Handbook, w

hich is in the possession of every Bureau special agent,

provided:

Threats against the P

resident of the U.S., m

embers of his im

- m

ediate family, the P

resident-elect, and the Vice-P

resident

Investigation

of threats again

st the P

residen

t of the U

nited

States, m

embers of his im

mediate fam

ily, the President-E

lect, and the V

ice-President is w

ithin the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S.

Secret Service. Any inform

ation indicating the possibility of an attem

pt against the pewes, or safety of the P

resident, mem

bers of the im

mediate fam

ily of the President, the P

resident-Elect or

the V

ice-Presid

ent m

ust b

e referred im

med

iately by th

e most

expeditious means of com

munication to the nearest office of the

U.S

. Secret S

ervice. Ad

vise the B

ureau

at the sam

e time b

y teletyp

e of the in

formation

so furn

ished

to the S

ecret Service

and the fact that it has been so disseminated. T

he above action should be taken w

ithout delay in order to attempt to verify the

information and no evaluation of the inform

ation should be at-tem

pted. When the threat is in the farm

of a written com

munica-

tion, give a copy to local Secret Service and forward the original

to the Bureau w

here it will be m

ade available to Secret Service h

eadq

uarters in

Wash

ington

. Th

e referral of the cop

y to local S

ecret Service sh

ould

not d

elay the im

med

iate referral of the

info

rmatio

n b

y th

e fastest available means of com

munication to

Secret Service locally."

Th

e State D

epartm

ent ad

vised th

e Secret S

ervice of all crank

and

threat letter m

ail or crank visitors and furnished reports concerning any assassination or attem

pted assassination of a ruler or other major

official anyw

here in

the w

orld."

Th

e several military in

telligence

agencies reported crank mail and sim

ilar threats involving the Presi-

den

t." A

ccordin

g to Sp

ecial Agen

t in C

harge B

ouck

, the S

ecret Service had no standard procedure for the system

atic review of its

requests for and receipt of in

form

ation fro

m o

ther F

ederal agencies."

The C

omm

ission believes that the facilities and procedures of the P

rotective Research Sect ion of the Secret Service prior to N

ovember

22, 1963, were inadequate. Its efforts appear to have been too largely

directed

at the "

crank

" th

reat. Alth

ough

the S

ervice recognized

th

at its advan

ce preven

tive measu

res mu

st encom

pass m

ore than

these m

ost obvious dangers, it mude little effort to identify factors in

the activities of an i nd i vi dos or an organized group, other than specific

threats, which suggeSted a sonrre of danger against w

hich timely pre-

caution

s could

be tak

en. E

seete fo

r its special "trip

index

" file of

400 names, none of the cases in the P

BS

general files was available for

systematic review

on a geographic basis when the P

resident planned a particular trip.

As reported in chapter H

, when the special file• w

as reviewed on

Novem

ber 8, it con

tained

the n

ames of n

o persons from the entire

432

Dallas-F

ort W

orth

urea, n

otw

ithstan

din

g th

e fact that A

mb

ematior &

- Stevenson had b

een ab

used

by p

ickets in

Dallas less th

an a m

onth befo

re. Bouck

explain

ed th

e failure to

try to

iden

tify th

e indiv

iduals

inv

olv

ed in

the S

teven

son

incid

ent after it. o

ccurred

on

the g

rou

nd

that P

RS

required a more direct indication of a threat to the P

resident, an

d th

at there w

as no such

ind

ication

un

til the P

residen

t's sched

uled

visit to that. area becam

e known." S

uch an approach seriously under- m

ines the precautionary nature of PB

S w

ork; if the presence in Dallas

of the Stevenson pickets m

ight have created a danger for the President

on a v

isit to th

at city, P

RS

should

hav

e investig

ated an

d b

een pre-

pared to g

uard

again

st it O

ther agencies occasionally provided information to the S

ecret. Serv-

ice concern

ing p

oten

tially d

angero

us p

olitical g

roups. T

his w

as d

on

e in

the c

ase

of th

e N

atio

nalist P

arty

of P

uerto

Ric

o, fo

r ex

ample, b

ut

only after

mem

bers o

f the g

roup

. had

resorted

to

political v

iolen

ce." How

ever, th

e vag

ue req

uests fo

r info

rmatio

n

wh

ich th

e Secret S

ervice m

ade to

Fed

eral intellig

ence an

d law

en-

forcement agencies w

ere not well designed to elicit inform

ation from

them

abo

ut p

erson

s oth

er than

tho

se wh

o w

ere ob

vio

us th

reats to th

e Presid

ent. T

he req

uests sh

ifted th

e responsibility for evaluat- ing difficult

cases from

th

e Serv

ice, the ag

ency

mo

st respo

nsib

le for p

erformin

g that

task

, to th

e o

ther a

gencie

s. N

o specific

gu

idan

ce was p

rov

ided

. Alth

ou

gh

the C

IA h

ad o

n file req

uests fro

m

the T

reasury

Dep

artmen

t for in

form

ation o

n th

e counterfeitin

g o

f U

.S. cu

rrency

and certain

smugglin

g m

atters," it had

no w

ritten

specification of intelligence information collected by C

IA abroad w

hich w

as desired by the Secret S

ervice in advance of Presidential trips out-

side th

e United

States.

Info

rma

tion

kno

Mn

ab

ou

t Lee H

arvey O

mea

ld p

rior to

the a

a-

eassination.—N

o in

form

ation

con

cernin

g L

ee. Harv

ey O

swald

ap-

peared in P

RS

files before th

e Presid

ent's trip

to D

allas. Osw

ald

was know

n to oth

er Fed

eral agen

cies with

which

the S

ecret Serv

ice m

aintain

ed in

telligen

ce liaison. T

he F

BI h

ad b

een interested in him

, to som

e degree at least, since the time of his defection in O

ctober 1959. It h

ad in

terview

ed h

im tw

ice sho

rtly after h

is return

to th

e Un

ited

States, ag

ain a y

ear later at his req

uest an

d w

as investig

ating h

im at

the tim

e of th

e assassinatio

n. T

he C

om

missio

n h

as taken

the testi-

mony of B

ureau'agents who interview

ed Osw

ald after his return from

the Soviet U

nion and prior to Novem

ber 22, 1963, the agent who w

as assig

ned

his case at th

e time o

f the assassin

ation

, the D

irector o

f the

FB

I, and

the A

ssistant to

the D

irector in

charg

e of all in

vestig

ative

activities u

nd

er the D

irector an

d A

ssociate D

irector." In

add

ition

, th

e Directo

r and D

eputy

Directo

r for P

lans o

f the C

IA testified

con-

cerning that Agency's lim

ited knowledge of O

swald before the assassi-

natio

n." F

inally

, the C

om

missio

n h

as review

ed th

e com

plete files

on Osw

ald, as they existed at the time of the assassination, of the D

e- p

artmen

t of S

tate, the O

ffice of N

aval In

telligen

ce, the F

BI, an

d th

e C

IA. T

he in

form

ation

kn

ow

n to

the F

BI is su

mm

arized b

elow

. 433

44100111 01011114161110 cto 410 401.11114 "4 irotential -danger to him. ;O

n

icesteinher Ise OM

, siker instinvildineryHaeilteeporaibilitiF for- A

liVIIM

CIP

ewe "

Air 44/0 en

ircou W

hite d

epiet L

awson

wan

t ;to rihe

44**0 1.1r. 1,1811014000, ViPlak 4f the geographic M

ews th

ere axe

AtiSiall Ale

fee out aiSkiwinuel deem

ed to be a potential .wager

OW

*

set swe seernesel of !he Sw

eet .service megioral nam

e

Wediseke. itunim

s un

idlltu

tt Wovtd

0'

sem

ptim

mew

o S

he IW

O n

ow

ris

e S

eam

Sem

ite depends liem

ely

4* )M1* .4444 .*

*/*

**/*

/** *O

A Ili&

*GM

* of utter Federal ogee ii

Whibeit *41“tir A

14 0160.1iii d

em

o is

ossed

isie

ly h

elm

th

e v

isit

of

the I

Feesid

en

iOM

* o

ven

ton

en

ev.

flaws his a

rriv

al is

Deals

ea

Som

mem

ber to

loses* o

nsh

mn

sei

4̂4- •.*

* lem

ma pole . se sect tea lo

cal

olle

e

salee PA

'S

of -6

, 00440anke *host gwasectial la

sgess

is O

w

Altlib

melb

Aevr ic

es -Vow m

a/A** IS P28 M

ee o

f

stim

esim

en

en

tem

aen

is D

efie

s s

oil*

Ata

testim

u;lo

r

Sts

on

men

oA

06.161110r 14p 1004 L

W*" bagel sad about the incident

an

d o

bta

ined

rb

ro

At d

bo kW

torsos p

hoto

grap

hs o

f born

e o

f the p

ea so

ns in

volv

ed

. a

Cite

usis

feer 0

1 a

Hoer* S

ervic

e agen

t stood et th

e e

ntr

an

ce to

the

Trad

e K

W, "W

O0 P

ot w

ee s

eh

ed

ule

d t

o s

peak

, wit

h c

op

ies

aso Fps.

Dalla

s d

ete

ctiv

es in

the L

ibb

y o

f the T

rad

e

$a$

en

d is th

e lu

nch

eon

em

s a

lso h

ad

esp

ies o

f them

ph

oto

grap

hs

otenbar of p

oi*

who r

esem

ble

d s

om

e of

those la

, the phalm

eraphs

ware ple,s4 vendee s

urveilla

nce a

t the T

rad

e ][a

rt."

TM

dim

in D

an

es g

ee. t

he k

cal S

wot Service represents-

giro the ewe of a pom

iblly dangerous individual in the Dallas area

ek

e w

oe in

veseir

stid

, It id

ea a

dvis

ed

the Sweet S

ervic

e o

f the c

irca-

letlein on Were dyer ill et a hated1411 onandy

critic

al o

f Presid

en

t

gan

ked

y,"

amn

ia ha ah

oolor ill Of

Is* ooport, S

hortly

befo

re,

'ha D

'of P

OO

himi-41104stisi w

est WI* l'4 , vviLso that the handbill

had

own

* on th

e sWoriss o

f I

mo.

Ush

er the D

alla

s p

olic

e n

or

the I'M

bed in

it learned the *oat* o

f the h

an

db

ill.' No o

ne e

lse w

as

iden

tified

to th

e *

Oat S

ervic

e th

ron

gs lo

cal in

qu

iry a

s p

ote

ntia

lly

+444

1 "1401

k, *be

fit

t 4 sievotop

arty ad

ditio

nal in

form

atio

n b

etw

een

Ifooresm

dsg

t $01, O

we to

mm

tteio

loft Itta

ak

ingto

n, a

nd

Novem

ber 2

2. T

he

od

tV

o* O

st ;

roi r o

ttigeo

. . wean

maintained by the Secret Service

et 414 Im

emoo6T

ialtitire, ir, ohuling a d

eta

iled

deoorip

tion

of

the "noir" 41410 en Les lbkrior O

swald axed the m

iaow w

hy his

moue had suit h

ew faeu

ished

to the *gess A

metos, tt d

imm

ed in

chapter V

III. k

itopoop

iat UP ,

k•Ukpixnagrit 111firria*

tNeos,z.z*tellit s i>ilt to

Dalla

s w

as to

sp

eak

ei • em

em

thess g

iven

4-5

oin

issok

e3.

"*3 A

mad

ora. T

he W

hite

Hou

se

wed

,÷orgessoest

*M

fg

.sr' f‘e

i the P

resid

em

wou

ld a

rriv

e

essay., 4ffitoete from D

ella? 4 ee e•i••; ,i crams a inet/at*.oie

throu

gh

the

sou xerewe area

of M

ah

e to

ow

!mo...,-latom

i site should b

e a

rran

ged

;

an

al O

at fo

llow

ing th

e lo

w- h

olm

N

esiden

t wou

ld retu

rn to th

e

airport b

y the m

ost nin

es route

Aevaed

irig

ty, it w

as im

porta

nt to

aetermine Y

AW

sueunevu pity could be established at the site and the m

otorcade route selected. O

n Novem

ber 4, Gerald A

. Behn, agent in charge of the W

hite House

detail, asked Sorrels to examine three potential sites for the luncheon."

One building, M

arket Hall, w

as unavailable for Novem

ber 22. The

second, the Wom

en's Building at the State F

air Grounds, w

as a one-story b

uild

ing w

ith few

entran

ces and

easy to mak

e secure, b

ut it

lacked necessary food-handling facilities and had certain unattractive

features, including a low ceiling w

ith exposed conduits and beams.

The third possibility, the T

rade Mart, a handsom

e new building w

ith

all the n

ecessary facilities, presen

ted secu

rity prob

lems. It h

ad

numerous entrances, several tiers of balconies surrounding the central

court where the luncheon w

ould be held, and several catwalks crossing

the court at each level. On N

ovember 4, Sorrels told B

ehn he believed security difficulties at the T

rade Mart could be overcom

e by special

precau

tions."

Law

son also evalu

ated th

e security h

azards at th

e

Trad

e Mart on

Novem

ber 18"

Ken

neth

O'D

onn

ell mad

e the fin

al

decision to hold the luncheon at the Trade M

art; Behn so notified

Law

son on Novem

ber 14." O

nce the Trade M

art had been selected, Sorrels and Law

son worked

out detailed arrangements for security at the building. In addition to

the reventive measures already m

entioned, they provided for con-

trol/mg access to the building, closing off and policing areas around

it, unstring the roof and insuring the presence of numerous police offi-

cers inside and around the building. Ultim

ately more than 200 law

enforounent officers, mainly D

allas police but including 8 Secret Serv-

ice w

ets, w

ere deployed in and around the Trade M

art."

The M

otorcade Route

Osa N

ovember 8, w

hen Law

son was briefed on the itinerary for the

trip to D

alla

s, h

e was told

that 45 m

inu

tes had

been

allotted for a

osotoreade procession from L

ove Field to the luncheon site." L

awson

was not specifically instructed to select the parade route, but he under-

stood th

at this w

as one of h

is fun

ctions."

Even

before th

e Trad

e

Mars had been definitely selected, L

awson and Sorrels began to con-

eider the best m

otorcade route from L

ove Field to the T

rade Mart..

On N

ovember 14, L

awson and Sorrels attended a m

eeting at Love

Field and on their return to D

allas drove over the route which Sorrels

believed best. suited for the proposed motorcade." T

his route, eventu-ally selected for the m

otorcade from the airport to the T

rade Mart,

measured 10 m

iles and could be driven easily within the allotted 45

min

utes."

From

Love F

ield th

e route p

assed th

rough

a portion

of

suburban Dallas, through the dow

ntown area along M

ein Street and

then to the Trade M

art via Stemm

ons Freew

ay. For the P

resident's

return to Love F

ield following the luncheon, the agents selected the

Duos direct route, w

hich was approxim

ately 4 miles."

A flee the selection of the T

rade Mart as the luncheon site, L

awson

and Sorrels met w

ith Dallas C

hief of Police Jesse E

. Curry, A

ssistant

81