IRAN, IRAQ, AND THE UNITED STATES THE NEW TRIANGLE’S IMPACT ON SECTARIANISM AND THE NUCLEAR THREAT...

8/7/2019 IRAN, IRAQ, AND THE UNITED STATES THE NEW TRIANGLES IMPACT ON SECTARIANISM AND THE NUCLEAR THREAT

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IRAN, IRAQ, AND THE UNITED STATES:THE NEW TRIANGLES IMPACT ON

SECTARIANISMAND THE NUCLEAR THREAT

Sherifa D. Zuhur

November 2006

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FOREWORD

Many observers are concerned about the best meansof discouraging sectarian conict in Iraq while stillwaging counterinsurgency efforts. Another tensionbetween regional policy goals concerns American andIraqi desires to constrain growing Iranian inuence inIraq, and in the region as a whole, and advocating morescrutiny over transnational dealings and control overweapons proliferation, while also promoting peacefulco-existence and stricter observance of sovereignty inthe Middle East. One pole around which these tensionscircumambulate is the tensions between Sunni and Shi`apolitical and religious entities. Bilateral state relationsare one level of consideration, to which must be addedAmerican concerns and those of other nations of the

region. This monograph explores the various doctrinal,historical, and political facets of these issues.

The analysis and recommendations offered hereby Dr. Sherifa Zuhur are intended to contribute to thedebate over these issues, and hopefully clarify someof the underlying questions for those who follow newdevelopments in these issue areas.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

SHERIFA D. ZUHUR is Research Professor of Islamicand Regional Studies. She has lectured widely,holding faculty positions at Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology; the University of California, Berkeley; theAmerican University in Cairo; and other universities.Dr. Zuhurs research interests include Islamic move-ments, war and peace in the Middle East, modernMiddle Eastern politics, Islamic political and religiousphilosophy, and social and cultural developments inthe Middle East. She is the author of 12 books andmonographs, and more than 51 articles and bookchapters. Dr. Zuhur holds a B.A. in Political Scienceand Arabic from UCLA, an M.A. in Islamic Studiesfrom UCLA, and a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern History

from UCLA.


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SUMMARY

What is the best possible response to growing Iranianinuence in Iraq? How does this issue relate to thecrisis over Irans efforts to obtain nuclear capabilities?Can the United States leverage one issue against theother, offering Iran incentives to shift down its nuclearprogram and, at the same time, withhold judgment onthat countrys inuence in Iraq? Or are these concernsbest dealt with separately from the American policyperspective? Beyond American foreign policy andpolicy analysis, European, Arab, Israeli, Russian, andChinese interests are factors in the new equation.

Perhaps there is no optimal response to an Irandetermined to acquire nuclear capabilities, nor to anIraqi Shii revival fostered or enhanced by Iranian soft

power. Still, to understand the dire predictions aboutthe growth of Shi`a power, or to offer constructiveadvice about the trilateral relations of Iran, Iraq, andthe United States, we must consider Iraqi-Iranianpopular, religious, and state-level dynamics. If weappreciate the strongly varying interests and politicalexperience of the Shi`a of Iraq and Iran, our fears ofthe dire scenarios predicted in the Arab world maydiminish.

Iran and Iraq historically have inuenced andthreatened each other. However, the triangle of U.S.-Iraq-Iran relations outweighs the two Middle Easternstates bilateral history, their contrasting political aims,respective grievances, and competition. Now, Iransnuclear ambitions cast a shadow on the future of both

countries, the Arabian Gulf states, Israel, and Americanforces and facilities in the region.

European efforts to extend incentives to Iran so thatit would cease uranium enrichment contrasted with


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the American administrations initial approach to thedilemma. The U.S. offer to join multistate negotiations

with Iran in June 2006, breaking with 27 years ofofcial silence, was conditional on Irans promise togive up uranium enrichment. Yet, European nationsalready had attempted negotiations with Iran in lieuof its compliance with International Atomic EnergyAgencys (IAEA) conditions.

Are these differing approaches to diplomacy theoutcome or a reection of varying responses to the warin Iraq? Does the American posture stem from long-time anger over the 1979 hostage crisis? Its projectionfor Iran in the New Middle East? European nationssometimes claim to be more knowledgeable about theMiddle East than the United States due to their rst-hand experiences in the colonial and Mandate eras andtheir lengthier tradition of Oriental studies. Possibly

this could enhance their pragmatism, resignation,diplomatic skills, or policy approaches to MiddleEastern democratization, or the issue of proliferation.European nations also may be more sanguine aboutthe potential for containing radical Islam in the regionthan the United States is.

When regime change in Iraq became a certainty,nearly all observers realized that the Shià of Iraq couldonly gain political inuence in a new governmentorganized on a representational basis. Leading guresin the Arab world, as well as some Westerners, soundedthe alarm on Irans goals in a weakened Iraq. In somecases, their charges proceed from the claim that Shiàinuence or Iranian-style militant fundamentalismhas increased throughout the region. The Shià, in

Iraq as elsewhere in the Middle East and Central Asia,have been accused of being Iranian agents.1 But somebelieve, like Reuel Marc Gerecht, resident scholar at the


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American Enterprise Institute, that Iraqi nationalismprovides the best defense against undue Iranian

inuence. Or, that foreign nations have other reasonsfor calling wolf in Iraq, namely, their Iran policies.2

One even hears that the Shi`a could be a positiveforce offsetting or detracting from radical Sunnisalasm. This idea stands in stark contrast to the visionof Iraq as a future Islamic Republic, or at least, thebreeding ground of a new Hizbullah. Some observers,like Thomas Friedman, foreign affairs columnist at theNew York Times, urge others not to make too much ofan Iranian bogeyman, pointing out that Iran had andwill continue to have inuence in Iraq, but that it is theShii Iraqis whose status had been transformed.3

In contrast, Irans political system has not changed,and there is probably little hope for encouraging reformfrom afar. In fact, Islamic revolutionary values are

being reinvigorated by the new President, MahmudAhmadinejad. Has he become a lightening rod forpopulist sentiment in Iran, a catalyst for anti-Americanand anti-Western grievances? Under his leadership,and that of a young Iraqi government strugglingwith daily crises, how will these two very importantsituations play out and what sorts of resulting risksand threats may be anticipated in the future?4

ENDNOTES

1. Craig Gordon cites General George Casey on Iranian andHizbollah training of Iraqi insurgents. Iran Cited as Threat inIraq, Newsday.com, June 23, 2006; Raymond Tanter, Irans Threatto Coalition Forces in Iraq, Washington, DC: Institute for NearEast Policy, January 15, 2004.

2. Reuel Marc Gerecht, Will Iran Win the Iraq War? WallStreet Journal, December 14, 2004; Mahan Abedin, Britain, IranPlaying with Iraqi Shiite Fire,Asia Times, October 1, 2005, www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GJ22Ak01.html.


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3. Thomas Friedman, A Political Arabesque, New York Times,December 19, 2004.

4. The informational cut-off date for this monograph wasAugust 1, 2006. It was written between January and June 2006.


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IRAN, IRAQ, AND THE UNITED STATES:THE NEW TRIANGLES IMPACT ON

SECTARIANISMAND THE NUCLEAR THREAT

INTRODUCTION

Many observers are doubly concerned by thegrowing Iranian inuence in Iraq and Irans announceddetermination to develop nuclear capabilities. Is therean optimal way for the United States to respond toeither issue, or both? The linkage of these issues affectsIrans neighbors, other Arab states, European nations,Russia, and China. A single example may be seen inBritish charges of an Iranian hand in the bombs thatkilled British soldiers in southern Iraq reported by

the BBC. The evidence concerned similarities toHizbullah-wielded devices. The correspondent drewa conclusion and then asked a loaded question. First,he noted that Iranian-British diplomacy was at such alow as a result of stalemate on the nuclear issue thatthe Foreign Ofce did not muzzle such accusations(which are rampant in Iraq). The question concernedwhich foreign powers know how Hizbullah makes abomb.1 Other accusations focus on Iranian connectionswith Shi`a militias, insurgents in Iraq, or that Iranianreligious ofcials are inltrating Iraq and spreading amore militant version of Shiism.2

In fact, there may not be a best response to thequestion of Iranian or Shi`a soft and hard power, butin order to select the least dangerous path forward,

we must rst understand Irans inuence on Iraq,Irans national self-image, and the fears of neighboringcountries regarding their minority populations, or Iraqand American inuence there.


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Iran and Iraq historically have inuenced andthreatened each other. However, the triangle of U.S.-

Iraq-Iran relations now overshadows the two MiddleEastern states bilateral history, their contrastingpolitical aims, respective grievances, and competition.Irans decision to pursue the development of nucleartechnology further complicates the relationshipbetween the three states. In addition, European effortsto extend incentives to Iran so that it would ceaseuranium enrichment contrasted with the Americanadministrations approach to the same situation. Is thisan outcome of differing approaches to the war in Iraq?Does it express long-standing American anger withIran? Or have the Europeans adopted an essentiallydifferent attitude to Middle Eastern affairs in generalthat is based on their economic interests, and extendsto questions of proliferation or democratization in the

region?When regime change in Iraq became a certainty,

all informed observers realized that the Iraqi Shiàpopulation would gain political inuence in agovernment organized on a representational basis.Many are comfortable saying that the Shià of Iraqrepresent about 60 percent of the population. But infact, it is quite possible that they make up much closerto 70 percent. Because of 1) the nature of politicaldevelopment and organization in Iraq throughoutthe 20th and early 21st centuries, 2) the Americanalliances forged with Iraqi opposition groups prior tospring 2003, 3) the emphasis put on communitarianrepresentation, and 4) outlawing the Ba`th party, Shiàreligious parties and clerics hold more inuence in Iraq

than ever.3The prominence of Islamist actors and ideas,

whether Shiì or Sunni, is reected in public opinion.


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that predominates in the Arab Middle East and somediscontent with U.S. Iraq policies.

Egypt, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia all blamed Iranfor fomenting Islamist opposition at the very least,if not more directly charging the country for incitingradicalism in their own (Egypt), funding oppositionmovements (Tunisia), and unleashing violence (SaudiArabia). Iraq could be the breeding ground of a newIslamic Republic, or at the very least, a new Hizbullah.Some observers, like Thomas Friedman, foreigncolumnist at the New York Times, caution againstmaking too much of an Iranian bogeyman, pointingout that Iran had and will continue to have inuencein Iraq, and that it is the Shi`i Iraqis whose status hadbeen transformed.11 In contrast, Irans Islamic politicalsystem remains in place, and Iranians were not ableto effect changes at the polls. Their reform movement

is not extinct, but it cannot stand up to other forces insociety or the power of the hardliners in government.Iranians, moreover, see few problems with their ownpolicies in Iraq. Instead, their ofcial government pressblames attacks on the Shi`a on the misguided policiesof the American government. As always, there is amore cooperative aspect to Irans relations with Iraq,in that the country has been willing to negotiate certainborder issues and to communicate informally with theAmerican Embassy in Iraq.

Irans Iraq policy gave way to concerns about Iranianbrinkmanship on the issue of nuclear development.Tensions circled around the person and statementsof the Iranian President. Was the new PresidentAhmadinejad a lightening rod for populist sentiment

in Iran, a catalyst for anti-American and anti-Westerngrievances? How will these two very importantsituations play out and what sorts of risks and threatscan we anticipate in the future?


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IRAQ AND THE FUTURE

Iraq is Americas most important project in a newlyimagined and more democratic Middle East. To date,a transformation of the Middle East, despite all thedifculties encountered in post-conict Iraq andAfghanistan, remains a plank of U.S. foreign policy.Paradoxically, that ambition places conservatives,including neoconservatives, on the same side of theroom as those in the region who have long opposedauthoritarianism or called for reforms, increasedpluralism, or some counterweight to their rulingelites. These U.S. intentions for the region, if theyare sincere, break with realism in our foreign policywhich, in Kissingerian mode, maintained allianceswith undemocratic rulers to promote stability and abalance of power in the area. The prevailing wisdom

for decades was that the slow steady growth of strongerpolitical institutions would produce increasinglymature political systems. These eventually shoulddemocratize, especially if free market economies wereencouraged. That thesis of political developmentdominated from the 1960s well into the 1980s when theMiddle East and the Muslim world entered an entirelynew phase.

Todays neo-realist vision for the Middle East echoessome past efforts to transform the region. At the end ofWorld War II, the British and French expected educatedelites to promote liberalism or liberal thought intheir societies. The British-sponsored Brothers ofFreedom, organized by Freya Stark and others, heldlectures and discussions with promising members of

the effendi class (gentlemen bureaucrats) in Egypt andIraq.12 Instead of white collar liberalism, the Syrian,Egyptian, and Iraqi revolutions brought an end to elite-


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based parliamentarianism and political pluralism, andaltered the class basis of regime beneciaries in those

countries.13

Thereafter, Arab unity and Arab socialismwere the chief concerns of U.S. and European interestsin the region.

American foreign policy sought an alliance ofnon-Arab states with more conservative Arab statesto balance the Arab socialism and anti-Israeli stancesof Gamal `Abd al-Nasser, President of Egypt, and theBa`th in Syria and Iraq. This produced a cold war inthe region, periodically expressed in proxy conicts asin Yemen. Virtually no one anticipated that politicalopposition, as well as social development, eventuallywould be expressed in Islamic terms in Arab states(with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia) ratherthan in Marxist/socialist discourse. It was therefore agreat shock to many observers, even in Iraq, when an

American ally, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, wasoverthrown in an Islamic revolution, and country aftercountry faced the activities of home-grown Islamistmovements.

Today, what Sunni Iraqi Arabs fear is vengeanceat the hands of some of their Shi`a compatriots due totheir horrendous treatment under Saddam. And theyprotest their exclusion from power in the new Iraq.Their Arab supporters predict a Lebanonized Iraq,and exude paranoia about a new cold war by proxiesthat might pit Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, and possiblyIran against Arab states inuenced by the sala andrevivalist movements. Since then, not only these Arabs,but others who shed no tears for Saddam Hussein areconcerned about the American dream of a New Middle

East, particularly as it has been iterated as part of theGlobal War on Terror (GWOT). They view Americaninjunctions on Arab (or Muslim) reform as the latest


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mode of imperialism, and warn that they open thedoor to regime insecurity for Iraqs neighbors. Other

observers have drawn attention to the destabilizingfeatures of intersectarian conict in Iraq as well.14

Given these fears, we wonder if American redrawingof the Middle East with Iraq as its centerpiece may betoo ambitious. Can Arab liberals be unied to takeadvantage of new circumstances, or have they beenutterly marginalized?15 Are critics in the region correctwhen they assert that America really is not committedto democratization; that this is merely a domesticappeal to rationalize the sacrices made in Iraq andcontroversial aspects of the GWOT?

The theme of transformational change in Iraq thatwould provide courage and support to other Araband Muslim democrats, and incentives for rulingelites to reform is appealing. It is more attractive than

alternative explanations for U.S. policy, for instance,those revolving around the need for oil security.According to Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice,16America could not simply leave the Middle East as itwas, dominated by authoritarian gures like SaddamHussein. Iraq was a destabilizing force in the regionunder his regime.

Secretary Rice also asserted that America would nolonger do business with dictators; that authoritarianismmust give way, an idea with great resonance in theregion. Meanwhile, within Iraq, the essential structuresof a confessional democracy, one based on ethnic orsectarian membership, are being erected. SecretaryRice has explained the difculties and resistance to thisproject by suggesting that such major transformations

are not easy; patience is called for.One of these difculties is intersectarian strife,

specically Sunni-Shi`i violence, whether in daytime


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attacks or in the gruesome discovery of bodies. ManyArab and Muslim states opposed Americas campaign

in Iraq. Among their chief voiced concerns were theoft-stated uncontrollable nature of Iraqi society and thestrength Iran wields in the regional balance of power,which they see as key factors in intersectarian conict.

Irans Islamic Republic presents an entirely differentnational model to Islamists throughout the region. It isboth populist and committed to popular representation,though power ultimately rests with the SupremeFaqih (jurist), Ayatullah Khamenei, who succeededAyatullah Khomeini, and a conservative Councilof Guardians. In Iraq, now that Islamism is stronglyrooted, one could only expect Iranian-inuencedIraqi Islamist parties like the Supreme Council for theIslamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, sometimes referredto as SAIRI) to promote movement toward the Iranian

model. However, other Iraqi political actors, includingthe leading Shi`i cleric in the country, Ayatullah Sistani,do not favor the Iranian state model, nor does Sistanipromote Ayatullah Khomeinis doctrine of vilayet-e faqih(rule of the jurist). The question is, then, whether thenewly structured forms of democratic representationwill irrevocably heighten the political aspects of IraqiShi`i Islamism? And if so, which ones, and how mightthey affect Iraq over time? Will the sectarian violencethat has plagued the country since the bombing of thegolden dome of the al-Askari mosque17 in Samarraon February 22, 2006, nally die down, only to eruptperiodically? Can such tensions be lessened throughfederal and local measures, and contained with a fullyoperational military and police force?

Democratization elsewhere in the Arab MiddleEast has mired down. An eventful 2005 democraticspring led to a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon,


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and the country now lies devastated by the 2006Israeli offensive. Most Middle Eastern governments

still are authoritarian, albeit slight movement towardpluralism in Egypt, governmental reforms in Morocco,a new public discourse on reform in Saudi Arabia,and then the electoral success of Hamas has occurred.Three-quarters of the Egyptian parliament voted toextend the long-protested Emergency Laws in thatcountry which essentially allow a suspension ofnormal legal processes and repression of opposition.Arab states complain that the battle against terrorismin their countries is hampering civil societys efforts atreform, and that governments hastened to make somecosmetic changes to please the United States, but theseare far from sufcient. Some Americans make much ofthe divergence between a Jeffersonian-style secularistdemocracy and the types of democracies and political

parties that may prevail in the region. From inside theMiddle East, would-be democracy advocates complainthat it is a matter of business as usual between theUnited States and undemocratic allies, who providelip service to reform, but not substantive changes.They are managing this because alternatives to theirgovernance are likely to be Islamist in nature.

Iraqs edging elected government is dangerouslyweak. Many observers express concern about Iransinuence at a time pregnant with uncertainty aboutIraqs cohesion. The formation of the rst independentelected Iraqi government was contentious and lengthy.The draft constitution is to undergo reform, and theexact shape of federalism in Iraq is being debated.If federalism in the Iraqi context were to lead to a

Shi`i provincial grouping, as SCIRIs leadership hadproposed, like that of the Kurds, then the specter ofa de facto Islamic Republic of Iraq might be more thanfantasy.


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SEPARATISM OR UNITY

Federalism in Iraq may lead to separatism. AShiì mini-state could be created in a completely legalmanner. However, a Shiì region, or state, might not befeasible for practical reasons. Either a three-province or anine-province grouping would be highly controversialto certain elements in the Shià population, as wellas Sunnis. The presence of oil facilities in these areas,and centers of mixed population are only part of theproblem. Iraq needs a unied national vision, whichthe Ba`th party provided, if only through extremelyrepressive practices and elimination of its politicalcompetitors. Also, separatist schemes previouslywere proposed in southern Iraq and were defeatedin the interest of a united Iraq. In the 1920s, Southernseparatists tried to found a state in the Basra area. This

idea was supported mainly by Sunni immigrants fromNajd and wealthy date merchants. Shiì men of Basra,far less inuential than its supporters, defeated thisscheme and waved the banners of Iraqi nationalism.Certain historians and those bemoaning the post-Saddam chaos in Iraq have called it an articial state,or a British creation. It is intriguing to realize youngBasrans and others in the Ottoman administration haddened an Iraq reaching from Basra to Samarra and,with that idea, defeated the separatists of their day.18

Iraqi unity and nationalism are of paramountimportance to the success of the state. Still, under thecurrent draft Iraqi constitution, the ambivalent languagethat supports a Kurdish entity, and independentlegislation in it, provides the very same rationale to any

other region, now dened as one province or more.19In Article 116, Section 2, the constitution states thatthe regional authority may amend implementation of


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the federal law, and Article 111 says that priority willbe given to the regions law in cases of dispute.20 The

legal vagueness that has and could permit signicantKurdish autonomy also would support particularregional rules in a Shi`i region, at least where mattersdo not pertain to the exclusive powers of the federalauthorities, according to Article 111. One couldenvision the application of Ja`fari family law or Islamiccriminal punishments in such a region as many Iraqisand others fear.

Oddly, the United States supported politicalleadership by the very party, SCIRI, that has made thecase most strongly for a Shi`i region.21 And the BadrCorps, SCIRIs militia, is accused of having directconnections with Iranian Revolutionary Guards,Iranian intelligence, and training.22 Following the Iraqielections and a period of debate over the designation

of portfolios, Secretary Rice and her then Britishcounterpart, Jack Straw, pressured Iraqis to form anational unity government, meeting in Iraq with al- Ja`fari, President Talabani, and others opposed to al-Ja`fari. The Iraqis still were attempting to work throughthe dispute over the nomination for prime minister,which was rst claimed by Ibrahim al-Ja`fari of theUnited Iraqi Alliance. The United States preferreda SCIRI candidate, previous Vice President AdelAbdul Mehdi.23 Secretary Rice said at that time, onthe Newshour with Jim Lehrer, that the Prime Minister,must be somebody who can unify the various blocs,the various groups of voters, who also went to thepolls and now represent the interests of their voters.24Commenting on her statements on the same program,

Professor Babak Rahimi of the University of Californiasaid, I think its giving the impression especially tothe Shia Iraqis and just generally Iraqis at large, that


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really the Americans are the ones calling the shots.25There were other factors in this effort. Clearly a key

concern was Shi`i-Sunni strife which had heightenedsince February 22, 2006, when an attack was launchedon the golden Askari mosque of Samarra. A campaignto unseat al-Ja`fari circulated around intimations thathe was ineffective and had difculty managing hisgovernment.26 According to journalist David Ignatius,Ambassador Khalilzad viewed Jafari as too weak andsectarian, and organized a rival coalition of Kurdishand Sunni politicians that outnumbered the Shiitealliance nominating al-Ja`fari.27 The Kurds believedhim to be stalling on the issue of Kirkuk, whose ethnicstatus is yet to be determined in a referendum, and themedia reported that Sunni parties were irritated byal-Ja`faris failure to take a stand against alleged Shi`ideath squad attacks on Sunnis.28 American preferences

toward the Shiite political party, SCIRI, appear to bebased on Washingtons need for more malleable andeffective leadership. But might not SCIRI leadershipeven more swiftly promote Irans growing inuence inIraq?

A slightly different explanation of the political jostling that did not focus on al-Ja`faris personalqualities goes like this. The al-Da`wa Party, moreauthentically Iraqi than SCIRI, was bolstered by thesupport of Muqtada al-Sadr, allowing al-Ja`fari todefeat narrowly SCIRI with the additional support ofindependents.29 The United States sought to outbalancethe Sadrists by defeating al-Ja`fari,30 and also obtainmore concessions to Sunnis and Kurds.31

In the end, Iraqis selected Jawad al-Maliki of the

al-Da`wah Party as Prime Minister. A leading Sunnipolitician described al-Maliki as being stronger,more insistent, and more practical than al-Ja`fari, in


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addition to being a good communicator.32 Nevertheless,intersectarian violence remained at an intolerable level

by July. Insurgent attacks continued as well.SCIRI and its militias are just one worry. The

Jaysh al-Mahdi, the militia forces of Muqtada al-Sadr, are culpable in the violence, and their pursuit ofWahhabis and other Sunnis is a denite concern thatshould be addressed through punitive measures byMuqtada himself. He has been a source of overblownaccusations concerning Irans undue inuence in Iraqas well. More importantly, he and his forces may playa role in future Shi`a in-ghting. Muqtada is a populistgure who has attracted those elements who wanta qaid (leader) rather than a spiritual guide, and anactivist less-Iranian-inuenced gure. His authoritywithin Shiism is very limited, accruing from hisfamily connections to Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, and

his father, Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr. Theleader of his fathers devotees is Ayatullah Kadhim al-Hairi, who is in Iran and has now separated himselffrom Muqtada, at least in part, because he cannotcontrol him.33

Intersectarian violence is an immediate concern, agrave obstacle to Iraqs future. A slow-moving, possiblyunavoidable Iranian inuence is not as tangible. But itis possible that there is no solution to the former issuewithout addressing the latter. A high degree of anxietyabout Irans strength in Iraq and the region is a moregeneral and widespread phenomenon.

Is it better for Iraqis to accede to American ideasregarding their new democracy, specically thatconcessions and promises made to Sunni Iraqis could

reduce the friction between the two groups and thatthey need to be institutionalized in certain ways? AreAmericans conceptualizing Iraqi-Iranian relations in


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light of intergroup tensions, or more along the lines ofinterstate inuences that have emerged with regularity

in Europe? U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzadsuggested a new approach:

Its not the U.S. policy to advocate or promote a hostilerelationship between Iraq and Iran. They are neighbors.We want to see these two countries have good relationswith each other. But good relations also mean . . . thatthere is no interference in Iraqi affairs. Good relationswith regard to all the neighbors means not to seek to

dominate, particularly Iraqi institutions or Iraqi areas,and to work together to have an Iraq . . . that can standon its own feet, is at peace internally and as well as . . .with the neighbors, to be a model.

There is a need for a change in the way one thinks aboutregional relations in this part of the world. And that isnot to look at things in a zero sum way, in an old geo-political . . . way, that in the weakness of ones neighborto see advantages for oneself. Thats what Europe didfor centuries . . . in post-World War II, there was achange in . . . that, in fact, if your neighbor is poor, ifyour neighbor is in distress, it can only send problemsfor you. You cant sell goods to a neighbor that has thatkind of problems. And Europeans learned through ahuge number of wars.

. . . the time has come for the countries of this region aswell to take another look, not to seek grandeur in themisery . . . or in the fragmentation of the neighbor orto use elements of neighboring powers state against theinterest of that country. And I think this is the messagethat Id like to send on the relations between Iraq and itsneighbors.34

It is true that during the horrible and lengthy civil war

in Lebanon, many countries in the region supportedparticular clients in that conict. That may be why the144 militias and ghting forces were able to continue


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ghting for so many years. On the other hand, theparticipation of other regional powers effected truces

and eventually the 1991 Taif Accords that ended theviolence.

This leads us to the strong expressions of concernabout Iraq voiced in the region: that it is now theplaything of Iran, that Iranian agents are hard atwork organizing the new Iraq, and that the UnitedStates apparently is blind to these trends, or worse,it is encouraging them in order to create a bloc ofnew entities that will battle Sunni salasm andsimultaneously promote U.S. interests. Further, theIran-Syria-Hizbullah axis is a matter of concern, notonly to observers who support Americas New MiddleEast, but also to Arab observers, especially in theabsence of other effective regional alliances.35

As with most fears or anxieties, a kernel of truth

supports its exaggeration. If Iraq, under a new, more just system of representation, has emancipated ShiìIraqis, then with their newfound majority and Islamistdiscourse, they might well choose to emulate aspects ofthe Shiì state next door. Islamic law, moral guidelines,and gender restrictions already are being drawn on,albeit crudely, in areas of the country. If we add tothis germ of truth the fact that Iran is a fairly strongand populous state with a huge clerical establishmentand Shiì legitimacy whereas Iraq is still weak andthreatened by a high level of insurgent violence, it ismore difcult to refute the pundits claim.

No Regional Shià Threat.

Could the Shià unite? Would they support U.S.policy objectives? Democratization? A necessarycorrective here is that observers should not think of


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the Shià as a monolith, either religiously or politically,in the past or present. Throughout the Islamic world,

the Shià do not maintain common interests beyondcertain key aspects of theology, historical experience,and legal tradition. Subsects and offshoots of ShiàIslam developed over time. These major groupingsare: 1) the Ithna Àshariyya (Twelver) Muslims whobelong to the Jaàfari legal school; 2) the Zaydiyya(of Yemen) who have their own legal school, and 3)the Ismaìliyya. Offshoots of Ismaili Islam include theDruze (Muwahhidun) and the Àlawi sect. The IthnaÀshariyya tend to regard members of the offshoot sectsas heretics, much as contemporary Sunnis, impactedby the Wahhabi rejection of Shiìsm, think of the IthnaÀshariyya.

In the brief explanations of Shiism available tothe general public, its diversity is underemphasized.

A few aspects of theology and praxis usually arecovered. These are the institution of the Imamate,the celebration of Àshura (where permitted; it is notalllowed in mixed towns in Saudi Arabia, nor was it inSaddams Iraq) in a agellant procession, and passionplays based on the history of the Shiì cause. Sunni andShiì Muslims alike believe in the doctrine of shafa` orintercession on behalf of the believers, but in Shiism,members of the ahl al-bayt (Muhammads family) andcertain Imams may provide it; for instance, SayyidnaFatima (the Prophet Muhammads daughter) mayintercede on behalf of one who is a muhibb (a lover ofGod), even if he is a sinner. A theme of redemptivesuffering, collective in nature, is ingrained deeply inShiì rituals, lamentation poetry (marathi), and visiting

of holy sites.36 The concepts ofghayba (occultation, thestate of the Twelfth Imam, the Imam Mahdi) and theintizar(the period of waiting for the return of the Imam),


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and other beliefs concerning the Twelfth Imams returnare key to Ithna Àshari (Twelver) Shiism.

Other differences between Sunnism and Shiismpertain to Islamic law, specically Shiìsms use of andbasis for ijtihad (a juridical principle that literally meansself-exertion to attain a conclusion), which was excludedby the Sunni schools of law as a source of jurisprudence.The two groups also regard ijma`, consensus, anotherlegal principle somewhat differently, with the Shiàclerics following the ijma` of the Imams and criticizingthe Sunni use of qiyas, or analogy in deductive form(mustanbit al-ìlla) in jurisprudence.37

Shiìsm subdivided because of differing opinionson the chain of religious leadership, specically thedesignation of the Imam within the institution of theImamate. Put very simply, the idea of the Imamate isa religious authority recognized by the Party of Àli

(the Shià) after the Prophets death, personied in anImam. This Shiì Imam must be distinguished from anordinary prayer leader in Sunni Islam, also known as animam, who may or may not have any advanced religioustraining. The Shiì Imam is Allahs servant, infallible,and conversant with all Quranic interpretations.38Each Imam should designate his successor, however,the sixth Imam, Ja`far al-Sadiq, died in 765 withoutdoing so. The ensuing differences of opinion producedat least six subsects, including the Ismaìli Shiìs whotrace the line of Ismaìl to their leader, the Agha Khan,the 49th Imam. Their esoteric teachings were spreadby missionaries and the powerful navy of the Fatimidempire, but are today rejected by Sunnis and TwelverMuslims in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. The larger Twelver

grouping in these countries recognized Musa as theseventh Imam, and acknowledge a line of 12 Imams,the last of which is in occultation (neither dead nor alive


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until his return to earth). The caliphs, concerned by thepotential popularity of Imams, kept them thereafter

under house arrest,39

establishing another theme ofShiism, the tension between temporal and religiousauthority.

The Zaydi Shià of contemporary Yemen, and 10thcentury Tabaristan, followed Zayd bin Àli as theirImam, who rebelled against the Ummayad ruler,Hisham, in 740. The Zaydis do not believe in theinfallibility of the Imams, nor in the doctrine of thehidden (occulted) Imam.

Other inter-Shiì rifts emerge from the competitionbetween different centers of religious scholarship.For instance, Hillah in Iraq was an important centerof Shiì activity, but was eclipsed in modern times byNajaf and Qum in Iran. Today, some speculate thatNajaf might eclipse Qum,40 since the former possesses

an undisputed marja`(Marja` al-taqlid al-mutlaq meansthe ultimate source of emulation, meaning the mostdistinguished cleric). Other clerics and Shiì Muslimscould follow his rulings and intellectual approach,namely Sistani. Whereas in Iran, the ofce of marja` hasbeen supplanted to some extent by the political ofceof the Supreme Faqih (jurist), currently AyatullahKhamenei. This dispute, which will be explained morethoroughly below, relates to the various acceptance orrejection of doctrine of rule by the jurist, vilayat-e faqih,and the future of political Islam in Iraq and Iran.

Further differences within Twelver Shiìsm thathave affected Iraqis and Iranians stem from doctrinaldisputes between usuli (rationalist) and akhbari(traditionalist) Shià. Usuli Shiìsm was the version

originally spreading from Hilla, Iraq, the center of Shiìlearning to Iran and Lebanon. Akhbari Shiism, whichcontested the emulation of the Shiì mujtahids (religious


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authorities who can utilize the legal principle of ijtihad),temporarily revived. Then, a neo-usulism, or an usuli

revival, overcame akhbarism to a great extent, whichsurvives today in Bahrain and in the city of Basra.41The two were antagonistic to the extent that akhbariswould avoid touching an usuli text without using ahandkerchief.42 The usuli tradition supports the role ofintellectual clerics who possesses àql (intellectualism)and can exercise ijtihad. Ijtihad is a method of jurisprudence solely employedby certied Shiì jurists after the 10th century, when thedoor to ijtihad was closed in Sunni Islam, and Sunniclerics instead emphasized ijma`, or consensus of thejurists (or the community of Medina) and the traditionsof the Sunni legal schools. They utilize ijma` as a sourceof law, along with the Quran, hadith (traditionsor short texts about the Prophets deeds, words, or

preferences or those of his Companions), and qiyas(analogy). This is why Shiì jurists may attain the rankof mujtahid (one who can make ijtihad) in contrast withSunni clerics who cannot claim this title. Modern-daySunni reformers have called for ijtihads reinstatementin Sunni jurisprudence. On this point and others,Shiìsm and Sunnism may not be irreconcilable; thereare elements in each sect aiming at a more peaceful,equitable, less tradition-bound manner of realizingIslamic law, society, and possibly government.

Also important is that marjaism, (marjaìyya) thereverence and emulation of a particular living Shiìreligious scholar, was upheld in usulism, thus leadingto the designation of an ultimate authority, marjaàl-taqlid al-mutlaq. The emergence of this position

lent more power to the elite Shiì ùlama.43 There hasnot always been a marja` at this level, nor would henecessarily be the authority for both Iran and Iraq.


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Individuals may follow their own marja`. In addition,usulism is attributed with injecting more activism into

the sect, but that may be as much an outcome of other20th century intellectual trends, like Marxist-Islamism,as in the views of the highly inuential Iranian writer,Àli Shariati.44

The concentration of Shià in Iran and the historicalconjunction of Shiism and Iranian nationalism makethe Islamic Republic and its clerical rule unique.Yet, Sistani could reject the ofcial philosophy ofIslamic governance held by Ayatullah Khameneiand earlier iterated by Ayatullah Khomeini in IslamicGovernment, and that is a powerful statement aboutthe decentralization and independence of Shiìleadership.

The Shià of Iraq and the Iranian population furtherdiverge ethnically, linguistically, and historically. It

may not be practical to consider the two groups asreligious, rather than political actors. Historian ofIran Nikki Keddie complained that the Shià werebelieved to behave in ways that express theirreligiosity everywhere, a myth that stemmed from theIranian Revolution. At the time, she suggested thatthe Shiis worldwide have been more inclined tofavor secularist governments and policies and to joinsecularist parties than have Sunnis.45 The majorreason for this is that outside of Iran, they have eitherbeen minorities (as in pre-civil war Lebanon, or SaudiArabia) or a disenfranchised majority (as in Iraq). Thiswas so in Iraq due to their exclusion from uppermilitary ranks in the Ottoman army, their derivationfrom impoverished rural areas, and because of the

threat that organized Shiism posed to Ba`thist Iraq.46 InBahrain, the Shià were alienated, underemployed, andtheir exclusion from the army and police underlined


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regime fears of their loyalty.47 In light of the region-wide growth of Islamism since the 1970s, it does not

seem likely that Iraqi Shiìs would support secularismas avidly today. Still, one should be very careful aboutassumptions that an Iranian-style Islamic Republic ofIraq will obtain strong popular support everywhere.Further, American foreign policy has provided a newopportunity for Iraqi Shià. In contrast, the UnitedStates has regarded the Shià of Lebanon in a verydifferent way. Although they also were and remainan underrepresented majority, the U.S. Governmentregards Hizbullah, the most popular Shià politicalparty in Lebanon, as a terrorist organization. Supportby the Syrians for Hizbullah and pressure on Syriato withdraw from Lebanon further complicate thispicture.

American interests concerning the Shiì minority

in Saudi Arabia appear to waver between the goal ofmaintaining tighter security over the oil-rich Easternprovince, and promoting more religious tolerance inthe Saudi system. As Syria is also a part of the imaginedShià crescent, one notes an additional foreign policydilemma there. It is a stretch to characterize Syria as areligious state of any type; indeed, the Ba`thi ideologydownplays religious allegiances. Still, despite Hafez al-Asads crushing of Sunni Islamism in 1982, the MuslimBrotherhood has revived. And should Bashar al-Asadsgovernment ever falter, the Sunni majority in Syriasmajor cities might well support a political dominanceof moderate Islamists like the Brotherhood.

We might extend the discussion to the Shiìpopulations in Pakistan and India. Militant attacks

have targeted the Shià of Pakistan on far too manyoccasions, but the sects relationship with the stateand its legal system differs from their counterparts inSaudi Arabia, since they have obtained a certain right


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to follow the Ja`fari madhhab, the Shià school of law inPakistan.

It should be mentioned that where Shiism hasserved as a force for centralization and communitysupport, it has been effective. That may be a functionof the Shià clergys more independent economic basisand more clearly dened hierarchy. Preachers in themosques loyal to Sistanis network in Iraq, and in theSadrist networks, have demonstrated their skills incommunity organization in Iraq,48 and Sistani himselfused his stature to calm his community and restrainvengeance. In the Muslim diaspora, it has beendifcult for Shià Muslims to unite; they have tendedto meet only in their linguistic-national groupings, butmore recently some endeavors, like the Young MuslimAssociation, support community activities and providea counterpoint to anti-Shià or anti-Muslim bias. Per-

haps these examples, added to the history of organizedclerical education and its dissemination in Shiism,can support the argument of Vali Nasr49 that Shiismcould serve as an antidote to violent salasm. The onlyproblem is that Shiism also has produced violence of arevolutionary and now state-Stalinist type emanatingfrom Iran. Therefore, for this and other reasons, itwould be better for American policymakers to avoidthe modern-day divide-and-conquer formula if thatmeans utilizing Shiism against Sunni salasm. Rather,the two sects need to seek reconciliation, especiallyin efforts in the GWOT, and in the Muslim worldsresponses to Western attacks on Muslim propensities.

IRAN AND IRAQ

Iran and Iraq have a very specic history of mutualand conicting interests. We can examine these alongwith American-Iranian and American-Iraqi relations


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at the global, regional, and national levels. For much ofSaddam Husseins reign, competitive symbiosis would

best describe this relationship. Contemporary Iranian-Iraqi relations are both complex and symbiotic.50

Ethnic tensions between Iranians and Arabs haveplayed a role in regional politics since the initial Arabconquest of Iran. Other ethnicities are representedin Sunni-Shiì tensions elsewhere; for instance, theTaliban made use of Pushtun Sunni hatred for theShiì Hazara in Afghanistan. The Hazara were treatedas heretics religiously and socially, something akinto inherited slaves in mixed communities,51 and theirethnic distinctiveness played a role in this process.Bahraini Shià are often of Iranian origin, but a morelimited number of Iraqi Shià are ethnically Persian,including many of the clerical families. The Shià ofYemen, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon are, on the other

hand, Arabs. Shiism itself was originally both anArabian peninsular and a Mesopotamian movement.The Indian and Pakistani Shiì communities, and EastAfrican Indian offshoots, are neither Arab nor Iranian.

The Shià, like Sunni Muslims, emphasize thecommonality of all believers, regardless of race ornational origin, based on the Prophets hadith, ortradition, I have been sent to the Red and Black.52Yet a historical and modern problem has been theArabs assertion that they best understand religioustraditions because the Quran was revealed in Arabic.In some areas of the Muslim world such as Indonesia,a reverence for Arab customs or authenticity is posedagainst local and more syncretic practices and beliefs.This tension, which manifests itself in a modern

debate about which Islamic practices are actually Arabcultural patterns, exists in Shiism as well as Sunnism.Likewise, clerical leadership in Shiism is Indian,


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Turkic, Iranian, and Arab. Nevertheless, in Iraq, thereis some signicance to the fact that Arabs were among

the leading clerics of Najaf. Muqtada al-Sadr and hisfollowers emphasize his Arab identity to provide acontrast to the sometimes quietist and intellectuallyelite Shiì clerics of the Hawza in Najaf, who are notArabs (for instance, Ayatullah Sistani).

Sunni hatred of the Shià became more or lessvirulent at certain historical junctures. For example,though the Fatimids were Ismaìli Shiì rulers overEgyptian Sunnis, anti-Shiì discourse did not developthere particularly until the emergence of contemporaryjihadism and anti-Iranian discourse by the state. (Egyptactually outlawed Shiism in the 1990s.) However, muchof the justication for modern-day sala antipathy tothe Shià was provided by Ibn Taymiyya, in the 14thcentury.53 Later, during the long wars of the Ottomans

against the Safavid Empire along what is now roughlythe Iraqi-Iranian border, ight and killing on the basisof sect took place on a large scale. When Sunni Afghantribes conquered Persia, hundreds of Shiì scholars andmerchants left for the shrine cities of Iraq.54

In 18th century Arabia, Muhammad Àbd al-Wahhab led a movement against what he viewed ascorrupt innovative practices, including Shiism andpopular reverence for the tombs of holy persons. TheWahhabis sacked Karbala in eastern Iraq in 1801 wherethe tomb of Husayn, grandson of the Prophet andleader of the Shiì rebellion against the Ummayads, islocated. The Wahhabi movement regarded the Shiàas heretics, and, though they number up to 45 percentof the population of Saudi Arabias Eastern province,

they could not build mosques or observe or marchat Shiì holidays. The government forbade the call toprayer, the adhan,in the Shià manner, and they were


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discriminated against in terms of their access to jobs,education, and participation in government. Prior to

public demonstrations in Hasa in 1979 and 1980, theShiì towns lacked paved roads, schools, and medicalfacilities. There was no education about the Shiàthemselves in the national system; their authors,history, and beliefs were not taught; and Shiì women,unlike other Saudi women, were not allowed toteach.55 Paradoxically, the government used to arrangefor religious students clerical study in Iraq, but theintent seems to have been to supply the communitywith its own source of religious guidance. Becauseof all of this, Shiì invective toward Sunni militancecoming from Iran, Lebanon, or Saudi Arabia tends toidentify Wahhabism, rather than Qutbismthe brandof militant Islam inspired by Sayyid Qutb, martyredGuide of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Sunni antipathy to the Shià conict is constructedprimarily on the basis of doctrinal and historicaldisagreements. The animosity between Iraqi sects is,then, a local version of a much broader dislike or hatred.Muslims have made some efforts to bridge this gap, forinstance, in the efforts of the Kubrawiyya Su order,especially under its leader, Muhammad Nurbaksh(d. 869/1464), and when Nadir Shah (d. 1747), rulerof the Afsharid state, tried to prohibit Shiì cursingand repudiation of the rst Three Caliphs and to haveImam Ja`far al-Sadiqs legal teachings recognized as afth school of Islamic law on a par with the four Sunnischools. However, Iranian ùlama at the time wereopposed to Shiisms reduction to the status of a legalschool.56 Nineteenth century Islamic reformer Jamal

al-Din al-Afghani called for the Sunnis and Shià tounite against Western imperialism. And the effort torecognize the Twelver or Jaàfari Shiì madhhab (school)


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of Islam as a legitimate legal school continued whenShaykh Mahmud al-Shaltut, the rector of Al-Azhar

University in Cairo, the foremost center of instructionin Sunni Islam, gave a fatwa to permit the instructionof that Shiì madhhab at the university in 1959.57 In Iraq,a Sunni, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz al-Badri, leader of theHizb al-Tahrir, bravely preached against the Ba`thiregimes arrest, torture, and public accusations againstSayyid Mahdi, the son of Ayatullah Hakim. He wasthen arrested and killed in prison, his tortured bodydumped at his doorstepone of the rst martyrs ofthe al-Bakr-Hussayn regime.58

Sunni objections to the Shià stem from the latterssupport of Àli ibn Abi Talib as Caliph, and in hisstatus as Imam in the Shiì institution of the aimah,the ultimately legitimate Muslim rulers. Therefore,Sunnis protest the Shiì phrase Ashhadu anna Àliyan

wali Allah (I testify that Àli is the designated agentof Allah), which the Shià add to the customarytestimony of faith (shahada). Similarly, the Shià citeQuranic verses that they say were deleted from thestandard Quran which mention Alis right to succeedas Caliph. As was explained above, Shià believe thatthe aimah, or chain of Imams, are infallible and canintercede on behalf of the believer. Sunnis object to allof these ideas, as well as the Shiì deemphasis on theCompanions of the Prophet and the practice of revilingthe rst three Caliphs. They consider the Shiì practicesof temporary marriage (mutàh in Arabic, sigheh inFarsi) and dissimulation called taqiya (not revealingthat one is a Shià) illegal.59 Often Sunnis, unfamiliarwith Shiì doctrine, accuse the Shià of worshipping

Àli, rather than God, or of not recognizing the ProphetMuhammad at all, which is decidedly not the case inShiism.


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In addition, the ethno-historical distaste of Persiansfor Arabs, the bitterness generated by the Iran-Iraq

war, unwillingness of Iraqi Shiì organizations toassume subservience to Tehran (with the exception ofSCIRI) are all factors that discourage alliances betweenthe two groups. Anti-Arab feeling stemming from thedestruction of the Sassanian empire by the Muslimarmy is not paralleled in other conquered regionsNorth Africa for example. When the mawali, clientsof the Muslims, were disadvantaged as comparedto earlier converts privileges (for example, in theirsharing of the conquest booty), territorial and ethno-historical loyalties created frictions in the Ummayadand Abbasid eras. East of the Tigris river, the populationfailed to adopt Arabic as a popular language, in contrastwith the territories of the former Roman empire to theWest and Egypt. Instead, the old language, Pahlavi,

gave way to a Muslim Persian (written in Arabicscript) which enjoyed a literary revival from 1111 to1274.60 The elite elevation of Persian as a language andculture continued into the Ottoman period. An entirecentury of that Ottoman era featured a war betweenthe Safavids of Iran and the Ottomans. This period,more than any other, dened Irans national identitywith Shiism and established the Iraqi-Iranian borders,more or less up to the present. Saddam Hussayn useda specic term for that earlier Persian literary revivalto demarcate Shiì Iraqis whom he said were disloyalto their country, shuùbi.61 The word implied onewho rejected Arab identity. Saddam was not the rstcontemporary Iraqi leader to use this invective againstthe Shià; it had been a favorite epithet of Sati` al-Husri,

Director of Education in Faysals Iraq, and a proponentof Arab unity.62

Iranian anti-Arab sentiment strengthened duringthe bitter 8-year IranIraq war, particularly after the


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Iraqis employed chemical weapons against theirenemies. Iranians recruited students as young as age

9 for the war by justifying it as a jihad,63

a battle by thefaithful against the Godless Saddam. The resentmentsof that war are strongest on a personal level, due tothe high death and injury gures. On the other hand,Shiì pilgrimage and corpse trafc ensured that Iraqiscontinued to encounter Iranians, and when the Shiàwere exiled from Iraq in the 1990s, as well as the late1970s, many found a refuge in Iran.

Beyond pilgrim trafc, which also distinguishesthe holy cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia,Mashhad in Iran, with the tomb of Imam Reza, and ata smaller scale, Damascus (for the Shià), the Wadi al-Salam grave area in Najaf is either the largest or secondlargest in the world. The corpse trafc has markedlydened Shiì interstate relations for centuries. Its

political economy with some 100 funerals a day,motivates much of local politics. All of this, along withthe demise of Saddam Hussein, points to the resurgenceof Najaf al-Ashraf (Najaf the Noble) as the center ofShiism.

With so many Iranians traveling to Iraq, the Iraniangovernment carefully monitors their movements.A grave security risk to Iran is posed by theirdisappearance, recruitment while on pilgrimage, ormisdeed. The pilgrim and corpse trafc, the growthof Islamist Shià political parties in Iraq, and theintersectarian conict there all play a role in the variousstories of Irans inuence in Iraq.

Neighboring countries have accused the UnitedStates of emphasizing sectarianism, and hence

intersectarian tensions. Saddam treated sectarianismas a political sin, but at the same time engaged insectarianism in his attacks against the Shià and the


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Kurds. Whether because of the theme of Ba`thi Arabunity, or due to the overwhelming unfamiliarity of

Sunnis with Shiism in other parts of the Muslim world,the prevailing wisdom in Iraq and outside of it is thatsectarianism simply did not exist before 2003. This isdisingenuous. It is true, however that neither Sunnisnor Shià tended to identify themselves as such beforethe fall of the Baathist regime; in fact, it was consideredquite rude, or shameful to ask what sect one was,64 butcommunitarian membership certainly mattered.

Al-Qaidas brand of virulent anti-Shiism unfortun-ately has had a great impact, both on the Sunnipopulation in Iraq and more broadly on Muslimsthroughout the Islamic world, including thosesympathetic to salasm. Anti-Shiì rhetoric, togetherwith the theme that the Iraqi Shià were Americanallies, sharpened contemporary anti-Shiism.65

The sala Islamists identied the Shià as radhin,or renegades or apostate radhin, since they allied withWesterners in Iraq. The late Abu Musàb al-Zarqawicalled Ayatullah Sistani, the leader of indelity andheresy, and the Shià in general, the crafty evilscorpion, the enemy lying in wait with a poisonousbite, who are intent on exacting revenge on theSunnis, who had superiority over them in the Ba`thistregime.66 He, too, alluded to their desire for a Shiàsuper-state extending from Lebanon to Iran, enlistingtheir alleged acts of treachery, including their cursingof Sunnis. To bolster his opinions, he quoted from theplentiful anti-Shià comments of Imam Malik Bukhari,Ibn Hazm, and Ibn Taymiyya, important medievalIslamic gures.67 Zarqawi saw targeting the Shià as

an essential strategy in awakening the Sunnis, ashe dened four enemies in a letter to bin Ladin: 1) theAmericans; 2) the Kurds; 3) [Iraqi] soldiers, police, andagents; and, 4) the Shià:


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Those in our opinion are the key to change. I mean thattargeting and hitting them in [their] religious, politicaland military depth will provoke them to show the Sunnisthe hidden rancor working in their breasts. If we succeedin dragging them into the arena of sectarian war, it willbecome possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis asthey feel imminent danger.68

Sunni fears of the Shià were awakened; politicalentities like the Iraqi Islamic Party, as well as ordinarycitizens, have received numerous threats.69 American

and Iraqi troops discovered bodies of Iraqi Sunnis infacilities where militias had operated, perhaps with theknowledge of the Ministry of the Interior. These semi-ofcial killings compounded daily gory discoveries instreets, neighborhoods, and roads, which unfortunatelydid not abate with the death of al-Zarqawi, at least tothe time of this writing. The Shià also have suffered

tremendously from bombings, massacres, kidnappings,and assassinations, with the greatest losses of life inthe attacks on mosques, buses, and military and policerecruitment stations.

In Iraq, an immediate result is cantonization.In mixed communities, Shià and Sunnis are beingtargeted, resulting in ight, broken families, andrelocation. It is now estimated that more than 500,000

people have left their homes for these reasons. Further,Iraqis actually are changing their names so as not tobe as easily identied by either personal or familynames.70

Iraqis can differentiate between Shiì Iraqis andIranians. Some Shià, for example, clerical families, areIranian in origin. Others were classied as such in the

earliest censuses of modern Iraq. Apparently, at thattime, a great many Arab Shià stated their origin asbeing Iranian rather than Ottoman, the only twochoices proferred, in order to avoid military service.


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Of these, nearly 200,000 Iraqis were exiled in the late1970s. Earlier, Fayli Kurds, who are Shià, were exiled

from 1971-72.71

In addition to the problem of sectarianism, someevidence suggests that Iraqis are more xenophobic thanother nationalities. This xenophobia was measured inrelation to particular nationalities, rather than religioussects. A survey in 2004 of 2,325 adults was compared todata from the useful World Values Survey from othercountries. Ronald Inglehart, Mark Tessler, and MansoorMoaddel found that more than 80 percent of the Iraqipublic rejected foreigners as neighborsmore thantwice the level of rejection found in any other society.This can be broken down by nationality, with 61 percentof the Iraqis studied rejecting Turks as neighbors, 55percent not wanting Iranians as neighbors, and 44percent rejecting Jordanians as neighbors.72

SHIISMS LEGACY IN IRAQ

The Shià legacy in Iraq is that of a people who werethoroughly suppressed, deprived, and discriminatedagainst on the basis of their religious identity. Yet,the story is more complicated than the simple factsof discrimination, under-representation, and thestates conscation of Shiì property or endowments.The Shià had consisted of diverse groups: clerics; anurban lay class, including armed guilds, merchants,landowners, tribes-people, peasants; and somewhatlater, a middle class. Their elites in the period up to1958 were disempowered after the revolution throughland reform and other policies. Besides the Shiì

social legacy, Arab nationalism and secularist policiesnegatively impacted the Shià and their clerics,73although many among the Shià did support Bathism


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and other secular ideologies. Arab nationalism initiallywas not as popular in Iraq as in Syria, but the Iraqi

ofcer corps, entirely Sunni, welcomed such ideasand opposed Iraqism.74 The chief ofcial means fortargeting the Shià was by way of calling them a sect,taifa, that was responsible for divisive sectarianism(taiyya), particularly in the service of imperialism.75To understand the gravity of this charge, one mustkeep in mind the way that imperialism was identiedin the Arab world. British and French imperialism, forinstance, famously promoted minorities at the expenseof the unity of the conquered population, whether theDruze and Alawis in Syria, the Maronites in Lebanon,the Berbers in North Africa, the Copts in Egypt, orthe Assyrians in Iraq.76 Divide and conquer policiesweakened the fabric of the Arab world, according tothis way of thought, allowing for Zionist victories in

Palestine and weakening local governments.While Saddam Hussein was well aware of and

manipulated growing Islamist sentiments in theSunni community, the Shiì Islamist movement, whichdeveloped decades earlier, was repressed at differentstages. The ùlama rst organized the Shiì Islamicmovement to deect the inroads made on piety bycommunism, Ba`thi secularism, and Arab national-ism.77 They established study circles, published booksand periodicals, and opposed certain governmentpolicies such as land reform. The al-Da`wah Party,which dates from this period, contacted their Sunnicounterpart, the Muslim Brotherhood, for support of anIslamic state, and together they obtained a license for theIslamic Party in 1960. The Islamic Action Organization,

formed in the mid-1970s, was the second response toBathist suppression, and it coalesced around attackson Hassan Shirazi, his brother, Muhammad Hussain


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Shirazi, and their nephews, Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarisi and Hadi al-Mudarisi. This particular group

was from Karbala, certainly Hassan Shirazi was morepolitically active than the al-Da`wa leaders, and tosome degree, rivaled them.78

Repression heightened when the Shiì Islamicmovement became increasingly militant after theIranian revolution had shocked the Bathi regime.The Islamist movement acquired its own martyrs,for instance, Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr;Shahid al-Rabi` (the Fourth Martyr) or Àlima Aminaal-Sadr; and his sister, also known as Bint al-Huda,who was hanged to death with her brother on April8, 1980. Because of the violent suppression of thismovement, and its longevity and renaissance under anew government, the Islamist revival that has sweptthe entire region has impacted the largest segments

of the Shià community and characterizes the moresuccessful Shiì political parties.

In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and thecrushing of the Iraqi Islamists, the Supreme Assemblyof the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) was rst established,and its Iranian patronage aimed at the demise of theBa`thi system. The highly structured administrativebody of SCIRI has been effective particularly inthe early organizational period of the new Iraqigovernment. SCIRI, and its competitors, Muqtada al-Sadrs followers, and the Fadhila Party are all politicalactors who contrast with the hawza, the religiousestablishment inNajaf where there is an expectationthat the clerics will remain outside of politics. In post-invasion Iraq, that ideal has not always been possible,

even for Ayatullah Sistani, who urged his followersand community to cooperate with Americans. Thatis why jihadi salasts like al-Zarqawi labeled Sistani


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the arch-radhi (renegade) apostate. The traditionalclerical institution sees the future of Shiism more in

terms of moral and educational, rather than politicalinuence. On the other hand, Sistani insisted on aspeedier transfer to an Iraqi authority than some mighthave preferred. And, to maintain his legitimacy, Sistanidoes not meet with Americans (nor non-Muslims). Tosuggest that his and the hawzas role was returning toits normal state and was separate from Iraqs politicalparties, Sistani announced that he would not supportany particular political party in the 2005 elections.

Iraq provides a very great contrast with Iran on theissue of politics. Its recent experience with Americanstate-building distinguishes it from its neighbor in adifferent way.

SHIISMS POLITICAL LEGACY IN IRAN

The United States had a lengthy relationship withIran that was curtailed following the Islamic Revolutionand the hostage crisis in 1979. U.S. desired outcomesfor Iran ran counter to Shiisms political legacy andthe clerical systems struggle to continue its inuencein the country. Most experts could not see any collision,as they believed that religion was a waning inuencein modern society. Iran79 was rst centralized and unied under theSafavid rulers, the rst of whom, Shah Isma`il (1487-1524) was also a Su master and poet. DeclaringShiism their ofcial sect and forcibly convertingSunnis,80 the Safavids provided a transition to amodern consciousness of Iran as a Shi`i nation. The

Safavids battled with the armies of the OttomanEmpire in Iraq, deepening Sunni-Shiite tensions androughly establishing todays borders between the twocountries.


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Some centuries later, Iranian intellectuals reachedout in two directions to modernize their ideas and

society to Western Europe and Russia. They wereunhappy with their rulers claims to be the Shadow ofGod on Earth and strove to break their absolute politicalauthority. They also struggled or colluded with thepolitical ambitions of the British and the Russians andother Europeans who saw the potential for great protsin Iran. The language of this struggle was both Islamicand modernist. As their leaders sold off economicconcessions, Persians warmed to antiauthoritarian andantiimperialist ideas like those of the Islamic reformer,Jamal al-Din al-Afghani,81 whose servant assassinatedthe Qajar Shah in 1898. Al-Afghani had sparked ananticapitalist and proto-democratic Islamic movementin 1891 called the Tobacco Rebellion,82 under whichsome Shi`i leaders stood for antiimperialism. In 1906,

Iranians organized themselves in political societiesand militated for a constitution. Their constitutionaleffort failed in 1911, and soon thereafter World WarI embroiled the Middle East. By the end of the war, anew Middle East took shape. The Ottoman Empire thathad governed Iraq ended, and the British assumed themandate for that country. Britain and Russia, the chessplayers of the Great Game, continued their rivalryin Iran. A Cossack commander, Reza Khan, steppedinto the power vacuum, occupying Tehran with hisbrigade in 1921, and then evacuating Russian troops.He became prime minister in 1923, and abolished theQajar dynasty, in 1925, inventing a new royal lineagefor himself with the family name Pahlavi, and crownedhimself Shah.

Reza Shah and his son, Muhammad Reza Shah,attempted to centralize and modernize Iran, repressingin turn clerics, leftists, and nationalists, along withmany other varieties of intellectuals. The United States


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allied with both shahs, hoping to prevent the spreadof Soviet inuence. When the Anglo-Iranian Oil

Consortium feared Iran would nationalize its oil undernationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh,the United States participated in a plan to return theyoung Mohammad Reza Shah to power in 1953.

In the 1960s, many American political thinkerspredicted that the Shahs modernizing state eventuallywould democratize. No one imagined that religiouselements would defeat the Shah and his terrifyingsecret service, SAVAK. The Shiì ùlama maintaineda certain distance from the state through continuedcontrol over religious education in the holy cities ofMashhad and Qum in Iran and in Najaf and Karbala inIraq. Some clerics opposed the government, however,others, like the last Iranian Grand Ayatullah (a marjaàl-taqlid al-mutlaq) Burujerdi, were politically quiescent.

In contrast, Khomeini responded vociferously to thestates modernizing efforts. He was arrested in 1964and exiled to Turkey, traveling from there to Iraq in1965. In addition to Khomeinis opposition to theShah, a different version of a religious critique basedon economic and cultural trends characterized nascentactivist Shiism. One theme was the growing nancialencroachment of the West on Iran as the Shah boughtweapons from the United States and the economicsituation in the country reected the deviation offunds that could have aided development, while thepresence of many Westerners pushed up rents inTehran. Another theme was the Westoxication ofIranian society, that should be resisted Islamically.

Another locus of support for Shiì activism came

from the merchant bourgeoisie, the more traditionalsegment known in Iran as the bazaris. Merchants do notrisk their livelihoods in political ventures frequently.


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It is possible that they might not have supportedthe religious opposition if the Shah had not referred

to them as ea-ridden disgraces and punished themthrough taxes and new regulations.

THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN

The Shahs alienation of other social groups andhis Macchiavellian tactics were compounded by hisrelationship with the United States. First, the UnitedStates had helped to return him to his throne. He thenused the United States to build up his military andpolitical strength in the Gulf. That tainted the regime.Iran forged good relations with Israel, an additionalpoint of contention for the religious opposition. TheShahs economic ambitions for the country made fortrouble as well, as did his imperial image and grand

style. Trouble ignited quickly with demonstrations in thelate 1970s, and the regimes violent response triggeredmore demonstrations.83 In retrospect, it is somewhatdifcult to determine how American ofcials viewedthe prospect of a Shi`i Islamist take-over of Iran; theyapparently did not give any credence to the prospect ofrevolution until it was too late. Then questions quicklyarose as to whether discussions should be held withthe opposition, and how the United States should treatlong-time allies like the Shah.84

A revolution is, by denition, the forcibleoverthrow of an established government by a peoplegoverned.85 That is what took place in Iran after aseries of demonstrations and crippling strikes in the oilindustry and newspapers in 1978. The Shah departed

Iran, and Khomeini triumphantly returned on February1, 1979.


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The ensuing hostage crisis arose out of a strugglebetween Iranians about the character and red lines

of the revolution. A cultural war against imperialismand Western inuence began and heightened from1979 through 1981. As part of this process, Iranianstudents took over the American Embassy and seizedhostages to protest the Shahs arrival in the UnitedStates for medical treatment. His entry into the UnitedStates countered the advice of Ambassador Sullivanto Cyrus Vance, although Henry Kissinger, ZbigniewBrezinski, and David Rockefeller had lobbied for theShahs admittance.86 The hostage takers played onparanoid fears that the United States would unseat thenew regime, and popular anger that the Shah and hisfamily had escaped Iran with their great wealth intact.To punish these Americans for being spies and theircountrys close relationship with the Shah, the hostages

were held for 444 days, although their captors releasedve women, eight African-Americans, and more than30 non-U.S. citizens.

Ayatullah Khomeini, who most likely was unawareof the plan to seize the embassy, fully supported thehostage takers once they had accomplished this action.The seizure of hostages was wildly popular withordinary Iranians, and the Majlis (the Iranian Parliament)eventually adopted Khomeinis four demands fromthe United States.87 The hostage crisis powerfully andpsychologically affected Americans. The crisis led to agasoline shortage and rationing. Although ofcial U.S.policy was to refuse to deal with terrorists, a militaryattempt to rescue the hostages failed and enraged theIranian public and disappointed Americans. President

Jimmy Carter, himself, considered the hostage crisisto be the foremost of three issues leading to hisfailure to be re-elected.88 The United States eventually


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negotiated the release of the hostages by promising notto intervene in Iranian affairs, unfreezing $11 billion

in frozen assets,89

and freezing the Shahs familysproperty. The announcement of successful negotiationsending the hostage crisis coincided with PresidentRonald Reagans inauguration on January 20, 1981.The hostage release precipitated a struggle betweenIranian political forces as well as a showdown betweenKhomeini and then-President Bani Sadr.

Under President Reagan, the United States wasovertly hostile both to Iran and its Islamist ideals, yet itsrepresentatives again negotiated with Iran for the livesof U.S. hostages in Lebanon. Iranians suffered fromthe long war with Iraq, in which the United States, aswell as Arab states, supported Saddam Hussein, whoinitially thought he could seize Iranian territory.

The Clinton administration initially improved trade

relations with Iran but subsequently toughened itsstance.90 In January 1995, President Bill Clinton calledfor an overthrow of the Iraqi and Iranian governmentsand reportedly authorized a Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) covert operation against Iran becauseof reports that the Russians were going to build twonuclear power reactors in Iran.91

Irans Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorism.

Iranian leaders proclaimed an Islamic foreignpolicy in the sense that they, like other Islamists,view Islamic goals as universal. In the revolutionaryShiì worldview, Iran was to support the oppressedmasses elsewhere, meaning the Shià of Lebanon,

other Shiì minorities, but also the Palestinians, whoare predominantly Sunni Muslims. Khomeini andhis Hezbe Jumhuriyye Islami (Islamic Republican


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Party, or IRP) explained that the Shah had betrayedMuslims with his support of Israel. In contrast,

Iran now supported the Palestinians revolutionarystruggle because Palestine is the vaqf(waqf, Arabic), orendowment-in-perpetuity (mortmain) of all Muslims,not only Arabs, or Palestinians. It cannot be sacricedthrough negotiation.

Iran indirectly supported Iranian Shi`i cleric in Tyre,Imam Musa Sadrs92 establishment of the Movement ofthe Dispossessed in Lebanon in 1974. Then in 1982, Israelinvaded Lebanon, setting up a security zone. Iranianssupported the growth of Hizbullah, providing funds,training, and a reported 1200 pasdarans in the Biqa`valley during the 1980s. Iran also has been accusedof fomenting mayhem in Saudi Arabia in plots timedduring the hajj, and the Khobar Towers incident. Earlierthe more activist Khomeini regime verbally attacked

the House of Saud for its misuse of oil wealth, alliancewith the United Statesthe Great Satanand becauseit is a monarchy, an improper form of government.

Irans Syria connection was forged in 1973 whenMusa Sadr issued a fatwa legitimizing the Syrianpresidents Alawi sect.93 In terms of Khomeinis Islamicforeign policy goals, Haz al-Asad was an odd ally,having massacred between 10,000 and 30,000 of his ownIslamist agitators, sympathizers, and ordinary citizensin the city of Hama. Demonstrating that its support ofIslamic revolution was less important than its need forregional allies, Iran used Syria to counter Iraqs power.Iran maintained a pilgrim trafc to Damascus whereSyria supported numerous dissidents, includingthe anti-Fatah Palestinians, anti-Saddam Iraqis, and

anti-Hashemite Jordanians, as well as Hizbullahrepresentatives from neighboring Lebanon.

Irans regional revolutionary inuence was moreof a chimera than a reality, perhaps because of the


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anti-Shi`a sentiment expressed even within moderateSunni Islamist entities. What local governments found

dangerous was the degree of inspiration their ownopposition saw in Iranian revolutionary populismand anti-Americanism. This extended even beyondthe Muslim world as was seen in the Salman Rushdieincident.

Shahram Chubin at the Geneva Centre for SecurityPolicy explains that Iran utilized terrorism in theservice of its political goals rather extensively throughRafsanjanis tenure as president, but notes a changefrom 1997 under Khatami. Notably better relationswith the Gulf states were formalized in an April 2001agreement with Saudi Arabia.94

While Irans foreign policy became less proactive,due to the pressures of the Iran-Iraq War, it continuedto support Hizbullah rhetorically, though the party

has now secured a rm local Lebanese support base.The Palestinian issue is perhaps the exception to amoderating of Islams regional policies. In this case,reformists or conservatives alike tend to see thestruggle of the Palestinians in terms of defensive jihad.Irans relations with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, orHizbullahs activities in the Territories are a sore pointfor the United States. After the eruption of the al-Aqsaintifadha in 2000, the Israelis claimed that Iran hadshipped some 50 tons of weapons on the ship, Karine-

A, to the Palestinian Authority. This incident was usedto further discredit President Arafat, and showed thatIran had never abandoned its meddlesome supportof terrorist activity despite its quieter prole on otherfronts.

Actually, Iraqis also broadly support the Pales-tinians. Iraqi Shi`a point to Hizbullah as a credibleorganizing force in Lebanon, as do many Sunnis. So it


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is ironic that some Iraqis would accept and propagateAmericas critique of Iran as a destabilizing force that

supports terrorism, and when they do so, often theyare expressing explicit political rationales.

Irans antipathy toward Iraq sharpened becauseof the long war with that country, but also due to theideological character of the regime. Azar Nasi, writerand professor of literature, remembers:

The war with Iraq began that September [1980] and did

not end until late July 1988. Everything that happenedto us during those 8 years of war, and the direction ourlives took afterward, was in some way shaped by thisconict. It was not the worst war in the world, althoughit left over a million dead and injured. At rst the warseemed to pull the divided country together; we were allIranian and the enemy had attacked our homeland. Buteven in this, many were not allowed to participate fully.From the regimes point of view, the enemy had attacked

not just Iran; it had attacked the Islamic Republic, and ithad attacked Islam.

The polarization created by the regime confused everyaspect of life. Not only were the forces of God ghtingan emissary of Satan, Iraqs Saddam Hussein, but theywere also ghting agents of Satan inside the country. Atall times, from the very beginning of the revolution andall through the war and after, the Islamic regime never

forgot its holy battle against its internal enemies. Allforms of criticism were now considered Iraqi-inspiredand dangerous to national security. Those groups andindividuals without a sense of loyalty to the regimesbrand of Islam were excluded from the war effort. Theyco

IRAN, IRAQ, AND THE UNITED STATES THE NEW TRIANGLE’S IMPACT ON SECTARIANISM AND THE NUCLEAR THREAT...

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