Interests, Values, and Objectives

Lsn 2

Values

• Represent the legal, philosophical, and moral basis for continuation of a nation’s system

• Provide a sense of national purpose and are the basis for the development of national interests

• But values can also be contradictory to one another– Values are situational and are

modified over time

Founding documents such as the Declaration of Independence often contain a statement of a nation’s values

Interests

• A nation’s perceived needs and aspirations in relation to its international environment

• Interests usually combine security and material concerns with moral and ethical concerns– During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and

communism were perceived as threats to both American security and American values

Categories of National Interests

• Defense of the Homeland– Protection against attack on the territory and

people of a nation-state in order to ensure survival with fundamental values and political systems intact

• Economic Prosperity– Attainment of conditions in the international

environment that insure the economic well-being of the nation

Categories of National Interests (cont)

• Promotion of Values– Establishment of the legitimacy of or the

expansion of the fundamental values of the nation such as free trade, human rights, and democracy

• Favorable World Order– Those end states that promote conditions

favorable to the values and fundamental purposes of the nation, such as stability and democratic governments

Intensity of Interests

• Vital– Assure a state its security, its freedom and

independence, protection of its institutions, and enshrinement of its values

– A nation is willing to expend blood and treasure, in short to do whatever it takes, to defend its vital interests

– If unfulfilled will have immediate consequence for critical national interests

Intensity of Interests

• Important– Do not affect national survival, but they do

affect importantly the national well-being and the character of the world in which nation exists

– If unfulfilled, will result in damage that will eventually affect critical national interests

– However, the use of force is not automatically deemed necessary to protect an important interest

Intensity of Interests

• Peripheral– If unfulfilled, will result in

damage that is unlikely to affect critical national interests

– Does not really pose a threat to the nation as a whole (although it may affect some private interests)

– The nation may or may not seek to defend a peripheral interest depending on the relative cost of the endeavor and the importance of the interest

Political scientist Michael Mandelbaum complained that in the Clinton Administration, “We have a foreign policy today in the shape of a doughnut—lots of peripheral interests but nothing at the center."

Policy and Strategy

• National Policy– A broad course of action or statements of guidance

and objectives adopted by a government at the national level in pursuit of national interests

– Objectives are end states that must be accomplished in order to advance national interests

• National Security Strategy– The art and science of using all the elements of

national power during peace and war to secure national interests

– Sometimes called national strategy or grand strategy

Elements (or Instruments) of Power

• Basic means a nation uses to pursue its interests– Power can influence, support, enforce, or coerce

• Can be natural determinants or social determinants

• Natural– Geography, population, natural resources, etc

• Social– Diplomatic, informational, military, and economic

(DIME)– Particularly adaptable to use by the strategist

Examples

• Diplomatic– Establishment, suspension,

or break in diplomatic relations

– UN Security Council debate– Cultural exchanges

• Informational– Propaganda– Scientific exchanges– Technical assistance– Intelligence

In 1995 Secretary of State Warren Christopher traveled to Vietnam to help open the US Embassy there and mark the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the US and Vietnam

Examples• Military

– Military assistance– Show of force– Quarantine, blockade,

or mining of ports– Invasion

• Economic– Trade embargo or

sanctions– Economic and financial

assistance– Economic and trade

policy

In spite of the highly repressive regime of Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania was one of the few communist countries to be accorded most-favored-nation status by the US during the Cold War, principally in recognition of Romania’s permissive policy toward emigration of Jews

The Strategist’s Challenge

• Determine the best way to project power by choosing those instruments of power which are both feasible and effective in achieving the objective

• Ensure that all strategies and instruments of power are supporting, complementary, and synergistic wherever possible (or at least do not work at cross-purposes)

Risk Assessment

• Almost no strategy has resources sufficient for complete assurance of success

• The strategy must ensure an assessment of the risk of less than full attainment of objectives

• If the risk is determined to be unacceptable, the strategy must be revised by…– Reducing the objectives– Changing the concepts, or– Increasing the resources

Case Studies

• Weinberger Doctrine

• Powell Doctrine

• Clinton Doctrine (Les Aspin and the Limited Objective School)

Beirut

• On Sept 29, 1982, US military forces were inserted in Lebanon as part of a multinational peacekeeping force

• Peacekeeping operations are designed to monitor and facilitate cease fire, truce, and diplomatic efforts

• No cease fire materialized in Beirut– Israelis and Syrians stayed in and around city

• In spite of this, the Marines were told to “establish presence” between Syrians and Israelis without an agreed upon withdrawal for either side

    

                                                                             

    

                                                                             

Beirut

• The Marines were first welcomed but steadily became perceived as being pro-Israeli

• The Marines were highly vulnerable in a non-tactical billeting arrangement with very strict ROE

• Violence culminated on October 23, 1983 with a terrorist bombing that claimed the lives of 241 service members

Time Reports the Terrorist Bombing

Lessons: Beirut

• “Without a clearly defined objective, determining the proper size and armament and rules of engagement for such a force is difficult at best.”

• “with no mission since there was no withdrawal agreement” Marines are effectively sitting targets.

• The military is but one instrument of national power, and it is not the appropriate one to be used in all situations or for all objectives.

• Resulted in the development of the Weinberger Doctrine—strategic criteria to commit U.S. forces overseas.

Conflicting Points of View

• “There had to be some way to deal with violent threats that lay between doing nothing and launching an all-out conventional war. Diplomacy could work [to address] problems most effectively when force– or the threat of force– was a credible part of the equation.”– Secretary of State George Shultz

Conflicting Points of View

• “My own feeling was that we should not commit American troops to any situation unless the objectives were so important to American interests that we had to fight, and that those conditions we met, and all diplomatic efforts failed, then we had to commit, as a last resort, not just token forces to provide an American presence, but enough forces to win and win overwhelmingly.”– Secretary of Defense Casper

Weinberger

Weinberger Doctrine

• The US should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies

• If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation,we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning

• If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives

Weinberger Doctrine (cont)

• The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed– their size, composition, and disposition– must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary

• Before the US commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress

• The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort

Beirut and The Weinberger Doctrine

• What impact did Beirut have on Weinberger’s criteria for using force relative to intensity of interest?

• How did the Weinberger Doctrine address risk?

• Why did the Weinberger Doctrine work well in the Cold War environment?

Changing World• Desert Storm

– War can be won quickly with low casualties

– Erased the “Vietnam Syndrome”• Dissolution of the Soviet Empire

– No more threat of a superpower clash

– US became the only world superpower

– Real opportunity for international cooperation and United Nations leadership

• Weinberger Doctrine came to be viewed as less appropriate in the post-Cold War era

Powell Doctrine

• Force should be used only as a last resort

• Military force should be used only when there is a clear-cut military objective

• Military force should be used only when we can measure that the military objective has been achieved

• Military force should be used only in an overwhelming fashion– Perceived as being too much like the

Weinberger Doctrine (but it did omit the “vital interest” requirement)

Les Aspin and the Limited Objective School

• “…this brand new world of ours is a world of turmoil and agitation. And that agitation has provoked calls for the use of military force in a whole range of circumstances that don’t fit the mold.”

Increased Optempo

• After the end of the Cold War and the tremendous success of Desert Storm, there was an increased willingness to use the military

• Previously reserved largely for “vital” interests, the military became increasingly used for lesser interests under a strategy of “engagement and enlargement”

Increased Optempo• The pace of deployments increased 16-fold since the

end of the Cold War. – Between 1960 and 1991, the Army conducted 10

operations outside of normal training and alliance commitments, but between 1992 and 1998, the Army conducted 26 such operations.

– The Marines conducted 15 contingency operations between 1982 and 1989, and 62 since 1989.

– During the 1990s, U.S. forces of 20,000 or more troops were engaged in non-warfighting missions in Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1996), and Iraq and Kuwait (1998).

The Heritage Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness, Jack Spencer, Executive Summary #1394

Changed World

• How did the end of the Cold War change America’s understanding of its interests?

• How did the end of the Cold War and Desert Storm affect risk?

• How do Powell and Aspin disagree over their understanding of what is a suitable objective for the military?

1996 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement

• “three basic categories of national interests that can merit the use of our armed forces”– Vital– Important– Humanitarian

Vital Interests

• “… interests that are of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity -- the defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and our economic well-being.”

• “We will do whatever it takes to defend these interests, including -- when necessary -- the unilateral and decisive use of military power.”– Desert Storm and Vigilant Warrior (when Iraq

threatened aggression against Kuwait in October 1994)

Important Interests• “… interests at stake do not affect our national

survival, but they do affect importantly our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live.”

• “In such cases, military forces should only be used if they advance U.S. interests, they are likely to be able to accomplish their objectives, the costs and risks of their employment are commensurate with the interests at stake and other means have been tried and have failed to achieve our objectives. Such uses of force should also be selective and limited, reflecting the relative saliency of the interests we have at stake.”– Haiti and Bosnia

Humanitarian Interests• “Here, our decisions focus on the resources we

can bring to bear by using unique capabilities of our military rather than on the combat power of military force. Generally, the military is not the best tool to address humanitarian concerns.”

• “But under certain conditions, the use of our armed forces may be appropriate: when a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond; when the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to jump-start the longer-term response to the disaster; when the response requires resources unique to the military; and when the risk to American troops is minimal.”– Somalia

Somalia

• US involvement in Somalia began in December 1992 to help ease the humanitarian crisis there

• Once this objective was accomplished the US forces expanded the mission to include disarming the Somali people and restoring law and order

• This change of mission was a direct threat to the power base of clan leader Mohammed Farah Aidid

Somalia

• On Oct 3, 1993 Task Force Ranger raided the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu to search for Aidid

• This led to a 17 hour battle in which 18 US soldiers were killed and 84 were wounded

• Pictures of the body of a dead US soldier being dragged through the streets and the capture of a US helicopter pilot caused a public outcry against the US policy in Somalia

• On Oct 7, President Clinton announced the beginning of the US withdrawal

Somalia

• Marked the beginning of a period in which the US became very “casualty adverse”– What type of interest was at stake in Somalia?

– Explain Somalia and intensity of interest in terms of risk acceptance.

– Explain the US decision to withdraw from Somalia as a function of intensity of interest.

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• Idealism and Realism