Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)
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Transcript of Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)
Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation
Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)
Effects of sanctioning system in social dilemma
Positive effects:A sanctioning system enhances coope
ration (e.g., Yamagishi, 1986)
Negative effects:A sanctioning system as an addictive
drug: The more of it we have, the more we depend on it (Taylor, 1987).
Negative effects of a sanctioning system
A sanctioning system makes people believe that they cooperate for external incentives.
↓ The sanctioning system reduce intrinsic
motivation to cooperate and trust for other people.
↓ People need severer sanctions to
cooperate.
Negative effects of a sanctioning system (cont’d)
An external sanctioning system is a coercer.
Coercion by itself may let people attribute their cooperation to external factors.
↓Reduction of intrinsic motivation to cooperate
Question:
Is it same for an internal sanctioning system ?
Coercion vs. Commitment
When members voluntarily introduce a sanctioning system, they may regard others (and themselves) as cooperation seeker rather than punishment avoiders.
↓An internal sanctioning system is a
commitment rather than a coercion.↓
Reduction of intrinsic motivation to cooperate
Purpose of this study
Examining negative effects of
an external / internal sanctioning system.
H0: Two sanctioning systems equally reduce intrinsic motivation to cooperate.
H1: An external sanctioning system more greatly reduce intrinsic motivation than an internal sanctioning system.
Experimental Design
Removing Sanctioning Paradigm (Mulder & van Dijk)
Three-person group play social dilemma game.
Social Dilemma trials with a sanctioning system
Social Dilemma trials without a sanctioning system
Phase 1: manipulation
Phase 2: measurement of intrinsic cooperation
Experimental Design (cont’d)
External Sanction
Condition
SD trials with a
sanctioning system
SD trials without a
sanctioning system
Internal Sanction
Condition
SD trials without a
sanctioning system
SD trials with a
chance to vote
Control
Condition
SD trials without a
sanctioning system
A sanctioning system is to be introduced by a majority vote.(In fact, the system is introduced always)
Summary: Prediction
1. In Phase 1, cooperation rates in external / internal sanctioning condition are higher than in control condition.
2. In Phase 2, cooperation rates in external sanctioning condition is lowest.
External incentives
Attribution to external factors
Preliminary Results
Cooperation rates (two sessions in each condition)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5
Trials
Co
op
era
tion
ra
te
Control External Internal
Phase 1 Phase 2
Preliminary Results
Cooperation rates (three sessions in each condition)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5
Trials
Co
op
era
tion
ra
te
Control External Internal
Phase 1 Phase 2
1. In Phase 1, cooperation rates in internal sanctioning condition are highest.
Unexpected results
Preliminary Results
Cooperation rates (three sessions in each condition)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5
Trials
Co
op
era
tion
ra
te
Control External Internal
Phase 1 Phase 2
2. In Phase 2, cooperation rates in external sanctioning condition is lowest.
However, cooperation rates in internal sanctioning condition is much lower than in control condition.Unexpected results
Preliminary Results
Cooperation rates (three sessions in each condition)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5
Trials
Co
op
era
tion
ra
te
Control External Internal
Phase 1 Phase 2
It may be too early to draw a conclusion (we run only two session), but we have to consider why our prediction is not supported by now.
Thank You !