Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status and Implications

Olli HeinonenBelfer Center for Science and International AffairsHarvard Kennedy School 19 November, 2013

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities

 Mining Gcchine Saghand    Milling Gcchine Ardakan  Conversion Isfahan    Enrichment Natanz   Fordow

Fuel Fabrication Isfahan

   Reactors TRR Bushehr IR-40 Others, planned

Nuclear Infrastructure

Iran has not adhered to the resolutions of the UN Security Council, but continued to build the nuclear program including the supporting infrastructure

- Iran continues to manufacture centrifuges and their components

- Iran is increasing the production of key raw materials (zirconium, heavy water, high strength aluminum), but depending still on imports (maraging steel, instrumentation)

The net result: Iran is increasing its nuclear capabilities, but the international community knows less about them

20 % UF6 Is Not Medium Enriched Uranium

Production of Weapons Grade Material

Production of 1 Significant Quantity (SQ) of weapons grade uranium from natural uranium requires about 5000 Separative Work Unit (SWU) of enrichment effort

SQ-- The approximate quantity of nuclear material required to manufacture the first nuclear weapon taking into account the manufacturing losses.

Nuclear Material Stockpiles

Current stock of UF6

- Natural uranium ca 425 metric tons

- 3-5 % enriched uranium ca 7.1. metric tons

- 20 % enriched uranium ca 200 kg

Quantity of concern

- 10 metric tons

- 1.3 metric tons

- 250 kg

Enrichment Capacity

Natanz and Fordow 18500 IR-1 centrifuges

Natanz 1000 IR-2m centrifuges

Total number of centrifuges and rotors produced and their locations are not known

Break out Scenarios

There are various scenarios available starting with feeding of natural, 3-5 % or 20 % enriched UF6, in Natanz, Fordow, or elsewhere to produce weapons grade, 90 % enriched uranium.

Break out Times for 90 % UF6

Examples of scenarios- Use all current centrifuges

in Natanz and Fordow with natural uranium

- Use all current centrifuges in Natanz and Fordow with 3-5 % uranium

- Use 6000 IR-1 centrifuges as tandem cascades with 20 % uranium

- Use 3000 IR-2ms at an unknown location

Time required for one SQ

6 months

2 months

2 weeks

1-2 weeks

Need for Enriched Uranium

Bushehr LWR has a contract for fuel with the Russians

- annual reload 20 tons 4 % enriched uranium

- requires 120-140000 IR-1 centrifuges to produce

- requires yellow cake importsTehran Research Reactor- 20 years ago Iran imported about 120 kg 20 % enriched fuel,

which is close to being consumed- Iran has produced 410 kg 20 % enriched UF6 ( 274 kg uranium)Iran states that it plans for four additional research reactors,

but has not disclosed detailsIran plans to build additional LWRs, but no plans disclosed

When the IAEA Rings Bells ?

IAEA inspects Fordow and Natanz every one or two weeksUranium stocks ( natural, 3-5 % and 20 %) in Isfahan are

inspected less frequently; monthlyIAEA cannot provide assurances that all facilities and nuclear

materials in Iran have been submitted to safeguardsIAEA does not have knowledge how much “yellow cake” has

been produced in Iran, and where these materials are IAEA does not have knowledge about the number of

centrifuges produced

Add Time to Uranium Clock

Action at known locations- Ship all 20 % uranium out

- Convert all 20 % uranium to oxide form

- Convert all 3-5 % uranium to oxide form (cannot be done in next 3 months)

- Ship all 3-5 % and 20 % out

- Allow a limited enrichment capability, 3000 IR-1 or 3000 SWU

Time gained

- 2 months

- > 1 month

- > 2 months

- 6 months

- > 1 month depending how much 3-5 % and 20 % UF6 stocks left

More Leash to the IAEA

From the beginning of the interim agreement

Iran to declare all the centrifuge rotors manufactured and their current location

IAEA allowed to monitor rotors and their manufacturingAll nuclear material (UF6, oxides) in Natanz, Fordow, and

Isfahan under IAEA remote monitoringIran to declared and allow the IAEA to monitor yellow cake

The Heavy Water Reactor Program

The IR-40 reactor will be commissioned in 2014.

Ill suited for isotope production though claimed to replace Tehran Research Reactor.

Will be able to produce plutonium enough for one nuclear device/year.

Plutonium available earliest in 2016/17, but requires a reprocessing plant to be built.

Add Time to Plutonium Clock

Suspend the construction of the IR-40Suspend production of fuel for the IR-40Place the key components and materials of IR-40 under the

IAEA monitoring (heavy water, fuel loading machine, pumps of the primary circuit)

The Stakes Are high

It is not only about Iran, but the credibility of the nonproliferation regime and the authority of the UN Security Council are being tested

When looking at the past experiences a comprehensive initial declaration is essential for the success of the interim agreement