Interpretation, Vol 20-2

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Winter 1992-93

Charles Salman

Jeffrey S. Turner

Volume 20 Number 2Phaedrus' Cosmology in the SymposiumThe Images of Enslavement and

Incommensurability in Plato's MenoLeonard R. Sorenson Rousseau's Socratism: The Political Bearing of

"On Theatr ical Imitation"

Hila il Gild in

John Farrenkopf

Leah Bradshaw

Book Reviews

Will Morrisey

The First Crisis of Modernity: Leo Strauss onth e Thought of Rousseau

Nietzsche, Spengler, and th e Politics ofCultura l Despair

Tyranny: Ancient and Modern

Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of ThomasJefferson, by Robert W. Tucker and DavidC. Hendrickson

Christopher Kelly Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age, byGrace G. Roosevelt

Terence E. Marshall Political Philosophy, Volume 1 , by Luc Ferry


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InterpretationEditor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin, Dept. of Philosophy, Queens CollegeGeneral Editors Seth G. Benardete Charles E. Butterworth

Hilail Gildin Robert Horwitz (d . 1987)Howard B. White (d . 1974)

Consulting Editors C hristopher Bruell Joseph Cropsey Ernest L. FortinJohn Hallowell (d . 1992) Harry V. Jaffa DavidLowenthal Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr .Arnaldo Momigliano (d . 1987) Michael Oakeshott(d . 1990) Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss (d . 1973)Kenneth W. Thompson

Editors Wayne Ambler Maurice Auerbach Fred BaumannMichael Blaustein Mark Blitz Patrick CobyChristopher A. Colmo Edward J. Erler M aureenFeder-Marcus Jo seph E. Goldberg Steve HarveyPamela K. Jensen Grant B. Mindle James W.Morris Will Morrisey Aryeh L. Motzkin CharlesT. Rubin Leslie G. Rubin Bradford P. WilsonHossein Ziai Michael Zuckert Catherine Zuckert

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InterpretationWinter 1992-93 A. Volume 20 Number 2

Charles Salman Phaedrus' Cosmology in the Symposium 99Jeffrey S. Turner The Images of Enslavement and

Incommensurability in Plato's Meno 117Leonard R. Sorenson Rousseau's Socratism: The Political Bearing of

"On Theatrical Imitation" 135Hilail Gildin The First Crisis of Modernity : Leo Strauss on

the Thought of Rousseau 157John Farrenkopf Nietzsche, Spengler, and th e Politics of

Cultural Despair 165Leah Bradshaw Tyranny: Ancient and Modern 187

Book ReviewsWill Morrisey Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas

Jefferson, by Robert W. Tucker and DavidC. Hendrickson 205Christopher Kelly Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age, by

Grace G. Rooseve lt 209Terence E. Marshall Political Philosophy, Volume 1 , by Luc Ferry

Copyright 1993 interpretation

ISSN 0020-9635

217


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Phaedrus' Cosmology in the SymposiumCharles SalmanTrinity University

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND BACKGROUND

While Phaedrus' speech has rarely received th e focal attention of interpretersof the Symposium, there are several striking reasons fo r considering it to be*'ofprimary importance. Perhaps chief among these, at first blush, comes fromoutside th e Symposium itself, from th e fact that in his s ec on d g re at dialogue oneros Plato s ho u ld c ho os e Phaedrus fo r Socrates' interlocutor. Although perhaps"not without merit in point of simplicity of style and arrangement"(Bury, xxv),Phaedrus' speech seems in c er ta in o bv io us r es pe ct s th e least outstanding in th eSymposium, and this alone makes th e eponym of th e later dialogue at leastsomething of a puzzle. Why should it be Phaedrus in particular to whom Socrates must tell th e tale that eros is a kind of "divine madness,"himself beinginspired to sing of th e "hyperouranian place,"he dwelling place of th e "beingthat truly

is," beyond the horizon of th e cosmos?1Of course there are certain indications of Phaedrus' importance within th e

drama of the Symposium itself. S ince it is his complaint that no one has adequately p ra is ed e ro s which initiates th e project of th e party (177a-d), he in asense becomes th e o ve rs ee r o r a rc ho n of the symposium, and he fulfi ls this roledramatically by governing over th e giving of th e encomia. Thus Pausanias(185c), Agathon (197e), and Socrates (212b) all formally offer their speechesto him, and at several key junctures he is responsible fo r seeing to it that th edelivery of speeches goes on (cf. 194d, 199b). But there is something of perhaps still greater importance about Phaedrus that is connected with his initiatingc om pl ai nt : s in ce he is th e inaugurator of th e idea fo r th e symposium, he iscommanded to take first place in th e series of sp eeches and in that sense toconstitute th e beginning of th e collective logos on eros. It might be too much tosay that Phaedrus stands at th e symbolic arche (cf. 177d3, 178a4) or inceptionof th e reflection that th e Symposium as a whole unfolds were it not that Platoseems to thematize something like just this in th e o ft en -n o te d w o rd s of Eryx-imachus: Phaedrus should be th e first to go both because he is sitting in th e firstposition and because he is, as it were , th e "father of th e logos" (177d).

The priority that attaches to Phaedrus by virtue of his standing at th e beginning might be said to be merely formal in nature, though it would be especially

interpretation, Winter 1992-93, Vol. 20, No. 2


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100 Interpretationimportant if there were some truth to the view adopted by various commentators that there is a Platonic principle whereby "the higher is prefigured or reflected in th e lower" (Rosen 1968, 39). Although this notion is variously construed, perhaps th e most revealing formulation comes from th e analysis ofdialogue structure that has been given by Mitchell Miller.2 Viewing th e "coremotif of dialogue as an "encounter between th e philosopher and th e non-philosopher," Miller sees the first part as occupied with (i) an "elicitation" of th enonphilosopher's basic position. The elicitation is progressive in th e sense thatas the dialogue proceeds, this root n o n ph i lo s op h ic a l p o si ti o n is brought ou tm ore and m ore radically: "the goal is th e s tr on ge st a nd most t ransparent formulation of the non-philosopher's position."Ordinarily this proceeds by the elicitation and refutation of definitions from a s in gle interlocutor (as in the Meno1),although sometimes (as fo r example in the Gorgias) "the philosopher may provoke one speaker to give way to another's m or e r ad ic al representation of hisown position."The Symposium r ep re se nt s y et another variation "in which non-philosophers drive one another to deeper approaches."

This "se ts the stage fo r the s e co n d s tr uc t ur a l moment , a basic refutation bythe philosopher"which brings the nonphilosopher to the dialogical turningpoint of aporia. The Socratic conviction that th e recognition of ignorance is th enecessary prerequisite to genuine philosophical thinking explains why (ii) it isonly and at just this point that the philosopher "makes his most basic contribution, a reorienting insight that shows a path through th e aporia"a p hi lo so ph ical "suggestion" which "sets the issues at hand in a new, more properly philosophical light." The third and final moment of th e dialogue is marked by (iii) a"resumption" of the initial discussion, in effect a "testing" of whether the interlocutor has appropriated th e reorienting insight of th e dialogue's central part.The almost invariable failure of Socrates' interlocutors here (and so th e characteristic lapse back, in th e last part of dialogue, to the level of th e nonphilosopher)Miller reads, finally, as Plato's testing of us, his provocation of th e reader torehabilitate th e central insight "for himself and to "try to develop it properly."

This basic structural rhythm of (i) elicitation, (ii) refutation/reorientation,and (iii) resumption/relapse is no t difficult to locate in th e Symposium and fallsin line with an often-voiced intuition, that th e Symposium divides quite naturally into three major parts or "Acts."4 Thus to transfer briefly Miller's view tothe structure of th e Symposium: (i) in th e first five speeches Plato would beprogressively evoking a basic nonphilosophical posture, and Agathon wouldstand at its culmination, its most "radical representation." Of course the basicdramatic metaphor of th e Symposium alone is enough to indicate something ofthis sort, since th e occasion is the gathering of all th e symposiasts to celebrateAgathon, as if (to take our cue from th e meaning of his name) he embodiedtheir common sense of th e "good." Indeed after Agathon has finally spoken,Plato has all the symposiasts applaud (198a), as if to express how he has given"the strongest and most transparent formulation" of their basic and underlying


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Phaedrus' Cosmology in the Symposium 101convictions. The characteristic turning point of aporia comes with Socrates'well-known refutation of Agathon (199c-201b), which opens th e way for (ii)Socrates' introduction of his reorienting insight, his attempt to reconceive erosin a genuinely philosophical light. While it will be our task further on to try toarticulate this insight against th e backdrop of th e root nonphilosophical positionit would supplant and overcome, fo r now we can refer to Socrates' introductionof th e concept of th e "daimonic." The (iii) "test" and relapse to th e non-philosophical would , of course, be signaled by th e arrival of Alcibiades, whoevocatively portrays th e failure to be converted by th e Socratic "initiation."Here again Plato indicates the symposiasts'collective complicity by th e enthusiastic acclaim with which Alcibiades is greeted (213a), itself a dramatic foreshadowing of A t h e n s ' imminent decision to follow him in th e fatal Sicilianadventure.

These reflections, schematic as they are, allow us to state th e significance ofP h a e d r u s ' primacy in the Symposium in a somewhat stronger way. If th e first" A c t " is involved in something like a progressive elicitation, then its root non-philosophical position would already be implicit or present in germ in th e inaugurating speech of Phaedrus, if not at its most "radical" or explicit , then at itssimplest and most basic. If Agathon represents th e nonphilosophical orientationto eros at its culmination or telos, in Phaedrus Plato would be presenting it atits arche or inception.5 In this sense P h a e d r u s ' inaugural "cosmology" mightcapture the fundamental orientation to th e " o r d e r " of things that governs th enonphilosopher's " c o s m o s , " a cosmos characterized by a kind of failure of loveor th e course of a "misguided eros."6 This last expression seems especiallyappropriate in view of Diotima's own rhetoric: in her synoptic and precipitousascent to the final mystery, she repeatedly emphasizes th e need fo r th e initiateto be "properly guided,"and that he must be on th e orthe odos , and "correctly"or "properly follow." (Thus orthos appears six t imes in her description of th eascent: 210a2, 210a4, 210a6, 210e4, 211b6, 211b7.) If P h a e d r u s ' cosmologyindeed "prefigures" th e collective nonphilosophical orientation to th e "cosmos,"we might say that it shows us th e failure of love at its Platonically conceivedinception or that it stands at th e symbolic arche of Plato's dramatic disclosureof th e path of "misguided eros."From this point of view th e movement towardsAgathon is a kind of expanding recapitulation, a movement that progressivelyarticulates a "failure" already implicit in th e logos of Phaedrus in germ.7 Thuswhile Socrates explicitly addresses himself to Agathon, we might even hereimagine th e possibility of a wondrous Platonic contrivance that

S o c r a t e s '

speech could prove at the same t ime to address itself implicitly to Phaedrus',and point by point prove likewise its mimesis and reorientation.

PHAEDRUS' COSMOLOGY

First of all then, as I said, he says Phaedrus started something like this sayingthat eros is a great god (megas theos), wondrous to men and gods alike


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102 Interpretation(thaumastos en anthropois te kai theois) in many different ways , and no t th e leastin th e matter of his birth (genesin). For being among th e oldest of th e gods , he ishonored (timion), he said. And here is the proof (tekmerion): parents (gones) oferos n eit he r ex is t n or are spoken fo r by anyone either in prose (idiotou) or poetry.Hes iod does say that Chaos first came to be,but then, full-breasted Earth, always steadfast seat of all, an d eros .Both Hesiod and Acusilaus agree that after Chaos these two, Earth and Eros, cameto be . And Parmenides says of th e beginning (ten genesin):First among all th e gods , it devised (metisato) Eros.So there is agreement in many authorities that Eros is among th e oldest.8

Phaedrus begins his cosmological reflection with the claim that eros is a"great god,"while Diotima will begin saying precisely that eros is no t a god,but rather is a "great daimon" (202d7).9 To understand th e sense in which thecosmos is daimonic insofar as it is animated by eros is thus to tak e th e first stepin seeing thro ugh to th e failure of love in Phaedrus' perception of th e cosmos.Diotima reasons as follows: the gods themselves are happy (eudaimonas) andbeautiful, whereas what is characterized by eros longs after th e se th ing s and somust in some way be lacking in t hem. But precisely insofar as something longsfo r such things it cannot be wholly ignorant about them, and in this s en se w ha tis erotic must have at least some share of th e things divine. For this reason eroscan be characterized as "daimonic," being "between divinity and mortalit(202el: metaxu esti theou te kai thnetou).

A c os mo s a ni m at ed by eros is thus characterized by a kind of split or separation between "divinity an d mortality,"and insofar as the one is perceived aspossessed of good and beautiful things (202c6-7) as in som e sen se deliveredfrom th e infirmities of th e other by a longing of what is subject to the vicissitudes of genesis for w hat som eho w seem s better a nd s tr on ge r. What is erotic isthus characterized precisely by a perception of the "divine," by th e perceptionof something which s ur pa ss es w ha t is already possessed in one's life, and sowhich in turn reveals th e sense in which this existence is lacking. Eros is daimonic or "in between" precisely insofar as it separates these two, revealing adisparity between th e m or ta l and what still outranks it. For the one wh o is trulyguided by eros, the cosmos is in this way animated by th e daimonic distinctionbetween the "mortal" and th e "divine," and so th e intimation of somethingblessed which transcends w ha te ve r g oo d is already incarnate in one's mortalexistence. Phaedrus' archaic "failure" is thus a kind of desacralization of thecosmos.'0

The living experience of this absence of a distinction between th e mortal an dth e divine Plato now begins to unfold in Phaedrus' next claim, that eros is"wondrous to men and gods alike."The strong conjunction (te kai) seems intended to underscore Phaedrus' conflation and carries th e sense of "wondrous


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Phaedrus' Cosmology in the Symposium 103to men in the same way as to gods. . . To be properly initiated into th edaimonic character of eros is to see precisely a distinction between what erosseparates or holds apart, and so to see th e sense in which it media tes , as itwere , between tw o disparate halves. So it is that when Diotima now closes herinstruction on th e daimonic nature of eros, she explains to Socrates about th e"power" (202e2: dunamin) of th e daimonic, which is different for men than it isfor th e gods:

Interpreting and conveying (hermeneuon kai diaporthmeuon) human affairs to thegods and divine matters to men: from th e one , entreaties [o r needs] and sacrifices(deeseis kai thusias), from th e other commands and recompense [or return-gifts]{epitaxeis te kai amoibas) fo r th e sacrifices. Being in th e middle it fills up withboth so as to bind (sundedesthai) th e whole together with itself. Through this alldivination (mantike) proceeds and all sacred practice (hiereon tekhne) involvingsacrifices, mystery rites (teletas) spells (epoidas), and all inspired utterance(manteian) and sorcery (goeteian). A god does not mingle (mignutai) with a humanbeing, but all mingling (homilia) and conversation between gods and men takesplace through this [intermediary]. (202e-203a)

On Diotima's account eros cannot be equally "wondrous" to th e gods in th eway that it is to men as what it "conveys" to th e one is a kind of supplicatingneediness, while what it conveys to th e other is a kind of plenitude or abundance. To try now to spell out Diotima's didactic metaphor into the experienceit means to express: the one who is truly initiated into th e daimonic character oferos begins to perceive its nature as a sundesmos or bond and so to feel th e"power" by which eros would unite what it separates or holds apart. But whateros thus brings together or binds into a whole has incommensurable or incongruous sides, of themselves, as it were , incapable of "mingling" or union: onth e one hand it is characterized by importunate privat ion, and so the pathos ofbeing necessitous and distressed, but on th e other, th e

"recompense" of a prodigious boon, and so the intimation of overwhelming good fortune . These tw oare brought together, as it were , in or "through" eros, so that what is characterized by eros is characterized by the daimonic presence of dissonant or heterogeneous sides. Bringing neediness and abundance together in th e samebreast, eros moves his initiate to feel precisely th e "power" of their disparity.Indeed, "Being in the middle he is filled up with both" and in this sense comesunder the magical "spell" or "enchantment" of a "mysterious" or perhaps even"numinous" situation.

It is thus crucial to recognize th e reason for th e aura of th e hierophanous andth e mantic that surrounds Diotima's description of this moment in erotic experience. To speak of the numinous copresence (o r being "bound together") ofincongruous elements (o f themselves, as she says, incompatible, or incapableof such mingling or union) is to speak of a situation that must , in consequence,present itself as fundamentally paradoxical or mysterious a situation, to put


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104 Interpretationthis alternatively, of which there is patently no apophantic or manifest logos:the initiate feels both needy and abundantly fortunate, and there is no sayingexactly why. Thus we can now begin to understand why it is just here thatSocrates is driven to wonder about th e genesis of eros (is moved , in Plato'sdramatic metaphor , to ask about the parents of eros) while at the analogousjuncture, as we will presently see, Phaedrus should be presented as preciselynot being moved to any inquiry as to "the matter of eros'genesis.""Filled up"with th e "power" of the paradoxical copresence of heterogenous forces, theinitiate will be "inspired" to try to seek out what this mystery points back to ,moved by a "sacred" wonder to try to "divine" th e hidden meaning at the originof his eros."

In a desacralized cosmos what one thus fails to perceive is precisely th e"wondrousness"

of eros. Dwelling in a cosmos not animated by th e daimonicdistinction between the mortal and th e divine, Phaedrus' cosmos is characterized by neither the pathos of his neediness nor by th e presence of that surpassing plenitude which promises abundant "recompense," "conveying" intimat ions of a better cosmos. Not "filled up"with the dynamic strife or tensionbetween these tw o incommensurable things, he is thus not "inspired" withwonder about th e hidden origins of eros. He is characterized, ra ther , at just thispoint, by a kind of complacency or erotic inertia, precisely failing to be movedto any inquiry about "the matter of

eros'enesis."Thus P lato has him say: "Forbeing among th e oldest of th e gods, he is honored, he said. And here is the

proof (tekmerion): parents of eros neither exist nor are spoken fo r by anyoneeither in prose or poetry."12 Why Plato should connect this passivity and satisfaction to a compliant appeal to th e authority of what has been spoken by"private or public"men , we will best understand after considering th e citationwhich Phaedrus actually does invoke, but even at this point we can say thismuch: th e acquiescence in what has already been said represents exactly thecountermood to th e experience of the initiate, whose cosmos is animated by th e"power" of what presents itself as mysterious, or (to restate this in th e form ofth e relevant paradox) precisely by th e presence of an absence of logos. Feelingnothing, as it were , "para"-doxical, Phaedrus' cosmos, by contrast, is animatedwholly and only by th e doxalogical.13

At th e analogous juncture in Diotima's account, as we have already anticipated, Socrates asks about th e parents of eros,'4 that is, he is moved to inquireabout just what it is that eros "points back to." To th e one properly guided byeros, it thus becomes generative of wonder , or awakens in him a particular kindof thoughtfulness: in Plato's dramatic metaphor, a recollective or genealogicalinquiry. In this sense the wondrous thing about eros to the initiate Socrates isprecisely not that it is among th e oldest, but that it points back to somethingstill "older," the hidden logos, as one might here say, behind the genesis of hiseros. What is now revealed to th e correctly aspiring lover who thus asks afterEros' origins?


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Phaedrus' Cosmology in the Symposium 105That's rather long to narrate (diegesasthai) she answered. But I'll tell you. WhenAphrodite was born, th e gods were feasting, both th e others and Poros, son ofMetis. And when they had dined, Penia came along begging since there wasfestivity going on and she stood there by th e doors. Now Poros, having gottenquite drunk on nectar there was no wine then had gone out to Zeus' littlegarden, and heavy-headed was overcome by sleep. Here Penia schemed(epibouleuousa), since she herself was resourceless (aporian), to have a child byPoros and she lay down beside him and thereby conceived Eros. For this reasonEros has been Aphrodite's attendant and servant, because he was conceived on th eday of her birth, and also is by nature a lover of beauty because of Aphrodite'sbeing so beautiful.

As Diotima goes on to complete th e narrative, tw o essential consequences fo rEros follow upon this parentage. The first (203c4-d7) brings into th e revelationof Eros' nature a distinctly downward turn, as we are forced to confront thesense in which Eros' fate (203c5: tukhe) is less than wholly sublime: for "...first of all, Eros is always in need (penes), and far from being tender andbeautiful as m o st p eo pl e think, he is harsh (sklepos) and rugged; possessing hismother's nature he is always living in lack (endeia)." Even th e "strengths" thatfollow from his paternal side are really kindred to this indigence, and onlyunderscore th e sense in which Eros emerges as an ambiguous (o r even trick-steresque) figure: he is "resourceful," "eager," "bold," "intense," "a cleverhunter," and "weaver of contrivances"; he is a "schemer (epiboulos) fo r beautifu l and good things," a "philosopher throughout his life" and indeed, at th emost extreme, even a "sorcerer, potion-maker and sophist"(goes kai phar-makeus kai sophistes).

The second basic consequence Diotima spells ou t (203d7-e5), in a sense, isan elaboration of the sobering first: "And so he is by nature neither immortalnor mortal , but on th e same day will bloom and live, when he prospers, andthen he will die, but again be brought back to life by his father's nature; whatever he makes his way to always ebbs away (hupekrei), so that Eros is neveraltogether poor (aporei) no r completely wealthy, but is in between w is do m a ndignorance." Never wholly wealthy no r wholly at a loss, Eros thus finds himselfhaving a kind of fluctuating character, and his "existence is a continual ebb andflow, from plenitude to vacuity, from birth to death" (Bury, xiii). In a word,Diotima's m y th c on cl ud es by revealing how Eros is subject to cycles of motionor genesis , and indeed these in their most basic or definitive form: what iserotic springs from life to death and from death again to a kind of rebirth.

We may take our first cue in interpreting what th e initiate here encountersfrom the very form of Diotima's narration: what th e lover who inquires into th eorigins of eros receives is likened to an allegorical or mythical message. In thusconspicuously shifting to th e mythical in his account of eros'origins, Platoevokes in us the very activi ty which th e myth itself will reveal to be central tothe initate's experience: just as th e tru e intentions of a m yth are never directly


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106 Interpretationor immediately revealed, so the inquiring lover does not receive a t ransparentlogos or immediate grasp of th e hidden meaning behind his eros, but ratherfinds himself given what is much like a mythical account an answer whicheven while speaking of the hidden logos behind the genesis

of his eros does soin a manner which is circuitous and oblique. The reader is thus compelled toexperience th e basic vicissitude of eros which (as we will presently see) is itselfthe central subject of the myth: Eros will call upon the initiate to engage in aparticular form of interpretation or "hermeneutics,"15 because h is access to , asit were, the true object of his eros, will prove pointedly indirect.

Indeed th e myth itself articulates this distance between what is erotic and itsobject. To begin with what seems most apparent: eros is animated by th e appearance of something beautiful, divinely promising, or in our earlier language,"conveying" intimations of overwhelming good fortune. Eros is thus "born" onth e birthday of "Aphrodite," surrounded by th e aura of divine abundance, as ifat a banquet among the gods. But it is also clear that what is erotic does nothave direct access to its beloved object, and that its object in consequence hasth e character of elusiveness or t ranscendence. Plato captures this unequivocallyin the staging of the mythic metaphor: though Eros is a lover of Aphrodite, heis not himself in attendance at the gods'divine banquet, and so does not, as itwere, "see" Aphrodite directly.16 Eros is in this sense alienated from th e beautiful promise which animates it, in the language of th e myth , born at a distancefrom th e scene of divine abundance. To try to translate, finally, th e mythicscenario into the moment of erotic experience it would express: although th einitiate feels a divine promise in eros with a pathos of utter necessity, he doesnot have an articulate grasp of just what it is that eros thus promises.

And yet what is erotic must have some sort of access to th e divine promisewhich animates it, just insofar as it "knows," so to speak, enough to love it orfeel its promise. Indeed th e myth does tell us in th e person of Poros that Eroshas a connection to the divine,17 but here again, in view of Poros' drunkennessand Penia s seduction, that th e divine inheritance is somehow compromised or"adulterated." Thus when we understand th e meaning of what th e myth tries tocapture in th e ambiguous sunousia or "relation" of Poros and Penia, we willunderstand what befalls between eros and its beautiful object, or the precisesense in which, in our earlier language, its access to th e plenitude of th e gods ismediated and indirect. This then is th e central metaphor of the myth: Eros onlyhas a divine inheritance by virtue of its compromising weddedness to mortalNeed. To say that th e divine plenitude is compromisingly wedded to mortalneed is to say that it is not inherited "uncorrupted," in or by itself, but only asbound up with or insofar as it comes together with mortal lacking. Eros onlyhas a divine inheritance insofar as it at the same t ime inherits a mortal Neediness. To say at the same t ime here is to say thai, the divine precisely onlyappears as that which illuminates the lacking as a lacking, that it is not inherited by itself, that is, apart from being this illumination or that it is only


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Phaedrus' Cosmology in the Symposium 10 7inherited, in th e language of th e myth , through this "relation" to mortal Need.What is erotic thus becomes conversant with (o r "connected to") somethingdivine only by virtue of its thus becoming conversant with its mortal lacking.

This sense of the union of Poros and Penia is reaffirmed and elaborated inth e particulars of th e mythic scenario. Each individually is thus "already" imbued with th e attributes of th e other, that is, expresses th e alteration of character presupposed for each in their coming together or "relation""1: that th e divineis not inherited unpolluted or incorrupted, in or by itself, Plato captures playfully yet poignantly in Poros' drunkenness. The god is thus "not himself insofa r as he enters into this union (and so is not inherited by Eros in "full possession"or with "unhampered clarity"of vision) but rather only as he would haveto become in "engaging" with mortal neediness (having "already" partaken ofwhat draws th e divine down into fogginess, obscurity, and "sleep"). That th emortal, conversely, is not inherited by itself but rather through its "relation" toth e plenitude of th e gods, Plato captures with equal precision in Penia' s scheming resourcefulness. The mortal Neediness Eros inherits is thus "already" a"schemer for good and beautiful things," an eager hunter for means , bold,intense, and resourceful. What is erotic "inherits" not merely mortal lacking butlacking perceived as a lacking, and this is lacking "already" standing in "relation" to divine abundance.

We can now begin to understand more precisely th e sense in which eros'access to its beloved object is mediated and indirect and th e route of th e initiatecircuitous and oblique. Since eros only has a divine inheritance through its"relation" to mortal Need, it does not have unhampered possession of whatseems so divinely promising, the divine scene, so to speak, apart from thislacking, or wholly delivered from such infirmities. Though what is erotic feelswith utter necessity the promise of overwhelming good fortune, what exactly itis that eros thus promises is not "immediately" given, unobscured by th e "related" illumination of mortal infirmity and failing. But if eros in this sensealienates th e initiate from th e promise of divine abundance which animates it,in another sense it can be said to have drawn h im more closely and related himto it: while his divine inheritance is not given to him unbenighted and unobscured, it is given to the initiate to have illuminated and made clear th e lackingin which he falls short of it, and thus to inherit the "means" by which what isbetter and stronger could be articulated and brought to light. While th e initiatethus suffers the pathos of good fortune's transcendence or absence, he nonetheless has a route to it which is excursive and indirect, since it is present as th e"resource" by which he can articulate just how he is wanting and lacking andby such means pursue th e hidden logos of a better cosmos he feels promisedwithin his eros. This articulation is th e interpretation demanded of th e initiate,the erotic "hermeneutics" to which he finds that th e gods "command" himthrough Eros."

We can now understand the consequences Diotima draws fo r eros'fate."


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108 InterpretationWe see "first of all"why it is that "far from being tender and beautiful as mostpeople think" eros is "harsh and rugged"and th e kindred grounds fo r its characte r as something of a trickster, "spell-maker" and "sophist": eros always holdsout th e promise of something divinely beautiful, but we only have access to thispromise insofar as we also inherit th e

"related" illumination, thus compelled byth e pathos of divine t ranscendence to the recognition of our mortal neediness.Eros in this sense seduces us with the "spell" of something divinely promising,only to then turn around, as it were, and turn out to demand of us somethinghard. In his intricate artistry P lato had already woven this consequence into adetail of the mythic scenario. W e might thus here surmise why he has Peniaarrive uninvited, standing at the doors, recalling as this would to every Greekear the uninvited arrival of th e goddess Eris at th e marriage feast of Peleus andThetis: with th e appearance of something beautiful which evokes our eroscomes an uninvited eris or strife.

W e can now likewise understand th e final consequence Diotima draws forEros' fate and why she should conclude telling how what is animated by Eros issubject to cycles of motion or genesis. Though eros does indeed harbor withinit the promise of a better cosmos, it only shows us this divine good fortune inits relation to mortal need, and so just what must be overcome and undergogenesis in order fo r that promise to be delivered and fulfilled. The initiate thussees how his divine inheritance is wedded to the vicissitudes of mortal lackingand that he must suffer his mortality to inherit the resources by which thatlacking could be made good. What is erotic in this sense finds itself subject toth e intractable demand of its changing and regeneration, or in th e language ofth e myth itself, to dying and being reborn.20 Thus the route of th e "correctly"aspiring lover leads him not only to experience th e t ranscendent and elusiveelement within eros'beautiful promise , but to see, in order that he might continue to follow, th e adamantine Necessity of genesis.

Since what eros thus makes itsway

to "always ebbs away"(203e3: to deporizomenon aei hupekrei), there is no end to the sacred wonder one could feelfor this Necessity, and th e philosopher, as Diotima is about to tell Socrates,will always be in between (204b).21 Here again Plato had already guided us in adetail of th e mythic scenario. That eros always shows us th e divine as it illuminates the lacking of a particular mortal perspective (and so never, as it were,reveals all at once th e entirety of what could be surpassed in a mortal) Platocaptures by having Eros conceived in ho tou dios kepos. The image is as potentas it is delicate and subtle: what is implanted by eros is like a seedling in th egarden of Zeus, one of many blooms the keeper of the cosmos would produce,see nourished and "prosper." And it is just insofar as this divine inheritancemay be profaned and abused used not as a means of mortal growth but as th eoccasion of vengefulness and repression that we can finally understand whyPlato makes Poros "the son of Metis": recalling as as this does Theogony886 ff.,22 Plato here indicates how Poros might become the "means" fo r an


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Phaedrus' Cosmology in the Symposium 109attempted rebellion against Zeus, who would communicate to us th ro ug h th econtrivance of eros th e demanding Necessity of genesis.

If the route of th e "correctly" following lover leads to the aporetic characterof the beautiful and the recognition of th e necessity of genesis, it is just such arebellion that Plato now places at the heart of Phaedrus' desacralized cosmos:Phaedrus' experience thus seems quite precisely characterized by what he nowsays, captured with ingenious Platonic compactness in a miscitation of Hesiod.In th e Theogony where Hesiod sings th e story of th e genesis of the gods, heplaces at th e arche23 of th e cosmos a kind of originating fourfold of deities,while when Phaedrus takes up this beginning he o m it s m en ti on of Tarta ros. Aswe reflect back on what Hesiod seems to capture in this famous cosmogonicpassage, Phaedrus' suppression of Tartaros begins to have an intriguing symbolic timeliness. Hesiod makes his beginning like this:24

First of all Chaos came to be, and then (116) broad-breasted Gaia (Earth), alwayssteadfast (asphales) seat of all (117) th e immortals who hold th e snowy peaks ofOlympus (118), and Tartaros, th e murky (eeroenta) in th e innermost place (mukhoi)within broad-wayed Earth (119), and Eros. . . . (120)

The etymology of khaos suggests that its coming into being signals th e appearance of a kind of "gap" or separation (cf. West, 192 and Kirk, Raven, andSchofield, 36-38). If line 1 19 is genuine, then Hesiod seems to place at th earche of th e cosmos the separation or complementary opposition of Gaia(Earth) and Tartaros.25 What does Hesiod here oppose to what? Since Earthherself will bring forth and be th e center of th e ordered, a rt ic u la te d c o sm o s(Theogony 126-33) (and Hesiod's epithet "steadfast" [asphales] seems to capture this stabilizing or grounding character), Tartaros, her complementary opposite, might be likened to the realm of th e unarticulated, disorderly, or eventh e "aporetic." Hesiod's epithet "murky" or "misty" (eeroenta) indeed seems toexpress just such a nature, and West notes that "the ancient c on ne ct io n w it htarasso is probably right"(195; tarasso means "to stir up,"disturb," "to trouble th e mind,"confound," "frighten," and generally "to throw into disorder").Hesiod's archaic fourfold, then, might be said to express something like th efollowing view about the fundamental nature of reality, about th e fundamentalor "archaic" structure of th e cosmos, or about what characterizes, it might bestill better to say, th e dwelling place of mortals as such: The cosmos is alwayscharacterized by th e distinction between and copresence of Earth and Tartaros,of on the one hand what is "steadfast," secure , articulated (and in that senseintelligible) and on the other, that "within" it which is still "misty," confounding, unintelligible (and so aporetic). Indeed Hesiod seems to confirm somethinglike th e present interpretation of the archaic structure of th e cosmos in the linesthat immediately follow (123-25), where as if to further articulate its ownnature as a d iv ision Chaos bring s forth both Erebos and Night, who in turnbring forth Ether and Day that is, Chaos articulates itself as th e division be-


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110 Interpretationtween what on th e one hand is (intelligible or) "illumined" and on th e otherwhat is (confounding or) "dark." These tw o are related, at the outset , preciselyin their separation or opposition (Chaos), but they are also, Hesiod seems tosuggest, so me ho w a ls o a potentially procreative or generative couple (Eros).26

The full significance of Phaedrus' suppression of Tartaros, however,emerges in view of th e immediate sequel (Theogony 126-210) in which th edynamic of genesis implicit in the structure of the cosmos is precisely whatHesiod begins to unfold. Mother Gaia proceeds to give birth from ou t of herselfto the elements of the articulated cosmos, first Ouranos, th e great starry fatherSky, who "covers her all around"(127), and after him th e hills, and Pontes, th esea. She then lay in love with Ouranos and conceived many wondrous children:th e twelve great titans, the powerful Cyclopes, and th e "most threatening"(155: deinotatoi) and "unspeakable" (148: ouk onomastoi) Kottos, Briareos,and Gyes, "overmastering children"(149: huperephana tekna). But th e ty rann ical Ouranos, fearful for his rule, would suffer th e birth of no children:

and just as any one came into being, he hid them all away (o r "concealed"them: apokruptaske) , in th e inward places of Gaia, (gaies en keuthmoni) an d w ou ldnot let them into th e light, and Ouranos exulted in his wicked work. But great Gaiag ro an ed w it hi n fo r pressure of pain. . . . (156-60)

Gaia appealed to her children fo r help, plotting to undo Ouranos' criminal (164:atasthalou) suppression, and her youngest-bom, Cronus, took courage. Usingth e great sickle he had been given by his mother he a mb us he d a nd c as tra te dOuranos as he came on in this amorous embrace, bringing him to ruin fo r hisfirst "wicked dealings" (166: aeikea . . . erga), the first to succumb violently toth e intractable dynamic of genesis. The genitals of his father Cronus threw intoth e sea, and from ou t of th e surrounding foam was born the beautiful Aphrodite. As sh e s te pp ed forth from the w a te r a t w av e-w as he d Cyprus, immediately"eros w ent with her."

It se em s str an ge that West is somewhat ambivalent on the question of justwhere th e "most fearsome" children are confined, saying only that "the storymust have been that th e Titans were kept in Gaia's womb by Uranus' unremitting embrace . . (214). H e thus refrains from making explicit w ha t see ms th emythic implication, namely , that this suppressed "womb" or place of confinement "deep inside Gaia" (gaies en keuthmoni) must be Tartaros itself, whichHesiod had already presented as "the innermost place (mukhoi) within broad-wayed

Earth." Ouranos'archaic injustice is thus to be characterized precisely

as a suppression of the contents of Tartaros, and Phaedrus' miscitation is itsverbal mimesis.27

The image expresses perfectly the counterexperience to Diotima's initiateand captures th e tyrannical hybris at th e heart of Phaedrus' desacralizedcosmos. Ouranos suppresses th e womb "within" Gaia in order to prevent th ebirth of any more c hild re n w ho would rise up spontaneously from the "misty"


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Phaedrus' Cosmology in the Symposium -111element "within" th e beautiful (beloved Gaia), "threatening" as Ouranos mightsee it, to overthrow his rule. Thus where th e initiate experiences th e magicalspell or enchantment of a numinous situation harboring "within" it th e th ehidden promise of a better cosmos Ouranos sees emerging precisely a confounding and ominous plight, w ha t w ou ld subvert the integrity of th e order thatis, a "fearful," "overmastering" threat . While th e initiate "follows" th e elusiveand my ster io us e le me nt "within" the beautiful seeing there th e resources fo rinterpreting just how what is better and stronger may be brought to lifeOuranos "conceals" w ha t w ou ld emerge from th e mysterious place within Gaiaand will "no t le t it into th e light." Phaedrus' desacralized cosmos is in this waycharacterized by a suppression of what is aporetic or "dark" within what is"steadfast" and secure, or in th e language of th e myth, of what is still "misty"at th e center of what order has already come to light.

As the m y th ic m e ta ph o r so vividly suggests, this suppression can be understood as a kind of violence against the nature of reality: in suppressing TartarosOuranos violates th e archaic structure of th e cosmos or th e fundamental "dynamic"or "power" implicit in and animating the cosmos. As th e Theogony'sfirst "wicked dealings," this v iolen c e a ga in st the cosmos is in a sense the archaic ac t of injustice, the attempt to exclude or suppress th e realm of the aporeti c from th e prevailing order of things and secure it against what presages itsdissolution or p er ha ps e ve n its overcoming. Since Ouranos would in this waytry to immortalize his "order," his cosmos is n ot s ub je ct to th e vicissitudes ofcosmogonic change or regeneration, but rather to th e tita nic pressure of itsdetainment and repression. Ouranos' suppression of Tartaros is in this sense arebellion against th e Necessity of genesis. (For th e neo-Platonic identificationof Tartaros as genesis, cf. Olympiodorus, Meteorologica, 141-50.)

As Hesiod's a rc ha ic s c en a ri o indicates, this suppression of genesis is at th esame t ime a kind of absolutizing or tyrannizing by th e order that is. There istherefore nothing that Ouranos concedes beyond the horizons of his order,nothing beyond its reaches or to which it w ou ld not ex ten d. Hesiod thus twicelikens Ouranos to what would "cover completely,""extend over,"or even "encompass"the whole: when he is first introduced Ouranos is said to "cover allover"(o r "envelop") all of Gaia (127: . . . hina min peri panta kaluptoi), andHesiod re-emphasizes this character when he is about to meet his end: Ouranoscame on and "desiring love spread himself around Gaia, extending over all"(176: amphi de gaie himeiron philotetos epeskheto kai r h e ta nu st he pante). It isin terms of Phaedrus' mimesis of this suppression of what is "beyond th e horizons of Ouranos" that w e m ust understand Socrates' la te r hymn to th e "hyper-ouranian"lace (cf. th e first paragraph of this essay). In a cosmos, finally, thatin this way reaches over the whole , nothing "paradoxical" is to be tolerated orendured. Thus while Diotima's initia te suffers the m y st er io u s p re se n ce of anabsence of logos, in Ouranos' c os mo s w ha t thus has no logos is precisely whatis suppressed: the children are thus ou k onomastoi , what can "not be spoken"


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112 Interpretationabout. Even as he speaks Phaedrus enacts the mortal mimesis: what men havealready said becomes the only tekmerion or "sign," and there is no longer adistinction between existing and being spoken of by men. The cosmos is in thisway dispossessed and divested of sacred wonder and, bereft of philosophy, isdelivered over to the authorities:

Both Hesiod and Acusilaus agree that after Chaos these two, Earth and Eros, cameto be. And Parmenides says of th e beginning (ten genesin):

First among all the gods, it devised (metisato) Eros.So there is agreement in many sources that Eros is among th e oldest.

Whereas Phaedrus thus quotes Parmenides as if to support his perspective, inParmenides' original there is an unnamed power behind the "devising" of Eros:th e goddess "who steers all things" and "the one Parmenides calls Dike andAnanke."28 Even while citing the philosopher Phaedrus thus distorts his intention and symbolically spurns precisely th e power presiding over th e entrance-way to philosophy, th e cosmic Necessity implicit in eros by which a mortalcould be "properly" guided. Thus Plato has Phaedrus end this logos by suppressing th e divine Necessity hidden behind th e pathos that animates th ecosmos, and this would be the "failure" in being a lover of wisdom, as it were,at its most archaic.29

NOTES

1 . Phaedrus 241c ii . Of th e three most recent fullscale studies of th e Phaedrus (Burger, Griswold , Ferrari) Griswold (18-24) does th e most in trying to tie th e theme of th e dialogue back toPhaedrus 'Symposium speech (though in large measure he follows Rosen, 1968). He thus emphasizes how Phaedrus' praise fo r th e "utility" of eros to th e beloved (178c-179b) is actually a defenseof erotic passivity and in that sense anticipates

Lysias' praise of th e nonlover. Cf. Burger, 10-11and Ferrari, 6.The fullest and most rewarding discussion of Phaedrus' speech in th e Symposium is still that of

Stanley Rosen (1968, 39-59) th o ug h th is essay will have occasion to differ widely from many keyfeatures of his analysis, particularly of th e cosmological first third of Phaedrus' speech with whichwe will be primarily occupied. All textual references are cited from Bury's edition.

2. (1980a, 1986). Cf. xii-xix of th e former and especially 4-9 of th e latter fo r a fuller presentation of th e view sketched only skeletally below. For precedents of Miller's view, cf. 1980a, 122n.35.

3. Thus Meno's third and last definition of virtue (78b: "the power of acquiring fine things")only makes explicit or transparent what was lurking at th e heart of his second (73c: "the capacity togovern over men"), while this in turn was a making explicit of what he already had in mind withth e first (71e: "managing the city's affairs capably"). The "elicitation" thus brings th e interlocutor'sconvictions before us more and more nakedly or (to borrow a relevent metaphor from th e Charmides) ha s th e function of "undressing" (154e) him.

4. Thus Bury (Iii) says: "w e see that it falls most naturally into three main divisions, three Actsas we might call t h em. In th e First Act are comprised all th e first five discourses; th e Second, andcentral, Act contains th e whole of th e deliverances of Socrates; th e Third Act consists of Al

encomium of Socrates." Cf. also Friedlander, vol. 3, 469 n. 30, and Bacon, 428.


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Phaedrus' Cosmology in the Symposium "1135. For other versions of th e principle that th e higher is prefigured in th e lower cf. Rosen (1968

and 1988), who inclines to see th e "base" as an ironic "caricature" of th e dialogue's real teaching,and Kosman, who shows how th e deeper insights of th e Charmides can be viewed as a "redemptiveappropriation"of Charmides first definition. These three ways of construing the basic "principle"are not incompatible so long as we can imagine that Plato, in his infinite artistry, could weave suchhybrid formulations which while at first appearing base or transparently failing from anotherperspective can be seen as a very icon of th e truth so long as we can imagine, that is, th esystematic compactness of his ironic mimesis.

6. Thus Brentlinger (6) aptly formulates th e dramatically projected context of th e Symposium:"By th e t ime of Apollodorus' telling of th e story th e political ruin of Athens is complete, and weare thus exposed to th e vast social and political dimensions of misguided Eros."

7. Thus Friedlander compactly states: "Agathon rounds out th e circle begun by Phaedrus" (vol.3, 20).

8. On th e textual difficulties in this passage cf. Bury, note to 178b, and Dover, note to 178b8.The problem revolves essentially around th e question of whether Phaedrus notes th e agreement ofAcusilaus with Hesiod before or after his citation from Parmenides, and in any event does notsubstantially affect th e interpretation which follows. Bury, Dover, and Burnet all furnish th e orderthat is followed here, while th e text which Robin prints in th e Bude edition would yield somethinglike th e following alternative:

but then, full-breasted Earth, always steadfast seat of all, and Eros.He says that after Chaos these two, Earth and Eros, came to be. And Parmenides says of th ebeginning (ten genesin):First among all the gods, it devised (metisato) Eros.Hesiod and Acusilaus agree. So there is agreement in many sources that Eros is among th eoldest.9. In his note on Diotima's "epithet" daimon megas , Bury rightly says: "The epithet serves to

point th e correction of Socrates' definition, megas theos (202b)." But we must push th e reflectionstill further: Socrates there was miming a position he located in Agathon (2 0 le), while Agathon inturn was articulating a position already present in Phaedrus. Diotima's "correction" thus ultimatelypoints back all th e way to th e nonphilosophical beginning, and its most archaic referent is Phaedrus.

10. That such a desacralization stands at th e nonphilosophical arche is reflected in th e long-noted aura of sacrilege that hovers over th e dialogue as a whole. Phaedrus, Eryximachus, andAlcibiades were all implicated in th e desecration of th e Hermae, and we are not fa r from th e nightof Alcibiades' profanation of th e mysteries , th e centrality of which in Plato's mind th e presence ofDiotima suffices to indicate. The aura of th e sacred thus surrounds Socrates' "reorientation" fromher very introduction (cf. 201dl ff.) and we should note in this connection her very first words: oukeuphemeseis. Her instruction, of course, is cast in th e form of an initiation into th e lower andhigher mysteries , and at its apex she speaks th e language of th e sacred Eleusianian revelation.Rosen is thus right to make a t h eme of Phaedrus' impiety (1968, 39-45), and it is worth keeping inmind th e force of a later remark: "Although the Platonic dialogues are by no means consistent intheir portrait of th e gods, they never present philosophy as anything bu t a divine gift or expressionof th e d ivin e in man"(237). Bury (xlviii-lii, "Eros as Religion") gives brief but appropriatelyemphatic formulation to the Symposium's religious dimension. It is perhaps not out of place here tosay that contemporary commentators on Plato need reminding of th e decidedly theological dimension in his thinking to which students of an earlier generation (cf. Jaeger, Voegelin, Cushman)were seemingly more sensitive. (For a recent exception, cf. Cobb 1989.) It was Plato, after all,who invented th e term "theology" (Rep. 379a), and Jaeger rightly says of this passage: "Thecoining of th e word indicates th e importance f rom Plato's point of view of th e mental attitudewhich it trie s to express. Theology is in a way th e very aim and centre of his thought" (194 n.13.Cf. also 4 ff.).

11 . That th e initiate feels th e absence of logos here, that is, feels th e necessity, rather , ofsomething like "divination," Plato deftly expresses with a dialogical shift: Socrates breaks h ispattern of dialectical questions and shifts rather to a more patently mythical idiom (203a9): patrosde, en d ego , linos esti kai metros;.


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114- Interpretation12. idiotou, as Dover points out in his note to 178b2, could here connote something like

"layman," in which case we might render: "either privately orpublicly."13. Although here (and indeed we might have chronicled this throughout) we see an example

of Plato's infinite artistry: that these men give no logos fo r the origin of eros can be viewed as a"caricature" of th e truth, "redemptively appropriated"in Diotima's teaching. (Cf. note 5 above.)

14. Thus cf. Bury's last note to 203a: "Here we have it tacitly assumed that Phaedrus' statement (178b), that Eros is unbegotten, is untrue."

15. Which Diotima had already in tima ted in th e first word of our previous passage: her-meneuon kai diaporthmeuon.

16 . Thus we can already begin to glimpse why th e telos of th e whole initiation is th e sight ofth e Beautiful (Aphrodite) itself (210e ff.), but also what a long road of trials stand between thatfinal mystery and th e present moment in erotic experience.

17. Bury thus formulates what I take to be more or less apparent: "We must conclude, therefore, that as Poros is th e source of th e divine side of th e nature of Eros, so Penia is th e source ofth e anti-divine side; and from the description of Eros as daimon, combined with the definition of todaimonion as metaxu theou te ka i thnetou (202e), we are justified in identifying this anti-divine sidewith mortal i ty, and in regarding he penia as a personification of he thnetephusis"xl-xli).

18. It is well worth bearing in mind here th e words of Plotinus (Enneads III 5.9), who giveskeen expression to what every good reader of myths intuitively knows: "Our way of speaking fo rmyths , if they are to serve their purpose, must necessarily import time-distinctions into their subjectand will often present as separate, Powers which exist in unity but d if fe r in rank or faculty; anddoes not philosophy itself relate th e births of th e unbegotten and discriminate where all is onesubstance? The truth is conveyed in th e only manner possible; it is left to our good sense to bringall together again.'

19. Cf. note 15 above. Of course Diotima had also anticipated our present point in that earlierpassage, since along with th e

gods'presents or gifts came their

"orders"or commands'": to n de tas

epitaxeis te kai amoibas (202e4).20 . Thus Walter Otto concludes in his study on "The Meaning of th e Eleusinian Mysteries"

(20-21): "Man receives th e fertility which is indispensable to him from th e hands of death."Diotima was prophetic earlier when she said th a t t hr ough eros comes all "sacred practice involvingsacrifices"(h e to n hiereon tekhne ton te peri tas thusias . .) (202e6).

21. Cf. Lowenstam, esp. 96 ff., whose conclusions, however, need to be deeply qualified.What th e philosopher acquires does not ebb away in th e sense that he later "loses" or "forgets" hisvision, bu t in th e sense that it later becomes subject , in turn, to what would reveal its lacking andso bid him to its overcoming.

22. And so th e fledgling arche ofZeus' governance of th e cosmos: Metis is th e first consort

taken by Zeus after th e t i tanomachia. She was fated to have a son who would rise up and overthrowhim, but Zeus took her into his belly and bore th e child from out of his own head (a daughter,Athena, who "might advise him as to good and bad"), thereby seemingly averting his overthrowand securing th e continuance of his rule. For th e beginnings of an account of th e subtextual presence of Zeus in th e Symposium cf. Salman (1991b).

23 . In th e l as t l ine of th e Theogony's proem (1 15) Hesiod commands th e Muses to sing of th ecosmos ex arkhes. . All textual references to th e Theogony are to West's edition.

24 . The emendations of Hesiod's text which delete lines 118 and 1 19 probably originated withPhaedrus' omission at Symposium 178a. M.L. West (192-93) argues persuasively fo r their authenticity, which is now rather widely accepted. Although Rosen is surely right in saying, "Phaedrusproceeds by silence or suppression,"his interpretation of Phaedrus' miscitation differs greatly fromth e one given here (1968, 45-48).

25. As we will see short ly, Eros, as a principle of unificat ion, is in tu rn th e complementaryopposite of th e separating or divisive Chaos. The following reading of th e th e cosmogonic passage(11. 1 16-33) has been initially stimulated by th e study of Mitchell Miller (1980b) which brings outth e logic of complementarity and contrariety which governs over th e passage. Responsibility fo r th eexistential turn of th e interpretation and its placement within th e first episode of Hesiod's succession story (116-210) is my own. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (with a number of worries) follow


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Phaedrus' Cosmology in the Symposium * 115Comford in taking Chaos to refer to th e gapping or separation of Earth from Sky (cf. 38-39). But itis surely right to follow West, who says of khaos: "I t is in fact th e same as that space betweenEarth and Tartarus which is called a khasma in 740" (192). For his persuasive response to Comford, cf. 193.

26 . That is, th e presence of Eros at th e arche of creation indicates th e fundamentality to th ecosmos of a dynamic of genesis, a moving dialectic between that which is "illumined" and what"within" it is "dark." Thus Athanassakis rightly says: "The position of Eros among such primevalelements as Chaos and Gaia indirectly or tacitly intimates a very important role, that of a demiurgiccatalyst, perhaps, within creation"(42). Or similarly West: Eros "' strongly suggests a quasi-demiurgic function . . he is . . present throughout as th e force of generation and reproduction . "(195-96).

27 . West's silence here is all th e more strange in view of his own earlier note to line 1 19: "both Chaos and Tartaros could be considered as something not separate from Earth, bu t deep insideit and part of it." The only commentator I know who explicitly suggests that Tartaros is th e placewhere th e children are confined is Caldwell (133), though I cannot follow him in his Freudianreading of th e originating fourfold, as th e present interpretation makes clear. For th e place of thisconnection between Ouranos and Phaedrus in th e larger subtextual theogony which animates th eSymposium as a whole , cf. Salman (1991a).

28. These are th e words of Aetius (2 . 7. 1, DK A37) cited by Morrison in his study of th evarious proposals as to th e elliptical subject of metisato. Morrison concludes that this daimonkubernetis is th e subject of metisato and is followed by Nehamas and Woodruff in their edition ofth e Symposium ( " . th e unstated subject of "designed" is evidently th e goddess of B 12"). Dikeappears in th e proem as th e keeper of th e gateway of Night and Day through which th e philosophical traveller passes (it is bound by a lintel and stone threshold which encloses it "o n both sides"),while in th e poem proper it is "strong Ananke" who holds Being "within th e bonds of a limit,enclosing it on all sides."29. So ends Phaedrus "cosmology" and th e first great phase of Diotima's teaching. It should befairly easy to now see how th e rest of Diotima's speech might counter th e rest of Phaedrus': as thecosmological section of Phaedrus' speech corresponds to Diotima's opening discussion of Eros'nature and birth (201e-204c), so Phaedrus' turn to th e good eros does among men (178c- 179b)corresponds to Diotima's response to Socrates' query as to the "use" of eros for men (204c-206a).Phaedrus' turn to erotic feats in th e face of th e confrontation with death (179b- 180b) ha s itscounter , finally, in Diotima's turn to th e erotic "praxis" (206b2) of striving for immortality (206b-212a). Indeed Phaedrus' three examples would even seem to correspond to th e three routes toimmortality Diotima sketches out there: that of Alcestis to th e sacrifices made fo r offspring of th ebody (207a-208b), that of Orpheus "themusician"o those made fo r offspring of th e soul (208c-209e), and that of Achilles (who to Phaedrus is th e "most honored by th e gods"and is "sent to th eIsles of th e Blessed") to the sacrifices made for "true virtue"(210a-212a) by th e one who "becomes a friend of th e gods"(212a6). And yet to spell out all th e mysteries Plato would likely havecontained in this mimesis , that would surely be an altogether higher initiation still.

REFERENCES

The following works are cited in th e text and notes by th e author's name alone or th eauthor's name and date:Athanassakis, A. N. Hesiod. The John s Hopk ins University Press, 1983.Bacon, H. "Socrates Crowned." Virginia Quarterly Review, 35(1959).Brentlinger, J. "The Cycle of Becoming in th e Symposium." In The Symposium of Plato,

trans. S. Q. Groden. University of Massachusetts Press, 1970.Burger, R. Plato's Phaedrus. University of Alabama Press, 1980.Bury, R. G. The Symposium of Plato. 2d ed. W. Heffer and Sons, 1932.


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116* InterpretationCaldwell, R. The Origin of the Gods. Oxford University Press, 1989.Cobb, W. "Plato on th e Possibility of an Irreligious Morality." International Journal for

Philosophy of Religion, 25(1989).Cushman, R. E. Therapeia. University of North Carolina Press, 1958.Dover, K. J. Plato: Symposium. Cambridge University Press, 1980.Ferrari, G. Listening to the Cicadas. Cambridge University Press, 1987.Friedlander, P. Plato. 3 vols. Trans. H. Meyerhoff. Princeton University Press, 1958

69 .Griswold, C. Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus. Yale University Press, 1986.Jaeger, W. The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers. Oxford University Press,

1960.Kirk, G. S., J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield. The Pre-Socratic Philosophers. 2d ed.

Cambridge University Press, 1983.Kosman, L. A. "Charmides' First Definition: Sophrosyne as Quietness." In Essays in

Ancient Greek Philosophy, J. Anton and A. Preus, eds. Vol. 2. State University ofNew York Press, 1983.

Lowenstam, S. "Paradoxes in Plato's Symposium." Ramus, 14(1985).Miller, M. The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman. Martinus Nijhoff, 1980(a)

"The Implicit Logic in Hesiod's Cosmogony." Independent Journal o f Philosophy, 4(1 980b).

Plato's Parmenides . Princeton University Press, 1986.Minton, W. "The Proem-Hymn of Hesiod's Theogony." TAPA, 101(1970).Morrison, J. S. "Four Notes on Plato's Symposium." Classical Quarterly, 14(1964).Nehamas, A. and P. Woodruff. Symposium. Hackett, 1989.Otto, W. "The Meaning of th e Eleusinian Mysteries." In The Mysteries: Papers from

the Eranos Yearbooks. Princeton University Press, 1955.Rosen, S. "The Nonlove r in Plato's Phaedrus." In The Quarrel Between Philosophy and

Poetry. Routledge, 1988.Plato's Symposium. Yale University Press, 1968. 2d ed., 1987.

Salman, C. "Anthropogony and Theogony in Plato's Symposium." The Classical Journal, 86(1 99 la).

The Wisdom of Plato's Aristophanes." Interpretation, 18(1 99 lb).Santas, G. Plato and Freud. Blackwell, 1988.Voegelin, E. The World of the Polis. Louisiana State University Press, 1957.West, M. L. Hesiod: Theogony. Oxford University Press, 1966.


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The Images of Enslavement and Incommensurability inPlato's MenoJeffrey S. TurnerBucknell University

You know also that they use visible forms and make their arguments about them,but they are not thinking about them but about those things which they resemble;they are making their arguments about th e square itself, th e diagonal itself, notabout th e one they draw, and similarly with th e others. These very things whichthey fashion and draw, of which there are shadows and images in water, they nowin turn use as images, in seeking to see those others themselves, which one cannotsee except in thought .

Republic 5\0d5-5lUV

I. INTRODUCTION

The example of mathematical instruction in Plato's Meno (82b9-85b7) isone of th e most dramatic passages in his entire corpus. Not only is it "out firstdirect, explicit, extended piece of evidence about Greekmathematics"(Fowler,7) as well as "the most sustained stretch of geometrical reasoning"in th e wholeof Plato's work (Vlastos, 1991, 118), it also offers us th e rare opportunity tohear Socrates comment explicitly on his own pedagogical efforts. Socrates inte rr up ts th e lesson with th e slave twice (82e4-13, 84a3-d2) in order to discussits progress with Meno, and at the conclusion of th e lesson (85b8-86c3) Socrates and Meno once again discuss it. At th e very heart of the Meno, then, wehave an example of Socratic instruction together with something like "meta-instruction." Both in word and deed, Socrates tries to show Meno somethingabout what it is to learn.But just what is he trying to show him? A straightforward answer imme

diately presents i tself: Socrates wants to show Meno "that learning is recollection." This, after all, is Socrates' claim at 81d4-5, and in fact th e metainstruc-t ional "interruptions" of th e discussion with the slave boy seem centrallyfocused on this claim. Of course, we might have our worries about whetherSocrates actually shows this we might hesitate to agree with Meno th at th eboy's opinions are all his own, that they were in him, and therefore that he hasrecollected and not been taught (85b8-e8) but it seems hard to deny that thisis what Socrates is trying to show.

interpretation, Winter 1992-93, Vol. 20, No. 2


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118 InterpretationWhile not denying that this is what Socrates is trying to show, in what

follows I want to ask again what "learning is recollection" is supposed to meanhere, and to consider how Socrates tries to show it. After considering in th eremainder of this section tw o interpretations of this passage offered by GregoryVlastos, I will then offer some comments about th e structure of the Meno as awhole (section II) as a preface to placing the images of enslavement and incommensurability within that context (section III), and then, finally, return to issuesmore directly related to the th es is th at "learning is recollection"(section IV).

My attempt to understand Socrates' claim situates itself between tw o paperson this passage in th e Meno written by Gregory Vlastos, and in a sense attempts to span a gap between them. At the beginning of his article "Anamnesisin th e Meno," Vlastos claims that

In th e Meno we have a chance, rare in Greek philosophy, to compare aphilosophical theory with th e data which make up its ostensible evidence. Menoasks if there is any way Socrates can show him that "learning" is recollecting.Socrates offers to produce th e proof on the spot. Meno will see th e slave-boylearning, and this will show that he was recollecting. (1965, 143)

On this v iew, Socrates has a theory that learning is recollection, and he usesthis episode with Meno's slave to give "evidence" fo r th is th eory. Presumably,then, the "metainstructional" interruptions are meant to get Meno to take astand on whether "the data" with th e slave boy support "the theory" of recollect ion.

But on what grounds should we believe that the example of mathematicalinstruction with the slave is meant as "data" for a "theory"? Neither these termsnor anything like them are used by Socrates in describing his discussion withth e slave boy. Are we so sure that the interruptions of this discussion have th echaracter of comparing "theory" and "data"? The religious overtones withwhich Socrates introduces his claim that learning is recollection might seem topoint in a somewhat different direction: Socrates attributes the doctrine to"priests and priestesses whose care it is to be able to give an account of theirpractices"(81al0-bl) . I suggest that Vlastos in "Anamnesis in th e Meno" hashis own theory about this part of Plato's text, which is that it is best interpretedin terms of th e relation between "data" and "theory." (Note, e.g., that hisarticle is divided into tw o parts, "The Data of th e Theory" [143-57] and "TheTheory" [158-67].) By looking at the Meno this way, Vlastos no doubt hopedto make clear what kind of support Socrates and Pla to have for this "theory" aswell as how strong that support is: th e use of th e data/theory relation as aninterpretive device is meant to make clear just what th e epistemic status of theclaim that "learning is recollection"really is.

It is therefore rather disturbing when one finds that in using this interpretive"metatheory" Vlastos seems to have fiddled with his data (the passage in th etext) in order to get his theory (his interpretation of this passage) to come out


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Images in Plato's Meno -119right. His central claim about th e "theory of recollection"is: "Reduced to itssimplest terms, then, what Plato means by 'recollection' in the Meno is anyenlargement of our knowledge which results from the perception of logicalrelationships."(1965, 156 f.) Vlastos goes on to try to uncover what "themiddle term Plato is offering us between th e data and th e theory [o f recollection]" was, and finds it in th e notion that these logical relationships are"within" us (1965, 158 f.). This is what determines th e epistemic status of"Plato's theory."

But just how does Vlastos reduce "the theory of recollection"to these simplest of terms? Essentially by changing th e text: Vlastos constructs tw o examples, th e first a simple problem in arithmetic and the second a simple logicproblem, and then claims that these are equivalent, for all of Plato's intents andpurposes, to th e problem in th e text. With th e arithmetical example Vlastos isparticularly bold: he invites th e reader to perform a "scissors-and-paste experiment on Plato's text":

... cut out th e whole interrogation from 82B 9 to 85B 7, paste in th e abovedialogue in its place, and consider whether any material change will have to bemade in what comes before and after. You will find that none will; th at th e samePlatonic theses would be illustrated, and that they would be substantiated to th esame degree, so that th e meaning and truth-value of th e conclusions Socrates drawsfrom th e dialogue at th e end will be unaffected. (1965, 146)

Vlastos turns from Plato's geometrical image to a pattern of logical inference.But this is fiddling with th e textual "data," and we ought to be wary of anyinterpretation to claim support from such fiddling. Note in particular that oncewe have agreed that th e meaning of "recollection" in th e Meno is "any enlargement of our knowledge which results from th e perception of logical relationships,"it is a short step indeed, all to o short a step to say that in this part ofth e te xt Socrates and Plato are offering us "data" fo r a "theory." By interpretingth e substantive concern of the text in terms of "the perception of logical relationships," it seems as if we could not possibly have done violence to the textby construing it in t e rms of the data/theory relation: it seems as if we are justinterpreting the text in its own terms.

But violence to th e tex t is in fact what has gone on here: Vlastos's "meta-theory" about Meno 82b9-85b7 more or less deliberately ignores th e particularimages of th e text fo r th e sake of his own theoretical construction.2 What makesthis all th e more troubling is that the geometrical image in this section of th edialogue has great significance, both fo r th e history of mathematics and ofphilosophy. Although it is not named as such in th e Meno (it is, however, atTheaetetus 148a7-b2), we have here an example of the existence of "irrational"numbers: the square with double area is built on th e diagonal of th e originalsquare, whose length is (expressed in modern terms) 2fl. It is an importantmathematical truth, of which Plato was no doubt aware, th at th is number is


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120 Interpretationinexpressible in terms of any integers m and n such that min = 2fl. This factwas of course damaging to the Pythagorean attempt to understand th e wholekosmos in terms of integral numbers and their proportions (see von Fritz, 382-412, and, more generally, Burkert) . Given th e Pythagorean overtones of someparts of th e Meno, this fact seems especially important; Plato surely uses theimage of incommensurability in this dialogue deliberately.

In his attempt to uncover the meaning of "learning is recollection,"then,Vlastos changes th e textual details purporting to show that learning is recollect ion. But to change th e text in order to get one's interpretation to come out rightseems to violate the spirit of Vlastos's own interpretive approach: if we want tofollow th e data/theory model we need a healthier respect fo r the independenceof our textual "data." A chapter from his recent book Socrates, Ironist andMoral Philosopher, "Elenchus and Mathematics," looks again at Meno 82b9-85b7 and appears at first glance to remedy this problem, fo r in it Vlastos takesth e image of incommensurability in the Meno much more seriously.

Let me begin by briefly summarizing the argument of this paper as a whole.Vlastos seeks to account fo r the "disenchantment with th e elenchus"(1991,118) he finds in the Lysis, Hippias Major, and Euthydemus, where "the yes-man of th e middle dialogues has made his entry into Plato's corpus"(1991,117, n. 47). For him th e solution lies in the fact that Plato himself, like thephilosophers of Book VII of th e Republic, is now deeply involved in mathematical studies, and "the effect is proving as t ransformat ive of his own outlookas he believed it would be of theirs" (1991, 118). Hence Socrates' apparentturn from elenchus to a more dogmatic approach is to be explained by hiscreator's new interest in th e more positive approach of mathematics, which canovercome th e "shortfall in epistemic certainty, inherent in the elencticmeth(1991, 114).

Given this, it is no surprise that th e example of mathematical instruction inth e Meno plays such a central role in Vlastos's chapter (it is in fact the firstpassage he considers after introducing his hypothesis about Plato's development). The use of a mathematical problem to which no straightforward arithmetical solution could be given, and whose solution therefore must simply beshown, might itself be taken as an image of the turn from elenchus to positivesystem. Vlastos seems to do this in the following passage:

The interrogation which follows has been thought a paradigm of Socratic elenchus.Is it? Yes and No. Yes, where th e boy's mistakes are being corrected.Elenchus is good fo r this, and only this. It does not begin to bring him to th e truthhe seeks. He could have gone on till doomsday trying out different integers orratios of integers to be shown their falsehood by th e same process, and none of thiswould have brought him an inch closer to the true answer. In Greek mathematics,which recognizes only integral number s , no integer or ratio of integers could yieldth e answer to Socrates' question. The problem admits of no arithmetical solution.But it does admit of a geometrical one. This answer no elenctic badgering could


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Images in Plato's Meno 121have elicited from the boy. To bring him to it Socrates must shed th e adversativerole to which persistence in elenctic argument would have kep t him. Shed it hedoes. Extending th e diagram, he plants into it th e line that opens sesame, and thenth e boy "recollects" th at th e side of a square whose area is twice that of a givensquare is th e diagonal of th e given square. (1991, 118 f.)

There is nothing new in th e claim that Socrates seems to be going beyondsimply "asking questions"of th e slave boy when he draws in th e diagonal here:cf. e.g. G. M. A. Grube's note to th is passage in his translation of th e Meno:"... Socrates here introduces a new element , which is not th e result of aquestion but of his own knowledge, though th e answer to the problem followsfrom questions"(1976, 18). What I want to call attention to now is a tensionbetween th e account of Meno 82b9-85b7 given here and th e account Vlastosgave earlier, a tension Vlastos himself seems to overlook (see 1991, 118, n.54). Here Vlastos takes the particular image in the text quite seriously: byfocussing on the fact that the solution to th e mathematical problem cannot bearithmetical because the diagonal of the square with sides whose length is 2units is irrational, he wants to show how Socrates must go beyond the methodof elenchus, and so "shed th e adversative role"and plant "the line that openssesame."(Were Vlastos to consider another image here, namely that Socrates'interlocutor is a slave, this point would seem even more compelling. Isn't aslave th e very image of a pliant interlocutor, one waiting to be "implanted"?)But in calling attention to th is he also shows something else: precisely to theextent that Socrates plants th e line that opens sesame, th e sense in which he isshowing Meno that th e slave boy "recollects" the truth here starts to slip away.(Note how Vlastos himself puts it in quotation marks.) If Socrates plants th eanswer, then even in Vlastos's own earlier view of Platonic recollection, Socrates is doing a pretty poor jo b of showing an example of recollection: how arewe so sure the slave boy "perceived th e logical relationships,"given Socrates'planting job?

There is a tension in Vlastos's tw o accounts, then, a tension between (i)trying to show the plausibility of Socrates' demonstration that learning is recollection and (ii) paying close attention to the particular character of the imagesin the text of th e Meno and Plato's use of them. In "Anamnesis in th e Meno"Vlastos pursues th e former at th e cost of the latter; in "Elenchus and Mathematics" he pursues the latter but at the cost of th e former. It is hard fo r Vlastosboth to emphasize th e antielenctic character of Socrates' mathematical instruction and to say that in order fo r the slave boy to be recollecting he must notdepend epistemically on Socrates' beliefs.

Upon reflection this tension might not be particularly surprising. The imagesat th e heart of Plato's dialogues often seem peculiarly self-defeating. Consider,for example , the image of the Sun in Republic VI-VII: Plato offers us the sourceof light as an image fo r th e precondition of intellect. But to look at "the sun


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122 Interpretationitself in its own place"(516b4-6) the ultimate intellectual moment of knowing, wholly outside th e cave would only lead one to blindness (cf. Bloom,402 ff.). Or again consider the so-called ladder of love in th e Symposium: howcan the levels of eros be related as "steps of a stair"and there still be anabsolute primacy to the top step? If th e "lower" steps aren't somehow preservedrather than annulled, th e whole ladder would collapse including th e top step.

The images at th e heart of th e Meno, then, may well be characteristicallyself-defeating. Might there nonetheless be a way of understanding the dialoguewhich would hold on to both the peculiar character of the images in the text andto what they purport to show?

II . THE STRUCTURE OF THE MENO AS A WHOLE

The first step in understanding Plato's use of th e images in this part of th eMeno in a way more consonant with the explicit action of th e text might wellbe to situate them within the action of the dialogue as a whole. And to do thatI propose we first consider briefly th e structure of th e Platonic dialogue ingeneral.

In his tw o recent books on th e Statesman (1980) and the Parmenides (1986),Mitchell Miller has made a bold proposal about the structure of Plato's dialogues. Claiming that "the same fundamental structure recurs in dialogue afterdialogue," Miller isolates four key moments within "the encounter of philosopher and nonphilosopher"(1986, 6) that constitutes th e Platonic dialogue: (1)First th e philosopher elicits from th e nonphilosopher a statement of th e latter'sposition, th e goal of this elicitation being "the strongest and most t ransparentformulation" of that view. The philosopher then proceeds (2) to refute th e non-philosophical position of his or her interlocutor, th e culmination of this refutation being the aporia into which the nonphilosopher then falls. The

"darkness"

of such aporia "is really an achivement; it marks th e release from the false lightof presumption and opinion,"and thus serves as a precondition fo r th e thirdmoment of the dialogue: (3) "the reorienting insight that shows a path throughth e aporia."Here th e dialogue moves forward thanks to the "most basic contribution" of th e philosopher, "characteristically th e most profound and original"insight of th e dialogue.3 There remains, however, a question about the extent towhich the nonphilosophical interlocutor of th e dialogue understands this philosophical insight: "no dialogue ever ends"at the point of reorientation. Instead,(4) "there is invariably, as the fourth and final momen t , a return to th e issues ordifficulties or, even, the plane of discourse prior to th e basic refutation" (emphasis added). The character of this return depends on the extent to which th enonphilosopher is able to appropriate th e reorienting philosophical insight: th ereceptivity of th e interlocutor to this insight and th e phi losophical depth of the"return" are directly proportional (see 1980, xviii).


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Images in Plato's Meno 123Miller's proposal, though largely ignored in recent scholarly literature on

Plato, has important implications for how we read th e Platonic corpus. I canonly begin to sketch them here. Accounts of Plato's development like that inVlastos's Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher need to take into consideration the possibility that "elenchus" is always a part of Plato's dialogues. IfMiller is right it is what fuels the opening sections of all the dialogues, even th e"middle" and "late" ones. (M iller's own work on the Statesman and Parmenides points in this direction fo r these particular "late" dialogues.) ThusVlastos's talk of Plato's scuttling th e elenchus (1991, 123) would be premature.Similarly, recognition of th e "reorienting insight" of th e philosopher, if it isindeed a structural element of all th e dialogues, would put to rest once and fo rall th e notion of th e "apore tic Socratic dialogue" (cf. Kahn), because Platowould be seen as presenting substantive philosophical insight from the beginning of his corpus to its end. "Plato's development" may not be nearly assimple as is usually thought it may not be a simple progression from dramatic"aporetic" dialogues to dogmatic treatises where th e dramatic form is a merecover fo r the author's own views (cf. Miller, 1986, 168-83).

An important advantage of Miller's approach is that it enables us to accept,without reducing interpretation to merely subjective speculat ion, th e fact thatboth Socrates within th e dialogue and Plato outside of it often proceed by wayof irony. The interpretive danger in admitting irony as a textual strategy is thatof opening a Pandora's box, because one interpreter's irony is another's deadseriousness: it's hard to tell when the Socrates of Plato's dialogues is beingironic. (How much better things would be if no philosopher were ever ironic!)But if Miller is on th e right track about th e general structure of th e dialogues,we can accept Socratic and Platonic irony without falling into an exegeticalschizophrenia: we will have some sense of what the philosopher is trying to doin the part of th e text in quest ion, and thereby have some handle on whethershe or he might be employing irony. With a grasp of the "rhythm" of thedialogue as a whole comes th e advantage of knowing when to expect irony andwhat th e grounds for that irony might be.

This way of putting the point brings to light another advantage of Miller'sstrategy: it allows us to consider the philosophical significance of th e dramaticaspects of the tex t without falling into reading those aspects too "subjectively."Because his readings of th e drama of th e dialogues are situated within a structural claim about th e whole dialogue, Miller is able to check such readings withth e action especially the "logical action"or argumentation of the dialogueas a whole. This perspective on one's interpretation of dramatic elements canoffer an important line of response to the criticism, in itself quite natural, of"overreading" th e drama of Plato's dialogues. It should be noted, however, thatMiller's structural claim also helps one to make more sense of the argumentswithin the text: by keeping in mind th e position of th e argument in questionwithin the action of th e whole dialogue, one can place th e argument in its


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124 Interpretationdialogical context, thereby paying due heed to "the specific w o r k that Plato[rather than th e reader] intends [it] to perform" (1986, 3 f.; emphasis added).

With some relatively minor modifications, I want to use the hermeneuticalstrategy Miller has proposed as a hypothesis in this paper and thereby situateMeno 82b9-85b7 within the whole of that dialogue. Indeed, the Meno seemsquite well suited to th e kind of structural analysis Mille r has proposed: its partsare well demarcated by signposts Plato himself has left for us . By considerings ome a sp ec ts of its structure more closely, I can both indicate the modificationsto Miller's proposal I wish to suggest and also begin to situate th e example ofmathematical instruction in th e Meno within the whole of that dialogue.

To begin with, note that th e firs

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