Introduction to Fichte

8/11/2019 Introduction to Fichte

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Chapter

One

107

521

(271)

S22

Chapter One

l l consciousness is conditioned by our

immediate consciousness

o

ourselves.

With the permission of thereader, with whom itis our task to reach agree

ment, I will address him informally in the second person.

(l) You are

undou

btedlyable to think

I ;

and insofar

as

you do thisyou

will discover that your consciousness is int:rnally determned in a specific

manner

and that you are thinking o f ~ n l y 0 I ' - ~ t h i g : viz., precisely what

you comprehend

under

the concept

I

It is this

of

which you are con

scious, and when you think

I

you are not thinking

of

any

of

the other

things of which you could otherwise well be thinking and of which you

mayhavepreviouslybeen thinking. - For themoment, I am unconcerned

with whether you may have included more or lessin the concept

I

than

I have. Yourconceptcertainlyincludes whatI am concernedwith, and this

is enough for me.

(2) Instead

of

thinkingof this particular, determinate [concept], you could

a l s o _ ~ ~ v e _ ~ ~ _ ~ l ~ t of something else: of your table, for example, or-of your

walls or your window; moreover, youactually do thinkof these objects if

summon

you todo so. You dothis inresponse toa

s ~ ~ n s

and inaccor

dance with a concept

of

what you are supposed to think

of

(which,

as

you

suppose, might just as easily have been some other object, or so I submit).

Accordingly, while engaged in this act of thinking, in this movement of

transition from thinkingof theI tothinking

of

the

t a b l ~

thewalls, etc., you

takenote

of

the

and freedom thatare involved therein. Yourthink

ing is, for you, an acting. ~ o fear that by admit ting this you may be

conceding to me ything you may latercome to regret. I am speaking of

nothing bu t the activity

of

which youbecome

~ m e d i a t e l y

conscious when

you < l _ ~ j ~ H h ~ s ~ J e . ~ - - - - a n d o n l y i n s o f a ~ as youare consciousof this activity.

If, however, you should find yourselfto be consciousof no activity at all in

this case (and many celebrated philosophers

of our

own day find

them-

106

selvesin just thissituation),then let

us

partfrom eachotherin peace atthis

point, for you willbe unable to understand anything I say from now on.

I am addressing myselfto those

of

you whounderstand what I am say

ingconcerning thispoint. Yourthinking is an acting; and hence, when you

are thinkingof some specific thing, youare acting in some specific manner.

In other words, thereason you are thinking of

p-;:ecisely

thisis because, in

thinking, youhaveacted in preciselythisway; and if, in engaging in this act

of thinking, you had acted differently (ifyou had thoughtdifferent{y), then

what you are thinking of would be something different (you would be

thinking

of something different).

(3) Youshould now be thinking of something quite specific: namely, I

This isa particularthought,and thus, according to the principle just enun

ciated, you

must

necessarily think in a particular manner in order to

pro

duce this thought. for you, intelligent reader, is this: You must

now become truly and m o s ~ t n c e . e . l y conscious of how Y0l ~ o c e e d when

y ~ t h i n 1 < . . ~ ' L .

Since

our

concepts

of

the

I

may notbe exactly the same,

I

must

assist you in doing this.

While youwere thinkingof yourtableor your wall, youwere, for your

self, the thnkng subject engaged in this act of thinking, since you, as an

intelligent reader, are

of

course aware

of

the activity involved in yourown

act

of

thinking.

On

theotherhand, what was

thought

o in thisact

of

think

ing was, for you, not you yourself, but rather something that has to be

distinguished from you. In short , in every concept of this type [ i.e. , in

everyconcept

of

an object], the thinking...s,l.lb$ct and

w ? .. i ~ _ t l t ( ) u g h ~ o K ~ r e

t W . Q _ . , ~ ~ f u . t - - . h i g s ,

as you will certainly discover within your own con

sciousness. I n ~ 1 ~ a s t , when you think ofyourself, t l ~ J l . . Y ( ) l t ~ r e , for your

self, not o n h ~ t h k j J . 1 ~ _ ~ Q k < ; 1 ; Y O 1 _ ' r ~ l s o at t b ~ m e time

t ~ ~ o f

which yooare thinking. In tl iscase the s u ~ i e ~ ~ a n d the ( ) b i e . c U ~ f t h i I ) k i n g

a r e s u p p o s e ~ ~ t o

b ~ Q e . ~ I 1 9 : , t h e . _ ~ ~ m e . The sort of acting in which you are

engaged'when you are thinking

of

yourselfis supposed to t U I _ ~ < l c k _ : I p ' o n

or revert

into

y o u ~ ~ e l f , the thinking subject.

It

FoIio w-s from this

thar the concept

o the

I or the act

o

thinking

o

the I

conssts

n

the I s acti lLupon t tseJt conversely,1uch

a Jl:ftng

1 1Z 0n itSilf

yields an

act

o thnhng o[the I and no other thnhng what50eVL. You have

ju;t discovered within yourselfthe truth

of

the first

of

these claims and

have conceded this to me.

If

you balk at the second claim and have any

doubts about whether we are warranted in affirming the converse ofour

1. dein Handeln im DenkensolI

auf

dich selbst, das Denkende, zuriickgehen.

(272)

523


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Introductions to the Wissenschafislehre

Chapter One

lW

first assertion, then I will leave i t u p to you to make the following experi

ment:

When your

thinking

turns

back

upon

yourself, as

the

thinking

sub

ject, does this ever produce any concept other than that of yourself?

Can

you even

think the

possibility that some other

concept could

be

produced

i n t hi s way? -

Th e

concept

of a self-reverting

act

of

t h i ~ I 1 _ k i J . g

a nd t he

----.-

------------------------

~

c Q ~ e p . t . . . . 9 f t ~ thus h ~ ~ ~ _ ~ ~ _ ~ c . t l y

the

same content.

2

TheJ i s _ ~ h ~ t . p o s i t s

itself,

3

and it is nothing

m o r e _ . h _ ~ J : h i s .

What posits itself is the I and

n ~ t h i n g ~ ~ r ~ N o - t h i ~ i e - i ; ~ - b ~ t

the I

produced by

the

act

we have

just

described;

and the

I can be

produced

by

no

other possible

act

except

the

one described.

Youcan also

now

appreciate

the

sense in whichyou were asked to think

of

the Linguistic signs have passed

through the hands

of

thoughtlessness

and

have acquired

some

of its indeterminacy; one is therefore unable to

make

oneself

sufficiently well

understood

simply by employirig

such

signs.

The on ly way i n whi ch a

concept

can be completely specified or

deter

mined

isby indicating

the act

through which

it

comes into being: If you

do

(273) what I say then you will

think what

I

am

thinking. This is

the method

that,

without

exception, we will

be

following in

the

course

of

our

inquiry. _

TjumgQYQJI m a L h a v ~ j I 1 . ~ I d e g many things

i l l ) : . Q u r ~ Q n ~ ~ P J . Q [ t J l e J : w h i c h

I l ~ v e l l

t

e..: ...:l.

the

concept

of

yourown

i n d i v i d l l ~ l i Y , for this tooissigni

fied

by the word I ),

you

may henceforth

pu t all of

this

aside. The only

I that I am

concerned with

here

istneonethafcomesliltoDeing through

the sheer

self-reverting

act

of

your own

thinking.

(4)

The

propositions

that

havebeen advanced are t h e . . i 1 . 1 ' : . 4 a _ ~ ~ . . ~ p , - ~ s . s n

the obser7 ation _ l l ~

htl:puust

, q,de, and

these propositions could arouse

2. erschopfen sich gegenseitig. Literally: mutually exhaust one another.

3. Das Ich ist das sich selbst Setzende.

The

verb setzen ( to posit ) isa basic

term in Fichte's technical vocabulary.

It

is the most general term onecan employ

toreferto theact consciousness itself. Anyobjectof consciousness- whetherreal

or imaginary, whetheran external objector the I itself-

is

therefore positedby

the I Taken by itself, the verb setzen does not necessarily imply any constitu

tion or creation of the object of consciousness; it simply signifies that the con

scious subject - whether f reely

or

under compulsion - puts

or

places

something within its field of awareness. T o posit something is thus an essential

condition for beingconscious at all (thoughit does not follow that we are, in fact,

always explicitly aware of all of the acts of positing involved in, for example, our

everyday consciousness of objects; on the contrary, Fichte contends that we are

typically unaware ofmany of these actsof positing- which can thus bedescribed

as occurring unconsciously - and become aware of them only through philo

sophical reflection).

doubts

only

if

one

were to

consider

them

to

be anything more

than

th e

immediate expression of

the

same. I

maintain that

the I comes into being .,24

only through a self-revertingact of thinking,

and when

I say thi s I

am

not

talking

about anything

except

whatcan

comeinto being

purelyby means

of

an act of thinking. All I

am

talking

abouthere

is

what

immediatelyappears

within my consciousness whenever I

think

in the manner indicated,and if

you too

think

in thi s

manner, then

this will immediately

appear

within

your consciousnessas well. In short, I

am

talkingonly

about theconcept

of

the Here I

am

n O y ~ ~ _ ~ ~ ~ _ ~ ~ ~ s . . c ~ . ~ . e r n e d : Y i t h J _ I Y _ ~ 1 : > . < i . n ~ : h ~ _ l m a y

have

apart

from this concept.

At

the

appropriate

t i m ~ w e w i L s e e whether

anr.0 wh-at-exteniorlecan talk aboutany beiIlg of this s() .t.aUlll. In order

to shield the reader against any possible doubts that might arise, and in

order

to protect

him against the

danger

of seeing, in

the

course of this

inquiry,

a previously

conceded proposition subsequently employed in

somesense

that

hed id not wish

to

concede, I will amend

the

propositions

just established (viz., t he I is

an

act of self-positing

and

other similar

propositions)

by adding

the phrase forthe I

At the

same time I can also explain

the

reason for

the

reader s

concern

about

perhaps

havingconceded too

much. But

I will

do

so oIlly if

the reader

will promise not to allow

himself to

become distracted thereby, for this

entire

remark is a merely incidental

one

which really does not belong here,

and

I

add

it merelyin order to avoid leaving any point obscure, even for a

moment. -

It

was asserted that

your

I comes into beingonly

through

the

reversion of your

own

act of

thinking

back

upon

itself.

You

probably

har

bor in somesmall

comer

of

your

soulthe followingobjection.to thisclaim:

Either,

I am supposed to think

bu t b ~ f o r e

I c a n t h ~ k I have to exist ; or,

I am supposed to

think

myself to directmy thinking back

upon

myself,

bu t whatever I

am

supposed to

think

of

or to turn my attention back upon

m ~ l i r . ~ _ t ~ _ x j s t j ) ~ f Q f . ~ j t ~ ~ ~ 1 j J ~ d l Q : u g h t

of or become the object of an act

of

reverting.

In

both

of

these cases, youpostulate

an

existence

of

yourself

that

is

independent

of

and

presupposed by the

thinking m,n: eing-thought-of

of yourseIf.4 In

the

former case, youpostulate

the

independent existence of

yourself as the thinking subject; in

the

latter, the independent existence

of

yourselfas

what

is to be

thought

In

connection with this objection, first (274)

simply answer for

me the

following question:

~ 1 } Q i ~ i ~ h a t _ ~ I ~ i ~ s t h _ a . t _ I 2 u

I11.\lgJ . 1ve

e ~ ~ t ~ ~ i o : . t o

your o w . . - ~ c t o hin_kj K?-

It is

undoubtedly

you

yourself who make this claim,

and when

you make

such

a c la im you a re

undoubtedly

engaging in an act of thinking. Furthermore, as you will also

4.

pos tu li rs t du ein von dem Denken und Gedachtseyn deiner selbs t unab

hangiges, und demse1ben vorauszusetzendes, Daseyn deiner selbst.


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Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre

Chapter One

III

525 claim, and as I am only too ready to concede, th is is a necessary act of

thinking, one that forces itselfupon you in this context. One nevertheless

trusts

that

it is only insofar as and only inasmuch as you think about this

existence that has to be presupposed that you possess any knowledge

of

it.

follows that this existence

of

the I is also nothing more than a posited

being

of

yourself, that is, a being that you yourself have posited.

we

examine

it

closely enough, therefore,

we

will find thatthe fact with which

you have confronted us

a ~ : J l _ n t s

tono more than this:

In

a 4 4 i J i o 1 1 1 . J h ~ a c t

ojiejP i i JKJ 2.l1idl-J f1.1J-have

a t l J r e ~ e . . n J raised

to

clear

o ~ e s s you must

I

1s.aJhiE-k

this t r

t

as tz eceded by another act o{selFpositing,

0'2.

e that is ot

acc..qrnpJ,IJJJ._ -tLb.'O'_a.n

v. clear

consciousness,

but towhic.h

the

fOrmer act refers Otnd

by means ofwhich it is co nt j if ned

Until such time as I havehad a chance to

explain to you the fecund law in accordancewith which this occurs,you can

avoid becomingmisled by the fact to which you have calledattention

if

you

will keep in mind that i t asser ts no more than what has justbeen stated.

Let

us now

to a

h i g J J ~ I ~ p e c u l a t i v e

standpoint.

1

Think

of

yourself, and payattentionto how you do this :

This

was my

first request . You had to at tend to yourself in order to understand what I

was saying (since I was discussing something that could exist only within

yourselO and in order to discover within your ownexperience the

truth of

whatI said

to

you.

Thisjttentiveness

toourselves in thisact w ~ t h ~ _ s u b j e c

five

element common to us both.

Wha,tyou

paid attention.to_was the man

nerin

which

you ,ent about

thinki

I1

gQfYQUJ.self,

whkh d.jd iiQfiliffg

from the manner

twent

about thinking

of

myself; and this was the-object

of

our investigation, the

o ?iective

element common to us both.

Now, however, I say to you:

J2 ay

a ~ e . . D - o n Q J . . - . . . o w ~ c t

o [ . ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ l l g J o

your

act

of

s ~ f - p o ~ i i l l g .

Attend to what you yourselfdid in the inquiry

you

h ~ ; - e - J u s t

completed and note how you managed to pay attention to

yourself. W at constituted the subjective ~ in the previous inquiry

must be made into

tbe object

of

the new inquiry we are now beginning.

5

S26

(2) The

point thatconcernsme here

is

notallthat easyto grasp. Yet

if

one

fails to grasp it, thenone willfail to grasp anything, since myentire theory

is based upon this. Perhaps , therefore, the reader will allow me to guide

5. As

a comparison with

1 of Fichte's lectures on Foundations of Transcen

dental Philosophy

(Wissenschaftslehre) nova methodo

reveals, Fichte

is

here simply

himthrough theentrance and to place him just ascloseas possibleto what

he

is

supposed to observe.

When you are conscious of a ~ ~ ~ j ~ ~ _ ~ ~ ' : h ' - t ~ Q . ~ v e r - of the wall over

th ere, let us say - the n, as you just conceded,

w h . a . t Y Q u . j l I . e _ ~ C l 1 J y ~ O _ I . 1 -

(27.1)

sciQus of is y o u ~ own acurlihinking..of

this wall,

and 0 l } 1 y - i I l s 9 i a r _ ~ ~ . ' y ( ) u

a r ~ ? ~ i o . l l . S - Q

this

ac t of thinking

j S . a I l } : . . C Q l l s . c i Q U J l ~ ~ ~ L Q f J h i s _ w ~ U . J ) O S -

sible.

In

order for youto be conscious

of

your own thinking, however, you

must be conscious of yourself. - YOll.S3._thaty.au...areconsci

ous

ofyour-

t.J,t in saying this, yOl .necessarilY

_.distin 1l sh_yo 1

.

b

i

kin

gJ

fronl

the

I that

i s _ t h 0 1 ' g h ~ ~ f i n

the act of thinking the I.

In order

for

xoUJobe

able

to

gothis,

however, the thinking

~ u b j e c t . w i t h i n t h i s

act.of-thinking must,

in turn, be

the.gbje.ctQf

a higheract

of

thinking, for otherwise

it

could not

be,an obje


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Introductions

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Wissensckafislehre

hapter

One

3

consciQ_usness.

6

I now repeat this same argument over and over again,

as

before, and once

we

have embarked upon such a series of inferences you

willneverbe ableto point to aplace where

we

should stop. Accordingly,

we

will always require, for every consciousness, another consciousness, one

thattakes the former

as

itsobject, and so on, forever. I thisway, therefore,

w e . w i l l J : l ~ e r

_ ~ r r ~ a p o i n t wherewewiU be-able to

aSSl:lme

the

e - x i s t ~ n c e

of

any actual consciousness. - You are conscious

of

yourself

as

an object

o f ~ ~ n s c i o u s n e s s

o ~ i y - insofar

as

you are conscious

of

yourself

as

the con

, scious subject;

but

then this conscious subject becomes, in turn, an object

of consciousness, and you must then, once again, become conscious of

yourself

as

the subject who is conscious of this object

of

consciousness

and so on, ad infinitum

How

c o l l l d - - O U - ~ - arrive tlt-1lftY oril inaleon

sciousness in this

way?

In short, consciousness s m p ~ be accQYllted-fuFin this

wa T

Once

again, what was the gist of the line of reasoning

we

just pursued, and what

is

the real reason why the nature of consciousness could not be grasped in

this way? The gist of the argument

was

as follows: I c a n ~ b ~ n s c i Q u s oany

527

o J J i ~ c t O J J . l y _ Q R t h e _ c o n d i t i o n m . a t l a m a J s o

conscious

o ~ l

that is,

of

the

conscious subject.

This

proposition is incontrovertible. -

It

was, however,

further claimed that, within my s e l f - c o n s c i ~ l : l _ s n e s s , ' : l I 1 _ ' : l ~ _ o l J i c ; c t f Q r m y

selfand that what

h ~ l c l t ~ e ~ ~ _ . t h e p r ~ v i Q u ~ L C < S ~ _ 3 1 s - ( L h Q l h . l n K Q f t h e _ ~ ~ b

ject that is conscious Qfthis.-o.bject: this subject too becomes an object, and

thus a new subject

is

re'quired, and soon

ad infinitum In ~ e r ' y c o n s c i o u s

ness, therefore, subjectand t h ~ . i > J ] j ~ ~ t w e r e _ s ~ p ~ X ' : l ~ c l J r : ~ ~ _ ~ : l h ot.her

and each was t r ~ a e d _ ' : l < i s ~ i n c t . T h i s i s ~ m Y e d i m p Q s s j b J e

fot-llS

to

C 0 I l 1 P ~ e I l ~ n d ~ 9 J J . ~ c i ( ) u s n e s S j n _ t b e a h o Y ~ _ J J 1 a n n e r

Yet.CQnsciousnessdoes exist. H e n c ~ ~ h a t wasj 1 ~ L c l a i m e . d - c o n c e r n i n g

it must beJ' Jse, and this means that tpe

9 p p ( ) ~ i t e ( ) f t h i s d a . i m j s - t r _ u e ;

that

I

is to say, there is a type o U o n s c i o ~ l ~ ~ j n _ ' Y h j c h . 2 Y . h a t j ~ e c t i v e and

;

whatis

objective cannot be separated from each other at all

but

are abso-

1 ~ . J t e l y

one and the same This, accordingly, would be the type of con-

_I sciousness that is required in order to explain consciousness at all. Let us

(276) now, without any further elaboration of this point, rktm:n straightaway

to

our

inquiry.

(3)

When you did as we asked and thought, first of objects that are sup

posed to lie outside of you, and then of yourself, you undoubtedly knew

6. das vorhin das Selbstbewusstseyn war. I.e., one's previous self-conscious

ness now becomes the object of a new higher-level act of reflection, which thus

requires the positing

of

a new subject.

th t.t

you were thinking, wha1 you were thinking, and haw.,you were think

ing. You must have known these things, for

we

were able to discuss this

with one another,

as

indeed

we

have just done.

I- ow

t h . ~ _ ~ _ < _ i ~ Q 1 : U ~ _ J 1 ~ g ~ t Q _ Q h t i . t i J 1 J h i s ~ Q n s c i m ~ l ) ~ ~ _ L 9 L y . Q l l L Q w n

think.il1g?

I

knew it immediately, you will reply. My consciousness

of

my own thinkIng not, aSltwere;-an accidental feature ofmy thinking, an

additional somethingthat is positedonly afterwards and subsequentlycon

nected with my thinking; instead, such consciousness is inseparable from

thinking. - You willand mustanswermy question inthis way, since you

are quite unable to think of your thinkingwithout having any conscious-

ness of it.

Thus from the very start,

we

could have discovered the type of con-

sciousness we were justseeking, a consciousness in which what

is

subjec

tive and what is objective are immediately united. The consciousness in

question

is

our consciousness of our own thinking. - Hence you are im-

mediately conscious of your own thinking. B u t h . Q . ~ ~ ~ ~ ) ~ ~ p _ r . ~ ~ e n t . h i s 528

t < u ' ( ) _ 1 J ~ ~ I f ? Evidently, you can do this only in the following way: Your

i n p e r ~ ~ i y j J Y w h i c 1 L i L < l i l e . ~ ~ ~ L i . \ u m n e t h i n g

outside

you (viz., at the

objectyou are thinkingabout), is, at the ~ 3 1 1 1 ~ _ t j m e , direc c;_d.withinamla

t

itselLAccording

to whatwas said above, however, self-revertingactivity

is

what generates the Accordingly, you were conscious of yourselfin your

ownact of thinking, and this s e l f : - : - ~ o n ) _ c ~ o u s n e s s w a s precisely

th e

same as

your j J l m ~ g i a t e _ c o n s c i o u ~ n e s -

of

y ( m c Q ~ n ~

t h l n k i ~ g ; -

a n d ~ this

is

true

whetheryou were thinking of some object or were thinking of yourself.

Self-consciousness is therefore immediate; what

is

subjective and what

is

o b $ ~ t i ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ - p ~ ' ; ; h l y - ~ ~ t : e d w l t h ~ ~ i l l ~ c o r i ~ ~ i ~ ~ s ~ ~ s ~ . - a ~ d - ~ ~ e . - a 1 J s - ( ) -

luteh_illle_and.thesaJDe,.

The scientific name for such an immediate consciousness is

intu-

ition-,- i which is the name by which

we

wish to designate it

as

well. The

i ~ ~ i t i o n

we

are now discussing

i S a I 1 - l ( t . . q f - J i - p o ~ i t i : n g g s - P Q s . i t i n g

(that is,

as positing anything objective whatsoever, which can also be I myself,

considered

as

a mere object); b Y - J : l ( ) u I l : l ~ l ~ . s , however, is it a . J T 1 . f : r ~ a E t

positing for then we would find ourselves once again entangled in the pre

; f ~ ~ s l y indicated impossibility of explainingconsciousness.

As

far

as

I am

concerned, everything depends upon one's understanding andbeing con

vinced of this point, which constitutes the ~ S - J Q u . n . d a . t i o n . o f the_.entire

SYSlenLtol)e.-.fll'er;lentecl

here.

7. See Kant's definition

of

intuition as the mode of cognition

[Erkenntnis]

in

which a cognition is immediately related to its object (KRV, A19/B33).


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Chapter One 115

All possiblecous-ciQusness, as something objective for a subject,

pre-

sllPposesan immediateconsciousness in whichwhat is,subjective and what

~ ~ o b j e c t i v e

are

s i ~ p l y

one andihes upe.

O t h e r ; i s ~ ,

consciousnessis.sim

p J y i n c Q m ~ e h e n s i b l e . Unless onehas graspedthe subjectand theobjectin

(277)

theirunity right from the start,one will forever seekin vain to discover any

bond between them. For thisreason, anyphilosophythat does not begin at

the point where the subject and the object are united will necessarily be

superficial and incomplete; it will be unable to explain what it is supposed

. t o explain, a nd hence it will be no philosophy at all.

J : .l I This

i m ~ 1 l i ~ t e

c O Q . ~ ~ i o l S n ~ is the intuition of the T just described.

A The i ' ; ~ ~ ; ~ M j l y p . o s i t s . i t s e l f w i t h i n ~ i ~ t ~ i t i o nand is thus at o n c e ~ ~ a t

is.subjective and whatis objective. A L o t l l e ' : ~ ( ) I s . < ; j ( ) ~ ~ ~ s s is c O l 1 n ~ ~ t e . < to

529 and mediated by. this immediate consciousness, and onlythrough thiscon

nection withimmediate consciousness does it become consciousness at all.

,,'

Immediate c O l l ~ ~ i o u s n e s s alone is unmediatedand unconditioned by any

,-tbhtg

e l ~ . It

is absolutely possible and is quite simply necessary

if

any

other consc iousness is to occur . - TJ e I should not be considered as a

1 I } ~ ~ . u b j e c t , which

is

how it has nearlyalways beenconsidereduntil now;

i n s t ~ ~ 4 L ~ t _ s J ( ) t ( t b e considered as a s , ~ j t : - c . ~ N . c t in the s e n s e j n . d i ~ e . 4 _

The sole type

of

being

of

theI with which e are here concerned is the

beingit possesses within the self-intuition we have now described; or,more

rigorously expressed, the beingof theI with which we are concerned is the

being

of

this intuition itself. I am this intuition and nothing more whatso

ever,and thisintuitionitselfis I This act of self-positing is

. 2

supposed to

produce an I that, soto speak, exists as a t h i ~ in itselfand continues toexist

independently of consciousness: Such a claim would undoubtedly be the

greatest of all absurdities. Nor does this intuition presuppose an existence

of the I as an (intuiting)thing, independentofconsciousness. Indeed, in my

opinion , such a claim would be no less absurd than the previous one;

though,

of

course, one shouldnot say this, since the most famous philoso

phers

of

our philosophical century subscribe to this opinion. T . ~ e a ~ I

m' il1t

ain

that no such existence

[o f

the I] h a s . t o . h e p r ~ s : t P P ( ) s ~ . < L i ~ asJol

lows: If you cannottalkabou.taD-y hinK.0fl ?h;chyou

are.1l

o

t.c.Q.n cio.us, and if,

i\ however, everYthing QLwhich are conscious i S J o ~ 4 i t i o n e 4 by the self-

\

c o n s c . ~ l z e r . e indicated

then:J J)J :...a.lI_1 fl lu:.t1t

l : - - o . . ~ 1 J . ~ . . t l l J l J L h i s

self

consciousness to be conditioned by some determinate object of which you are

c9isciQus:viz.-,ntheallegedexisterlce-of the rapart from a T f m t ~ t i ~ g a; d

thinking. Ei

t h e ~ J : Q : l . _ n : t

: l ~ . t _ ~ I 1 i _ t ~ a t you are

here

s p e a k i ~ g ( ) L s ( ) I T l ~ t h i n g

withoutknowing anything.

ab

9:tI

tit ( ~ h I c h

you are-hardly likely to do), or

else

y o u l 1 1 U ~ t

deIlY

t h ~ t a I 1 9 t h e r c Q n s c i Q u s n e . s s

is_conditionedhy the self-

consciousnessin

q u e ~ t i Q n

(which,

if

you haveunderstood me at all, you will

be ~ i t ~ - ~ n . a b l ~ t ~ d ~ ) . - at this point, therefore, it also becomes obvious

that, through o u r v e r y f i r s t p r o p o s i ~ o n ,

o n e J 1 . l ~ _

u n _ a v o i d . a ~ Y _ ~ _ Q < > ' p ~ . d _ the

s t a p d p o i ~ _ Q 1 t ~ ~ c ~ n J l m t a l

idea li sm not jus t for the case in quest ion ,

but for all possffi ecases=':- and that understanding this proposition is ex-

530

actly the same as being convinced of the truth

of

transcendental idealism.

The intellect thus intuitsitselfonly as an intellect, or asa pure intellect;

and ii-is pnicisffi1'ffis self mtmtion that constitutes its essential nature.

(278)

Ac'cordingly, the event that there might turn outto be someother type

of intuition as well, we are entitled to designate the type

of

intuition we

have beendiscussinghere intellectual intuition, in order to distinguish it

f rom any other type

of

intuition. -

I n ~ t e a d of

iI e1lect, I prefer to

use theterm I - : - h 0 9 ~ J . ~ because, for anyonecapableof the leastbit

of

atten

tiveness, this_terlllin.4i . o s i t e d

~ h r o ~ i J i t t s - m e r i i . i i ~ e p ~

If

what hasbeenpositedisI, thentheword self is formed.

H e n ~ e the--;ord self presupposes the concept of the I, and everything that is

thoughtto beabsolute withinthe former isborrowedfrom the concept of the latter.

Perhapsin a popularexpositionthe term self is moreconvenient, becauseit adds

a special emphasis to the concept of t he I as s uch, which - a ft er

a l l

is always

obscurely thought

of

along with the word self. Such an emphasis may well be

required by the ordinary reader, but it seems to me that in a scientific exposition

oneshouldemploythe term that designatesthis concept in themost immediateand

properway.- In a rece 1tlxpu.blishe4-W9rk intendedfor the public at large, how

ever, the

~ ~ I l _ c . e . p L o . f . h ~ _ ~ j s

d i s t i n ~ ~ e d from and opp()se


6/7

1

Thatigkeit ist Agilitat, innere B e w e g u n g ~ der Geist reisst sich selbst i iber

absolutentgegengesetztehinweg; - durch welche Beschreibung keineswegesetwa

das unbegreifliche begreiflich gemacht. (Note:

unbegreifliche

incomprehen

sible, in the sense

of

incapable

of

being discursively grasped by means

of

con

cepts. )

11

Youwereclingingtransfixedin that gaze. Freely quoted from Virgil,Aeneid,

1,495.

5

Let us now direct

our

attention to yet another circumstance involved in

observing the activity we have been asIeotOpefform. What follows, how

ever, should be treated as no more than a provisional remark from which

nothing will be immediately inferred and the implications of which will

become apparent only later. Nevertheless, wecannot let this opportunity

pass without adding the following remark.

(279) You discovered yourselfto be active both in the act of representing an

object and in the act of representing yourself. Now look again very care

fully at whatoccurred within youwhen youentertained the representation

of

this activity. Activity is agili ty or inner movement; the mind here

tears itselfaway from something absolutely opposed [to activity] - a de-

scription

that

isby no means intended, as it were, to make comprehensible

what is incomprehensible,1O but is instead designed to call attention more

forcibly to an intuition that isnecessarilypresent within everyone. -

This

agility isintuited asa process by means which

the

active force wrenches itself

awayfrom astate ofrepose,andit can beintuitedin nootherway. And ifyou

actually accomplished what we asked you to do, this is in fact how you

intuited this agility.

In

compliance with my summons, youthought

of

your table, yourwall,

etc.; and after youhad succeeded in actively producingwithin yourselfthe

thoughts of theseobjects, you

then

remained caught

up

ina state of peace

ful and unchangingcontemplationof them obtutu haerebasfixus in i lo,1I as

the poetsays). Next I asked you tothinkof yourselfandto take specialnote

of thefact thatthisactof thinking isa kindof doing. In order todo this, you

hadto tearyourselfawayfrom yourstateof contemplative repose; thatis to

say, you had to tear yourselfaway from that determinacy of your thinking

and determine your thinking differently. Moreover, you were able to no

tice that youwere activeonly insofaras youtook noteof thisact

of

wrench

ingyourselfawayand this act

of

alteringthe determinacy in question. I can

do no more here than appeal to your own inner intuition; I cannot exter-

12

Die Bestimmtheitdeines Denkens durch das Denken deinerselbst.

hapter

One

nally demonstrate to you somethingthat can existonly within you.

The result of attending to oneself in the requested manner would be

532

this: Qne


7/7

ntroductions to the issenschaftslehre

yourself, and when you understood this last word youalso engaged - in

the very act

o

understanding it - in that self-reverting activity that pro

duces the thought

of

the

But accomplished this without r e ~ i z i n g

w h a t y } u ~ ~ ~ ~ e . . _ ~ ~ i n g ,

for you were

n o L p a y i n g - I Y _ ~ ~ f i < l L a , l ~ n t i Q - t o

this.

And this was theoriginofwhat you discovered within yourownconscious

ness. I then asked you to pay attentionto how you wereable toaccomplish

this. You then engaged once again in the same activity in which you had

engaged previously, but this time you did so with attentiveness and con

SCIOusness

I lner activity, grasped in its state of repose, i s ~ e I e r a J ~ ~ _ : ~ Q D -

cept. Consequently,whatwasnecessarilyunited with the intuitionof the

-fwas-ihe concept of the I; and without this concept any consciousness of

the I would have remained impossible, for it is this concept thatfirst com

pletes and comprises consciousness.

A concept is never anything other than t h ~ V e Y _ ~ ~ t ~ y i t y of intui_tjng-

s i ~ p l y

~ , - s ~ e d , n ~ t _ ~

agili y,

but

as a state of repose and determinacy.

This is true of the concept of the I as well. The concept

of

the

IS

the

seTf-

reverting activity,

~ a s p e d

as

s o m e ~ . J g

stable and

e n d u r i n ~ t h u s

it is in

this

way thattheI

as

actIve the I

as

the object ofmy activity coincide.

, Nothing is present within ordinary consciousness but concepts; ~ _ n o

)

' means are intuitions as such

e V ~ ; - ; < ; ) l I I 1 ~ r ~ d t h e r e ,

des Efie the fact that

c Q n c ~ p t s

arise o n i y h y - m e a n - ~ ~ { i l 1 _ t u i t i o n s (though this occurs-without

(281), any consciousness on our part). O 1 Y ~ h r o u g h r ~ can oneJift_one-

selftoa

c o n s < : i p l J ~ ~ s s _ } f L ~ i i ~ n , as

h a s - J ~ S i b e e n done in the caseof the

Every conscious intuition, moreover, is related to a concept, whichindi

cates the particular direction freedom has to take. T h i s ~ ~ - p l < l j n s

how, in

every case, as in the particular case

we

have been examining, ~ of

intuitiQDcanhe said-to exist prior to the intuition itself.

The

object)n

534 question is precisely the concept. From this discussion, one can see that

the

cQl1ce12tis

n o t h i D ~ b u L t h e

intuitionitself, grasped

as_a

state

of

repose

and not

as

such, i.e., not as an

activity 13

13 With the (unfulfilled)promise To becontinued infuture issues), thefourth

and final published installment

of

n

ttemptat a New Presentation

o the issen-

schaftslehre concludesat this point.

Review

o

the ourn l for rut

Published in thehilosophischesJournal 1797 .

9

Introduction to Fichte

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Transcript of Introduction to Fichte