XI. INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

1. General and Particular Use of Words

Matuguina Wood vs CA [1996] Refresher: encroachment blamed upon person who used to be major stockholder of co. her new company was asked to pay up. But new company was never party to old case. Doctrine: no transfer of liability. corporation has distinct personality. interpretation of the word transfer should be that it includes only

obligations arising from general duties not personal obligations [i.e. transgressions of the law]

Tan v People

In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words/phrases should be given their plain, ordinary & common usage meaning

o Thus, Sec 68 makes no distinction between raw of processed lumber

Bernardo v Bernardo

Refresher: This case is about a land dispute where one was asserting that he has more right to avail of the land because the law favors "bona fide" settlers over the lessor. Doctrine: "Actual" & "bona fide" settlers are not synonymous. Bona fide means good faith. While Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual" & solely used "bona fide" occupants" thereby emphasizing the requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be endowed with legitimate tenure.

Malanyaon vs. Lising

Refresher: Malanyaon filed a petition to declare illegal the disbursement made by Goleta as municipal treasurer to the wife of Mayor Pontanal. The said mayor was charged of violation of Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act and was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency. The interpretation of the word acquitted is the issue here. Doctrine: Acquitted means that after due hearing and consideration of evidence against a person, the court is of the opinion that his guilt is not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal does not show the defendant is not guilty. Only time dismissal is the same as acquittal is when the prosecution presented all pieces of evidence and court dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence failed to show beyond reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty.

2. Associated Words

Noscitur a sociis * sir said that this doesnt require an enumeration; construe the statute as a whole

Aisporna v CA Refresher: Rodolfo Aisporna w/ the active participation of Mapalad Aisporna, his wife, issued a Personal Accident Policy for Ana Isidro. TC found Mapalad guilty for violating the Insurance Act. Though she contended that being Rodolfos wife, she naturally helped in his work & that it was merely a renewal & she didnt receive compensation for it. SC acquitted her. Doctrine: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses, & phrases shouldnt be studied as detached & isolated expressions, but the whole & every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts & in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statue must be interpreted w/ reference to the context. Doctrine of associated words (noscitur a sociis) states that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear & specific by considering the company in w/c it is found or in w/c it is associated. Sooo..when a word is ambiguous look at the words surrounding it to understand its meaning.

Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing Corporation v. Villarama, Jr. Refresher: This is a case about an employee who worked in another company which was the same line of business as his former company, Dai-chi. His former company and he had in their contract an agreement that an employee should not work for another company that is in the same line of business. Labor Arbiter has the exclusive jurisdiction for employer-employee relations cases but SC held here that this is not one of them. There must be a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided in the article 217 before Labor Arbiter can assume jurisdiction. Doctrine: Although there's no explicit phrase that says damages from employer-employee relations, it's clear from the reading of the whole article that the circumstances are exactly those within the employer-employee relations. In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, the Court held that it is evident that there is a unifying element which runs through pars. 1 to 5 and that is that they all refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. This, is in other words, a situation where the rule of noscitur a sociis may be usefully

invoked in clarifying the scope of par. 3 and any other par. Of Art. 217 of the Labor Code.

Ejusdem generis

PBA vs CA [2000]

Refresher: PBA claiming that it shouldnt anymore pay BIR since it paid local tax. Doctrine: but PBA [sports] not a place of amusement] under local tax code where general words follow and enumeration of persons or things,

by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed to their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius

Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos

FACTS:

Officers of a Civic Organization, Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund drive for renovating the chapel of Tikay, Bulacan. Martin Centeno (chairman of the group) & Vicente Yao approached Judge Adoracion Angeles & solicited from her a contribution of Php 1,500

The solicitation was made without a permit from DSWD. As a consequence, Judge Angeles filed a complaint against the petitioners for violating PD 1564 (the Solicitation Permit Law).

Sec. 2 Any person, corporation, organization or association desiring to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Dept. of Social Service and Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon filing of a written application for permit in the form prescribed by the Regional Offices of the Dept. of Social Service and Development, the Regional Director or his duly authorized representative may, in his discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit to disapprove the application. In the interest of the public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any permit issued under Act 4075. Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts do

not constitute an offense since the decree only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes not those made for a religious purpose. This was denied and trial ensued.

The TC rendered judgments against the petitioners & ordered them to pay a fine of Php200 each. Nonetheless, they also recommended that the petitioners should be pardoned since they acted in good faith & should not have been held liable were it not for the PD.

Petitioners appealed to the RTC of Bulacan. (One of the petitioners withdrew his appeal but it continued with respect to the other one)

RTC judge affirmed the decision of the LC & modified the penalty because the perversity of the act committed which caused damage & prejudice to the complainant. The penalty was increases to Php1000, without subsidiary imprisonment, and imprisonment of 6 months.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner questions the applicability of PD 1564 to solicitations for

contributions intended for religious purposes in that : 1) religious purposes is not expressly included in the provisions

of the statue what the law does not include, it excludes 2) Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the state &

liberally in favor of the accused 3) State regulation of solicitations made for a religious purpose

would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the constitution

ISSUES: (main issue is #1)

1) WON the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. NO

2) WON regulation of solicitations for religious purposes would abridge the right of freedom of religion. NO

RATIO DECIDENDI: 1) WON the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose NO

It is the elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one thing, person, act or consequence excludes all the others

o Expressio unius est exclusion alterius where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters

o Proceeds from the premise that the legislature would have not made a specific enumeration in a statute, had the intention been not to restrict its meaning & confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

The 1987 Constitution & several other statutes treat the words charitable & religious separately & independently of each other

o Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution: charitable is only 1 of the 3 words used to describe those institutions exempt from tax

o Sec. 26(e): corporations exempt from income tax o Sec. 28(8)(e): exclusions from gross income of the National

Internal Revenue Code o Sec. 88 of the Corporation Code: organization of non-stock

corporations o Sec. 234 of the Local Government Code: exceptions from real

property tax Since the aforementioned statutes specifically spelled out charitable

& religious, while PD 1564 merely states charitable or public welfare purposes, shows that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes. If the opposite were their intent, there is no reason why it would not have expressly stated so.

All religious activities are charitable in nature. The converse may not be true since charitable purposes can also include those which are not religious.

There is a distinction between charitable purpose & religious purpose except where the 2 terms are used synonymously or where the distinction has been done away with by the statute.

Charitable is capable of meaning different things, but since PD 1564 is a penal law, it cannot be given such a broad application since it would be prejudicial to the petitioner (accused).

Provisions of the Constitution & the statutes makes use of the disjunctive or to relate charitable & religious. Or is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. When or is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be taken separately. There is no compelling consideration to deviate from this application in construing the provisions of PD 1564.

To include religious purpose to the intent of PD 1564 by virtue of the word charitable, under the pain of penal liability without the necessary permit, would be prejudicial to the petitioner.

Charitable should be strictly construed. This is consisted with the doctrine that all penal legislation should be interpreted to favor the accused.

Charitable is a matter of description rather than a precise definition, the determination of that which is charitable, must be decided on its own particular facts & circumstances.

2) WON regulation of solicitations for religious purposes would abridge the right of freedom of religion. NO

Even the exercise of religion may be regulated in order for the state to protect its citizens from injury.

A state may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger to establish his identity & his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort or convenience.

A regulation which does not involve any religious test or delay that collection of funds would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.

The State, under its exercise of police power, has the authority to determine WON there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes which are also prejudicial to the interest of worthy & proper charities. Some regulation is in the public interest.

Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation of the State, but since religious solicitations are not covered by PD 1564, the petitioner cannot be held criminally liable.

Malinias v COMELEC Refresher: This is the case where Malinias claims that he was not able to enter the canvassing area during the elections because of the police checkpoint instituted by a congressman to deliberately prevent him form going there. He wants the policemen & the congressman to be criminally punished, but the court held that those offenses are just administratively sanctioned because they are not included in the enumeration of election offenses criminally chargeable. Doctrine: The rule of expression is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expression facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.

Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio

Garvida vs. Sales

Refresher: Lynette Garvida ran and won for SK Chairman. Her proclamation was suspended by the COMELEC en banc because she was beyond the age limit for elective members. Doctrine: The Local Govt Code had a different maximum age for a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official. The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification.

Casus omissus

Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v Province of Cebu Refresher: Provincial Governor of Cebu appointed teachers for extension classes. COA saw that the salaries & personnel-related benefits & college scholarship grants were charged against the SEF. SC said the salaries could be charged to the SEF but not the college scholarship grants. Doctrine: Doctrine of necessary implication: every statute is construed, by implication, to have all the provisions as may be necessary to effectuate it (this is how the SC arrived at the decision that the salaries could be charged). Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est: a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally (w/c is why SC said college scholarship grants cant be charged).

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos

Ramirez v. CA FACTS: Soccoro Ramirez filed a civil case for damages against Ester Garcia, who allegedly insulted and humiliated her in a hostile & furious mood & in a manner offensive to the petitioners dignity & personality. To support this claim, she produced a verbatim transcript of the confrontation w/c was based on a tape recording that she made. Garcia thus filed a criminal case w/ the RTC of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200 (wiretapping), stating that the secret taping was illegal. Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash the information w/c was granted by the RTC. Garcia appealed to through certiorari to the SC w/c referred the case to the CA, w/c declared the TCs decision null & void. After denying Ramirezs motion for reconsideration, she petitioned to the SC. Petitioner argues:

1) the applicable provision of RA 4200 doesnt apply to the taping of the private conversation by one of the parties to the convo

2) the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private convo by a party other than those involved in the communication

3) the substance or content of the convo must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of RA 4200

4) that RA 4200 penalizes the taping of a private communication not a private conversation.

ISSUE(s):

1) WON RA 4200 applies to the taping of a private convo by one of the parties to it

2) WON the substance of the convo must be alleged in the Information

3) WON RA 4200 penalizes the taping of a private communication, not a private convo"

HELD: 1) Yes, 2&3) No. Judgment affirmed.

RATIO DECIDENDI: 1) YES. Legislative intent is determined from the language of the statute & when it is clear & unambiguous, the law is applied accdg to its express terms. Sec.1 of RA 4200 clearly makes it illegal for anyone, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record the convo. The law makes no distinctiong as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private convo. The intent of the statute is underscored by the use of the qualifier ANY. Further, Senate Congressional records, supports this conclusion. Thus, where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. And RA 4200 does NOT make a distinction. 2) NO. The nature of the convo is immaterial to a violation of the statute. And its substance doesnt need to be specifically alleged in the information. Nowhere in the law is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the convo, as well as its communication to a 3rd person should be professed. 3) NO. By interpreting that private communication in Sec.1, RA 4200 doesnt include private convo narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity. Communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the process by w/c meanings or thoughts are shared btwn individuals through a common system of symbols. Its definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of meanings or thoughts. Thus, the confrontation that took place btwn the petitioner & respondent it included. Further, the terms convo & communication were used interchangeably by Sen. Tatad in his Explanatory Note to the bill. And the statute explicitly mentions the unauthorized recording of private communications w/ the use of tape-recorders.

Cebu Institute of Medicine v CIM Union [2001] Refresher: Union charges school with violation of law for using part of the 70%-tuition-increase money to pay participation fee for employee benefits. Doctrine: employer is right! the law says so Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not.

Reddendo singular singulis

Ppl v Tamani Reddendo singula singulis referring each to each; referring each

phrase/expression to its appropriate object; let each be put in its proper place; words should be taken distributively

Amadora v CA

Refresher: Kid shot classmate. Parents of dead son, suing for damages against the school. Art 2180 CC: "Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts & trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils & students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody." Doctrine: Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" & "the heads of establishments of arts & trades" to the word "apprentices". *but we all know that they said there's no difference anymore between the two.

Doctrine of Necessary implication

NATU v Torres

Refresher: NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of Planters Banks employees occupying supervisory positions. Bank said such supervisory positions are actually managerial and/or confidential employees ineligible to join, assist or form a union. Doctrine: Using the doctrine of necessary implication, Managers/OICs, cashiers and controllers are confidential employees even though the labor code singled out managerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. The rationale is that the said position are considered confidential employees, which are supposed to be on the side of the employer and to see to it that its interests are well protected.

3. Provisos, Exceptions, and Saving Clauses

Provisos, exceptions and saving clauses (Agpalo article)

> Generally, the office of a proviso is either to limit the application of the enacting clause, section or provision of a statute or to except something therefrom or to qualify or restrain its generality or to exclude some possible ground or misinterpretation of it.

> An exception is a clause which exempts something from the operation of a statute by express words. The express mention of exceptions operates to exclude other exceptions and conversely those which are not within the enumerated exceptions are deemed included in the general rule. > A saving clause is a clause in a provision of law which operates to except from the effect of the law what the clause provides or to save something which would otherwise be lost. > Exception is different from a proviso in the sense that: (1) an exception exempts something absolutely from the operation of a statute, by express words in the enacting clause. A proviso defeats its operation conditionally, (2) An exception takes out of the statute something that otherwise would be a part of the subject matter of it. A proviso avoids them by way of defeasance or excuse (3) exception is generally a part of the enactment itself, absolutely excluding from its operation some subject or thing that otherwise would fall within its scope. But when the enactment is modified by engrafting upon it a new provision, by way of amendment, providing conditionally for a new case, it is in the nature of a provision. > However, one of the functions of a proviso is to except something from an enacting clause. In this sense, an exception and a proviso are similar.