INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTSRECOMMITTING TO PROTECTION IN ARMED CONFLICT ON THE 70 TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..........................................................................................................................5

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................9

CHAPTER 2: CONTEMPORARY AND FUTURE CHALLENGES IN THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES ........151. Urbanizationofarmedconflicts ........................................................................................................ 16A) Theprotectionofciviliansagainsttheeffectsofhostilitiesduringurbanwarfare ..................................16B) Theuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas ....................................................................................................19C) Theprotectionofthecivilianpopulationduringsieges .......................................................................................22

2. Newtechnologiesofwarfare .............................................................................................................26A) Cyberoperations,theirpotentialhumancost,andtheprotectionaffordedbyIHL .................................26B) Autonomousweaponsystems .........................................................................................................................................29C) Artificialintelligenceandmachinelearning .............................................................................................................31D) HumanitarianconsequencesandconstraintsunderIHL related tothepotentialuseofweaponsinouterspace ......................................................................................... 32E) Challengesposedbycertainnewtechnologiesofwarfaretolegalreviewsofnewweapons ............... 34

CHAPTER 3: NEEDS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN INCREASINGLY LONG CONFLICTS: SELECTED ISSUES ...............................................................................................................................371. Internallydisplacedpersons .............................................................................................................38

2. Theprotectionofpersonswithdisabilities ....................................................................................... 41

3. Accesstoeducation .......................................................................................................................... 44

CHAPTER 4: IHL AND NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS ...........................................................................491. TheapplicabilityofIHLtoconflictsinvolvingmultiplenon-Statearmedgroups .............................50

2. Thelegalregimeprotectingpersonsliving interritory underthecontrolofnon-Statearmedgroups ...................................................................................52

3. Detentionbynon-Statearmedgroups ...............................................................................................54

CHAPTER 5: TERRORISM, COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES, AND IHL ............................................571. TheapplicabilityofIHLtoStatesfighting“terrorism” andnon-Statearmedgroupsdesignatedas“terrorists” ...................................................................58

2. Counterterrorismmeasuresand principledhumanitarianaction .....................................................59

3. Statusandprotectionofforeignfightersandtheirfamilies .............................................................. 61

CHAPTER 6: CLIMATE, ARMED CONFLICT, AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT ................................65

CHAPTER 7: ENHANCING RESPECT FOR IHL ......................................................................................711. Investigationsinarmedconflict .......................................................................................................72

2. Rootsofrestraintinwar ...................................................................................................................74

3. “Supportrelationships”inarmedconflict .......................................................................................75

4. IHLinaction:Respectforthelawon the battlefield .........................................................................76

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................79

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CHAPTER 2

CONTEMPORARY AND FUTURE CHALLENGES IN THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES

16 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS

1. URBANIZATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS

2 ICRC,Urban Services during Protracted Armed Conflict: A Call for a Better Approach to Assisting Affected People, 2015;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/4249_urban_services_during_protracted_armed_conflict.pdf.

3 Tothatend,theUniversitéLavalandtheICRCorganizedameetingofexpertsontheprincipleofproportionality:see ICRC,The Principle of Proportionality in the Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, 2018;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/79184/4358_002_expert_meeting_report_web_1.pdf. TheICRChasalsotakenpartinprocessesinvolvingexpertsandorganizedbyotherinstitutions:seeInternationalLawAssociationStudyGroup,The Conduct Of Hostilities and International Humanitarian Law: Challenges of 21st Century Warfare, 2017;availableathttps://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId=3763&StorageFileGuid=11a3fc7e‑d69e‑4e5a‑b9dd‑1761da33c8ab(thisreportalsodiscussesthenotionsof“militaryobjective”and“precautionsinattack”);ChathamHouse,Proportionality in the Conduct of Hostilities: The Incidental Harm Side of the Assessment,researchpaper,2018;availableathttps://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018‑12‑10‑proportionality‑conduct‑hostilities‑incidental‑harm‑gillard‑final.pdf.

Astheworldurbanizes,sotoodoesconflict.Increasingly,fightingtakesplaceinurbanareas,andciviliansbearthebruntofit.TheICRCknowsfromdirectobservationthattheuseinpopulatedareasofexplosiveweaponsthathavewideareaeffectscontinuestobeamajorcauseofinjuryanddeathamongciviliansandofdamagetocivilianobjects.Evenwhenservicesthatareindispensableforsustaininglifeinurbanareasarenotdirectlytargeted,theyaredisruptedasanindirectresultofattacks,orbecomemoreandmoredegradeduntiltheyareatthepointofbreakdown.2Insomecases,servicesaredeliberatelydeniedtospecificareas,inordertoexertpressureoncivilianslivingthere.Inhabitantsareleftwithoutsufficientfoodorwater,sanitationandelectricity,anddeprivedofhealthcare;suchprivationisaggravatedwhencitiesarebesieged.Inaddition,fightinginurbancentresresultsinwidespreaddisplacement.Oncefightingstops,unexplodedordnanceand/orotherformsofweaponcontamination,andthelackofessentialservices,preventmanyofthedisplacedfromreturning.Manyoftheseconsequencesarenotuniquetocities,buttheyoccuronasignificantlylargerscaleinurbanwarfareandmayrequireadifferenthumanitarianresponse.

IHLimposeslimitsonthechoiceofmeansandmethodsofwarfare,protectingciviliansandcivilianinfra‑structureagainstunacceptableharmanddestruction.Evenso,thedevastatinghumanitarianconsequencesofurbanwarfareraiseseriousquestionsregardinghowpartiestosuchconflictsinterpretandapplyrelevantIHLrules.Inthissection,theICRCpresentsitsviewsandsharesthefindingsofnewmultidisciplinaryresearchon(a)theprotectionofciviliansagainsttheeffectsofhostilitiesduringurbanwarfare;(b)theuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas;and(c)theprotectionofthecivilianpopulationduringsieges.

A) THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF HOSTILITIES DURING URBAN WARFARE

Militaryandcivilianpeopleandobjectsareoftenintermingledincities.Forpartiesinvolvedinurbanhostil‑ities,thisinterminglingpresentsimportantchallenges,bothmilitarilyandintermsofavoidingcivilianharm.Becauseurbanwarfareendangersciviliansinwaysparticulartoit,theprotectionaffordedbytheprinciplesandprovisionsofIHLiscritical.Policiescanalsobeaneffectivetooltoprotectciviliansandlimittheeffectsofurbanwarfare,buttheymustnotbeusedtoofferprotectiontociviliansthatwouldbeweakerorlessthanthataffordedbyIHL.

IHLprohibitsattacksdirectedatciviliansandcivilianobjects,aswellasindiscriminateattacks–thatis,attacksthatstrikemilitaryobjectivesandciviliansorcivilianobjectswithoutdistinction.IHLalsoprohibitsattacksthatmaybeexpectedtocauseincidentalcivilianharmthatwouldbeexcessiveinrelationtotheconcreteanddirectmilitaryadvantageanticipated.Whiletheexistenceoftheprincipleofproportionalityisuncontestedandisapplieddailybymilitarycommanders,thekeyconceptsonwhichitrelies(“incidentalcivilianharm”,“militaryadvantage”,and“excessiveness”)wouldbenefitfromfurtherclarification,whichtheICRChassoughttosupport.3

Contemporary and future Challenges in the ConduCt of hostilities 17

Inaddition,IHLrequirespartiestoconflicttotakearangeofprecautionsinattackandagainsttheeffectsofattackstoprotectciviliansandcivilianobjects.Withregardtoprecautionsinattack,allfeasibleprecautionsmustbetakentoavoidoratleastminimizeincidentalcivilianharm.Feasibleprecautionsarethosethatarepossibleinpractice,takingintoaccountallofthecircumstancesrulingatthetime,includinghumanitar‑ianandmilitaryconsiderations.Theunderstandingofwhatprecautionsarefeasiblemayevolveovertime,dependingonanumberoffactors,includingtechnologicaldevelopments,orwiththeidentificationofnewtechniques,tacticsorproceduresthatmakeitpossibletominimizeincidentalcivilianharm.Inthisregard,lessons‑learnedprocesses/exercisesmaybringnewfeasibleprecautionstolight.

Unlesscircumstancesdonotpermit,effectiveadvancewarningmustbegivenofattacksthatmayaffectthecivilianpopulation.Mostattacksinurbanareasmaywelldoso.4Theeffectivenessofawarningshouldbeassessedfromtheperspectiveofthecivilianpopulationthatmaybeaffected.Itshouldreachandbeunderstoodbyasmanyciviliansaspossibleamongthosewhomaybeaffectedbytheattack,anditshouldgivethemtimetoleave,findshelter,ortakeothermeasurestoprotectthemselves.Advancewarningsdonotrelievethepartycarryingouttheattackfromtheobligationtotakeotherprecautionarymeasures,andcivilianswhoremainintheareathatwillbeaffectedbytheattack–whethervoluntarilyornot–remainprotected.

Theprinciplesofdistinction,proportionalityandprecautionsarecomplementary,andallthreemustberespectedforanattacktobelawful.

Debatehasarisenwithrespecttotherelevanceofexpectedincidentalharmtociviliansintheformofdis‑easeandmentaltraumawhenimplementingtheprinciplesofproportionalityandprecautions.IntheICRC’sview,itisimportanttoconsiderincidentalharmthatisforeseeable,suchascontaminationwhentargetingamilitaryobjectiveinacitythatcontainstoxicindustrialchemicals,orthespreadofdiseaseduetoincidentaldamagetomunicipalsewagesystems.Thisisparticularlyrelevantwhenanattackerexpectstocauseinci‑dentaldamagetowaterorsewagesystemsinacitywherecholeraorothersimilarlycontagiousdiseasesarealreadypresent,ashasbeenthecaseinsomerecentconflicts.

Asformentalhealth,whileIHLprohibitsactswhoseprimarypurposeistoterrorizethecivilianpopulation,psychologicaltraumahaslongbeenseenasaninevitableconsequenceofconflicts.Thepsychologicaleffectsofhostilitiesmightalsobelesseasilyanticipatedthanphysicalinjuriesordeath.Yet,itisbroadlyacceptedtodaythathumanhealthencompassesphysicalandmentalhealth.Inthisregard,thereissomeindicationofawarenessinsomerecentmilitarymanualsthatthepsychologicaleffectsofhostilitiesshouldbetakenintoaccount.Thismaybeanareainwhichthepracticeofbelligerentsinthefuturemightbeinfluencedbyevolvingresearchandunderstanding.Intheiroperations,theICRCanditsMovementpartnersseesignificantmentalhealthandpsychosocialneeds,whichrequirebroaderacknowledgementandbetterwaystoaddresstheharmcaused.5

SeveraloftherulesmentionedaboveapplyspecificallytoattackswithinthemeaningofIHL:thatis,tomili‑taryoperationsmostlikelytocauseharmtocivilians.Nonetheless,partiestoconflictmusttakeconstantcaretosparethecivilianpopulationinall militaryoperations.Theseincludetroopmovementsandmanoeuvrespreparatorytocombat,suchasduringgroundoperationsinurbanareas.Thespecificprotectionaffordedtoparticularobjectsmayalsogobeyondattacks.Forinstance,objectsindispensabletothesurvivalofthecivil‑ianpopulationmustneitherbeattackednorotherwisedestroyed,removedorrendereduseless.Thisincludesacity’sdrinking‑watersupplynetworkandinstallations.

4 Forhospitalsandmedicalfacilities,includingthoselocatedinurbanareas,thathavelosttheirprotectionbecausetheyareusedforactsharmfultotheenemy,there is a specific rule on warnings prior to attack.

5 Seebackgrounddocument,“Addressingmentalhealthandpsychosocialneedsofpeopleaffectedbyarmedconflicts,naturaldisastersandotheremergencies”,33IC/19/12.2,2019.

18 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS

CompliancewithIHLduringtheconductofhostilitiesinurbanareas,asanywhereelse,dependsonwhatthecommanderknew,orshouldhaveknown,atthetimeoftheattack,basedoninformationreasonablyavailablefromallsourcesinthecircumstances.Giventheinterminglingofciviliansandmilitaryobjectivesinurbanareas,itiscriticalthatinformationcollectedwhenplanninganoperationinurbanareasdoesnotfocussolelyonverifyingthattargetsaremilitaryobjectives–akeyrequirement,ofcourse–butalsoonassessingtheincidentalcivilianharm,includingtheindirector“reverberating”effects,thatmaybeexpected.Practicessuchasassumingthepresenceofciviliansinallcivilianbuildingsandassessingpatternsofcivilianlife,amongothers,mayhelpovercomedifficulties–createdbythephysicalenvironmentofacity–inaccuratelyassessing civilian presence.

ChallengesraisedbyattacksinurbanareasServicesessentialtothecivilianpopulationinurbanareasrelyonacomplexwebofinterconnectedinfra‑structuresystems.6Themostcriticalinfrastructurenodeswithinasystemenabletheprovisionofservicestoalargepartofthepopulationanddamagetothemwouldbemostconcerningwhenitcausesthewholesystemtofail.Suchnodesarealsodescribedasa“singlepointoffailure”.Servicesdependontheoperationofpeople,hardwareandconsumables,eachofwhichcanbedisrupteddirectlyorindirectly.Forinstance,adamagedelectricaltransformercanimmediatelyshutdownthesupplyofwatertoanentireneighbourhoodorhospital,drasticallyincreasingtherisksposedtopublichealthandwell‑being.Inaddition,overtime,directandindirecteffectscanhaveacumulativeimpactonaparticularservice–leavinglargepartsofthesystemindisarray–whichbecomesmuchmoredifficulttoaddress.Thiscumulativeeffectwillinfluencetheincidental‑harmassessmentandanalysisduringprotractedhostilities:intheproportionalityassessment,thecivilianharmexpectedfromdamagingthelastelectricpowerdistributionlineofacitywillbesignifi‑cantlygreaterthanthatexpectedfromdamagingoneofmanyfunctioningdistributionlines,asthatlosscanbemadeupbyredundancyinthepowerdistributiongrid.

Giventhiscomplexityandinterconnectednessofessentialservicesystems,itisparticularlyimportanttoconsidernotonlyincidentalcivilianharmdirectlycausedbyanattackbutalsoreverberatingeffects,providedtheyareforeseeable.7Asforanytypeofincidentalharm,whatisreasonablyforeseeable–orshouldhavebeenforeseen–willvary,dependingonthecircumstancesoftheattackandthetarget;however,patternsofincidentalcivilianharmcanbeforeseenbasedonpastexperienceoftheeffectsofurbanwarfare.Whatisforeseeablewillbeinformedandevolve,inparticular,through:analysisoftheeffectsofpastattacks;studiesontheeffectsofconflicts;bettermodellingofweapons’effects;betterunderstandingoftheinfrastruc‑turalset‑upandinterdependencybetweenservices;andnewtechnologiestobetterassesstheconditionorstatusofinfrastructureandservicedeliveryduringtheconflict.Inthisrespect,itisimportantthatarmedforcesrigorouslyapplyshortfeedbackloopsandotherlessonslearnedaspartofthetargetingcycleorother decision‑makingprocesses,topreventtherepetitionofmistakesandinformfutureassessmentsofeffectsthathadnotbeenadequatelyanticipatedormitigatedinthepast.Inparticular,recentconflictshaveshownthedevastatingeffectsthaturbanwarfarehasoncriticalcivilianinfrastructureandthedeliveryofessentialservicestothepopulation,especiallywhenexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareaareused.

Displacementwithincities,ortootherareas,isoneofthemanyharmfuleffectsonciviliansofurbanwar‑fare.8Inadditiontothethreattocivilianlives,andthedisruptionofessentialurbanservices,oneofthekeydriversoflong‑termdisplacementisthedamageordestructionofcivilianhomestypicallycausedbytheuseofheavyexplosiveweapons.Whiledisplacementisnotexpresslymentionedintheprinciplesofproportion‑alityandprecautionsasarelevanttypeofcivilianharm,dependingonthecircumstancesitmayincrease

6 ICRC,Urban Services during Protracted Armed Conflict: A Call for a Better Approach to Assisting Affected People,2015; availableathttps://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/4249_urban_services_during_protracted_armed_conflict.pdf.

7 SeeInternational Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts,2015,32IC/15/11,pp.52–53;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/15061/32ic‑report‑on‑ihl‑and‑challenges‑of‑armed‑conflicts.pdf. (SubsequentreferencestothisreportwillciteitastheIHL Challenges Report 2015.)

8 SeeICRC,Displaced in Cities: Experiencing and Responding to Urban Internal Displacement Outside Camps,ICRC,2018,pp.18ff.;availableathttps://shop.icrc.org/displaced‑in‑cities‑experiencing‑and‑responding‑to‑urban‑internal‑displacement‑outside‑camps‑2926.html.SeealsochapterIII.1)oninternallydisplacedpersons.

Contemporary and future Challenges in the ConduCt of hostilities 19

theriskofdeath,injuryordisease.Moregenerally,thedisplacementofciviliansexpectedwhenincidentallydamagingtheirhomeswillaffecttheweighttobegiventothatdamageundertheseprinciples.

Anotherchallengeofurbanwarfareisthatmanyobjectsareusedsimultaneouslyformilitaryandcivilianpurposes.Forexample,afiringpositionmightbesituatedontherooftopofacivilianhouseoranapartmentinamultistoreybuildingusedasacommandpost.Similarly,apowerstationmayprovideelectricitytobothamilitarybarracksandtherestofthecity.Ifitsuseformilitarypurposesrendersacivilianobject–ortheseparablepartthereof–amilitaryobjective,itwillbecomealawfultarget.However,theprevailingview,9 sharedbytheICRC,isthattheprinciplesofproportionalityandprecautionsremainrelevant,notonlywithregardtoincidentaldamagetoothercivilianobjects,butalsointermsoftheconsequencesforciviliansofimpairingthecivilianuseofthatobject.Underthisview,forinstance,theattackmustbedirectedattherooftopofthecivilianhouseoratthespecificapartmentinthemulti‑storeybuilding,provideditisfeasibleinthecircumstances,toavertthepossibilityofcivilianslosingtheirhomesandlivelihoods.

Finally,duringgroundoperationsinurbanareas,troopsarelikelytobecomeinvolvedinfirefightsandcallforfiresupport.Thedangerandurgencyofsuchsituationssignificantlyincreasesthelikelihoodandextentofincidentalciviliancasualtiesanddamage–astheICRChasobservedrepeatedly.Asfurtherdiscussedbelow,firebytroopsincontactwiththeenemy,aswellasfiresupport,mustrespectalltherulesgoverningtheconductofhostilities.

ProtectingtheurbanpopulationagainsttheeffectsofattacksCivilianscanbeprotectedmosteffectivelywhentheyarenotinthemidstofcombat.Becauseurbanwarfareoccursamongcivilians,itiscriticalthatpartiesimplementtheirobligationtotakeallfeasibleprecautionstoprotectciviliansandcivilianobjectsundertheircontrolfromtheeffectsofattacks.Forexample,avoidingtolocatemilitaryobjectiveswithinorneardenselypopulatedareas,ormoregenerally,employingstrategiesandtacticsthattakecombatoutsidepopulatedareas,aremeanstotrytoreduceurbanfightingaltogether.

Whenurbanfightingcannotbeavoided,allpartieshaveanobligationtotakeprecautionstospareciviliansfromtheeffectsofattacks.Theobligationofthepartycarryingoutanattacktogiveeffectiveadvancewarn‑ingismirroredbythatofthepartyincontroloftheareatoremoveciviliansandcivilianobjectsfromthevicinityofmilitaryobjectivestothemaximumextentfeasible.

Unfortunately,fartoooftenincontemporaryconflicts,partiesdotheexactoppositeanddeliberatelyendan‑gerthecivilianpopulationandciviliansundertheircontrolbyusingthemashumanshields,whichisabso‑lutelyprohibited.Civiliansusedashumanshields remainprotected,and–while itdoesraisepracticalchallenges–theotherpartymusttakeallfeasibleprecautionstoavoidharmingtheseciviliansandmusttakethemintoaccountinproportionalityassessments.

B) THE USE OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS Oneofthedefiningfeaturesofurbanwarfareistheuseofexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactarea(alsoreferredtoas“heavy”explosiveweapons),i.e.ofweaponsthattypicallydeliversignificantexplosiveforcefromafarandoverawidearea.10Whilegenerallynotacauseforconcernwhenusedinopenbattlefields,theseweaponshavedevastatingeffectsforthecivilianpopulationwhenemployedagainstmilitaryobjectives

9 Foranaccountofthisdebatewithregardtoproportionality,whichwouldapplymutatis mutandiswithregardtoprecautions,seeICRC,The Principle of Proportionality in the Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law,pp.37–40;InternationalLawAssociationStudyGroup,The Conduct Of Hostilities And International Humanitarian Law: Challenges of 21st Century Warfare, pp.11–12.

10 Theseare:i)weaponsthathaveawideimpactareabecauseofthelargedestructiveradiusoftheindividualmunitionused,i.e.itslargeblastandfragmentationrangeoreffect(suchaslargebombsormissiles);ii)weaponsthathaveawideimpactareabecauseofthelackofaccuracyofthedeliverysystem(suchasunguidedindirect‑fireweapons,includingartilleryandmortars);andiii)weaponsthathaveawideimpactareabecausetheweaponsystemisdesignedtodelivermultiplemunitionssimultaneouslyoverawidearea(suchasmulti‑barrelrocketlaunchers).SeeICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2015,p.49.

20 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS

locatedinpopulatedareas,11suchastownsandcities.TheirfootprintsarealloverrecentandongoingarmedconflictssuchasthoseinAfghanistan,Gaza,Iraq,Libya,Somalia,Syria,Ukraine,andYemen:death,severeinjuries(oftenleadingtolifelongdisabilities),mentalandpsychologicaltrauma,andlarge‑scaledestructionofhouses,hospitals,schools,andinfrastructureindispensableforthefunctioningofessentialservices–everythingthatmakesacitywork,andonwhichitsinhabitantsdependfortheirsurvival.

Beyondthedirectimpactonthelives,healthandpropertyofcivilians,thereisawidearrayofindirectorreverberatingeffectsthatspreadacrossthenetworksofinterconnectedurbanservicesandaffectamuchlargerpartofthecivilianpopulationthanthosepresentintheimmediateimpactareaoftheattack.Theseincreasinglyknownandforeseeableconsequencesareexacerbatedinprotractedarmedconflicts,wherethelong‑termandattimesirreversibledegradationofessentialservicesincreasesthesufferingofcivilians.Thegenderedimpactofheavyexplosiveweapons’useinpopulatedareasisalsooftenoverlooked:thedifferentsocialrolesofmenandwomenwillinfluencethechancesofwhowillbeinjuredorkilled–men,women,boys,orgirls–,andimpactthenatureofthestigmafacedbysurvivors.Moreover,heavybombingandshell‑ingisamajorcauseofdisplacement;displacedpopulationsareexposedtofurtherrisks,includingsexualviolence,particularlyagainstwomen.

IHLquestionsraisedbytheuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareasInits2015report,International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts,12theICRCoutlinedkeyIHLquestionsraisedbytheuseofexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareainpopulatedareas.Thosequestionsaresummarizedhere,followedbyadditionalissues.

Theuseofexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareaagainstmilitaryobjectiveslocatedinpopulatedareasisnotprohibitedper seunderIHL,butitisregulatedbytherulesontheconductofhostilities–notablythepro‑hibitionagainstindiscriminateattacks,theprohibitionagainstdisproportionateattacks,andtheobligationtotakeallfeasibleprecautionsinattack.Becauseofthecloseproximityofmilitaryobjectivestociviliansandcivilianobjects,theparticularvulnerabilityofciviliansinurbanenvironmentsasaresultoftheirdependencyoninterlinkedessentialservices,andthewide‑areaeffectsoftheexplosiveweaponsofconcern,theuseofsuchweaponsinpopulatedareastypicallyresultsinsignificantcivilianharm,raisingseriousquestionsabouttheinterpretationandapplicationoftherelevantIHLrules.

Inits2015report,theICRCnotedthattheinherentinaccuracyofcertaintypesofexplosiveweaponsystems –suchasmanyoftheartillery,mortarandmultiple‑rocketlaunchersystemsinusetoday,inparticularwhenusingunguidedmunitions,aswellasunguidedair‑deliveredbombsandrockets–raisesseriousconcernsundertheprohibitionagainstindiscriminateattacks.Theirlowaccuracymakesitverydifficulttodirecttheseweaponsagainstaspecificmilitaryobjectiveasrequiredbythisrule:thereisahighriskthereforethattheywillstrikemilitaryobjectivesandciviliansandcivilianobjectswithoutdistinction.Whileincreasingtheaccur‑ acyofdeliverysystemswouldhelpreducetheweapons’wide‑areaeffectsinpopulatedareas,theiraccuracycouldbeobviatedbytheuseoflarge‑calibremunitions–i.e.munitionsthathavealargedestructiveradiusrelativetothesizeofthemilitaryobjective–whichmightstillbecontrarytoIHL.

Inthe2015report,theICRCalsonotedthat,inadditiontothedirecteffectsofanattackusingheavyexplosiveweapons,indirectorreverberatingeffectsmustalsobetakenintoaccountwhenassessingtheexpectedinci‑dentalcivilianharmasrequiredbytherulesonproportionalityandonprecautionsinattack,insofarastheyarereasonablyforeseeableinthecircumstances.13Forexample,asnotedabove,incidentaldamagecaused byheavyexplosiveweaponstocriticalcivilianinfrastructure–suchasvitalwaterandelectricityfacilities andsupplynetworks–canseverelydisruptservicesessentialtociviliansurvival,notablyhealthcare,the

11 Theterms‘populatedareas’and‘denselypopulatedareas’areusedinterchangeablyhere,torefertoaconcentrationofciviliansorofciviliansandcivilianobjects,beitinacity,townorvillage,orinanon‑built‑uparea,andbeitpermanentortemporary.See,notably,Art.1(2)ofProtocolIIItothe1980ConventiononCertainConventionalWeapons.

12 ICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2015,pp.47–53.13 Onthequestionofwhenreverberatingeffectsarereasonablyforeseeable,seechapter2,section1)a.ontheprotectionofciviliansagainsttheeffectsofhostilitiesduringurbanwarfare.

Contemporary and future Challenges in the ConduCt of hostilities 21

provisionofelectricity,andwaterandsanitationservices.Astheseservicesareforthemostpartinterdependent, damagetoanyonecomponentofaservicewilloftenhaveadominoeffectonotheressentialservices,trig‑geringhumanitarianconsequencesfarbeyondaweapon’simpactzone.Basedondirectobservationoftheextensivecivilianharmcausedbytheuseofheavyexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas,thereissignificantdoubtthatarmedforcessufficientlyfactorinsuchreverberatingeffects,asrequiredbytherulesofpropor‑tionalityandprecautionsinattack.

Whereexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareaareusedtoprovidecoveringfireforownorfriendlyforcesunderattack,someStatesinvokethenotionof“self‑defence”tosuggestthatIHLrestrictionsontheuseofforce,includingonthechoiceofweapons,couldbelessstringentcomparedtosuchrestrictionsinpre‑plannedattacks,andtojustifytheuseofweaponsthatcarryahighriskofindiscriminateeffectsinthecircumstances.However,eventheuseofforcein“self‑defence”iscircumscribedbytheabsoluteprohibitionsagainstindis‑criminateanddisproportionateattacks,andbyallotherIHLrulesgoverningtheconductofhostilities,whichapplyindefensiveaswellasoffensivesituations.IntheICRC’sview,theprotectionofownorfriendlyforcesisarelevantmilitaryconsiderationimpactingonthefeasibilityofprecautions.Itisalsoarelevantmilitaryadvantagewhenassessingtheproportionalityofanattack,butonlyinsofarasitis“concreteanddirect”,whichisprimarilythecasewhentroopsareunderattack(i.e.in“self‑defence”scenarios).Inallsuchcir‑cumstances,forceprotectionmustbebalancedagainsthumanitarianconsiderations,suchastheextentofincidentalcivilianharmexpectedtoresultfromtheuseofheavyexplosiveweapons.Inthisrespect,thegreatertheriskofincidentalcivilianharmanticipatedfromtheattack,thegreatertherisktoitsownforcestheattackingpartymayhavetobepreparedtoaccept.Atanyrate,forceprotectioncanneverjustifytheuseofindiscriminatefireasameasuretoavoidtheexposureofownorfriendlyforces.

Attimes,explosiveweaponswithawideimpactarea(mostcommonlyartilleryorotherindirect‑fireweaponsystems)areusedtoharasstheenemy,todenythemfreedomofmovement,ortoobstructtheiractivities(“harassing”,“interdiction”or“suppressive”fire).Thistakestheformofacontinuousflowoffire–oftenoflowormoderateintensity–intendedtodelivereffectsoveranareaoronspecificobjectsorpersons,dependingonthecircumstances.However,tobelawful,harassing,interdictionorsuppressivefiremustbedirectedataspecificmilitaryobjective,andmustusemeanscapableofbeingsodirected.Yetinpracticeitisnotalwaysclearthatthisisthecase.

Whenusingindirect‑fireweaponsystemssuchasartillery,manyarmedforcesapplyfireadjustmenttech‑niquessuchas“walkingfire”againstatargetor“bracketing”atarget,inordertobeabletostrikethetar‑getafterseveralroundsoffire.Suchtechniquesconsistinfiringroundsprogressivelyclosertothetarget,recordingtheirimpactandmakingadjustments(corrections)beforefiring“foreffect”atthetarget(fireinsalvos).Suchmethodsofadjustingfirewithinapopulatedareainthemselvesposeasignificantriskofcivilianharm,inthatthe“adjustment”roundsarelikelytolandoff‑targetandstrikeciviliansand/orcivil‑ianobjects.Theuseofsuchtechniquesinpopulatedareasthereforeraisesquestionsundertheprohibitionagainstindiscriminateattacks.

Avoidingtheuseofwide-impactexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareasInits2015report,theICRCreiteratedapositionithadfirstexpressedlikethisin2011:“duetothesignificantlikelihoodofindiscriminateeffectsanddespitetheabsenceofanexpresslegalprohibitionforspecifictypesofweapons,theICRCconsidersthatexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareashouldbeavoidedindenselypopulatedareas”.14

14 Ibid.,pp.48–49.TheICRCfirstpublisheditspositiononexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareasinICRC,International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts,2011,32IC/15/11,pp.40–42;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/red‑cross‑crescent‑movement/31st‑international‑conference/31‑int‑conference‑ihl‑challenges‑report‑11‑5‑1‑2‑en.pdf(subsequentreferencestothisreportwillciteitastheIHL Challenges Report 2011).AsimilarcallwasmadebytheMovementin2013.SeeResolution7ofthe2013CouncilofDelegates,“Weaponsandinternationalhumanitarianlaw”,CD/13/R7,para.4;availableathttps://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/red‑cross‑crescent‑movement/council‑delegates‑2013/cod13‑r7‑weapons‑and‑ihl‑adopted‑eng.pdf.

22 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS

TheICRChascalledonallStatesandpartiestoarmedconflictstoadoptapolicyofavoidanceofuseofheavyexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas,regardlessofwhetherornotsuchusewouldviolateIHL,basedonthreeobservations:

• thegravepatternofcivilianharmcausedbytheuseoftheseweaponsandthehumanitarianandmoralimperativetoprevent,oratleastreduce,suchlevelsofdestructionandsuffering

• theobjectivedifficultyofemploying–inconformitywiththeprohibitionsagainstindiscriminateanddisproportionateattacks–explosiveweaponswithawideimpactareaagainstmilitaryobjectivessituatedinpopulatedareas

• thepersistentlackofclarityonhowStates,andpartiestoarmedconflictsinparticular,interpretandapplysaidIHLruleswithregardtotheuseofheavyexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas.AstheICRChaspreviouslystated,“therearedivergentviewsonwhethertheserulessufficientlyregulatetheuseofsuchweapons,orwhetherthereisaneedtoclarifytheirinterpretationortodevelopnewstandardsorrules.Basedontheeffectsofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareasbeingwitnessedtoday,thereareseriousquestionsregardinghowthepartiesusingsuchweaponsareinterpretingandapplyingIHL.”15

Anavoidancepolicysuggestsapresumptionofnon‑useofsuchweaponsowingtothehighriskofincidentalcivilianharm,whichcouldbereversedifsufficientmitigationmeasurescanbetakentoreducesuchrisktoanacceptablelevel.Theseincludemeasuresandproceduresrelatedtotargetingandtothechoiceofweaponsthatsignificantlyreducethesizeoftheexplosiveweapon’sareaofimpact,andothermeasurestominimizethelikelihoodand/orextentofincidentalcivilianharm.Suchpoliciesandpracticesshouldbedevelopedwellinadvanceofmilitaryoperationsandfaithfullyimplementedduringtheconductofhostilities,sharedwithpartnerforcesorsupportedpartiesinthecontextofsuchoperations,andtakenintoconsiderationwhendecidingonthetransferofheavyexplosiveweaponsaswellaswhenprovidingsupporttoapartytoanarmedconflict.

Changingbehaviourthrough“goodpractice”Giventhecomplexchallengesofconductinghostilitiesinurbanenvironments,andtheuniquevulnerabil‑itiesofcivilianslivingthere,itiscriticalthatmilitarypoliciesandpracticespaysufficientattentiontotheprotectionofcivilians,includinginthechoiceofmeansandmethodsofwarfare.Whileinstancesofexpresslimitationsonheavyexplosiveweaponsandassociatedmethodsofwarfareinpopulatedareascanbefound,thesearescatteredormission‑specificandrarelypartofaconsistentapproachtowardsmilitaryoperationsconductedinsuchenvironments.InformationavailabletotheICRCtodateindicatesthatonlyalimitednum‑berofStatesappeartohavespecificguidanceandtrainingonurbanwarfareortheconductofhostilitiesinpopulatedareas–althoughsomepositivemovementcanbeseen.

TosupportpolicydevelopmentinthisregardbyStatesandpartiestoarmedconflicts,theICRCrecommended,inarecentlypublishedreport,anumberofgoodpracticesforimplementinganavoidancepolicyandforfacilitatingcompliancewithIHLrulesontheconductofhostilitiesinpopulatedareas.

Inlightofthelarge‑scaledestructionandciviliansufferingwitnessedintoday’sarmedconflicts,theICRCcontinuestocallonallpartiestoarmedconflicttotakeurgentactionbyreviewingtheirmilitarypoliciesandpracticeandbyensuringthattheirdoctrine,education,trainingandweaponsareadaptedtothespecificitiesofurbanandotherpopulatedenvironmentsandtothevulnerabilityofcivilianstherein.

C) THE PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION DURING SIEGESThehistoryofwarfareisfullofinstancesofsiegesbeingusedasamethodofwarfare.Someofthemarenotoriousfortheirexceedinglyhighdeathtolls.ContemporaryconflictsintheMiddleEasthaveagaindrawntheattentionoftheinternationalcommunitytosiegesandotherencirclementtactics.

Siegesoftenhavegraveconsequencesforlargenumbersofcivilians.Recentsiegeswereaccompaniedbybombardmentandsometimesintensefightingbetweenbesiegingandbesiegedforces,creatingconstantdan‑gerforthecivilianstrappedinthebesiegedarea.Littleornoelectricityanddegradedpublicservicesarealso

15 SeeICRC,IHL Challenges Report 2015,p.51.

Contemporary and future Challenges in the ConduCt of hostilities 23

characteristicfeaturesofsieges.Familiesareforcedtomakeimpossiblechoiceswiththelittlefoodandwateravailable.Factorssuchasage,gender‑specificroles,ordisabilities,mayexacerbatedifficultiesinaccessingscarceresources.Theconsequencesarehunger,malnutrition,dehydration,illness,injuryanddeath.

Thenotionof“siege”Thereisnodefinitionof“siege”or“encirclement”underIHL.Asiegecanbedescribedasatactictoencircleanenemy’sarmedforces,inordertopreventtheirmovementorcutthemofffromsupportandsupplychan‑nels.Theultimateaimofasiegeisusuallytoforcetheenemytosurrender,historicallythroughstarvationandthirst,thoughincontemporaryconflictsbesiegingforcesusuallyattempttocapturethebesiegedareathroughhostilities.Siegesorotherformsofencirclementmayalsobepartofalargeroperationalplan:forinstance,theycanbeusedtoisolatepocketsofenemyforcesleftbehindduringaninvasion.

Asiegethatdoesnotinvolveattemptstocaptureanareathroughassaultmaybeaimedatobtainingamili‑taryadvantageinrelativesafetyforthearmedforcesofthebesiegingparty.Itavoidsthehazardsofurbanfightingforthebesiegingpartyandmayalsobeameanstolimittheheavyciviliancasualtiesoftenassociatedwithurbanfighting.

Conversely,siegesthatdoinvolveattemptstocaptureanareathroughassaultmayincreasetheintensityofthefightingandtheassociatedrisksofincidentalharmforcivilians.Thisisparticularlythecaseifthebesiegedforcesareleftwithnooptionotherthantofightorsurrender.

UnderIHL,itisnotprohibitedtobesiegeanareawherethereareonlyenemyforcesortoblocktheirre‑ inforcementorresupply,includingtoachievetheirsurrenderthroughstarvation.Itisalsonotprohibitedtoattackmilitaryobjectiveswithinabesiegedarea,providedsuchattackscanbecarriedoutinconformitywiththeprinciplesofdistinction,proportionalityandprecautions.

Unfortunately,civiliansareoftentrappedwithinwhenentiretownsorotherpopulatedareasarebesieged,causingunspeakablesuffering.IHLoffersvitalprotectiontotheseciviliansbyimposinglimitstowhatthepartiescandoduringsuchsieges.

Thescopeoftheparties’obligationtoallowcivilianstoleaveabesiegedareaThroughouthistory,besiegingandbesiegedforceshavepreventedciviliansfromleavingbesiegedareas.Forthebesiegingforces,themainpurposewasoftentohastenthesurrenderofthebesiegedforces,becausecivilianshavetorelyonthesamesuppliesastheenemyforces.AttheNurembergtrials,thepracticeofusingartillerytopreventciviliansfromleavingabesiegedareawasdeemedanextreme,butnotunlawful,measure.

Thelawhasevolvedconsiderablysincethen.Ithasdevelopedevenbeyondtheessential,butlimited,provi‑sionsoftheGenevaConventionsontheevacuationofspecificcategoriesofvulnerablepeople.

Today,siegesarelawfulonlywhendirectedexclusivelyagainstanenemy’sarmedforces.

First,shootingatorotherwiseattackingciviliansfleeingabesiegedareawouldamounttoadirectattackonciviliansandisabsolutelyprohibited.

Second,IHLrulesapplytotheconductofhostilitiesduringsieges.Asshowninthefollowingparagraphs,theimplementationofseveralrulesstemmingfromtheprincipleofprecautionsrequiresbothpartiestoallowcivilianstoleavethebesiegedareawheneverfeasible.Inparticular,constantcaremustbetakentosparethecivilianpopulationinallmilitaryoperations,andallfeasibleprecautionsmustbetaken,notablyinthechoiceofmeansandmethodsofwarfare,toavoidorminimizeincidentallossofcivilianlife,injurytociviliansanddamagetocivilianobjects.Inabesiegedareawherehostilitiesaretakingplace,andinviewoftheriskthatposestothem,oneobviousprecautionarymeasureistoevacuatecivilians,oratleastallowthemtoleave.Partiesmustalsogiveeffectiveadvancewarningsofattacksthatmayaffectthecivilianpopulation,thepur‑poseofwhichispreciselytoenablecivilianstotakemeasurestoprotectthemselves.

24 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS

Thebesiegedpartyhasobligations,too.Itmusttakeallfeasibleprecautionstoprotectthecivilianpopulationunderitscontrolfromtheeffectsofattacks.Thiscanentailallowingcivilianstoleaveorotherwiseremovingthemfromthevicinityofmilitaryobjectives,forexamplebyevacuatingthemfromabesiegedareawherehostilitiesareongoingorexpectedtotakeplace.

Thebesiegedpartymightbe tempted toprevent thecivilianpopulation from leavingbecausehavingabesiegedareaclearedofcivilianswouldmakeiteasierforthebesiegingforcestostarveoutthebesiegedforces,orgivetheformermoreleewaywhenattackingmilitaryobjectivesinthebesiegedarea.However,IHLcategoricallyprohibitsusingthepresenceofcivilianstorendercertainareasimmunefrommilitaryoper‑ations,forinstanceinattemptstoimpedethemilitaryoperationsofthebesiegingforces.Thiswouldamounttousingthecivilianpopulationashumanshields.

Finally,treatyandcustomaryIHLprohibitthestarvation ofthecivilianpopulationasamethodofwarfare.Theimplicationisthattheplightofciviliansdeprivedofsuppliesessentialtotheirsurvivalinabesiegedareacannolongerbeusedbyabesiegingpartyasalegitimatemeanstosubdueitsenemy.ItisthereforetheICRC’sviewthatabelligerentaimingtousestarvationasamethodofwarfareagainstenemyforces,besiegedinanareainwhichciviliansarealsotrapped,mustallowthecivilianstoleavethebesiegedarea,becauseexperienceshowsthatinpracticethesecivilianswillsharetheprivationcausedbyasiegeandmaybeexpectedtobeleftwiththeirbasicneedsunmet.

Theprotectionofciviliansleaving,orbeingevacuatedfrom,abesiegedareaCiviliansmayfleeabesiegedorotherwiseencircledareaorbevoluntarilyevacuated;theymayalsobeevacu‑atedagainsttheirwillbyapartytotheconflict.

Theissueofforcibleevacuationofabesiegedareahasraisedquestionswithrespecttoforceddisplacement.UnderIHL,forceddisplacementisprohibited,unlessthesecurityoftheciviliansinvolvedorimperativemili‑taryreasonssodemand.ProhibitedactsofforceddisplacementcanincludethoseresultingfromunlawfulactsunderIHLbythepartiesinordertocoercecivilianstoleave,includingintheconductofhostilities.16 As hostilitiesduringsiegesentailahighriskofincidentalciviliancasualties,thesecurityoftheciviliansinvolvedmayrequiretheirevacuationfromthebesiegedarea,buttheevacuationmustnotbecarriedoutinawaythatwouldamounttoforceddisplacementasaresultofunlawfulacts.

Toensurethatdisplacementisnotforcedorunlawful,itmustlastnolongerthanrequiredbythecircum‑stances.Displacedpersonshavearighttoreturnvoluntarilyandinsafetytotheirhomesorplacesofhabitualresidenceassoonasthereasonsfortheirdisplacementceasetoexist.17Althoughtemporaryevacuationsmaybenecessary,andevenlegallyrequired,siegesmustnotbeusedtocompelcivilianstopermanentlyleaveaparticulararea.

Fromapracticalperspective,safeevacuationsarebestorganizedwhenthepartiestotheconflictagreeonthenecessaryprocedures.Intheabsenceofsuchanagreement,bothpartiesremainobligedtotakeallfeasibleprecautionstoavoidcausingincidentalharmtociviliansfleeingduringhostilities.

Incaseofdisplacement,regardlessofwhetherciviliansfleeorareevacuatedfromabesiegedarea,allpos‑siblemeasuresmustbetakentoensurethattheciviliansinquestionarereceivedundersatisfactorycondi‑tionsofshelter,hygiene,health,safety(includingfromsexualandgender‑basedviolence)andnutritionandthatmembersofthesamefamilyarenotseparated.

16 ICTY,Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic,Judgment(AppealsChamber),IT‑97‑24‑A,22March2006,paras281,284–287;ICTY,Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic,Judgment(TrialJudgment),IT‑02‑60‑T,17January2005,paras596 and600–601.

17 SeechapterIII.1)oninternallydisplacedpersons.

Contemporary and future Challenges in the ConduCt of hostilities 25

Thebesiegingpartymaydecidetoscreendisplacedpersonsforsecurityreasons,suchasfindingoutwhethermembersofthebesiegedforcesintermingledwiththeciviliansleavingthebesiegedarea.ScreeningandothersecuritymeasuresundertakenbythebesiegingpartymustbeconductedwithfullrespectforIHLandhumanrightslaw,particularlywithregardtohumanetreatment,livingconditionsandrelevantproceduralsafeguardsincasesofdetention,andtheprohibitionagainstcollectivepunishment.

Theprotectionofciviliansandthewoundedandsickwhoremain inabesiegedorencircledareaCivilianswhoremaininabesiegedareacontinuetobeprotectedascivilians,unlessandforsuchtimeastheytakeadirectpartinhostilities.Themerefactofremaininginabesiegedarea–whethervoluntarily,for‑ cibly,orashumanshields–doesnotamounttotakingadirectpartinhostilities.Inaddition,thepresenceofbesiegedfightersamongthecivilianpopulationdoesnotmeanthatthecivilianslosetheirprotectionfromdirectattack.Thebesiegedandbesiegingforcesthereforeremainboundbyalltherulesprotectingciviliansagainsttheeffectsofhostilities.18

Furthermore,theIHLrulesonstarvationandonreliefoperationsaredesignedtoensure–incombination–thatciviliansarenotdeprivedofsuppliesessentialtotheirsurvival.

First,inadditiontotheprohibitionagainstusingstarvationofthecivilianpopulationasamethodofwarfare,IHLprohibitsattacking,destroying,removingorrenderinguselessobjectsindispensabletothesurvivalofthecivilianpopulation.Evenwhensuchobjectsarealsousedbytheenemyarmedforces,operationsagainstthemareprohibitediftheycanbeexpectedtoleavethecivilianpopulationwithsuchinsufficientquantitiesoffoodorwaterastocauseitsstarvation.

Second,duringasiege,thepartiescontinuetobeboundbyIHLobligationsrelatingtoreliefoperationsandhumanitarianaccess.IHLprovidesthatimpartialhumanitarianorganizationshavearighttooffertheirser‑vicesinordertocarryouthumanitarianactivities,inparticularwhentheneedsofthepopulationaffectedbythearmedconflictarenotbeingmet.Onceimpartialhumanitarianreliefoperationshavebeenagreedto,thepartiestothearmedconflict–whichretaintherighttocontrolthehumanitariannatureofreliefconsign‑ments–mustallowandfacilitaterapidandunimpededpassageofthesereliefoperations.

Thecommanderofabesiegedforcewhoisnotinapositiontoprovidethesuppliesessentialtothesurvivalofthecivilianpopulationunder itscontrolmustconsenttohumanitarianreliefoperationsforcivilians.Similarly,thecommanderofabesiegingforcemustallowhumanitarianaccesstoandreliefoperationsforciviliansremaininginthebesiegedarea.Thisissubjecttotheparties’rightofcontrolandabilitytoimposetemporaryandgeographicallylimitedrestrictionsrequiredbymilitarynecessityatthetimeandplaceofon‑goinghostilities.

Finally,IHLcontainsextensiverulesrelatingtorespectandprotectionforthewoundedandsick,aswellasthepersonsandobjectsassignedtocareforthem.TheGenevaConventionscontainafewexplicitprovisionsontheevacuationofthewoundedandsickfrombesiegedareasandthepassageofmedicalpersonnelandmedicalequipmentintosuchareas.Moregenerally,partiesmusttakeallpossiblemeasurestosearchfor,collectandevacuatethesickandwounded,andmustprovide–tothefullestextentpracticableandwiththeleastpossibledelay–themedicalcareandattentionrequiredbytheircondition.Alltheserulesapplynotonlytocivilians;theyalsobenefitwoundedandsickmembersofanenemy’sarmedforces.Theapplicabilityoftheserulestosiegesisuncontested.

18 SeechapterII.1)a.ontheprotectionofciviliansagainsttheeffectsofhostilitiesduringurbanwarfare.