Iran Nuclear Debate Breakthrough or Failure

8/12/2019 Iran Nuclear Debate Breakthrough or Failure

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Paris Dennard: [0:01] Good evening. Thank you all for coming. My name is Paris Dennard. I'm the events director here at the McCain Institute. We are so appreciative of all of you coming out tonight for our first debate here in Washington D.C. We had one a few weeks ago at, in Arizona, uh, out at ASU. Um, I want to intr, make sure we all know a few things.

[0:21] Number one, who has Facebook, Twitter, Instagram? Raise your hand. Have you liked the Facebook page of the institute? If you have not, go to McCain Institute and like us on Facebook, follow us on Twitter and Instagram. On the back ofyour program, there is WiFi access for this auditorium. So all of the information is right here so you can log on on WiFi.

[0:43] If you have a smartphone, iPad, telephone, please put it on silent or vibrate. This is uh, going to be recorded, and we do have the press here, so we donot want to be disrespectful to our moderator and to our panel.

[0:56] But, we want you to be active on social media, so if you are on Twitter,please use our McCain Institute. Also, utilize our hashtag for tonight #MIDebateIran. Again, it's #MIDebateIran. Facebook, Instagram, Twitter.

[1:12] And again, please silence or put your phones on vibrate. And be active. There's a Q&A portion at the end of the program, and we encourage you to do that. We will take questions off of Twitter as well.

[1:23] And inside of your programs, there are a listing of the uh, Insta, uh theTwitter name of all of our panelists. And so if you have a good point that theymake that you want your audience to hear, please be active.

[1:36] I would love to introduce right now our wonderful Executive Director of the McCain Institute, Ambassador Kurt Volker. Thank you. [applause]

Ambassador Kurt Volker: [1:56] Uh, thank you very much Paris. And if I could um,welcome all of you. Thank you for coming to our debate. I see a lot of familiarfaces. I see a few of ambassadors. I see a few former participants in our McCain Institute debates.

[2:09] Welcome our debaters to the stage. Please have a seat. We'll introduce th

em in just a second.

[2:13] Uh, this is, uh, the next in a series of debates that we have organized as the McCain Institute in order to focus on some of the most challenging issuesthat our country has to make decisions about. What do we do? Uh, we focused on the possibility of an intervention in Syria, withdrawal from Afghanistan, on cutsto the defense budget, drone warfare, uh NSA spying domestically.

[2:37] And uh, today's debate is going to focus on the issue of nuclear negotiations with Iran. Uh, is this process that we've embarked on, this initial agreement a breakthrough that's going to help us avoid conflict and help, uh, Iran winddown from a nuclear weapon? Or is it just the opposite? Is it allowing Iran tobuy time and progress toward a nuclear weapon while we dismantle the sanctions t

hat even brought them to the negotiating table. So that's the topic of tonight'sdebate.

[3:02] We aim to make these timed, fair, structured debates. We want to make sure we get a balance of views. We want to make sure we get equal time for differences of opinion. It's part of the ethos that we have as the McCain Institute to try to focus on lively, fair, open debate in order to try to help us as a countryarrive at the best possible policy decisions.

[3:23] Uh, as Paris mentioned, we are tweeting. We are livestreaming. We have an


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audience in Arizona, and we are, uh, delighted that you are here for this as well.

[3:32] Uh, before going any further, I would like to take a moment to introducethe, uh, namesake of the McCain Institute, a person who had the vision to createan institute aimed at developing the next generation of character driven leadership, Senator John McCain. [applause]

Senator John McCain: [4:03] Well, thank all of you for panel, for being here. Thank our panel for being here. Thank you for this very important discussion. Um,these are, these four individuals, I think, are most highly qualified to, uh, discuss this issue.

[4:18] And I, um, think that it's, again, um, something that has been with us for some period of time and I think that is going to be a topic of great debate and discussion not only in the Congress of the United States, but in places all over the world. I think this issue has a lot more ramifications than just the, theissue of Iranian nuclear weapons, and so I appreciate our, our panel and I appreciate all of you for coming today.

[4:53] And uh, I had, uh, a long speech on the North Korean nuclear buildup which I will save for another day. Thank you. [applause]

Ambassador Volker: [5:06] Thank you. And with that I would like to introduce our

moderator for tonight's debate. She is the former chief White House correspondent for CNN and is now a frequent contributor to debate over issues of, uh, national policy significance, Jessica Yellin. [applause]

Jessica Yellin: [5:28] Thank you Senator McCain, Ambassador Volker, and our panel for being here tonight. Ah, we are going to have a lively debate, ah, and I'mgoing to keep them on time as best I can. I'll be tough.

[5:41] Ah, but after we get through an initial few questions, we'll open it up to you guys for some questions of your own. So, please listen, but also come up with some pithy and pointed ah queries to give to these gentlemen.

[5:54] First, let me do a quick introduction for the deal skeptics, we have Bret

Stephens foreign affairs columnist for the Wall Street Journal and deputy editorial page editor and recent winner of the Pulitzer Prize, Bret? [applause]

Jessica: [6:06] OK, then we have Reuel Marc Gerecht with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and previously a case officer on the Middle East for the CIA,he's the author of "Know Thine Enemy: A Spy's Journey into Revolutionary Iran."He's slightly to the left of the right. [laughter]

Reuel Marc Gerecht: [6:23] Slightly.

Jessica: [6:26] And arguing give the deal a chance, former Obama State Department Special Advisor for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Bob Einhorn. He's now asenior foreign policy fellow with the Brookings Institute, and then by his side

, Karim Sadjadpour with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and previously Chief Iran Analyst for the International Crisis Group. He speaks fluent Farsi, and fortunately for us, fluent English too.

[6:50] So the teams are clear and we will start with opening statements first toBob and Karim, an Iran deal is a breakthrough because?

Robert Einhorn: [7:00] They talk.

Karim Sadjadpour: [7:01] Thank you Jessica, and thank you all for coming. Thank


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you to Senator McCain for, for organizing this. This is I think the 20th time I've debated Reuel direct publicly. I fear that we may soon be confused as a married couple. [laughter]

Karim: [7:13] So the nuclear deal with Iran is a very complicated technical document. Um, Bob and I have a fairly simple argument. I'm going to defer all the technical details to Bob.

[7:24] But essentially what we have to do is not look at the ideal alternative to a nuclear deal with Iran, but look at what are the realistic alternatives to this current deal. And to paraphrase Winston Churchill, the only thing worse thanthis current interim nuclear deal with Iran are the, are the alternatives to it.

[7:44] In an ideal world, we could force Iran to dismantle its entire program and agree to zero enrichment of uranium, but realistically that's not going to happen. Ah, I think insisting on a policy of zero enrichment and other than total dismantlement ah, would increase the likelihood of both war with Iran and a nuclear armed Iran.

[8:08] So there are two main problems with the alternative to this current deal.The first is that if we insisted on a very rigid position of zero enrichment, it would have unraveled international unity.

[8:19] Uh, a reason why China, Russia, and European countries agreed to sign onto these sanctions was because of the fact that for many years Iran was the intransigent party. Um, if we would have continued to take such a rigid approach, the international sanctions which forced Iran to compromise would have unraveled.Um, second, had we insisted on a very rigid policy we would have emboldened these hardline actors in Tehran who would argue that uh, by offering to put their foot on the brakes they received nothing in return, so instead they need to put their foot in the nuclear accelerator.

[8:55] So, we're living in a time in which the American public wants to avert both a nuclear armed Iran and um, another war in the Middle East. The war with Iran. And the alternatives to this current deal would make both scenarios more likely, both a nuclear armed Iran and a war with Iran.

[9:13] And there's a very real possibility that we're not going to be, be able to achieve a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. But given the pain, painful legacy of both Iraq and Afghanistan, ah, it would be shameful if we didn't try togive diplomacy a chance. Bob.

Robert: [9:30] Karim, thank you. Senator McCain, thank you, Jessica, Kurt as well. The interim deal that was reached in November in Geneva, ah, is only a firststep toward the final deal. The final deal will be the test of whether negotiations have succeeded. But the interim deal I think is a very promising first step.Uh, what it does is to halt in a very comprehensive way any forward movement inIran's nuclear program. The first time in over a dozen years.

[10:01] It uh, without this deal, uh, Iran could have ramped up its program, uh,it could've gotten to the point where it was, you know, two, three weeks way from producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon. Uh, this deal moves usfar, farther away, uh, from, from that possibility.

[10:22] Uh, also what it does, the enhanced, uh, verification provisions of thedeal gives us a better window into what's going on in Iran than we've had in a very long time. We have daily access to the uranium enrichment facilities. Uh, wehave access to centrifuge production plants. Uh, this is the kind of, uh, monitoring we haven't had in a long time. We have a much better picture of what's hap


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pening in Iran than we used to have.

[10:51] Uh, also we, um, uh, I think it's important to look at what we paid forthis deal, and what we paid was very, very little. It was, we really got this onthe cheap.

[11:03] Uh, the estimates are that the total sanctions relief that Iran will getfrom this deal is about seven billion dollars. During the same six month period, they will go 30 billion dollars deeper into the hole because of lost, uh, oilrevenues.

[11:21] I know there's a lot of speculation, uh, that sanctions are eroding, uh,that there's a shift in psychology. Uh, true. Um, companies are rushing to, uh,Iran, to try to, uh, do deals. And they are, um, uh, uh, but, but, where there's a lot of smoke, uh, there's no fire. Uh, people tell me that not a single newdeal has been reached, uh, during this period.

[11:49] Uh, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, uh, uh, points out that what's happening now is, uh, Iran's economy may be leveling off, but it's leveling off at the bottom of a recept, recession. Uh, Iran has plenty of incentives to conclude a nuclear deal. Uh, they know the only way their economy is going be right, is if they can get the sanctions lifted. The only way the sanctions will be lif, lifted,uh, is, uh, with a, uh, uh, an accommodation on the nuclear deal.

Jessica: [12:22] Thank you, gentlemen. And our skeptics.Bret Stephens: [12:25] Uh, I am skeptical. [laughter]

Bret: [12:28] Uh, first I just want to, uh, thank Senator McCain. He is actuallyone of my heroes. Most of my heroes are dead.

Jessica: [laughs] [12:35]

Bret: [12:36] And I only have one under 80, so as long as he keeps going, I feelsort of hip. [laughter]

Bret: [12:40] Um, now I, I think, you know, before we, we get into the debate on

the JPA, I think you have to ask yourself a basic question. And the basic question is, uh, are you prepared to preemptively strike Iran to stop their nuclear program? Is it a greater wrong in the end for Iran and for Khomeini and the Revolutionary Guard Corps to have a nuclear weapon? Or for America to engage, uh, inanother military action in the Middle East, which could lead to war? It's possible.

[13:15] Now, if you decide that under no circumstances should the United Statespreemptively strike Iran, and I can say that Karim and I have debated this issuebefore. And unless Karim has changed his position, he would argue that in facta preemptive American military action is the worst possible outcome.

[13:33] If you believe that, then you're going to approach these negotiations en

tirely differently. These negotiations, as long as they continue, whether it befor six months or twelve months or even, in fact, much, much longer, and I thinkif the Iranians have their way, it will go longer than twelve months, that's abetter conclusion.

[13:50] If we go down the road twelve months, and we see that in fact the Iranians are willing to compromise on eliminating 19,000 centrifuges, if they're willing to reduce it down so they have a one year breakout at the known facilities, if they're willing to stop the heavy water plant, convert it to a light water plant, if they're willing to confess about their past efforts at weaponization, if


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they're willing to allow an inspections regime that could go into military sitesin any facility without warning, if they're willing to turn over the paperworkand the officials, particularly uh, form, uh, Foreign Minister Salehi, who has aPh.D. for nuclear engineer, engineering courtesy of MIT, and allow to see how they cheated in the past...

[14:35] If we get twelve months down the road, and the Iranians have actually agreed to roll back their program in a serious way, I'd be the first to say the JPA is serious. But it's not. I mean, uh, to say that we paid very little, and...

Jessica: [14:48] Fifteen.

Bret: [14:49] ...uh, you know, we got, is true. We did pay very little, and we got less. I mean, we were at the high water mark, I think, of American leverage.Uh, at the beginning of this process, Iran is, its position is getting better. Ours is getting weaker. The odds of us being able to actually push them, uh, to compromise seriously, I think, has gone down appreciably.

Reuel: [15:17] Well, thank you for, um having me here. And of course, once again, thanks to Senator McCain. It's, uh, I'm grateful that there's a forum like theMcCain Institute. If there had been a McCain presidency, there wouldn't be a McCain Institute, but then we wouldn't be having this very depressing debate... [laughter]

Reuel: [15:31] ...so that's another story. [laughter]Reuel: [15:33] Um. Uh, Karim, uh, and actually, I want to also say, I want to thank Karim and Bob, uh. There are a lot of unworthy opponents in this debate, andthat's not, uh, true of them. Uh, so, um, although, I guess we'll find out. [laughter]

Reuel: [15:48] Um, I, uh, I'm inspired by many philosophers. Um, and the philosopher who inspires me most is Chris Rock. Uh, the comedian.

[16:01] And Chris Rock has a song, which you can find on YouTube, and the titleis "There is No Sex in The Champagne Room." And the point of the song is there is no sex in the champagne room.

[16:11] Now Karim mentioned that we have been, um, we need to give diplomacy a chance. And people with short memories must imagine that, uh, we have just initiated a process of diplomacy that is only a few, uh, months, or less than, uh, uh,a year old. But, in fact, we have been in the champagne room for twelve years.And in the champagne room, there is titillation, there is suggestion, there arevisions, there is hope. But in the end, with the Iranians, there is no sex in the champagne room. In fact, with the Iranians, there is no champagne in the champagne room. [laughter]

Reuel: [16:45] There is no deal. The whole strategy of Iran since negotiations began in 2002, with the EU three, with the Russians, through back channels with,uh, the Bush administration, through the Turks, through the Brazilians, in the c

onversations in [indecipherable 0:17:02] and many other cities. The whole strategy of the Iranians has been to delay and delay and delay.

[17:08] Bob mentioned that this is simply false, that this is the first time that we have had the Iranians suspend their nuclear program. They suspended it before in 2004, in 2005 under Rouhani. And Rouhani himself is the first to tell youthat it was that suspension that allowed him to divide the west and advance Iran's nuclear program.

[17:27] We are fooling ourselves to imagine that there is a consummation in this


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, uh, in this negotiation. We're in the champagne room with Iran. Don't exp, don't get your hopes up.

Jessica: [laughs] All right. Those were some pretty strong terms. I do hope thatthere is Iranian caviar in the champagne room. [laughter] [17:37]

Jessica: [17:43] Uh, let me put the first question to you, Bret and Reuel. You've said that making a deal with the Iranians is worse than Munich. Bret, you saidthat.

Reuel: [17:50] Yes.

Jessica: [17:51] Well, you've described this as a diplomatic march to the bomb.Now President Obama just told Bloomberg's Jeffrey Goldberg that, quote, "We losenothing by testing this out." So the question is, would you outline the optionyou believe will prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon? And, why not test out their diplomatic solution?

Reuel: [18:10] Well, I think I would approach the negotiations in a different way. And that is I'd realize that the Iranians are more inclined to actually conclude a deal, ah, if you meet them, uh, head on and you, in fact, scare them. Youintimidate them.

[18:26] Uh, I would, on the sanctions route, I would, uh, tell the Iranians, ver

y clearly, what's coming down the pike.[18:33] Uh, there are lots of different sanctions that we haven't tried that wecould try. We won't lose the Europeans, by the way. The French were, in fact, abit flabbergasted, uh, by the deal, uh, and they wanted to take a much harder line. It was the President of the United States that actually took the softer approach.

[18:49] So, I think there's a lot more you could do with sanctions, and I'd alsothreaten. You have to say this. You're going to have to draw led, red lines, and it's extremely difficult now, for President Obama, after Syria, to draw a redline. You're going to have to draw a led line, and say very clearly, make the argument.

[19:04] You're going to have to make it to the American people, you're going tohave to make it so the Iranian people hear it, that we will fight on this issue.We will preemptively strike. We will not allow you to develop a nuclear weapon,and these are the red lines that we will use.

Jessica: [19:18] OK. To the other side. Bret, I'm sorry he took your time. So, you're going to have to fight him next time. [laughs]

[19:22] Uh, to the other side. Let's separate the strike because the president says that that is on the table. We'll get to whether people believe it. Why not follow their route of more sanctions? And just strengthening the current regime is strength, sanc, sanctions?

Robert: [19:35] First of all, since President Obama took office, he has been able to get broad support throughout the international community for the most draconian sanctions that Iran has ever faced. Uh, this is what gives us leverage, uh,perhaps even more than the threat of military attack, uh, which, uh, many Iranians would actually like to see. They would like to have a green light to get nuclear weapons. A military attack would do that.

[20:02] The sanctions are very, very powerful. Ah, and, uh, we should continue,uh, we, and, and, and we don't have to, at the negotiating table, tell the, uh,


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Iranians, who...Well, they know. They hear what is happening in the US Congress.They know, if they're not serious, they're going to fact even more crippling sanctions.

[20:22] Uh, so I think there's prenny, plenty of leverage, and plenty of incentives, uh. for the Iranians to negotiate, seriously. And if they don't, then we ought to walk away and look at the alternatives. But we have to look at the alternatives honestly and realistically, and they're not very promising.

[20:39] And I agree totally with Karim. Uh, it would be irresponsible for us notto test out the leverage we currently have to see whether the kind of negotiates solution that you talked about is possible.

Jessica: [20:53] I'll put this one to you, Bob, again, and Karim. If, if the administration has what, what is the functional alternative, uh, if you, if you don't pursue further sanctions now, and, uh, you do believe that the President hasput a military strike on the table. Um, after S...Let me take his question. After Syria, do the mullahs really believe a military strike is on the table?

Karim: [21:19] Does the Iranian regime believe it?

Jessica: [21:20] Yeah.

Karim: [21:21] I mean, if you look at the president, uh, the period in which Ira

n made the fastest nuclear progress was during the Bush Administration, when George W Bush as saying, on almost, um, you know, a weekly basis, that all optionsare on the table. There was tens of thousands of US troops in Iraq, and that didn't deter, uh, their forward progress.

[21:42] But I think what Bob pointed out is worth re-emphasizing, and that is that it was actually the Obama's administration's unprecedented, but unreciprocated, overtures to Iran, which created the international unity that forced Iran into this current nuclear compromise.

Jessica: [21:57] Do you...Gentlemen, Obama says the mullahs are certain he's notbluffing. They believe the threat of a military strike is real. After Syria, doyou agree?

Bret: [22:06] I mean, look, the, the notion that the Mullah's think that this administration, which constantly bends over backwards to, eh, not only ask for a diplomatic solution, to plead for it, is serious about a military option is justnot, uh, I think, a credible view of the world.

[22:22] Uh, it's hard to imagine that a president who retreats and capitulates in the face of a weak power like Syria, after the Syrian dictator has clearly crossed a presidential red line, is then prepared to take the much harder steps a militar...much harder step of a military strike against, uh, um, against Iran. That credibility ended.

[22:46] And by the way, the credibility issue here is important, not simply vis- -vi

what the Iranians think. It's also important vis- -vis what the Saudis think and wht the Israelis think. Because one of the things that we would like to do, in theprocess of this negotiation, is make sure that our allies don't become freelancers in region, because they feel that American security guarantees are no longercredible. As they are, by the way, justified in feeling.

Reuel: [23:10] If I just [indecipherable 0:23:10] one thing. The, the build up for war and the invasion of Iraq paralyzed the Iranian policic, political class,and it paralyzed the nuclear program. And if you want to count s...when it started to rebuild have two thou...2005, it's when the Americans thought first that t


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hey were in actually in difficult situation, when the Iranians began to leave...realize that they American were, uh, weak in Iraq, and that the Iranians could actually strike them in Iraq.

[23:38] And if you were to actually look at the production of centrifuges, the progress on the Iraq heavy water facility, or the ballistic missile progress, themost progress the Iranians have made has been from 2008 forward, not from 2008back.

Bret: [23:54] No, I mean, in fact, Iran began enriching, in 2006, at the very lowest moment, six months before surge in Iraq. Iran stopped -- I mean, accordingto this famous 2007 NIE -- Iran actually stopped its program at precisely the high-water mark of American credibility and military force in [indecipherable 0:24:12] . [crosstalk]

Jessica: [24:12] OK. Let them rebut. Do you want to rebut, directly.

Karim: [24:15] I would just say that during the Bush administration, they Iranians didn't even negotiate. They would come to...If they showed up at negotiations, they would simply come and repeat talking points. So this is the first time, since 2003, that they've agreed to turn their car over to the side of the road.

Jessica: [24:30] But Karim, the Israelis have been vocal in expressing their distrust and frustration with the Obama administration. On the Middle East peace pr

ocess, they see that the US is, uh, vacillated on Syria. In terms of a militarystrike, has wanted to pull out of Iraq and Afghanistan. Um, and, you know, a final deal only works if the Israelis have a high degree of confidence that the USis willing to strike.

[24:49] So, the President says that our allies should believe that we're willingto strike. Do our allies think so?

Karim: [24:55] I think that there's a point, also, worth emphasizing here, and that is that what's in question here is not the nature of the Iranian regime. We're all in agreement here that this is a regime, which has very few redeeming qualities. And its entire existence is premised on, um, on hostility toward Americaand toward Israel.

[25:15] But I believe one of the key questions we should be contemplating is what's, what are the best US policies to facilitate political change in Iran?

[25:24] And I would frankly argue that military action against Iran would not bea stick against these hardliners. It would be a carrot. It would actually further entrench their power and prolong the shelf life of this regime.

[25:36] So I think that if we can think about policies, which, you know, they overt a nuclear-armed Iran, but at the same time, try to reintegrate Iran back into the international community, try to empower the Iranian masses, who want a different, um, a different foreign policy, I think we should be thinking hard aboutthese things.

Robert: [25:54] If I could just add, the one thing that this, this supreme leader values above anything else is survival of the regime. That, I think, if there's a threat to his regime, that's when he's going to make compromised.

Reuel: [26:07] That's what I said.

Robert: [26:08] I think then, then we have threatened it. The economic sanctions, um, are...have been devastating. And there are...They're a stronger threat tothe survival of this regime, uh, than a military attack, which is just going to


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embolden the Iranians, get them to withdraw from the MPT, kick out the IAEA.

[26:28] And then where are we? An accelerated Iranian nuclear weapons program. Ithink they're much more concerned about devastating economic sanctions.

Bret: [26:37] There's an inherent illogic in what you said, and I want to pointthis out, OK? If you suppose that sanctions were putting devastating pressure onIran, then there was no cost to us in November of last year, to give those sanctions time to increase the pressure on Iran...

Man 4: [26:55] There was.

Bret: [26:55] Hang on...to get a better deal. If, on the other hand, you're likeLes Gelb, and a lot of people, who are kind of on your side, for different reasons, you think that sanctions have no affect on Iranian calculations, at all, then this is entirely the wrong conversation. Either we're going to have a conversation about accepting Iran as a de facto nuclear power, or we're going to have aconversation about stopping it militarily.

[27:14] But you can't simultaneously say, "Sanctions were working, and by the way, this was the best deal we could hope for."

Karim: [27:20] Well, I'll tell you, the, the logic sound, but because the dangerin, uh, adding more sanctions last November, instead of trying for a deal, was

precisely that the international coalition, the unity which forced Iran to compromise, was on the verge of unraveling. The Russians and the Chinese, the Europeans, their entire premise was, "OK, we'll, we'll agree to sign onto sanctions tobring Iran back to the negotiating table."

[27:44] That happened, and if it appeared then that America was the intransigentactor in the equation, these countries are not going to forsake their own commercial and strategic interests...

Bret: [27:54] Why was France the intransigent actor?

Karim: [27:55] Well France, France is, is to our right, when it comes to Iran, but China, um, Germany, Russia, they were not going to maintain this coalition.

Reuel: [28:04] Yes, they were. Germany was. The Russian, the Chinese, do the math. The Russian and the Chinese are irrelevant for the sanctions, which are really hurting the Iranians.

Karim: [28:11] China certainly isn't. [crosstalk]

Reuel: [28:12] China is relevant, for, for the sanctions that's really hurting.

Bret: [28:15] Totally, totally wrong. The, the oil sanctions, the loss of oil revenues are the most important thing. China is the biggest importer of Iranian crude oil. The volumes of crude that they are not importing, because of the sanctions, is where, is really hurting Iran.

Reuel: [28:32] No, the, the primary thing that are hurting the Iranians are actually the restrictions on their banking industry, the restrictions on their banking industry, the restrictions on using hard currency. And also the Chinese, if the Chinese are the only buyers, the Chinese screw the Iranians. So if you want to go in that direction, that's fine. I don't have an objection to that.

Jessica: [28:48] It's the administration's view that US is actually in a stronger position to either ratchet up sanctions, or strike Iran if we first try thesenegotiations, and then Iran balks. It makes the US the angel, and we have a bett


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er chance of getting international support for whatever future action we pursue.Why isn't that a legitimate and arguably the smarter course?

Reuel: [29:08] Well, I, I think it's fine to try negotiations, but negotiate well. Uh, I mean, I, I...Right now, I think they Iranians hold the cards, because the Iranians know that we're scared. If you read...I mean, what happened when the, uh, uh, s, bipartisan senate bill was coming forward to actually threaten theIranians that if the sanct...If these negotiations fail, if they don't produce Xby a certain period of time, "We're going to hit you with more sanctions."

[29:37] What did the administration do? They had its minions attack democratic senators and call them war mongers. I mean, what more counterproductive action could you take to send a signal to Tehran that we're not serious about that? Thatwe're not serious about the military actions and we're not serious about the sanctions.

[29:55] You need to use a combined-arm approach. There is this notion out therethat diplomacy is, in fact, not...you can't use mailed fist in diplomacy. Of course, you can. You put the two together and you get the best deal that you possibly can at the beginning.

[30:12] Because you know the Iranians are going to lie and cheat and push it. And you have to go hard at the beginning, or otherwise this is just going to become a long, protracted affair, where the process takes over and the end become, be

comes less relevant.Jessica: [30:27] Gentlemen, his point is that we need to have a productive and asubstantive negotiation. Let's talk about the content of the actual deal for aminute. The P5-plus-one -- and tell me if you disagree -- has effectively conceded that Iran will have a nuclear enrichment program, that Iran will continue todevelop its technical expertise, have nuclear scientists who have the option.

[30:47] And they also have the option of kicking out inspectors, and ways to break it at some point. Why wouldn't that deal, if it allowed all that, ultimatelybe containment?

Robert: [30:57] Because if they would agree to, uh, the tough kinds of proposals

that make sense, which is A very drastically low enrichment program, very tightlimits on the rich uranium stocks they can have, uh, a monitoring system that gives us almost instantaneously indications that they may be cheating, and a lotof time in which it would take them to produce their first nuclear weapon, so that we could intervene then to stop them.

[31:27] By the way, if they were breaking out of a, an agreement, in a way thatmade it clear they were lurching for nuclear weapons, I think any inhibitions against the use of military force would disappear. I think President Obama as saidover, and over again, he will not permit Iran to have a nuclear weapon.

[31:48] And I think the situation in which he would not hesitate to use force isin a situation where Iran has kicked out the inspectors, started ramping up the

ir centrifuges to produce weapons grade uranium. I think, in that unambiguous situation, I think the Iranians could expect a military strike.

Jessica: [32:08] I think Bret had a point.

Bret: [32:09] Yeah. I'd like to...This is important. Just a few weeks ago the defense science boards came out with a comprehensive report about our monitoring and verification systems for enforcing nuclear agreements, and the core point made is they're not very good. We are taken by surprise again, and again, and again.


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[32:26] And we're also living in a world of subterranean nuclear proliferators exchanging technologies between Pyongyang, and Damascus and, uh, even Caracas, various, uh...various other places.

[32:40] It is a conceit to suppose that an intelligence body, like the CIA, thatwas unable to anticipate India's nuclear test in 1998 -- this is an open, democratic country, we had no idea they were going to test weapons -- and then turn around and say "We will have ample warning when the Iranians decide to test." Thelesson that we learned in Iraq wasn't that we over hyped the intelligence.

[33:01] The lesson that we learned is that our intelligence agents get it wrongtime, and time again when it comes to anticipating nuclear proliferators and nuclear breakouts. So there is this line out there that we will have perfect intelligence, and we will know well in advance when Iran decides to break up. That issimply not worn out by 60 years of failure to anticipate proliferation.

Robert: [33:28] You know, there, uh...Iran had three, uh, secret facilities, Natanz, Iraq, a plutonium production reactor, and Fordow. Uh, the first two were, uh, disclosed by the MEK, and Iranian dissonant group. The third one, the Fordowreactor, was discovered by western intelligence...

Bret: [33:49] Well, what about the fourth?

Robert: [33:50] ...And by the...And by the CIA. You name the fourth one if you can.

Bret: [33:54] Well, neither of us know it.

Robert: [33:55] Yeah, no. That's right. [laughter]

Robert: [33:57] You can always...It's hard to refute...It's hard to refute thatpoint, but I can tell you that some of our friendly intelligence agencies, including those who are very focused on the Iran problem do not have any indicationsof a covert program. The Iranians have been burned three times [indecipherable 0:34:18] .

[34:18] That's not to say that we have to be complacent, but the very stringentverification you see in the interim agreement is an indication that we're goingto have much more robust monitoring, and ability to have high confidence that they don't have a covert program.

Reuel: [34:33] I'll just say two things. One, I used to work in the CIA in the clandestine service, and if you're depending upon the clandestine service to helpyou here, God help you. [laughter]

Reuel: [34:41] Uh, second, I'd just like to say that the former foreign minister, Velayati, who may be an opium addict, but still he has his redeeming virtues,he remarked that, uh, for the Iranians to accept, uh, a, uh, inspections plush regime, where they can go into any facility, the Revolutionary Guard facilities,

since the Revolutionary Guard controls the nuclear weapons program, and search it, is the equivalent of the Iranians, once again, accepting the treaty of Turkemanchay.

[35:10] And any Iranian, you just say Turkemanchay, that is the most embarrassing moment in Iranian history. It isn't going to happen. And that's why in the JPA, and I can guarantee you down the road the Americans are going to pull away from saying "We wanna have that inspections regime."

[35:26] Instead, they're gonna go in the direction that the regime wants you to


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go in, which is "Well, we'll let you have cameras wherever you want them in theknown facilities," while they continue to make progress on advanced centrifuges.And listen, if you get an advanced centrifuge, the more progress you've made with that -- and the Iranians have made ample progress -- you can have much smaller facilities, much smaller cascades, and they can break out like that.

Jessica: [35:51] It is true that a deal depends on a measure of trust. We have intelligence, but there's also the possibility that they could try to develop nuclear weapons in the dark. And while you say that the prior, uh, attempts at thatwere discovered, the question is how long will it take to for us discover them,and is it too long. So Karim, why should we trust them now?

Karim: [36:11] I don't think anyone is arguing that we should trust them, but Ithink, you know, we started off this debate by saying that the deal isn't perfect. But Bret is a friend of mine. It appears otherwise, but Bret is my friend. He's a brilliant columnist. But the onus is on you guys to, to describe what alternative policy would be better.

[36:33] They're...We're never going to be able to trust Iranian...This current Iranian regime, um, but what is the better alternative to a policy of trying to test diplomacy? Is it war? The American public was, was weary of even pin prick bombings against the Syrian regime. Are they ready to embark on another potentialfull scale war in the Middle East? Is it a nuclear armed Iran something where we rip up this current agreement and Iran moves full speed ahead?

[37:04] So, I, I, I think that no one is arguing here that this a perfect deal,this is a moment for euphoria and we should not trust Iranians, but I still haven't heard what a better and viable alternative to this current deal is.

Bret: [37:16] Well, the ultimate goal, OK, and this is probably the nature of the deep disagreement that we have here, is your ultimate goal is a contained Iranthat is, uh...Say, has nuclear capabilities similar to those of Japan, that itcould break out quickly but it hasn't broken out formally. That's what you're really aiming for.

[37:39] My ultimate goal is an Iran which never gets within a mile of a nuclearweapon. Unfortunately, by now, they're half a mile to a nuclear weapon, and afte

r the JPA, probably sprinting distance to a nuclear weapon. Why? Because I thinkthat the perfectly foreseeable consequences and outcomes of an Iran with nuclear weapons, or with a nuclear weapons capability are much, much worse than even the theoretically unforeseeable consequences of, uh, uh, of, of military strikesto prevent them.

[38:12] I don't want war, but I'm convinced that the only measures that will save us from that choice are, are much harsher sanctions than what we have...Than what we had. So the proper course in November wasn't to start talking about ratcheting down the sanctions. It was to start talking about ratcheting them up, so that Khomeini was convinced...To properly persuade Khomeini that his regime's survival would be better assured without nuclear weapons than with them.

Karim: [38:40] Had they agreed to zero enrichment, would you have trusted them that they would, uh...Would make that deal in good faith?

Bret: [38:47] Yeah, zero enrichment with proper verification, sure.

Karim: [38:50] But we're talking about same verification that you don't trust now.

Bret: [38:53] No.


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Robert: [38:54] You just said they would have a covert facility, and that you would be OK.

Reuel: [38:57] No, you'd have to...I mean, there are going to be real weaknesseswith verifications, but unless you have an inspections regime plus, where you can go all over the country, where you can follow up intelligence tidbits, whereyou can follow up, you know, any type of information that you have, uh, you're doomed.

Robert: [39:16] I agree with that. I agree with that. You're not going to get anywhere, any time inspection like we had in Iraq after the Gulf War because, youknow, they're a sovereign country, they haven't been defeated in the battlefield, but we can get something pretty good where we can have access to all militaryfacilities. If they have a small piece of equipment that they need to shroud because it has nothing to do with the nuclear deal, fine.

[39:41] But I think we can get a good monitoring regime, and I agree with you. Our goal being Japan, but it's not Japan. Japan has centrifuges, it has lots of plutonium. We should never accept anything like Japan in the Iran case. We can'ttrust them to have that nuclear break out capability.

[40:02] We need to reduce their nuclear infrastructure to a very low level. We need to have monitoring, so that we can detect any break out instantaneously, andthen they have to have such a small capability that will take them a long time

to build a singular...Single nuclear weapon, which gives us the time to intervene, and to stop them from doing that.

Bret: [40:23] Well, wonderful. Good luck getting that deal. You just hear JavadZarif in Tokyo saying that they will never shut down the plutonium reactor in Arak. That reactor has one purpose, which is to breed plutonium for nuclear weapons. He's just told you, told us, in broad daylight that you...we are never goingto achieve the kind of deal that you have specified, so...

Robert: [40:46] He didn't say...He didn't...You're right. He's not going to shutit down, and I don't believe we need to shut it down. We need to convert it tothe kind of reactor that is not a plutonium breeder, as you say.

[40:59] The current one breeds enough plutonium every year for a bomb. The kindof reactor that we're trying to get them to accept would enable them to achieveone-tenth of the amount needed for a bomb in a single year, which would be much,much better. Break out would become nearly impossible.

Jessica: [41:17] So to the skeptics, it's easier to shoot holes in someone else's plan than propose your own. Uh, if you dial back, and we look at this in a bigger picture and think we have two time lines in Iran. One is trying to slow their rush to a possible bomb. The other is the political time frame, and trying toget them to a democracy, or see that they get to some kind of political change there.

[41:37] Can you speed up the political change in Iran? Is there a way you can se

e accelerating what the timeframe that's good for the US while slowing down thenuclear time frame?

Bret: [41:48] You know, in the 1990s there were all these conversations, earnestconversation in Washington, by people who had studied the Balkans their entirecareer, who kept going on about the importance of Kosovo to the Serbian nationalidentity. And they urged that no war be waged in Kosovo because nothing would do Slobadon Melosevic a greater favor then to fight Serbia on behalf of Kosovo'sliberation.


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[42:13] In fact, when President Clinton, to his infinite credit, with the support of some of the people of this room, um decided on a bombing campaign of Kosovo, it was ultimately the destruction of Milosevic's regime.

[42:27] In 1982, a horrible military junta in Argentina decided to make itself popular by seizing islands knows as Los Malvinas, better known to you as the Falklands, suddenly became a fervent cause in Argentina, then Mrs. Thatcher took them back, and the junta fell in a week. And that's how, by the way, political change came to Argentina. I wish it had lasted a little bit longer.

[42:52] But the lesson you draw from that is when a regime, an unpopular regime,invests all of its prestige in a single controversial project and watches it goup in ash and smoke, it is not good for the survival of the regime.

[43:06] I really don't think Khomeini is, is in his bed time prayer saying "I hope the American's bomb us because that way we'll be in power forever." I don't think he thinks that.

Karim: [43:16] Look at the reality, Bret. The Iranian regime has been arming andfinancing an ushered regime, which has been willing to kill upwards of 100,000people rather than relinquish power. Uh, in Iran, you have the same dynamic, andthat the current leadership believes that if they were to relinquish power it'skill or be killed.

[43:35] The opposition, you have a young, vibrant population, which is not interesting in, in...in killing or dying for their cause. You know, the line I use isthat in 1979 Iranians had a revolution without democracy, today they want a democracy without a revolution. And you have the revolutionary guys in the [indecipherable 0:43:52] who have a monopoly of violence.

[43:55] They're the only armed individuals. So the notion that if we bomb Iran,um, these, kind of young, peaceful demonstrators would be able to rise up and, and, and, and kick out the only forces who have arms is... [cross talk]

Robert: [44:09] We're not saying. I think what Bret is saying is that if a regime has predicated its, its nuclear program, and has said over, and over again that the Americans will not strike, that they are scared to strike, and if the Amer

icans then come in and take out that program, completely demolish.

[44:31] And I suggest to you that there, there's, the Americans actually do manythings well, and one of the things we really do well is blowing things up. Andif they go...If the American air force goes in there and takes out that, there is now way that's going to rebound to their advantage. Will it cause riots in thestreets? I don't know, but the truth is the opposition got stuffed in 2009, 2010.

[44:53] And it's, it's, I don't think it's responsible policy to predicate, uh,what Americans should do on the nuclear program based on the hope, and the illusion, I would argue, that somehow, uh, that this peaceful revolution that you'rehoping for, and I'm hoping for, to is going to come about because we don't bomb.

[45:14] I, I, I think that, so far as trauma is concerned, there's vastly more trauma to the system if the American armed forces go in there and take out something which the regime said "Under no circumstances we are going to lose, and under no circumstances they are going to strike."

Bret: [45:31] You know, one of the, just briefly...People often think about Iranand the diplomacy now going on with Iran, and they draw the analogy of our diplomacy with China in the 1970s. Well, the Chinese made certain overtures to us toindicate that they were interested in that, in having some diplomacy. And somet


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imes it was at the level of gestures, most famously with the ping pong tournaments.

[45:58] Where is the gesture that Iran has made to the west to indicate, small thing that might not cost Rouhani too much politically to indicate that he is willing to turn a new leaf.

Jessica: [46:10] He's tweeting.

Bret: [46:11] What...Well what he did is he sent his foreign minister, or his foreign minister himself to Beirut to lay a reef at the tomb of Imhad Mugmia who was second only to Osama Bin Laden in the amount of American blood that he has his on his hands.

[46:25] Where is the evidence really, besides this kind of mindless American media semantic obsession with calling Rouhani a moderate, that he is a moderate? Are the level of executions down? Has Iranian support for, for Assad diminished, or have they been helpful at the negotiating table in Geneva? No, they have not.

[46:48] Have they changed their policy vis- -vis Israel? No, we just saw that they snt 40 or...Odd long range rockets, or were attempting to send these rockets to Gaza. I would like to see some glimmer of evidence that Rouhani really is this reformer, and this moderate that he is painted...

Jessica: [47:06] OK.Bret: [47:07] ...To be, rather than just a canny manipulator who understands that we, um, are desperate to get suckered.

Jessica: [47:13] Karim, and let me put that to you. The president, in a recent interview, said that he believes the Iranians are not irrational, that they're...That's not a direct quote, but he said that he believes they're not impulsive, and not...Don't have a death wish the way that, you could say, the North Koreansdo. Is that a fair assessment, and is, uh, Rouhani really a reformer?

Karim: [47:33] I think it's a fair assessment that in the three and half decadesof this regime, they've shown themselves to be homicidal, but not suicidal, mea

ning they're willing to kill a lot of their own people in order to stay in power. But ultimately, that's what's paramount for the Iranian regime. They want to maintain power, so they haven't done things which would, which would warrant, um,the type of military operation that you guys are talking about.

[47:54] I think, you know, the individual we need to me talking about it the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, not necessarily Rouhani. Am I convinced that the supreme leader has turned over a new leaf, and is now interested in an amicable relationship with the United States? Certainly not, but I believe it's alwaysuseful for us to, to kind of question our own assumptions.

[48:14] Henry Kissinger once said that a week before he went to meet with Mao for the first time, all of the China experts in America said that Mao will never c

hange.

[48:22] So I am doubtful that the supreme leader is interested in a totally different relationship with the united states, but I think we have to test that because what's happening in Iran is not that the regime wants to have a different relationship with the world, but they have a very young population, three-quartersof whom were born after the revolution, which is desperate to have reintegration with the outside world, and is not interested in this antipathy toward America, and toward Israel.


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[48:49] And so I think we need to have a policy which, which takes into accountthat, and not hold kind of the Iranian...Pursue policies which hold the Iranianpeople hostage to their own government.

Bret: [48:58] I think I have to say the best rebuttal to what Karim just said isactually, I highly recommend it, his own piece, his profile... [laughter]

Bret: [49:07] ...Of Khomeini, "Reading Khomeini." I think after you read that you can't possibly come away and think that the supreme leader really cares all that much about the, uh, giving way to the new generations, and that what he caresmost about is maintaining the revolutionary creed.

[49:25] And so does Rouhani. I've spent a lot of time, I and my colleague, Ali Alfoneh, reading everything that Rouhani has every written and said.

[49:35] And I have to say after you go through it, it's not fun because he doesn't have a nice pen, uh, that he's basically an NKB colonel. He's not even a KGBcolonel. He's an NKB colonel. And the notion that the supreme leader...They aregoing to give up something, which has been the centerpiece, I think, of their identity, and that's just [indecipherable 0:49:55] how you can look at the nuclearweapons program, that they're going to give that up unless, literally, they aredown on their knees, I think is naive.

[50:05] Now, the question is, is can we devise a method to put them on their kne

es? I would argue that what the president has done since November is just in theopposite direction. It's treating the Iranians as if they're on some type of psychiatric couch, and with a little confidence building measures, they're going to come along and quote "be rational." It's not irrational for Islamist revolutionaries to have a nuke. It's quite rational.

Karim: [50:30] Listen, a famous senator, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, once said "Youcan have your own...Your own opinions, but not your own facts," and the fact isthat most draconian sanctions which Iran has experienced was under the Obama administration, not during the Bush administration. And I was doing this job during the Bush administration.

[50:47] And when I would talk to Russians, Chinese, Europeans, they said "Listen

, why should we sign up for tougher sanctions against Iran when you Americans have refused to even try to engage them?" So I actually think that our Obama administration's policy's a win, win because if we engage them, and you and I are wrong, and Ayatollah Khomeini is genuinely interested in change, that's constructive for US national security.

[51:09] And if we engage them and they rebuff us, it simply exposes the fact that the...Iran remains the [indecipherable 0:51:15] , not us.

Jessica: [51:17] Bob, you had a point to make.

Robert: [51:19] Uh, uh, who else seems to believe that the Iranians are hell bent on moving with their nuclear weapons program no matter what? We have pretty go

od indication, and the director of National Intelligence says over and over again, that essentially the supreme leader put his finger on the pause button.

[51:37] Not on all an aspect of a program that developing missiles and enrichment program, but on the key element of constructing a nuclear explosive device, hehas apparently given a red light to the people in Iran, who -- undoubtedly wantto have nuclear weapons.

[51:54] That pause button has been on for quite some time now, since about 2003,as you pointed out. On the eve of the US-Iraq election.


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[52:03] Our job needs to ensure, that even though there are those in Iran who undoubtedly want nuclear weapon, to make sure they have no incentive to get nearerthe nuclear threshold and cross over it, because the cost to them would be tremendous, and even threatening to the regime. That's what we need to do. An agreement enables us to do that by moving them farther away from the nuclear threshold. And I don't agree that the joint plan of action gets them closer. It moves them farther away.

[52:37] A good agreement -- and hopefully we could get a good agreement -- wouldmove them a good distance away. And uh, insure that it's in their incentive tocontinue to keep the nuclear weapons program on indefinite deferral.

Bret: [52:51] The director of national intelligence you're referring to is Jim Clapper.

Reuel: [52:53] Jim Clapper.

Bret: [52:54] Of course. Great authority.

[52:55] Um, uh, sorry. Uh, uh, the problem with that view is it takes a somewhatinnocent, um, approach to the way in which you go about constructing a nuclearweapons capability. We view acquisition of nuclear weapons usually through the lens of our own experience, which is we were in World War II and we were racing t

owards the bomb. We tested a weapon in, out in New Mexico in July of 1945. We detonated a weapon over Japan in August of 1945. We were trying as quickly as we could to get a bomb to end the war.

[53:34] Most countries understand that their interests are better served by notwhat you might call a "fast breakout," but by a wide breakout. Develop your nuclear infrastructure in a way that allows you to test one weapon when that test has behind it 10 or 15 or 20 weapons.

[53:55] So there are various kinds of ways in which Iran might choose to breakout. Various kinds of scenarios. They might say, "It is dangerous for us to race towards a nuclear test, because we wouldn't want to test one nuclear weapon withanother one in the basement. Then we're, then we're very vulnerable. We'd rather

build a broad nuclear industrial capability, so that at the moment we choose totest, we can readily deploy many, uh, many other weapons."

[54:19] And you're looking at this scenario through the kind of the fast breakout scenario.

[54:24] Another point that's important to make, because this refers to the question of weaponization. If you talk to people who have built nuclear weapons, theweaponization aspect, at least in a primitive nuclear bomb, is the simplest technical aspect. What's hard is to acquire sufficient quantities of high enriched uranium or weapons grade plutonium.

[54:44] And what's also hard is to acquire means of delivering those weapons eff

ectively. The Iranians continue to move ahead on their ballistic missile capabilities. That's the means of delivery. And, uh, they have acquired now a stockpileof, what? 10,000 or 8,000 kilos of, of, of enriched uranium. The more they, themore they acquire at the low enriched level, the more easily they can break outto higher, to higher levels of enrichment.

[55:10] So I think it's wrong to simply suppose that, you know, uh, having a system which continues to allow them to build their nuclear infrastructure keeps them at a greater distance from a bomb. It doesn't.


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Reuel: [55:22] That, you said, "a system that allows them to continue to build their nuclear infrastructure." We have an agreement in place now that has broughttheir program to a halt...

Bret: [55:31] No.

Reuel: [55:32] ...in all significant respects. And we have a negotiating position for a comprehensive agreement that is going to set back that prop, that infrastructure, going to reduce it substantially, so that the breakout timeline is extended a great deal.

[55:47] And if we don't get that kind of agreement, we should walk away from thenegotiations and look at alternatives.

Bret: [55:52] Deputy Foreign...

Reuel: [55:53] I agree with your analysis by the way about how nuclear programswork. But I think, uh, you know, our job now is to move them as far away from a,a breakout capability as possible. And if we can't do that in the negotiations,then we have to stop those...

Jessica: [56:09] Let me pause just right here. Keep your thoughts.

[56:11] It's time for you all to come up with your questions, so there will be,

uh, microphones in the audience. Please start thinking and, uh, get ready to asksome questions.

[56:22] If you had a rebuttal point you can make it. I...

Reuel: [56:24] I was just going to say. Deputy Foreign Minister Araqchi said that, uh, you know, everything that they quote, conceded in the JPA they can reverse in 24 hours. Flip a switch. They're absolutely right.

Senator McCain: [56:33] They are right, they are right.

Reuel: [56:35] 2000 and 2003, let's be honest, 2003 is about fear. That's what paralyzed the program. I would also add just a little bit of caution that we, the

American intelligence community like all intelligence services gets little flashes of insight. I'm willing to bet a large quantity of money, I'll bet all the money that he has... [laughter]

Bret: [56:55] It's not a lot.

Reuel: [56:56] Oh, sorry. That uh...

Bret: [56:57] I'm a journalist.

Reuel: [56:58] ...that, uh...What about the Pulitzer? That, uh, you cannot, thatwe have no continuous intelligence source inside of the Iranian nuclear establishment or the upper reaches of the government. And because we don't have that, I

would caution to say that we, that they're still on the pause button.

[57:16] In 2003, I think the odds are pretty high that they were on the pause button. They were on the pause button because the United States just took down Saddam Hussein. I think they've had, they still have residual fear.

[57:27] And I think the President is right when he underscores that. They stillhave residual fear of the United States. That's why they don't do anything stupid at Iraq. That's why they don't try to break out at [indecipherable 0:57:36] because if they do that, they could provoke the President of the United States to


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do something that he doesn't want to do.

[57:42] All I'm suggesting is use fear. It is an obvious good for diplomacy. Whycan't we incorporate fear a little bit more heavily into the way we negotiate with Iranians.

Jessica: [57:56] OK, let's pause. Does anybody have a question that you'd like to ask of them? Right over here, the gentleman on this side, you've got it.

Stanley Koger: [58:04] I'm Stanley Koger. Sun Tzu in "The Art of War" said, "Know your enemy, and know yourself." For reasons of time, let's just do "know yourself." In threatening military action, we are making an implicit assumption of what the American people are willing to support. 2003 was a while ago. A lot has happened since then. So I'd like to make that implicit assumption explicit.

Jessica: [58:34] All right. Thank you. Let me put that to the skeptics. Uh, do you think there's the political will for a, a strike against Iran? And let me addto that, you've already shot holes in American intelligence abilities, capabilities. Why do you have confidence that any strike would actually decimate their nuclear program or what would it actually achieve?

Bret: [58:54] Well, I have a lot of confidence in American military capabilities. That's the Defense Department and the intelligence community are two very different beasts.

[59:02] The problem here, and this is implicit, there are few problems implicitin what I thought was an astute, it was an astute comment. One is, the issue here is not taking a poll and then trying to decide whether it would be popular tobomb Iran. This is where leadership counts, and this is where leadership has been missing.

[59:22] One of the constant features that I hear from people who come out of theObama administration like Vali Nasr who writes about this publicly, is this isan administration for whom foreign policy is a matter of um, uh, has, has uh, has always been a matter of taking a poll.

[59:37] But the second thing is, we are now victims of the Iraq Syndrome in the

sense that we think every single military action we undertake or think of undertaking is gonna end up with the American 3rd Infantry Division bogged down in some godforsaken place with a stand at the end of it that we don't want to be in.

[59:54] And that's simply not the case. The idea that a strike against Iran, should we be forced to undertake it, is going to be another Iraq situation, is fanciful. It's simply wrong.

[60:07] The Israelis think, the Israelis think that they can accomplish a successful strike in a single day. OK? And that's the Israeli, the Israeli view of, ofwhat a strike would take. So the notion, this kind of, this kind of um, bugaboo, that oh my god, we're going to bomb Iran, and next thing you know we're gonnabe in a ten year war that's going to cost us a trillion dollars, is not, should

not be realistically incorporated in any serious conversation.

Jessica: [60:32] Bob, if we, if the U.S. were to strike, what would that accomplish? Would it do more than mowing the lawn? Would it actually pull out the roots?

Robert: [60:38] Um, and we have estimates on it. It's hard to say. It would setback the program, but nobody knows how long it would set it back. Six months, twelve months, eighteen months? We don't know. But I think we're pretty confidentabout the policies that it would provoke. Uh, they would immediately, uh, kick o


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ut all the inspectors, our eyes and ears. They would withdraw from the NPT, uh,and finally, uh, the, uh, you know, the red light that has been on their weaponeers all this time would turn to a green light. And they would actively pursue nuclear weapons.

[61:16] Uh, I'm pretty confident of that. And if we used nuclear, if we used military force today, I think we would fragment our sanctions coalition. The one thing we would need after a military strike is strong international support. And if we used military force today, it would be seen as illegitimate and the sanctions would unravel.

[61:37] If after an agreement, uh, the Iranians were to break out of that agre,violate it and break out and go for nuclear weapons, I think, uh, it's much morelikely that we'd use force in those situations. And we would have legitimacy onour side and we can keep the sanctions coalition together.

[61:55] One very useful thing, and I wish Senator McCain were on the, uh, here on the podium to talk about it. It would be very, very useful in the wake of a comprehensive agreement for the Congress to legislate prior authorization to the President of the United States, whoever it may be, to use military force in the event that there was clear evidence that the Iranians had violated the agreement,were breaking out and pursuing nuclear weapons.

[62:26] In terms of the credibility of the threat to use force, that would be tr

emendous. I think that credibility was reduced when President Obama first went to the Congress to seek authorization in the Syria case and when Congress essentially balked. And the American public balked.

[62:44] I think something like a congressional prior authorization in the wake of an agreement would be a very powerful and credible motivator for Iran to comply with the agreement.

Jessica: [62:55] Can we take another question from the audience?

[62:58] Um, let's see. There's a woman down here in the blue if you can come ondown.

[63:09] And if you'd identify yourself and your affiliation?

Sharla Siddiqui: [63:12] I'm Sharla Siddiqui from Voice of America Persian TV language service.

[63:17] I have two questions actually. One is does the government, the administration, have any post comprehensive agreement policy for Iran or are they just sitting and hoping?

[63:31] And the other is there is two doors open at the moment at these days which hasn't been before. One is that United States and the world is actually talking to Iran. And the other is the Ukraine event, which the energy matter has, youknow, come to the issue.

[63:51] Is there any way that the world can encourage Iran to come to the cooperation, more cooperation with the world community in order to replace the Russian's gas supply to the Europe in the long term? Because they are desperate for the, the money and they are san, under sanctions. Is there any policy that can address that?

Jessica: [64:16] All right. Karim, if you want to take that.

Karim: [64:18] There's actually a way, I think, you can bunch together the two q


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uestions or in two answers. And to say that my sense of what the administration,um, is thinking vis- -vis Iran is to actually widen the aperture and look beyond jut the nuclear issue.

[64:33] Because if you look at the view from, view of the world from the Oval Office, Iran is integral to at least major seven major US national security challenges. You have Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine, uh, terrorism. You mentioned energy. There's nuclear proliferation.

[64:49] And I think at a macro level, there's an understanding that if you go towar with Iran, you're likely going to exacerbate each of those issues. And in an ideal world, if you can reach some type of a modus vivendi with Iran, a more cooperative relationship with Iran, you not only help defuse the nuclear conflict, but you potentially ameliorate those other challenges.

[65:11] Now, I think it's going to be very difficult to, to, um, pursue policieswhich improve Iranian behavior on Israel-Palestine, on Syria, on the issue of Hezbollah, but on some of the other issues, Iraq, Afghanistan, I think there is,there is pot, potential here.

[65:28] And again, I think whenever you're looking at these issues, you have tolook at what are the alternative options? What are the alternative policies? Andfrankly, I've not heard alternative policies, um, which, which make better sense than what they're currently trying to do.

Jessica: [65:44] If I could ask this of the critics, because there's a related question from online, on Twitter, from the British American Security InformationCouncil, uh, they ask, uh, "What ideas are there to improve the diplomatic process?"

[65:56] So let's say that we're in a world in which you have to work inside thisdiplomatic process. What would you, uh, prescribe as, uh, the best means of getting the outcome we want?

Reuel: [66:09] You like? Do you like that one?

Bret: [66:11] No, you like that one. [laughter]

Jessica: [66:15] It goes against diplomacy.

Reuel: [66:16] Well, you know, I, again, I, I, I emphasize...

Jessica: [66:18] Come on.

Reuel: [66:19] ...that you cannot take diplomacy and subtract from it military force. Uh, this is a very odd notion, so you must combine the two. I, I don't seehow you win, uh, through just further talks with the regime.

Jessica: [66:38] Do you dispute that military force is on the table?

Reuel: [66:40] Uh, it's not, I think I have to say it's not terribly credible. Iam and then I'm also willing to confess, I'm a bit at a loss, to how the President recovers the ground that he lost, uh, in Syria and the way he and others inthe administration, uh, constantly downplay and belittle the use of force.

Bret: [67:01] Can I...I'd like to just add a point, because you use this expression that comes up a lot, "mow the lawn." Are you merely mowing the lawn? Has anyone here mowed their lawn twice?

[67:12] I mean, of course, you mow the lawn. You mow the lawn, and when the weed


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s grow back, you mow it again. Um, the idea that Iran might seek after a military strike to then reconstitute their nuc, their nuclear capability, which I hopethey don't do it, might mean that we might have to mow the lawn twice.

[67:32] These are preferable alternatives to having a nuclear Iran that sets offa nuclear arms race in the world's most volatile region, a nuclear Iran with, with deep relationships not only with the Assad regime, but with Hezbollah, withIslamic Jihad, still I think with Hamas, other, uh, other very, uh, nasty actors.

[67:52] So, you know, I have not actually heard a, a credible comment on your part that says, "Well, you know, what..."

Karim: [67:58] But if you concede that if we were to take military action and they reconstitute, um, several months after, they kick out all the inspectors, allthe cameras, do you concede that that will eventually require US troop presencewithin Iran?

Bret: [68:13] You know, you and I, uh, sat, had a similar debate where Dennis Ross, uh, who's kind of on your side of this issue more or less.

Karim: [68:20] In between us [indecipherable 1:08:24] .

Bret: [68:21] See, Dennis sits right here, right?

Reuel: [68:22] Right there.

Bret: [68:23] And Dennis made the interesting point, uh, and I cite him becausehe's not some crazy right winger like I am, um, Dennis makes the interesting point that he thinks in his view it would take at least two years for Iran to recover, but it actually would take five, because then they would have to reconstitute a program that was that much better defended against the possibility of a subsequent strike.

[68:46] When Israel struck the Osirak reactor in 1981, the best Israeli intelligence estimates were that Iraq would be able to reconstitute its nuclear programby the mid-1980s. In fact, we would never have had a Gulf War, we would never ha

ve been able to liberate Kuwait in 1991 had the Israelis taken the view that itwasn't worth striking Iraq, because after all, they would simply reconstitute, uh, uh, again.

[69:11] In life, delay is often a very good, uh, uh, a very good option. If someone says you have a disease, but we have something that is going to extend yourlife by 10 years, you will probably take that option, and then take your chancesafterwards.

Jessica: [69:25] Let's get a question from that side of the room. I see a womanwith her hand up, short sleeves, two, two rows in front of you. Very good.

Christine Vargas Abescent: [69:35] Uh, hello, Christine Vargas Abescent. Uh, tha

nk you gentlemen for being here today.

[69:39] I want to build a question, a point that Jessica made, in terms of a solution. But I also want to shape, not one, but two goals, that I think, uh, the first, you know, has been on the table. But the second hasn't. The first goal being, uh, let's get Iran to find it illogical to have a true nuclear weapons program both with the current regime, and amongst the young, next generation political cadre.

[70:03] And the second order goal is how to, and it's a little dangerous to say


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this out loud, because the Obama administration claims that this is not what they want to do. How to, how do we destabilize the current regime just enough thatthe young political cadres that are up and coming have some space to grow into themselves over the next generation and find it illogical to have this nuclear weapons program?

[70:27] Because what you can slide over the table as a carrot in the current situation, up to and including Obama landing in Tehran to offer this and then walkaway, making the Moula seem, uh, perhaps unreasonable, is look what's going on with Russia and the Ukraine to the woman in the blue shirt's point. Uh, let's open up Europe from a, uh, energy standpoint.

Jessica: [70:48] So, to the skeptics, uh, short of a military strike, OK. Let'sjust take it off the table for a moment. How do you affect political change in Iran, and do you see a way of empowering the next generation to actually force that kind of change away from a nuclear program onto their leadership?

Reuel: [71:06] Yeah, well obviously prayer helps, um... [laughter]

Reuel: [71:10] Uh, the uh, look, I believe this regime is going to end around the year 2025. Why? Because that's by, by the year 2025 the generation that made the revolution is going to be dying. The reason the Soviet Union ended when it did is that Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader who would had not fought in theSecond World War. His moral trajectory, his moral purpose in life wasn't tied up

with that definitive moment, which was the red, the red flag over the Reichstagin 1945.

[71:41] The issue is how do we get there, how do we either accelerate that moment or at least get there uh, in, uh, uh, in one piece, because a lot of bad things can happen between today and 2025 or 2030.

[71:54] Uh, one of the, I think, great shames of this administration is that inits fervor to engage the leadership of Iran, it has consistently downplayed efforts to cultivate what used to be known as the Green Movement, or the Green Revolutionaries. This was, I think, a tragically missed opportunity in 2009 when, uh,when Obama went out of his way not to meddle in what was happening, uh, in Iran, not to encourage the dissidents.

[72:23] Um, it's a shame that in 1981, 1982, names like Lahwalesa and all the names of the solidarity dissidents were common currency, not just on the Americanright, but on the American left. People from Lane Kirkland at AFL CIO to Catholic priests and the Pope, to the Reagan administration kept that solidarity movement alive and vibrant.

[72:47] And I don't see any similar efforts by this administration to do that, precisely because they're so desperate to make nice with the current leaders of Iran at the expense of the people we both hope will be the future leaders of Iran.

Bret: [73:01] Can I make one quick comment?

Jessica: [73:02] If it's quick.

Bret: [73:03] It's quick. Uh, I mean Iran has a very perverse evolution, and that is uh, as the youth, uh, continue to westernize, continue to culturally democratize, continue to look towards the west, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, the regime actually becomes more scared. It becomes, they actually hate us more. It'sa very perverse evolution. It's one that President Obama, for example, didn't understand, that the more he reached out to Hamidi the more Hamidi hated him.


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[73:30] Uh, concerning what America should do, I'd try everything. I mean, you don't know what's going to work. I would, I would certainly just keep trying, andkeep reaching out, covert action, overt action, try everything, throw, throw the kitchen sink at it. Just keep trying to do something.

Jessica: [73:47] Bob, I'd like to put a question to you, because you were just in the administration not so long ago. Gary Samore who is the President's formerweapons expert, is not an optimist, not optimistic that this deal will succeed.If success means dramatically limiting the centrifuges at Natanz, closing [indecipherable 1:14:03] , converting Iraq, and enhanced monitoring and verification,what percentage chance do you believe we'll get there?

Robert: [74:11] I don't think it requires all of those things. For example, youknow, this plutonium production reactor at Iraq, I think you can convert it to make it, you know, very poor at producing plutonium. At the underground facilityat Fordo, uh, the deeply buried one, I'd make sure we get all of those centrifuges out of there, maybe turn it into some R&D facility or something like that.

[74:36] Uh, and in terms of their overall, uh, infrastructure, uh, they have 19,000 installed centrifuges now. I think that number has to come way, way down. And their stocks of enriched uranium have to come way, way down. And I think that's the kind of deal we, the administration is trying to achieve, and that's the one, I think, if we get, uh would move uh, Iran significantly away from this brea

kout threshold.Jessica: [75:03] And what do you believe is the likelihood we get that deal?

Robert: [75:05] Um, you know, the President said 50/50. I would go uh, a littleless than that. I think it's, I think it's going to be hard to achieve that kindof a, uh, agreement. Uh, the Iranians have dug themselves in with a number of statements, including some that Reuel has mentioned. Uh, they're not showing muchflexibility. They have an inflated notion of what's achievable. I think, uh, they will, they will be proved wrong.

Jessica: [75:32] 40/60?

Robert: [75:33] Pardon?

Jessica: [75:34] 40/60?

Robert: [75:35] Yeah, I'll, I'll take maybe a little lower than 40. [laughter]

Jessica: [75:40] OK. I'd like to go down the line and ask everybody to give, uh,their final policy recommendations, what should be done, if you could, in a minute or less. Bret, you want to begin?

Bret: [75:49] You know, I was thinking that it's a pity there isn't a woman on this panel, um, because the core case, in my view, against a nuclear Iran is this. A regime that is capable of taking a stone in one hand and stoning a woman to

death who has been already buried up to her waist, should not be allowed to getanywhere near having the ability to take a nuclear weapon in its other hand anddo likewise with its neighbors.

[76:20] There needs to be not just a conservative strategic case against a nuclear Iran. There has to be a liberal case that a regime that is so barbarous as this one does not get a nuclear weapon. None of us stays awake at night knowing that Francois Hollande has his finger on the bomb. None of us stays awake at nightfeeling that David Cameron does, or that Benjamin Netanyahu does. The reason we're talking about Iran today has to do with the nature of that regime. It's scar


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y. Don't let them get weapons that are equally scary.

Jessica: [76:53] Reuel.

Reuel: [76:54] Well, to be fair to the Justice Ministry, they have recently ruled that in fact you, you, we shouldn't whack a woman's head in with stones if shecommits adultery. Now, admittedly it's not yet settled law in Iran, and there'sstill a debate, so, uh, but you should give them some credit for trying to go in that direction.

Bret: [77:12] They're becoming more moderate.

Reuel: [77:13] They're becoming more moderate. Um, you know, I, again, I would just say that it's, know thine enemy. You know. Look at the way the Ir-, the Iranian regime handles internal politics. Look how they deal with each other. Look how they deal with foreigners. Uh, and then let them have some of their own medicine. Uh, do not mirror image your own beliefs into their, into their system. SoI would say by all means, intimidate them. That does not mean that we make an immediate X at the bombing door.

[77:45] And I would agree right now from where we are I would not be in favor ofdoing at this moment, by any means though, one could make an argument we shouldhave done it a few years ago. But I think we have to establish that unless we bring more force into these negotiations, to get a good deal, uh, to get a, a, de

al that could actually stop the nuclear weapons program, uh, I think is impossible, so you have to have more force. You have to marry it to a much tougher sanctions regime. Do not worry about the sanctions regime falling apart. If in fact you make the case, I think the French will hold. As long as the French hold, Europe holds, the west holds. You can move forward.

Jessica: [78:24] Karim.

Karim: [78:25] Henry Kissinger once said there are few nations in the world withwhom the United States has more common interests and less reason to quarrel than Iran. I think we've focused exclusively the last decade on Iran's nuclear program, and we haven't focused nearly enough on what Bret was talking about. Policies which expedite political change in Iran. Because, I think once you do have a

more representative government in Iran which follows Iran's national interests,this antipathy toward America, the antipathy toward Israel, this nonsensical nuclear program don't make a lot of sense.

[78:57] I just wanted to end on one quote which I found from the French philosopher Joseph Joubert because I think that we haven't settled this debate

Reuel: [79:05] J'adore la France

Karim: [79:06] ...but, um he said, "It's better to debate a question without settling it, rather than to settle a question without debating it." So I wanted tothank...

Jessica: [laughs] [79:15] He's a conciliator.

Karim: [79:15] ...the team and Jessica.

Jessica: [79:16] Bob? You have any fancy quotes.

Robert: [79:19] Yeah, no, uh, no fancy quotes. Uh, but I do agree with Bret. Itwould be a terrible, terrible thing for Iran to get nuclear weapons. And we should go to great lengths to stop them, including use of military force. But beforewe use military force, I think we have to make every effort to see if diplomacy


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will work.

[79:37] And I think there is a diplomatic solution that involves getting strongmonitoring and early detection of breakout, lengthening the time it would take them to break out, because you've reduced their nuclear capability, and threatenincredibly to use force.

[79:54] Uh, if, uh, if we have good information that they're breaking out. I think that's the solution we should try to achieve. If we can't get a solution likethat, we should walk away from the table, and we should consider other alternatives. But let's be realistic about those other alternatives, whether it's the use of force, whether it's, uh, trying to get support for draconian sanctions. They may not be very promising.

[80:19] Uh, we may have to resort to them, but I think it would be irresponsibleof us not to make every effort to get a diplomatic solution before we turn to the alternatives.

Jessica: [80:30] All right. Gentlemen, thank you for a provocative and responsible debate. It was a pleasure and, uh, thank you... [applause]

Jessica: [80:37] ...to all of you for being here tonight. Ambassador Volker.

Ambassador Volker: [80:44] And before we leave, could I ask, could we have a rou

nd of applause for our fantastic moderator. Jessica Yellin. [applause]Ambassador Volker: [80:55] And I want to thank all of you for coming. I think this was exactly what we were looking for which was one of the most rich, robust,deep debates about the options that we face, and I want to thank all of you andthank all of you for coming. [applause]

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