1995 and 1997, the value of total arms de-liveries of all types to Iran exceeded $1.5 billion with China


and Russia leading all other nations at $725 million and$480 million respectively.46

Ballistic missile technologies represent another impor-tant facet of the nascent Iranian nuclear weapons pro-gram. The inaccurate Scud B presently forms the back-bone of Iran’s ballistic missile force. But Iran has madeincremental improvements in the Scud’s accuracy andrange while simultaneously moving to equip its forces withthe Shahab 3, an indigenous variant of the North KoreanNodong (1,500 km) intermediate-range ballistic missile.The relationship with North Korea appears strong, thus,giving rise to fears that Iran could eventually acquire the3,000 km Taepo-Dong missile that could be modified to ac-commodate multistage boosters. Should this occur, theIranians would be able to threaten most of Western Europewith nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads.47

Although the above facts certainly provide ample reasonfor US officials to express concern about the Iranian nu-clear program, there also are reasons to be somewhat op-timistic about US-Iranian relations in the near term. In thefirst place, the list of nuclear-capable suppliers who couldrapidly accelerate Iran’s progress toward developing a nu-clear bomb is relatively short. Such states as China andRussia would seriously jeopardize their relationship withthe United States and its allies if they provided fissile ma-terial to the Islamic republic. International monitors haverecently thwarted illicit attempts to supply Iran with suchmaterials.48

The Iraqi attempt to develop a Hiroshima-type atomicdevice could provide a reasonable yardstick against whichto measure the likely timelines that would characterize theIranian program. Beginning in the early 1970s, SaddamHussein sponsored an all-out effort to produce a bomb—that effort has proved unsuccessful to date. Despite rela-tively loose controls on technology imports and dual-usepolicies, the Iraqi effort was still 8 to 12 months short offielding its first atomic weapon when the Gulf War beganin January 1991. The research and development effort be-hind Iraq’s program occurred with relatively few fiscal re-strictions on procurement—a situation that does not pre-vail in present-day Iran. Moreover, during the Iran-IraqWar, the West (particularly the United States) viewed Iraq

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as an acceptable proxy in its efforts to contain the tide ofIslamic fundamentalism that appeared to originate in theAyatollah Khomeini’s Islamic republic. This proxy statuseased many import restrictions, and Hussein’s nuclear sci-entists clearly turned it to their advantage.49 Iran does notenjoy such sponsorship for its research efforts.

A final reason for optimism regarding Iran’s nuclearweapons research program lies within the Islamic repub-lic’s borders. The Iran of the twenty-first century is not theIran of 1979—or of 1989 for that matter. The wave of fun-damentalism that swept the mullahs into power has some-what subsided leaving Iranians yearning for better socialand economic conditions. The landslide election of Khatamiand his reelection indicate the degree to which the mullahsmust pay attention to popular desires for reform. Khatamihas made hesitant public overtures to the West in generaland to the United States in particular. He treads a fine line,however, between loyalty to revolutionary principles andthe mandate to ease Iran toward a more moderate form ofIslamic republicanism. He addressed this issue before theAssembly of Experts on 4 February 1998 saying, “I havechosen elimination of tension as the core of our foreignpolicy. . . . Elimination of tension, however, does not meangiving up our principles . . . and forsaking our integrity andindependence in return for such things as, for example,rapprochement with the United States.”50 Consequently,the United States should remain cautious regarding Iran’snuclear weapons research programs. While Iran’s leaderswill probably continue to pursue nuclear weapons andlong-range missile programs to complement their robustchemical and biological programs, competing factions withinthe Islamic republic will likely delay progress toward devel-oping a fully functioning nuclear device for several years.

Implications for US Policy

The hypothesis that describes the Iranian strategic cul-ture as more akin to a rational state actor rather than asan irrational and unpredictable religiously fanatic stateappears valid. This statement does not imply that a pecu-liar brand of Islamic fundamentalism has no bearing on


Iranian governmental decisions regarding the utility ofWMD. On the contrary, the power wielded by the clericsand Ayatollah Khamenei, in the proper religious context,could make a decision to launch chemical, biological, nu-clear, or radiological attacks more likely. As discussedabove, however, the Iranians appear to prefer to actcovertly through surrogates to advance their Islamistagenda abroad while simultaneously preserving the terri-torial integrity of the Iranian state by adopting a strategicdefensive posture.51

Economic conditions within Iran appear to be the primaryvehicle for encouraging or constraining moderate influenceswithin the government. The economy’s overwhelming de-pendence on oil production for growth gives state competi-tors a significant lever to shape dialogue with the Islamicrepublic. Iran’s leaders are aware of this fundamentalweakness and tend to resent the Gulf states and their trad-ing partners when they enact policies that constrain theIranian economy. Once again, the clerics tend to view theirstate’s economic weakness as an assault by the Westagainst the revolutionary Islamic utopia. Therefore, theUnited States and its allies should use economic sanctionscarefully with an understanding of the paranoia thathaunts the powerful clergy—at any time, the imams couldinvoke jihad using covert WMD attacks against competi-tors to alleviate economic strains brought on by perceivedWestern intervention in the Iranian economy.

Iran’s deteriorating conventional military capabilitiestend to encourage WMD proliferation. The expense of cre-ating indigenous conventional weapons industries withinthe context of a faltering economy has forced Iran to lookto China, the former Soviet states, North Korea, and otherproliferators to recapitalize its conventional force. Tacticaland operational effectiveness, coupled with the relativeease of producing chemical and biological agents, has en-couraged the Iranians to procure large stocks of uncon-ventional weapons along with advanced missile technologyfor delivering them against strategic targets.52 As for nu-clear and radiological weapons, the respect India and Pak-istan gained after demonstrating their nuclear capabilitiesis unlikely to have escaped notice in Tehran. AlthoughIran’s normal military posture focuses on defense and de-

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terrence, analysts do not discount the possibility that theIranians would resort to WMD attacks should they per-ceive their deterrent posture as weakening.

US policy makers should concentrate intelligence-gathering efforts on emerging democratic movementswithin the Islamic republic. According to several reports,“There are growing signs that Iran may evolve a more tol-erant approach to defining the Islamic state, one that em-phasizes the humanitarian and moral strength of Islam,rather than the effort to force other nations into acceptingits concept of repressive and outdated theological rulesand social customs.”53 Ill-considered diplomatic initiativesbased upon general perceptions of Iran as an “irrationaland unpredictable” actor could reinforce conservativepower at the expense of emerging moderate trends. Thistype of mistake could encourage Iran’s predilection towardWMD proliferation while simultaneously making their usemore likely.

While there are compelling reasons for US policy makersto look toward Iran with optimism, several realizationsmust take hold before relations between the two countriescan thaw. In the first place, Iran will continue to pursue itsrevolutionary agenda to its logical conclusion. This pursuitwill likely mean a continuation of the theocratic govern-mental model with its inherent conservatism and resist-ance to accommodation with the larger international com-munity. This trend works at cross-purposes to traditionalUS preferences for rapid, decisive action in internationalaffairs, but American policy makers must learn to distin-guish between Iranian intransigence and the strugglewithin the governing community to reconcile religiousprinciples with the demands of international and domesticaffairs. For the present, US policy offers an olive branch toTehran—but at arm’s length.54

While the above mentioned trend may require more ac-commodation and patience from US policy makers than itdoes from Iranian leaders, Iran’s leaders must decisivelyabandon their historic support of radical Islamist and ter-rorist groups that threaten governments in the MiddleEast and elsewhere. The events of 11 September 2001have greatly stiffened US resolve to combat terrorism, es-pecially state-sponsored terrorism. The State Department


reported in April 2001, “Iran remained the most activestate sponsor of terrorism in 2000. It provided increasingsupport to numerous terrorist groups, including theLebanese Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian IslamicJihad (PIJ) which seek to undermine the Middle East peacenegotiations through the use of terrorism.”55 Since 11 Sep-tember, Iranian leaders have condemned the al-Qaeda-sponsored attacks against the United States, but they alsoleveled muted criticism at the US actions against the Tal-iban regime in Afghanistan. President Khatami’s policy of“eliminating tension without neglecting principles of theRevolution” must change substantially to reflect the newstrategic circumstances of the ongoing war against terror-ism if Iran is to realize détente with the United States.56

US policy makers can encourage Iranian actions with re-gard to changing policies about terrorism by acknowledgingthe Islamic republic’s legitimate aspirations to regional lead-ership. Iran has the economic potential, geographic position,and a sense of cultural destiny to garner respect as a con-structive regional power; however, such a position comeswith responsibilities. Iranian leaders must acknowledge thattheir efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction andlong-range missile technologies work at cross-purposes totheir visions of regional leadership. International trendspoint to arms limitations as a preferred stabilizing mecha-nism that paves the way for economic and cultural develop-ment. Tehran’s efforts to acquire advanced weaponry whileits economy declines and its people labor under high infla-tion rates makes little sense—especially in the context of aglobal economy that is projected to amplify differences be-tween developed and undeveloped nations.

Finally, Iran must adopt domestic policies that lead tosocial reform. With nearly 440,000 students enrolled inhigher education, Iranian society is destined to undergodramatic change. While the managers of the revolution inthe post-Khomeini era are to be commended for promotingsuch high levels of education, they also must realize thateducation will cause their revolution to evolve in unfore-seen ways. Rather than suppressing the exchange of ideasthrough surveillance, control of the media, secret police,and thinly veiled state-sponsored assassinations, Iran’sleaders should recognize the consensus that exists among

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their constituents for the theocratic form of government.As that government reconciles itself with the internationalsystem, the citizens can become a potent engine for socialdevelopment, economic growth, and cultural advancement.This, after all, is the vision that President Khatami out-lined for Iranian civilization.57

Despite Khatami’s apparently contradictory call for eas-ing tensions within a context of revolutionary independ-ence, Iran’s leaders must take positive action to ease thesuffering of their people. Gary Sick notes, “The demon-strations in Iran are not about clerical rule or a return tothe monarchy or even about democracy and human rights.They are about quality of life, drinking water, inflation,housing, and jobs. The demonstrations are serious—notbecause they threaten to overturn the government, but be-cause they force the government to confront its failure tokeep promises and to deal with fundamental economic is-sues.”58 The emerging schism in Iranian domestic politicsgives some observers reason to believe that a dialoguecould evolve that would ultimately reverse Iran’s pursuit ofnuclear weapons. The Clinton administration’s policy oftreating Iran and Iraq as essentially twin sides of the samerogue-state coin under the rubric of dual containment hasfailed to make Iranian WMD programs more transparent.On the contrary, US officials know disturbingly little aboutthe scope and progress of chemical, biological, and nuclearweapons research in the largest state in the Persian Gulfregion.

Even before Khatami’s rise to the presidency, analysts inthe United States called for easing of the rhetoric and thetensions between Iran and the world’s remaining super-power. Kenneth Timmerman wrote as early as 1996, “Con-tainment is no longer enough. Iran has been too success-ful in procuring nuclear weapons technologies, in spite ofour entreaties to our allies. When we have been successfuland have blocked a problematic sale, Iran has simply goneshopping in Russia, China, and India.”59 Some observerspoint to the fact that Iran boasts the only democraticallyelected government in the Persian Gulf region and that theIslamic republic enjoys broad support among its con-stituents. Those who adhere to this view suggest thatusing an approach similar to the one used to alter the di-


rection of North Korea’s nuclear program may provide afoundation for better US-Iranian relations while reducingthe nuclear threat.60 Using this model, US leaders wouldno longer characterize Iran as a rogue state, but would rec-ognize the legitimate right of the Iranian people to adopt atheocracy as their chosen form of government.61

There are, however, several obstacles to the conciliatoryapproach. Iranian clerics and the Revolutionary Guardswho control the WMD and missile programs will probablybe reluctant to forgo the research and developmentprogress achieved to date. In addition, the fiercely inde-pendent Iranian leaders will most likely refuse to submit tothe invasive inspections that would be necessary to verifycompliance with international demands to rollback nu-clear research. Ideologically, the clerics continue to ex-press support for radical Islamist movements throughoutthe Middle East. Western fear that Hizbollah or Hamas op-eratives could employ an Iranian nuclear or radiologicaldevice remain a powerful bargaining chip in the Iranian ar-senal. The obvious advantage of such a tactic lies in thecovert advancement of Iranian policies toward Israel or inthe Persian Gulf. The events of 11 September also compli-cate matters as long as the United States identifies Iran asa state that sponsors global terrorism.62 Finally, US lead-ers must recognize the fundamental utility that Iran gainsfrom possessing WMD—strategic advantage vis-à-vis itsprincipal regional rival, Iraq. As long as Saddam Hussein,or leaders with his proclivities, rule in Iraq, Iran will pur-sue a security policy that includes aggressive pursuit ofnuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their asso-ciated delivery systems.

By all accounts, the Iranian nuclear program is severalyears from producing its first practical weapon. The ag-gressive research programs that center on chemical, bio-logical, and missile development more than compensatefor the Islamic republic’s nascent capability in the nucleararena. Iran’s central place, however, in the Persian Gulfand within the larger Islamic world will continue to drawUS attention and efforts to ease the Islamic republic awayfrom proliferation. While trust between the two govern-ments remains low, US policy makers will have a difficulttime gaining enough credible information with which to

CAIN 21

formulate effective strategies to mitigate the Iranian prolif-eration threat. The longer this process takes, the more dif-ficult it will be to discover common interests upon which tothaw the cold war that has characterized US-Iranian rela-tions since 1979. This should motivate US negotiators tomove quickly and carefully to maintain an acceptable levelof instability amid the tensions of Middle Eastern politics.

Notes

1. Michael Eisenstadt, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deter-rence: Iran (Alexandria, Va.: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Insti-tute, 1998), 17.

2. Rouhallah K. Ramazani, “Reflections on Iran’s Foreign Policy:Defining the ‘National Interests,’” in Iran at the Crossroads, eds. John L.Esposito and Rouhallah K. Ramazani (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

3. A recent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report contained the ob-servation that “Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking toacquire weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventionalweapons technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting to de-velop a domestic capability to produce various types of weapons—chem-ical, biological, and nuclear—and their delivery systems.” See Unclassi-fied Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Related toWeapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (CIA,2001), n.p., on-line, Internet, 1 October 2001, available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm#1.

4. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dabashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr,eds. Expectation of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History (Albany, N.Y.: StateUniversity Press of New York, 1984), 2–6; I. P. Petrushevsky, Islam in Iran,trans. Hubert Evans (Albany, N.Y.: State University Press of New York,1985).

5. Mehran Tamadonfar observes, “Muslims agree that the establish-ment of an Islamic state requires the implementation of Islamic principlesand laws. In Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters developed doc-trinal justifications for uncontested clerical rule to ensure political orderand social conformity.” Mehran Tamadonfar, “Islam, Law, and PoliticalControl in Contemporary Iran,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion40, no. 2 (2001).

6. John Esposito writes: “Iran’s export of revolution served as a cata-lyst in the emergence of Hizballah and Islamic Jihad in Lebanon; supportfor radical organizations and movements across the Muslim world re-sulted in kidnappings and hostage taking and contributed to uprisingsand protest demonstrations in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. . . . Iran, infact, proved more effective as a symbol and exemplar of revolution thanan effective model.” John L. Esposito, “Introduction: From Khomeini toKhatami,” in Iran at the Crossroads, 1.

7. Graham Fuller distinguishes between Islam (the religion) and Is-lamism (the radical philosophy that turns the tenets of Islam to political


purposes). Graham E. Fuller, “Islamic Fundamentalism,” in Conflict afterthe Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K.Betts (New York: Macmillan, 1994).

8. Cyrus Vakili-Zad notes that “the ideology of the revolution, andthose who carried the heavy burden of often bloody confrontations withgovernment troops, were, in general, religiously oriented and linked totraditional values from the rural past . . . the blueprint for future societywas an Islamic Republic modeled on the one created by the ProphetMuhammad more that 1,400 years earlier.” Cyrus Vakili-Zad, “Continu-ity and Change: The Structure of Power in Iran,” in Modern Capitalismand Islamic Ideology in Iran, eds. Cyrus Bina and Hamid Zangeneh (NewYork: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 29.

9. Some principles of jihad will illustrate how compelling the doctrineis for motivating Iranian and militant Islamic soldiers. “People againstwhom jihad should be carried out are three categories: (1) Those whorebel against the Imam, (2) protected minorities such as Jews, Christians,and Zoroastrians, if they violate the conditions of protection; and (3) who-ever is hostile, among the various kinds of unbelievers. The Muslimsmust bring all of these into submission, either by subjecting them or con-verting them to Islam. . . . It is permissible to fight the enemy by anymeans which will lead to victory.” S. H. Nasr, Dabashi, and S. V. R. Nasr,62.

10. One obvious exception may be the struggles between Catholic andProtestant factions in Northern Ireland. If the infusion of leftist politicalideology in the conflict between the parties had not occurred, the conflictin Ulster may have revolved solely around religious differences.

11. Mehran Tamadonfar, The Islamic Polity and Political Leadership:Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Pragmatism, Westview special studieson the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 36.

12. “The intense factional struggle that has come to characterize vir-tually all aspects of life in contemporary Iran has its roots in the ambi-tious proposition put forward at the birth of the Islamic Republic twodecades ago—that it be both an Islamic state run by clerics and a repub-lic ruled by popular consent. Failure to resolve this tension in a lastingand profound way had badly weakened the cohesion of the clerical class,undermined the legitimacy of the Islamic system, and left the state in-creasingly paralyzed in the face of mounting internal pressures.” GeneiveAbdo, “Re-Thinking the Islamic Republic: A ‘Conversation’ with AyatollahHossein ‘Ali Montazeri’,” The Middle East Journal 55, no. 1 (2001). OlivierRoy writes, “What we are witnessing since Khatami’s election is the un-folding of a contradiction which already existed in the text of the Consti-tution: in a religious revolution such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution,the status and role of religion is nevertheless defined by political institu-tions, not religious ones. Politics rule over religion. The crisis of religiouslegitimacy is leading to the supremacy of politics, and subsequently to ade facto secularization. There is a growing tendency . . . to separate reli-gion and politics, this time in order to save Islam from politics, and not,as was the case in most of the processes of secularization in Western Eu-rope, to save politics from religion.” Olivier Roy, “The Crisis of ReligiousLegitimacy in Iran,” The Middle East Journal 53, no. 2 (1999).

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13. Iran, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (Alexan-dria, Va.: Jane’s Information Group, Inc., 2000), 72.

14. “By late 1987, the United States had some thirteen naval ships inthe gulf, supported by another twelve to fifteen in the Gulf of Oman anda substantial allied force. American forces several times attacked smallIrani ships. Iranian-laid naval mines posed the gravest threat to gulf ship-ping. On 18 April 1988, in retaliation for a mine attack on the frigateSamuel B. Roberts, the navy fought its largest surface action since WorldWar II. Operation Praying Mantis destroyed two oil platforms, a frigate, afast attack craft, and two armed speed boats.” Mark H. Lytle, “US Mili-tary Involvement in Iran,” in The Oxford Companion to American MilitaryHistory, ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1999).

15. “In July 2000 amidst a heat wave that has seen water shortagesand no improvements in living standards, thousands of protesters frompoorer areas joined with prodemocracy students to demonstrate theirfrustration at the lack of political liberalization and harsh economic con-ditions. The protesters specifically singled out President Khatami for hisinability to improve the plight of ordinary Iranians, but directed most oftheir anger at the conservatives who have stalled the president’s reforms.. . . Khatami warned his conservative opponents that the growing rest-lessness of the Iranian people could no longer be contained by force.”Iran, 51.

16. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Military Forces in Transition: Con-ventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, Conn.:Praeger, 1999), 3.

17. Leaders in Tehran transported several casualties to Vienna for ex-aminations by United Nations officials. UN investigators identified con-clusive evidence that Iraq used mustard gas and the nerve agent tabunagainst Iranian troops in 1984. Investigators also alluded to evidence thatsome Iranian casualty patients may have suffered exposure to mycotox-ins as well as mustard and nerve agents. The Iranian decision to pursuechemical and biological arsenals came as a result of the failure of the in-ternational community to act decisively on the evidence that stemmedfrom the casualty investigations. Julian Perry Robinson and Jozef Gold-blat, Chemical Warfare in the Iraq-Iran War, Stockholm InternationalPeace Research Institute, 1984, n.p., on-line, Internet, 16 January 2002,available from http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/research/factsheet-1984.html.

18. “When the Shah relaxed censorship laws in 1977, Iran eruptedinto a series of demonstrations and dissents. There were two distinct rev-olutionary movements. The first was the religious movement headed bythe ulama; this movement demanded the return to a society based on theShari’ah and ulama administration. The second movement was a liberalmovement that wanted Westernization, but also demanded greaterdemocracy, economic freedom, and human rights. As the revolution pro-ceeded, these two groups gradually merged to form a united front.”Richard Hooker, Shi’a: The Iranian Revolution, 1996, n.p., on-line, Inter-net, 18 January 2002, available from http://www.wsu.edu:8000/~dee/shia/rev.htm.


19. President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami observed, “For many cen-turies, we lived under regimes which drew their power and authority notfrom public support but from other sources and ruled over our people notby relying on public will and aspiration but on their own military might . . .and since they did not derive their authority from a popular basis, theyfelt no responsibility to people and had no need of their participation inrunning the country. . . . As a result of their revolution, our people man-aged to regain their highly constructive mood of building a civilization andculture.” Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Outlooks of President Seyyed Mo-hammad Khatami: Religion, Culture, and Civilization, 1998, n.p., on-line,Internet, 9 December 2001, available from http://www.gov.ir/outlooks/civiliz.htm.

20. Iran.21. In an address to the Assembly of Experts in 1998, President

Khatami made this observation: “We must undertake fundamental re-building of this country so that there will be neither inflation and highprices, nor unemployment and underemployment in the long run, insteadof merely administering short-term ‘sedatives’ to our economy. We arecurrently examining our state-owned companies to decide which are es-sential and vital for the economy and should, therefore, remain undergovernment control and which can be turned over to the private sector.”Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Outlooks of President Seyyed MohammadKhatami: Economic Problems, 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 9 December2001, available from http://www.gov.ir/outlooks/economic.htm.

22. Department of State, Background Note: Iran, Bureau of Near East-ern Affairs, 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 16 January 2002, available fromhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/index.cfm?docid=5314.

23. Iran, 142.24. Patrick Clawson documents recent efforts to tap the oil reserves

in the Caucasus region via a pipeline that terminates along the CaspianSea. If such measures prove successful, isolated states like Iran could beforced to take drastic action to avoid social and economic catastrophe.Patrick L. Clawson, “Oil Resources: Markets, Politics, and Policies,” in TheGlobal Century: Globalization and National Security, eds. Richard L. Ku-gler and Ellen L. Frost (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University[NDU] Press, 2001).

25. Iran.26. Cordesman, 269.27. Anwar Iqbal, Iran Seeks Weapons of Mass Destruction, United Press

International (UPI), 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, 16 January 2002, availablefrom http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?storyid=09012002-035338-8224r.

28. Efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities date back to the shah’sregime. The Islamic republic has continued and expanded efforts to pro-cure nuclear weapons technology and delivery vehicles. Gregory F. Giles,“The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and ChemicalWeapons,” in Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear,Biological, and Chemical Weapons, eds. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan,and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000); “Prolif-eration: Threat and Response” (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretaryof Defense, 1996), Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of

CAIN 25

Technology Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Con-ventional Munitions.

29. “Proliferation: Threat and Response,” 17; “Special: A Bigger Punch,”The Economist 359, no. 8223 (2001).

30. Iran, 80.31. The first allegation of chemical weapons use by Iraq against Iran-

ian troops occurred in November 1980, approximately two months afterthe war began. By the war’s end—in 1988—an estimated 5 percent ofIranian casualties resulted from chemical weapons attacks. Jeffery K.Smart, “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Per-spective,” in Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds.Frederick R. Siddell, Ernest T. Takafuji, and David R. Franz (Washington,D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Borden Institute, Walter Reed ArmyMedical Center, 1997).

32. Iran, 101.33. Ramazani, 223.34. Cordesman, 357.35. Department of Defense analysts conclude, “Iran is seeking fissile

material and technology for weapons development through an elaboratesystem of military and civilian organizations. . . . Iran’s success in achiev-ing a nuclear capability will depend, to a large degree, on the supply poli-cies of Russia and China or on Iran’s successful illicit acquisition of ade-quate quantities of weapons-useable fissile material.” “Proliferation:Threat and Response.” Barry Schneider writes, “In the mid-1990s, CIA of-ficials in public testimony estimated Iranian production of a nuclearweapon to be ‘unlikely before the end of the decade without foreign as-sistance.’ ” Barry R. Schneider, Future War and Counterproliferation: USMilitary Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats (Westport, Conn.: Praeger,1999), 32. Geoffrey Kemp also reports, “CIA director James Woolsey saidon 23 September 1994 that ‘Iran is 8–10 years away from building suchweapons and that help from the outside would be critical in reaching thattimetable.’ ” Geoffrey Kemp, “Assessing the Iranian Threat,” in FightingProliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties, ed. Henry Sokolski (MaxwellAir Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, 1996), 217. See alsoCordesman; Paula A. DeSutter, Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring IranianUse of NBC Weapons (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1997); and Giles.

36. Gregory Giles writes, “In 1979, Iran had no offensive or defensivechemical warfare program to speak of and no biological warfare program.As a part of the civilian nuclear program, however, the Shah had under-taken nuclear weapons-related research, including paper and computerstudies.” Giles, 81.

37. Shahram Chubin, “The Persian Gulf: Security, Politics, andOrder,” in The Global Century: Globalization and National Security, eds.Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press,2001), 931.

38. “Given the limitations of Iran’s conventional forces . . . efforts toacquire weapons of mass destruction are probably the most threateningaspect of Iran’s present and future military capabilities.” Cordesman,222.

39. Eisenstadt, 12.


40. Iranian leaders take issue with the structure and terms of theNPT. “Underlying Iran’s resentment, however, is a simple fact; NPT is adiscriminatory treaty, with two classes of states. Unlike other multilateralarms control conventions such as the Chemical Weapons Convention,where all states are prohibited a category of weapons—in NPT—states aregiven different rights and privileges. NPT is an unequal treaty that also isselectively enforced and adhered to. Iran, as a revolutionary state, wouldnot have adhered to the treaty if it had not inherited membership. A na-tionalist Iran will find the inequality of the treaty and double standards itimplies no less chafing.” Chubin, 941.

41. Iran, 106.42. “The weak international response to Iraqi violations of the Geneva

Protocols greatly disappointed Iran’s leaders and encouraged Tehran toconsider military responses. . . . The mullahs even reversed themselvesand began to resurrect Iran’s nuclear program. . . . As the war draggedon, Iran increasingly fulfilled realist expectations by developing its ownnuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry capabilities to offset those ofIraq.” Giles, 82.

43. Kemp, 215.44. The eight facilities are located at Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Dark-

hovin, Gorgan, Isfahan, Banab, Qazvin, and Yazd. Disturbingly, Iran hasindigenous sources of uranium ore thus dramatically simplifying theweapon construction equation. Iran, 105.

45. “Since 1982, Germans have sold on average $2.5 billion worth ofhigh technology goods to Iran. What they have gotten in return is a well-funded Iranian intelligence network implanted on German soil, infiltrat-ing the Muslim immigrant population, assassinating Iranian oppositionfigures in public restaurants, and using private German airports andGerman front companies to purchase technology so sensitive for the Iran-ian nuclear weapons program that even the German government wouldnot authorize its sale to Iran.” Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Opportunities forChange in Iran,” in Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties,ed. Henry Sokolski (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1996), 231.

46. Iran, 136.47. “After over 25 years of rocketry research, Iran has a considerable

technical endowment. The essential equipment to create long-range mis-siles of mid- to late 1950s vintage appears to be largely in hand. If Irandecides to give the program higher national priority, making the leap fromdabbler to a determined proliferator, it could have a long-range systemsufficiently advanced for flight testing to begin within two years, althoughkey technologies still would have to be mastered. The pacing technologyno longer appears to be propulsion or guidance. It is more likely to bewarheads and re-entry vehicles.” Iqbal, Iran Seeks Weapons of Mass De-struction. Ibqal, see also “Proliferation: Threat and Response.”

48. The editors of Jane’s Security Sentinel write, on 5 July 2000, “Se-curity forces in Kazakhstan detained three people who were allegedlysmuggling un-enriched Uranium 235. Moscow’s NTV reported that it wasbelieved that the substance was en route to Afghanistan and then to Iran.There were previous reports of uranium allegedly bound for Iran being in-tercepted. It was claimed that such seizures were made in Georgia in

CAIN 27

April 2000 and September 1999. In early April 2000 Uzbek customs offi-cers seized a cargo of radioactive materials in an Iranian truck driven byan Iranian citizen.” Iran, 105. See also, “Proliferation: Threat and Re-sponse,” 34–36.

49. For a riveting account of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program see,Khidhir Hamza, Saddam’s Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of theIraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York: Scribner, 2000).

50. Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Outlooks of President Seyyed Mo-hammad Khatami: International and Regional Issues, 1998, n.p., on-line,Internet, 9 December 2001, available from http://www.gov.ir/outlooks/issuse.htm.

51. “Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2000.Its Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Se-curity (MIOS) continued to be involved in the planning and execution ofterrorist acts and continued to support a variety of groups that use ter-rorism to pursue their goals.” Department of State, Patterns of Global Ter-rorism, 2000, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2001, n.p.,on-line, Internet, 18 September 2001 available from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000.

52. Jane’s Security Sentinel includes this assessment: “The U.S.claims that Iran already has stocks of up to 2,000 tons of chemicalweapons which include choking, blister, and blood agents. . . . What evi-dence is available suggests that Tehran has taken the decision to con-centrate its available resources on WMD rather than conventional mili-tary programs.” Iran, 107.

53. Cordesman, 1.54. “The U.S. believes that normal relations are impossible until

Iran’s behavior changes. However, the United States has offered to enterinto dialogue with authorized representatives of the Iranian Governmentwithout preconditions. The Iranian Government has not accepted thisoffer. The United States has made clear that it does not seek to overthrowthe Iranian Government but will continue to pressure Iran to change itsbehavior.” Department of State, Background Note: Iran.

55. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000.56. Khatami, Outlooks of President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami: In-

ternational and Regional Issues.57. Khatami, Outlooks of President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami: Reli-

gion, Culture, and Civilization.58. Gary Sick, “The Stalemate in US-Iran Relations,” in Fighting Pro-

liferation: New Concerns for the Nineties, ed. Henry Sokolski (MaxwellAFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1996), 243.

59. Timmerman, 232–33.60. “Denial and punishment strategies do not deal with the motives of

these states. A policy based more on the North Korean model of mixinginducements with deterrence might lead to better technology offered withthe degree of transparency the target state accepted may be more pro-ductive. Thus, the United States should consider offering Iran appropri-ate nuclear technology in exchange for increased transparency.” Chubin,945–46.


61. Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Contain-ment after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press,2000), 189–92.

62. The continuing existence of Israel remains the central issue forIranian support of terrorist groups. According to the State Department,“Iran’s involvement in terrorist-related activities remained focused onsupport for groups opposed to Israel and peace between Israel and itsneighbors. Statements by Iran’s leaders demonstrated Iran’s unrelentinghostility to Israel. Supreme Leader Khamenei continued to refer to Israelas a ‘cancerous tumor’ that must be removed; President Khatami, label-ing Israel an ‘illegal entity,’ called for sanctions against Israel during theintifadah; and Expediency Council Secretary (MOSEN) Rezai said, ‘Iranwill continue its campaign against Zionism until Israel is completely erad-icated.’ Iran has long provided Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian re-jectionist groups—notably HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, andAhmad Jibril’s PFLP-GC—with varying amounts of funding, safe haven,training, and weapons. This activity continued at its already high levelsfollowing the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May and dur-ing the intifadah in the fall. Iran continued to encourage Hizballah andthe Palestinian groups to coordinate their planning and to escalate theiractivities against Israel. Iran also provided a lower level of support—in-cluding funding, training, and logistics assistance—to extremist groupsin the Gulf, Africa, Turkey, and Central Asia.” Department of State, Pat-terns of Global Terrorism, 2000.

CAIN 29

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