SYMPOSIUM ON NARCISSISM: DIFFERING PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES

INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTS ON OBSERVATIONAL DUALITY

Leland van den Daele, Guest Editor

The papers published in this special issue of the Journal were first pre- sented at a symposium sponsored by the Candidates Association of the American Institute for Psychoanalysis. The aim of the conference was the examination of narcissism in psychoanalytic theory and practice, in order to promote dialogue among adherents to various psychoanalytic orientations. [n particular, the symposium organizers desired to compare the classical point of view with the contemporary approaches of Otto Kernberg, Heinz Kohut, and Karen Homey. The chairperson, Stephanie Steinfelt, Ph.D., in- vited speakers who had special expertise with these theorists. She worked tirelessly to achieve this goal. My task was to encourage presenters to pro- vide drafts of their papers and to do some editing. Not all speakers submitted their work for publication, but the papers that follow are representative. The order of papers was modified for publication to provide greater coherence.

The rubric of "narcissism" and "self-psychology" represents an emerging paradigm within psychoanalytic observation, technique, and theory. Diverse points of view within psychoanalytic psychology have been brought to bear upon the various pathologies of the self. Apparently contradictory claims are made for the validity of one point of view rather than another. As Tuttman observes later in this issue, differences among theorists may be more than merely rhetorical.

Among the issues which seem paramount in the conceptual clarification and evaluation of these competing points of view are the following: is pa- thology of the self causative, derivative, or independent of structural con- flict? What are the relations between dynamics in classical theory and self- pathology? Is it the case that narcissistic disorders implicate the primacy of early interpersonal relations in pathogenesis and relegate drive theory to a subordinate position? Are there multiple syndromes of self-disorder with, perhaps, multiple causal pathways?

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Perhaps the reader will be better able to sort out his own answers to these questions if he keeps a firm grasp of the observational duality which per- vades psychoanalytic conceptual schemes of pathology. This observational duality more than any other factor may be at the core of so much theoretical sturm und drang because, in a sense, not only is the language of observa- tion, but the universe observed, different in the two cases. 1 have in mind the distinction between "seeing from without" and "seeing from within." In psychoanalytic parlance, one mode of observation embodies language which describes traits, modes of behavior, energies, structures, and so on, but the patient or his hypothetical psychic organization is always seen from without: as T. S. Eliot wrote, "As if a magic lantern showed the nerves in pat- terns upon a screen." In the other mode, language describes wants, desires, feelings, perceptions, and so on, but always the patient's, or the analyst's, inner experience.

So much is clear, but now the rub: How are these modes of description to be related? Does psychoanalytic inquiry require the transformation of one to the other? Surely psychoanalytic theorists differ radically on how this problem is to be handled. Certain theorists have a penchant for the mental apparatus, and other theorists are immersed in man's existential state. I am reminded of William James's categories of psychologists, the "hard" and "tender" hearted. The problem of relationship between objective and sub- jective realities is put aside, and in the limiting case, the objectivist embraces a variant of behaviorism, and the subjectivist, a form of phenomenology. Within either of these polar forms of psychology, categories and rules may be formulated which have as their reference either the inner or the outer. Such categories and rules may exist at any level of abstraction, but maintain their utility only when their reference to outer reality or subjective experi- ence is clearly delineated. Unfortunately, this solution may leave us with two discrepent psychologies.

There is another approach to the relation of inner and outer reality very much prized by formal theorists: at some level of abstraction, the repre- sentation of inner and outer experience is presumed to converge to yield something like psychoanalytic metatheory. Among theorists of this persua- sion, it is fashionable to abstract from content. Content is "mere content" to be substituted in some propositional, linguistic, or cognitive form. Form, considered abstractly, is universal. Hence, whether subjective or objective, a structural psychology with point-to-point isomorphism is not only desir- able, but possible. We may therefore take hold of the myriad, changing processes that coordinate human thought and feeling, give to these proc- esses a formal identification, and construct an objective theory of mind.

Yet, there remain symbols and processes which are inextricably linked to the subjective, symbols and processes that inherently cannot find expres-

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sion in a language of structures and forces without abandonment of that which is uniquely and inextricably subjective? What if the essence of the subjective is content, so the more objectivist the formulation in the sense above, the less is revealed? This indeed would present a problem to com- monplace assumptions about what is an adequate psychological or psycho- analytic theory.

An objectivist formulation compounded of structures, operations, forces, and the like is not more inclusive than generalization laden with imagery and content; rather, it is different in kind. We are dealing with discursive universes which take their meaning from discrete strata of experience. The subjective is communicated in symbol, myth, and art: As William Blake wrote, "To see the world in a grain of sand/And heaven in a wildflower . . . . " The clinical formulation which reveals human experience and enriches clinical acumen does so to the extent that it embodies the language and imagery of the subjective. The myths of Oedipus and Narcissus are just such formulations. So also are Jung's Archetypes which Jung chose to explicate by relation to related symbols, myths, and images. Greece's Golden Age ushered in not only the birth of logic, but also of art.

The analogy of inner experience to intuitively known mathematical truth and that of external schemas to mathematical formalization suggests the application of G6del's theorem to the "inner and outer" modes of compre- hension. 1 From this vantage point, no formal theory of human psycho- dynamics, no matter how complex, can deduce the full range of resources or modes of action of the human mind. At best, various formalizations can map partial segments of inner function. Insofar as no complete and consis- tent formal psychoanalytic theory is possible in principle, we need to be content with various sets of theories which provide relatively consistent but incomplete maps of the inner world. This, in fact, describes the current status of the field. Nevertheless, aside from efforts by Gedo, 2 Stolorow and Atwood, 3 and others 4 to hierarchize or give parity to various models of pathological function, psychoanalytic factionalism persists with a view that this or that model is inherently more complete or consistent. True, a given model may be more adequate for this or that syndrome, but inherently any model cannot be consistent and complete for all mental phenomena.

The fundamental duality of psychoanalysis and the relation between these modes of experience and comprehension remains highly problematic. Observation of the within provides information that cannot be derived from the without: complementarity is inherent in the observational duality of psychoanalysis. The solution proposed in the objectivist program for a gen- eral psychoanalytic theory has faltered. This is the theoretical status of con- temporary psychoanalysis, and self-psychology is its heir.

Clinical phenomena of narcissism and pathological self-states may or may

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not be more prevelant in our era than in past history. The reader needs onJy to peruse Dostoyevesky's later works for remarkably contemporaneous portraitures of self-pathology. Perhaps the social climate of Saint Petersberg possessed deep parallels to the valuative confusions of our time, and per- haps these confusions provide a fertile soil for a greater prevalance of narcis- sistic disorders. Yet patients diagnosed in classical terms may be rife with self-pathology, such as the patient discribed by Dewald in his classic case study. ~

Whether we assert that narcissistic disorders are a corrolary to our times or that narcissistic disturbances are an accompaniment to any clinical disorder, the delineation of a selfipsychology ultimately rests upon observations of the inner life which hitherto were not mapped in classical psychoanalysis. New observation necessitates new terminology and new paradigms of formal comprehension.

In her important clinical paper on self-psychology, Esther Menaker con- trasts the psychotherapeutic requirements which arise from the structural theory with the requirements that follow from the human encounter be- tween analyst and analysand. Saul Tuttman touches a similar theme in his thoughtful evaluation of Kernberg's approach to narcissistic pathology. Steven Mitchell, in his scholarly review and critique of Kohut's theory, identifies the seeming contradictions in which Kohut is bound by his efforts to reconcile classical theory with self-psychology. My contribution to the symposium endeavors to demonstrate parallelisms in the clinical observations of Kohut and Homey and sketch out the basis for a more adequate formal theory of self-psychology.

Each of these participants in his or her own way presents a contrast be- tween two discrete modes of approach to psychoanalytic theory or therapy. if, as I have suggested, these contrasts ultimately arise from psychoanalytic observational duality, we are in a position to illuminate deep divisions in the theory and therapy of narcissistic disorders. Since the self as a datum of psychoanalysis is necessarily subjective in contrast with the ego, which sug- gests an objective perspective on a mental structure, any study of the self as self promotes engagement with subjective experience. The content of the self subtly promotes a shift in observational mode from an objectivist per- spective to a subjectivist point of view. From the subjectivist perspective, structures, cathexes, forces, and the like fade from view and nuances of feeling, self-states, relations to others, and the like take on primacy. In the papers by Menaker, Tuttman, Mitchell, and myself, the two points of view exist as complements or stark alternatives.

The two concluding papers of the symposium are relatively unencum- bered by issues related to an objectivist program for a structural psychology. Louis De Rosis's spirited presentation of Horney's clinical contributions to

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the investigation of character and human behavior illuminate the central role of human inner experience in Horney's theory. Mario Rendon's paper provides a sociopsychoanalytic perspective on narcissism in contemporary culture which links social values with subjective experience. Insofar as his paper addresses alienation, self-glorification, and mythology, his presenta- tion, while far-ranging, is grounded in the language of the interior'.

To conclude my introduction to readers of these symposium papers, [ re- call Jung's remarks that we know far too little about the inner world to pre- maturely find closure in this or that "scientific" theory. 6 A great deal can be accomplished and understood simply through psychoanalytic observation and discription of subjective experience. Yet at the same time, I believe that the dialectic between the inner and outer modes of observation and repre- sentation in psychoanalytic theory is important to the science of psycho- analysis and our ultimate comprehension of human nature. The alternatives of a pure objectivist or subjectivist approach to psychoanalytic observation are each fraught with limitations. In our efforts to coordinate the within and without, we enrich and deepen our conception of both.

REFERENCES

1. Nagel, E., and Newman, J. R. Gddel's Proof. New York: New York University Press, 1958.

2. Gedo, J. E. Beyond Interpretation: Toward a Revised Theory for Psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press, 1979.

3. Stolorow, R. D., and Atwood, G. E. Faces in a Cloud: Subjectivity in Personality Theory. New York: Jason Aronson, 1979.

4, Arieti, S. The Intrapsychic Self. New York: Basic Books, 1967. 5. Dewald, P. A. The Psychoanalytic Process: A Case Illustration. New York: Basic

Books, 1972. 6. lung, C. G. The Development of Personality. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954.

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