Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

27
SAFE NEVER SLEEPS A peak into the underworld… Hosted by: Jathniel Meyer & Christo van Staden, McAfee South Africa Date: 17-19 October 2011

description

Safe never sleep - a peak into the IT underworld. Security briefing from McAfee and Global Micro - Microsoft Hosting Partner of the Year 2010 and 2011. Presentation by Christo Van Staden www.globalmicro.co.za. Follow me on twitter @jjrmilner

Transcript of Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Page 1: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

SAFE NEVER SLEEPS A peak into the underworld…

Hosted by: Jathniel Meyer & Christo van Staden, McAfee South Africa Date: 17-19 October 2011

Page 2: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Introduction to the Advanced Persistent Threat & Hactivism

Page 3: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

3

Advanced Persistent Threats (APT’s)

Countermeasures

Questions and Answers

Agenda

1

2

3

Page 4: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Advanced Persistent Threat,

How was it Done

APT In action

Page 5: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Advanced Persistent Threats

Page 6: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Advanced Persistent Threats

6

1. An attack by a sophisticated adversary with deep resources and advanced penetration skills engaged in electronic espionage to support long-term strategic goals

2. Over abused marketing term used by point product security vendors to refer to “bad things from the Internet”

What is an Advanced Persistent Threat?

APTs have specific targets

Page 7: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

7

Advanced Persistent Threats

Page 8: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Simple blacklisting, signature-based solutions with MD5 hashes yield a low rate of true positives.

8

Average file size 121.85 kb

Most common AP

file names Svchost.exe, explore.exe,

lprinp.dll, wiinzf21.dll

Anomaly detection

avoidance Outbound HTTP connections

Process injection and

Service persistence

Communication 100 percent of backdoors

connect outbound-only

83 percent use TCP port

80 or 443; 17 percent are mixed

Malware Used in APTs

Page 9: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Operation Shady RAT

Page 10: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Shady RAT advanced persistent threat (APT).

10

Active command and control (C&C) server accessed by Mcafee® Labs™

Evidence of five years of attacks

Most common attack vector: Spearphishing

Operation Shady RAT

Page 11: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Coveted Data

11

Operation Shady RAT

Page 12: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Motivation

12

Operation Shady RAT

MONEY POLITICS

Page 13: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Operation Night Dragon

Page 14: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Targeted attacks & advanced persistent threats

14

Night Dragon

Page 15: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

15

Methodical and Progressive

Night Dragon

Internet Email

1. Attacker sends a spear-phishing email containing a link to a compromised web server

2. User opens infected email and the compromised website is accessed; a RAT is downloaded.

3. User account information and host configuration information is sent to a C&C server

4. Attacker uses RAT malware to conduct additional reconnaissance and systems compromises and to harvest confidential data

Web

C&C

Page 16: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Operation StuxNet

Page 17: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

17

Used 20 Zero day vulnerabilities

Stuxnet

CVE-2010-2772 – SCADA WinCC/PCS 7 vulnerability

CVE-2010-2568 - MS10-046 - LNK

CVE-2010-2729 - MS10-061 - Print Spooler

CVE-2010-2743 - MS010-073 - Privilege escalation via keyboard layout file

CVE-2010-3338 – MS010-092 - Privilege escalation via Task Scheduler

Win32k.sys (waiting CVE)

Stuxnet

Page 18: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

18

The Stuxnet Trojan was discovered in mid-June 2010 by an antimalware company in Belarus called VirusBlokAda.

It was signed with a real-looking but faked signature attributed to Realtek Semiconductor, one of the biggest producers of computer equipment.

The certificate was valid through June 10 and Stuxnet's drivers were signed in late January. It was about a week after the certificate expired that the anti-malware community first saw Stuxnet in the wild.

The malware searched the compromised system in an attempt to access the Siemens Windows SIMATIC WinCC SCADA systems database. It used a hard-coded password in the WinCC Siemens system to access operational data of the control systems stored in WinCC software’s SQL database.

Stuxnet

Page 19: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Hacktivism

Page 20: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

20

Anonymous Group stands up for Wikileaks

Hactivism

Page 21: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

21

Anonymous publishes BofA emails

Stuxnet

Page 22: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

Countermeasures

Page 23: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

23

McAfee: Complete End-to-End Protection Against All Phases of APT Attacks

Steps to Protection

Step 1 Reconnaissance

Network DLP (Prevent sensitive data from leaving)

Step 2 Network Intrusion

Firewall (blocks APT connection via IP reputation) Web Gateway (detects/blocks obfuscated malware) Email Gateway (block spear-phishing emails, links to malicious sites) Network Threat Response (detects obfuscated malware) Network Security Platform (stops malicious exploit delivery)

Step 3 Establish Backdoor

Firewall (detects/blocks APT back-channel communication) Network Threat Response (detects APT destination IPs) Application Whitelisting (prevent backdoor installation)

Page 24: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

24

McAfee: Complete End-to-End Protection Against All Phases of APT Attacks

Steps to Protection

Step 4 Install Command and Control Utilities

Web Gateway (detects/blocks access to malicious applications) Application Whitelisting (prevent unauthorized changes to systems)

Step 5 Data Ex-Filtration

Unified DLP (prevent data from leaving the network)

Step 6 Maintaining Persistence

Network User Behavioral Analysis (identifies unexpected user behavior during APT reconnaissance and data collection phases)

Page 25: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

25

Collaboration Proxies

Agent-based Collectors

Threat Feeds

Vulnerability Probes

Real-time Threat Analyzers

Data Protection Vaults

Authentication and Trust Brokers

Intelligent Dashboards

McAfee SaaS Architecture Vision

Page 26: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

26

McAfee SaaS Architecture Vision An intelligent security fabric that wraps around the Enterprise

Page 27: Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism

27

Find out more

Visit Global Micro Solutions: http://www.globalmicro.co.za