Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

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Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Transcript of Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Page 1: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation

Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Page 2: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Effects of sanctioning system in social dilemma

Positive effects:A sanctioning system enhances coope

ration (e.g., Yamagishi, 1986)

Negative effects:A sanctioning system as an addictive

drug: The more of it we have, the more we depend on it (Taylor, 1987).

Page 3: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Negative effects of a sanctioning system

A sanctioning system makes people believe that they cooperate for external incentives.

↓ The sanctioning system reduce intrinsic

motivation to cooperate and trust for other people.

↓ People need severer sanctions to

cooperate.

Page 4: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Negative effects of a sanctioning system (cont’d)

An external sanctioning system is a coercer.

Coercion by itself may let people attribute their cooperation to external factors.

↓Reduction of intrinsic motivation to cooperate

Question:

Is it same for an internal sanctioning system ?

Page 5: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Coercion vs. Commitment

When members voluntarily introduce a sanctioning system, they may regard others (and themselves) as cooperation seeker rather than punishment avoiders.

↓An internal sanctioning system is a

commitment rather than a coercion.↓

Reduction of intrinsic motivation to cooperate

Page 6: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Purpose of this study

Examining negative effects of

an external / internal sanctioning system.

H0: Two sanctioning systems equally reduce intrinsic motivation to cooperate.

H1: An external sanctioning system more greatly reduce intrinsic motivation than an internal sanctioning system.

Page 7: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Experimental Design

Removing Sanctioning Paradigm (Mulder & van Dijk)

Three-person group play social dilemma game.

Social Dilemma trials with a sanctioning system

Social Dilemma trials without a sanctioning system

Phase 1: manipulation

Phase 2: measurement of intrinsic cooperation

Page 8: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Experimental Design (cont’d)

External Sanction

Condition

SD trials with a

sanctioning system

SD trials without a

sanctioning system

Internal Sanction

Condition

SD trials without a

sanctioning system

SD trials with a

chance to vote

Control

Condition

SD trials without a

sanctioning system

A sanctioning system is to be introduced by a majority vote.(In fact, the system is introduced always)

Page 9: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Summary: Prediction

1. In Phase 1, cooperation rates in external / internal sanctioning condition are higher than in control condition.

2. In Phase 2, cooperation rates in external sanctioning condition is lowest.

External incentives

Attribution to external factors

Page 10: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Preliminary Results

Cooperation rates (two sessions in each condition)

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1 2 3 4 5

Trials

Co

op

era

tion

ra

te

Control External Internal

Phase 1 Phase 2

Page 11: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Preliminary Results

Cooperation rates (three sessions in each condition)

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1 2 3 4 5

Trials

Co

op

era

tion

ra

te

Control External Internal

Phase 1 Phase 2

1. In Phase 1, cooperation rates in internal sanctioning condition are highest.

Unexpected results

Page 12: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Preliminary Results

Cooperation rates (three sessions in each condition)

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1 2 3 4 5

Trials

Co

op

era

tion

ra

te

Control External Internal

Phase 1 Phase 2

2. In Phase 2, cooperation rates in external sanctioning condition is lowest.

However, cooperation rates in internal sanctioning condition is much lower than in control condition.Unexpected results

Page 13: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Preliminary Results

Cooperation rates (three sessions in each condition)

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1 2 3 4 5

Trials

Co

op

era

tion

ra

te

Control External Internal

Phase 1 Phase 2

It may be too early to draw a conclusion (we run only two session), but we have to consider why our prediction is not supported by now.

Page 14: Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

Thank You !